file made using scans of public domain works at the university of georgia.) an inquiry into the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation by thorstein veblen new york b.w. huebsch _all rights reserved_ copyright, . by the macmillan company. published april, : reprinted august, . new edition published by b.w. huebsch. january, . preface it is now some years since kant wrote the essay, _zum ewigen frieden_. many things have happened since then, although the peace to which he looked forward with a doubtful hope has not been among them. but many things have happened which the great critical philosopher, and no less critical spectator of human events, would have seen with interest. to kant the quest of an enduring peace presented itself as an intrinsic human duty, rather than as a promising enterprise. yet through all his analysis of its premises and of the terms on which it may be realised there runs a tenacious persuasion that, in the end, the régime of peace at large will be installed. not as a deliberate achievement of human wisdom, so much as a work of nature the designer of things--_natura daedala rerum_. to any attentive reader of kant's memorable essay it will be apparent that the title of the following inquiry--on the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation--is a descriptive translation of the caption under which he wrote. that such should be the case will not, it is hoped, be accounted either an unseemly presumption or an undue inclination to work under a borrowed light. the aim and compass of any disinterested inquiry in these premises is still the same as it was in kant's time; such, indeed, as he in great part made it,--viz., a systematic knowledge of things as they are. nor is the light of kant's leading to be dispensed with as touches the ways and means of systematic knowledge, wherever the human realities are in question. meantime, many things have also changed since the date of kant's essay. among other changes are those that affect the direction of inquiry and the terms of systematic formulation. _natura daedala rerum_ is no longer allowed to go on her own recognizances, without divulging the ways and means of her workmanship. and it is such a line of extension that is here attempted, into a field of inquiry which in kant's time still lay over the horizon of the future. the quest of perpetual peace at large is no less a paramount and intrinsic human duty today than it was, nor is it at all certain that its final accomplishment is nearer. but the question of its pursuit and of the conditions to be met in seeking this goal lies in a different shape today; and it is this question that concerns the inquiry which is here undertaken,--what are the terms on which peace at large may hopefully be installed and maintained? what, if anything, is there in the present situation that visibly makes for a realisation of these necessary terms within the calculable future? and what are the consequences presumably due to follow in the nearer future from the installation of such a peace at large? and the answer to these questions is here sought not in terms of what ought dutifully to be done toward the desired consummation, but rather in terms of those known factors of human behaviour that can be shown by analysis of experience to control the conduct of nations in conjunctures of this kind. february contents chapter i introductory: on the state and its relation to war and peace the inquiry is not concerned with the intrinsic merits of peace or war, . --but with the nature, causes and consequences of the preconceptions favoring peace or war, . --a breach of the peace is an act of the government, or state, . --patriotism is indispensable to furtherance of warlike enterprise, . --all the peoples of christendom are sufficiently patriotic, . --peace established by the state, an armistice--the state is an instrumentality for making peace, not for perpetuating it, . --the governmental establishments and their powers in all the christian nations are derived from the feudal establishments of the middle ages, . --still retain the right of coercively controlling the actions of their citizens, . --contrast of icelandic commonwealth, . --the statecraft of the past half century has been one of competitive preparedness, . --prussianised germany has forced the pace in this competitive preparedness, . --an avowedly predatory enterprise no longer meets with approval, . --when a warlike enterprise has been entered upon, it will have the support of popular sentiment even if it is an aggressive war, . --the moral indignation of both parties to the quarrel is to be taken for granted, . --the spiritual forces of any christian nation may be mobilised for war by either of two pleas: ( ) the preservation or furtherance of the community's material interests, real or fancied, and ( ) vindication of the national honour; as perhaps also perpetuation of the national "culture," . chapter ii on the nature and uses of patriotism the nature of patriotism, . --is a spirit of emulation, . --must seem moral, if only to a biased populace, . --the common man is sufficiently patriotic but is hampered with a sense of right and honest dealing, . --patriotism is at cross purposes with modern life, . --is an hereditary trait? . --variety of racial stocks in europe, . --patriotism a ubiquitous trait, . --patriotism disserviceable, yet men hold to it, . --cultural evolution of europeans, . --growth of a sense of group solidarity, . --material interests of group falling into abeyance as class divisions have grown up, until prestige remains virtually the sole community interest, . --based upon warlike prowess, physical magnitude and pecuniary traffic of country, . --interests of the master class are at cross purposes with the fortunes of the common man, . --value of superiors is a "prestige value," . --the material benefits which this ruling class contribute are: defense against aggression, and promotion of the community's material gain, . --the common defense is a remedy for evils due to the patriotic spirit, . --the common defense the usual blind behind which events are put in train for eventual hostilities, . --all the nations of warring europe convinced that they are fighting a defensive war, . --which usually takes the form of a defense of the national honour, . --material welfare is of interest to the dynastic statesman only as it conduces to political success, . --the policy of national economic self-sufficiency, . --the chief material use of patriotism is its use to a limited number of persons in their quest of private gain, . --and has the effect of dividing the nations on lines of rivalry, . chapter iii on the conditions of a lasting peace the patriotic spirit of modern peoples is the abiding source of contention among nations, . --hence any calculus of the chances of peace will be a reckoning of forces which may be counted on to keep a patriotic nation in an unstable equilibrium of peace, . --the question of peace and war at large is a question of peace and war among the powers, which are of two contrasted kinds: those which may safely be counted on spontaneously to take the offensive and those which will fight on provocation, . --war not a question of equity but of opportunity, . --the imperial designs of germany and japan as the prospective cause of war, . --peace can be maintained in two ways: submission to their dominion, or elimination of these two powers; no middle course open, . --frame of mind of states; men and popular sentiment in a dynastic state, . --information, persuasion and reflection will not subdue national animosities and jealousies; peoples of europe are racially homogeneous along lines of climatic latitude, . --but loyalty is a matter of habituation, . --derivation and current state of german nationalism, . --contrasted with the animus of the citizens of a commonwealth, ;--a neutral peace-compact may be practicable in the absence of germany and japan, but it has no chance in their presence, . --the national life of germany: the intellectuals, . --summary of chapter, . chapter iv peace without honour submission to the imperial power one of the conditions precedent to a peaceful settlement, . --character of the projected tutelage, . --life under the _pax germanica_ contrasted with the ottoman and russian rule, . --china and biological and cultural success, . --difficulty of non-resistant subjection is of a psychological order, . --patriotism of the bellicose kind is of the nature of habit, . --and men may divest themselves of it, . --a decay of the bellicose national spirit must be of the negative order, the disuse of the discipline out of which it has arisen, . --submission to imperial authorities necessitates abeyance of national pride among the other peoples, . --pecuniary merits of the projected imperial dominion, . --pecuniary class distinctions in the commonwealths and the pecuniary burden on the common man, . --material conditions of life for the common man under the modern rule of big business, . --the competitive régime, "what the traffic will bear," and the life and labor of the common man, . --industrial sabotage by businessmen, . --contrasted with the imperial usufruct and its material advantages to the common man, . chapter v peace and neutrality personal liberty, not creature comforts, the ulterior springs of action of the common man of the democratic nations, . --no change of spiritual state to be looked for in the life-time of the oncoming generation, . --the dynastic spirit among the peoples of the empire will, under the discipline of modern economic conditions, fall into decay, . --contrast of class divisions in germany and england, . --national establishments are dependent for their continuance upon preparation for hostilities, . --the time required for the people of the dynastic states to unlearn their preconceptions will be longer than the interval required for a new onset, . --there can be no neutral course between peace by unconditional surrender and submission or peace by the elimination of imperial germany and japan, . --peace by submission not practicable for the modern nations, . --neutralisation of citizenship, . --spontaneous move in that direction not to be looked for, . --its chances of success, . --the course of events in america, . chapter vi elimination of the unfit a league of neutrals, its outline, . --need of security from aggression of imperial germany, . --inclusion of the imperial states in the league, . --necessity of elimination of imperial military clique, . --necessity of intermeddling in internal affairs of germany even if not acceptable to the german people, . --probability of pacific nations taking measures to insure peace, - . --the british gentleman and his control of the english government, . --the shifting of control out of the hands of the gentleman into those of the underbred common man, . --the war situation and its probable effect on popular habits of thought in england, . --the course of such events and their bearing on the chances of a workable pacific league, . --conditions precedent to a successful pacific league of neutrals, . --colonial possessions, . --neutralisation of trade relations, . --futility of economic boycott, . --the terms of settlement, . --the effect of the war and the chances of the british people being able to meet the exigencies of peace, . --summary of the terms of settlement, . --constitutional monarchies and the british gentlemanly government, . --the american national establishment, a government by businessmen, and its economic policy, . --america and the league, . chapter vii peace and the price system the different conceptions of peace, . --psychological effects of the war, . --the handicraft system and the machine industry, and their psychological effect on political preconceptions, . --the machine technology and the decay of patriotic loyalty, . --summary, . --ownership and the right of contract, . --standardised under handicraft system, . --ownership and the machine industry. . --business control and sabotage, . --governments of pacific nations controlled by privileged classes, . --effect of peace on the economic situation, . --economic aspects of a régime of peace, especially as related to the development of classes, . --the analogy of the victorian peace, . --the case of the american farmer, . --the leisure class, . --the rising standard of living, . --culture, . --the eventual cleavage of classes, those who own and those who do not, . --conditioned by peace at large, . --necessary conditions of a lasting peace, . an inquiry into the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation on the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation chapter i introductory: on the state and its relation to war and peace to many thoughtful men ripe in worldly wisdom it is known of a verity that war belongs indefeasibly in the order of nature. contention, with manslaughter, is indispensable in human intercourse, at the same time that it conduces to the increase and diffusion of the manly virtues. so likewise, the unspoiled youth of the race, in the period of adolescence and aspiring manhood, also commonly share this gift of insight and back it with a generous commendation of all the martial qualities; and women of nubile age and no undue maturity gladly meet them half way. on the other hand, the mothers of the people are commonly unable to see the use of it all. it seems a waste of dear-bought human life, with a large sum of nothing to show for it. so also many men of an elderly turn, prematurely or otherwise, are ready to lend their countenance to the like disparaging appraisal; it may be that the spirit of prowess in them runs at too low a tension, or they may have outlived the more vivid appreciation of the spiritual values involved. there are many, also, with a turn for exhortation, who find employment for their best faculties in attesting the well-known atrocities and futility of war. indeed, not infrequently such advocates of peace will devote their otherwise idle powers to this work of exhortation without stipend or subsidy. and they uniformly make good their contention that the currently accepted conception of the nature of war--general sherman's formula--is substantially correct. all the while it is to be admitted that all this axiomatic exhortation has no visible effect on the course of events or on the popular temper touching warlike enterprise. indeed, no equal volume of speech can be more incontrovertible or less convincing than the utterances of the peace advocates, whether subsidised or not. "war is bloodier than peace." this would doubtless be conceded without argument, but also without prejudice. hitherto the pacifists' quest of a basis for enduring peace, it must be admitted, has brought home nothing tangible--with the qualification, of course, that the subsidised pacifists have come in for the subsidy. so that, after searching the recesses of their imagination, able-bodied pacifists whose loquacity has never been at fault hitherto have been brought to ask: "what shall we say?" * * * * * under these circumstances it will not be out of place to inquire into the nature of this peace about which swings this wide orbit of opinion and argument. at the most, such an inquiry can be no more gratuitous and no more nugatory than the controversies that provoke it. the intrinsic merits of peace at large, as against those of warlike enterprise, it should be said, do not here come in question. that question lies in the domain of preconceived opinion, so that for the purposes of this inquiry it will have no significance except as a matter to be inquired into; the main point of the inquiry being the nature, causes and consequences of such a preconception favoring peace, and the circumstances that make for a contrary preconception in favor of war. by and large, any breach of the peace in modern times is an official act and can be taken only on initiative of the governmental establishment, the state. the national authorities may, of course, be driven to take such a step by pressure of warlike popular sentiment. such, e.g., is presumed to have been the case in the united states' attack on spain during the mckinley administration; but the more that comes to light of the intimate history of that episode, the more evident does it become that the popular war sentiment to which the administration yielded had been somewhat sedulously "mobilised" with a view to such yielding and such a breach. so also in the case of the boer war, the move was made under sanction of a popular war spirit, which, again, did not come to a head without shrewd surveillance and direction. and so again in the current european war, in the case, e.g., of germany, where the initiative was taken, the state plainly had the full support of popular sentiment, and may even be said to have precipitated the war in response to this urgent popular aspiration; and here again it is a matter of notoriety that the popular sentiment had long been sedulously nursed and "mobilised" to that effect, so that the populace was assiduously kept in spiritual readiness for such an event. the like is less evident as regards the united kingdom, and perhaps also as regards the other allies. and such appears to have been the common run of the facts as regards all the greater wars of the last one hundred years,--what may be called the "public" wars of this modern era, as contrasted with the "private" or administrative wars which have been carried on in a corner by one and another of the great powers against hapless barbarians, from time to time, in the course of administrative routine. it is also evident from the run of the facts as exemplified in these modern wars that while any breach of the peace takes place only on the initiative and at the discretion of the government, or state,[ ] it is always requisite in furtherance of such warlike enterprise to cherish and eventually to mobilise popular sentiment in support of any warlike move. due fomentation of a warlike animus is indispensable to the procuring and maintenance of a suitable equipment with which eventually to break the peace, as well as to ensure a diligent prosecution of such enterprise when once it has been undertaken. such a spirit of militant patriotism as may serviceably be mobilised in support of warlike enterprise has accordingly been a condition precedent to any people's entry into the modern concert of nations. this concert of nations is a concert of powers, and it is only as a power that any nation plays its part in the concert, all the while that "power" here means eventual warlike force. [footnote : a modern nation constitutes a state only in respect of or with ulterior bearing on the question of international peace or war.] such a people as the chinese, e.g., not pervaded with an adequate patriotic spirit, comes into the concert of nations not as a power but as a bone of contention. not that the chinese fall short in any of the qualities that conduce to efficiency and welfare in time of peace, but they appear, in effect, to lack that certain "solidarity of prowess" by virtue of which they should choose to be (collectively) formidable rather than (individually) fortunate and upright; and the modern civilised nations are not in a position, nor in a frame of mind, to tolerate a neighbor whose only claim on their consideration falls under the category of peace on earth and good-will among men. china appears hitherto not to have been a serviceable people for warlike ends, except in so far as the resources of that country have been taken over and converted to warlike uses by some alien power working to its own ends. such have been the several alien dynasties that have seized upon that country from time to time and have achieved dominion by usufruct of its unwarlike forces. such has been the nature of the manchu empire of the recent past, and such is the evident purpose of the prospective japanese usufruct of the same country and its populace. meantime the chinese people appear to be incorrigibly peaceable, being scarcely willing to fight in any concerted fashion even when driven into a corner by unprovoked aggression, as in the present juncture. such a people is very exceptional. among civilised nations there are, broadly speaking, none of that temper, with the sole exception of the chinese,--if the chinese are properly to be spoken of as a nation. modern warfare makes such large and direct use of the industrial arts, and depends for its successful prosecution so largely on a voluminous and unremitting supply of civilian services and wrought goods, that any inoffensive and industrious people, such as the chinese, could doubtless now be turned to good account by any warlike power that might have the disposal of their working forces. to make their industrial efficiency count in this way toward warlike enterprise and imperial dominion, the usufruct of any such inoffensive and unpatriotic populace would have to fall into the hands of an alien governmental establishment. and no alien government resting on the support of a home population trained in the habits of democracy or given over to ideals of common honesty in national concerns could hopefully undertake the enterprise. this work of empire-building out of unwarlike materials could apparently be carried out only by some alien power hampered by no reserve of scruple, and backed by a servile populace of its own, imbued with an impeccable loyalty to its masters and with a suitably bellicose temper, as, e.g., imperial japan or imperial germany. however, for the commonplace national enterprise the common run will do very well. any populace imbued with a reasonable measure of patriotism will serve as ways and means to warlike enterprise under competent management, even if it is not habitually prone to a bellicose temper. rightly managed, ordinary patriotic sentiment may readily be mobilised for warlike adventure by any reasonably adroit and single-minded body of statesmen,--of which there is abundant illustration. all the peoples of christendom are possessed of a sufficiently alert sense of nationality, and by tradition and current usage all the national governments of christendom are warlike establishments, at least in the defensive sense; and the distinction between the defensive and the offensive in international intrigue is a technical matter that offers no great difficulty. none of these nations is of such an incorrigibly peaceable temper that they can be counted on to keep the peace consistently in the ordinary course of events. peace established by the state, or resting in the discretion of the state, is necessarily of the nature of an armistice, in effect terminable at will and on short notice. it is maintained only on conditions, stipulated by express convention or established by custom, and there is always the reservation, tacit or explicit, that recourse will be had to arms in case the "national interests" or the punctilios of international etiquette are traversed by the act or defection of any rival government or its subjects. the more nationally-minded the government or its subject populace, the readier the response to the call of any such opportunity for an unfolding of prowess. the most peaceable governmental policy of which christendom has experience is a policy of "watchful waiting," with a jealous eye to the emergence of any occasion for national resentment; and the most irretrievably shameful dereliction of duty on the part of any civilised government would be its eventual insensibility to the appeal of a "just war." under any governmental auspices, as the modern world knows governments, the keeping of the peace comes at its best under the precept, "speak softly and carry a big stick." but the case for peace is more precarious than the wording of the aphorism would indicate, in as much as in practical fact the "big stick" is an obstacle to soft speech. evidently, in the light of recent history, if the peace is to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management,--in spite of the state rather than by its good offices. at the best, the state, or the government, is an instrumentality for making peace, not for perpetuating it. * * * * * anyone who is interested in the nature and derivation of governmental institutions and establishments in europe, in any but the formal respect, should be able to satisfy his curiosity by looking over the shoulders of the professed students of political science. quite properly and profitably that branch of scholarship is occupied with the authentic pedigree of these institutions, and with the documentary instruments in the case; since political science is, after all, a branch of theoretical jurisprudence and is concerned about a formally competent analysis of the recorded legal powers. the material circumstances from which these institutions once took their beginning, and the exigencies which have governed the rate and direction of their later growth and mutation, as well as the _de facto_ bearing of the institutional scheme on the material welfare or the cultural fortunes of the given community,--while all these matters of fact may be germane to the speculations of political theory, they are not intrinsic to its premises, to the logical sequence of its inquiry, or to its theoretical findings. the like is also true, of course, as regards that system of habits of thought, that current frame of mind, in which any given institutional scheme necessarily is grounded, and without the continued support of which any given scheme of governmental institutions or policy would become nugatory and so would pass into the province of legal fiction. all these are not idle matters in the purview of the student of political science, but they remain after all substantially extraneous to the structure of political theory; and in so far as matters of this class are to be brought into the case at all, the specialists in the field can not fairly be expected to contribute anything beyond an occasional _obiter dictum_. there can be no discourteous presumption, therefore, in accepting the general theorems of current political theory without prejudice, and looking past the received theoretical formulations for a view of the substantial grounds on which the governmental establishments have grown into shape, and the circumstances, material and spiritual, that surround their continued working and effect. by lineal descent the governmental establishments and the powers with which they are vested, in all the christian nations, are derived from the feudal establishments of the middle ages; which, in turn, are of a predatory origin and of an irresponsible character.[ ] in nearly all instances, but more particularly among the nations that are accounted characteristically modern, the existing establishments have been greatly altered from the mediaeval pattern, by concessive adaptation to later exigencies or by a more or less revolutionary innovation. the degree of their modernity is (conventionally) measured, roughly, by the degree in which they have departed from the mediaeval pattern. wherever the unavoidable concessions have been shrewdly made with a view to conserving the autonomy and irresponsibility of the governmental establishment, or the "state," and where the state of national sentiment has been led to favor this work of conservation, as, e.g., in the case of austria, spain or prussia, there the modern outcome has been what may be called a dynastic state. where, on the other hand, the run of national sentiment has departed notably from the ancient holding ground of loyal abnegation, and has enforced a measure of revolutionary innovation, as in the case of france or of the english-speaking peoples, there the modern outcome has been an (ostensibly) democratic commonwealth of ungraded citizens. but the contrast so indicated is a contrast of divergent variants rather than of opposites. these two type-forms may be taken as the extreme and inclusive limits of variation among the governmental establishments with which the modern world is furnished.[ ] [footnote : the partial and dubious exception of the scandinavian countries or of switzerland need raise no question on this head.] [footnote : cf., e.g., eduard meyer, _england: its political organisation and development_. ch. ii.] the effectual difference between these two theoretically contrasted types of governmental establishments is doubtless grave enough, and for many purposes it is consequential, but it is after all not of such a nature as need greatly detain the argument at this point. the two differ less, in effect, in that range of their functioning which comes in question here than in their bearing on the community's fortunes apart from questions of war and peace. in all cases there stand over in this bearing certain primary characteristics of the ancient régime, which all these modern establishments have in common, though not all in an equal degree of preservation and effectiveness. they are, e.g., all vested with certain attributes of "sovereignty." in all cases the citizen still proves on closer attention to be in some measure a "subject" of the state, in that he is invariably conceived to owe a "duty" to the constituted authorities in one respect and another. all civilised governments take cognizance of treason, sedition, and the like; and all good citizens are not only content but profoundly insistent on the clear duty of the citizen on this head. the bias of loyalty is not a matter on which argument is tolerated. by virtue of this bias of loyalty, or "civic duty"--which still has much of the color of feudal allegiance--the governmental establishment is within its rights in coercively controlling and directing the actions of the citizen, or subject, in those respects that so lie within his duty; as also in authoritatively turning his abilities to account for the purposes that so lie within the governmental discretion, as, e.g., the common defense. these rights and powers still remain to the governmental establishment even at the widest democratic departure from that ancient pattern of masterful tutelage and usufruct that marked the old-fashioned patrimonial state,--and that still marks the better preserved ones among its modern derivatives. and so intrinsic to these governmental establishments are these discretionary powers, and by so unfailing a popular bias are they still accounted a matter of course and of axiomatic necessity, that they have invariably been retained also among the attributes of those democratic governments that trace their origin to a revolutionary break with the old order. to many, all this will seem a pedantic taking note of commonplaces,--as if it were worth while remarking that the existing governments are vested with the indispensable attributes of government. yet history records an instance at variance with this axiomatic rule, a rule which is held to be an unavoidable deliverance of common sense. and it is by no means an altogether unique instance. it may serve to show that these characteristic and unimpeachable powers that invest all current governmental establishments are, after all, to be rated as the marks of a particular species of governments, and not characteristics of the genus of governmental establishments at large. these powers answer to an acquired bias, not to an underlying trait of human nature; a matter of habit, not of heredity. such an historical instance is the so-called republic, or commonwealth, of iceland--tenth to thirteenth centuries. its case is looked on by students of history as a spectacular anomaly, because it admitted none of these primary powers of government in its constituted authorities. and yet, for contrast with these matter-of-course preconceptions of these students of history, it is well to note that in the deliberations of those ancients who installed the republic for the management of their joint concerns, any inclusion of such powers in its competency appears never to have been contemplated, not even to the extent of its being rejected. this singularity--as it would be rated by modern statesmen and students--was in no degree a new departure in state-making on the part of the founders of the republic. they had no knowledge of such powers, duties and accountabilities, except as unwholesome features of a novel and alien scheme of irresponsible oppression that was sought to be imposed on them by harald fairhair, and which they incontinently made it their chief and immediate business to evade. they also set up no joint or collective establishment with powers for the common defense, nor does it appear that such a notion had occurred to them. in the history of its installation there is no hint that the men who set up this icelandic commonwealth had any sense of the need, or even of the feasibility, of such a coercive government as would be involved in concerted preparation for the common defense. subjection to personal rule, or to official rule in any degree of attenuation, was not comprised in their traditional experience of citizenship; and it was necessarily out of the elements comprised in this traditional experience that the new structure would have to be built up. the new commonwealth was necessarily erected on the premises afforded by the received scheme of use and wont; and this received scheme had come down out of pre-feudal conditions, without having passed under the discipline of that régime of coercion which the feudal system had imposed on the rest of europe, and so had established as an "immemorial usage" and a "second nature" among the populations of christendom. the resulting character of the icelandic commonwealth is sufficiently striking when contrasted with the case of the english commonwealth of the seventeenth century, or the later french and american republics. these, all and several, came out of a protracted experience in feudalistic state-making and state policy; and the common defense--frequently on the offensive--with its necessary coercive machinery and its submissive loyalty, consequently would take the central place in the resulting civic structure. to close the tale of the icelandic commonwealth it may be added that their republic of insubordinate citizens presently fell into default, systematic misuse, under the disorders brought on by an accumulation of wealth, and that it died of legal fiction and constitutional formalities after some experience at the hands of able and ambitious statesmen in contact with an alien government drawn on the coercive plan. the clay vessel failed to make good among the iron pots, and so proved its unfitness to survive in the world of christian nations,--very much as the chinese are today at the mercy of the defensive rapacity of the powers. and the mercy that we gave them was to sink them in the sea, down on the coast of high barbarie. no doubt, it will be accepted as an axiomatic certainty that the establishment of a commonwealth after the fashion of the icelandic republic, without coercive authority or provision for the common defense, and without a sense of subordination or collective responsibility among its citizens, would be out of all question under existing circumstances of politics and international trade. nor would such a commonwealth be workable on the scale and at the pace imposed by modern industrial and commercial conditions, even apart from international jealousy and ambitions, provided the sacred rights of ownership were to be maintained in something like their current shape. and yet something of a drift of popular sentiment, and indeed something of deliberate endeavour, setting in the direction of such a harmless and helpless national organisation is always visible in western europe, throughout modern times; particularly through the eighteenth and the early half of the nineteenth centuries; and more particularly among the english-speaking peoples and, with a difference, among the french. the dutch and the scandinavian countries answer more doubtfully to the same characterisation. the movement in question is known to history as the liberal, rationalistic, humanitarian, or individualistic departure. its ideal, when formulated, is spoken of as the system of natural rights; and its goal in the way of a national establishment has been well characterised by its critics as the police state, or the night-watchman state. the gains made in this direction, or perhaps better the inroads of this animus in national ideals, are plainly to be set down as a shift in the direction of peace and amity; but it is also plain that the shift of ground so initiated by this strain of sentiment has never reached a conclusion and never has taken effect in anything like an effectual working arrangement. its practical consequences have been of the nature of abatement and defection in the pursuit of national ambitions and dynastic enterprise, rather than a creative work of installing any institutional furniture suitable to its own ends. it has in effect gone no farther than what would be called an incipient correction of abuses. the highest rise, as well as the decline, of this movement lie within the nineteenth century. in point of time, the decay of this amiable conceit of _laissez-faire_ in national policy coincides with the period of great advance in the technology of transport and communication in the nineteenth century. perhaps, on a larger outlook, it should rather be said that the run of national ambitions and animosities had, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, suffered a degree of decay through the diffusion of this sentimental predilection for natural liberty, and that this decline of the manlier aspirations was then arrested and corrected by help of these improvements in the technological situation; which enabled a closer and more coercive control to be exercised over larger areas, and at the same time enabled a more massive aggregate of warlike force to strike more effectively at a greater distance. this whole episode of the rise and decline of _laissez-faire_ in modern history is perhaps best to be conceived as a transient weakening of nationalism, by neglect; rather than anything like the growth of a new and more humane ideal of national intercourse. such would be the appraisal to be had at the hands of those who speak for a strenuous national life and for the arbitrament of sportsmanlike contention in human affairs. and the latterday growth of more militant aspirations, together with the more settled and sedulous attention to a development of control and of formidable armaments, such as followed on through the latter half of the nineteenth century, would then be rated as a resumption of those older aims and ideals that had been falling somewhat into abeyance in the slack-water days of liberalism. there is much to be said for this latter view; and, indeed, much has been said for it, particularly by the spokesmen of imperialist politics. this bias of natural liberty has been associated in history with the english-speaking peoples, more intimately and more extensively than with any other. not that this amiable conceit is in any peculiar degree a race characteristic of this group of peoples; nor even that the history of its rise and decline runs wholly within the linguistic frontiers indicated by this characterisation. the french and the dutch have borne their share, and at an earlier day italian sentiment and speculation lent its impulsion to the same genial drift of faith and aspiration. but, by historical accident, its center of gravity and of diffusion has lain with the english-speaking communities during the period when this bias made history and left its impress on the institutional scheme of the western civilisation. by grace of what may, for the present purpose, be called historical accident, it happens that the interval of history during which the bias of natural liberty made visible headway was also a period during which these english-speaking peoples, among whom its effects are chiefly visible, were relatively secure from international disturbance, by force of inaccessibility. little strain was put upon their sense of national solidarity or national prowess; so little, indeed, that there was some danger of their patriotic animosity falling into decay by disuse; and then they were also busy with other things. peaceable intercourse, it is true, was relatively easy, active and far-reaching--eighteenth and nineteenth centuries--as compared with what had been the case before that time; but warlike intercourse on such a scale as would constitute a substantial menace to any large nation was nearly out of the question, so far as regards the english-speaking peoples. the available means of aggression, as touches the case of these particular communities, were visibly and consciously inadequate as compared with the means of defense. the means of internal or intra-national control or coercion were also less well provided by the state of the arts current at that time than the means of peaceable intercourse. these means of transport and communication were, at that stage of their development, less well suited for the purposes of far-reaching warlike strategy and the exercise of surveillance and coercion over large spaces than for the purposes of peaceable traffic. but the continued improvement in the means of communication during the nineteenth century presently upset that situation, and so presently began to neutralise the geographical quarantine which had hedged about these communities that were inclined to let well enough alone. the increasing speed and accuracy of movement in shipping, due to the successful introduction of steam, as well as the concomitant increasing size of the units of equipment, all runs to this effect and presently sets at naught the peace barriers of sea and weather. so also the development of railways and their increasing availability for strategic uses, together with the far-reaching coordination of movement made possible by their means and by the telegraph; all of which is further facilitated by the increasing mass and density of population. improvements in the technology of arms and armament worked to the like effect, of setting the peace of any community on an increasingly precarious footing, through the advantage which this new technology gave to a ready equipment and a rapid mobilisation. the new state of the industrial arts serviceable for warlike enterprise put an increasingly heavy premium on readiness for offense or defense, but more particularly it all worked increasingly to the advantage of the offensive. it put the fabian strategy out of date, and led to the doctrine of a defensive offense. gradually it came true, with the continued advance in those industrial arts that lend themselves to strategic uses, and it came also to be realised, that no corner of the earth was any longer secure by mere favor of distance and natural difficulty, from eventual aggression at the hands of any provident and adventurous assailant,--even by help of a modicum of defensive precaution. the fear of aggression then came definitively to take the place of international good-will and became the chief motive in public policy, so fast and so far as the state of the industrial arts continued to incline the balance of advantage to the side of the aggressor. all of which served greatly to strengthen the hands of those statesmen who, by interest or temperament, were inclined to imperialistic enterprise. since that period all armament has conventionally been accounted defensive, and all statesmen have professed that the common defense is their chief concern. professedly all armament has been designed to keep the peace; so much of a shadow of the peaceable bias there still stands over. throughout this latest phase of modern civilisation the avowed fear of aggression has served as apology, possibly as provocation in fact, to national armaments; and throughout the same period any analysis of the situation will finally run the chain of fear back to prussia as the putative or actual, center of disturbance and apprehension. no doubt, prussian armament has taken the lead and forced the pace among the nations of christendom; but the prussian policy, too, has been diligently covered with the same decorous plea of needful provision for the common defense and an unremitting solicitude for international peace,--to which has been added the canny afterthought of the "defensive offense." it is characteristic of this era of armed peace that in all these extensive preparations for breaking the peace any formal avowal of other than a defensive purpose has at all times been avoided as an insufferable breach of diplomatic decorum. it is likewise characteristic of the same era that armaments have unremittingly been increased, beyond anything previously known; and that all men have known all the while that the inevitable outcome of this avowedly defensive armament must eventually be war on an unprecedented scale and of unexampled ferocity. it would be neither charitable nor otherwise to the point to call attention to the reflection which this state of the case throws on the collective sagacity or the good faith of the statesmen who have had the management of affairs. it is not practicable to imagine how such an outcome as the present could have been brought about by any degree of stupidity or incapacity alone, nor is it easier to find evidence that the utmost sagacity of the statecraft engaged has had the slightest mitigating effect on the evil consummation to which the whole case has been brought. it has long been a commonplace among observers of public events that these professedly defensive warlike preparations have in effect been preparations for breaking the peace; against which, at least ostensibly, a remedy had been sought in the preparation of still heavier armaments, with full realisation that more armament would unfailingly entail a more unsparing and more disastrous war,--which sums up the statecraft of the past half century. prussia, and afterwards prussianised germany, has come in for the distinction of taking the lead and forcing the pace in this competitive preparation--or "preparedness"--for war in time of peace. that such has been the case appears in good part to be something of a fortuitous circumstance. the season of enterprising force and fraud to which that country owes its induction into the concert of nations is an episode of recent history; so recent, indeed, that the german nation has not yet had time to live it down and let it be forgotten; and the imperial state is consequently burdened with an irritably uneasy sense of odium and an established reputation for unduly bad faith. from which it has followed, among other things, that the statesmen of the empire have lived in the expectation of having their unforgotten derelictions brought home, and so have, on the one hand, found themselves unable to credit any pacific intentions professed by the neighboring powers, while on the other hand they have been unable to gain credence for their own voluble professions of peace and amity. so it has come about that, by a fortuitous conjuncture of scarcely relevant circumstances, prussia and the empire have been thrown into the lead in the race of "preparedness" and have been led assiduously to hasten a breach which they could ill afford. it is, to say the least, extremely doubtful if the event would have been substantially different in the absence of that special provocation to competitive preparedness that has been injected into the situation by this german attitude; but the rate of approach to a warlike climax has doubtless been hastened by the anticipatory policy of preparedness which the prussian dynasty has seen itself constrained to pursue. eventually, the peculiar circumstances of its case--embarrassment at home and distaste and discredit abroad--have induced the imperial state to take the line of a defensive offense, to take war by the forelock and retaliate on presumptive enemies for prospective grievances. but in any case, the progressive improvement in transport and communication, as well as in the special technology of warfare, backed by greatly enhanced facilities for indoctrinating the populace with militant nationalism,--these ways and means, working under the hand of patriotic statesmen must in course of the past century have brought the peace of europe to so precarious a footing as would have provoked a material increase in the equipment for national defense; which would unavoidably have led to competitive armament and an enhanced international distrust and animosity, eventually culminating in hostilities. * * * * * it may well be that the plea of defensive preparation advanced by the statesmen, prussian and others, in apology for competitive armaments is a diplomatic subterfuge,--there are indications that such has commonly been the case; but even if it commonly is visibly disingenuous, the need of making such a plea to cover more sinister designs is itself an evidence that an avowedly predatory enterprise no longer meets with the requisite popular approval. even if an exception to this rule be admitted in the recent attitude of the german people, it is to be recalled that the exception was allowed to stand only transiently, and that presently the avowal of a predatory design in this case was urgently disclaimed in the face of adversity. even those who speak most fluently for the necessity of war, and for its merits as a needed discipline in the manly virtues, are constrained by the prevailing sentiment to deprecate its necessity. yet it is equally evident that when once a warlike enterprise has been entered upon so far as to commit the nation to hostilities, it will have the cordial support of popular sentiment even if it is patently an aggressive war. indeed, it is quite a safe generalisation that when hostilities have once been got fairly under way by the interested statesmen, the patriotic sentiment of the nation may confidently be counted on to back the enterprise irrespective of the merits of the quarrel. but even if the national sentiment is in this way to be counted in as an incidental matter of course, it is also to be kept in mind in this connection that any quarrel so entered upon by any nation will forthwith come to have the moral approval of the community. dissenters will of course be found, sporadically, who do not readily fall in with the prevailing animus; but as a general proposition it will still hold true that any such quarrel forthwith becomes a just quarrel in the eyes of those who have so been committed to it. a corollary following from this general theorem may be worth noting in the same connection. any politician who succeeds in embroiling his country in a war, however nefarious, becomes a popular hero and is reputed a wise and righteous statesman, at least for the time being. illustrative instances need perhaps not, and indeed can not gracefully, be named; most popular heroes and reputed statesmen belong in this class. another corollary, which bears more immediately on the question in hand, follows also from the same general proposition: since the ethical values involved in any given international contest are substantially of the nature of afterthought or accessory, they may safely be left on one side in any endeavour to understand or account for any given outbreak of hostilities. the moral indignation of both parties to the quarrel is to be taken for granted, as being the statesman's chief and necessary ways and means of bringing any warlike enterprise to a head and floating it to a creditable finish. it is a precipitate of the partisan animosity that inspires both parties and holds them to their duty of self-sacrifice and devastation, and at its best it will chiefly serve as a cloak of self-righteousness to extenuate any exceptionally profligate excursions in the conduct of hostilities. any warlike enterprise that is hopefully to be entered on must have the moral sanction of the community, or of an effective majority in the community. it consequently becomes the first concern of the warlike statesman to put this moral force in train for the adventure on which he is bent. and there are two main lines of motivation by which the spiritual forces of any christian nation may so be mobilised for warlike adventure: ( ) the preservation or furtherance of the community's material interests, real or fancied, and ( ) vindication of the national honour. to these should perhaps be added as a third, the advancement and perpetuation of the nation's "culture;" that is to say, of its habitual scheme of use and wont. it is a nice question whether, in practical effect, the aspiration to perpetuate the national culture is consistently to be distinguished from the vindication of the national honour. there is perhaps the distinction to be made that "the perpetuation of the national culture" lends a readier countenance to gratuitous aggression and affords a broader cover for incidental atrocities, since the enemies of the national culture will necessarily be conceived as an inferior and obstructive people, falling beneath the rules of commonplace decorum. those material interests for which modern nations are in the habit of taking to arms are commonly of a fanciful character, in that they commonly have none but an imaginary net value to the community at large. such are, e.g., the national trade or the increase of the national territory. these and the like may serve the warlike or dynastic ambitions of the nation's masters; they may also further the interests of office-holders, and more particularly of certain business houses or businessmen who stand to gain some small advantage by help of the powers in control; but it all signifies nothing more to the common man than an increased bill of governmental expense and a probable increase in the cost of living. that a nation's trade should be carried in vessels owned by its citizens or registered in its ports will doubtless have some sentimental value to the common run of its citizens, as is shown by the fact that disingenuous politicians always find it worth their while to appeal to this chauvinistic predilection. but it patently is all a completely idle question, in point of material advantage, to anyone but the owners of the vessels; and to these owners it is also of no material consequence under what flag their investments sail, except so far as the government in question may afford them some preferential opportunity for gain,--always at the cost of their fellow citizens. the like is equally true as regards the domicile and the national allegiance of the businessmen who buy and sell the country's imports and exports. the common man plainly has no slightest material interest in the nationality or the place of residence of those who conduct this traffic; though all the facts go to say that in some puzzle-headed way the common man commonly persuades himself that it does make some occult sort of difference to him; so that he is commonly willing to pay something substantial toward subsidising businessmen of his own nationality, in the way of a protective tariff and the like. the only material advantage to be derived from such a preferential trade policy arises in the case of international hostilities, in which case the home-owned vessels and merchants may on occasion count toward military readiness; although even in that connection their value is contingent and doubtful. but in this way they may contribute in their degree to a readiness to break off peaceable relations with other countries. it is only for warlike purposes, that is to say for the dynastic ambitions of warlike statesmen, that these preferential contrivances in economic policy have any substantial value; and even in that connection their expediency is always doubtful. they are a source of national jealousy, and they may on occasion become a help to military strategy when this national jealousy eventuates in hostilities. the run of the facts touching this matter of national trade policy is something as follows: at the instance of businessmen who stand to gain by it, and with the cordial support of popular sentiment, the constituted authorities sedulously further the increase of shipping and commerce under protection of the national power. at the same time they spend substance and diplomatic energy in an endeavor to extend the international market facilities open to the country's businessmen, with a view always to a preferential advantage in favor of these businessmen, also with the sentimental support of the common man and at his cost. to safeguard these commercial interests, as well as property-holdings of the nation's citizens in foreign parts, the nation maintains naval, military, consular and diplomatic establishments, at the common expense. the total gains derivable from these commercial and investment interests abroad, under favorable circumstances, will never by any chance equal the cost of the governmental apparatus installed to further and safeguard them. these gains, such as they are, go to the investors and businessmen engaged in these enterprises; while the costs incident to the adventure are borne almost wholly by the common man, who gets no gain from it all. commonly, as in the case of a protective tariff or a preferential navigation law, the cost to the common man is altogether out of proportion to the gain which accrues to the businessmen for whose benefit he carries the burden. the only other class, besides the preferentially favored businessmen, who derive any material benefit from this arrangement is that of the office-holders who take care of this governmental traffic and draw something in the way of salaries and perquisites; and whose cost is defrayed by the common man, who remains an outsider in all but the payment of the bills. the common man is proud and glad to bear this burden for the benefit of his wealthier neighbors, and he does so with the singular conviction that in some occult manner he profits by it. all this is incredible, but it is everyday fact. in case it should happen that these business interests of the nation's businessmen interested in trade or investments abroad are jeopardised by a disturbance of any kind in these foreign parts in which these business interests lie, then it immediately becomes the urgent concern of the national authorities to use all means at hand for maintaining the gainful traffic of these businessmen undiminished, and the common man pays the cost. should such an untoward situation go to such sinister lengths as to involve actual loss to these business interests or otherwise give rise to a tangible grievance, it becomes an affair of the national honour; whereupon no sense of proportion as between the material gains at stake and the cost of remedy or retaliation need longer be observed, since the national honour is beyond price. the motivation in the case shifts from the ground of material interest to the spiritual ground of the moral sentiments. in this connection "honour" is of course to be taken in the euphemistic sense which the term has under the _code duello_ governing "affairs of honour." it carries no connotation of honesty, veracity, equity, liberality, or unselfishness. this national honour is of the nature of an intangible or immaterial asset, of course; it is a matter of prestige, a sportsmanlike conception; but that fact must not be taken to mean that it is of any the less substantial effect for purposes of a _casus belli_ than the material assets of the community. quite the contrary: "who steals my purse, steals trash," etc. in point of fact, it will commonly happen that any material grievance must first be converted into terms of this spiritual capital, before it is effectually turned to account as a stimulus to warlike enterprise. even among a people with so single an eye to the main chance as the american community it will be found true, on experiment or on review of the historical evidence, that an offense against the national honour commands a profounder and more unreserved resentment than any infraction of the rights of person or property simply. this has latterly been well shown in connection with the manoeuvres of the several european belligerents, designed to bend american neutrality to the service of one side or the other. both parties have aimed to intimidate and cajole; but while the one party has taken recourse to effrontery and has made much and ostentatious use of threats and acts of violence against person and property, the other has constantly observed a deferential attitude toward american national self-esteem, even while engaged on a persistent infraction of american commercial rights. the first named line of diplomacy has convicted itself of miscarriage and has lost the strategic advantage, as against the none too adroit finesse of the other side. the statesmen of this european war power were so ill advised as to enter on a course of tentatively cumulative intimidation, by threats and experimentally graduated crimes against the property and persons of american citizens, with a view to coerce american cupidity and yet to avoid carrying these manoeuvres of terrorism far enough to arouse an unmanageable sense of outrage. the experiment has served to show that the breaking point in popular indignation will be reached before the terrorism has gone far enough to raise a serious question of pecuniary caution. this national honour, which so is rated a necessary of life, is an immaterial substance in a peculiarly high-wrought degree, being not only not physically tangible but also not even capable of adequate statement in pecuniary terms,--as would be the case with ordinary immaterial assets. it is true, where the point of grievance out of which a question of the national honour arises is a pecuniary discrepancy, the national honour can not be satisfied without a pecuniary accounting; but it needs no argument to convince all right-minded persons that even at such a juncture the national honour that has been compromised is indefinitely and indefinably more than what can be made to appear on an accountant's page. it is a highly valued asset, or at least a valued possession, but it is of a metaphysical, not of a physical nature, and it is not known to serve any material or otherwise useful end apart from affording a practicable grievance consequent upon its infraction. this national honour is subject to injury in divers ways, and so may yield a fruitful grievance even apart from offences against the person or property of the nation's businessmen; as, e.g., through neglect or disregard of the conventional punctilios governing diplomatic intercourse, or by disrespect or contumelious speech touching the flag, or the persons of national officials, particularly of such officials as have only a decorative use, or the costumes worn by such officials, or, again, by failure to observe the ritual prescribed for parading the national honour on stated occasions. when duly violated the national honour may duly be made whole again by similarly immaterial instrumentalities; as, e.g., by recital of an appropriate formula of words, by formal consumption of a stated quantity of ammunition in the way of a salute, by "dipping" an ensign, and the like,--procedure which can, of course, have none but a magical efficacy. the national honour, in short, moves in the realm of magic, and touches the frontiers of religion. throughout this range of duties incumbent on the national defense, it will be noted, the offenses or discrepancies to be guarded against or corrected by recourse to arms have much of a ceremonial character. whatever may be the material accidents that surround any given concrete grievance that comes up for appraisal and redress, in bringing the case into the arena for trial by combat it is the spiritual value of the offense that is played up and made the decisive ground of action, particularly in so far as appeal is made to the sensibilities of the common man, who will have to bear the cost of the adventure. and in such a case it will commonly happen that the common man is unable, without advice, to see that any given hostile act embodies a sacrilegious infraction of the national honour. he will at any such conjuncture scarcely rise to the pitch of moral indignation necessary to float a warlike reprisal, until the expert keepers of the code come in to expound and certify the nature of the transgression. but when once the lesion to the national honour has been ascertained, appraised and duly exhibited by those persons whose place in the national economy it is to look after all that sort of thing, the common man will be found nowise behindhand about resenting the evil usage of which he so, by force of interpretation, has been a victim. chapter ii on the nature and uses of patriotism patriotism may be defined as a sense of partisan solidarity in respect of prestige. what the expert psychologists, and perhaps the experts in political science, might find it necessary to say in the course of an exhaustive analysis and definition of this human faculty would presumably be something more precise and more extensive. there is no inclination here to forestall definition, but only to identify and describe the concept that loosely underlies the colloquial use of this term, so far as seems necessary to an inquiry into the part played by the patriotic animus in the life of modern peoples, particularly as it bears on questions of war and peace. on any attempt to divest this concept of all extraneous or adventitious elements it will be found that such a sense of an undivided joint interest in a collective body of prestige will always remain as an irreducible minimum. this is the substantial core about which many and divers subsidiary interests cluster, but without which these other clustering interests and aspirations will not, jointly or severally, make up a working palladium of the patriotic spirit. it is true, seen in some other light or rated in some other bearing or connection, one and another of these other interests, ideals, aspirations, beatitudes, may well be adjudged nobler, wiser, possibly more urgent than the national prestige; but in the forum of patriotism all these other necessaries of human life--the glory of god and the good of man--rise by comparison only to the rank of subsidiaries, auxiliaries, amenities. he is an indifferent patriot who will let "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" cloud the issue and get in the way of the main business in hand. there once were, we are told, many hardy and enterprising spirits banded together along the spanish main for such like ends, just as there are in our day an even greater number of no less single-minded spirits bent on their own "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness," according to their light, in the money-markets of the modern world; but for all their admirable qualities and splendid achievements, their passionate quest of these amenities has not entitled these gentlemen adventurers to claim rank as patriots. the poet says: "strike for your altars and your fires! strike for the green graves of your sires! god and your native land!" but, again, a temperate scrutiny of the list of desiderata so enumerated in the poet's flight, will quickly bring out the fact that any or all of them might drop out of the situation without prejudice to the plain call of patriotic duty. in the last resort, when the patriotic spirit falls back on its naked self alone, it is not reflection on the merits of these good and beautiful things in nature that gives him his cue and enforces the ultimate sacrifice. indeed it is something infinitely more futile and infinitely more urgent,--provided only that the man is imbued with the due modicum of patriotic devotion; as, indeed, men commonly are. it is not faith, hope or charity that abide as the irreducible minimum of virtue in the patriot's scheme of things; particularly not that charity that has once been highly spoken of as being the greatest of these. it may be that, viewed in the light of reason, as doctor katzenberger would say, patriotic devotion is the most futile thing in the world; but, for good or ill, the light of reason has nothing to do with the case,--no more than "the flowers that bloom in the spring." the patriotic spirit is a spirit of emulation, evidently, at the same time that it is emulation shot through with a sense of solidarity. it belongs under the general caption of sportsmanship, rather than of workmanship. now, any enterprise in sportsmanship is bent on an invidious success, which must involve as its major purpose the defeat and humiliation of some competitor, whatever else may be comprised in its aim. its aim is a differential gain, as against a rival; and the emulative spirit that comes under the head of patriotism commonly, if not invariably, seeks this differential advantage by injury of the rival rather than by an increase of home-bred well-being. indeed, well-being is altogether out of the perspective, except as underpinning for an edifice of national prestige. it is, at least, a safe generalisation that the patriotic sentiment never has been known to rise to the consummate pitch of enthusiastic abandon except when bent on some work of concerted malevolence. patriotism is of a contentious complexion, and finds its full expression in no other outlet than warlike enterprise; its highest and final appeal is for the death, damage, discomfort and destruction of the party of the second part. it is not that the spirit of patriotism will tolerate no other sentiments bearing on matters of public interest, but only that it will tolerate none that traverse the call of the national prestige. like other men, the patriot may be moved by many and divers other considerations, besides that of the national prestige; and these other considerations may be of the most genial and reasonable kind, or they may also be as foolish and mischievous as any comprised in the range of human infirmities. he may be a humanitarian given over to the kindliest solicitude for the common good, or a religious devotee hedged about in all his motions by the ever present fear of god, or taken up with artistic, scholarly or scientific pursuits; or, again, he may be a spendthrift devotee of profane dissipation, whether in the slums or on the higher levels of gentility, or he may be engaged on a rapacious quest of gain, as a businessman within the law or as a criminal without its benefit, or he may spend his best endeavors in advancing the interests of his class at the cost of the nation at large. all that is understood as a matter of course and is beside the point. in so far as he is a complete patriot these other interests will fall away from him when the one clear call of patriotic duty comes to enlist him in the cause of the national prestige. there is, indeed, nothing to hinder a bad citizen being a good patriot; nor does it follow that a good citizen--in other respects--may not be a very indifferent patriot. many and various other preferences and considerations may coincide with the promptings of the patriotic spirit, and so may come in to coalesce with and fortify its driving force; and it is usual for patriotic men to seek support for their patriotic impulses in some reasoned purpose of this extraneous kind that is believed to be served by following the call of the national prestige,--it may be a presumptive increase and diffusion of culture at large, or the spread and enhancement of a presumptively estimable religious faith, or a prospective liberation of mankind from servitude to obnoxious masters and outworn institutions; or, again, it may be the increase of peace and material well-being among men, within the national frontiers or impartially throughout the civilised world. there are, substantially, none of the desirable things in this world that are not so counted on by some considerable body of patriots to be accomplished by the success of their own particular patriotic aspirations. what they will not come to an understanding about is the particular national ascendency with which the attainment of these admirable ends is conceived to be bound up. the ideals, needs and aims that so are brought into the patriotic argument to lend a color of rationality to the patriotic aspiration in any given case will of course be such ideals, needs and aims as are currently accepted and felt to be authentic and self-legitimating among the people in whose eyes the given patriotic enterprise is to find favor. so one finds that, e.g., among the followers of islam, devout and resolute, the patriotic statesman (that is to say the politician who designs to make use of the popular patriotic fervor) will in the last resort appeal to the claims and injunctions of the faith. in a similar way the prussian statesman bent on dynastic enterprise will conjure in the name of the dynasty and of culture and efficiency; or, if worse comes to worst, an outbreak will be decently covered with a plea of mortal peril and self-defense. among english-speaking peoples much is to be gained by showing that the path of patriotic glory is at the same time the way of equal-handed justice under the rule of free institutions; at the same time, in a fully commercialised community, such as the english-speaking commonly are, material benefits in the way of trade will go far to sketch in a background of decency for any enterprise that looks to the enhancement of the national prestige. but any promise of gain, whether in the nation's material or immaterial assets, will not of itself carry full conviction to the commonplace modern citizen; or even to such modern citizens as are best endowed with a national spirit. by and large, and overlooking that appreciable contingent of morally defective citizens that is to be counted on in any hybrid population, it will hold true that no contemplated enterprise or line of policy will fully commend itself to the popular sense of merit and expediency until it is given a moral turn, so as to bring it to square with the dictates of right and honest dealing. on no terms short of this will it effectually coalesce with the patriotic aspiration. to give the fullest practical effect to the patriotic fervor that animates any modern nation, and so turn it to use in the most effective way, it is necessary to show that the demands of equity are involved in the case. any cursory survey of modern historical events bearing on this point, among the civilised peoples, will bring out the fact that no concerted and sustained movement of the national spirit can be had without enlisting the community's moral convictions. the common man must be persuaded that right is on his side. "thrice is he armed who knows his quarrel just." the grounds of this conviction may often be tawdry enough, but the conviction is a necessary factor in the case. the requisite moral sanction may be had on various grounds, and, on the whole, it is not an extremely difficult matter to arrange. in the simplest and not infrequent case it may turn on a question of equity in respect of trade or investment as between the citizens or subjects of the several rival nations; the chinese "open door" affords as sordid an example as may be desired. or it may be only an envious demand for a share in the world's material resources--"a place in the sun," as a picturesque phrase describes it; or "the freedom of the seas," as another equally vague and equally invidious demand for international equity phrases it. these demands are put forward with a color of demanding something in the way of equitable opportunity for the commonplace peaceable citizen; but quite plainly they have none but a fanciful bearing on the fortunes of the common man in time of peace, and they have a meaning to the nation only as a fighting unit; apart from their prestige value, these things are worth fighting for only as prospective means of fighting. the like appeal to the moral sensibilities may, again, be made in the way of a call to self-defense, under the rule of live and let live; or it may also rest on the more tenuous obligation to safeguard the national integrity of a weaker neighbor, under a broader interpretation of the same equitable rule of live and let live. but in one way or another it is necessary to set up the conviction that the promptings of patriotic ambition have the sanction of moral necessity. it is not that the line of national policy or patriotic enterprise so entered upon with the support of popular sentiment need be right and equitable as seen in dispassionate perspective from the outside, but only that it should be capable of being made to seem right and equitable to the biased populace whose moral convictions are requisite to its prosecution; which is quite another matter. nor is it that any such patriotic enterprise is, in fact, entered on simply or mainly on these moral grounds that so are alleged in its justification, but only that some such colorable ground of justification or extenuation is necessary to be alleged, and to be credited by popular belief. it is not that the common man is not sufficiently patriotic, but only that he is a patriot hampered with a plodding and uneasy sense of right and honest dealing, and that one must make up one's account with this moral bias in looking to any sustained and concerted action that draws on the sentiment of the common man for its carrying on. but the moral sense in the case may be somewhat easily satisfied with a modicum of equity, in case the patriotic bias of the people is well pronounced, or in case it is reenforced with a sufficient appeal to self-interest. in those cases where the national fervor rises to an excited pitch, even very attenuated considerations of right and justice, such as would under ordinary conditions doubtfully bear scrutiny as extenuating circumstances, may come to serve as moral authentication for any extravagant course of action to which the craving for national prestige may incite. the higher the pitch of patriotic fervor, the more tenuous and more thread-bare may be the requisite moral sanction. by cumulative excitation some very remarkable results have latterly been attained along this line. * * * * * patriotism is evidently a spirit of particularism, of aliency and animosity between contrasted groups of persons; it lives on invidious comparison, and works out in mutual hindrance and jealousy between nations. it commonly goes the length of hindering intercourse and obstructing traffic that would patently serve the material and cultural well-being of both nationalities; and not infrequently, indeed normally, it eventuates in competitive damage to both. all this holds true in the world of modern civilisation, at the same time that the modern civilised scheme of life is, notoriously, of a cosmopolitan character, both in its cultural requirements and in its economic structure. modern culture is drawn on too large a scale, is of too complex and multiform a character, requires the cooperation of too many and various lines of inquiry, experience and insight, to admit of its being confined within national frontiers, except at the cost of insufferable crippling and retardation. the science and scholarship that is the peculiar pride of civilised christendom is not only international, but rather it is homogeneously cosmopolitan; so that in this bearing there are, in effect, no national frontiers; with the exception, of course, that in a season of patriotic intoxication, such as the current war has induced, even the scholars and scientists will be temporarily overset by their patriotic fervour. indeed, with the best efforts of obscurantism and national jealousy to the contrary, it remains patently true that modern culture is the culture of christendom at large, not the culture of one and another nation in severalty within the confines of christendom. it is only as and in so far as they partake in and contribute to the general run of western civilisation at large that the people of any one of these nations of christendom can claim standing as a cultured nation; and even any distinctive variation from this general run of civilised life, such as may give a "local colour" of ideals, tastes and conventions, will, in point of cultural value, have to be rated as an idle detail, a species of lost motion, that serves no better purpose than a transient estrangement. so also, the modern state of the industrial arts is of a like cosmopolitan character, in point of scale, specialisation, and the necessary use of diversified resources, of climate and raw materials. none of the countries of europe, e.g., is competent to carry on its industry by modern technological methods without constantly drawing on resources outside of its national boundaries. isolation in this industrial respect, exclusion from the world market, would mean intolerable loss of efficiency, more pronounced the more fully the given country has taken over this modern state of the industrial arts. exclusion from the general body of outlying resources would seriously cripple any one or all of them, and effectually deprive them of the usufruct of this technology; and partial exclusion, by prohibitive or protective tariffs and the like, unavoidably results in a partial lowering of the efficiency of each, and therefore a reduction of the current well-being among them all together. into this cultural and technological system of the modern world the patriotic spirit fits like dust in the eyes and sand in the bearings. its net contribution to the outcome is obscuration, distrust, and retardation at every point where it touches the fortunes of modern mankind. yet it is forever present in the counsels of the statesmen and in the affections of the common man, and it never ceases to command the regard of all men as the prime attribute of manhood and the final test of the desirable citizen. it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no other consideration is allowed in abatement of the claims of patriotic loyalty, and that such loyalty will be allowed to cover any multitude of sins. when the ancient philosopher described man as a "political animal," this, in effect, was what he affirmed; and today the ancient maxim is as good as new. the patriotic spirit is at cross purposes with modern life, but in any test case it is found that the claims of life yield before those of patriotism; and any voice that dissents from this order of things is as a voice crying in the wilderness. * * * * * to anyone who is inclined to moralise on the singular discrepancies of human life this state of the case will be fruitful of much profound speculation. the patriotic animus appears to be an enduring trait of human nature, an ancient heritage that has stood over unshorn from time immemorial, under the mendelian rule of the stability of racial types. it is archaic, not amenable to elimination or enduring suppression, and apparently not appreciably to be mitigated by reflection, education, experience or selective breeding. throughout the historical period, and presumably through an incalculable period of the unrecorded past, patriotic manslaughter has consistently been weeding out of each successive generation of men the most patriotic among them; with the net result that the level of patriotic ardor today appears to be no lower than it ever was. at the same time, with the advance of population, of culture and of the industrial arts, patriotism has grown increasingly disserviceable; and it is to all appearance as ubiquitous and as powerful as ever, and is held in as high esteem. the continued prevalence of this archaic animus among the modern peoples, as well as the fact that it is universally placed high among the virtues, must be taken to argue that it is, in its elements, an hereditary trait, of the nature of an inborn impulsive propensity, rather than a product of habituation. it is, in substance, not something that can be learned and unlearned. from one generation to another, the allegiance may shift from one nationality to another, but the fact of unreflecting allegiance at large remains. and it all argues also that no sensible change has taken effect in the hereditary endowment of the race, at least in this respect, during the period known by record or by secure inference,--say, since the early neolithic in europe; and this in spite of the fact that there has all this while been opportunity for radical changes in the european population by cross-breeding, infiltration and displacement of the several racial stocks that go to make up this population. hence, on slight reflection the inference has suggested itself and has gained acceptance that this trait of human nature must presumably have been serviceable to the peoples of the earlier time, on those levels of savagery or of the lower barbarism on which the ancestral stocks of the european population first made good their survival and proved their fitness to people that quarter of the earth. such, indeed, is the common view; so common as to pass for matter-of-course, and therefore habitually to escape scrutiny. still it need not follow, as more patient reflection will show. all the european peoples show much the same animus in this respect; whatever their past history may have been, and whatever the difference in past experience that might be conceived to have shaped their temperament. any difference in the pitch of patriotic conceit and animosity, between the several nationalities or the several localities, is by no means wide, even in cases where the racial composition of the population is held to be very different, as, e.g., between the peoples on the baltic seaboard and those on the mediterranean. in point of fact, in this matter of patriotic animus there appears to be a wider divergence, temperamentally, between individuals within any one of these communities than between the common run in any one community and the corresponding common run in any other. but even such divergence of individual temper in respect of patriotism as is to be met with, first and last, is after all surprisingly small in view of the scope for individual variation which this european population would seem to offer. * * * * * these peoples of europe, all and several, are hybrids compounded out of the same run of racial elements, but mixed in varying proportions. on any parallel of latitude--taken in the climatic rather than in the geometric sense--the racial composition of the west-european population will be much the same, virtually identical in effect, although always of a hybrid complexion; whereas on any parallel of longitude--also in the climatic sense--the racial composition will vary progressively, but always within the limits of the same general scheme of hybridisation,--the variation being a variation in the proportion in which the several racial elements are present in any given case. but in no case does a notable difference in racial composition coincide with a linguistic or national frontier. but in point of patriotic animus these european peoples are one as good as another, whether the comparison be traced on parallels of latitude or of longitude. and the inhabitants of each national territory, or of each detail locality, appear also to run surprisingly uniform in respect of their patriotic spirit. heredity in any such community of hybrids will, superficially, appear to run somewhat haphazard. there will, of course, be no traceable difference between social or economic classes, in point of heredity,--as is visibly the case in christendom. but variation--of an apparently haphazard description--will be large and ubiquitous among the individuals of such a populace. indeed, it is a matter of course and of easy verification that individual variation within such a hybrid stock will greatly exceed the extreme differences that may subsist between the several racial types that have gone to produce the hybrid stock. such is the case of the european peoples. the inhabitants vary greatly among themselves, both in physical and in mental traits, as would be expected; and the variation between individuals in point of patriotic animus should accordingly also be expected to be extremely wide,--should, in effect, greatly exceed the difference, if any, in this respect between the several racial elements engaged in the european population. some appreciable difference in this respect there appears to be, between individuals; but individual divergence from the normal or average appears always to be of a sporadic sort,--it does not run on class lines, whether of occupation, status or property, nor does it run at all consistently from parent to child. when all is told the argument returns to the safe ground that these variations in point of patriotic animus are sporadic and inconsequential, and do not touch the general proposition that, one with another, the inhabitants of europe and the european colonies are sufficiently patriotic, and that the average endowment in this respect runs with consistent uniformity across all differences of time, place and circumstance. it would, in fact, be extremely hazardous to affirm that there is a sensible difference in the ordinary pitch of patriotic sentiment as between any two widely diverse samples of these hybrid populations, in spite of the fact that the diversity in visible physical traits may be quite pronounced. in short, the conclusion seems safe, on the whole, that in this respect the several racial stocks that have gone to produce the existing populations of christendom have all been endowed about as richly one as another. patriotism appears to be a ubiquitous trait, at least among the races and peoples of christendom. from which it should follow, that since there is, and has from the beginning been, no differential advantage favoring one racial stock or one fashion of hybrid as against another, in this matter of patriotic animus, there should also be no ground of selective survival or selective elimination on this account as between these several races and peoples. so that the undisturbed and undiminished prevalence of this trait among the european population, early or late, argues nothing as to its net serviceability or disserviceability under any of the varying conditions of culture and technology to which these europeans have been subjected, first and last; except that it has, in any case, not proved so disserviceable under the conditions prevailing hitherto as to result in the extinction of these europeans, one with another.[ ] [footnote : for a more extended discussion of this matter, cf. _imperial germany and the industrial revolution_, ch. i. and supplementary notes i. and ii.] the patriotic frame of mind has been spoken of above as if it were an hereditary trait, something after the fashion of a mendelian unit character. doubtless this is not a competent account of the matter; but the present argument scarcely needs a closer analysis. still, in a measure to quiet title and avoid annoyance, it may be noted that this patriotic animus is of the nature of a "frame of mind" rather than a mendelian unit character; that it so involves a concatenation of several impulsive propensities (presumably hereditary); and that both the concatenation and the special mode and amplitude of the response are a product of habituation, very largely of the nature of conventionalised use and wont. what is said above, therefore, goes little farther than saying that the underlying aptitudes requisite to this patriotic frame of mind are heritable, and that use and wont as bearing on this point run with sufficient uniformity to bring a passably uniform result. it may be added that in this concatenation spoken of there seems to be comprised, ordinarily, that sentimental attachment to habitat and custom that is called love of home, or in its accentuated expression, home-sickness; so also an invidious self-complacency, coupled with a gregarious bent which gives the invidious comparison a group content; and further, commonly if not invariably, a bent of abnegation, self-abasement, subservience, or whatever it may best be called, that inclines the bearer unreasoningly and unquestioningly to accept and serve a prescriptive ideal given by custom or by customary authority. * * * * * the conclusion would therefore provisionally run to the effect that under modern conditions the patriotic animus is wholly a disserviceable trait in the spiritual endowment of these peoples,--in so far as bears on the material conditions of life unequivocally, and as regards the cultural interests more at large presumptively; whereas there is no assured ground for a discriminating opinion as touches its possible utility or disutility at any remote period in the past. there is, of course, always room for the conservative estimate that, as the possession of this spiritual trait has not hitherto resulted in the extinction of the race, so it may also in the calculable future continue to bring no more grievous results than a degree of mischief, without even stopping or greatly retarding the increase of population. all this, of course, is intended to apply only so far as it goes. it must not be taken as intending to say any least word in derogation of those high qualities that inspire the patriotic citizen. in its economic, biological and cultural incidence patriotism appears to be an untoward trait of human nature; which has, of course, nothing to say as to its moral excellence, its aesthetic value, or its indispensability to a worthy life. no doubt, it is in all these respects deserving of all the esteem and encomiums that fall to its share. indeed, its well-known moral and aesthetic value, as well as the reprobation that is visited on any shortcomings in this respect, signify, for the purposes of the present argument, nothing more than that the patriotic animus meets the unqualified approval of men because they are, all and several, infected with it. it is evidence of the ubiquitous, intimate and ineradicable presence of this quality in human nature; all the more since it continues untiringly to be held in the highest esteem in spite of the fact that a modicum of reflection should make its disserviceability plain to the meanest understanding. no higher praise of moral excellence, and no profounder test of loyalty, can be asked than this current unreserved commendation of a virtue that makes invariably for damage and discomfort. the virtuous impulse must be deep-seated and indefeasible that drives men incontinently to do good that evil may come of it. "though he slay me, yet will i trust in him." in the light--and it is a dim and wavering light--of the archaeological evidence, helped out by circumstantial evidence from such parallel or analogous instances as are afforded by existing communities on a comparable level of culture, one may venture more or less confidently on a reconstruction of the manner of life among the early europeans, of early neolithic times and later.[ ] and so one may form some conception of the part played by this patriotic animus among those beginnings, when, if not the race, at least its institutions were young; and when the native temperament of these peoples was tried out and found fit to survive through the age-long and slow-moving eras of stone and bronze. in this connection, it appears safe to assume that since early neolithic times no sensible change has taken effect in the racial complexion of the european peoples; and therefore no sensible change in their spiritual and mental make-up. so that in respect of the spiritual elements that go to make up this patriotic animus the europeans of today will be substantially identical with the europeans of that early time. the like is true as regards those other traits of temperament that come in question here, as being included among the stable characteristics that still condition the life of these peoples under the altered circumstances of the modern age. [footnote : cf. _imperial germany and the industrial revolution_, as above.] the difference between prehistoric europe and the present state of these peoples resolves itself on analysis into a difference in the state of the industrial arts, together with such institutional changes as have come on in the course of working out this advance in the industrial arts. the habits and the exigencies of life among these peoples have greatly changed; whereas in temperament and capacities the peoples that now live by and under the rule of this altered state of the industrial arts are the same as they were. it is to be noted, therefore, that the fact of their having successfully come through the long ages of prehistory by the use of this mental and spiritual endowment can not be taken to argue that these peoples are thereby fit to meet the exigencies of this later and gravely altered age; nor will it do to assume that because these peoples have themselves worked out this modern culture and its technology, therefore it must all be suitable for their use and conducive to their biological success. the single object lesson of the modern urban community, with its endless requirements in the way of sanitation, police, compulsory education, charities,--all this and many other discrepancies in modern life should enjoin caution on anyone who is inclined off-hand to hold that because modern men have created these conditions, therefore these must be the most suitable conditions of life for modern mankind. in the beginning, that is to say in the european beginning, men lived in small and close groups. control was close within the group, and the necessity of subordinating individual gains and preferences to the common good was enjoined on the group by the exigencies of the case, on pain of common extinction. the situation and usages of existing eskimo villages may serve to illustrate and enforce the argument on this head. the solidarity of sentiment necessary to support the requisite solidarity of action in the case would be a prime condition of survival in any racial stock exposed to the conditions which surrounded these early europeans. this needful sense of solidarity would touch not simply or most imperatively the joint prestige of the group, but rather the joint material interests; and would enforce a spirit of mutual support and dependence. which would be rather helped than hindered by a jealous attitude of joint prestige; so long as no divergent interests of members within the group were in a position to turn this state of the common sentiment to their own particular advantage. this state of the case will have lasted for a relatively long time; long enough to have tested the fitness of these peoples for that manner of life,--longer, no doubt, than the interval that has elapsed since history began. special interests--e.g., personal and family interests--will have been present and active in these days of the beginning; but so long as the group at large was small enough to admit of a close neighborly contact throughout its extent and throughout the workday routine of life, at the same time that it was too small and feeble to allow any appreciable dissipation of its joint energies in such pursuit of selfish gains as would run counter to the paramount business of the common livelihood, so long the sense of a common livelihood and a joint fortune would continue to hold any particularist ambitions effectually in check. had it fallen out otherwise, the story of the group in question would have been ended, and another and more suitably endowed type of men would have taken the place vacated by its extinction. with a sensible advance in the industrial arts the scale of operations would grow larger, and the group more numerous and extensive. the margin between production and subsistence would also widen and admit additional scope for individual ambitions and personal gains. and as this process of growth and increasing productive efficiency went on, the control exercised by neighborly surveillance, through the sentiment of the common good as against the self-seeking pursuits of individuals and sub-groups, would gradually slacken; until by progressive disuse it would fall into a degree of abeyance; to be called into exercise and incite to concerted action only in the face of unusual exigencies touching the common fortunes of the group at large, or on persuasion that the collective interest of the group at large was placed in jeopardy in the molestation of one and another of its members from without. the group's prestige at least would be felt to suffer in the defeat or discourtesy suffered by any of its members at the hands of any alien; and, under compulsion of the ancient sense of group solidarity, whatever material hardship or material gain might so fall to individual members in their dealings with the alien would pass easy scrutiny as material detriment or gain inuring to the group at large,--in the apprehension of men whose sense of community interest is inflamed with a jealous disposition to safeguard their joint prestige. with continued advance in the industrial arts the circumstances conditioning life will undergo a progressive change of such a character that the joint interest of the group at large, in the material respect, will progressively be less closely bound up with the material fortunes of any particular member or members; until in the course of time and change there will, in effect, in ordinary times be no general and inclusive community of material interest binding the members together in a common fortune and working for a common livelihood. as the rights of ownership begin to take effect, so that the ownership of property and the pursuit of a livelihood under the rules of ownership come to govern men's economic relations, these material concerns will cease to be a matter of undivided joint interest, and will fall into the shape of interest in severalty. so soon and so far as this institution of ownership or property takes effect, men's material interests cease to run on lines of group solidarity. solely, or almost solely, in the exceptional case of defense against a predatory incursion from outside, do the members of the group have a common interest of a material kind. progressively as the state of the arts advances, the industrial organisation advances to a larger scale and a more extensive specialisation, with increasing divergence among individual interests and individual fortunes; and intercourse over larger distances grows easier and makes a larger grouping practicable; which enables a larger, prompter and more effective mobilisation of forces with which to defend or assert any joint claims. but by the same move it also follows, or at least it appears uniformly to have followed in the european case, that the accumulation of property and the rights of ownership have progressively come into the first place among the material interests of these peoples; while anything like a community of usufruct has imperceptibly fallen into the background, and has presently gone virtually into abeyance, except as an eventual recourse _in extremis_ for the common defense. property rights have displaced community of usufruct; and invidious distinctions as between persons, sub-groups, and classes have displaced community of prestige in the workday routine of these peoples; and the distinctions between contrasted persons or classes have come to rest, in an ever increasing degree, directly or indirectly, on invidious comparisons in respect of pecuniary standing rather than on personal affiliation with the group at large. so, with the advance of the industrial arts a differentiation of a new character sets in and presently grows progressively more pronounced and more effectual, giving rise to a regrouping on lines that run regardless of those frontiers that divide one community from another for purposes of patriotic emulation. so far as it comes chiefly and typically in question here, this regrouping takes place on two distinct but somewhat related principles of contrast: that of wealth and poverty, and that of master and servant, or authority and obedience. the material interests of the population in this way come to be divided between the group of those who own and those who command, on the one hand, and of those who work and who obey, on the other hand. neither of these two contrasted categories of persons have any direct material interest in the maintenance of the patriotic community; or at any rate no such interest as should reasonably induce them to spend their own time and substance in support of the political (patriotic) organisation within which they live. it is only in so far as one or another of these interests looks for a more than proportionate share in any prospective gain from the joint enterprise, that the group or class in question can reasonably be counted on to bear its share in the joint venture. and it is only when and in so far as their particular material or self-regarding interest is reenforced by patriotic conceit, that they can be counted on to spend themselves in furtherance of the patriotic enterprise, without the assurance of a more than proportionate share in any gains that may be held in prospect from any such joint enterprise; and it is only in its patriotic bearing that the political community continues to be a joint venture. that is to say, in more generalised terms, through the development of the rights of property, and of such like prescriptive claims of privilege and prerogative, it has come about that other community interests have fallen away, until the collective prestige remains as virtually the sole community interest which can hold the sentiment of the group in a bond of solidarity. to one or another of these several interested groups or classes within the community the political organisation may work a benefit; but only to one or another, not to each and several, jointly or collectively. since by no chance will the benefit derived from such joint enterprise on the part of the community at large equal the joint cost; in as much as all joint enterprise of the kind that looks to material advantage works by one or another method of inhibition and takes effect, if at all, by lowering the aggregate efficiency of the several countries concerned, with a view to the differential gain of one at the cost of another. so, e.g., a protective tariff is plainly a conspiracy in restraint of trade, with a view to benefit the conspirators by hindering their competitors. the aggregate cost to the community at large of such an enterprise in retardation is always more than the gains it brings to those who may benefit by it. in so speaking of the uses to which the common man's patriotic devotion may be turned, there is no intention to underrate its intrinsic value as a genial and generous trait of human nature. doubtless it is best and chiefly to be appreciated as a spiritual quality that beautifies and ennobles its bearer, and that endows him with the full stature of manhood, quite irrespective of ulterior considerations. so it is to be conceded without argument that this patriotic animus is a highly meritorious frame of mind, and that it has an aesthetic value scarcely to be overstated in the farthest stretch of poetic license. but the question of its serviceability to the modern community, in any other than this decorative respect, and particularly its serviceability to the current needs of the common man in such a modern community, is not touched by such an admission; nor does this recognition of its generous spiritual nature afford any help toward answering a further question as to how and with what effect this animus may be turned to account by anyone who is in position to make use of the forces which it sets free. among christian nations there still is, on the whole, a decided predilection for that ancient and authentic line of national repute that springs from warlike prowess. this repute for warlike prowess is what first comes to mind among civilised peoples when speaking of national greatness. and among those who have best preserved this warlike ideal of worth, the patriotic ambition is likely to converge on the prestige of their sovereign; so that it takes the concrete form of personal loyalty to a master, and so combines or coalesces with a servile habit of mind. but peace hath its victories no less renowned than war, it is said; and peaceable folk of a patriotic temper have learned to make the best of their meager case and have found self-complacency in these victories of the peaceable order. so it may broadly be affirmed that all nations look with complacency on their own peculiar culture--the organised complex of habits of thought and of conduct by which their own routine of life is regulated--as being in some way worthier than the corresponding habits of their neighbors. the case of the german culture has latterly come under a strong light in this way. but while it may be that no other nation has been so naive as to make a concerted profession of faith to the effect that their own particular way of life is altogether commendable and is the only fashion of civilisation that is fit to survive; yet it will scarcely be an extravagance to assert that in their own secret mind these others, too, are blest with much the same consciousness of unique worth. conscious virtue of this kind is a good and sufficient ground for patriotic inflation, so far as it goes. it commonly does not go beyond a defensive attitude, however. now and again, as in the latterday german animation on this head, these phenomena of national use and wont may come to command such a degree of popular admiration as will incite to an aggressive or proselyting campaign. in all this there is nothing of a self-seeking or covetous kind. the common man who so lends himself to the aggressive enhancement of the national culture and its prestige has nothing of a material kind to gain from the increase of renown that so comes to his sovereign, his language, his countrymen's art or science, his dietary, or his god. there are no sordid motives in all this. these spiritual assets of self-complacency are, indeed, to be rated as grounds of high-minded patriotism without afterthought. these aspirations and enthusiasms would perhaps be rated as quixotic by men whose horizon is bounded by the main chance; but they make up that substance of things hoped for that inflates those headlong patriotic animosities that stir universal admiration. so also, men find an invidious distinction in such matters of physical magnitude as their country's area, the number of its population, the size of its cities, the extent of its natural resources, its aggregate wealth and its wealth per capita, its merchant marine and its foreign trade. as a ground of invidious complacency these phenomena of physical magnitude and pecuniary traffic are no better and no worse than such immaterial assets as the majesty of the sovereign or the perfections of the language. they are matters in which the common man is concerned only by the accident of domicile, and his only connection with these things is an imaginary joint interest in their impressiveness. to these things he has contributed substantially nothing, and from them he derives no other merit or advantage than a patriotic inflation. he takes pride in these things in an invidious way, and there is no good reason why he should not; just as there is also no good reason why he should, apart from the fact that the common man is so constituted that he, mysteriously, takes pride in these things that concern him not. * * * * * of the several groups or classes of persons within the political frontiers, whose particular interests run systematically at cross purposes with those of the community at large under modern conditions, the class of masters, rulers, authorities,--or whatever term may seem most suitable to designate that category of persons whose characteristic occupation is to give orders and command deference,--of the several orders and conditions of men these are, in point of substantial motive and interest, most patently at variance with all the rest, or with the fortunes of the common man. the class will include civil and military authorities and whatever nobility there is of a prescriptive and privileged kind. the substantial interest of these classes in the common welfare is of the same kind as the interest which a parasite has in the well-being of his host; a sufficiently substantial interest, no doubt, but there is in this relation nothing like a community of interest. any gain on the part of the community at large will materially serve the needs of this group of personages, only in so far as it may afford them a larger volume or a wider scope for what has in latterday colloquial phrase been called "graft." these personages are, of course, not to be spoken of with disrespect or with the slightest inflection of discourtesy. they are all honorable men. indeed they afford the conventional pattern of human dignity and meritorious achievement, and the "fountain of honor" is found among them. the point of the argument is only that their material or other self-regarding interests are of such a nature as to be furthered by the material wealth of the community, and more particularly by the increasing volume of the body politic; but only with the proviso that this material wealth and this increment of power must accrue without anything like a corresponding cost to this class. at the same time, since this class of the superiors is in some degree a specialised organ of prestige, so that their value, and therefore their tenure, both in the eyes of the community and in their own eyes, is in the main a "prestige value" and a tenure by prestige; and since the prestige that invests their persons is a shadow cast by the putative worth of the community at large, it follows that their particular interest in the joint prestige is peculiarly alert and insistent. but it follows also that these personages cannot of their own substance or of their own motion contribute to this collective prestige in the same proportion in which it is necessary for them to draw on it in support of their own prestige value. it would, in other words, be a patent absurdity to call on any of the current ruling classes, dynasties, nobility, military and diplomatic corps, in any of the nations of europe, e.g., to preserve their current dignity and command the deference that is currently accorded them, by recourse to their own powers and expenditure of their own substance, without the usufruct of the commonalty whose organ of dignity they are. the current prestige value which they enjoy is beyond their unaided powers to create or maintain, without the usufruct of the community. such an enterprise does not lie within the premises of the case. in this bearing, therefore, the first concern with which these personages are necessarily occupied is the procurement and retention of a suitable usufruct in the material resources and good-will of a sufficiently large and industrious population. the requisite good-will in these premises is called loyalty, and its retention by the line of personages that so trade on prestige rests on a superinduced association of ideas, whereby the national honour comes to be confounded in popular apprehension with the prestige of these personages who have the keeping of it. but the potentates and the establishments, civil and military, on whom this prestige value rests will unavoidably come into invidious comparison with others of their kind; and, as invariably happens in matters of invidious comparison, the emulative needs of all the competitors for prestige are "indefinitely extensible," as the phrase of the economists has it. each and several of them incontinently needs a further increment of prestige, and therefore also a further increment of the material assets in men and resources that are needful as ways and means to assert and augment the national honor. it is true, the notion that their prestige value is in any degree conditioned by the material circumstances and the popular imagination of the underlying nation is distasteful to many of these vicars of the national honour. they will incline rather to the persuasion that this prestige value is a distinctive attribute, of a unique order, intrinsic to their own persons. but, plainly, any such detached line of magnates, notables, kings and mandarins, resting their notability on nothing more substantial than a slightly sub-normal intelligence and a moderately scrofulous habit of body could not long continue to command that eager deference that is accounted their due. such a picture of majesty would be sadly out of drawing. there is little conviction and no great dignity to be drawn from the unaided pronouncement: "we're here because, we're here because, we're here because we're here," even when the doggerel is duly given the rhetorical benefit of a "tenure by the grace of god." the personages that carry this dignity require the backing of a determined and patriotic populace in support of their prestige value, and they commonly have no great difficulty in procuring it. and their prestige value is, in effect, proportioned to the volume of material resources and patriotic credulity that can be drawn on for its assertion. it is true, their draught on the requisite sentimental and pecuniary support is fortified with large claims of serviceability to the common good, and these claims are somewhat easily, indeed eagerly, conceded and acted upon; although the alleged benefit to the common good will scarcely be visible except in the light of glory shed by the blazing torch of patriotism. in so far as it is of a material nature the benefit which the constituted authorities so engage to contribute to the common good, or in other words to confer on the common man, falls under two heads: defense against aggression from without; and promotion of the community's material gain. it is to be presumed that the constituted authorities commonly believe more or less implicitly in their own professions in so professing to serve the needs of the common man in these respects. the common defense is a sufficiently grave matter, and doubtless it claims the best affections and endeavour of the citizen; but it is not a matter that should claim much attention at this point in the argument, as bearing on the service rendered the common man by the constituted authorities, taken one with another. any given governmental establishment at home is useful in this respect only as against another governmental establishment elsewhere. so that on the slightest examination it resolves itself into a matter of competitive patriotic enterprise, as between the patriotic aspirations of different nationalities led by different governmental establishments; and the service so rendered by the constituted authorities in the aggregate takes on the character of a remedy for evils of their own creation. it is invariably a defense against the concerted aggressions of other patriots. taken in the large, the common defense of any given nation becomes a detail of the competitive struggle between rival nationalities animated with a common spirit of patriotic enterprise and led by authorities constituted for this competitive purpose. except on a broad basis of patriotic devotion, and except under the direction of an ambitious governmental establishment, no serious international aggression is to be had. the common defense, therefore, is to be taken as a remedy for evils arising out of the working of the patriotic spirit that animates mankind, as brought to bear under a discretionary authority; and in any balance to be struck between the utility and disutility of this patriotic spirit and of its service in the hands of the constituted authorities, it will have to be cancelled out as being at the best a mitigation of some of the disorders brought on by the presence of national governments resting on patriotic loyalty at large. but this common defense is by no means a vacant rubric in any attempted account of modern national enterprise. it is the commonplace and conclusive plea of the dynastic statesmen and the aspiring warlords, and it is the usual blind behind which events are put in train for eventual hostilities. preparation for the common defense also appears unfailingly to eventuate in hostilities. with more or less _bona fides_ the statesmen and warriors plead the cause of the common defense, and with patriotic alacrity the common man lends himself to the enterprise aimed at under that cover. in proportion as the resulting equipment for defense grows great and becomes formidable, the range of items which a patriotically biased nation are ready to include among the claims to be defended grows incontinently larger, until by the overlapping of defensive claims between rival nationalities the distinction between defense and aggression disappears, except in the biased fancy of the rival patriots. of course, no reflections are called for here on the current american campaign of "preparedness." except for the degree of hysteria it appears to differ in no substantial respect from the analogous course of auto-intoxication among the nationalities of europe, which came to a head in the current european situation. it should conclusively serve the turn for any self-possessed observer to call to mind that all the civilised nations of warring europe are, each and several, convinced that they are fighting a defensive war. the aspiration of all right-minded citizens is presumed to be "peace with honour." so that first, as well as last, among those national interests that are to be defended, and in the service of which the substance and affections of the common man are enlisted under the aegis of the national prowess, comes the national prestige, as a matter of course. and the constituted authorities are doubtless sincere and single-minded in their endeavors to advance and defend the national honour, particularly those constituted authorities that hold their place of authority on grounds of fealty; since the national prestige in such a case coalesces with the prestige of the nation's ruler in much the same degree in which the national sovereignty devolves upon the person of its ruler. in so defending or advancing the national prestige, such a dynastic or autocratic overlord, together with the other privileged elements assisting and dependent on him, is occupied with his own interest; his own tenure is a tenure by prestige, and the security of his tenure lies in the continued maintenance of that popular fancy that invests his person with this national prestige and so constitutes him and his retinue of notables and personages its keeper. but it is uniformly insisted by the statesmen--potentates, notables, kings and mandarins--that this aegis of the national prowess in their hands covers also many interests of a more substantial and more tangible kind. these other, more tangible interests of the community have also a value of a direct and personal sort to the dynasty and its hierarchy of privileged subalterns, in that it is only by use of the material forces of the nation that the dynastic prestige can be advanced and maintained. the interest of such constituted authorities in the material welfare of the nation is consequently grave and insistent; but it is evidently an interest of a special kind and is subject to strict and peculiar limitations. the common good, in the material respect, interests the dynastic statesman only as a means to dynastic ends; that is to say, only in so far as it can be turned to account in the achievement of dynastic aims. these aims are "the kingdom, the power and the glory," as the sacred formula phrases the same conception in another bearing. that is to say, the material welfare of the nation is a means to the unfolding of the dynastic power; provided always that this material welfare is not allowed to run into such ramifications as will make the commonwealth an unwieldy instrument in the hands of the dynastic statesmen. national welfare is to the purpose only in so far as it conduces to political success, which is always a question of warlike success in the last resort. the limitation which this consideration imposes on the government's economic policy are such as will make the nation a self-sufficient or self-balanced economic commonwealth. it must be a self-balanced commonwealth at least in such measure as will make it self-sustaining in case of need, in all those matters that bear directly on warlike efficiency. of course, no community can become fully self-sustaining under modern conditions, by use of the modern state of the industrial arts, except by recourse to such drastic measures of repression as would reduce its total efficiency in an altogether intolerable degree. this will hold true even of those nations who, like russia or the united states, are possessed of extremely extensive territories and extremely large and varied resources; but it applies with greatly accentuated force to smaller and more scantily furnished territorial units. peoples living under modern conditions and by use of the modern state of the industrial arts necessarily draw on all quarters of the habitable globe for materials and products which they can procure to the best advantage from outside their own special field so long as they are allowed access to these outlying sources of supply; and any arbitrary limitation on this freedom of traffic makes the conditions of life that much harder, and lowers the aggregate efficiency of the community by that much. national self-sufficiency is to be achieved only by a degree of economic isolation; and such a policy of economic isolation involves a degree of impoverishment and lowered efficiency, but it will also leave the nation readier for warlike enterprise on such a scale as its reduced efficiency will compass. so that the best that can be accomplished along this line by the dynastic statesmen is a shrewd compromise, embodying such a degree of isolation and inhibition as will leave the country passably self-sufficient in case of need, without lowering the national efficiency to such a point as to cripple its productive forces beyond what will be offset by the greater warlike readiness that is so attained. the point to which such a policy of isolation and sufficiency will necessarily be directed is that measure of inhibition that will yield the most facile and effective ways and means of warlike enterprise, the largest product of warlike effectiveness to be had on multiplying the nation's net efficiency into its readiness to take the field. into any consideration of this tactical problem a certain subsidiary factor enters, in that the patriotic temper of the nation is always more or less affected by such an economic policy. the greater the degree of effectual isolation and discrimination embodied in the national policy, the greater will commonly be its effect on popular sentiment in the way of national animosity and spiritual self-sufficiency; which may be an asset of great value for the purposes of warlike enterprise. plainly, any dynastic statesman who should undertake to further the common welfare regardless of its serviceability for warlike enterprise would be defeating his own purpose. he would, in effect, go near to living up to his habitual professions touching international peace, instead of professing to live up to them, as the exigencies of his national enterprise now conventionally require him to do. in effect, he would be _functus officio_. there are two great administrative instruments available for this work of repression and national self-sufficiency at the hands of the imperialistic statesman: the protective tariff, and commercial subvention. the two are not consistently to be distinguished from one another at all points, and each runs out into a multifarious convolution of variegated details; but the principles involved are, after all, fairly neat and consistent. the former is of the nature of a conspiracy in restraint of trade by repression; the latter, a conspiracy to the like effect by subsidised monopoly; both alike act to check the pursuit of industry in given lines by artificially increasing the cost of production for given individuals or classes of producers, and both alike impose a more than proportionate cost on the community within which they take effect. incidentally, both of these methods of inhibition bring a degree, though a less degree, of hardship, to the rest of the industrial world. all this is matter of course to all economic students, and it should, reasonably, be plain to all intelligent persons; but its voluble denial by interested parties, as well as the easy credulity with which patriotic citizens allow themselves to accept the sophistries offered in defense of these measures of inhibition, has made it seem worth while here to recall these commonplaces of economic science. the ground of this easy credulity is not so much infirmity of intellect as it is an exuberance of sentiment, although it may reasonably be believed that its more pronounced manifestations--as, e.g., the high protective tariff--can be had only by force of a formidable cooperation of the two. the patriotic animus is an invidious sentiment of joint prestige; and it needs no argument or documentation to bear out the affirmation that its bias will lend a color of merit and expediency to any proposed measure that can, however speciously, promise an increase of national power or prestige. so that when the statesmen propose a policy of inhibition and mitigated isolation on the professed ground that such a policy will strengthen the nation economically by making it economically self-supporting, as well as ready for any warlike adventure, the patriotic citizen views the proposed measures through the rosy haze of national aspirations and lets the will to believe persuade him that whatever conduces to a formidable national battle-front will also contribute to the common good. at the same time all these national conspiracies in restraint of trade are claimed, with more or less reason, to inflict more or less harm on rival nationalities with whom economic relations are curtailed; and patriotism being an invidious sentiment, the patriotic citizen finds comfort in the promise of mischief to these others, and is all the more prone to find all kinds of merit in proposals that look to such an invidious outcome. in any community imbued with an alert patriotic spirit, the fact that any given circumstance, occurrence or transaction can be turned to account as a means of invidious distinction or invidious discrimination against humanity beyond the national pale, will always go far to procure acceptance of it as being also an article of substantial profit to the community at large, even though the slightest unbiased scrutiny would find it of no ascertainable use in any other bearing than that of invidious mischief. and whatever will bear interpretation as an increment of the nation's power or prowess, in comparison with rival nationalities, will always be securely counted as an item of joint credit, and will be made to serve the collective conceit as an invidious distinction; and patriotic credulity will find it meritorious also in other respects. so, e.g., it is past conception that such a patent imbecility as a protective tariff should enlist the support of any ordinarily intelligent community except by the help of some such chauvinistic sophistry. so also, the various royal establishments of europe, e.g., afford an extreme but therefore all the more convincing illustration of the same logical fallacy. these establishments and personages are great and authentic repositories of national prestige, and they are therefore unreflectingly presumed by their several aggregations of subjects to be of some substantial use also in some other bearing; but it would be a highly diverting exhibition of credulity for any outsider to fall into that amazing misconception. but the like is manifestly true of commercial turnover and export trade among modern peoples; although on this head the infatuation is so ingrained and dogmatic that even a rank outsider is expected to accept the fallacy without reflection, on pain of being rated as unsafe or unsound. such matters again, as the dimensions of the national territory, or the number of the population and the magnitude of the national resources, are still and have perhaps always been material for patriotic exultation, and are fatuously believed to have some great significance for the material fortunes of the common man; although it should be plain on slight reflection that under modern conditions of ownership, these things, one and all, are of no consequence to the common man except as articles of prestige to stimulate his civic pride. the only conjuncture under which these and the like national holdings can come to have a meaning as joint or collective assets would arise in case of a warlike adventure carried to such extremities as would summarily cancel vested rights of ownership and turn them to warlike uses. while the rights of ownership hold, the common man, who does not own these things, draws no profit from their inclusion in the national domain; indeed, he is at some cost to guarantee their safe tenure by their rightful owners. in so pursuing their quest of the kingdom, the power and the glory, by use of the national resources and by sanction of the national spirit, the constituted authorities also assume the guardianship of sundry material interests that are presumed to touch the common good; such as security of person and property in dealings with aliens, whether at home or abroad; security of investment and trade, and vindication of their citizens before the law in foreign parts; and, chiefly and ubiquitously, furtherance and extension of the national trade into foreign parts, particularly of the export trade, on terms advantageous to the traders of the nation. the last named of these advantages is the one on which stress is apt to fall in the argument of all those who advocate an unfolding of national power, as being a matter of vital material benefit to the common man. the other items indicated above, it is plain on the least reflection, are matters of slight if any material consequence to him. the common man--that is ninety-nine and a fraction in one hundred of the nation's common men--has no dealings with aliens in foreign parts, as capitalist, trader, missionary or wayfaring man, and has no occasion for security of person or property under circumstances that raise any remotest question of the national prowess or the national prestige; nor does he seek or aspire to trade to foreign parts on any terms, equitable or otherwise, or to invest capital among aliens under foreign rule, or to exploit concessions or take orders, for acceptance or delivery; nor, indeed, does he at all commonly come into even that degree of contact with abroad that is implied in the purchase of foreign securities. virtually the sole occasion on which he comes in touch with the world beyond the frontier is when, and if, he goes away from home as an emigrant, and so ceases to enjoy the tutelage of the nation's constituted authorities. but the common man, in point of fact, is a home-keeping body, who touches foreign parts and aliens outside the national frontiers only at the second or third remove, if at all, in the occasional purchase of foreign products, or in the sale of goods that may find their way abroad after he has lost sight of them. the exception to this general rule would be found in the case of those under-sized nations that are too small to contain the traffic in which their commonplace population are engaged, and that have neither national prowess nor national prestige to fall back on in a conceivable case of need,--and whose citizens, individually, appear to be as fortunately placed in their workday foreign relations, without a background of prowess and prestige, as the citizens of the great powers who are most abundantly provided in these respects. with wholly negligible exceptions, these matters touch the needs or the sensibilities of the common man only through the channel of the national honour, which may be injured in the hardships suffered by his compatriots in foreign parts, or which may, again, be repaired or enhanced by the meritorious achievements of the same compatriots; of whose existence he will commonly have no other or more substantial evidence, and in whose traffic he has no share other than this vicarious suffering of vague and remote indignity or vainglory by force of the wholly fortuitous circumstance that they are (inscrutably) his compatriots. these immaterial goods of vicarious prestige are, of course, not to be undervalued, nor is the fact to be overlooked or minimised that they enter into the sum total of the common citizen's "psychic income," for whatever they may foot up to; but evidently their consideration takes us back to the immaterial category of prestige value, from which the argument just now was hopefully departing with a view to consideration of the common man's material interest in that national enterprise about which patriotic aspirations turn. these things, then, are matters in which the common man has an interest only as they have a prestige value. but there need be no question as to their touching his sensibilities and stirring him to action, and even to acts of bravery and self-sacrifice. indignity or ill treatment of his compatriots in foreign parts, even when well deserved, as is not infrequently the case, are resented with a vehemence that is greatly to the common man's credit, and greatly also to the gain of those patriotic statesmen who find in such grievances their safest and most reliable raw materials for the production of international difficulty. that he will so respond to the stimulus of these, materially speaking irrelevant, vicissitudes of good or ill that touch the fortunes of his compatriots, as known to him by hearsay, bears witness, of course, to the high quality of his manhood; but it falls very far short of arguing that these promptings of his patriotic spirit have any value as traits that count toward his livelihood or his economic serviceability in the community in which he lives. it is all to his credit, and it goes to constitute him a desirable citizen, in the sense that he is properly amenable to the incitements of patriotic emulation; but it is none the less to be admitted, however reluctantly, that this trait of impulsively vicarious indignation or vainglory is neither materially profitable to himself nor an asset of the slightest economic value to the community in which he lives. quite the contrary, in fact. so also is it true that the common man derives no material advantage from the national success along this line, though he commonly believes that it all somehow inures to his benefit. it would seem that an ingrown bias of community interest, blurred and driven by a jealously sensitive patriotic pride, bends his faith uncritically to match his inclination. his persuasion is a work of preconception rather than of perception. but the most substantial and most unqualified material benefit currently believed to be derivable from a large unfolding of national prowess and a wide extension of the national domain is an increased volume of the nation's foreign trade, particularly of the export trade. "trade follows the flag." and this larger trade and enhanced profit is presumed to inure to the joint benefit of the citizens. such is the profession of faith of the sagacious statesmen and such is also the unreflecting belief of the common man. it may be left an open question if an unfolding of national prowess and prestige increases the nation's trade, whether in imports or in exports. there is no available evidence that it has any effect of the kind. what is not an open question is the patent fact that such an extension of trade confers no benefit on the common man, who is not engaged in the import or export business. more particularly does it yield him no advantage at all commensurate with the cost involved in any endeavour so to increase the volume of trade by increasing the nation's power and extending its dominion. the profits of trade go not to the common man at large but to the traders whose capital is invested; and it is a completely idle matter to the common citizen whether the traders who profit by the nation's trade are his compatriots or not.[ ] [footnote : all this, which should be plain without demonstration, has been repeatedly shown in the expositions of various peace advocates, typically by mr. angell.] the pacifist argument on the economic futility of national ambitions will commonly rest its case at this point; having shown as unreservedly as need be that national ambition and all its works belong of right under that rubric of the litany that speaks of fire, flood and pestilence. but an hereditary bent of human nature is not to be put out of the way with an argument showing that it has its disutilities. so with the patriotic animus; it is a factor to be counted with, rather than to be exorcised. as has been remarked above, in the course of time and change the advance of the industrial arts and of the institutions of ownership have taken such a turn that the working system of industry and business no longer runs on national lines and, indeed, no longer takes account of national frontiers,--except in so far as the national policies and legislation, arbitrarily and partially, impose these frontiers on the workings of trade and industry. the effect of such regulation for political ends is, with wholly negligible exceptions, detrimental to the efficient working of the industrial system under modern conditions; and it is therefore detrimental to the material interests of the common citizen. but the case is not the same as regards the interests of the traders. trade is a competitive affair, and it is to the advantage of the traders engaged in any given line of business to extend their own markets and to exclude competing traders. competition may be the soul of trade, but monopoly is necessarily the aim of every trader. and the national organisation is of service to its traders in so far as it shelters them, wholly or partly, from the competition of traders of other nationalities, or in so far as it furthers their enterprise by subvention or similar privileges as against their competitors, whether at home or abroad. the gain that so comes to the nation's traders from any preferential advantage afforded them by national regulations, or from any discrimination against traders of foreign nationality, goes to the traders as private gain. it is of no benefit to any of their compatriots; since there is no community of usufruct that touches these gains of the traders. so far as concerns his material advantage, it is an idle matter to the common citizen whether he deals with traders of his own nationality or with aliens; both alike will aim to buy cheap and sell dear, and will charge him "what the traffic will bear." nor does it matter to him whether the gains of this trade go to aliens or to his compatriots; in either case equally they immediately pass beyond his reach, and are equally removed from any touch of joint interest on his part. being private property, under modern law and custom he has no use of them, whether a national frontier does or does not intervene between his domicile and that of their owner. these are facts that every man of sound mind knows and acts on without doubt or hesitation in his own workday affairs. he would scarcely even find amusement in so futile a proposal as that his neighbor should share his business profits with him for no better reason than that he is a compatriot. but when the matter is presented as a proposition in national policy and embroidered with an invocation of his patriotic loyalty the common citizen will commonly be found credulous enough to accept the sophistry without abatement. his archaic sense of group solidarity will still lead him at his own cost to favor his trading compatriots by the imposition of onerous trade regulations for their private advantage, and to interpose obstacles in the way of alien traders. all this ingenious policy of self-defeat is greatly helped out by the patriotic conceit of the citizens; who persuade themselves to see in it an accession to the power and prestige of their own nation and a disadvantage to rival nationalities. it is, indeed, more than doubtful if such a policy of self-defeat as is embodied in current international trade discriminations could be insinuated into the legislation of any civilized nation if the popular intelligence were not so clouded with patriotic animosity as to let a prospective detriment to their foreign neighbors count as a gain to themselves. so that the chief material use of the patriotic bent in modern populations, therefore, appears to be its use to a limited class of persons engaged in foreign trade, or in business that comes in competition with foreign industry. it serves their private gain by lending effectual countenance to such restraint of international trade as would not be tolerated within the national domain. in so doing it has also the secondary and more sinister effect of dividing the nations on lines of rivalry and setting up irreconcilable claims and ambitions, of no material value but of far-reaching effect in the way of provocation to further international estrangement and eventual breach of the peace. how all this falls in with the schemes of militant statesmen, and further reacts on the freedom and personal fortunes of the common man, is an extensive and intricate topic, though not an obscure one; and it has already been spoken of above, perhaps as fully as need be. chapter iii on the conditions of a lasting peace the considerations set out in earlier chapters have made it appear that the patriotic spirit of modern peoples is the abiding source of contention among nations. except for their patriotism a breach of the peace among modern peoples could not well be had. so much will doubtless be assented to as a matter of course. it is also a commonplace of current aphoristic wisdom that both parties to a warlike adventure in modern times stand to lose, materially; whatever nominal--that is to say political--gains may be made by one or the other. it has also appeared from these considerations recited in earlier passages that this patriotic spirit prevails throughout, among all civilised peoples, and that it pervades one nation about as ubiquitously as another. nor is there much evidence of a weakening of this sinister proclivity with the passage of time or the continued advance in the arts of life. the only civilized nations that can be counted on as habitually peaceable are those who are so feeble or are so placed as to be cut off from hope of gain through contention. vainglorious arrogance may run at a higher tension among the more backward and boorish nations; but it is not evident that the advance guard among the civilised peoples are imbued with a less complete national self-complacency. if the peace is to be kept, therefore, it will have to be kept by and between peoples made up, in effect, of complete patriots; which comes near being a contradiction in terms. patriotism is useful for breaking the peace, not for keeping it. it makes for national pretensions and international jealously and distrust, with warlike enterprise always in perspective; as a way to national gain or a recourse in case of need. and there is commonly no settled demarkation between these two contrasted needs that urge a patriotic people forever to keep one eye on the chance of a recourse to arms. therefore any calculus of the chances of peace appears to become a reckoning of the forces which may be counted on to keep a patriotic nation in an unstable equilibrium of peace for the time being. as has just been remarked above, among civilised peoples only those nations can be counted on consistently to keep the peace who are so feeble or otherwise so placed as to be cut off from hope of national gain. and these can apparently be so counted on only as regards aggression, not as regards the national defense, and only in so far as they are not drawn into warlike enterprise, collectively, by their more competent neighbors. even the feeblest and most futile of them feels in honour bound to take up arms in defense of such national pretensions as they still may harbour; and all of them harbour such pretensions. in certain extreme cases, which it might seem invidious to specify more explicitly, it is not easy to discover any specific reasons for the maintenance of a national establishment, apart from the vindication of certain national pretensions which would quietly lapse in the absence of a national establishment on whom their vindication is incumbent. of the rest, the greater nations that are spoken of as powers no such general statement will hold. these are the peoples who stand, in matters of national concern, on their own initiative; and the question of peace and war at large is in effect, a question of peace and war among these powers. they are not so numerous that they can be sifted into distinct classes, and yet they differ among themselves in such a way that they may, for the purpose in hand, fairly be ranged under two distinguishable if not contrasted heads: those which may safely be counted on spontaneously to take the offensive, and those which will fight on provocation. typically of the former description are germany and japan. of the latter are the french and british, and less confidently the american republic. in any summary statement of this kind russia will have to be left on one side as a doubtful case, for reasons to which the argument may return at a later point; the prospective course of things in russia is scarcely to be appraised on the ground of its past. spain and italy, being dubious powers at the best, need not detain the argument; they are, in the nature of things, subsidiaries who wait on the main chance. and austria, with whatever the name may cover, is for the immediate purpose to be counted under the head of germany. there is no invidious comparison intended in so setting off these two classes of nations in contrast to one another. it is not a contrast of merit and demerit or of prestige. imperial germany and imperial japan are, in the nature of things as things go, bent in effect on a disturbance of the peace,--with a view to advance the cause of their own dominion. on a large view of the case, such as many german statesmen were in the habit of professing in the years preceding the great war, it may perhaps appear reasonable to say--as they were in the habit of saying--that these imperial powers are as well within the lines of fair and honest dealing in their campaign of aggression as the other powers are in taking a defensive attitude against their aggression. some sort of international equity has been pleaded in justification of their demand for an increased share of dominion. at least it has appeared that these imperial statesmen have so persuaded themselves after very mature deliberation; and they have showed great concern to persuade others of the equity of their imperial claim to something more than the law would allow. these sagacious, not to say astute, persons have not only reached a conviction to this effect, but they have become possessed of this conviction in such plenary fashion that, in the german case, they have come to admit exceptions or abatement of the claim only when and in so far as the campaign of equitable aggression on which they had entered has been proved impracticable by the fortunes of war. with some gift for casuistry one may, at least conceivably, hold that the felt need of imperial self-aggrandisement may become so urgent as to justify, or at least to condone, forcible dispossession of weaker nationalities. this might, indeed it has, become a sufficiently perplexing question of casuistry, both as touches the punctilios of national honour and as regards an equitable division between rival powers in respect of the material means of mastery. so in private life it may become a moot question--in point of equity--whether the craving of a kleptomaniac may not on occasion rise to such an intolerable pitch of avidity as to justify him in seizing whatever valuables he can safely lay hands on, to ease the discomfort of ungratified desire. in private life any such endeavour to better oneself at one's neighbors' cost is not commonly reprobated if it takes effect on a decently large scale and shrewdly within the flexibilities of the law or with the connivance of its officers. governing international endeavours of this class there is no law so inflexible that it can not be conveniently made over to fit particular circumstances. and in the absence of law the felt need of a formal justification will necessarily appeal to the unformulated equities of the case, with some such outcome as alluded to above. all that, of course, is for the diplomatists to take care of. but any speculation on the equities involved in the projected course of empire to which these two enterprising nations are committing themselves must run within the lines of diplomatic parable, and will have none but a speculative interest. it is not a matter of equity. accepting the situation as it stands, it is evident that any peace can only have a qualified meaning, in the sense of armistice, so long as there is opportunity for national enterprise of the character on which these two enterprising national establishments are bent, and so long as these and the like national establishments remain. so, taking the peaceable professions of their spokesmen at a discount of one hundred percent, as one necessarily must, and looking to the circumstantial evidence of the case, it is abundantly plain that at least these two imperial powers may be counted on consistently to manoeuvre for warlike advantage so long as any peace compact holds, and to break the peace so soon as the strategy of imperial enterprise appears to require it. there has been much courteous make-believe of amiable and upright solicitude on this head the past few years, both in diplomatic intercourse and among men out of doors; and since make-believe is a matter of course in diplomatic intercourse it is right and seemly, of course, that no overt recognition of unavowed facts should be allowed to traverse this run of make-believe within the precincts of diplomatic intercourse. but in any ingenuous inquiry into the nature of peace and the conditions of its maintenance there can be no harm in conveniently leaving the diplomatic make-believe on one side and looking to the circumstances that condition the case, rather than to the formal professions designed to mask the circumstances. * * * * * chief among the relevant circumstances in the current situation are the imperial designs of germany and japan. these two national establishments are very much alike. so much so that for the present purpose a single line of analysis will passably cover both cases. the same line of analysis will also apply, with slight adaptation, to more than one of the other powers, or near-powers, of the modern world; but in so far as such is held to be the case, that is not a consideration that weakens the argument as applied to these two, which are to be taken as the consummate type-form of a species of national establishments. they are, between them, the best instance there is of what may be called a dynastic state. except as a possible corrective of internal disorders and discontent, neither of the two states "desires" war; but both are bent on dominion, and as the dominion aimed at is not to be had except by fighting for it, both in effect are incorrigibly bent on warlike enterprise. and in neither case will considerations of equity, humanity, decency, veracity, or the common good be allowed to trouble the quest of dominion. as lies in the nature of the dynastic state, imperial dominion, in the ambitions of both, is beyond price; so that no cost is too high so long as ultimate success attends the imperial enterprise. so much is commonplace knowledge among all men who are at all conversant with the facts. to anyone who harbors a lively sentimental prejudice for or against either or both of the two nations so spoken of, or for or against the manner of imperial enterprise to which both are committed, it may seem that what has just been said of them and their relation to the world's peace runs on something of a bias and conveys something of dispraise and reprobation. such is not the intention, however, though the appearance is scarcely to be avoided. it is necessary for the purposes of the argument unambiguously to recognise the nature of these facts with which the inquiry is concerned; and any plain characterisation of the facts will unavoidably carry a fringe of suggestions of this character, because current speech is adapted for their reprobation. the point aimed at is not this inflection of approval or disapproval. the facts are to be taken impersonally for what they are worth in their causal bearing on the chance of peace or war; not at their sentimental value as traits of conduct to be appraised in point of their goodness or expediency. so seen without prejudice, then, if that may be, this imperial enterprise of these two powers is to be rated as the chief circumstance bearing on the chances of peace and conditioning the terms on which any peace plan must be drawn. evidently, in the presence of these two imperial powers any peace compact will be in a precarious case; equally so whether either or both of them are parties to such compact or not. no engagement binds a dynastic statesman in case it turns out not to further the dynastic enterprise. the question then recurs: how may peace be maintained within the horizon of german or japanese ambitions? there are two obvious alternatives, neither of which promises an easy way out of the quandary in which the world's peace is placed by their presence: submission to their dominion, or elimination of these two powers. either alternative would offer a sufficiently deterrent outlook, and yet any project for devising some middle course of conciliation and amicable settlement, which shall be practicable and yet serve the turn, scarcely has anything better to promise. the several nations now engaged on a war with the greater of these imperial powers hold to a design of elimination, as being the only measure that merits hopeful consideration. the imperial power in distress bespeaks peace and good-will. those advocates, whatever their nationality, who speak for negotiation with a view to a peace compact which is to embrace these states intact, are aiming, in effect, to put things in train for ultimate submission to the mastery of these imperial powers. in these premises an amicable settlement and a compact of perpetual peace will necessarily be equivalent to arranging a period of recuperation and recruiting for a new onset of dynastic enterprise. for, in the nature of the case, no compact binds the dynastic statesman, and no consideration other than the pursuit of imperial dominion commands his attention. there is, of course, no intention to decry this single-mindedness that is habitually put in evidence by the dynastic statesmen. nor should it be taken as evidence of moral obliquity in them. it is rather the result of a peculiar moral attitude or bent, habitual to such statesmen, and in its degree also habitual to their compatriots, and is indispensably involved in the imperial frame of mind. the consummation of imperial mastery being the highest and ubiquitously ulterior end of all endeavour, its pursuit not only relieves its votaries from the observance of any minor obligations that run counter to its needs, but it also imposes a moral obligation to make the most of any opportunity for profitable deceit and chicanery that may offer. in short, the dynastic statesman is under the governance of a higher morality, binding him to the service of his nation's ambition--or in point of fact, to the personal service of his dynastic master--to which it is his dutiful privilege loyally to devote all his powers of force and fraud. democratically-minded persons, who are not moved by the call of loyalty to a gratuitous personal master, may have some difficulty in appreciating the force and the moral austerity of this spirit of devotion to an ideal of dynastic aggrandisement, and in seeing how its paramount exigence will set aside all meticulous scruples of personal rectitude and veracity, as being a shabby with-holding of service due. to such of these doubters as still have retained some remnants of their religious faith this attitude of loyalty may perhaps be made intelligible by calling to mind the analogous self-surrender of the religious devotee. and in this connection it may also be to the purpose to recall that in point of its genesis and derivation that unreserved self-abasement and surrender to the divine ends and guidance, which is the chief grace and glory of the true believer, is held by secular students of these matters to be only a sublimated analogue or counterfeit of this other dutiful abasement that constitutes loyalty to a temporal master. the deity is currently spoken of as the heavenly king, under whose dominion no sinner has a right that he is bound to respect; very much after the fashion in which no subject of a dynastic state has a right which the state is bound to respect. indeed, all these dynastic establishments that so seek the kingdom, the power and the glory are surrounded with a penumbra of divinity, and it is commonly a bootless question where the dynastic powers end and the claims of divinity begin. there is something of a coalescence.[ ] [footnote : "to us the state is the most indispensable as well as the highest requisite to our earthly existence.... all individualistic endeavor ... must be unreservedly subordinated to this lofty claim.... the state ... eventually is of infinitely more value than the sum of all the individuals within its jurisdiction." "this conception of the state, which is as much a part of our life as is the blood in our veins, is nowhere to be found in the english constitution, and is quite foreign to english thought, and to that of america as well."--eduard meyer, _england, its political organisation and development and the war against germany_, translated by h.s. white. boston . pp. - .] the kaiser holds dominion by divine grace and is accountable to none but god, if to him. the whole case is in a still better state of repair as touches the japanese establishment, where the emperor is a lineal descendant of the supreme deity, amaterazu (_o mi kami_), and where, by consequence, there is no line of cleavage between a divine and a secular mastery. pursuant to this more unqualified authenticity of autocratic rule, there is also to be found in this case a correspondingly unqualified devotion in the subjects and an unqualified subservience to dynastic ends on the part of the officers of the crown. the coalescence of dynastic rule with the divine order is less complete in the german case, but all observers bear witness that it all goes far enough also in the german case. this state of things is recalled here as a means of making plain that the statesmen of these imperial powers must in the nature of the case, and without blame, be drawn out from under the customary restraint of those principles of vulgar morality that are embodied in the decalogue. it is not that the subject, or--what comes to the same thing--the servant of such a dynastic state may not be upright, veracious and humane in private life, but only that he must not be addicted to that sort of thing in such manner or degree as might hinder his usefulness for dynastic purposes. these matters of selfishly individual integrity and humanity have no weight as against the exigencies of the dynastic enterprise. these considerations may not satisfy all doubters as to the moral sufficiency of these motives that so suffice to decide the dynastic statesmen on their enterprise of aggression by force and fraud; but it should be evident that so long as these statesmen continue in the frame of mind spoken of, and so long as popular sentiment in these countries continues, as hitherto, to lend them effectual support in the pursuit of such imperial enterprise, so long it must also remain true that no enduring peace can be maintained within the sweep of their imperial ambition. any peace compact would necessarily be, in effect, an armistice terminable at will and serving as a season of preparation to meet a deferred opportunity. for the peaceable nations it would, in effect, be a respite and a season of preparation for eventual submission to the imperial rule. by advocates of such a negotiated compact of perpetual peace it has been argued that the populace underlying these imperial powers will readily be brought to realise the futility and inexpediency of such dynastic enterprise, if only the relevant facts are brought to their knowledge, and that so these powers will be constrained to keep the peace by default of popular support for their warlike projects. what is required, it is believed by these sanguine persons, is that information be competently conveyed to the common people of these warlike nations, showing them that they have nothing to apprehend in the way of aggression or oppressive measures from the side of their more peaceable neighbours; whereupon their warlike animus will give place to a reasonable and enlightened frame of mind. this argument runs tacitly or explicitly, on the premise that these peoples who have so enthusiastically lent themselves to the current warlike enterprise are fundamentally of the same racial complexion and endowed with the same human nature as their peaceable neighbours, who would be only too glad to keep the peace on any terms of tolerable security from aggression. if only a fair opportunity is offered for the interested peoples to come to an understanding, it is held, a good understanding will readily be reached; at least so far as to result in a reasonable willingness to submit questions in dispute to an intelligent canvass and an equitable arbitration. projects for a negotiated peace compact, to include the dynastic states, can hold any prospect of a happy issue only if this line of argument, or its equivalent, is pertinent and conclusive; and the argument is to the point only in so far as its premises are sound and will carry as far as the desired conclusion. therefore a more detailed attention to the premises on which it runs will be in place, before any project of the kind is allowed to pass inspection. as to homogeneity of race and endowment among the several nations in question, the ethnologists, who are competent to speak of that matter, are ready to assert that this homogeneity goes much farther among the nations of europe than any considerable number of peace advocates would be ready to claim. in point of race, and broadly speaking, there is substantially no difference between these warring nations, along any east-and-west line; while the progressive difference in racial complexion that is always met with along any north-and-south line, nowhere coincides with a national or linguistic frontier. in no case does a political division between these nations mark or depend on a difference of race or of hereditary endowment. and, to give full measure, it may be added that also in no case does a division of classes within any one of these nations, into noble and base, patrician and plebeian, lay and learned, innocent and vicious, mark or rest on any slightest traceable degree of difference in race or in heritable endowment. on the point of racial homogeneity there is no fault to find with the position taken. if the second postulate in this groundwork of premises on which the advocates of negotiable peace base their hopes were as well taken there need be no serious misgiving as to the practicability of such a plan. the plan counts on information, persuasion and reflection to subdue national animosities and jealousies, at least in such measure as would make them amenable to reason. the question of immediate interest on this head, therefore, would be as to how far this populace may be accessible to the contemplated line of persuasion. at present they are, notoriously, in a state of obsequious loyalty to the dynasty, single-minded devotion to the fortunes of the fatherland, and uncompromising hatred of its enemies. in this frame of mind there is nothing that is new, except the degree of excitement. the animus, it will be recalled, was all there and on the alert when the call came, so that the excitement came on with the sweep of a conflagration on the first touch of a suitable stimulus. the german people at large was evidently in a highly unstable equilibrium, so that an unexampled enthusiasm of patriotic self-sacrifice followed immediately on the first incitement to manslaughter, very much as if the nation had been held under an hypnotic spell. one need only recall the volume of overbearing magniloquence that broke out all over the place in that beginning, when the day was believed to be dawning. such a popular frame of mind is not a transient episode, to be created at short notice and put aside for a parcel of salutary advice. the nation that will make such a massive concerted move with the alacrity shown in this instance must be living in a state of alert readiness for just such an onset. yet this is not to be set down as anything in the way of a racial trait specifically distinguishing the german people from those other adjacent nationalities that are incapable of a similarly swift and massive response to the appeal of patriotism. these adjacent nationalities are racially identical with the german people, but they do not show the same warlike abandon in nearly the same degree. but for all that, it is a national trait, not to be acquired or put away by taking thought. it is just here that the line of definition runs: it is a national trait, not a racial one. it is not nature, but it is second nature. but a national trait, while it is not heritable in the simple sense of that term, has the same semblance, or the same degree, of hereditary persistence that belongs to the national institutions, usages, conventionalities, beliefs, which distinguish the given nation from its neighbors. in this instance it may be said more specifically that this eager loyalty is a heritage of the german people at large in the same sense and with the same degree of permanence as the institution of an autocratic royalty has among them, or a privileged nobility. indeed, it is the institutional counterfoil of these establishments. it is of an institutional character, just as the corresponding sense of national solidarity and patriotic devotion is among the neighboring peoples with whom the german nation comes in comparison. and an institution is an historical growth, with just so much of a character of permanence and continuity of transmission as is given it by the circumstances out of which it has grown. any institution is a product of habit, or perhaps more accurately it is a body of habits of thought bearing on a given line of conduct, which prevails with such generality and uniformity throughout the group as to have become a matter of common sense. such an article of institutional furniture is an outcome of usage, not of reflection or deliberate choice; and it has consequently a character of self-legitimation, so that it stands in the accredited scheme of things as intrinsically right and good, and not merely as a shrewdly chosen expedient _ad interim_. it affords a norm of life, inosculating with a multiplicity of other norms, with which it goes to make up a balanced scheme of ends, ways and means governing human conduct; and no one such institutional item, therefore, is materially to be disturbed, discarded or abated except at the cost of serious derangement to the balanced scheme of things in which it belongs as an integral constituent. nor can such a detail norm of conduct and habitual propensity come into bearing and hold its place, except by force of habituation which is at the same time consonant with the common run of habituation to which the given community is subject. it follows that the more rigorous, comprehensive, unremitting and long-continued the habituation to which a given institutional principle owes its vogue, the more intimately and definitively will it be embedded in the common sense of the community, the less chance is there of its intrinsic necessity being effectually questioned or doubted, and the less chance is there of correcting it or abating its force in case circumstances should so change as to make its continued rule visibly inexpedient. its abatement will be a work not of deliberation and design, but of defection through disuse. not that reflection and sane counsel will count for nothing in these premises, but only that these exertions of intelligence will count for relatively very little by comparison with the run of habituation as enforced by the circumstances conditioning any given case; and further, that wise counsel and good resolutions can take effect in the way of amending any untoward institutional bent only by way of suitable habituation, and only at such a rate of change as the circumstances governing habituation will allow. it is, at the best, slow work to shift the settled lines of any community's scheme of common sense. now, national solidarity, and more particularly an unquestioning loyalty to the sovereign and the dynasty, is a matter of course and of commonsense necessity with the german people. it is not necessary to call to mind that the japanese nation, which has here been coupled with the german, are in the same case, only more so. doubtless it would be exceeding the premises to claim that it should necessarily take the german people as long-continued and as harsh a schooling to unlearn their excess of chauvinism, their servile stooping to gratuitous authority, and their eager subservience to the dynastic ambitions of their masters, as that which has in the course of history induced these habits in them. but it would seem reasonable to expect that there should have to be some measure of proportion between what it has cost them in time and experience to achieve their current frame of mind in this bearing and what it would cost to divest themselves of it. it is a question of how long a time and how exacting a discipline would be required so far to displace the current scheme of commonsense values and convictions in force in the fatherland as to neutralise their current high-wrought principles of servility, loyalty and national animosity; and on the solution of this difficulty appear to depend the chances of success for any proposed peace compact to which the german nation shall be made a party, on terms of what is called an "honorable peace." the national, or rather the dynastic and warlike, animus of this people is of the essence of their social and political institutions. without such a groundwork of popular sentiment neither the national establishment, nor the social order on which it rests and through which it works, could endure. and with this underlying national sentiment intact nothing but a dynastic establishment of a somewhat ruthless order, and no enduring system of law and order not based on universal submission to personal rule, could be installed. both the popular animus and the correlative coercive scheme of law and order are of historical growth. both have been learned, acquired, and are in no cogent sense original with the german people. but both alike and conjointly have come out of a very protracted, exacting and consistent discipline of mastery and subjection, running virtually unbroken over the centuries that have passed since the region that is now the fatherland first passed under the predaceous rule of its teutonic invaders,--for no part of the "fatherland" is held on other tenure than that of forcible seizure in ancient times by bands of invaders, with the negligible exception of holstein and a slight extent of territory adjoining that province to the south and south-west. since the time when such peoples as were overtaken in this region by the germanic barbarian invasions, and were reduced to subjection and presently merged with their alien masters, the same general fashion of law and order that presently grew out of that barbarian conquest has continued to govern the life of those peoples, with relatively slight and intermittent relaxation of its rigors. contrasted with its beginnings, in the shameful atrocities of the dark ages and the prehistoric phases of this german occupation, the later stages of this system of coercive law and order in the fatherland will appear humane, not to say genial; but as compared with the degree of mitigation which the like order of things presently underwent elsewhere in western europe, it has throughout the historical period preserved a remarkable degree of that character of arrogance and servility which it owes to its barbarian and predatory beginnings. * * * * * the initial stages of this germanic occupation of the fatherland are sufficiently obscure under the cloud of unrecorded antiquity that covers them; and then, an abundance of obscurantism has also been added by the vapours of misguided vanity that have surrounded so nearly all historical inquiry on the part of patriotic german scholars. yet there are certain outstanding features in the case, in history and prehistory, that are too large or too notorious to be set aside or to be covered over, and these may suffice to show the run of circumstances which have surrounded the german peoples and shaped their civil and political institutions, and whose discipline has guided german habits of thought and preserved the german spirit of loyalty in the shape in which it underlies the dynastic state of the present day. among the most engaging of those fables that make the conventional background of german history is the academic legend of a free agricultural village community made up of ungraded and masterless men. it is not necessary here to claim that such a village community never played a part in the remoter prehistoric experiences out of which the german people, or their ruling classes, came into the territory of the fatherland; such a claim might divert the argument. but it is sufficiently patent to students of those matters today that no such community of free and ungraded men had any part in the germanic beginnings; that is to say, in the early experiences of the fatherland under german rule. the meager and ambiguous remarks of tacitus on the state of domestic and civil economy among the inhabitants of germany need no longer detain anyone, in the presence of the available archaeological and historical evidence. the circumstantial evidence of the prehistoric antiquities which touch this matter, as well as the slight allusions of historical records in antiquity, indicate unambiguously enough that when the germanic immigrants moved into the territories of the fatherland they moved in as invaders, or rather as marauders, and made themselves masters of the people already living on the land. and history quite as unambiguously declares that when the fatherland first comes under its light it presents a dark and bloody ground of tumultuous contention and intrigue; where princes and princelings, captains of war and of rapine as well as the captains of superstition, spend the substance of an ignominiously sordid and servile populace in an endless round of mutual raiding, treachery, assassinations and supersession. taken at their face value, the recorded stories of that early time would leave one to infer that the common people, whose industry supported this superstructure of sordid mastery, could have survived only by oversight. but touched as it is with poetic license and devoted to the admirable life of the master class--admirable in their own eyes and in those of their chroniclers, as undoubtedly also in the eyes of the subject populace--the history of that time doubtless plays up the notable exploits and fortunes of its conspicuous personages, somewhat to the neglect of the obscure vicissitudes of life and fortune among that human raw material by use of which the admirable feats of the master class were achieved, and about the use of which the dreary traffic of greed and crime went on among the masters. of the later history, what covers, say, the last one thousand years, there is no need to speak at length. with transient, episodic, interruptions it is for the fatherland a continuation out of these beginnings, leading out into a more settled system of subjection and mastery and a progressively increased scale of princely enterprise, resting on an increasingly useful and increasingly loyal populace. in all this later history the posture of things in the fatherland is by no means unique, nor is it even strikingly peculiar, by contrast with the rest of western europe, except in degree. it is of the same general kind as the rest of what has gone to make the historical advance of medieval and modern times; but it differs from the generality in a more sluggish movement and a more tenacious adherence to what would be rated as the untoward features of mediaevalism. the approach to a modern scheme of institutions and modern conceptions of life and of human values has been slow, and hitherto incomplete, as compared with those communities that have, for good or ill, gone farthest along the ways of modernity. habituation to personal subjection and subservience under the rigorous and protracted discipline of standardised service and fealty has continued later, and with later and slighter mitigation, in the fatherland; so as better to have conserved the spiritual attitude of the feudal order. law and order in the fatherland has in a higher degree continued to mean unquestioning obedience to a personal master and unquestioning subservience to the personal ambitions of the master. and since freedom, in the sense of discretionary initiative on the part of the common man, does not fit into the framework of such a system of dependence on personal authority and surveillance, any degree of such free initiative will be "licence" in the eyes of men bred into the framework of this system; whereas "liberty," as distinct from "licence," is not a matter of initiative and self-direction, but of latitude in the service of a master. hence no degree of curtailment in this delegated "liberty" will be resented or repudiated by popular indignation, so long as the master to whom service is due can give assurance that it is expedient for his purposes. the age-long course of experience and institutional discipline out of which the current german situation has come may be drawn schematically to the following effect: in the beginning a turmoil of conquest, rapine, servitude, and contention between rival bands of marauders and their captains, gradually, indeed imperceptibly, fell into lines of settled and conventionalised exploitation; with repeated interruptions due to new incursions and new combinations of rapacious chieftains. out of it all in the course of time came a feudal régime, under which personal allegiance and service to petty chiefs was the sole and universal accredited bond of solidarity. as the outcome of further unremitting intrigue and contention among feudal chiefs, of high and low degree, the populace fell into larger parcels, under the hands of feudal lords of larger dominion, and the bias of allegiance and service came to hold with some degree of permanence and uniformity, or at least of consistency, over a considerable reach of country, including its inhabitants. with the rise of states came allegiance to a dynasty, as distinguished from the narrower and more ephemeral allegiance to the semi-detached person of a victorious prince; and the relative permanence of territorial frontiers under this rule gave room for an effectual recrudescence of the ancient propensity to a sentimental group solidarity; in which the accredited territorial limits of the dynastic dominion served to outline the group that so was felt to belong together under a joint dispensation and with something of a joint interest in matters of fame and fortune. as the same notion is more commonly and more suggestively expressed, a sense of nationality arose within the sweep of the dynastic rule. this sense of community interest that is called nationality so came in to reenforce the sense of allegiance to the dynastic establishment and so has coalesced with it to produce that high-wrought loyalty to the state, that draws equally on the sentiment of community interest in the nation and on the prescriptive docility to the dynastic head. the sense of national solidarity and of feudal loyalty and service have coalesced, to bring this people to that climax of patriotic devotion beyond which there lies no greater height along this way. but this is also as far as the german people have gone; and it is scarcely to be claimed that the japanese have yet reached this stage; they would rather appear to be, essentially, subjects of the emperor, and only inchoately a japanese nation. of the german people it seems safe to say that they have achieved such a coalescence of unimpaired feudal fealty to a personal master and a full-blown sense of national solidarity, without any perceptible slackening in either strand of the double tie which so binds them in the service of the dynastic state. germany, in other words, is somewhat in arrears, as compared with those europeans that have gone farthest along this course of institutional growth, or perhaps rather institutional permutation. it is not that this retardation of the german people in this matter of national spirit is to be counted as an infirmity, assuredly not as a handicap in the pursuit of that national prestige on which all patriotic endeavour finally converges. for this purpose the failure to distinguish between the ambitions of the dynastic statesmen and the interests of the commonwealth is really a prodigious advantage, which their rivals, of more mature growth politically, have lost by atrophy of this same dynastic axiom of subservience. these others, of whom the french and the english-speaking peoples make up the greater part and may be taken as the typical instance, have had a different history, in part. the discipline of experience has left a somewhat different residue of habits of thought embedded in their institutional equipment and effective as axiomatic premises in their further apprehension of what is worth while, and why. it is not that the difference between these two contrasted strains of the western civilisation is either profound or very pronounced; it is perhaps rather to be stated as a difference of degree than of kind; a retardation of spiritual growth, in respect of the prevalent and controlling habits of thought on certain heads, in the one case as against the other. therefore any attempt to speak with sufficient definition, so as to bring out this national difference of animus in any convincing way, will unavoidably have an appearance of overstatement, if not also of bias. and in any case, of course, it is not to be expected that the national difference here spoken for can be brought home to the apprehension of any unspoiled son of the fatherland, since it does not lie within that perspective. it is not of the nature of a divergence, but rather a differential in point of cultural maturity, due to a differential in the rate of progression through that sequence of institutional phases through which the civilised peoples of europe, jointly and severally, have been led by force of circumstance. in this movement out of the dark ages and onward, circumstances have fallen out differently for those europeans that chanced to live within the confines of the fatherland, different with such effect as to have in the present placed these others at a farther remove from the point of departure, leaving them furnished with less of that archaic frame of mind that is here in question. possessed of less, but by no means shorn of all--perhaps not of the major part--of that barbaric heritage. circumstances have so fallen out that these--typically the french and the english-speaking peoples--have left behind and partly forgotten that institutional phase in which the people of imperial germany now live and move and have their being. the french partly because they--that is the common people of the french lands--entered the procession with a very substantial lead, having never been put back to a point abreast of their neighbors across the rhine, in that phase of european civilisation from which the peoples of the fatherland tardily emerged into the feudal age. so, any student who shall set out to account for the visible lead which the french people still so obstinately maintain in the advance of european culture, will have to make up his account with this notable fact among the premises of his inquiry, that they have had a shorter course to cover and have therefore, in the sporting phrase, had the inside track. they measure from a higher datum line. among the advantages which so have come, in a sense unearned, to the french people, is their uninterrupted retention, out of roman--and perhaps pre-roman--times, of the conception of a commonwealth, a community of men with joint and mutual interests apart from any superimposed dependence on a joint feudal superior. the french people therefore became a nation, with unobtrusive facility, so soon as circumstances permitted, and they are today the oldest "nation" in europe. they therefore were prepared from long beforehand, with an adequate principle (habit of thought) of national cohesion and patriotic sentiment, to make the shift from a dynastic state to a national commonwealth whenever the occasion for such a move should arise; that is to say, whenever the dynastic state, by a suitable conjunction of infirmity and irksomeness, should pass the margin of tolerance in this people's outraged sense of national shame. the case of the german people in their latterday attitude toward dynastic vagaries may afford a term of comparison. these appear yet incapable of distinguishing between national shame and dynastic ambition. by a different course and on lines more nearly parallel with the life-history of the german peoples, the english-speaking peoples have reached what is for the present purpose much the same ground as the french, in that they too have made the shift from the dynastic state to the national commonwealth. the british started late, but the discipline of servitude and unmitigated personal rule in their case was relatively brief and relatively ineffectual; that is to say, as compared with what their german cousins had to endure and to learn in the like connection. so that the british never learned the lesson of dynastic loyalty fully by heart; at least not the populace; whatever may be true for the privileged classes, the gentlemen, whose interests were on the side of privilege and irresponsible mastery. here as in the french case it was the habits of thought of the common man, not of the class of gentlemen, that made the obsolescence of the dynastic state a foregone conclusion and an easy matter--as one speaks of easy achievement in respect of matters of that magnitude. it is now some two and a half centuries since this shift in the national point of view overtook the english-speaking community. perhaps it would be unfair to say that that period, or that period plus what further time may yet have to be added, marks the interval by which german habits of thought in these premises are in arrears, but it is not easy to find secure ground for a different and more moderate appraisal. the future, of course, is not to be measured in terms of the past, and the tempo of the present and of the calculable future is in many bearings very different from that which has ruled even in the recent historical past. but then, on the other hand, habituation always requires time; more particularly such habituation as is to take effect throughout a populous nation and is counted on to work a displacement of a comprehensive institutional system and of a people's outlook on life. germany is still a dynastic state. that is to say, its national establishment is, in effect, a self-appointed and irresponsible autocracy which holds the nation in usufruct, working through an appropriate bureaucratic organisation, and the people is imbued with that spirit of abnegation and devotion that is involved in their enthusiastically supporting a government of that character. now, it is in the nature of a dynastic state to seek dominion, that being the whole of its nature. and a dynastic establishment which enjoys the unqualified usufruct of such resources as are placed at its disposal by the feudalistic loyalty of the german people runs no chance of keeping the peace, except on terms of the unconditional surrender of all those whom it may concern. no solemn engagement and no pious resolution has any weight in the balance against a cultural fatality of this magnitude. * * * * * this account of the derivation and current state of german nationalism will of course appear biased to anyone who has been in the habit of rating german culture high in all its bearings, and to whom at the same time the ideals of peace and liberty appeal. indeed, such a critic, gifted with the due modicum of asperity, might well be provoked to call it all a more or less ingenious diatribe of partisan malice. but it can be so construed only by those who see the question at issue as a point of invidious distinction between this german animus on the one hand and the corresponding frame of mind of the neighboring peoples on the other hand. there may also appear to the captious to be some air of deprecation about the characterisation here offered of the past history of political traffic within the confines of the fatherland. all of which, of course, touches neither the veracity of the characterisation nor the purpose with which so ungrateful a line of analysis and exposition has been entered upon. it is to be regretted if facts that may flutter the emotions of one and another among the sensitive and unreflecting can not be drawn into such an inquiry without having their cogency discounted beforehand on account of the sentimental value imputed to them. of course no offense is intended and no invidious comparison is aimed at. even if the point of it all were an invidious comparison it would immediately have to be admitted that the net showing in favor of these others, e.g., the french or the english-speaking peoples, is by no means so unreservedly to their credit as such a summary statement of the german case might seem to imply. as bearing on the chances of a peace contingent upon the temper of the contracting nationalities, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that such a peace compact would hold indefinitely even if it depended solely on the pacific animus of these others that have left the dynastic state behind. these others, in fact, are also not yet out of the woods. they may not have the same gift of gratuitous and irresponsible truculence as their german cousins, in the same alarming degree; but as was said in an earlier passage, they too are ready to fight on provocation. they are patriotic to a degree; indeed to such a degree that anything which visibly touches the national prestige will readily afford a _casus belli_. but it remains true that the popular temper among them is of the defensive order; perhaps of an unnecessarily enthusiastic defensive order, but after all in such a frame of mind as leaves them willing to let well enough alone, to live and let live. and herein appears to lie the decisive difference between those peoples whose patriotic affections center about the fortunes of an impersonal commonwealth and those in whom is superadded a fervent aspiration for dynastic ascendency. the latter may be counted on to break the peace when a promising opportunity offers. the contrast may be illustrated, though not so sharply as might be desirable, in the different temper shown by the british people in the boer war on the one hand, as compared with the popularity of the french-prussian war among the german people on the other hand. both were aggressive wars, and both were substantially unprovoked. diplomatically speaking, of course, sufficient provocation was found in either case, as how should it not? but in point of substantial provocation and of material inducement, both were about equally gratuitous. in either case the war could readily have been avoided without material detriment to the community and without perceptible lesion to the national honour. both were "engineered" on grounds shamelessly manufactured _ad hoc_ by interested parties; in the one case by a coterie of dynastic statesmen, in the other by a junta of commercial adventurers and imperialistic politicians. in neither case had the people any interest of gain or loss in the quarrel, except as it became a question of national prestige. but both the german and the british community bore the burden and fought the campaign to a successful issue for those interested parties who had precipitated the quarrel. the british people at large, it is true, bore the burden; which comes near being all that can be said in the way of popular approval of this war, which political statesmen have since then rated as one of the most profitable enterprises in which the forces of the realm have been engaged. on the subject of this successful war the common man is still inclined to cover his uneasy sense of decency with a recital of extenuating circumstances. what parallels all this in the german case is an outbreak of patriotic abandon and an admirable spirit of unselfish sacrifice in furtherance of the dynastic prestige, an intoxication of patriotic blare culminating in the triumphant coronation at versailles. nor has the sober afterthought of the past forty-six years cast a perceptible shadow of doubt across the glorious memory of that patriotic debauch. such is the difference of animus between a body of patriotic citizens in a modern commonwealth on the one hand and the loyal subjects of a dynastic state on the other hand. there need be no reflections on the intrinsic merits of either. seen in dispassionate perspective from outside the turmoil, there is not much to choose, in point of sane and self-respecting manhood, between the sluggish and shamefaced abettor of a sordid national crime, and a ranting patriot who glories in serving as cat's-paw to a syndicate of unscrupulous politicians bent on dominion for dominion's sake. but the question here is not as to the relative merits or the relative manhood contents of the two contrasted types of patriot. doubtless both and either have manhood enough and to spare; at least, so they say. but the point in question is the simpler and nowise invidious one, as to the availability of both or either for the perpetuation of the world's peace under a compact of vigilant neutrality. plainly the german frame of mind admits of no neutrality; the quest of dominion is not compatible with neutrality, and the substantial core of german national life is still the quest of dominion under dynastic tutelage. how it stands with the spirit that has repeatedly come in sight in the international relations of the british community is a question harder to answer. it may be practicable to establish a peace of neutrals on the basis of such national spirit as prevails among these others--the french and english-speaking peoples, together with the minor nationalities that cluster about the north sea--because their habitual attitude is that of neutrality, on the whole and with allowance for a bellicose minority in all these countries. by and large, these peoples have come to the tolerant attitude that finds expression in the maxim, live and let live. but they are all and several sufficiently patriotic. it may, indeed, prove that they are more than sufficiently patriotic for the purposes of a neutral peace. they stand for peace, but it is "peace with honour;" which means, in more explicit terms, peace with undiminished national prestige. now, national prestige is a very particular commodity, as has been set out in earlier passages of this inquiry; and a peace which is to be kept only on terms of a jealous maintenance of the national honour is likely to be in a somewhat precarious case. if, and when, the national honour is felt to require an enhanced national ascendancy, the case for a neutral peace immediately becomes critical. and the greater the number and diversity of pretensions and interests that are conceived to be bound up with the national honour, the more unstable will the resulting situation necessarily be. the upshot of all this recital of considerations appears to be that a neutral peace compact may, or it may not, be practicable in the absence of such dynastic states as germany and japan; whereas it has no chance in the presence of these enterprising national establishments. no one will be readier or more voluble in exclaiming against the falsity of such a discrimination as is here attempted, between the democratic and the dynastic nations of the modern world, than the spokesmen of these dynastic powers. no one is more outspoken in professions of universal peace and catholic amity than these same spokesmen of the dynastic powers; and nowhere is there more urgent need of such professions. official and "inspired" professions are, of course, to be overlooked; at least, so charity would dictate. but there have, in the historic present, been many professions of this character made also by credible spokesmen of the german, and perhaps of the japanese, people, and in all sincerity. by way of parenthesis it should be said that this is not intended to apply to expressions of conviction and intention that have come out of germany these two years past (december ). without questioning the credibility of these witnesses that have borne witness to the pacific and genial quality of national sentiment in the german people, it will yet be in place to recall the run of facts in the national life of germany in this historical present and the position of these spokesmen in the german community. * * * * * the german nation is of a peculiar composition in respect of its social structure. so far as bears on the question in hand, it is made up of three distinctive constituent factors, or perhaps rather categories or conditions of men. the populace is of course the main category, and in the last resort always the main and decisive factor. next in point of consequence as well as of numbers and initiative is the personnel of the control,--the ruling class, the administration, the official community, the hierarchy of civil and political servants, or whatever designation may best suit; the category comprises that pyramidal superstructure of privilege and control whereof the sovereign is the apex, and in whom, under any dynastic rule, is in effect vested the usufruct of the populace. these two classes or conditions of men, the one of which orders and the other obeys, make up the working structure of the nation, and they also between them embody the national life and carry forward the national work and aim. intermediate between them, or rather beside them and overlapping the commissure, is a third category whose life articulates loosely with both the others at the same time that it still runs along in a semi-detached way. this slighter but more visible, and particularly more audible, category is made up of the "intellectuals," as a late, and perhaps vulgar, designation would name them. these are they who chiefly communicate with the world outside, and at the same time they do what is academically called thinking. they are in intellectual contact and communication with the world at large, in a contact of give and take, and they think and talk in and about those concepts that go in under the caption of the humanities in the world at large. the category is large enough to constitute an intellectual community, indeed a community of somewhat formidable magnitude, taken in absolute terms, although in percentages of the population at large their numbers will foot up to only an inconsiderable figure. their contact with the superior class spoken of above is fairly close, being a contact, in the main, of service on the one side and of control on the other. with the populace their contact and communion is relatively slight, the give and take in the case being neither intimate nor far-reaching. more particularly is there a well-kept limit of moderation on any work of indoctrination or intellectual guidance which this class may carry down among the people at large, dictated and enforced by dynastic expediency. this category, of the intellectuals, is sufficiently large to live its own life within itself, without drawing on the spiritual life of the community at large, and of sufficiently substantial quality to carry its own peculiar scheme of intellectual conventions and verities. of the great and highly meritorious place and work of these intellectuals in the scheme of german culture it is needless to speak. what is to the point is that they are the accredited spokesmen of the german nation in all its commonplace communication with the rest of civilised europe. the intellectuals have spoken with conviction and sincerity of the spiritual state of the german people, but in so doing, and in so far as bears on the character of german nationalism, they have been in closer contact, intellectually and sympathetically, with the intellectual and spiritual life of civilised europe at large than with the movements of the spirit among the german populace. and their canvassing of the concepts which so have come under their attention from over the national frontiers has been carried forward--so far, again, as bears on the questions that are here in point--with the german-dynastic principles, logic and mechanism of execution under their immediate observation and supplying the concrete materials for inquiry. indeed, it holds true, by and large, that nothing else than this german-dynastic complement of ways and means has, or can effectually, come under their observation in such a degree of intimacy as to give body and definition to the somewhat abstract theorems on cultural aims and national preconceptions that have come to them from outside. in short, they have borrowed these theoretical formulations from abroad, without the concrete apparatus of ways and means in which these theorems are embodied in their foreign habitat, and have so found themselves construing these theoretical borrowings in the only concrete terms of which they have had first-hand and convincing knowledge. such an outcome would be fairly unavoidable, inasmuch as these intellectuals, however much they are, in the spirit, citizens of the cosmopolitan republic of knowledge and intelligence, they are after all, _in propria persona_, immediately and unremittingly subjects of the german-dynastic state; so that all their detail thinking on the aims, ways and means of life, in all its civil and political bearings, is unavoidably shaped by the unremitting discipline of their workday experience under this dynastic scheme. the outcome has been that while they have taken up, as they have understood them, the concepts that rule the civic life of these other, maturer nations, they have apprehended and developed these theorems of civic life in the terms and by the logic enforced in that system of control and surveillance known to them by workday experience,--the only empirical terms at hand. the apex of growth and the center of diffusion as regards the modern culture in respect of the ideals and logic of civic life--other phases of this culture than this its civil aspect do not concern the point here in question--this apex of growth and center of diffusion lie outside the fatherland, in an environment alien to the german institutional scheme. yet so intrinsic to the cultural drift of modern mankind are these aims and this logic, that in taking over and further enriching the intellectual heritage of this modern world the intellectuals of the fatherland have unavoidably also taken over those conceptions of civil initiative and masterless self-direction that rule the logic of life in a commonwealth of ungraded men. they have taken these over and assimilated them as best their experience would permit. but workday experience and its exigencies are stubborn things; and in this process of assimilation of these alien conceptions of right and honest living, it is the borrowed theorems concerning civic rights and duties that have undergone adaptation and revision, not the concrete system of ways and means in which these principles, so accepted, are to be put in practice. necessarily so, since in the german scheme of law and order the major premise is the dynastic state, whereas the major premise of the modern civilised scheme of civic life is the absence of such an organ. so, the development and elaboration of these modern principles of civic liberty--and this elaboration has taken on formidable dimensions--under the hand of the german intellectuals has uniformly run out into pickwickian convolutions, greatly suggestive of a lost soul seeking a place to rest. with unquestionably serious purpose and untiring endeavour, they have sought to embody these modern civilised preconceptions in terms afforded by, or in terms compatible with, the institutions of the fatherland; and they have been much concerned and magniloquently elated about the german spirit of freedom that so was to be brought to final and consummate realisation in the life of a free people. but at no point and in no case have either the proposals or their carrying out taken shape as a concrete application of the familiar principle of popular self-direction. it has always come to something in the way of a concessive or expedient mitigation of the antagonistic principle of personal authority. where the forms of self-government or of individual self-direction have concessively been installed, under the imperial rule, they have turned out to be an imitative structure with some shrewd provision for their coercion or inhibition at the discretion of an irresponsible authority. neither the sound intelligence nor the good faith of these intellectuals of the fatherland is to be impugned. that the--necessarily vague and circumlocutory--expositions of civic institutions and popular liberty which they have so often and so largely promulgated should have been used as a serviceable blind of dynastic statecraft is not to be set down to their discredit. circumstances over which they could have no control, since they were circumstances that shaped their own habits of thought, have placed it beyond their competence to apprehend or to formulate these alien principles (habits of thought) concretely in those alien institutional details and by the alien logic with which they could have no working acquaintance. to one and another this conception of cultural solidarity within the nation, and consequent cultural aliency between nations, due to the different habits of life and of thought enforced by the two diverse institutional systems, may be so far unfamiliar as to carry no conviction. it may accordingly not seem out of place to recall that the institutional system of any given community, particularly for any community living under a home-bred and time-tried system of its own, will necessarily be a balanced system of interdependent and mutually concordant parts working together in one comprehensive plan of law and order. through such an institutional system, as, e.g., the german imperial organisation, there will run a degree of logical consistency, consonant with itself throughout, and exerting a consistent discipline throughout the community; whereby there is enforced a consistent drift or bent in the prevalent habits of life, and a correlative bent in the resulting habits of thought prevalent in the community. it is, in fact, this possession of a common scheme of use and wont, and a consequent common outlook and manner of thinking, that constitutes the most intrinsic bond of solidarity in any nationality, and that finally marks it off from any other. it is equally a matter of course that any other given community, living under the rule of a substantially different, or divergent, system of institutions, will be exposed to a course of workday discipline running to a different, perhaps divergent, effect; and that this other community will accordingly come in for a characteristically different discipline and fall under the rule of a different commonsense outlook. where an institutional difference of this kind is somewhat large and consistent, so as to amount in effect to a discrepancy, as may fairly be said of the difference between imperial germany and its like on the one hand, and the english-speaking nations on the other hand, there the difference in everyday conceptions may readily make the two peoples mutually unintelligible to one another, on those points of institutional principle that are involved in the discrepancy. this is the state of the case as between the german people, including the intellectuals, and the peoples against whom their preconceptions of national destiny have arrayed them. and the many vivid expressions of consternation, abhorrence and incredulity that have come out of this community of intellectuals in the course of the past two years of trial and error, bear sufficient testimony to the rigorous constraint which these german preconceptions and their logic exercise over the intellectuals, no less than over the populace. conversely, of course, it is nearly as impracticable for those who have grown up under the discipline of democratic institutions to comprehend the habitual outlook of the commonplace german patriot on national interests and aims; not quite, perhaps, because the discipline of use and wont and indoctrination is neither so rigorous nor so consistent in their case. but there is, after all, prevalent among them a sufficiently evident logical inability to understand and appreciate the paramount need of national, that is to say dynastic, ascendancy that actuates all german patriots; just as these same patriots are similarly unable to consider national interests in any other light than that of dynastic ascendancy. going simply on the face value of the available evidence, any outsider might easily fall into the error of believing that when the great adventure of the war opened up before them, as well as when presently the shock of baffled endeavour brought home its exasperating futility, the intellectuals of the fatherland distinguished themselves above all other classes and conditions of men in the exuberance of their patriotic abandon. such a view would doubtless be almost wholly erroneous. it is not that the intellectuals reached a substantially superior pitch of exaltation, but only that, being trained in the use of language, they were able to express their emotions with great facility. there seems no reason to believe that the populace fell short of the same measure in respect of their prevalent frame of mind. to return to the workings of the imperial dynastic state and the forces engaged. it plainly appears that the intellectuals are to be counted as supernumeraries, except so far as they serve as an instrument of publicity and indoctrination in the hands of the discretionary authorities. the working factors in the case are the dynastic organisation of control, direction and emolument, and the populace at large by use of whose substance the traffic in dynastic ascendancy and emolument is carried on. these two are in fairly good accord, on the ancient basis of feudal loyalty. hitherto there is no evident ground for believing that this archaic tie that binds the populace to the dynastic ambitions has at all perceptibly weakened. and the possibility of dynastic germany living at peace with the world under any compact, therefore translates itself into the possibility of the german people's unlearning its habitual deference and loyalty to the dynasty. as its acquirement has been a work of protracted habituation, so can its obsolescence also come about only through more or less protracted habituation under a system of use and wont of a different or divergent order. the elements of such a systematic discipline running to an effect at cross purposes with this patriotic animus are not absent from the current situation in the fatherland; the discipline of the modern industrial system, for instance, runs to such a divergent effect; but this, and other conceivable forces which may reenforce it, will after all take time, if they are to work a decisive change in the current frame of mind of the patriotic german community. during the interval required for such a change in the national temper, the peace of the world would be conditioned on the inability of the dynastic state to break it. so that the chances of success for any neutral peace league will vary inversely as the available force of imperial germany, and it could be accounted secure only in the virtual elimination of the imperial state as a national power. if the gradual obsolescence of the spirit of militant loyalty in the german people, through disuse under a régime of peace, industry, self government and free trade, is to be the agency by force of which dynastic imperialism is to cease, the chance of a neutral peace will depend on the thoroughness with which such a régime of self-direction can be installed in this case, and on the space of time required for such obsolescence through disuse. obviously, the installation of a workable régime of self-government on peaceable lines would in any case be a matter of great difficulty among a people whose past experience has so singularly incapacitated them for self-government; and obviously, too, the interval of time required to reach secure ground along this line of approach would be very considerable. also, in view of these conditions, obviously, this scheme for maintaining the peace of nations by a compact of neutrals based on a compromise with an aspiring dynastic state resolves itself into the second of the two alternatives spoken of at the outset, viz., a neutral peace based on the elimination of germany as a war power, together with the elimination of any materials suitable for the formation of a formidable coalition. and then, with imperial germany supposedly eliminated or pacified, there would still remain the japanese establishment, to which all the arguments pertinent in the case of germany will apply without abatement; except that, at least hitherto, the dynastic statesmen of japan have not had the disposal of so massive a body of resources, in population, industry, or raw materials. chapter iv peace without honour the argument therefore turns back to a choice between the two alternatives alluded to: peace in submission to the rule of the german dynastic establishment (and to japan), or peace through elimination of these enterprising powers. the former alternative, no doubt, is sufficiently unattractive, but it is not therefore to be put aside without a hearing. as goes without saying, it is repugnant to the patriotic sentiments of those peoples whom the imperial german establishment have elected for submission. but if this unreflecting patriotic revulsion can once be made amenable to reason, there is always something to be said in favor of such a plan of peaceable submission, or at least in extenuation of it; and if it is kept in mind that the ulterior necessity of such submission must always remain in perspective as a condition precedent to a peaceful settlement, so long as one or both of these enterprising powers remains intact, it will be seen that a sane appraisal of the merits of such a régime of peace is by no means uncalled for. for neither of these two powers is there a conclusive issue of endeavour short of paramount dominion. * * * * * there should also be some gain of insight and sobriety in recalling that the intellectuals of the fatherland, who have doubtless pondered this matter longer and more dispassionately than all other men, have spoken very highly of the merits of such a plan of universal submission to the rule of this german dynastic establishment. they had, no doubt, been considering the question both long and earnestly, as to what would, in the light of reason, eventually be to the best interest of those peoples whose manifest destiny was eventual tutelage under the imperial crown; and there need also be no doubt that in that time (two years past) they therefore spoke advisedly and out of the fulness of the heart on this head. the pronouncements that came out of the community of intellectuals in that season of unembarrassed elation and artless avowal are doubtless to be taken as an outcome of much thoughtful canvassing of what had best be done, not as an enforced compromise with untoward necessities but as the salutary course freely to be pursued with an eye single to the best good of all concerned. it is true, the captious have been led to speak slightingly of the many utterances of this tenure coming out of the community of intellectuals, as, e.g., the lay sermons of professor ostwald dating back to that season; but no unprejudiced reader can well escape the persuasion that these, as well as the very considerable volume of similar pronouncements by many other men of eminent scholarship and notable for benevolent sentiments, are faithfully to be accepted as the expressions of a profound conviction and a consciously generous spirit. in so speaking of the advantages to be derived by any subject people from submission to the german imperial rule, these intellectuals are not to be construed as formulating the drift of vulgar patriotic sentiment among their compatriots at large, but rather as giving out the deliverances of their own more sensitive spirit and maturer deliberation, as men who are in a position to see human affairs and interests in a larger perspective. such, no doubt, would be their own sense of the matter. reflection on the analogous case of the tutelage exercised by the american government over the subject philippinos may contribute to a just and temperate view of what is intended in the régime of tutelage and submission so spoken for by the german intellectuals,--and, it may be added, found good by the imperial statesmen. there would, of course, be the difference, as against the case of the philippinos, that whereas the american government is after all answerable, in the last resort and in a somewhat random fashion, to a popular opinion that runs on democratic preconceptions, the german imperial establishment on the other hand is answerable to no one, except it be to god, who is conceived to stand in somewhat the relation of a silent partner, or a minority stockholder in this dynastic enterprise. yet it should not be overlooked that any presumptive hard usage which the vassal peoples might look for at the hands of the german dynasty would necessarily be tempered with considerations of expediency as dictated by the exigencies of usufruct. the imperial establishment has shown itself to be wise, indeed more wise than amiable, but wise at least in its intentions, in the use which it has made of subject peoples hitherto. it is true, a somewhat accentuated eagerness on the part of the imperial establishment to get the maximum service in a minimum of time and at a minimum cost from these subject populations,--as, e.g., in silesia and poland, in schleswig-holstein, in alsace-lorraine, or in its african and oceanic possessions,--has at times led to practices altogether dubious on humanitarian grounds, at the same time that in point of thrifty management they have gone beyond "what the traffic will bear." yet it is not to be overlooked--and in this connection it is a point of some weight--that, so far as the predatory traditions of its statecraft will permit, the imperial establishment has in all these matters been guided by a singularly unreserved attention to its own material advantage. where its management in these premises has yielded a less profitable usufruct than the circumstances would reasonably admit, the failure has been due to an excess of cupidity rather than the reverse. the circumstantial evidence converges to the effect that the imperial establishment may confidently be counted on to manage the affairs of its subject peoples with an eye single to its own material gain, and it may with equal confidence be counted on that in the long run no unadvised excesses will be practised. of course, an excessive adventure in atrocity and predation, due to such human infirmity in its agents or in its directorate as has been shown in various recent episodes, is to be looked for now and again; but these phenomena would come in by way of fluctuating variations from the authentic routine, rather than as systematic features of it. that superfluity of naughtiness that has given character to the current german imperial policy in belgium, e.g., or that similarly has characterised the dealings of imperial japan in korea during the late "benevolent assimilation" of that people into japanese-imperial usufruct, is not fairly to be taken to indicate what such an imperial establishment may be expected to do with a subject people on a footing of settled and long-term exploitation. at the outset, in both instances, the policy of frightfulness was dictated by a well-advised view to economy of effort in reducing the subject people to an abject state of intimidation, according to the art of war as set forth in the manuals; whereas latterly the somewhat profligate excesses of the government of occupation--decently covered with diplomatic parables on benevolence and legality--have been dictated by military convenience, particularly by the need of forced labor and the desirability of a reduced population in the acquired territory. so also the "personally conducted" dealings with the armenians by use of the turks should probably also best be explained as an endeavour to reduce the numbers of an undesirable population beforehand, without incurring unnecessary blame. all these things are, at the most, misleading indications of what the imperial policy would be like under settled conditions and in the absence of insubordination. by way of contrast, such as may serve to bring the specific traits of this prospective imperial tutelage of nations into a better light, the ottoman usufruct of the peoples of the turkish dominions offers an instructive instance. the ottoman tutelage is today spoken of by its apologists in terms substantially identical with the sketches of the future presented by hopeful german patriots in the early months of the current war. but as is so frequently the case in such circumstances, these expressions of the officers have to be understood in a diplomatic sense; not as touching the facts in any other than a formal way. it is sufficiently evident that the ottoman management of its usufruct has throughout been ill-advised enough persistently to charge more than the traffic would bear, probably due in great part to lack of control over its agents or ramifications, by the central office. the ottoman establishment has not observed, or enforced, the plain rules of economy in its utilisation of the subject peoples, and finds itself today bankrupt in consequence. what may afford more of a parallel to the prospective german tutelage of the nations is the procedure of the japanese establishment in korea, manchuria, or china; which is also duly covered with an ostensibly decent screen of diplomatic parables, but the nature and purpose of which is overt enough in all respects but the nomenclature. it is not unlikely that even this japanese usufruct and tutelage runs on somewhat less humane and complaisant lines than a well-advised economy of resources would dictate for the prospective german usufruct of the western nations. there is the essential difference between the two cases that while japan is over-populated, so that it becomes the part of a wise government to find additional lands for occupancy, and that so it is constrained by its imperial ambitions to displace much of the population in its subject territories, the fatherland on the other hand is under-populated-- notoriously, though not according to the letter of the diplomatic parables on this head--and for the calculable future must continue to be under-populated; provided that the state of the industrial arts continues subject to change in the same general direction as hitherto, and provided that no radical change affects the german birth-rate. so, since the imperial government has no need of new lands for occupancy by its home population, it will presumably be under no inducement to take measures looking to the partial depopulation of its subject territories. the case of belgium and the measures looking to a reduction of its population may raise a doubt, but probably not a well taken doubt. it is rather that since it has become evident that the territory can not be held, it is thought desirable to enrich the fatherland with whatever property can be removed, and to consume the accumulated man-power of the belgian people in the service of the war. it would appear that it is a war-measure, designed to make use of the enemy's resources for his defeat. indeed, under conditions of settled occupation or subjection, any degree of such depopulation would entail an economic loss, and any well-considered administrative policy would therefore look to the maintenance of the inhabitants of the acquired territories in undiminished numbers and unimpaired serviceability. the resulting scheme of imperial usufruct should accordingly be of a considerate, not to say in effect humane, character,--always provided that the requisite degree of submission and subservience ("law and order") can be enforced by a system of coercion so humane as not to reduce the number of the inhabitants or materially to lower their physical powers. such would, by reasonable expectation, be the character of this projected imperial tutelage and usufruct of the nations of christendom. in its working-out this german project should accordingly differ very appreciably from the policy which its imperial ambitions have constrained the japanese establishment to pursue in its dealings with the life and fortunes of its recently, and currently, acquired subject peoples. the better to appreciate in some concrete fashion what should, by reasonable expectation, be the terms on which life might so be carried on _sub pace germanica_, attention may be invited to certain typical instances of such peace by abnegation among contemporary peoples. perhaps at the top of the list stands india, with its many and varied native peoples, subject to british tutelage, but, the british apologists say, not subject to british usufruct. the margin of tolerance in this instance is fairly wide, but its limits are sharply drawn. india is wanted and held, not for tribute or revenue to be paid into the imperial treasury, nor even for exclusive trade privileges or preferences, but mainly as a preserve to provide official occupation and emoluments for british gentlemen not otherwise occupied or provided for; and secondarily as a means of safeguarding lucrative british investments, that is to say, investments by british capitalists of high and low degree. the current british professions on the subject of this occupation of india, and at times the shamefaced apology for it, is that the people of india suffer no hardship by this means; the resulting governmental establishment being no more onerous and no more expensive to them than any equally, or even any less, competent government of their own would necessarily be. the fact, however, remains, that india affords a much needed and very considerable net revenue to the class of british gentlemen, in the shape of official salaries and pensions, which the british gentry at large can on no account forego. narrowed to these proportions it is readily conceivable that the british usufruct of india should rest with no extraordinary weight on the indian people at large, however burdensome it may at times become to those classes who aspire to take over the usufruct in case the british establishment can be dislodged. this case evidently differs very appreciably from the projected german usufruct of neighboring countries in europe. a case that may be more nearly in point would be that of any one of the countries subject to the turkish rule in recent times; although these instances scarcely show just what to expect under the projected german régime. the turkish rule has been notably inefficient, considered as a working system of dynastic usufruct; whereas it is confidently expected that the corresponding german system would show quite an exceptional degree of efficiency for the purpose. this turkish inefficiency has had a two-fold effect, which should not appear in the german case. through administrative abuses intended to serve the personal advantage of the irresponsible officials, the underlying peoples have suffered a progressive exhaustion and dilapidation; whereby the central authority, the dynastic establishment, has also grown progressively, cumulatively weaker and therefore less able to control its agents; and, in the second place, on the same grounds, in the pursuit of personal gain, and prompted by personal animosities, these irresponsible agents have persistently carried their measures of extortion beyond reasonable bounds,--that is to say beyond the bounds which a well considered plan of permanent usufruct would countenance. all this would be otherwise and more sensibly arranged under german imperial auspices. one of the nations that have fallen under turkish rule--and turkish peace--affords a valuable illustration of a secondary point that is to be considered in connection with any plan of peace by submission. the armenian people have in later time come partly under russian dominion, and so have been exposed to the russian system of bureaucratic exploitation; and the difference between russian and turkish armenia is instructive. according to all credible--that is unofficial--accounts, conditions are perceptibly more tolerable in russian armenia. well informed persons relate that the cause for this more lenient, or less extreme, administration of affairs under russian officials is a selective death rate among them, such that a local official who persistently exceeds a certain ill-defined limit of tolerance is removed by what would under other circumstances be called an untimely death. no adequate remedy has been found, within the large limits which russian bureaucratic administration habitually allows itself in questions of coercion. the turk, on the other hand, less deterred by considerations of long-term expediency, and, it may be, less easily influenced by outside opinion on any point of humanity, has found a remedy in the systematic extirpation of any village in which an illicit death occurs. one will incline to presume that on this head the german imperial procedure would be more after the russian than after the turkish pattern; although latterday circumstantial evidence will throw some sinister doubt on the reasonableness of such an expectation. it is plain, however, that the turkish remedy for this form of insubordination is a wasteful means of keeping the peace. plainly, to the home office, the high command, the extinction of a village with its population is a more substantial loss than the unseasonable decease of one of its administrative agents; particularly when it is called to mind that such a decease will presumably follow only on such profligate excesses of naughtiness as are bound to be inexcusably unprofitable to the central authority. it may be left an open question how far a corrective of this nature can hopefully be looked to as applicable, in case of need, under the projected german imperial usufruct. it may, i apprehend, be said without offense that there is no depth of depravity below the ordinary reach of the russian bureaucracy; but this organisation finds itself constrained, after all, to use circumspection and set some limits on individual excursions beyond the bounds of decency and humanity, so soon as these excesses touch the common or joint interest of the organisation. any excess of atrocity, beyond a certain margin of tolerance, on the part of any one of its members is likely to work pecuniary mischief to the rest; and then, the bureaucratic conduct of affairs is also, after all, in an uncertain degree subject to some surveillance by popular sentiment at home or abroad. the like appears not to hold true of the turkish official organisation. the difference may be due to a less provident spirit among the latter, as already indicated. but a different tradition, perhaps an outgrowth of this lack of providence and of the consequent growth of a policy of "frightfulness," may also come in for a share in the outcome; and there is also a characteristic difference in point of religious convictions, which may go some way in the same direction. the followers of islam appear on the whole to take the tenets of their faith at their face value--servile, intolerant and fanatic--whereas the russian official class may perhaps without undue reproach be considered to have on the whole outlived the superstitious conceits to which they yield an expedient _pro forma_ observance. so that when worse comes to worst, and the turk finds himself at length with his back against the last consolations of the faith that makes all things straight, he has the assured knowledge that he is in the right as against the unbelievers; whereas the russian bureaucrat in a like case only knows that he is in the wrong. the last extremity is a less conclusive argument to the man in whose apprehension it is not the last extremity. again, there is some shadow of doubt falls on the question as to which of these is more nearly in the german imperial spirit. on the whole, the case of china is more to the point. by and large, the people of china, more particularly the people of the coastal-plains region, have for long habitually lived under a régime of peace by non-resistance. the peace has been broken transiently from time to time, and local disturbances have not been infrequent; but, taken by and large, the situation has habitually been of the peaceful order, on a ground of non-resisting submission. but this submission has not commonly been of a whole-hearted kind, and it has also commonly been associated with a degree of persistent sabotage; which has clogged and retarded the administration of governmental law and order, and has also been conducive to a large measure of irresponsible official corruption. the habitual scheme of things chinese in this bearing may fairly be described as a peace of non-resistance tempered with sabotage and assassination. such was the late manchu régime, and there is no reason in china for expecting a substantially different outcome from the japanese invasion that is now under way. the nature of this japanese incursion should be sufficiently plain. it is an enterprise in statecraft after the order of macchiavelli, metternich, and bismarck. of course, the conciliatory fables given out by the diplomatic service, and by the other apologists, are to be taken at the normal discount of one-hundred percent. the relatively large current output of such fables may afford a hint as to the magnitude of the designs which the fables are intended to cover. the chinese people have had a more extended experience in peace of this order than all others, and their case should accordingly be instructive beyond all others. not that a european peace by non-resistance need be expected to run very closely on the chinese lines, but there should be a reasonable expectation that the large course of things would be somewhat on the same order in both cases. neither the european traditions and habitual temperament nor the modern state of the industrial arts will permit one to look for anything like a close parallel in detail; but it remains true, when all is said, that the chinese experience of peace under submission to alien masters affords the most instructive illustration of such a régime, as touches its practicability, its methods, its cultural value, and its effect on the fortunes of the subject peoples and of their masters. now, it may be said by way of preliminary generalisation that the life-history of the chinese people and their culture is altogether the most imposing achievement which the records of mankind have to show; whereas the history of their successive alien establishments of mastery and usufruct is an unbroken sequence of incredibly shameful episodes,--always beginning in unbounded power and vainglory, running by way of misrule, waste and debauchery, to an inglorious finish in abject corruption and imbecility. always have the gains in civilisation, industry and in the arts, been made by the subject chinese, and always have their alien masters contributed nothing to the outcome but misrule, waste, corruption and decay. and yet in the long run, with all this handicap and misrule, the chinese people have held their place and made headway in those things to which men look with affection and esteem when they come to take stock of what things are worth while. it would be a hopeless task to count up how many dynasties of masterful barbarians, here and there, have meanwhile come up and played their ephemeral role of vainglorious nuisance and gone under in shame and confusion, and dismissed with the invariable verdict of "good riddance!" it may at first sight seem a singular conjuncture of circumstances, but it is doubtless a consequence of the same conjuncture, that the chinese people have also kept their hold through all history on the chinese lands. they have lived and multiplied and continued to occupy the land, while their successive alien masters have come and gone. so that today, as the outcome of conquest, and of what would be rated as defeat, the people continue to be chinese, with an unbroken pedigree as well as an unbroken line of home-bred culture running through all the ages of history. in the biological respect the chinese plan of non-resistance has proved eminently successful. and, by the way, much the same, though not in the same degree, is true for the armenian people; who have continued to hold their hill country through good days and evil, apparently without serious or enduring reduction of their numbers and without visible lapse into barbarism, while the successive disconnected dynasties of their conquering rulers have come and gone, leaving nothing but an ill name. "this fable teaches" that a diligent attention to the growing of crops and children is the sure and appointed way to the maintenance of a people and its culture even under the most adverse conditions, and that eventual death and shameful destruction inexorably wait on any "ruling race." hitherto the rule has not failed. the rule, indeed, is grounded in the heritable traits of human nature, from which there is no escape. for its long-term biological success, as well as for the continued integrity of a people's culture, a peace of non-resistance, under good or evil auspices, is more to be desired than imperial dominion. but these things are not all that modern peoples live for, perhaps it is safe to say that in no case are these chief among the things for which civilised europeans are willing to live. they urgently need also freedom to live their own life in their own way, or rather to live within the bonds of convention which they have come in for by use and wont, or at least they believe that such freedom is essential to any life that shall be quite worth while. so also they have a felt need of security from arbitrary interference in their pursuit of a livelihood and in the free control of their own pecuniary concerns. and they want a discretionary voice in the management of their joint interests, whether as a nation or in a minor civil group. in short, they want personal, pecuniary and political liberty, free from all direction or inhibition from without. they are also much concerned to maintain favorable economic conditions for themselves and their children. and last, but chiefly rather than least, they commonly are hide-bound patriots inspired with an intractable felt need of national prestige. it is an assemblage of peoples in such a frame of mind to whom the pacifists are proposing, in effect, a plan for eventual submission to an alien dynasty, under the form of a neutral peace compact to include the warlike powers. there is little likelihood of such a scheme being found acceptable, with popular sentiment running as it now does in the countries concerned. and yet, if the brittle temper in which any such proposal is rejected by popular opinion in these countries today could be made to yield sufficiently to reflection and deliberate appraisal, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that its acceptance would not be the best way out of a critical situation. the cost of disabling and eliminating the warlike power whose dominion is feared, or even of staving off the day of surrender, is evidently serious enough. the merits of the alternative should be open to argument, and should, indeed, be allowed due consideration. and any endeavour to present them without heat should presumably find a hearing. it appears to have been much of the fault of the pacifists who speak for the peace league that they have failed or refused to recognise these ulterior consequences of the plan which they advocate; so that they appear either not to know what they are talking about, or to avoid talking about what they know. it will be evident from beforehand that the grave difficulty to be met in any advocacy of peace on terms of non-resistant subjection to an alien dynastic rule--"peace at any price"--is a difficulty of the psychological order. whatever may be conceived to hold true for the chinese people, such submission is repugnant to the sentiments of the western peoples. which in turn evidently is due to the prevalence of certain habitual preconceptions among modern civilised men,--certain acquired traits of temper and bias, of the nature of fixed ideas. that something in the way of a reasonably contented and useful life is possible under such a régime as is held in prospect, and even some tolerable degree of well-being, is made evident in the chinese case. but the chinese tolerance of such a régime goes to argue that they are charged with fewer preconceptions at variance with the exigencies of life under these conditions. so, it is commonly accepted, and presumably to be accepted, that the chinese people at large have little if any effectual sense of nationality; their patriotism appears to be nearly a negligible quantity. this would appear to an outsider to have been their besetting weakness, to which their successful subjection by various and sundry ambitious aliens has been due. but it appears also to have been the infirmity by grace of which this people have been obliged to learn the ways of submission, and so have had the fortune to outlive their alien masters, all and sundry, and to occupy the land and save the uncontaminated integrity of their long-lived civilisation. * * * * * some account of the nature and uses of this spirit of patriotism that is held of so great account among western nations has already been set out in an earlier passage. one or two points in the case, that bear on the argument here, may profitably be recalled. the patriotic spirit, or the tie of nationalism, is evidently of the nature of habit, whatever proclivity to the formation of such a habit may be native to mankind. more particularly is it a matter of habit--it might even be called a matter of fortuitous habit--what particular national establishment a given human subject will become attached to on reaching what is called "years of discretion" and so becoming a patriotic citizen. the analogy of the clam may not be convincing, but it may at least serve to suggest what may be the share played by habituation in the matter of national attachment. the young clam, after having passed the free-swimming phase of his life, as well as the period of attachment to the person of a carp or similar fish, drops to the bottom and attaches himself loosely in the place and station in life to which he has been led; and he loyally sticks to his particular patch of ooze and sand through good fortune and evil. it is, under providence, something of a fortuitous matter where the given clam shall find a resting place for the sole of his foot, but it is also, after all, "his own, his native land" etc. it lies in the nature of a clam to attach himself after this fashion, loosely, to the bottom where he finds a living, and he would not be a "good clam and true" if he failed to do so; but the particular spot for which he forms this attachment is not of the essence of the case. at least, so they say. it may be, as good men appear to believe or know, that all men of sound, or at least those of average, mind will necessarily be of a patriotic temper and be attached by ties of loyalty to some particular national establishment, ordinarily the particular establishment which is formally identified with the land in which they live; although it is always possible that a given individual may be an alien in the land, and so may owe allegiance to and be ruled by a patriotic attachment to another national establishment, to which the conventionalities governing his special case have assigned him as his own proper nation. the analogy of the clam evidently does not cover the case. the patriotic citizen is attached to his own proper nationality not altogether by the accident of domicile, but rather by the conventions, legal or customary, which assign him to this or that national establishment according to certain principles of use and wont. mere legal citizenship or allegiance does not decide the matter either; at least not by any means unavoidably; as appears in the case of the chinese subject under manchu or japanese rule; and as appears perhaps more perspicuously in the case of the "hyphenate" american citizen, whose formal allegiance is to the nation in whose land he prefers to live, all the while that his patriotic affection centers on his spiritual fatherland in whose fortunes he has none but a non-resident interest. indeed, the particular national tie that will bind the affections--that is to say the effectual patriotic attachment--of any given individual may turn out on closer scrutiny to be neither that of domicile or of formal legal allegiance, nor that of putative origin or pedigree, but only a reflex of certain national animosities; which may also turn out on examination to rest on putative grounds--as illustrated by a subsidiary class of hyphenate american citizens whose affections have come to be bound up in the national fortunes of one foreign power for the simple, but sufficient, reason that, on conventional grounds, they bear malice against another equally foreign power. evidently there is much sophistication, not to say conventionalised affectation, in all this national attachment and allegiance. it will perhaps not do to say that it is altogether a matter of sophistication. yet it may not exceed the premises to say that the particular choice, the concrete incidence, of this national attachment is in any given case a matter of sophistication, largely tempered with fortuity. one is born into a given nationality--or, in case of dynastic allegiance, into service and devotion to a (fortuitously) given sovereign--or at least so it is commonly believed. still one can without blame, and without excessive shame, shift one's allegiance on occasion. what is not countenanced among civilised men is to shift out of allegiance to any given nationality or dynasty without shifting into the like complication of gainless obligations somewhere else. such a shifting of national or dynastic base is not quite reputable, though it is also not precisely disreputable. the difficulty in the case appears to be a moral difficulty, not a mental or a pecuniary one, and assuredly not a physical difficulty, since the relation in question is not a physical relation. it would appear to be of the moral order of things, in that sense of the term in which conventional proprieties are spoken of as moral. that is to say, it is a question of conforming to current expectations under a code of conventional proprieties. like much of the conventional code of behavior this patriotic attachment has the benefit of standardised decorum, and its outward manifestations are enjoined by law. all of which goes to show how very seriously the whole matter is regarded. and yet it is also a matter of common notoriety that large aggregates of men, not to speak of sporadic individuals, will on occasion shift their allegiance with the most felicitous effect and with no sensible loss of self-respect or of their good name. such a shift is to be seen in multiple in the german nation within the past half-century, when, for instance, the hanoverians, the saxons, and even the holsteiners in very appreciable numbers, not to mention the subjects of minuscular principalities whose names have been forgotten in the shuffle, all became good and loyal subjects of the empire and of the imperial dynasty,--good and loyal without reservation, as has abundantly appeared. so likewise within a similar period the inhabitants of the southern states repudiated their allegiance to the union, putting in its place an equivalent loyalty to their new-made country; and then, when the new national establishment slipped out from under their feet they returned as whole-heartedly as need be to their earlier allegiance. in each of these moves, taken with deliberation, it is not to be doubted that this body of citizens have been moved by an unimpeachable spirit of patriotic honour. no one who is in any degree conversant with the facts is likely to question the declaration that it would be a perversion, not to say an inversion, of fact to rate their patriotic devotion to the union today lower than that of any other section of the country or any other class or condition of men. but there is more, and in a sense worse, to be found along the same general line of evidence touching this sublimated sentiment of group solidarity that is called nationalism. the nation, of course, is large; the larger the better, it is believed. it is so large, indeed, that considered as a group or community of men living together it has no sensible degree of homogeneity in any of their material circumstances or interests; nor is anything more than an inconsiderable fraction of the aggregate population, territory, industry, or daily life known to any one of these patriotic citizens except by remote and highly dubious hearsay. the one secure point on which there is a (constructive) uniformity is the matter of national allegiance; which grows stronger and more confident with every increase in aggregate mass and volume. it is also not doubtful, e.g., that if the people of the british dominions in north america should choose to throw in their national lot with the union, all sections and classes, except those whose pecuniary interest in a protective tariff might be conceived to suffer, would presently welcome them; nor is it doubtful that american nationality would cover the new and larger aggregate as readily as the old. much the same will hold true with respect to the other countries colonised under british auspices. and there is no conclusive reason for drawing the limit of admissible national extension at that point. so much, however, is fairly within the possibilities of the calculable future; its realisation would turn in great measure on the discontinuance of certain outworn or disserviceable institutional arrangements; as, e.g., the remnants of a decayed monarchy, and the legally protected vested interests of certain business enterprises and of certain office-holding classes. what more and farther might practicably be undertaken in this way, in the absence of marplot office-holders, office-seekers, sovereigns, priests and monopolistic business concerns sheltered under national animosities and restraints of trade, would be something not easy to assign a limit to. all the minor neutrals, that cluster about the north sea, could unquestionably be drawn into such a composite nationality, in the absence, or with due disregard, of those classes, families and individuals whose pecuniary or invidious gain is dependent on or furthered by the existing division of these peoples. the projected defensive league of neutrals is, in effect, an inchoate coalescence of the kind. its purpose is the safeguarding of the common peace and freedom, which is also the avowed purpose and justification of all those modern nations that have outlived the régime of dynastic ambition and so of enterprise in dominion for dominion's sake, and have passed into the neutral phase of nationality; or it should perhaps rather be said that such is the end of endeavour and the warrant of existence and power for these modern national establishments in so far as they have outlived and repudiated such ambitions of a dynastic or a quasi-dynastic order, and so have taken their place as intrinsically neutral commonwealths. it is only in the common defense (or in the defense of the like conditions of life for their fellowmen elsewhere) that the citizens of such a commonwealth can without shame entertain or put in evidence a spirit of patriotic solidarity; and it is only by specious and sophistical appeal to the national honour--a conceit surviving out of the dynastic past--that the populace of such a commonwealth can be stirred to anything beyond a defense of their own proper liberties or the liberties of like-minded men elsewhere, in so far as they are not still imbued with something of the dynastic animus and the chauvinistic animosities which they have formally repudiated in repudiating the feudalistic principles of the dynastic state. the "nation," without the bond of dynastic loyalty, is after all a make-shift idea, an episodic half-way station in the sequence, and loyalty, in any proper sense, to the nation as such is so much of a make-believe, that in the absence of a common defense to be safeguarded any such patriotic conceit must lose popular assurance and, with the passing of generations, fall insensibly into abeyance as an archaic affectation. the pressure of danger from without is necessary to keep the national spirit alert and stubborn, in case the pressure from within, that comes of dynastic usufruct working for dominion, has been withdrawn. with further extension of the national boundaries, such that the danger of gratuitous infraction from without grows constantly less menacing, while the traditional régime of international animosities falls more and more remotely into the background, the spirit of nationalism is fairly on the way to obsolescence through disuse. in other words, the nation, as a commonwealth, being a partisan organisation for a defensive purpose, becomes _functa officio_ in respect of its nationalism and its patriotic ties in somewhat the same measure as the national coalition grows to such a size that partisanship is displaced by a cosmopolitan security. doubtless the falling into abeyance through disuse of so pleasing a virtue as patriotic devotion will seem an impossibly distasteful consummation; and about tastes there is no disputing, but tastes are mainly creations of habit. except for the disquieting name of the thing, there is today little stands in the way of a cosmopolitan order of human intercourse unobtrusively displacing national allegiance; except for vested interests in national offices and international discriminations, and except for those peoples among whom national life still is sufficiently bound up with dynastic ambition. in an earlier passage the patriotic spirit has been defined as a sense of partisan solidarity in point of prestige, and sufficient argument has been spent in confirming the definition and showing its implications. with the passing of all occasion for a partisan spirit as touches the common good, through coalescence of the parts between which partisan discrepancies have hitherto been kept up, there would also have passed all legitimate occasion for or provocation to an intoxication of invidious prestige on national lines,--and there is no prestige that is not of an invidious nature, that being, indeed, the whole of its nature. he would have to be a person of praeternatural patriotic sensibilities who could fall into an emotional state by reason of the national prestige of such a coalition commonwealth as would be made up, e.g., of the french and english-speaking peoples, together with those other neutrally and peaceably inclined european communities that are of a sufficiently mature order to have abjured dynastic ambitions of dominion, and perhaps including the chinese people as well. such a coalition may now fairly be said to be within speaking distance, and with its consummation, even in the inchoate shape of a defensive league of neutrals, the eventual abeyance of that national allegiance and national honour that bulks so large in the repertory of current eloquence would also come in prospect. all this is by no means saying that love of country, and of use and wont as it runs in one's home area and among one's own people, would suffer decay, or even abatement. the provocation to nostalgia would presumably be as good as ever. it is even conceivable that under such a (contemplated) régime of unconditional security, attachment to one's own habitat and social circumstances might grow to something more than is commonly seen in the precarious situation in which the chances of a quiet life are placed today. but nostalgia is not a bellicose distemper, nor does it make for gratuitous disturbance of peaceable alien peoples; neither is it the spirit in which men lend themselves to warlike enterprise looking to profitless dominion abroad. men make patriotic sacrifices of life and substance in spite of home-sickness rather than by virtue of it. * * * * * the aim of this long digression has been to show that patriotism, of that bellicose kind that seeks satisfaction in inflicting damage and discomfort on the people of other nations, is not of the essence of human life; that it is of the nature of habit, induced by circumstances in the past and handed on by tradition and institutional arrangements into the present; and that men can, without mutilation, divest themselves of it, or perhaps rather be divested of it by force of circumstances which will set the current of habituation the contrary way. the change of habituation necessary to bring about such a decay of the bellicose national spirit would appear to be of a negative order, at least in the main. it would be an habituation to unconditional peace and security; in other words, to the absence of provocation, rather than a coercive training away from the bellicose temper. this bellicose temper, as it affects men collectively, appears to be an acquired trait; and it should logically disappear in time in the absence of those conditions by impact of which it has been acquired. such obsolescence of patriotism, however, would not therefore come about abruptly or swiftly, since the patriotic spirit has by past use and wont, and by past indoctrination, been so thoroughly worked into the texture of the institutional fabric and into the commonsense taste and morality, that its effectual obsolescence will involve a somewhat comprehensive displacement and mutation throughout the range of institutions and popular conceits that have been handed down. and institutional changes take time, being creations of habit. yet, again, there is the qualification to this last, that since the change in question appears to be a matter, not of acquiring a habit and confirming it in the shape of an article of general use and wont, but of forgetting what once was learned, the time and experience to be allowed for its decay need logically not equal that required for its acquirement, either in point of duration or in point of the strictness of discipline necessary to inculcate it. while the spirit of nationalism is such an acquired trait, and while it should therefore follow that the chief agency in divesting men of it must be disuse of the discipline out of which it has arisen, yet a positive, and even something of a drastic discipline to the contrary effect need not be altogether ineffectual in bringing about its obsolescence. the case of the chinese people seems to argue something of the sort. not that the chinese are simply and neutrally unpatriotic; they appear also to be well charged with disloyalty to their alien rulers. but along with a sense of being on the defensive in their common concerns, there is also the fact that they appear not to be appreciably patriotic in the proper sense; they are not greatly moved by a spirit of nationality. and this failure of the national spirit among them can scarcely be set down to a neutral disuse of that discipline which has on the other hand induced a militant nationalism in the peoples of christendom; it should seem more probable, at least, that this relative absence of a national ambition is traceable in good part to its having been positively bred out of them by the stern repression of all such aspirations under the autocratic rule of their alien masters. * * * * * peace on terms of submission and non-resistance to the ordinary exactions and rulings of those imperial authorities to whom such submission may become necessary, then, will be contingent on the virtual abeyance of the spirit of national pride in the peoples who so are to come under imperial rule. a sufficient, by no means necessarily a total, elimination or decadence of this proclivity will be the condition precedent of any practicable scheme for a general peace on this footing. how large an allowance of such animus these prospectively subject peoples might still carry, without thereby assuring the defeat of any such plan, would in great measure depend on the degree of clemency or rigor with which the superior authority might enforce its rule. it is not that a peace plan of this nature need precisely be considered to fall outside the limits of possibility, on account of this necessary condition, but it is at the best a manifestly doubtful matter. advocates of a negotiated peace should not fail to keep in mind and make public that the plan which they advocate carries with it, as a sequel or secondary phase, such an unconditional surrender and a consequent régime of non-resistance, and that there still is grave doubt whether the peoples of these western nations are at present in a sufficiently tolerant frame of mind, or can in the calculable future come in for such a tolerantly neutral attitude in point of national pride, as to submit in any passable fashion to any alien imperial rule. if the spiritual difficulty presented by this prevalent spirit of national pride--sufficiently stubborn still, however inane a conceit it may seem on sober reflection--if this animus of factional insubordination could be overcome or in some passable measure be conciliated or abated, there is much to be said in favor of such a plan of peaceable submission to an extraneous and arbitrary authority, and therefore also for that plan of negotiated peace by means of which events would be put in train for its realisation. any passably dispassionate consideration of the projected régime will come unavoidably to the conclusion that the prospectively subject peoples should have no legitimate apprehension of loss or disadvantage in the material respect. it is, of course, easy for an unreflecting person to jump to the conclusion that subjection to an alien power must bring grievous burdens, in the way of taxes and similar impositions. but reflection will immediately show that no appreciable increase, over the economic burdens already carried by the populace under their several national establishments, could come of such a move. as bearing on this question it is well to call to mind that the contemplated imperial dominion is designed to be very wide-reaching and with very ample powers. its nearest historical analogue, of course, is the roman imperial dominion--in the days of the antonines--and that the nearest analogue to the projected german peace is the roman peace, in the days of its best security. there is every warrant for the presumption that the contemplated imperial dominion is to be substantially all-inclusive. indeed there is no stopping place for the projected enterprise short of an all-inclusive dominion. and there will consequently be no really menacing outside power to be provided against. consequently there will be but little provision necessary for the common defense, as compared, e.g., with the aggregate of such provision found necessary for self-defense on the part of the existing nations acting in severalty and each jealously guarding its own national integrity. indeed, compared with the burden of competitive armament to which the peoples of europe have been accustomed, the need of any armed force under the new régime should be an inconsiderable matter, even when there is added to the necessary modicum of defensive preparation the more imperative and weightier provision of force with which to keep the peace at home. into the composition of this necessary modicum of armed force slight if any contingents of men would be drawn from the subject peoples, for the reason that no great numbers would be needed; as also because no devoted loyalty to the dynasty could reasonably be looked for among them, even if no positive insecurity were felt to be involved in their employment. on this head the projected scheme unambiguously commends itself as a measure of economy, both in respect of the pecuniary burdens demanded and as regards the personal annoyance of military service. as a further count, it is to be presumed that the burden of the imperial government and its bureaucratic administration--what would be called the cost of maintenance and repairs of the dynastic establishment and its apparatus of control--would be borne by the subject peoples. here again one is warranted in looking for a substantial economy to be effected by such a centralised authority, and a consequent lighter aggregate burden on the subjects. doubtless, the "overhead charges" would not be reduced to their practicable minimum. such a governmental establishment, with its bureaucratic personnel, its "civil list" and its privileged classes, would not be conducted on anything like a parsimonious footing. there is no reason to apprehend any touch of modesty in the exactions of such a dynastic establishment for itself or in behalf of its underlying hierarchy of gentlefolk. there is also to be counted in, in the concrete instance on which the argument here turns, a more or less considerable burden of contributions toward the maintenance and augmentation of that culture that has been the topic of so many encomiums. at this point it should be recalled that it is the pattern of periclean athens that is continually in mind in these encomiums. which brings up, in this immediate connection, the dealings of periclean athens with the funds of the league, and the source as well as the destination of these surplus funds. out of it all came the works on the acropolis, together with much else of intellectual and artistic life that converged upon and radiated from this athenian center of culture. the vista of _denkmäler_ that so opens to the vision of a courageous fancy is in itself such a substance of things hoped for as should stir the heart of all humane persons.[ ] the cost of this subvention of culture would doubtless be appreciable, but those grave men who have spent most thought on this prospective cultural gain to be had from the projected imperial rule appear to entertain no doubt as to its being worth all that it would cost. [footnote : _denk 'mall_] any one who is inclined to rate the prospective pecuniary costs and losses high would doubtless be able to find various and sundry items of minor importance to add to this short list of general categories on the side of cost; but such additional items, not fairly to be included under these general captions, would after all be of minor importance, in the aggregate or in detail, and would not appreciably affect the grand balance of pecuniary profit and loss to be taken account of in any appraisal of the projected imperial régime. there should evidently be little ground to apprehend that its installation would entail a net loss or a net increase of pecuniary burdens. there is, of course, the ill-defined and scarcely definable item of expenditure under the general head of gentility, dignity, distinction, magnificence, or whatever term may seem suitable to designate that consumption of goods and services that goes to maintain the high repute of the court and to keep the underlying gentlefolk in countenance. in its pecuniary incidence this line of (necessary) expenditure belongs under the rubric of conspicuous waste; and one will always have to face the disquieting flexibility of this item of expenditure. the consumptive demand of this kind is in an eminent degree "indefinitely extensible," as the phrasing of the economists would have it, and as various historical instances of courtly splendor and fashionable magnificence will abundantly substantiate. there is a constant proclivity to advance this conventional "standard of living" to the limit set by the available means; and yet these conventional necessities will ordinarily not, in the aggregate, take up all the available means; although now and again, as under the _ancien régime_, and perhaps in imperial rome, the standard of splendid living may also exceed the current means in hand and lead to impoverishment of the underlying community. an analysis of the circumstances governing this flexibility of the conventional standard of living and of pecuniary magnificence can not be gone into here. in the case under consideration it will have to be left as an indeterminate but considerable item in the burden of cost which the projected imperial rule may be counted on to impose on the underlying peoples. the cost of the imperial court, nobility, and civil service, therefore, would be a matter of estimate, on which no close agreement would be expected; and yet, here as in an earlier connection, it seems a reasonable expectation that sufficient dignity and magnificence could be put in evidence by such a large-scale establishment at a lower aggregate cost than the aggregate of expenditures previously incurred for the like ends by various nations working in severalty and at cross purposes. doubtless it would be altogether a mistaken view of this production of dignity by means of a lavish expenditure on superfluities, to believe that the same principle of economy should apply here as was found applicable in the matter of armament for defense. with the installation of a collective national establishment, to include substantially all the previously competing nations, the need of defensive armament should in all reason decline to something very inconsiderable indeed. but it would be hasty to conclude that with the coalescence of these nations under one paramount control the need of creating notoriety and prestige for this resulting central establishment by the consumption of decorative superfluities would likewise decline. the need of such dignity and magnificence is only in part, perhaps a minor part, of a defensive character. for the greater part, no doubt, the motive to this conspicuously wasteful consumption is personal vanity, in imperial policy as well as in the private life of fashion,--or perhaps one should more deferentially say that it is a certain range of considerations which would be identified as personal vanity in case they were met with among men beneath the imperial level. and so far as the creation of this form of "good-will" by this manner of advertising is traceable to such, or equivalent, motives of a personal incidence, the provocation to economy along this line would presumably not be a notable factor in the case. and one returns perforce to the principle already spoken of above, that the consumptive need of superfluities is indefinitely extensible, with the resulting inference that nothing conclusive is to be said as to the prospective magnitude of this item in the imperial bill of expense, or of the consequent pecuniary burdens which it would impose on the underlying peoples. * * * * * so far the argument has run on the pecuniary incidence of this projected imperial dominion as it falls on the underlying community as a whole, with no attempt to discriminate between the divergent interests of the different classes and conditions of men that go to make up any modern community. the question in hand is a question of pecuniary burdens, and therefore of the pecuniary interests of these several distinguishable classes or conditions of men. in all these modern nations that now stand in the article of decision between peace by submission or a doubtful and melancholy alternative,--in all of them men are by statute and custom inviolably equal before the law, of course; they are ungraded and masterless men before the law. but these same peoples are also alike in the respect that pecuniary duties and obligations among them are similarly sacred and inviolable under the dispassionate findings of the law. this pecuniary equality is, in effect, an impersonal equality between pecuniary magnitudes; from which it follows that these citizens of the advanced nations are not ungraded men in the pecuniary respect; nor are they masterless, in so far as a greater pecuniary force will always, under this impersonal equality of the law, stand in a relation of mastery toward a lesser one. class distinctions, except pecuniary distinctions, have fallen away. but all these modern nations are made up of pecuniary classes, differing from one another by minute gradations in the marginal cases, but falling, after all, and in the large, into two broadly and securely distinguishable pecuniary categories: those who have more and those who have less. statisticians have been at pains to ascertain that a relatively very small numerical minority of the citizens in these modern nations own all but a relatively very small proportion of the aggregate wealth in the country. so that it appears quite safe to say that in such a country as america, e.g., something less than ten percent of the inhabitants own something more than ninety percent of the country's wealth. it would scarcely be a wild overstraining of its practical meaning to say that this population is made up of two classes: those who own the country's wealth, and those who do not. in strict accuracy, as before the law, this characterisation will not hold; whereas in practical effect, it is a sufficiently close approximation. this latter class, who have substantially no other than a fancied pecuniary interest in the nation's material fortunes, are the category often spoken of as the common man. it is not necessary, nor is it desired, to find a corresponding designation for the other category, those who own. the articulate recognition of this division into contrasted pecuniary classes or conditions, with correspondingly (at least potentially) divergent pecuniary interests, need imply no degree of approval or disapproval of the arrangement which is so recognised. the recognition of it is necessary to a perspicuous control of the argument, as bears on the possible systematic and inherent discrepancy among these men in respect of their material interests under the projected imperial rule. substantially, it is a distinction between those who have and those who have not, and in a question of prospective pecuniary loss the man who has nothing to lose is differently placed from the one who has. it would perhaps seem flippant, and possibly lacking in the courtesy due one's prospective lord paramount, to say with the poet, _cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator_. but the whole case is not so simple. it is only so long as the projected pecuniary inroad is conceived as a simple sequestration of wealth in hand, that such a characterisation can be made to serve. the imperial aim is not a passing act of pillage, but a perpetual usufruct; and the whole question takes on a different and more complex shape when it so touches the enduring conditions of life and livelihood. the citizen who has nothing, or who has no capitalisable source of unearned income, yet has a pecuniary interest in a livelihood to be gained from day to day, and he is yet vulnerable in the pecuniary respect in that his livelihood may with the utmost facility be laid under contribution by various and sundry well-tried contrivances. indeed, the common man who depends for his livelihood on his daily earnings is in a more immediately precarious position than those who have something appreciable laid up against a rainy day, in the shape of a capitalised source of income. only that it is still doubtful if his position is precarious in such a fashion as to lay him open to a notable increase of hardship, or to loss of the amenities of life, in the same relative degree as his well-to-do neighbour. in point of fact it may well be doubted if this common man has anything to apprehend in the way of added hardship or loss of creature comforts under the contemplated régime of imperial tutelage. he would presumably find himself in a precarious case under the arbitrary and irresponsible authority of an alien master working through an alien master class. the doubt which presents itself is as to whether this common man would be more precariously placed, or would come in for a larger and surer sum of hard usage and scant living, under this projected order of things, than what he already is exposed to in his pecuniary relations with his well-to-do compatriots under the current system of law and order. under this current régime of law and order, according to the equitable principles of natural rights, the man without means has no pecuniary rights which his well-to-do pecuniary master is bound to respect. this may have been an unintended, as it doubtless was an unforeseen, outcome of the move out of feudalism and prescriptive rights and immunities, into the system of individual liberty and manhood franchise; but as commonly happens in case of any substantial change in the scheme of institutional arrangements, unforeseen consequences come in along with those that have been intended. in that period of history when western europe was gathering that experience out of which the current habitual scheme of law and order has come, the right of property and free contract was a complement and safeguard to that individual initiative and masterless equality of men for which the spokesmen of the new era contended. that it is no longer so at every turn, or even in the main, in later time, is in great part due to changes of the pecuniary order, that have come on since then, and that seem not to have cast their shadow before. in all good faith, and with none but inconsequential reservations, the material fortunes of modern civilised men--together with much else--have so been placed on a pecuniary footing, with little to safeguard them at any point except the inalienable right of pecuniary self-direction and initiative, in an environment where virtually all the indispensable means of pecuniary self-direction and initiative are in the hands of that contracted category of owners spoken of above. a numerical minority--under ten percent of the population--constitutes a conclusive pecuniary majority--over ninety percent of the means--under a system of law and order that turns on the inalienable right of owners to dispose of the means in hand as may suit their convenience and profit,--always barring recourse to illegal force or fraud. there is, however, a very appreciable margin of legal recourse to force and of legally protected fraud available in case of need. of course the expedients here referred to as legally available force and fraud in the defense of pecuniary rights and the pursuit of pecuniary gain are not force and fraud _de jure_ but only _de facto_. they are further, and well known, illustrations of how the ulterior consequences of given institutional arrangements and given conventionalised principles (habits of thought) of conduct may in time come to run at cross purposes with the initial purpose that led to the acceptance of these institutions and to the confirmation and standardisation of these habitual norms of conduct. for the time being, however, they are "fundamentally and eternally right and good." being a pecuniary majority--what may be called a majority of the corporate stock--of the nation, it is also fundamentally and eternally right and good that the pecuniary interests of the owners of the material means of life should rule unabated in all those matters of public policy that touch on the material fortunes of the community at large. barring a slight and intermittent mutter of discontent, this arrangement has also the cordial approval of popular sentiment in these modern democratic nations. one need only recall the paramount importance which is popularly attached to the maintenance and extension of the nation's trade--for the use of the investors--or the perpetuation of a protective tariff--for the use of the protected business concerns--or, again, the scrupulous regard with which such a body of public servants as the interstate commerce commission will safeguard the legitimate claim of the railway companies to a "reasonable" rate of earnings on the capitalised value of the presumed earning-capacity of their property. * * * * * again, in view of the unaccustomed freedom with which it is here necessary to speak of these delicate matters, it may be in place to disclaim all intention to criticise the established arrangements on their merits as details of public policy. all that comes in question here, touching these and the like features of the established law and order, is the bearing of all this on the material fortunes of the common man under the current régime, as contrasted with what he would reasonably have to look for under the projected régime of imperial tutelage that would come in, consequent upon this national surrender to imperial dominion. * * * * * in these democratic countries public policy is guided primarily by considerations of business expediency, and the administration, as well as the legislative power, is in the hands of businessmen, chosen avowedly on the ground of their businesslike principles and ability. there is no power in such a community that can over-rule the exigencies of business, nor would popular sentiment countenance any exercise of power that should traverse these exigencies, or that would act to restrain trade or discourage the pursuit of gain. an apparent exception to the rule occurs in wartime, when military exigencies may over-rule the current demands of business traffic; but the exception is in great part only apparent, in that the warlike operations are undertaken in whole or in part with a view to the protection or extension of business traffic. national surveillance and regulation of business traffic in these countries hitherto, ever since and in so far as the modern democratic order of things has taken effect, has uniformly been of the nature of interference with trade and investment in behalf of the nation's mercantile community at large, as seen in port and shipping regulations and in the consular service, or in behalf of particular favored groups or classes of business concerns, as in protective tariffs and subsidies. in all this national management of pecuniary affairs, under modern democratic principles, the common man comes into the case only as raw material of business traffic,--as consumer or as laborer. he is one of the industrial agencies by use of which the businessman who employs him supplies himself with goods for the market, or he is one of the units of consumptive demand that make up this market in which the business man sells his goods, and so "realises" on his investment. he is, of course, free, under modern principles of the democratic order, to deal or not to deal with this business community, whether as laborer or as consumer, or as small-scale producer engaged in purveying materials or services on terms defined by the community of business interests engaged on so large a scale as to count in their determination. that is to say, he is free _de jure_ to take or leave the terms offered. _de facto_ he is only free to take them--with inconsequential exceptions--the alternative being obsolescence by disuse, not to choose a harsher name for a distasteful eventuality. the general ground on which the business system, as it works under the over-ruling exigencies of the so-called "big business," so defines the terms of life for the common man, who works and buys, is the ground afforded by the principle of "charging what the traffic will bear;" that is to say, fixing the terms of hiring, buying and selling at such a figure as will yield the largest net return to the business concerns in whom, collectively or in severalty, the discretion vests. discretion in these premises does not vest in any business concern that does not articulate with the system of "big business," or that does not dispose of resources sufficient to make it a formidable member of the system. whether these concerns act in severalty or by collusion and conspiracy, in so defining the pecuniary terms of life for the community at large, is substantially an idle question, so far as bears on the material interest of the common man. the base-line is still what the traffic will bear, and it is still adhered to, so nearly as the human infirmity of the discretionary captains of industry will admit, whether the due approximation to this base-line is reached by a process of competitive bidding or by collusive advisement. the generalisation so offered, touching the material conditions of life for the common man under the modern rule of big business, may seem unwarrantably broad. it may be worth while to take note of more than one point in qualification of it, chiefly to avoid the appearance of having overlooked any of the material circumstances of the case. the "system" of large business, working its material consequences through the system of large-scale industry, but more particularly by way of the large-scale and wide-reaching business of trade in the proper sense, draws into the net of its control all parts of the community and all its inhabitants, in some degree of dependence. but there is always, hitherto, an appreciable fraction of the inhabitants--as, e.g., outlying agricultural sections that are in a "backward" state--who are by no means closely bound in the orderly system of business, or closely dependent on the markets. they may be said to enjoy a degree of independence, by virtue of their foregoing as much as may be of the advantages offered by modern industrial specialisation. so also there are the minor and interstitial trades that are still carried on by handicraft methods; these, too, are still somewhat loosely held in the fabric of the business system. there is one thing and another in this way to be taken account of in any exhaustive survey, but the accounting for them will after all amount to nothing better than a gleaning of remnants and partial exceptions, such as will in no material degree derange the general proposition in hand. again, there runs through the length and breadth of this business community a certain measure of incompetence or inefficiency of management, as seen from the point of view of the conceivable perfect working of the system as a whole. it may be due to a slack attention here and there; or to the exigencies of business strategy which may constrain given business concerns to an occasional attitude of "watchful waiting" in the hope of catching a rival off his guard; or to a lack of perfect mutual understanding among the discretionary businessmen, due sometimes to an over-careful guarding of trade secrets or advance information; or, as also happens, and quite excusably, to a lack of perfect mutual confidence among these businessmen, as to one another's entire good faith or good-will. the system is after all a competitive one, in the sense that each of the discretionary directors of business is working for his own pecuniary gain, whether in cooperation with his fellows or not. "an honest man will bear watching." as in other collusive organisations for gain, confederates are apt to fall out when it comes to a division of what is in hand. in one way and another the system is beset with inherent infirmities, which hinder its perfect work; and in so far it will fall short of the full realisation of that rule of business that inculcates charging what the traffic will bear, and also in so far the pressure which the modern system of business management brings to bear on the common man will also fall short of the last straw--perhaps even of the next-to-the-last. again it turns out to be a question not of the failure of the general proposition as formulated, but rather as to the closeness of approximation to its theoretically perfect work. it may be remarked by the way that vigilant and impartial surveillance of this system of business enterprise by an external authority interested only in aggregate results, rather than in the differential gains of the interested individuals, might hopefully be counted on to correct some of these shortcomings which the system shows when running loose under the guidance of its own multifarious incentives. on the opposite side of the account, it is also worth noting that, while modern business management may now and again fall short of what the traffic will bear, it happens more commonly that its exactions will exceed that limit. this will particularly be true in businessmen's dealings with hired labour, as also and perhaps with equally far-reaching consequences in an excessive recourse to sophistications and adulterants and an excessively parsimonious provision for the safety, health or comfort of their customers--as, e.g., in passenger traffic by rail, water or tramway. the discrepancy to which attention is invited here is due to a discrepancy between business expediency, that is expediency for the purpose of gain by a given businessman, on the one hand, and serviceability to the common good, on the other hand. the business concern's interest in the traffic in which it engages is a short-term interest, or an interest in the short-term returns, as contrasted with the long-term or enduring interest which the community at large has in the public service over which any such given business concern disposes. the business incentive is that afforded by the prospective net pecuniary gain from the traffic, substantially an interest in profitable sales; while the community at large, or the common man that goes to make up such a community, has a material interest in this traffic only as regards the services rendered and the enduring effects that follow from it. the businessman has not, or at least is commonly not influenced by, any interest in the ulterior consequences of the transactions in which he is immediately engaged. this appears to hold true in an accentuated degree in the domain of that large-scale business that draws its gains from the large-scale modern industry and is managed on the modern footing of corporation finance. this modern fashion of business organisation and management apparently has led to a substantial shortening of the term over which any given investor maintains an effective interest in any given corporate enterprise, in which his investments may be placed for the time being. with the current practice of organising industrial and mercantile enterprises on a basis of vendible securities, and with the nearly complete exemption from personal responsibility and enduring personal attachment to any one corporate enterprise which this financial expedient has brought, it has come about that in the common run of cases the investor, as well as the directorate, in any given enterprise, has an interest only for the time being. the average term over which it is (pecuniarily) incumbent on the modern businessman to take account of the working of any given enterprise has shortened so far that the old-fashioned accountability, that once was depended on to dictate a sane and considerate management with a view to permanent good-will, has in great measure become inoperative. by and large, it seems unavoidable that the pecuniary interests of the businessmen on the one hand and the material interests of the community on the other hand are diverging in a more and more pronounced degree, due to institutional circumstances over which no prompt control can be had without immediate violation of that scheme of personal rights in which the constitution of modern democratic society is grounded. the quandary in which these communities find themselves, as an outcome of their entrance upon "the simple and obvious system of natural liberty," is shown in a large and instructive way by what is called "labor trouble," and in a more recondite but no less convincing fashion by the fortunes of the individual workman under the modern system. the cost of production of a modern workman has constantly increased, with the advance of the industrial arts. the period of preparation, of education and training, necessary to turn out competent workmen, has been increasing; and the period of full workmanlike efficiency has been shortening, in those industries that employ the delicate and exacting processes of the modern technology. the shortening of this working-life of the workman is due both to a lengthening of the necessary period of preparation, and to the demand of these processes for so full a use of the workman's forces that even the beginning of senescence will count as a serious disability,--in many occupations as a fatal disability. it is also a well ascertained fact that effectual old age will be brought on at an earlier period by overwork; overwork shortens the working life-time of the workman. thorough speeding-up ("scientific management"?) will unduly shorten this working life-time, and so it may, somewhat readily, result in an uneconomical consumption of the community's man-power, by consuming the workmen at a higher rate of speed, a higher pressure, with a more rapid rate of deterioration, than would give the largest net output of product per unit of man-power available, or per unit of cost of production of such man-power. on this head the guiding incentives of the businessman and the material interest of the community at large--not to speak of the selfish interest of the individual workman--are systematically at variance. the cost of production of workmen does not fall on the business concern which employs them, at least not in such definite fashion as to make it appear that the given business concern or businessman has a material interest in the economical consumption of the man-power embodied in this given body of employees. some slight and exceptional qualification of this statement is to be noted, in those cases where the processes in use are such as to require special training, not to be had except by a working habituation to these processes in the particular industrial plant in question. so far as such special training, to be had only as employees of the given concern, is a necessary part of the workman's equipment for this particular work, so far the given employer bears a share and an interest in the cost of production of the workmen employed; and so far, therefore, the employer has also a pecuniary interest in the economical use of his employees; which usually shows itself in the way of some special precautions being taken to prevent the departure of these workmen so long as there is a clear pecuniary loss involved in replacing them with men who have not yet had the special training required. evidently this qualifying consideration covers no great proportion of the aggregate man-power consumed in industrial enterprises under business management. and apart from the instances, essentially exceptional, where such a special consideration comes in, the businessmen in charge will, quite excusably as things go, endeavour to consume the man-power of which they dispose in the persons of their employees, not at the rate that would be most economical to the community at large, in view of the cost of their replacement, nor at such a rate as would best suit the taste or the viability of the particular workman, but at such a rate as will yield the largest net pecuniary gain to the employer. there is on record an illustrative, and indeed an illustrious, instance of such cannily gainful consumption of man-power carried out systematically and with consistently profitable effect in one of the staple industries of the country. in this typical, though exceptionally thoroughgoing and lucrative enterprise, the set rule of the management was, to employ none but select workmen, in each respective line of work; to procure such select workmen and retain them by offering wages slightly over the ordinary standard; to work them at the highest pace and pressure attainable with such a picked body; and to discharge them on the first appearance of aging or of failing powers. in the rules of the management was also included the negative proviso that the concern assumed no responsibility for the subsequent fortunes of discharged workmen, in the way of pension, insurance or the like. this enterprise was highly successful and exceedingly profitable, even beyond the high average of profits among enterprises in the same line of business. out of it came one of the greater and more illustrious fortunes that have been accumulated during the past century; a fortune which has enabled one of the most impressive and most gracious of this generation's many impressive philanthropists, never weary in well-doing; but who, through this cannily gainful consumption of man-power, has been placed in the singular position of being unable, in spite of avowedly unremitting endeavour, to push his continued disbursements in the service of humanity up to the figure of his current income. the case in question is one of the most meritorious known to the records of modern business, and while it will conveniently serve to illustrate many an other, and perhaps more consequential truth come to realisation in the march of triumphant democracy, it will also serve to show the gainfulness of an unreservedly canny consumption of man-power with an eye single to one's own net gain in terms of money. * * * * * evidently this is a point in the articulation of the modern economic system where a sufficiently ruthless outside authority, not actuated by a primary regard for the pecuniary interests of the employers, might conceivably with good effect enforce a more economical consumption of the country's man-power. it is not a matter on which one prefers to dwell, but it can do no harm to take note of the fact for once in a way, that these several national establishments of the democratic order, as they are now organised and administered, do somewhat uniformly and pervasively operate with an effectual view to the advantage of a class, so far as may plausibly be done. they are controlled by and administered in behalf of those elements of the population that, for the purpose in hand, make up a single loose-knit class,--the class that lives by income rather than by work. it may be called the class of the business interests, or of capital, or of gentlemen. it all comes to much the same, for the purpose in hand. the point in speaking of this contingent whose place in the economy of human affairs it is to consume, or to own, or to pursue a margin of profit, is simply that of contrasting this composite human contingent with the common man; whose numbers account for some nine-tenths or more of the community, while his class accounts for something less than one-tenth of the invested wealth, and appreciably less than that proportion of the discretionary national establishment,--the government, national or local, courts, attorneys, civil service, diplomatic and consular, military and naval. the arrangement may be called a gentlemen's government, if one would rather have it that way; but a gentleman is necessarily one who lives on free income from invested wealth--without such a source of free, that is to say unearned, income he becomes a decayed gentleman. again, pushing the phrasing back a step farther toward the ground facts, there are those who would speak of the current establishments as "capitalistic;" but this term is out of line in that it fails to touch the human element in the case, and institutions, such as governmental establishments and their functioning, are after all nothing but the accustomed ways and means of human behaviour; so that "capitalistic" becomes a synonym for "businessmen's" government so soon as it is designated in terms of the driving incentives and the personnel. it is an organisation had with a view to the needs of business (i.e. pecuniary) enterprise, and is made up of businessmen and gentlemen, which comes to much the same, since a gentleman is only a businessman in the second or some later generation. except for the slightly odious suggestion carried by the phrase, one might aptly say that the gentleman, in this bearing, is only a businessman gone to seed. by and large, and taking the matter naively at the simple face value of the material gain or loss involved, it should seem something of an idle question to the common man whether his collective affairs are to be managed by a home-bred line of businessmen and their successive filial generations of gentlemen, with a view to accelerate the velocity and increase the volume of competitive gain and competitive spending, on the one hand, or by an alien line of officials, equally aloof from his common interests, and managing affairs with a view to the usufruct of his productive powers in furtherance of the imperial dominion. not that the good faith or the generous intentions of these governments of gentlemen is questioned or is in any degree questionable; what is here spoken of is only the practical effect of the policies which they pursue, doubtless with benevolent intentions and well-placed complacency. in effect, things being as they are today in the civilised world's industry and trade, it happens, as in some sort an unintended but all-inclusive accident, that the guidance of affairs by business principles works at cross purposes with the material interests of the common man. so ungraceful a view of the sacred core of this modern democratic organisation will need whatever evidence can be cited to keep it in countenance. therefore indulgence is desired for one further count in this distasteful recital of ineptitudes inherent in this institutional scheme of civilised life. this count comes under the head of what may be called capitalistic sabotage. "sabotage" is employed to designate a wilful retardation, interruption or obstruction of industry by peaceable, and ordinarily by legally defensible, measures. in its present application, particularly, there is no design to let the term denote or insinuate a recourse to any expedients or any line of conduct that is in any degree legally dubious, or that is even of questionable legitimacy. sabotage so understood, as not comprising recourse to force or fraud, is a necessary and staple expedient of business management, and its employment is grounded in the elementary and indefeasible rights of ownership. it is simply that the businessman, like any other owner, is vested with the right freely to use or not to use his property for any given purpose. his decision, for reasons of his own, not to employ the property at his disposal in a particular way at a particular time, is well and blamelessly within his legitimate discretion, under the rights of property as universally accepted and defended by modern nations. in the particular instance of the american nation he is protected in this right by a constitutional provision that he must not be deprived of his property without due process of law. when the property at his disposal is in the shape of industrial plant or industrial material, means of transportation or stock of goods awaiting distribution, then his decision not to employ this property, or to limit its use to something less than full capacity, in the way for which it is adapted, becomes sabotage, normally and with negligible exceptions. in so doing he hinders, retards or obstructs the working of the country's industrial forces by so much. it is a matter of course and of absolute necessity to the conduct of business, that any discretionary businessman must be free to deal or not to deal in any given case; to limit or to withhold the equipment under his control, without reservation. business discretion and business strategy, in fact, has no other means by which to work out its aims. so that, in effect, all business sagacity reduces itself in the last analysis to a judicious use of sabotage. under modern conditions of large business, particularly, the relation of the discretionary businessman to industry is that of authoritative permission and of authoritative limitation or stoppage, and on his shrewd use of this authority depends the gainfulness of his enterprise. if this authority were exercised with an eye single to the largest and most serviceable output of goods and services, or to the most economical use of the country's material resources and man-power, regardless of pecuniary consequences, the course of management so carried out would be not sabotage but industrial strategy. but business is carried on for pecuniary gain, not with an unreserved view to the largest and most serviceable output or to the economical use of resources. the volume and serviceability of the output must wait unreservedly on the very particular pecuniary question of what quantity and what degree of serviceability will yield the largest net return in terms of price. uneconomical use of equipment, labor and resources is necessarily an everyday matter under these circumstances, as in the duplication of plant and processes between rival concerns, and in the wasteful use of all resources that do not involve expenditure on the part of the given concern. it has been the traditional dogma among economists and publicists in these modern communities that free competition between the businessmen in charge will indefeasibly act to bring the productiveness of industry to the highest practicable pitch and would lead to the most unreserved and vigilant endeavour to serve the community's material needs at all points. the reasons for the failure of this genial expectation, particularly under latterday business management, might be shown in some detail, if that were needed to enforce the argument as it runs in the present connection. but a summary indication of the commoner varieties and effects of sabotage as it is systematically applied in the businesslike conduct of industry will serve the purpose as well and with less waste of words and patience. it is usual to notice, and not unusual to deplore the duplication of plant and appliances in many lines of industry, due to competitive management, as in factories engaged in the same class of manufacture, in parallel or otherwise competing railways and boat lines, in retail merchandising, and in some degree also in the wholesale trade. the result, of course, is sabotage; in the sense that this volume of appliances, materials and workmen are not employed to the best advantage for the community. one effect of the arrangement is an increased necessary cost of the goods and services supplied by these means. the reason for it is competition for gain to be got from the traffic. that all this is an untoward state of things is recognised on all hands; but no lively regret is commonly spent on the matter, since it is commonly recognised that under the circumstances there is no help for it except at the cost of a more untoward remedy. the competitive system having been tried and found good--or at least so it is assumed--it is felt that the system will have to be accepted with the defects of its qualities. its characteristic qualities are held to be good, acceptable to the tastes of modern men whose habits of thought have been standardised in its terms; and it would be only reluctantly and by tardy concession that these modern men could bring themselves to give up that scheme of "natural liberty" within the framework of which runs this competitive system of business management and its wasteful manifolding of half-idle equipment and nugatory work. the common man, at the worst, comforts himself and his neighbour with the sage reflection that "it might have been worse." the businessmen, on the other hand, have also begun to take note of this systematic waste by duplication and consequent incompetence, and have taken counsel how to intercept the waste and divert it to their own profit. the businessmen's remedy is consolidation of competing concerns, and monopoly control. to the common man, with his preconceptions on the head of "restraint of trade," the proposed remedy seems more vicious than the evil it is designed to cure. the fault of the remedy plainly is not that the mismanagement of affairs due to competitive business can not be corrected by recourse to monopoly, but only that the community, it is presumed, would still suffer all the burdens and discomforts of the régime of competition and sabotage, with, possibly, further inconveniences and impositions at the hands of the businesslike monopoly; which, men are agreed, may fairly be depended on to use its advantage unsparingly under the business principle of charging what the traffic will bear. there is also this other singular phenomenon in this modern industrial world, that something not very far short of one-half the industrial equipment systematically lies idle for something approaching one-half the time, or is worked only to one-half its capacity half the time; not because of competition between these several industrial concerns, but because business conditions will not allow its continued productive use; because the volume of product that would be turned out if the equipment were working uninterruptedly at its full capacity could not be sold at remunerative prices. from time to time one establishment and another will shut down during a period of slack times, for the same reason. this state of things is singular only as seen from the point of view of the community's material interest, not that it is in any degree unfamiliar or that any serious fault is found with the captains of industry for so shutting off the industrial process and letting the industrial equipment lie waste. as all men know, the exigencies of business will not tolerate production to supply the community's needs under these circumstances; although, as is equally notorious, these slack times, when production of goods is unadvisable on grounds of business expediency, are commonly times of wide-spread privation, "hard times," in the community at large, when the failure of the supply is keenly felt. it is not that the captains of industry are at fault in so failing, or refusing, to supply the needs of the community under these circumstances, but only that they are helpless under the exigencies of business. they can not supply the goods except for a price, indeed not except for a remunerative price, a price which will add something to the capital values which they are venturing in their various enterprises. so long as the exigencies of price and of pecuniary gain rule the case, there is manifestly no escaping this enforced idleness of the country's productive forces. it may not be out of place also to remark, by way of parenthesis, that this highly productive state of the industrial arts, which is embodied in the industrial plant and processes that so are systematically and advisedly retarded or arrested under the rule of business, is at the same time the particular pride of civilised men and the most tangible achievement of the civilised world. a conservative estimate of this one item of capitalistic sabotage could scarcely appraise it at less than a twenty-five percent reduction from the normally possible productive capacity of the community, at an average over any considerable period; and a somewhat thorough review of the pertinent facts would probably persuade any impartial observer that, one year with another, such businesslike enforced idleness of plant and personnel lowers the actual output of the country's industry by something nearer fifty percent of its ordinary capacity when fully employed. to many, such an assertion may seem extravagant, but with further reflection on the well-known facts in the case it will seem less so in proportion as the unfamiliarity of it wears off. however, the point of attention in the case is not the precise, nor the approximate, percentages of this arrest and retardation, this partial neutralisation of modern improvements in the industrial arts; it is only the notorious fact that such arrest occurs, systematically and advisedly, under the rule of business exigencies, and that there is no corrective to be found for it that will comport with those fundamental articles of the democratic faith on which the businessmen necessarily proceed. any effectual corrective would break the framework of democratic law and order, since it would have to traverse the inalienable right of men who are born free and equal, each freely to deal or not to deal in any pecuniary conjuncture that arises. but it is at the same time plain enough that this, in the larger sense untoward, discrepancy between productive capacity and current productive output can readily be corrected, in some appreciable degree at least, by any sufficient authority that shall undertake to control the country's industrial forces without regard to pecuniary profit and loss. any authority competent to take over the control and regulate the conduct of the community's industry with a view to maximum output as counted by weight and tale, rather than by net aggregate price-income over price-cost, can readily effect an appreciable increase in the effectual productive capacity; but it can be done only by violating that democratic order of things within which business enterprise runs. the several belligerent nations of europe are showing that it can be done, that the sabotage of business enterprise can be put aside by sufficiently heroic measures. and they are also showing that they are all aware, and have always been aware, that the conduct of industry on business principles is incompetent to bring the largest practicable output of goods and services; incompetent to such a degree, indeed, as not to be tolerable in a season of desperate need, when the nation requires the full use of its productive forces, equipment and man-power, regardless of the pecuniary claims of individuals. * * * * * now, the projected imperial dominion is a power of the character required to bring a sufficient corrective to bear, in case of need, on this democratic situation in which the businessmen in charge necessarily manage the country's industry at cross purposes with the community's--that is the common man's--material interest. it is an extraneous power, to whom the continued pecuniary gain of these nations' businessmen is a minor consideration, a negligible consideration in case it shall appear that the imperial usufruct of the underlying nation's productive forces is in any degree impaired by the businessmen's management of it for their own net gain. it is difficult to see on what grounds of self-interest such an imperial government could consent to tolerate the continued management of these underlying nations' industries on business principles, that is to say on the principle of the maximum pecuniary gain to the businesslike managers; and recent experience seems to teach that no excessive, that is to say no inconvenient, degree of consideration for vested rights, and the like, would long embarrass the imperial government in its administration of its usufruct. it should be a reasonable expectation that, without malice and with an unprejudiced view to its own usufruct of these underlying countries, the imperial establishment would take due care that no systematically, and in its view gratuitously, uneconomical methods should continue in the ordinary conduct of their industry. among other considerations of weight in this connection is the fact that a contented, well-fed, and not wantonly over-worked populace is a valuable asset in such a case. similarly, by contraries, as an asset in usufruct to such an alien power, a large, wealthy, spendthrift, body of gentlefolk, held in high esteem by the common people, would have but a slight value, conceivably even a negative value, in such a case. a wise administration would presumably look to their abatement, rather than otherwise. at this point the material interest of the common man would seem to coincide with that of the imperial establishment. still, his preconceived notions of the wisdom and beneficence of his gentlefolk would presumably hinder his seeing the matter in that reasonable light. under the paramount surveillance of such an alien power, guided solely by its own interest in the usufruct of the country and its population, it is to be presumed that class privileges and discrimination would be greatly abated if not altogether discontinued. the point is in some doubt, partly because this alien establishment whose dominion is in question is itself grounded in class prerogatives and discrimination, and so, not improbably, it would carry over into its supervision of the underlying nations something of a bias in favor of class privileges. and a similar order of things might also result by choice of a class-system as a convenient means of control and exploitation. the latter consideration is presumably the more cogent, since the imperial establishment in question is already, by ancient habit, familiar with the method of control by class and privilege; and, indeed, unfamiliar with any other method. such a government, which governs without effectual advice or formal consent of the governed, will almost necessarily rest its control of the country on an interested class, of sufficient strength and bound by sufficiently grave interest to abet the imperial establishment effectually in all its adventures and enterprises. but such a privileged order, that is to be counted in to share dynastic usufruct and liabilities, in good days and evil, will be of a feudalistic complexion rather than something after the fashion of a modern business community doing business by investment and pecuniary finesse. it would still be a reasonable expectation that discrimination between pecuniary classes should fall away under this projected alien tutelage; more particularly all such discrimination as is designed to benefit any given class or interest at the cost of the whole, as, e.g., protective tariffs, monopolistic concessions and immunities, engrossing of particular lines of material resources, and the like. the character of the economic policy to be pursued should not be difficult of apprehension, if only these underlying peoples are conceived as an estate in tail within the dynastic line of descent. the imperial establishment which so is prospectively to take over the surveillance of these modern peoples under this projected enterprise in dominion, may all the more readily be conceived as handling its new and larger resources somewhat unreservedly as an estate to be administered with a shrewd eye to the main chance, since such has always been its relation to the peoples and territories whose usufruct it already enjoys. it is only that the circumstances of the case will admit a freer and more sagacious application of those principles of usufruct that lie at the root of the ancient culture of the fatherland. * * * * * this excessively long, and yet incomplete, review of the presumptive material advantages to accrue to the common man under a régime of peace by unconditional surrender to an alien dynasty, brings the argument apparently to the conclusion that such an eventuality might be fortunate rather than the reverse; or at least that it has its compensations, even if it is not something to be desired. such should particularly appear to be the presumption in case one is at all inclined to make much of the cultural gains to be brought in under the new régime. and more particularly should a policy of non-resistant submission to the projected new order seem expedient in view of the exceedingly high, not to say prohibitive, cost of resistance, or even of materially retarding its fulfillment. chapter v peace and neutrality considered simply on the face of the tangible material interests involved, the choice of the common man in these premises should seem very much of a foregone conclusion, if he could persuade himself to a sane and perspicuous consideration of these statistically apparent merits of the case alone. it is at least safely to be presumed that he has nothing to lose, in a material way, and there is reason to look for some slight gain in creature comforts and in security of life and limb, consequent upon the elimination, or at least the partial disestablishment, of pecuniary necessity as the sole bond and criterion of use and wont in economic concerns. but man lives not by bread alone. in point of fact, and particularly as touches the springs of action among that common run that do not habitually formulate their aspirations and convictions in extended and grammatically defensible documentary form, and the drift of whose impulses therefore is not masked or deflected by the illusive consistencies of set speech,--as touches the common run, particularly, it will hold true with quite an unacknowledged generality that the material means of life are, after all, means only; and that when the question of what things are worth while is brought to the final test, it is not these means, nor the life conditioned on these means, that are seen to serve as the decisive criterion; but always it is some ulterior, immaterial end, in the pursuit of which these material means find their ulterior ground of valuation. neither the overt testimony nor the circumstantial evidence to this effect is unequivocal; but seen in due perspective, and regard being had chiefly to the springs of concerted action as shown in any massive movement of this common run of mankind, there is, after all, little room to question that the things which commend themselves as indefeasibly worth while are the things of the human spirit. these ideals, aspirations, aims, ends of endeavour, are by no means of a uniform or homogeneous character throughout the modern communities, still less throughout the civilised world, or throughout the checkered range of classes and conditions of men; but, with such frequency and amplitude that it must be taken as a major premise in any attempted insight into human behaviour, it will hold true that they are of a spiritual, immaterial nature. the caution may, parenthetically, not be out of place, that this characterisation of the ulterior springs of action as essentially not of the nature of creature comforts, need be taken in no wider extension than that which so is specifically given it. it will be found to apply as touches the conduct of the common run; what modification of it might be required to make it at all confidently applicable to the case of one and another of those classes into whose scheme of life creature comforts enter with more pronounced effect may be more of a delicate point. but since it is the behaviour, and the grounds of behaviour, of the common run that are here in question, the case of their betters in this respect may conveniently be left on one side. the question in hand touches the behavior of the common man, taken in the aggregate, in face of the quandary into which circumstances have led him; since the question of what these modern peoples will do is after all a question of what the common man in the aggregate will do, of his own motion or by persuasion. his betters may be in a position to guide, persuade, cajole, mislead, and victimise him; for among the many singular conceits that beset the common man is the persuasion that his betters are in some way better than he, wiser, more beneficent. but the course that may so be chosen, with or without guidance or persuasion from the superior classes, as well as the persistence and energy with which this course is pursued, is conditioned on the frame of mind of the common run. just what will be the nature and the concrete expression of these ideal aspirations that move the common run is a matter of habitual preconceptions; and habits of thought vary from one people to another according to the diversity of experience to which they have been exposed. among the western nations the national prestige has come to seem worth while as an ulterior end, perhaps beyond all else that is comprised in the secular scheme of things desirable to be had or to be achieved. and in the apprehension of such of them as have best preserved the habits of thought induced by a long experience in feudal subjection, the service of the sovereign or the dynasty still stands over as the substantial core of the cultural scheme, upon which sentiment and endeavour converge. in the past ages of the democratic peoples, as well as in the present-day use and wont among subjects of the dynastic states--as e.g., japan or germany--men are known to have resolutely risked, and lost, their life for the sake of the sovereign's renown, or even to save the sovereign's life; whereas, of course, even the slightest and most nebulous reflection would make it manifest that in point of net material utility the sovereign's decease is an idle matter as compared with the loss of an able-bodied workman. the sovereign may always be replaced, with some prospect of public advantage, or failing that, it should be remarked that a regency or inter-regnum will commonly be a season of relatively economical administration. again, religious enthusiasm, and the furtherance of religious propaganda, may come to serve the same general purpose as these secular ideals, and will perhaps serve it just as well. certain "principles," of personal liberty and of opportunity for creative self-direction and an intellectually worthy life, perhaps may also become the idols of the people, for which they will then be willing to risk their material fortune; and where this has happened, as among the democratic peoples of christendom, it is not selfishly for their own personal opportunity to live untroubled under the light of these high principles that these opinionated men are ready to contend, but rather impersonally for the human right which under these principles is the due of all mankind, and particularly of the incoming and of later generations. on these and the like intangible ends the common man is set with such inveterate predilection that he will, on provocation, stick at nothing to put the project through. for such like ends the common man will lay down his life; at least, so they say. there may always be something of rhetorical affectation in it all; but, after all, there is sufficient evidence to hand of such substance and tenacity in the common man's hold on these ideal aspirations, on these idols of his human spirit, as to warrant the assertion that he is, rather commonly, prepared to go to greater lengths in the furtherance of these immaterial gains that are to inure to someone else than for any personal end of his own, in the way of creature comforts or even of personal renown. for such ends the common man, in democratic christendom is, on provocation, willing to die; or again, the patient and perhaps more far-seeing common man of pagan china is willing to live for these idols of an inveterate fancy, through endless contumely and hard usage. the conventional chinese preconceptions, in the way of things that are worth while in their own right, appear to differ from those current in the occident in such a way that the preconceived ideal is not to be realised except by way of continued life. the common man's accountability to the cause of humanity, in china, is of so intimately personal a character that he can meet it only by tenaciously holding his place in the sequence of generations; whereas among the peoples of christendom there has arisen out of their contentious past a preconception to the effect that this human duty to mankind is of the nature of a debt, which can be cancelled by bankruptcy proceedings, so that the man who unprofitably dies fighting for the cause has thereby constructively paid the reckoning in full. evidently, if the common man of these modern nations that are prospectively to be brought under tutelage of the imperial government could be brought to the frame of mind that is habitual with his chinese counterpart, there should be a fair hope that pacific counsels would prevail and that christendom would so come in for a régime of peace by submission under this imperial tutelage. but there are always these preconceptions of self-will and insubordination to be counted with among these nations, and there is the ancient habit of a contentious national solidarity in defense of the nation's prestige, more urgent among these peoples than any sentiment of solidarity with mankind at large, or any ulterior gain in civilisation that might come of continued discipline in the virtues of patience and diligence under distasteful circumstances. the occidental conception of manhood is in some considerable measure drawn in negative terms. so much so that whenever a question of the manly virtues comes under controversy it presently appears that at least the indispensable minimum, and indeed the ordinary marginal modicum, of what is requisite to a worthy manner of life is habitually formulated in terms of what not. this appearance is doubtless misleading if taken without the universally understood postulate on the basis of which negative demands are formulated. there is a good deal of what would be called historical accident in all this. the indispensable demands of this modern manhood take the form of refusal to obey extraneous authority on compulsion; of exemption from coercive direction and subservience; of insubordination, in short. but it is always understood as a matter of course that this insubordination is a refusal to submit to irresponsible or autocratic rule. stated from the positive side it would be freedom from restraint by or obedience to any authority not constituted by express advice and consent of the governed. and as near as it may be formulated, when reduced to the irreducible minimum of concrete proviso, this is the final substance of things which neither shame nor honour will permit the modern civilised man to yield. to no arrangement for the abrogation of this minimum of free initiative and self-direction will he consent to be a party, whether it touches the conditions of life for his own people who are to come after, or as touches the fortunes of such aliens as are of a like mind on this head and are unable to make head against invasion of these human rights from outside. as has just been remarked, the negative form so often taken by these demands is something of an historical accident, due to the fact that these modern peoples came into their highly esteemed system of natural liberty out of an earlier system of positive checks on self-direction and initiative; a system, in effect, very much after the fashion of that imperial jurisdiction that still prevails in the dynastic states--as, e.g., germany or japan--whose projected dominion is now the immediate object of apprehension and repugnance. how naively the negative formulation gained acceptance, and at the same time how intrinsic to the new dispensation was the aspiration for free initiative, appears in the confident assertion of its most genial spokesman, that when these positive checks are taken away, "the simple and obvious system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord." the common man, in these modern communities, shows a brittle temper when any overt move is made against this heritage of civil liberty. he may not be altogether well advised in respect of what liberties he will defend and what he will submit to; but the fact is to be counted with in any projected peace, that there is always this refractory residue of terms not open to negotiation or compromise. now it also happens, also by historical accident, that these residual principles of civil liberty have come to blend and coalesce with a stubborn preconception of national integrity and national prestige. so that in the workday apprehension of the common man, not given to analytic excursions, any infraction of the national integrity or any abatement of the national prestige has come to figure as an insufferable infringement on his personal liberty and on those principles of humanity that make up the categorical articles of the secular creed of christendom. the fact may be patent on reflection that the common man's substantial interest in the national integrity is slight and elusive, and that in sober common sense the national prestige has something less than a neutral value to him; but this state of the substantially pertinent facts is not greatly of the essence of the case, since his preconceptions in these premises do not run to that effect, and since they are of too hard and fast a texture to suffer any serious abatement within such a space of time as can come in question here and now. * * * * * the outlook for a speedy settlement of the world's peace on a plan of unconditional surrender to the projected imperial dominion seems unpromisingly dubious, in view of the stubborn temper shown by these modern peoples wherever their preconceived ideas of right and honest living appear to be in jeopardy; and the expediency of entering into any negotiated compact of diplomatic engagements and assurances designed to serve as groundwork to an eventual enterprise of that kind must therefore also be questionable in a high degree. it is even doubtful if any allowance of time can be counted on to bring these modern peoples to a more reasonable, more worldly-wise, frame of mind; so that they would come to see their interest in such an arrangement, or would divest themselves of their present stubborn and perhaps fantastic prejudice against an autocratic régime of the kind spoken for. at least for the present any such hope of a peaceable settlement seems illusive. what may be practicable in this way in the course of time is of course still more obscure; but argument on the premises which the present affords does not point to a substantially different outcome in the calculable future. for the immediate future--say, within the life-time of the oncoming generation--the spiritual state of the peoples concerned in this international quandary is not likely to undergo so radical a change as to seriously invalidate an argument that proceeds on the present lie of the land in this respect. preconceptions are a work of habit impinging on a given temperamental bent; and where, as in these premises, the preconceptions have taken on an institutionalised form, have become conventionalised and commonly accepted, and so have been woven into the texture of popular common sense, they must needs be a work of protracted and comprehensive habituation impinging on a popular temperamental bent of so general a prevalence that it may be called congenital to the community at large. a heritable bent pervading the group within which inheritance runs, does not change, so long as the racial complexion of the group remains passably intact; a conventionalised, commonly established habit of mind will change only slowly, commonly not without the passing of at least one generation, and only by grace of a sufficiently searching and comprehensive discipline of experience. for good or ill, the current situation is to be counted on not to lose character over night or with a revolution of the seasons, so far as concerns these spiritual factors that make or mar the fortunes of nations. at the same time these spiritual assets, being of the nature of habit, are also bound to change character more or less radically, by insensible shifting of ground, but incontinently,--provided only that the conditions of life, and therefore the discipline of experience, undergo any substantial change. so the immediate interest shifts to the presumptive rate and character of those changes that are in prospect, due to the unremitting change of circumstances under which these modern peoples live and to the discipline of which they are unavoidably exposed. for the present and for the immediate future the current state of things is a sufficiently stable basis of argument; but assurance as to the sufficiency of the premises afforded by the current state of things thins out in proportion as the perspective of the argument runs out into the succeeding years. the bearing of it all is two-fold, of course. this progressive, cumulative habituation under changing circumstances affects the case both of those democratic peoples whose fortunes are in the hazard, and also of those dynastic states by whom the projected enterprise in dominion is to be carried into effect. * * * * * the case of the two formidable dynastic states whose names have been coupled together in what has already been said is perhaps the more immediately interesting in the present connection. as matters stand, and in the measure in which they continue so to stand, the case of these is in no degree equivocal. the two dynastic establishments seek dominion, and indeed they seek nothing else, except incidentally to and in furtherance of the main quest. as has been remarked before, it lies in the nature of a dynastic state to seek dominion, that being the whole of its nature in so far as it runs true to form. but a dynastic state, like any other settled, institutionalised community of men, rests on and draws its effectual driving force from the habit of mind of its underlying community, the common man in the aggregate, his preconceptions and ideals as to what things are worth while. without a suitable spiritual ground of this kind such a dynastic state passes out of the category of formidable powers and into that of precarious despotism. in both of the two states here in question the dynastic establishment and its bodyguard of officials and gentlefolk may be counted on to persevere in the faith that now animates them, until an uneasy displacement of sentiment among the underlying populace may in time induce them judiciously to shift their footing. like the ruling classes elsewhere, they are of a conservative temper and may be counted on so to continue. they are also not greatly exposed to the discipline of experience that makes for adaptive change in habits of life, and therefore in the correlated habits of thought. it is always the common man that is effectually reached by any exacting or wide-reaching change in the conditions of life. he is relatively unsheltered from any forces that make for adaptive change, as contrasted with the case of his betters; and however sluggish and reluctant may be his response to such discipline as makes for a displacement of outworn preconceptions, yet it is always out of the mass of this common humanity that those movements of disaffection and protest arise, which lead, on occasion, to any material realignment of the institutional fabric or to any substantial shift in the line of policy to be pursued under the guidance of their betters. the common mass of humanity, it may be said in parenthesis, is of course not a homogeneous body. uncommon men, in point of native gifts of intelligence, sensibility, or personal force, will occur as frequently, in proportion to the aggregate numbers, among the common mass as among their betters. since in any one of these nations of christendom, with their all-inclusive hybridisation, the range, frequency and amplitude of variations in hereditary endowment is the same throughout all classes. class differentiation is a matter of habit and convention; and in distinction from his betters the common man is common only in point of numbers and in point of the more general and more exacting conditions to which he is exposed. he is in a position to be more hardly ridden by the discipline of experience, and is at the same time held more consistently to such a body of preconceptions, and to such changes only in this body of preconceptions, as fall in with the drift of things in a larger mass of humanity. but all the while it is the discipline which impinges on the sensibilities of this common mass that shapes the spiritual attitude and temper of the community and so defines what may and what may not be undertaken by the constituted leaders. so that, in a way, these dynastic states are at the mercy of that popular sentiment whose creatures they are, and are subject to undesired changes of direction and efficiency in their endeavors, contingent on changes in the popular temper; over which they have only a partial, and on the whole a superficial control. a relatively powerful control and energetic direction of the popular temper is and has been exercised by these dynastic establishments, with a view to its utilisation in the pursuit of the dynastic enterprise; and much has visibly been accomplished in that way; chiefly, perhaps, by military discipline in subordination to personal authority, and also by an unsparing surveillance of popular education, with a view to fortify the preconceptions handed down from the passing order as well as to eliminate all subversive innovation. yet in spite of all the well-conceived and shrewdly managed endeavors of the german imperial system in this direction, e.g., there has been evidence of an obscurely growing uneasiness, not to say disaffection, among the underlying mass. so much so that hasty observers, and perhaps biased, have reached the inference that one of the immediate contributory causes that led to the present war was the need of a heroic remedy to correct this untoward drift of sentiment. for the german people the government of the present dynastic incumbent has done all that could (humanly speaking) be expected in the way of endeavoring to conserve the passing order and to hold the popular imagination to the received feudalistic ideals of loyal service. and yet the peoples of the empire are already caught in the net of that newer order which they are now endeavoring to break by force of arms. they are inextricably implicated in the cultural complex of christendom; and within this western culture those peoples to whom it fell to lead the exodus out of the egypt of feudalism have come quite naturally to set the pace in all the larger conformities of civilised life. within the confines of christendom today, for good or ill, whatever usage or customary rule of conduct falls visibly short of the precedent set by these cultural pioneers is felt to fall beneath the prescriptive commonplace level of civilisation. failure to adopt and make use of those tried institutional expedients on which these peoples of the advance guard have set their mark of authentication is today presumptively a mistake and an advantage foregone; and a people who are denied the benefit of these latterday ways and means of civic life are uneasy with a sense of grievance at the hands of their rulers. besides which, the fashion in articles of institutional equipage so set by the authentic pioneers of culture has also come to be mandatory, as a punctilio of the governmental proprieties; so that no national establishment which aspires to a decorous appearance in the eyes of the civilised world can longer afford to be seen without them. the forms at least must be observed. hence the "representative" and pseudo-representative institutions of these dynastic states. these dynastic states among the rest have partly followed the dictates of civilised fashion, partly yielded to the, more or less intelligent, solicitations of their subjects, or the spokesmen of their subjects, and have installed institutional apparatus of this modern pattern--more in point of form than of substance, perhaps. yet in time the adoption of the forms is likely to have an effect, if changing circumstances favor their taking effect. such has on the whole been the experience of those peoples who have gone before along this trail of political advance. as instance the growth of discretionary powers under the hands of parliamentary representatives in those cases where the movement has gone on longest and farthest; and these instances should not be considered idle, as intimations of what may presumptively be looked for under the imperial establishments of germany or japan. it may be true that hitherto, along with the really considerable volume of imitative gestures of discretionary deliberation delegated to these parliamentary bodies, they have as regards all graver matters brought to their notice only been charged with a (limited) power to talk. it may be true that, for the present, on critical or weighty measures the parliamentary discretion extends no farther than respectfully to say: "_ja wohl_!" but then, _ja wohl_ is also something; and there is no telling where it may all lead to in the long course of years. one has a vague apprehension that this "_ja wohl_!" may some day come to be a customarily necessary form of authentication, so that with-holding it (_behüt' es gott_!) may even come to count as an effectual veto on measures so pointedly neglected. more particularly will the formalities of representation and self-government be likely to draw the substance of such like "free institutions" into the effectual conduct of public affairs if it turns out that the workday experiences of these people takes a turn more conducive to habits of insubordination than has been the case hitherto. indications are, again, not wanting, that even in the empire the discipline of workday experience is already diverging from that line that once trained the german subjects into the most loyal and unrepining subservience to dynastic ambitions. of course, just now, under the shattering impact of warlike atrocities and patriotic clamour, the workday spirit of insubordination and critical scrutiny is gone out of sight and out of hearing. something of this inchoate insubordination has showed itself repeatedly during the present reign, sufficient to provoke many shrewd protective measures on the side of the dynastic establishment, both by way of political strategy and by arbitrary control. disregarding many minor and inconsequential divisions of opinion and counsel among the german people during this eventful reign, the political situation has been moving on the play of three, incipiently divergent, strains of interest and sentiment: (a) the dynasty (together with the agrarians, of whom in a sense the dynasty is a part); (b) the businessmen, or commercial interest (including investors); and (c) the industrial workmen. doubtless it would be easier to overstate than to indicate with any nice precision what has been the nature, and especially the degree, of this alienation of sentiment and divergence of conscious interest among these several elements. it is not that there has at any point been a perceptible faltering in respect of loyalty to the crown as such. but since the crown belongs, by origin, tradition, interest and spiritual identity, in the camp of the agrarians, the situation has been such as would inevitably take on a character of disaffection toward the dynastic establishment, in the conceivable absence of that strong surviving sentiment of dynastic loyalty that still animates all classes and conditions of men in the fatherland. it would accordingly, again, be an overstatement to say that the crown has been standing precariously at the apex of a political triangle, the other two corners of which are occupied by these two divided and potentially recalcitrant elements of the body politic, held apart by class antipathy and divergent pecuniary interest, and held in check by divided counsels; but something after that fashion is what would have resulted under similar conditions of strain in any community where the modern spirit of insubordination has taken effect in any large measure. both of these elements of incipient disturbance in the dynastic economy, the modern commercial and working classes, are creatures of the new era; and they are systematically out of line with the received dynastic tradition of fealty, both in respect of their pecuniary interests and in respect of that discipline of experience to which their workday employment subjects them. they are substantially the same two classes or groupings that came forward in the modernisation of the british community, with a gradual segregation of interest and a consequent induced solidarity of class sentiment and class animosities. but with the difference that in the british case the movement of changing circumstances was slow enough to allow a fair degree of habituation to the altered economic conditions; whereas in the german case the move into modern economic conditions has been made so precipitately as to have carried the mediaeval frame of mind over virtually intact into this era of large business and machine industry. in the fatherland the commercial and industrial classes have been called on to play their part without time to learn their lines. the case of the english-speaking peoples, who have gone over this course of experience in more consecutive fashion than any others, teaches that in the long run, if these modern economic conditions persist, one or the other or both of these creatures of the modern era must prevail, and must put the dynastic establishment out of commission; although the sequel has not yet been seen in this british case, and there is no ground afforded for inference as to which of the two will have the fortune to survive and be invested with the hegemony. meantime the opportunity of the imperial establishment to push its enterprise in dominion lies in the interval of time so required for the discipline of experience under modern conditions to work out through the growth of modern habits of thought into such modern (i.e. civilised) institutional forms and such settled principles of personal insubordination as will put any effectual dynastic establishment out of commission. the same interval of time, that must so be allowed for the decay of the dynastic spirit among the german people under the discipline of life by the methods of modern trade and industry, marks the period during which no peace compact will be practicable, except with the elimination of the imperial establishment as a possible warlike power. all this, of course, applies to the case of japan as well, with the difference that while the japanese people are farther in arrears, they are also a smaller, less formidable body, more exposed to outside forces, and their mediaevalism is of a more archaic and therefore more precarious type. what length of time will be required for this decay of the dynastic spirit among the people of the empire is, of course, impossible to say. the factors of the case are not of a character to admit anything like calculation of the rate of movement; but in the nature of the factors involved it is also contained that something of a movement in this direction is unavoidable, under providence. as a preliminary consideration, these peoples of the empire and its allies, as well as their enemies in the great war, will necessarily come out of their warlike experience in a more patriotic and more vindictive frame of mind than that in which they entered on this adventure. fighting makes for malevolence. the war is itself to be counted as a set-back. a very large proportion of those who have lived through it will necessarily carry a warlike bent through life. by that much, whatever it may count for, the decay of the dynastic spirit--or the growth of tolerance and equity in national sentiment, if one chooses to put it that way--will be retarded from beforehand. so also the imperial establishment, or whatever is left of it, may be counted on to do everything in its power to preserve the popular spirit of loyalty and national animosity, by all means at its disposal; since the imperial establishment finally rests on the effectual body of national animosity. what hindrance will come in from this agency of retardation can at least vaguely be guessed at, in the light of what has been accomplished in that way under the strenuously reactionary rule of the present reign. again, there is the chance, as there always is a chance of human folly, that the neighboring peoples will undertake, whether jointly or severally, to restrict or prohibit trade relations between the people of the empire and their enemies in the present war; thereby fomenting international animosity, as well as contributing directly to the economic readiness for war both on their own part and on that of the empire. this is also, and in an eminent degree, an unknown factor in the case, on which not even a reasonable guess can be made beforehand. these are, all and several, reactionary agencies, factors of retardation, making for continuation of the current international situation of animosity, distrust, chicane, trade rivalry, competitive armament, and eventual warlike enterprise. * * * * * to offset these agencies of conservatism there is nothing much that can be counted on but that slow, random, and essentially insidious working of habituation that tends to the obsolescence of the received preconceptions; partly by supplanting them with something new, but more effectually by their falling into disuse and decay. there is, it will have to be admitted, little of a positive character that can be done toward the installation of a régime of peace and good-will. the endeavours of the pacifists should suffice to convince any dispassionate observer of the substantial futility of creative efforts looking to such an end. much can doubtless be done in the way of precautionary measures, mostly of a negative character, in the way especially of removing sources of infection and (possibly) of so sterilising the apparatus of national life that its working shall neither maintain animosities and interests at variance with the conditions of peace nor contribute to their spread and growth. there is necessarily little hope or prospect that any national establishment will contribute materially or in any direct way to the obsolescence of warlike sentiments and ambitions; since such establishments are designed for the making of war by keeping national jealousies intact, and their accepted place in affairs is that of preparation for eventual hostilities, defensive or offensive. except for the contingency of eventual hostilities, no national establishment could be kept in countenance. they would all fall into the decay of desuetude, just as has happened to the dynastic establishments among those peoples who have (passably) lost the spirit of dynastic aggression. the modern industrial occupations, the modern technology, and that modern empirical science that runs so close to the frontiers of technology, all work at cross purposes with the received preconceptions of the nationalist order; and in a more pronounced degree they are at cross purposes with that dynastic order of preconceptions that converges on imperial dominion. the like is true, with a difference, of the ways, means and routine of business enterprise as it is conducted in the commercialised communities of today. the working of these agencies runs to this effect not by way of deliberate and destructive antagonism, but almost wholly by force of systematic, though unintended and incidental, neglect of those values, standards, verities, and grounds of discrimination and conviction that make up the working realities of the national spirit and of dynastic ambition. the working concepts of this new, essentially mechanistic, order of human interests, do not necessarily clash with those of the old order, essentially the order of personages and personalities; the two are incommensurable, and they are incompatible only in the sense and degree implied in that state of the case. the profoundest and most meritorious truths of dynastic politics can on no provocation and by no sleight of hand be brought within the logic of that system of knowledge and appraisal of values by which the mechanistic technology proceeds. within the premises of this modern mechanistic industry and science all the best values and verities of the dynastic order are simply "incompetent, irrelevant and impertinent." there is accordingly no unavoidable clash and no necessary friction between the two schemes of knowledge or the two habits of mind that characterise the two contrasted cultural eras. it is only that a given individual--call him the common man--will not be occupied with both of these incommensurable systems of logic and appreciation at the same time or bearing on the same point; and further that in proportion as his waking hours and his mental energy are fully occupied within the lines of one of these systems of knowledge, design and employment, in much the same measure he will necessarily neglect the other, and in time he will lose proficiency and interest in its pursuits and its conclusions. the man who is so held by his daily employment and his life-long attention within the range of habits of thought that are valid in the mechanistic technology, will, on an average and in the long run, lose his grip on the spiritual virtues of national prestige and dynastic primacy; "for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." not that the adepts in this modern mechanistic system of knowledge and design may not also be very good patriots and devoted servants of the dynasty. the artless and, on the whole, spontaneous riot of dynastic avidity displayed to the astonished eyes of their fellow craftsmen in the neutral countries by the most eminent scientists of the fatherland during the early months of the war should be sufficient warning that the archaic preconceptions do not hurriedly fly out of the window when the habits of thought of the mechanistic order come in at the door. but with the passage of time, pervasively, by imperceptible displacement, by the decay of habitual disuse, as well as by habitual occupation with these other and unrelated ways and means of knowledge and belief, dynastic loyalty and the like conceptions in the realm of religion and magic pass out of the field of attention and fall insensibly into the category of the lost arts. particularly will this be true of the common man, who lives, somewhat characteristically, in the mass and in the present, and whose waking hours are somewhat fully occupied with what he has to do. with the commercial interests the imperial establishment can probably make such terms as to induce their support of the dynastic enterprise, since they can apparently always be made to believe that an extension of the imperial dominion will bring correspondingly increased opportunities of trade. it is doubtless a mistake, but it is commonly believed by the interested parties, which is just as good for the purpose as if it were true. and it should be added that in this, as in other instances of the quest of larger markets, the costs are to be paid by someone else than the presumed commercial beneficiaries; which brings the matter under the dearest principle known to businessmen: that of getting something for nothing. it will not be equally easy to keep the affections of the common man loyal to the dynastic enterprise when he begins to lose his grip on the archaic faith in dynastic dominion and comes to realise that he has also--individually and in the mass--no material interest even in the defense of the fatherland, much less in the further extension of imperial rule. but the time when this process of disillusionment and decay of ideals shall have gone far enough among the common run to afford no secure footing in popular sentiment for the contemplated imperial enterprise,--this time is doubtless far in the future, as compared with the interval of preparation required for a new onset. habituation takes time, particularly such habituation as can be counted on to derange the habitual bent of a great population in respect of their dearest preconceptions. it will take a very appreciable space of time even in the case of a populace so accessible to new habits of thought as the german people are by virtue of their slight percentage of illiteracy, the very large proportion engaged in those modern industries that constantly require some intelligent insight into mechanistic facts, the density of population and the adequate means of communication, and the extent to which the whole population is caught in the web of mechanically standardised processes that condition their daily life at every turn. as regards their technological situation, and their exposure to the discipline of industrial life, no other population of nearly the same volume is placed in a position so conducive to a rapid acquirement of the spirit of the modern era. but, also, no other people comparable with the population of the fatherland has so large and well-knit a body of archaic preconceptions to unlearn. their nearest analogue, of course, is the japanese nation. in all this there is, of course, no inclination to cast a slur on the german people. in point of racial characteristics there is no difference between them and their neighbours. and there is no reason to question their good intentions. indeed, it may safely be asserted that no people is more consciously well-meaning than the children of the fatherland. it is only that, with their archaic preconceptions of what is right and meritorious, their best intentions spell malevolence when projected into the civilised world as it stands today. and by no fault of theirs. nor is it meant to be intimated that their rate of approach to the accepted occidental standard of institutional maturity will be unduly slow or unduly reluctant, so soon as the pertinent facts of modern life begin effectively to shape their habits of thought. it is only that, human nature--and human second nature--being what it always has been, the rate of approach of the german people to a passably neutral complexion in matters of international animosity and aggression must necessarily be slow enough to allow ample time for the renewed preparation of a more unsparing and redoubtable endeavour on the part of the imperial establishment. what makes this german imperial establishment redoubtable, beyond comparison, is the very simple but also very grave combination of circumstances whereby the german people have acquired the use of the modern industrial arts in the highest state of efficiency, at the same time that they have retained unabated the fanatical loyalty of feudal barbarism.[ ] so long, and in so far, as this conjunction of forces holds there is no outlook for peace except on the elimination of germany as a power capable of disturbing the peace. [footnote : for an extended discussion of this point, see _imperial germany and the industrial revolution_, especially ch. v. and vi.] it may seem invidious to speak so recurrently of the german imperial establishment as the sole potential disturber of the peace in europe. the reason for so singling out the empire for this invidious distinction--of merit or demerit, as one may incline to take it--is that the facts run that way. there is, of course, other human material, and no small volume of it in the aggregate, that is of much the same character, and serviceable for the same purposes as the resources and man-power of the empire. but this other material can come effectually into bearing as a means of disturbance only in so far as it clusters about the imperial dynasty and marches under his banners. in so speaking of the imperial establishment as the sole enemy of a european peace, therefore, these outlying others are taken for granted, very much as one takes the nimbus for granted in speaking of one of the greater saints of god. * * * * * so the argument returns to the alternative: peace by unconditional surrender and submission, or peace by elimination of imperial germany (and japan). there is no middle course apparent. the old-fashioned--that is to say nineteenth-century--plan of competitive defensive armament and a balance of powers has been tried, and it has not proved to be a success, even so early in the twentieth century. this plan offers a substitute (_ersatz_) for peace; but even as such it has become impracticable. the modern, or rather the current late-modern, state of the industrial arts does not tolerate it. technological knowledge has thrown the advantage in military affairs definitively to the offensive, particularly to the offensive that is prepared beforehand with the suitable appliances and with men ready matured in that rigorous and protracted training by which alone they can become competent to make warlike use of these suitable appliances provided by the modern technology. at the same time, and by grace of the same advance in technology, any well-designed offensive can effectually reach any given community, in spite of distance or of other natural obstacles. the era of defensive armaments and diplomatic equilibration, as a substitute for peace, has been definitively closed by the modern state of the industrial arts. of the two alternatives spoken of above, the former--peace by submission under an alien dynasty--is presumably not a practicable solution, as has appeared in the course of the foregoing argument. the modern nations are not spiritually ripe for it. whether they have reached even that stage of national sobriety, or neutrality, that would enable them to live at peace among themselves after elimination of the imperial powers is still open to an uneasy doubt. it would be by a precarious margin that they can be counted on so to keep the peace in the absence of provocation from without the pale. their predilection for peace goes to no greater lengths than is implied in the formula: peace with honour; which assuredly does not cover a peace of non-resistance, and which, in effect, leaves the distinction between an offensive and a defensive war somewhat at loose ends. the national prestige is still a live asset in the mind of these peoples; and the limit of tolerance in respect of this patriotic animosity appears to be drawn appreciably closer than the formula cited above would necessarily presume. they will fight on provocation, and the degree of provocation required to upset the serenity of these sportsmanlike modern peoples is a point on which the shrewdest guesses may diverge. still, opinion runs more and more consistently to the effect that if these modern--say the french and the english-speaking--peoples were left to their own devices the peace might fairly be counted on to be kept between them indefinitely, barring unforeseen contingencies. experience teaches that warlike enterprise on a moderate scale and as a side interest is by no means incompatible with such a degree of neutral animus as these peoples have yet acquired,--e.g., the spanish-american war, which was made in america, or the boer war, which was made in england. but these wars, in spite of the dimensions which they presently took on, were after all of the nature of episodes,--the one chiefly an extension of sportsmanship, which engaged the best attention of only the more sportsmanlike elements, the other chiefly engineered by certain business interests with a callous view to getting something for nothing. both episodes came to be serious enough, both in their immediate incidence and in their consequences; but neither commanded the deliberate and cordial support of the community at large. there is a meretricious air over both; and there is apparent a popular inclination to condone rather than to take pride in these _faits accomplis_. the one excursion was a product of sportsmanlike bravado, fed on boyish exuberance, fomented for mercenary objects by certain business interests and place-hunting politicians, and incited by meretricious newspapers with a view to increase their circulation. the other was set afoot by interested businessmen, backed by politicians, seconded by newspapers, and borne by the community at large, in great part under misapprehension and stung by wounded pride. opinions will diverge widely as to the chances of peace in a community of nations among whom episodes of this character, and of such dimensions, have been somewhat more than tolerated in the immediate past. but the consensus of opinion in these same countries appears to be setting with fair consistency to the persuasion that the popular spirit shown in these and in analogous conjunctures in the recent past gives warrant that peace is deliberately desired and is likely to be maintained, barring unforeseen contingencies. * * * * * in the large, the measures conducive to the perpetuation of peace, and necessary to be taken, are simple and obvious; and they are largely of a negative character, exploits of omission and neglect. under modern conditions, and barring aggression from without, the peace is kept by avoiding the breaking of it. it does not break of itself,--in the absence of such national establishments as are organised with the sole ulterior view of warlike enterprise. a policy of peace is obviously a policy of avoidance,--avoidance of offense and of occasion for annoyance. what is required to insure the maintenance of peace among pacific nations is the neutralisation of all those human relations out of which international grievances are wont to arise. and what is necessary to assure a reasonable expectation of continued peace is the neutralisation of so much of these relations as the patriotic self-conceit and credulity of these peoples will permit. these two formulations are by no means identical; indeed, the disparity between what could advantageously be dispensed with in the way of national rights and pretensions, and what the common run of modern patriots could be induced to relinquish, is probably much larger than any sanguine person would like to believe. it should be plain on slight reflection that the greater part, indeed substantially the whole, of those material interests and demands that now engage the policy of the nations, and that serve on occasion to set them at variance, might be neutralised or relinquished out of hand, without detriment to any one of the peoples concerned. the greater part of these material interests over which the various national establishments keep watch and hold pretensions are, in point of historical derivation, a legacy from the princely politics of what is called the "mercantilist" period; and they are uniformly of the nature of gratuitous interference or discrimination between the citizens of the given nation and outsiders. except (doubtfully) in the english case, where mercantilist policies are commonly believed to have been adopted directly for the benefit of the commercial interest, measures of this nature are uniformly traceable to the endeavours of the crown and its officers to strengthen the finances of the prince and give him an advantage in warlike enterprise. they are kept up essentially for the same eventual end of preparation for war. so, e.g., protective tariffs, and the like discrimination in shipping, are still advocated as a means of making the nation self-supporting, self-contained, self-sufficient; with a view to readiness in the event of hostilities. a nation is in no degree better off in time of peace for being self-sufficient. in point of patent fact no nation can be industrially self-sufficient except at the cost of foregoing some of the economic advantages of that specialisation of industry which the modern state of the industrial arts enforces. in time of peace there is no benefit comes to the community at large from such restraint of trade with the outside world, or to any class or section of the community except those commercial concerns that are favored by the discrimination; and these invariably gain their special advantage at the cost of their compatriots. discrimination in trade--export, import or shipping--has no more beneficial effect when carried out publicly by the national authorities than when effected surreptitiously and illegally by a private conspiracy in restraint of trade within a group of interested business concerns. hitherto the common man has found it difficult to divest himself of an habitual delusion on this head, handed down out of the past and inculcated by interested politicians, to the effect that in some mysterious way he stands to gain by limiting his own opportunities. but the neutralisation of international trade, or the abrogation of all discrimination in trade, is the beginning of wisdom as touches the perpetuation of peace. the first effect of such a neutral policy would be wider and more intricately interlocking trade relations, coupled with a further specialisation and mutual dependence of industry between the several countries concerned; which would mean, in terms of international comity, a lessened readiness for warlike operations all around. it used to be an argument of the free-traders that the growth of international commercial relations under a free-trade policy would greatly conduce to a spirit of mutual understanding and forbearance between the nations. there may or may not be something appreciable in the contention; it has been doubted, and there is no considerable evidence to be had in support of it. but what is more to the point is the tangible fact that such specialisation of industry and consequent industrial interdependence would leave all parties to this relation less capable, materially and spiritually, to break off amicable relations. so again, in time of peace and except with a view to eventual hostilities, it would involve no loss, and presumably little pecuniary gain, to any country, locality, town or class, if all merchant shipping were registered indiscriminately under neutral colors and sailed under the neutral no-man's flag, responsible indiscriminately to the courts where they touched or where their business was transacted. neither producers, shippers, merchants nor consumers have any slightest interest in the national allegiance of the carriers of their freight, except such as may artificially be induced by discriminatory shipping regulations. in all but the name--in time of peace--the world's merchant shipping already comes near being so neutralised, and the slight further simplification required to leave it on a neutral peace footing would be little else than a neglect of such vexatious discrimination as is still in force. if no nation could claim the allegiance, and therefore the usufruct, of any given item of merchant shipping in case of eventual hostilities, on account of the domicile of the owners or the port of registry, that would create a further handicap on eventual warlike enterprise and add so much to the margin of tolerance. at the same time, in the event of hostilities, shipping sailing under the neutral no-man's flag and subject to no national allegiance would enjoy such immunities as still inure to neutral shipping. it is true, neutrality has not carried many immunities lately. cumulatively effective usage and the exigencies of a large, varied, shifting and extensive maritime trade have in the course of time brought merchant shipping to something approaching a neutral footing. for most, one might venture to say for virtually all, routine purposes of business and legal liability the merchant shipping comes under the jurisdiction of the local courts, without reservation. it is true, there still are formalities and reservations which enable questions arising out of incidents in the shipping trade to become subject of international conference and adjustment, but they are after all not such as would warrant the erection of national apparatus to take care of them in case they were not already covered by usage to that effect. the visible drift of usage toward neutralisation in merchant shipping, in maritime trade, and in international commercial transactions, together with the similarly visible feasibility of a closer approach to unreserved neutralisation of this whole range of traffic, suggests that much the same line of considerations should apply as regards the personal and pecuniary rights of citizens traveling or residing abroad. the extreme,--or, as seen from the present point of view, the ultimate--term in the relinquishment of national pretensions along this line would of course be the neutralisation of citizenship. this is not so sweeping a move as a patriotically-minded person might imagine on the first alarm, so far as touches the practical status of the ordinary citizen in his ordinary relations, and particularly among the english-speaking peoples. as an illustrative instance, citizenship has sat somewhat lightly on the denizens of the american republic, and with no evident damage to the community at large or to the inhabitants in detail. naturalisation has been easy, and has been sought with no more eagerness, on the whole, than the notably low terms of its acquirement would indicate. without loss or discomfort many law-abiding aliens have settled in this country and spent the greater part of a life-time under its laws without becoming citizens, and no one the worse or the wiser for it. not infrequently the decisive inducement to naturalisation on the part of immigrant aliens has been, and is, the desirability of divesting themselves of their rights of citizenship in the country of their origin. not that the privilege and dignity of citizenship, in this or in any other country, is to be held of little account. it is rather that under modern civilised conditions, and among a people governed by sentiments of humanity and equity, the stranger within our gates suffers no obloquy and no despiteful usage for being a stranger. it may be admitted that of late, with the fomentation of a more accentuated nationalism by politicians seeking a _raison d'être_, additional difficulties have been created in the way of naturalisation and the like incidents. still, when all is told of the average american citizen, _qua_ citizen, there is not much to tell. the like is true throughout the english-speaking peoples, with inconsequential allowance for local color. a definitive neutralisation of citizenship within the range of these english-speaking countries would scarcely ripple the surface of things as they are--in time of peace. all of which has not touched the sore and sacred spot in the received scheme of citizenship and its rights and liabilities. it is in the event of hostilities that the liabilities of the citizen at home come into the foreground, and it is as a source of patriotic grievance looking to warlike retaliation that the rights of the citizen abroad chiefly come into the case. if, as was once, almost inaudibly, hinted by a well-regarded statesman, the national establishment should refuse to jeopardise the public peace for the safeguarding of the person and property of citizens who go out _in partes infidelium_ on their own private concerns, and should so leave them under the uncurbed jurisdiction of the authorities in those countries into which they have intruded, the result might in many cases be hardship to such individuals. this would, of course, be true almost exclusively of such instances only as occur in such localities as are, temporarily or permanently, outside the pale of modern law and order. and, it may be in place to remark, instances of such hardship, with the accompanying hazard of national complications, would, no doubt, greatly diminish in frequency consequent upon the promulgation of such a disclaimer of national responsibility for the continued well-being of citizens who so expatriate themselves in the pursuit of their own advantage or amusement. meantime, let it not seem inconsiderate to recall that to the community at large the deplorable case of such expatriates under hardship involves no loss or gain in the material respect; and that, except for the fortuitous circumstance of his being a compatriot, the given individual's personal or pecuniary fortune in foreign parts has no special claim on his compatriots' sympathy or assistance; from which it follows also that with the definitive neutralisation of citizenship as touches expatriates, the sympathy which is now somewhat unintelligently confined to such cases, on what may without offense be called extraneous grounds, would somewhat more impartially and humanely extend to fellowmen in distress, regardless of nativity or naturalisation. what is mainly to the point here, however, is the fact that if citizenship were so neutralised within the range of neutral countries here contemplated, one further source of provocation to international jealousy and distrust would drop out of the situation. and it is not easy to detect any element of material loss involved in such a move. in the material respect no individual would be any the worse off, with the doubtful and dubious exception of the expatriate fortune-hunter, who aims to fish safely in troubled waters at his compatriots' expense. but the case stands otherwise as regards the balance of immaterial assets. the scaffolding of much highly-prized sentiment would collapse, and the world of poetry and pageantry--particularly that of the tawdrier and more vendible poetry and pageantry--would be poorer by so much. the man without a country would lose his pathetic appeal, or would at any rate lose much of it. it may be, of course, that in the sequel there would result no net loss even in respect of these immaterial assets of sentimental animation and patriotic self-complacency, but it is after all fairly certain that something would be lost, and it is by no means clear what if anything would come in to fill its place. an historical parallel may help to illustrate the point. in the movement out of what may be called the royal age of dynasties and chivalric service, those peoples who have moved out of that age and out of its spiritual atmosphere have lost much of the conscious magnanimity and conviction of merit that once characterised that order of things, as it still continues to characterise the prevalent habit of mind in the countries that still continue under the archaic order of dynastic mastery and service. but it is also to be noted that these peoples who so have moved out of the archaic order appear to be well content with this change of spiritual atmosphere, and they are even fairly well persuaded, in the common run, that the move has brought them some net gain in the way of human dignity and neighbourly tolerance, such as to offset any loss incurred on the heroic and invidious side of life. such is the tempering force of habit. whereas, e.g., on the other hand, the peoples of these surviving dynastic states, to which it is necessary continually to recur, who have not yet moved out of that realm of heroics, find themselves unable to see anything in such a prospective shift but net loss and headlong decay of the spirit; that modicum of forbearance and equity that is requisite to the conduct of life in a community of ungraded masterless men is seen by these stouter stomachs as a loosening of the moral fiber and a loss of nerve. * * * * * what is here tentatively projected under the phrase, "neutralization of citizenship," is only something a little more and farther along the same general line of movement which these more modern peoples have been following in all that sequence of institutional changes that has given them their present distinctive character of commonwealths, as contrasted with the dynastic states of the mediaeval order. what may be in prospect--if such a further move away from the mediaeval landmarks is to take effect--may best be seen in the light of the later moves in the same direction hitherto, more particularly as regards the moral and aesthetic merits at large of such an institutional mutation. as touches this last previous shifting of ground along this line, just spoken of, the case stands in this singular but significant posture, in respect of the spiritual values and valuations involved: these peoples who have, even in a doubtful measure, made this transition from the archaic institutional scheme, of fealty and dynastic exploit and coercion, to the newer scheme of the ungraded commonwealth, are convinced, to the point of martyrdom, that anything like a return to the old order is morally impossible as well as insufferably shameful and irksome; whereas those people, of the retarded division of the race, who have had no experience of this new order, are equally convinced that it is all quite incompatible with a worthy life. evidently, there should be no disputing about tastes. evidently, too, these retarded others will not move on into the later institutional phase, of the ungraded commonwealth, by preconceived choice; but only, if at all, by such schooling of experience as will bring them insensibly to that frame of mind out of which the ideal of the ungraded commonwealth emerges by easy generalisation of workday practice. meantime, having not yet experienced that phase of sentiment and opinion on civic rights and immunities that is now occupied by their institutionally maturer neighbours, the subjects of the imperial fatherland, e.g., in spite of the most laudable intentions and the best endeavour, are, by failure of this experience, unable to comprehend either the ground of opposition to their well-meaning projects of dominion or the futility of trying to convert these their elder brothers to their own prescriptive acceptation of what is worth while. in time, and with experience, this retarded division of christendom may come to the same perspective on matters of national usage and ideals as has been enforced on the more modern peoples by farther habituation. so, also, in time and with experience, if the drift of circumstance shall turn out to set that way, the further move away from mediaeval discriminations and constraint and into the unspectacular scheme of neutralisation may come to seem as right, good and beautiful as the democratic commonwealth now seems to the english-speaking peoples, or as the hohenzollern imperial state now seems to the subjects of the fatherland. there is, in effect, no disputing about tastes. there is little that is novel, and nothing that is to be rated as constructive innovation, in this sketch of what might not inaptly be called peace by neglect. the legal mind, which commonly takes the initiative in counsels on what to do, should scarcely be expected to look in that direction for a way out, or to see its way out in that direction in any case; so that it need occasion no surprise if the many current projects of pacification turn on ingenious and elaborate provisions of apparatus and procedure, rather than on that simpler line of expedients which the drift of circumstance, being not possessed of a legal mind, has employed in the sequence of institutional change hitherto. the legal mind that dominates in the current deliberations on peace is at home in exhaustive specifications and meticulous demarkations, and it is therefore prone to seek a remedy for the burden of supernumerary devices by recourse to further excesses of regulation. this trait of the legal mind is not a bad fault at the worst, and the quality in which this defect inheres is of the greatest moment in any project of constructive engineering on the legal and political plane. but it is less to the purpose, indeed it is at cross purposes, in such a conjuncture as the present; when the nations are held up in their quest of peace chiefly by an accumulation of institutional apparatus that has out-stayed its usefulness. it is the fortune even of good institutions to become imbecile with the change of conditioning circumstances, and it then becomes a question of their disestablishment, not of their rehabilitation. if there is anywhere a safe negative conclusion, it is that an institution grown mischievous by obsolescence need not be replaced by a substitute. instances of such mischievous institutional arrangements, obsolete or in process of obsolescence, would be, e.g., the french monarchy of the ancient régime, the spanish inquisition, the british corn laws and the "rotten boroughs," the barbary pirates, the turkish rule in armenia, the british crown, the german imperial dynasty, the european balance of powers, the monroe doctrine. in some sense, at least in the sense and degree implied in their selective survival, these various articles of institutional furniture, and many like them, have once presumably been suitable to some end, in the days of their origin and vigorous growth; and they have at least in some passable fashion met some felt want; but if they ever had a place and use in the human economy they have in time grown imbecile and mischievous by force of changing circumstances, and the question is not how to replace them with something else to the same purpose after their purpose is outworn. a man who loses a wart off the end of his nose does not apply to the _ersatz_ bureau for a convenient substitute. now, a large proportion, perhaps even substantially the whole, of the existing apparatus of international rights, pretensions, discriminations, covenants and provisos, visibly fall in that class, in so far as concerns their material serviceability to the nation at large, and particularly as regards any other than a warlike purpose, offensive or defensive. of course, the national dignity and diplomatic punctilio, and the like adjuncts and instrumentalities of the national honour, all have their prestige value; and they are not likely to be given up out of hand. in point of fact, however solicitous for a lasting peace these patriotically-minded modern peoples may be, it is doubtful if they could be persuaded to give up any appreciable share of these appurtenances of national jealousy even when their retention implies an imminent breach of the peace. yet it is plain that the peace will be secure in direct proportion to the measure in which national discrimination and prestige are allowed to pass into nothingness and be forgot. * * * * * by so much as it might amount to, such neutralisation of outstanding interests between these pacific nations should bring on a degree of coalescence of these nationalities. in effect, they are now held apart in many respects by measures of precaution against their coming to a common plan of use and wont. the degree of coalescence would scarcely be extreme; more particularly it could not well become onerous, since it would rest on convenience, inclination and the neglect of artificial discrepancies. the more intimate institutions of modern life, that govern human conduct locally and in detail, need not be affected, or not greatly affected, for better or worse. yet something appreciable in that way might also fairly be looked for in time. the nature, reach and prescriptive force of this prospective coalescence through neutralisation may perhaps best be appreciated in the light of what has already come to pass, without design or mandatory guidance, in those lines of human interest where the national frontiers interpose no bar, or at least no decisive bar, whether by force of unconcern or through impotence. fashions of dress, equipage and decorous usage, e.g., run with some uniformity throughout these modern nations, and indeed with some degree of prescriptive force. there is, of course, nothing mandatory, in the simpler sense, about all this; nor is the degree of conformity extreme or uniform throughout. but it is a ready-made generalisation that only those communities are incorporated in this cosmopolitan coalescence of usage that are moved by their own incitement, and only so far as they have an effectually felt need of conformity in these premises. it is true, a dispassionate outsider, if such there be, would perhaps be struck by the degree of such painstaking conformity to canons of conduct which it frequently must cost serious effort even to ascertain in such detail as the case calls for. doubtless, or at least presumably, conformity under the jurisdiction of the fashions, and in related provinces of decorum, is obligatory in a degree that need not be looked for throughout the scheme of use and wont at large, even under the advisedly established non-interference of the authorities. still, on a point on which the evidence hitherto is extremely scant it is the part of discretion to hold no settled opinion. a more promising line of suggestion is probably that afforded by the current degree of contact and consistency among the modern nations in respect of science and scholarship, as also in the aesthetic or the industrial arts. local color and local pride, with one thing and another in the way of special incitement or inhibition, may come in to vary the run of things, or to blur or hinder a common understanding and mutual furtherance and copartnery in these matters of taste and intellect. yet it is scarcely misleading to speak of the peoples of christendom as one community in these respects. the sciences and the arts are held as a joint stock among these peoples, in their elements, and measurably also in their working-out. it is true, these interests and achievements of the race are not cultivated with the same assiduity or with identical effect throughout; but it is equally true that no effectual bar could profitably be interposed, or would be tolerated in the long run in this field, where men have had occasion to learn that unlimited collusion is more to the purpose than a clannish discrimination. * * * * * it is, no doubt, beyond reasonable hope that these democratic peoples could be brought forthwith to concerted action on the lines of such a plan of peace by neutralisation of all outstanding national pretensions. both the french and the english-speaking peoples are too eagerly set on national aims and national prestige, to allow such a plan to come to a hearing, even if something of the kind should be spoken for by their most trusted leaders. by settled habit they are thinking in terms of nationality, and just now they are all under the handicap of an inflamed national pride. advocacy of such a plan, of course, does not enter seriously into the purpose of this inquiry; which is concerned with the conditions under which peace is sought today, with the further conditions requisite to its perpetuation, and with the probable effects of such a peace on the fortunes of these peoples in case peace is established and effectually maintained. it is a reasonable question, and one to which a provisional answer may be found, whether the drift of circumstances in the present and for the immediate future may be counted on to set in the direction of a progressive neutralisation of the character spoken of above, and therefore possibly toward a perpetuation of that peace that is to follow the present season of war. so also is it an open and interesting question whether the drift in that direction, if such is the set of it, can be counted on to prove sufficiently swift and massive, so as not to be overtaken and overborne by the push of agencies that make for dissension and warlike enterprise. anything like a categorical answer to these questions would have to be a work of vaticination or of effrontery,--possibly as much to the point the one as the other. but there are certain conditions precedent to a lasting peace as the outcome of events now in train, and there are certain definable contingencies conditioned on such current facts as the existing state of the industrial arts and the state of popular sentiment, together with the conjuncture of circumstances under which these factors will come into action. the state of the industrial arts, as it bears on the peace and its violation, has been spoken of above. it is of such a character that a judiciously prepared offensive launched by any power of the first rank at an opportune time can reach and lay waste any given country of the habitable globe. the conclusive evidence of this is at hand, and it is the major premise underlying all current proposals and projects of peace, as well as the refusal of the nations now on the defensive to enter into negotiations looking to an "inconclusive peace." this state of the case is not commonly recognised in so many words, but it is well enough understood. so that all peace projects that shall hope to find a hearing must make up their account with it, and must show cause why they should be judged competent to balk any attempted offensive. in an inarticulate or inchoate fashion, perhaps, but none the less with ever-increasing certitude and increasing apprehension, this state of the case is also coming to be an article of popular "knowledge and belief," wherever much or little thought is spent on the outlook for peace. it has already had a visible effect in diminishing the exclusiveness of nationalities and turning the attention of the pacific peoples to the question of feasible ways and means of international cooperation in case of need; but it has not hitherto visibly lessened the militant spirit among these nations, nor has it lowered the tension of their national pride, at least not yet; rather the contrary, in fact. the effect, upon the popular temper, of this inchoate realisation of the fatality that so lies in the modern state of the industrial arts, varies from one country to another, according to the varying position in which they are placed, or in which they conceive themselves to be placed. among the belligerent nations it has put the spur of fear to their need of concerted action as well as to their efforts to strengthen the national defense. but the state of opinion and sentiment abroad in the nation in time of war is no secure indication of what it will be after the return to peace. the american people, the largest and most immediately concerned of the neutral nations, should afford more significant evidence of the changes in the popular attitude likely to follow from a growing realisation of this state of the case, that the advantage has passed definitively to any well prepared and resolute offensive, and that no precautions of diplomacy and no practicable measures of defensive armament will any longer give security,--provided always that there is anywhere a national power actuated by designs of imperial dominion. it is, of course, only little by little that the american people and their spokesmen have come to realise their own case under this late-modern situation, and hitherto only in an imperfect degree. their first response to the stimulus has been a display of patriotic self-sufficiency and a move to put the national defense on a war-footing, such as would be competent to beat off all aggression. those elements of the population who least realise the gravity of the situation, and who are at the same time commercially interested in measures of armament or in military preferment, have not begun to shift forward beyond this position of magniloquence and resolution; nor is there as yet much intimation that they see beyond it, although there is an ever-recurring hint that they in a degree appreciate the practical difficulty of persuading a pacific people to make adequate preparation beforehand, in equipment and trained man-power, for such a plan of self-sufficient self-defense. but increasingly among those who are, by force of temperament or insight or by lack of the pecuniary and the placeman's interest, less confident of an appeal to the nation's prowess, there is coming forward an evident persuasion that warlike preparations--"preparedness"--alone and carried through by the republic in isolation, will scarcely serve the turn. there are at least two lines of argument, or of persuasion, running to the support of such a view; readiness for a warlike defense, by providing equipment and trained men, might prove a doubtfully effectual measure even when carried to the limit of tolerance that will always be reached presently in any democratic country; and then, too, there is hope of avoiding the necessity of such warlike preparation, at least in the same extreme degree, by means of some practicable working arrangement to be effected with other nations who are in the same case. hitherto the farthest reach of these pacific schemes for maintaining the peace, or for the common defense, has taken the shape of a projected league of neutral nations to keep the peace by enforcement of specified international police regulations or by compulsory arbitration of international disputes. it is extremely doubtful how far, if at all, popular sentiment of any effectual force falls in with this line of precautionary measures. yet it is evident that popular sentiment, and popular apprehension, has been stirred profoundly by the events of the past two years, and the resulting change that is already visible in the prevailing sentiment as regards the national defense would argue that more far-reaching changes in the same connection are fairly to be looked for within a reasonable allowance of time. in this american case the balance of effectual public opinion hitherto is to all appearance quite in doubt, but it is also quite unsettled. the first response has been a display of patriotic emotion and national self-assertion. the further, later and presumably more deliberate, expressions of opinion carry a more obvious note of apprehension and less of stubborn or unreflecting national pride. it may be too early to anticipate a material shift of base, to a more neutral, or less exclusively national footing in matters of the common defense. the national administration has been moving at an accelerated rate in the direction not of national isolation and self-reliance resting on a warlike equipment formidable enough to make or break the peace at will--such as the more truculent and irresponsible among the politicians have spoken for--but rather in the direction of moderating or curtailing all national pretensions that are not of undoubted material consequence, and of seeking a common understanding and concerted action with those nationalities whose effectual interests in the matters of peace and war coincide with the american. the administration has grown visibly more pacific in the course of its exacting experience,--more resolutely, one might even say more aggressively pacific; but the point of chief attention in all this strategy of peace has also visibly been shifting somewhat from the maintenance of a running equilibrium between belligerents and a keeping of the peace from day to day, to the ulterior and altogether different question of what is best to be done toward a conclusive peace at the close of hostilities, and the ways and means of its subsequent perpetuation. this latter is, in effect, an altogether different question from that of preserving neutrality and amicable relations in the midst of importunate belligerents, and it may even, conceivably, perhaps not unlikely, come to involve a precautionary breach of the current peace and a taking of sides in the war with an urgent view to a conclusive outcome. it would be going too far to impute to the administration, at the present stage, such an aggressive attitude in its pursuit of a lasting peace as could be called a policy of defensive offense; but it will shock no one's sensibilities to say that such a policy, involving a taking of sides and a renouncing of national isolation, is visibly less remote from the counsels of the administration today than it has been at any earlier period. in this pacific attitude, increasingly urgent and increasingly far-reaching and apprehensive, the administration appears to be speaking for the common man rather than for the special interests or the privileged classes. such would appear, on the face of the returns, to be the meaning of the late election. it is all the more significant on that account, since in the long run it is after all the common man that will have to pass on the expediency of any settled line of policy and to bear the material burden of carrying it into effect. it may seem rash to presume that a popularly accredited administration in a democratic country must approximately reflect the effectual changes of popular sentiment and desire. especially would it seem rash to anyone looking on from the point of view of an undemocratic nation, and therefore prone to see the surface fluctuations of excitement and shifting clamor. but those who are within the democratic pale will know that any administration in such a country, where official tenure and continued incumbency of the party rest on a popular vote,--any such administration is a political organisation and is guided by political expediency, in the tawdry sense of the phrase. such a political situation has the defects of its qualities, as has been well and frequently expounded by its critics, but it has also the merits of its shortcomings. in a democracy of this modern order any incumbent of high office is necessarily something of a politician, quite indispensably so; and a politician at the same time necessarily is something of a demagogue. he yields to the popular drift, or to the set of opinion and demands among the effective majority on whom he leans; and he can not even appear to lead, though he may surreptitiously lead opinion in adroitly seeming to reflect it and obey it. ostensible leadership, such as has been staged in this country from time to time, has turned out to be ostensible only. the politician must be adroit; but if he is also to be a statesman he must be something more. he is under the necessity of guessing accurately what the drift of events and opinion is going to be on the next reach ahead; and in taking coming events by the forelock he may be able to guide and shape the drift of opinion and sentiment somewhat to his own liking. but all the while he must keep within the lines of the long-term set of the current as it works out in the habits of thought of the common man. such foresight and flexibility is necessary to continued survival, but flexibility of convictions alone does not meet the requirements. indeed, it has been tried. it is only the minor politicians--the most numerous and long-lived, it is true--who can hold their place in the crevices of the party organisation, and get their livelihood from the business of party politics, without some power of vision and some hazard of forecast. it results from this state of the case that the drift of popular sentiment and the popular response to the stimulus of current events is reflected more faithfully and more promptly by the short-lived administrations of a democracy than by the stable and formally irresponsible governmental establishments of the older order. it should also be noted that these democratic administrations are in a less advantageous position for the purpose of guiding popular sentiment and shaping it to their own ends. * * * * * now, it happens that at no period within the past half-century has the course of events moved with such celerity or with so grave a bearing on the common good and the prospective contingencies of national life as during the present administration. this apparent congruity of the administration's policy with the drift of popular feeling and belief will incline anyone to put a high rating on the administration's course of conduct, in international relations as well as in national measures that have a bearing on international relations, as indicating the course taken by sentiment and second thought in the community at large,--for, in effect, whether or not in set form, the community at large reflects on any matters of such gravity and urgency as to force themselves upon the attention of the common man. two main lines of reflection have visibly been enforced on the administration by the course of events in the international field. there has been a growing apprehension, mounting in the later months to something like the rank of a settled conviction, that the republic has been marked down for reduction to a vassal state by the dynastic empire now engaged with its european adversaries. in so saying that the republic has been marked down for subjection it is not intended to intimate that deliberate counsel has been had by the imperial establishment on that prospective enterprise; still less that a resolution to such effect, with specification of ways and means, has been embodied in documentary form and deposited for future reference in the imperial archives. all that is intended, and all that is necessary to imply, is that events are in train to such effect that the subjugation of the american republic will necessarily find its place in the sequence presently, provided that the present imperial adventure is brought to a reasonably auspicious issue; though it does not follow that this particular enterprise need be counted on as the next large adventure in dominion to be undertaken when things again fall into promising shape. this latter point would, of course, depend on the conjuncture of circumstances, chief of which would have to be the exigencies of imperial dominion shaping the policy of the empire's natural and necessary ally in the far east. all this has evidently been coming more and more urgently into the workday deliberations of the american administration. of course, it is not spoken of in set terms to this effect in official utterances, perhaps not even within doors; that sort of thing is not done. but it can do no harm to use downright expressions in a scientific discussion of these phenomena, with a view to understanding the current drift of things in this field. beyond this is the similar apprehension, similarly though more slowly and reluctantly rising to the level of settled conviction, that the american commonwealth is not fit to take care of its own case single-handed. this apprehension is enforced more and more unmistakably with every month that passes on the theatre of war. and it is reenforced by the constantly more obvious reflection that the case of the american commonwealth in this matter is the same as that of the democratic countries of europe, and of the other european colonies. it is not, or at least one may believe it is not yet, that in the patriotic apprehension of the common man, or of the administration which speaks for him, the resources of the country would be inadequate to meet any contingencies of the kind that might arise, whether in respect of industrial capacity or in point of man-power, if these resources were turned to this object with the same singleness of purpose and the same drastic procedure that marks the course of a national establishment guided by no considerations short of imperial dominion. the doubt presents itself rather as an apprehension that the cost would be extravagantly high, in all respects in which cost can be counted; which is presently seconded, on very slight reflection and review of experience, by recognition of the fact that a democracy is, in point of fact, not to be persuaded to stand under arms interminably in mere readiness for a contingency, however distasteful the contingency may be. in point of fact, a democratic commonwealth is moved by other interests in the main, and the common defense is a secondary consideration, not a primary interest,--unless in the exceptional case of a commonwealth so placed under the immediate threat of invasion as to have the common defense forced into the place of paramount consequence in its workday habits of thought. the american republic is not so placed. anyone may satisfy himself by reasonable second thought that the people of this nation are not to be counted on to do their utmost in time of peace to prepare for war. they may be persuaded to do much more than has been their habit, and adventurous politicians may commit them to much more than the people at large would wish to undertake, but when all is done that can be counted on for a permanency, up to the limit of popular tolerance, it would be a bold guess that should place the result at more than one-half of what the country is capable of. particularly would the people's patience balk at the extensive military training requisite to put the country in an adequate position of defense against a sudden and well-prepared offensive. it is otherwise with a dynastic state, to the directorate of which all other interests are necessarily secondary, subsidiary, and mainly to be considered only in so far as they are contributory to the nation's readiness for warlike enterprise. america at the same time is placed in an extra-hazardous position, between the two seas beyond which to either side lie the two imperial powers whose place in the modern economy of nations it is to disturb the peace in an insatiable quest of dominion. this position is no longer defensible in isolation, under the later state of the industrial arts, and the policy of isolation that has guided the national policy hitherto is therefore falling out of date. the question is as to the manner of its renunciation, rather than the fact of it. it may end in a defensive copartnership with other nations who are placed on the defensive by the same threatening situation, or it may end in a bootless struggle for independence, but the choice scarcely extends beyond this alternative. it will be said, of course, that america is competent to take care of itself and its monroe doctrine in the future as in the past. but that view, spoken for cogently by thoughtful men and by politicians looking for party advantage, overlooks the fact that the modern technology has definitively thrown the advantage to the offensive, and that intervening seas can no longer be counted on as a decisive obstacle. on this latter head, what was reasonably true fifteen years ago is doubtful today, and it is in all reasonable expectation invalid for the situation fifteen years hence. the other peoples that are of a neutral temper may need the help of america sorely enough in their endeavours to keep the peace, but america's need of cooperation is sorer still, for the republic is coming into a more precarious place than any of the others. america is also, at least potentially, the most democratic of the greater powers, and is handicapped with all the disabilities of a democratic commonwealth in the face of war. america is also for the present, and perhaps for the calculable future, the most powerful of these greater powers, in point of conceivably available resources, though not in actually available fighting-power; and the entrance of america unreservedly into a neutral league would consequently be decisive both of the purposes of the league and of its efficiency for the purpose; particularly if the neutralisation of interests among the members of the league were carried so far as to make withdrawal and independent action disadvantageous. on the establishment of such a neutral league, with such neutralisation of national interests as would assure concerted action in time of stress, the need of armament on the part of the american republic would disappear, at least to the extent that no increase of armed force would be advisable. the strength of the republic lies in its large and varied resources and the unequalled industrial capacity of its population,--a capacity which is today seriously hampered by untoward business interests and business methods sheltered under national discrimination, but which would come more nearly to its own so soon as these national discriminations were corrected or abrogated in the neutralisation of national pretensions. the neutrally-minded countries of europe have been constrained to learn the art of modern war, as also to equip themselves with the necessary appliances, sufficient to meet all requirements for keeping the peace through such a period as can or need be taken into account,--provided the peace that is to come on the conclusion of the present war shall be placed on so "conclusive" a footing as will make it anything substantially more than a season of recuperation for that warlike power about whose enterprise in dominion the whole question turns. provided that suitably "substantial guarantees" of a reasonable quiescence on the part of this imperial power are had, there need be no increase of the american armament. any increased armament would in that case amount to nothing better than an idle duplication of plant and personnel already on hand and sufficient to meet the requirements. to meet the contingencies had in view in its formation, such a league would have to be neutralised to the point that all pertinent national pretensions would fall into virtual abeyance, so that all the necessary resources at the disposal of the federated nations would automatically come under the control of the league's appointed authorities without loss of time, whenever the need might arise. that is to say, national interests and pretensions would have to give way to a collective control sufficient to insure prompt and concerted action. in the face of such a neutral league imperial japan alone would be unable to make a really serious diversion or to entertain much hope of following up its quest of dominion. the japanese imperial establishment might even be persuaded peaceably to let its unoffending neighbours live their own life according to their own light. it is, indeed, possibly the apprehension of some such contingency that has hurried the rapacity of the island empire into the headlong indecencies of the past year or two. chapter vi elimination of the unfit it may seem early (january ) to offer a surmise as to what must be the manner of league into which the pacific nations are to enter and by which the peace will be kept, in case such a move is to be made. but the circumstances that are to urge such a line of action, and that will condition its carrying out in case it is entered on, have already come into bearing and should, on the whole, no longer be especially obscure to anyone who will let the facts of the case rather than his own predilections decide what he will believe. by and large, the pressure of these conditioning circumstances may be seen, and the line of least resistance under this pressure may be calculated, with due allowance of a margin of error owing to unknown contingencies of time and minor variables. time is of the essence of the case. so that what would have been dismissed as idle vapour two years ago has already become subject of grave deliberation today, and may rise to paramount urgency that far hence. time is needed to appreciate and get used to any innovation of appreciable gravity, particularly where the innovation depends in any degree on a change in public sentiment, as in this instance. the present outlook would seem to be that no excess of time is allowed in these premises; but it should also be noted that events are moving with unexampled celerity, and are impinging on the popular apprehension with unexampled force,--unexampled on such a scale. it is hoped that a recital of these circumstances that provoke to action along this line will not seem unwarrantably tedious, and that a tentative definition of the line of least resistance under pressure of these circumstances may not seem unwarrantably presumptuous. the major premise in the case is the felt need of security from aggression at the hands of imperial germany and its auxiliary powers; seconded by an increasingly uneasy apprehension as to the prospective line of conduct on the part of imperial japan, bent on a similar quest of dominion. there is also the less articulate apprehension of what, if anything, may be expected from imperial russia; an obscure and scarcely definable factor, which comes into the calculation chiefly by way of reenforcing the urgency of the situation created by the dynastic ambitions of these other two imperial states. further, the pacific nations, the leading ones among them being the french and english-speaking peoples, are coming to recognise that no one among them can provide for its own security single-handed, even at the cost of their utmost endeavour in the way of what is latterly called "preparedness;" and they are at the same time unwilling to devote their force unreservedly to warlike preparation, having nothing to gain. the solution proposed is a league of the pacific nations, commonly spoken of at the present stage as a league to enforce peace, or less ambitiously as a league to enforce arbitration. the question being left somewhat at loose ends, whether the projected league is to include the two or three imperial powers whose pacific intentions are, euphemistically, open to doubt. such is the outline of the project and its premises. an attempt to fill in this outline will, perhaps, conduce to an appreciation of what is sought and of what the conditioning circumstances will enforce in the course of its realisation. as touches the fear of aggression, it has already been indicated, perhaps with unnecessary iteration, that these two imperial powers are unable to relinquish the quest of dominion through warlike enterprise, because as dynastic states they have no other ulterior aim; as has abundantly appeared in the great volume of expository statements that have come out of the fatherland the past few years, official, semi-official, inspired, and spontaneous. "assurance of the nation's future" is not translatable into any other terms. the imperial dynasty has no other ground to stand on, and can not give up the enterprise so long as it can muster force for any formidable diversion, to get anything in the way of dominion by seizure, threat or chicane. this is coming to be informally and loosely, but none the less definitively, realised by the pacific nations; and the realisation of it is gaining in clearness and assurance as time passes. and it is backed by the conviction that, in the nature of things, no engagement on the part of such a dynastic state has any slightest binding force, beyond the material constraint that would enforce it from the outside. so the demand has been diplomatically phrased as a demand for "substantial guarantees." any gain in resources on the part of these powers is to be counted as a gain in the ways and means of disturbing the peace, without reservation. the pacific nations include among them two large items, both of which are indispensable to the success of the project, the united states and the united kingdom. the former brings in its train, virtually without exception or question, the other american republics, none of which can practicably go in or stay out except in company and collusion with the united states. the united kingdom after the same fashion, and with scarcely less assurance, may be counted on to carry the british colonies. evidently, without both of these groups the project would not even make a beginning. beyond this is to be counted in as elements of strength, though scarcely indispensable, france, belgium, the netherlands and the scandinavian countries. the other west-european nations would in all probability be found in the league, although so far as regards its work and its fortunes their adhesion would scarcely be a matter of decisive consequence; they may therefore be left somewhat on one side in any consideration of the circumstances that would shape the league, its aims and its limitations. the balkan states, in the wider acceptance, they that frequent the sign of the double cross, are similarly negligible in respect of the organisation of such a league or its resources and the mutual concessions necessary to be made between its chief members. russia is so doubtful a factor, particularly as regards its place and value in industry, culture and politics, in the near future, as to admit nothing much more than a doubt on what its relation to the situation will be. the evil intentions of the imperial-bureaucratic establishment are probably no more to be questioned than the good intentions of the underlying peoples of russia. china will have to be taken in, if for no other reason than the use to which the magnificent resources of that country would be turned by its imperial neighbour in the absence of insurmountable interference from outside. but china will come in on any terms that include neutrality and security. the question then arises as to the imperial powers whose dynastic enterprise is primarily to be hedged against by such a league. reflection will show that if the league is to effect any appreciable part of its purpose, these powers will also be included in the league, or at least in its jurisdiction. a pacific league not including these powers, or not extending its jurisdiction and surveillance to them and their conduct, would come to the same thing as a coalition of nations in two hostile groups, the one standing on the defensive against the warlike machinations of the other, and both groups bidding for the favor of those minor powers whose traditions and current aspirations run to national (dynastic) aggrandizement by way of political intrigue. it would come to a more articulate and accentuated form of that balance of power that has latterly gone bankrupt in europe, with the most corrupt and unreliable petty monarchies of eastern europe vested with a casting vote; and it would also involve a system of competitive armaments of the same general character as what has also shown itself bankrupt. it would, in other words, mean a virtual return to the _status quo ante_, but with an overt recognition of its provisional character, and with the lines of division more sharply drawn. that is to say, it would amount to reinstating the situation which the projected league is intended to avert. it is evidently contained in the premises that the projected league must be all-inclusive, at least as regards its jurisdiction and surveillance. the argument will return to this point presently. the purpose of the projected league is peace and security, commonly spoken of under patriotic preconceptions as "national" peace and security. this will have to mean a competent enforcement of peace, on such a footing of overmastering force at the disposal of the associated pacific nations as to make security a matter of ordinary routine. it is true, the more genial spokesmen of the project are given to the view that what is to come of it all is a comity of neutral nations, amicably adjusting their own relations among themselves in a spirit of peace and good-will. but this view is over-sanguine, in that it overlooks the point that into this prospective comity of nations imperial germany (and imperial japan) fit like a drunken savage with a machine gun. it also overlooks the patent fatality that these two are bound to come into a coalition at the next turn, with whatever outside and subsidiary resources they can draw on; provided only that a reasonable opening for further enterprise presents itself. the league, in other terms, must be in a position to enforce peace by overmastering force, and to anticipate any move at cross purposes with the security of the pacific nations. this end can be reached by either one of two ways. if the dynastic states are left to their own devices, it will be incumbent on the associated nations to put in the field a standing force sufficient to prevent a recourse to arms; which means competitive armament and universal military rule. or the dynastic states may be taken into partnership and placed under such surveillance and constraint as to practically disarm them; which would admit virtual disarmament of the federated nations. the former arrangement has nothing in its favour, except the possibility that no better or less irksome arrangement can be had under existing circumstances; that is to say that the pacific nations may not be able to bring these dynastic states to terms of disarmament under surveillance. they assuredly can not except by force; and this is the precise point on which the continued hostilities in europe turn today. in diplomatic parable the german imperial spokesmen say that they can accept (or as they prefer to phrase it, grant) no terms that do not fully safeguard the future of the fatherland; and in similarly diplomatic parable the spokesmen of the entente insist that prussian militarism must be permanently put out of commission; but it all means the same thing, viz. that the imperial establishment is to be (or is not to be) disabled beyond the possibility of its entering on a similar warlike enterprise again, when it has had time for recuperation. the dynastic statesmen, and the lay subjects of the imperial establishment, are strenuously set on securing a fair opportunity for recuperation and a wiser endeavour to achieve that dominion which the present adventure promises to defeat; while the entente want no recurrence, and are persuaded that a recurrence can be avoided only on the footing of a present collapse of the imperial power and a scrupulously enforced prostration of it henceforth. without the definitive collapse of the imperial power no pacific league of nations can come to anything much more than armistice. on the basis of such a collapse the league may as well administer its affairs economically by way of an all-around reduction of armaments, as by the costlier and more irksome way of "preparedness." but a sensible reduction of armaments on the part of the neutral nations implies disarmament of the dynastic states. which would involve a neutral surveillance of the affairs of these dynastic states in such detail and with such exercise of authority as would reduce their governments to the effective status of local administrative officials. out of which, in turn, would arise complications that would lead to necessary readjustments all along the line. it would involve the virtual, if not also the formal, abolition of the monarchy, since the monarchy has no other use than that of international war and intrigue; or at least it would involve the virtual abrogation of its powers, reducing it to the same status of _faineantise_ as now characterises the british crown. evidently this means a serious intermeddling in the domestic concerns and arrangements of the fatherland, such as is not admissible under the democratic principle that any people must be left free to follow their own inclinations and devices in their own concerns; at the same time that this degree of interference is imperative if the peace is to be kept on any other footing than that of eternal vigilance and superior armed force, with a people whose own inclinations and devices are of the kind now grown familiar in the german case,--all of which also applies, with accentuation, in the case of imperial japan. * * * * * some such policy of neutral surveillance in the affairs of these peoples whose pacific temper is under suspicion, is necessarily involved in a plan to enforce peace by concert of the pacific nations, and it will necessarily carry implications and farther issues, touching not only these supposedly recalcitrant peoples, but also as regards the pacific nations themselves. assuming always that the prime purpose and consistent aim of the projected league is the peace and security of those pacific nations on whose initiative it is to be achieved, then it should be reasonable to assume that the course of procedure in its organisation, administration and further adaptations and adjustments must follow the logic of necessities leading to that end. he who wills the end must make up his account with the means. the end in this case is peace and security; which means, for practical purposes, peace and good-will. ill-will is not a secure foundation of peace. even the military strategists of the imperial establishment recommend a programme of "frightfulness" only as a convenient military expedient, essentially a provisional basis of tranquility. in the long run and as a permanent peace measure it is doubtless not to the point. security is finally to be had among or between modern peoples only on the ground of a common understanding and an impartially common basis of equity, or something approaching that basis as nearly as circumstances will permit. which means that in so far as the projected peace-compact is to take effect in any enduring way, and leave the federated nations some degree of freedom from persistent apprehension and animosity, as well as from habitual insecurity of life and limb, the league must not only be all-inclusive, but it must be inclusively uniform in all its requirements and regulations. the peoples of the quondam imperial nations must come into the league on a footing of formal equality with the rest. this they can not do without the virtual abdication of their dynastic governmental establishments and a consequent shift to a democratic form of organisation, and a formal abrogation of class privileges and prerogatives. however, a virtual abdication or cancelment of the dynastic rule, such as to bring it formally into the same class with the british crown, would scarcely meet the requirements in the case of the german imperial establishment; still more patently not in the case of imperial japan. if, following the outlines of the decayed british crown, one or the other of these imperial establishments were by formal enactment reduced to a state of nominal desuetude, the effect would be very appreciably different from what happens in the british community, where the crown has lost its powers by failure of the requisite subordination on the part of the people, and not by a formal abdication of rights. in the german case, and even more in the japanese case, the strength of the imperial establishment lies in the unimpaired loyalty of the populace; which would remain nearly intact at the outset, and would thin out only by insensible degrees in the sequel; so that if only the imperial establishment were left formally standing it would command the fealty of the common run in spite of any formal abrogation of its powers, and the course of things would, in effect, run as before the break. in effect, to bring about a shift to a democratic basis the dynastic slate would have to be wiped very clean indeed. and this shift would be indispensable to the successful conduct of such a pacific league of nations, since any other than an effectually democratic national establishment is to be counted on unfailingly to intrigue for dynastic aggrandizement, through good report and evil. in a case like that of imperial germany, with its federated states and subsidiaries, where royalty and nobility still are potent preconceptions investing the popular imagination, and where loyal abnegation in the presence of authority still is the chief and staple virtue of the common man,--in all such cases virtual abdication of the dynastic initiative under constitutional forms can be had only by a formal and scrupulously complete abrogation of all those legal and customary arrangements on which this irresponsible exercise of authority has rested and through which it has taken effect. neutralisation in these instances will mean reduction to an unqualified democratic footing; which will, at least at the outset, not be acceptable to the common people, and will be wholly intolerable to the ruling classes. such a régime, therefore, while it is indispensable as a working basis for a neutral league of peace, would from the outset have to be enforced against the most desperate resistance of the ruling classes, headed by the dynastic statesmen and warlords, and backed by the stubborn loyalty of the subject populace. it would have to mean the end of things for the ruling classes and the most distasteful submission to an alien scheme of use and wont for the populace. and yet it is also an indispensable element in any scheme of pacification that aims at permanent peace and security. in time, it may well be believed, the people of the fatherland might learn to do well enough without the gratuitous domination of their ruling classes, but at the outset it would be a heartfelt privation. it follows that a league to enforce peace would have to begin its régime with enforcing peace on terms of the unconditional surrender of the formidable warlike nations; which could be accomplished only by the absolute and irretrievable defeat of these powers as they now stand. the question will, no doubt, present itself, is the end worth the cost? that question can, of course, not be answered in absolute terms, inasmuch as it resolves itself into a question of taste and prepossession. an answer to it would also not be greatly to the purpose here, since it would have no particular bearing on the course of action likely to be pursued by these pacific nations in their quest of a settled peace. it is more to the point to ask what is likely to be the practical decision of these peoples on that head when the question finally presents itself in a concrete form. again it is necessary to call to mind that any momentous innovation which rests on popular sentiment will take time; that consequently anything like a plébiscite on the question today would scarcely give a safe index of what the decision is likely to be when presently put to the test; and that as things go just now, swiftly and urgent, any time-allowance counts at something more than its ordinary workday coefficient. what can apparently be said with some degree of confidence is that just now, during these two years past, sentiment has been moving in the direction indicated, and that any growing inclination of the kind is being strongly reenforced by a growing realisation that nothing but heroic remedies will avail at this juncture. if it comes to be currently recognised that a settled peace can be had only at the cost of eradicating privilege and royalty from the warlike nations, it would seem reasonable to expect, from their present state of mind, that the pacific nations will scarcely hesitate to apply that remedy,--provided always that the fortunes of war fall out as that measure would require, and provided also that the conflict lasts long enough and severe enough to let them make up their mind to anything so drastic. * * * * * there is a certain side issue bearing on this question of the ulterior probabilities of popular sentiment and national policy as to what is to be done with the warlike nations in the event that the allied nations who fight for neutrality have the disposal of such matters. this side issue may seem remote, and it may not unlikely be overlooked among the mass of graver and more tangible considerations. it was remarked above that the united kingdom is one of the two chief pillars of the projected house of peace; and it may be added without serious fear of contradiction or annoyance that the united kingdom is also the one among these pacific nations that comes nearest being capable, in the event of such an emergency, to take care of its own case single-handed. for better or worse, british adhesion to the project is indispensable, and the british are in a position virtually to name their own terms of adhesion. the british commonwealth--a very inclusive phrase in this connection--must form the core of the pacific league, if any, and british sentiment will have a very great place in the terms of its formation and in the terms which it will be inclined to offer the imperial coalition at the settlement. now, it happens that the british community entered on this war as a democratic monarchy ruled and officered by a body of gentlemen--doubtless the most correct and admirable muster of gentlemen, of anything approaching its volume, that the modern world can show. but the war has turned out not to be a gentlemen's war. it has on the contrary been a war of technological exploits, reenforced with all the beastly devices of the heathen. it is a war in which all the specific traits of the well-bred and gently-minded man are a handicap; in which veracity, gallantry, humanity, liberality are conducive to nothing but defeat and humiliation. the death-rate among the british gentlemen-officers in the early months, and for many months, ran extravagantly high, for the most part because they were gallant gentlemen as well as officers imbued with the good, old class spirit of _noblesse oblige_, that has made half the tradition and more than half the working theory of the british officer in the field,--good, but old, hopelessly out of date. that generation of officers died, for the most part; being unfit to survive or to serve the purpose under these modern conditions of warfare, to which their enemy on the other hand had adapted themselves with easy facility from beforehand. the gentlemanly qualifications, and the material apparatus of gentility, and, it will perhaps have to be admitted, the gentlemen, have fallen into the background, or perhaps rather have measurably fallen into abeyance, among the officers of the line. there may be more doubt as to the state of things in respect of the gentility of the staff, but the best that can confidently be said is that it is a point in doubt. it is hoped that one may say without offense that in the course of time the personnel has apparently worked down to the level of vulgarity defined by the ways and means of this modern warfare; which means the level on which runs a familiar acquaintance with large and complex mechanical apparatus, railway and highway transport and power, reenforced concrete, excavations and mud, more particularly mud, concealment and ambush, and unlimited deceit and ferocity. it is not precisely that persons of pedigree and gentle breeding have ceased to enter or seek entrance to employment as officers, still less that measures have been taken to restrain their doing so or to eliminate from the service those who have come into it--though there may present itself a doubt on this point as touches the more responsible discretionary positions--but only that the stock of suitable gentlemen, uncommonly large as it is, has been overdrawn; that those who have latterly gone into service, or stayed in, have perforce divested themselves of their gentility in some appreciable measure, particularly as regards class distinction, and have fallen on their feet in the more commonplace role of common men. serviceability in this modern warfare is conditioned on much the same traits of temperament and training that make for usefulness in the modern industrial processes, where large-scale coordinations of movement and an effective familiarity with precise and far-reaching mechanical processes is an indispensable requirement,--indispensable in the same measure as the efficient conduct of this modern machine industry is indispensable. but the british gentleman, in so far as he runs true to type, is of no use to modern industry; quite the contrary, in fact. still, the british gentleman is, in point of heredity, the same thing over again as the british common man; so that, barring the misdirected training that makes him a gentleman, and which can largely be undone under urgent need and pressure, he can be made serviceable for such uses as the modern warfare requires. meantime the very large demand for officers, and the insatiable demand for capable officers, has brought the experienced and capable common man into the case and is in a fair way to discredit gentility as a necessary qualification of field officers. but the same process of discredit and elimination is also extending to the responsible officials who have the administration of things in hand. indeed, the course of vulgarisation among the responsible officials has now been under way for some appreciable time and with very perceptible effect, and the rate of displacement appears to be gathering velocity with every month that passes. here, as in the field operations, it also appears that gentlemanly methods, standards, preconceptions, and knowledge of men and things, is no longer to the purpose. here, too, it is increasingly evident that this is not a gentlemen's war. and the traditional qualifications that have sufficed in the past, at least to the extent of enabling the british management to "muddle through," as they are proudly in the habit of saying,--these qualifications are of slight account in this technological conjuncture of the nation's fortunes. it would perhaps be an under-statement to say that these gentlemanly qualifications are no longer of any account, for the purpose immediately in hand, and it would doubtless not do to say that they are wholly and unreservedly disserviceable as things run today; but captious critics might find at least a precarious footing of argument on such a proposition. through the course of the nineteenth century the british government had progressively been taking on the complexion of a "gentlemen's agreement;" a government by gentlemen, for gentlemen, and of gentlemen, too, beyond what could well be alleged in any other known instance, though never wholly so. no government could be a government of gentlemen exclusively, since there is no pecuniary profit in gentlemen as such, and therefore no object in governing them; more particularly could there never be any incentive in it for gentlemen, whose livelihood is, in the nature of the case, drawn from some one else. a gentlemen's government can escape death by inanition only in so far as it serves the material interest of its class, as contrasted with the underlying population from which the class draws its livelihood. this british arrangement of a government by prudent and humane gentlemen with a view to the conservation of that state of things that best conduced to the material well-being of their own class, has on the whole had the loyal support of the underlying populace, with an occasional floundering protest. but the protest has never taken the shape of an expressed distrust of gentlemen, considered as the staple ways and means of government; nor has the direction of affairs ever descended into the hands of any other or lower class or condition of men. on the whole, this british arrangement for the control of national affairs by a body of interested gentlemen-investors has been, and perhaps still is, just as well at home in the affectionate preconceptions of the nineteenth-century british as the corresponding german usufruct by self-appointed swaggering aristocrats has been among the underlying german population, or as the american arrangement of national control by business men for business ends. the british and the american arrangements run very much to the same substantial effect, of course, inasmuch as the british gentlemen represent, as a class, the filial generations of a business community, and their aims and standards of conduct continue to be such as are enforced by the pecuniary interests on which their gentility is conditioned. they continue to draw the ways and means of a worthy life from businesslike arrangements of a "vested" character, made and provided with a view to their nourishment and repose. their resulting usufruct of the community's productive efforts rests on a vested interest of a pecuniary sort, sanctioned by the sacred rights of property; very much as the analogous german dynastic and aristocratic usufruct rests on personal prerogative, sanctioned by the sacred rights of authentic prescription, without afterthought. the two, it will be noted are very much alike, in effect, "under the skin." the great distinguishing mark being that the german usufructuary gentlemen are, in theory at least, gentlemen-adventurers of prowess and proud words, whose place in the world's economy it is to glorify god and disturb the peace; whereas their british analogues are gentlemen-investors, of blameless propriety, whose place it is more simply to glorify god and enjoy him forever. all this arrangement of a usufruct with a view to the reputable consumption of the community's superfluous production has had the cordial support of british sentiment, perhaps fully as cordial as the german popular subservience in the corresponding german scheme; both being well embedded in the preconceptions of the common man. but the war has put it all to a rude test, and has called on the british gentlemen's executive committee to take over duties for which it was not designed. the exigencies of this war of technological exploits have been almost wholly, and very insistently, of a character not contemplated in the constitution of such an executive committee of gentlemen-investors designed to safeguard class interests and promote their pecuniary class advantage by a blamelessly inconspicuous and indirect management of national affairs. the methods are of the class known colloquially among the vulgar-spoken american politicians as "pussyfooting" and "log-rolling"; but always with such circumstance of magnitude, authenticity and well-bred deference to precedent, as to give the resulting routine of subreption, trover and conversion, an air not only of benevolent consideration but of austere morality. but the most austere courtesy and the most authentically dispassionate division of benefits will not meet the underbred exigencies of a war conducted on the mechanistic lines of the modern state of the industrial arts. so the blameless, and for the purpose imbecile, executive committee of gentlemen-investors has been insensibly losing the confidence and the countenance of the common man; who, when all is said, will always have to do what is to be done. the order of gentlemanly parleying and brokery has, therefore, with many apprehensions of calamity, been reluctantly and tardily giving ground before something that is of a visibly underbred order. increasingly underbred, and thereby insensibly approaching the character of this war situation, but accepted with visible reluctance and apprehension both by the ruling class and by the underlying population. the urgent necessity of going to such a basis, and of working out the matter in hand by an unblushing recourse to that matter-of-fact logic of mechanical efficiency, which alone can touch the difficulties of the case, but which has no respect of persons,--this necessity has been present from the outset and has been vaguely apprehended for long past, but it is only tardily and after the chastening of heavy penalties on this gentlemanly imbecility that a substantial move in that direction has been made. it has required much british resolution to overcome the night-fear of going out into the unhallowed ground of matter-of-fact, where the farthest earlier excursions of the governmental agencies had taken them no farther than such financial transactions as are incident to the accomplishment of anything whatever in a commercial nation. and then, too, there is a pecuniary interest in being interested in financial transactions. this shifting of discretionary control out of the hands of the gentlemen into those of the underbred common run, who know how to do what is necessary to be done in the face of underbred exigencies, may conceivably go far when it has once been started, and it may go forward at an accelerated rate if the pressure of necessity lasts long enough. if time be given for habituation to this manner of directorate in national affairs, so that the common man comes to realise how it is feasible to get along without gentlemen-investors holding the discretion, the outcome may conceivably be very grave. it is a point in doubt, but it is conceivable that in such a case the gentlemanly executive committee administering affairs in the light of the gentlemanly pecuniary interest, will not be fully reinstated in the discretionary control of the united kingdom for an appreciable number of years after the return of peace. possibly, even, the régime may be permanently deranged, and there is even a shadowy doubt possible to be entertained as to whether the vested pecuniary rights, on which the class of gentlemen rests, may not suffer some derangement, in case the control should pass into the hands of the underbred and unpropertied for so long a season as to let the common man get used to thinking that the vested interests and the sacred rights of gentility are so much ado about nothing. such an outcome would be extreme, but as a remote contingency it is to be taken into account. the privileged classes of the united kingdom should by this time be able to see the danger there may be for them and their vested interests, pecuniary and moral, in an excessive prolongation of the war; in such postponement of peace as would afford time for a popular realisation of their incompetence and disserviceability as touches the nation's material well-being under modern conditions. to let the nation's war experience work to such an outcome, the season of war would have to be prolonged beyond what either the hopes or the fears of the community have yet contemplated; but the point is after all worth noting, as being within the premises of the case, that there is herein a remote contingency of losing, at least for a time, that unformulated clause in the british constitution which has hitherto restricted the holding of responsible office to men of pedigree and of gentle breeding, or at least of very grave pecuniary weight; so grave as to make the incumbents virtual gentlemen, with a virtual pedigree, and with a virtual gentleman's accentuated sense of class interest. should such an eventuality overtake british popular sentiment and belief there is also the remote contingency that the rights of ownership and investment would lose a degree of sanctity. it seems necessary to note a further, and in a sense more improbable, line of disintegration among modern fixed ideas. among the best entrenched illusions of modern economic preconceptions, and in economic as well as legal theory, has been the indispensability of funds, and the hard and fast limitation of industrial operations by the supply or with-holding of funds. the war experience has hitherto gone tentatively to show that funds and financial transactions, of credit, bargain, sale and solvency, may be dispensed with under pressure of necessity; and apparently without seriously hindering that run of mechanical fact, on which interest in the present case necessarily centers, and which must be counted on to give the outcome. latterly the case is clearing up a little further, on further experience and under further pressure of technological exigencies, to the effect that financial arrangements are indispensable in this connection only because and in so far as it has been arranged to consider them indispensable; as in international trade. they are an indispensable means of intermediation only in so far as pecuniary interests are to be furthered or safeguarded in the intermediation. when, as has happened with the belligerents in the present instance, the national establishment becomes substantially insolvent, it is beginning to appear that its affairs can be taken care of with less difficulty and with better effect without the use of financial expedients. of course, it takes time to get used to doing things by the more direct method and without the accustomed circumlocution of accountancy, or the accustomed allowance for profits to go to interested parties who, under the financial régime, hold a power of discretionary permission in all matters that touch the use of the industrial arts. under these urgent material exigencies, investment comes to have much of the appearance of a gratuitous drag and drain on the processes of industry. here, again, is a sinister contingency; sinister, that is, for those vested rights of ownership by force of which the owners of "capital" are enabled to permit or withhold the use of the industrial arts by the community at large, on pain of privation in case the accustomed toll to the owners of capital is not paid. it is, of course, not intended to find fault with this arrangement; which has the sanction of "time immemorial" and of a settled persuasion that it lies at the root of all civilised life and intercourse. it is only that in case of extreme need this presumed indispensable expedient of industrial control has broken down, and that experience is proving it to be, in these premises, an item of borrowed trouble. should experience continue to run on the same lines for an appreciable period and at a high tension, it is at least conceivable that the vested right of owners to employ unlimited sabotage in the quest of profits might fall so far into disrepute as to leave them under a qualified doubt on the return of "normal" conditions. the common man, in other words, who gathers nothing but privation and anxiety from the owners' discretionary sabotage, may conceivably stand to lose his preconception that the vested rights of ownership are the cornerstone of his life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. * * * * * the considerations recited in this lengthy excursion on the war situation and its probable effects on popular habits of thought in the united kingdom go to say that when peace comes to be negotiated, with the united kingdom as the chief constituent and weightiest spokesman of the allied nations and of the league of pacific neutrals, the representatives of british aims and opinions are likely to speak in a different, chastened, and disillusioned fashion, as contrasted with what the british attitude was at the beginning of hostilities. the gentlemanly british animus of arrogant self-sufficiency will have been somewhat sobered, perhaps somewhat subdued. concession to the claims and pretensions of the other pacific nations is likely to go farther than might once have been expected, particularly in the way of concession to any demand for greater international comity and less international discrimination; essentially concession looking to a reduction of national pretensions and an incipient neutralisation of national interests. coupled with this will presumably be a less conciliatory attitude toward the members of the dynastic coalition against whom the war has been fought, owing to a more mature realisation of the impossibility of a lasting peace negotiated with a power whose substantial core is a warlike and irresponsible dynastic establishment. the peace negotiations are likely to run on a lower level of diplomatic deference to constituted authorities, and with more of a view to the interests and sentiments of the underlying population, than was evident in the futile negotiations had at the outbreak of hostilities. the gentle art of diplomacy, that engages the talents of exalted personages and well-bred statesmen, has been somewhat discredited; and if it turns out that the vulgarisation of the directorate in the united kingdom and its associated allies and neutrals will have time to go on to something like dominance and authenticity, then the deference which the spokesmen of these nations are likely to show for the prescriptive rights of dynasty, nobility, bureaucracy, or even of pecuniary aristocracy, in the countries that make up the party of the second part, may be expected to have shrunk appreciably, conceivably even to such precarious dimensions as to involve the virtual neglect or possible downright abrogation of them, in sum and substance. indeed, the chances of a successful pacific league of neutrals to come out of the current situation appear to be largely bound up with the degree of vulgarisation due to overtake the several directorates of the belligerent nations as well as the popular habits of thought in these and in the neutral countries, during the further course of the war. it is too broad a generalisation, perhaps, to say that the longer the war lasts the better are the chances of such a neutral temper in the interested nations as will make a pacific league practicable, but the contrary would appear a much less defensible proposition. it is, of course, the common man that has the least interest in warlike enterprise, if any, and it is at the same time the common man that bears the burden of such enterprise and has also the most immediate interest in keeping the peace. if, slowly and pervasively, in the course of hard experience, he learns to distrust the conduct of affairs by his betters, and learns at the same move to trust to his own class to do what is necessary and to leave undone what is not, his deference to his betters is likely to suffer a decline, such as should show itself in a somewhat unguarded recourse to democratic ways and means. in short, there is in this progressive vulgarisation of effectual use and wont and of sentiment, in the united kingdom and elsewhere, some slight ground for the hope, or the apprehension, that no peace will be made with the dynastic powers of the second part until they cease to be dynastic powers and take on the semblance of democratic commonwealths, with dynasties, royalties and privileged classes thrown in the discard. this would probably mean some prolongation of hostilities, until the dynasties and privileged classes had completely exhausted their available resources; and, by the same token, until the privileged classes in the more modern nations among the belligerents had also been displaced from direction and discretion by those underbred classes on whom it is incumbent to do what is to be done; or until a juncture were reached that comes passably near to such a situation. on the contingency of such a course of events and some such outcome appears also to hang the chance of a workable pacific league. without further experience of the futility of upper-class and pecuniary control, to discredit precedent and constituted authority, it is scarcely conceivable, e.g., that the victorious allies would go the length of coercively discarding the german imperial dynasty and the kept classes that with it constitute the imperial state, and of replacing it with a democratic organisation of the people in the shape of a modern commonwealth; and without a change of that nature, affecting that nation and such of its allies as would remain on the map, no league of pacific neutrals would be able to manage its affairs, even for a time, except on a war-footing that would involve a competitive armament against future dynastic enterprises from the same quarter. which comes to saying that a lasting peace is possible on no other terms than the disestablishment of the imperial dynasty and the abrogation of all feudalistic remnants of privilege in the fatherland and its allies, together with the reduction of those countries to the status of commonwealths made up of ungraded men. * * * * * it is easy to speculate on what the conditions precedent to such a pacific league of neutrals must of necessity be; but it is not therefore less difficult to make a shrewd guess as to the chances of these conditions being met. of these conditions precedent, the chief and foremost, without which any other favorable circumstances are comparatively idle, is a considerable degree of neutralisation, extending to virtually all national interests and pretensions, but more particularly to all material and commercial interests of the federated peoples; and, indispensably and especially, such neutralisation would have to extend to the nations from whom aggression is now apprehended, as, e.g., the german people. but such neutralisation could not conceivably reach the fatherland unless that nation were made over in the image of democracy, since the imperial state is, by force of the terms, a warlike and unneutral power. this would seem to be the ostensibly concealed meaning of the allied governments in proclaiming that their aim is to break german militarism without doing harm to the german people. as touches the neutralisation of the democratically rehabilitated fatherland, or in default of that, as touches the peace terms to be offered the imperial government, the prime article among the stipulations would seem to be abolition of all trade discrimination against germany or by germany against any other nationality. such stipulation would, of course, cover all manner of trade discrimination,--e.g., import, export and excise tariff, harbor and registry dues, subsidy, patent right, copyright, trade mark, tax exemption whether partial or exclusive, investment preferences at home and abroad,--in short it would have to establish a thoroughgoing neutralisation of trade relations in the widest acceptation of the term, and to apply in perpetuity. the like applies, of course, to all that fringe of subsidiary and outlying peoples on whom imperial germany relies for much of its resources in any warlike enterprise. such a move also disposes of the colonial question in a parenthesis, so far as regards any special bond of affiliation between the empire, or the fatherland, and any colonial possessions that are now thought desirable to be claimed. under neutralisation, colonies would cease to be "colonial possessions," being necessarily included under the general abrogation of commercial discriminations, and also necessarily exempt from special taxation or specially favorable tax rates. colonies there still would be, though it is not easy to imagine what would be the meaning of a "german colony" in such a case. colonies would be free communities, after the fashion of new zealand or australia, but with the further sterilisation of the bond between colony and mother country involved in the abolition of all appointive offices and all responsibility to the crown or the imperial government. now, there are no german colonies in this simpler british sense of the term, which implies nothing more than community of blood, institutions and language, together with that sense of solidarity between the colony and the mother country which this community of pedigree and institutions will necessarily bring; but while there are today no german colonies, in the sense of the term so given, there is no reason to presume that no such german colonies would come into bearing under the conditions of this prospective régime of neutrality installed by such a pacific league, when backed by the league's guarantee that no colony from the fatherland will be exposed to the eventual risk of coming under the discretionary tutelage of the german imperial establishment and so falling into a relation of step-childhood to the imperial dynasty. as is well known, and as has by way of superfluous commonplace been set forth by a sometime colonial secretary of the empire, the decisive reason for there being no german colonies in existence is the consistently impossible colonial policy of the german government, looking to the usufruct of the colonies by the government, and the fear of further arbitrary control and nepotic discrimination at the pleasure of the self-seeking dynastic establishment. it is only under imperial rule that no german colony, in this modern sense of the term, is possible; and only because imperial rule does not admit of a free community being formed by colonists from the fatherland; or of an ostensibly free community of that kind ever feeling secure from unsolicited interference with its affairs. the nearest approach to a german colony, as contrasted with a "colonial possession," hitherto have been the very considerable, number of escaped german subjects who have settled in english-speaking or latin-speaking countries, particularly in north and south america. and considering that the chief common trait among them is their successful evasion of the imperial government's heavy hand, they show an admirable filial piety toward the imperial establishment; though troubled with no slightest regret at having escaped from the imperial surveillance and no slightest inclination to return to the shelter of the imperial tutelage. a colloquialism--"hyphenate"--has latterly grown up to meet the need of a term to designate these evasive and yet patriotic colonists. it is scarcely misleading to say that the german-american hyphenate, e.g., in so far as he runs true to form, is still a german subject with his heart, but he is an american citizen with his head. all of which goes to argue that if the fatherland were to fall into such a state of democratic tolerance that no recidivist need carry a defensive hyphen to shield him from the importunate attentions of the imperial government, german colonies would also come into bearing; although, it is true, they would have no value to the german government. in the imperial colonial policy colonies are conceived to stand to their imperial guardian or master in a relation between that of a step-child and that of an indentured servant; to be dealt with summarily and at discretion and to be made use of without scruple. the like attitude toward colonies was once familiar matter-of-course with the british and spanish statesmen. the british found the plan unprofitable, and also unworkable, and have given it up. the spanish, having no political outlook but the dynastic one, could of course not see their way to relinquish the only purpose of their colonial enterprise, except in relinquishing their colonial possessions. the german (imperial) colonial policy is and will be necessarily after the spanish pattern, and necessarily, too, with the spanish results. under the projected neutral scheme there would be no colonial policy, and of course, no inducement to the acquisition of colonies, since there would be no profit to be derived, or to be fancied, in the case. but while no country, as a commonwealth, has any material interest in the acquisition or maintenance of colonies, it is otherwise as regards the dynastic interests of an imperial government; and it is also otherwise, at least in the belief of the interested parties, as regards special businessmen or business concerns who are in a position to gain something by help of national discrimination in their favor. as regards the pecuniary interests of favored businessmen or business concerns, and of investors favored by national discrimination in colonial relations, the case falls under the general caption of trade discrimination, and does not differ at all materially from such expedients as a protective tariff, a ship subsidy, or a bounty on exports. but as regards the warlike, that is to say dynastic, interest of an imperial government the case stands somewhat different. colonial possessions in such a case yield no material benefit to the country at large, but their possession is a serviceable plea for warlike preparations with which to retain possession of the colonies in the face of eventualities, and it is also a serviceable means of stirring the national pride and keeping alive a suitable spirit of patriotic animosity. the material service actually to be derived from such possessions in the event of war is a point in doubt, with the probabilities apparently running against their being of any eventual net use. but there need be no question that such possessions, under the hand of any national establishment infected with imperial ambitions, are a fruitful source of diplomatic complications, excuses for armament, international grievances, and eventual aggression. a pacific league of neutrals can evidently not tolerate the retention of colonial possessions by any dynastic state that may be drawn into the league or under its jurisdiction, as, e.g., the german empire in case it should be left on an imperial footing. whereas, in case the german peoples are thrown back on a democratic status, as neutralised commonwealths without a crown or a military establishment, the question of their colonial possessions evidently falls vacant. as to the neutralisation of trade relations apart from the question of colonies, and as bears on the case of germany under the projected jurisdiction of a pacific league of neutrals, the considerations to be taken account of are of much the same nature. as it would have to take effect, e.g., in the abolition of commercial and industrial discriminations between germany and the pacific nations, such neutralisation would doubtless confer a lasting material benefit on the german people at large; and it is not easy to detect any loss or detriment to be derived from such a move so long as peace prevails. protective, that is to say discriminating, export, import, or excise duties, harbor and registry dues, subsidies, tax exemptions and trade preferences, and all the like devices of interference with trade and industry, are unavoidably a hindrance to the material interests of any people on whom they are imposed or who impose these disabilities on themselves. so that exemption from these things by a comprehensive neutralisation of trade relations would immediately benefit all the nations concerned, in respect of their material well-being in times of peace. there is no exception and no abatement to be taken account of under this general statement, as is well known to all men who are conversant with these matters. but it is otherwise as regards the dynastic interest in the case, and as regards any national interest in warlike enterprise. it is doubtless true that all restraint of trade between nations, and between classes or localities within the national frontiers, unavoidably acts to weaken and impoverish the people on whose economic activities this restraint is laid; and to the extent to which this effect is had it will also be true that the country which so is hindered in its work will have a less aggregate of resources to place at the disposal of its enterprising statesmen for imperialist ends. but these restraints may yet be useful for dynastic, that is to say warlike, ends by making the country more nearly a "self-contained economic whole." a country becomes a "self-contained economic whole" by mutilation, in cutting itself off from the industrial system in which industrially it belongs, but in which it is unwilling nationally to hold its place. national frontiers are industrial barriers. but as a result of such mutilation of its industrial life such a country is better able--it has been believed--to bear the shock of severing its international trade relations entirely, as is likely to happen in case of war. in a large country, such as america or russia, which comprises within its national boundaries very extensive and very varied resources and a widely distributed and diversified population, the mischief suffered from restraints of trade that hinder industrial relations with the world at large will of course be proportionately lessened. such a country comes nearer being a miniature industrial world; although none of the civilised nations, large or small, can carry on its ordinary industrial activities and its ordinary manner of life without drawing on foreign parts to some appreciable extent. but a country of small territorial extent and of somewhat narrowly restricted natural resources, as, e.g., germany or france, can even by the most drastic measures of restraint and mutilation achieve only a very mediocre degree of industrial isolation and "self-sufficiency,"--as has, e.g., appeared in the present war. but in all cases, though in varying measure, the mitigated isolation so enforced by these restraints on trade will in their degree impair the country's industrial efficiency and lower the people's material well-being; yet, if the restrictions are shrewdly applied this partial isolation and partial "self-sufficiency" will go some way toward preparing the nation for the more thorough isolation that follows on the outbreak of hostilities. the present plight of the german people under war conditions may serve to show how nearly that end may be attained, and yet how inadequate even the most unreserved measures of industrial isolation must be in face of the fact that the modern state of the industrial arts necessarily draws on the collective resources of the world at large. it may well be doubted, on an impartial view, if the mutilation of the country's industrial system by such measures of isolation does not after all rather weaken the nation even for warlike ends; but then, the discretionary authorities in the dynastic states are always, and it may be presumed necessarily, hampered with obsolete theories handed down from that cameralistic age, when the little princes of the fatherland were making dynastic history. so, e.g., the current, nineteenth and twentieth century, economic policy of the prussian-imperial statesmen is still drawn on lines within which frederick ii, called the great, would have felt well at home. like other preparation for hostilities this reduction of the country to the status of a self-contained economic organisation is costly, but like other preparation for hostilities it also puts the nation in a position of greater readiness to break off friendly relations with its neighbors. it is a war measure, commonly spoken for by its advocates as a measure of self-defense; but whatever the merits of the self-defenders' contention, this measure is a war measure. as such it can reasonably claim no hearing in the counsels of a pacific league of neutrals, whose purpose it is to make war impracticable. particularly can there be no reasonable question of admitting a policy of trade discrimination and isolation on the part of a nation which has, for purposes of warlike aggression, pursued such a policy in the past, and which it is the immediate purpose of the league to bind over to keep the peace. there has been a volume of loose talk spent on the justice and expediency of boycotting the trade of the peoples of the empire after the return of peace, as a penalty and as a preventive measure designed to retard their recovery of strength with which to enter on a further warlike enterprise. such a measure would necessarily be somewhat futile; since "business is business," after all, and the practical limitations imposed on an unprofitable boycott by the moral necessity to buy cheap and sell dear that rests on all businessmen would surreptitiously mitigate it to the point of negligibility. it is inconceivable--or it would be inconceivable in the absence of imbecile politicians and self-seeking businessmen--that measures looking to the trade isolation of any one of these countries could be entertained as a point of policy to be pursued by a league of neutrals. and it is only in so far as patriotic jealousy and vindictive sentiments are allowed to displace the aspiration for peace and security, that such measures can claim consideration. considered as a penalty to be imposed on the erring nations who set this warlike adventure afoot, it should be sufficiently plain that such a measure as a trade boycott could not touch the chief offenders, or even their responsible abettors. it would, rather, play into the hands of the militarist interests by keeping alive the spirit of national jealousy and international hatred, out of which wars arise and without which warlike enterprise might hopefully be expected to disappear out of the scheme of human intercourse. the punishment would fall, as all economic burdens and disabilities must always fall, on the common man, the underlying population. the chief relation of this common run, this underlying population of german subjects, to the inception and pursuit of this imperial warlike enterprise, is comprised in the fact that they are an underlying population of subjects, held in usufruct by the imperial establishment and employed at will. it is true, they have lent themselves unreservedly to the uses for which the dynasty has use for them, and they have entered enthusiastically into the warlike adventure set afoot by the dynastic statesmen; but that they have done so is their misfortune rather than their fault. by use and wont and indoctrination they have for long been unremittingly, and helplessly, disciplined into a spirit of dynastic loyalty, national animosity and servile abnegation; until it would be nothing better than a pathetic inversion of all the equities of the case to visit the transgressions of their masters upon the common run; whose fault lies, after all, in their being an underlying population of subjects, who have not had a chance to reach that spiritual level on which they could properly be held accountable for the uses to which they are turned. it is true, men are ordinarily punished for their misfortunes; but the warlike enterprise of the imperial dynasty has already brought what might fairly be rated as a good measure of punishment on this underlying populace, whose chief fault and chief misfortune lies in an habitual servile abnegation of those traits of initiative and discretion in man that constitute him an agent susceptible of responsibility or retribution. it would be all the more of a pathetic mockery to visit the transgressions of their masters on these victims of circumstance and dynastic mendacity, since the conventionalities of international equity will scarcely permit the high responsible parties in the case to be chastised with any penalty harsher than a well-mannered figure of speech. to serve as a deterrent, the penalty must strike the point where vests the discretion; but servile use and wont is still too well intact in these premises to let any penalty touch the guilty core of a profligate dynasty. under the wear and tear of continued war and its incident continued vulgarisation of the directorate and responsible staff among the pacific allies, the conventional respect of persons is likely to suffer appreciable dilapidation; but there need be no apprehension of such a loss of decent respect for personages as would compromise the creature comforts of that high syndicate of personages on whose initiative the fatherland entered upon this enterprise in dominion. bygone shortcomings and transgressions can have no reasonable place in the arrangements by which a pacific league of neutrals designs to keep the peace. neither can bygone prerogatives and precedents of magnificence and of mastery, except in so far as they unavoidably must come into play through the inability of men to divest themselves of their ingrained preconceptions, by virtue of which a hohenzollern or a hapsburger is something more formidable and more to be considered than a recruiting sergeant or a purveyor of light literature. the league can do its work of pacification only by elaborately forgetting differences and discrepancies of the kind that give rise to international grievances. which is the same as saying that the neutralisation of national discriminations and pretensions will have to go all the way, if it is to serve. but this implies, as broadly as need be, that the pacific nations who make the league and provisionally administer its articles of agreement and jurisdiction, can not exempt themselves from any of the leveling measures of neutralisation to which the dynastic suspects among them are to be subject. it would mean a relinquishment of all those undemocratic institutional survivals out of which international grievances are wont to arise. as a certain danish adage would have it, the neutrals of the league must all be shorn over the same comb. * * * * * what is to be shorn over this one comb of neutralisation and democracy is all those who go into the pacific league of neutrals and all who come under its jurisdiction, whether of their own choice or by the necessities of the case. it is of the substance of the case that those peoples who have been employed in the campaigns of the german-imperial coalition are to come in on terms of impartial equality with those who have held the ground against them; to come under the jurisdiction, and prospectively into the copartnery, of the league of neutrals--all on the presumption that the imperial coalition will be brought to make peace on terms of unconditional surrender. let it not seem presumptuous to venture on a recital of summary specifications intended to indicate the nature of those concrete measures which would logically be comprised in a scheme of pacification carried out with such a view to impartial equality among the peoples who are to make up the projected league. there is a significant turn of expression that recurs habitually in the formulation of terms put forth by the spokesmen of the entente belligerents, where it is insisted that hostilities are carried on not against the german people or the other peoples associated with them, but only against the imperial establishments and their culpable aids and abettors in the enterprise. so it is further insisted that there is no intention to bring pains and penalties on these peoples, who so have been made use of by their masters, but only on the culpable master class whose tools these peoples have been. and later, just now (january ), and from a responsible and disinterested spokesman for the pacific league, there comes the declaration that a lasting peace at the hands of such a league can be grounded only in a present "peace without victory." the mutual congruity of these two declarations need not imply collusion, but they are none the less complementary propositions and they are none the less indicative of a common trend of convictions among the men who are best able to speak for those pacific nations that are looked to as the mainstay of the prospective league. they both converge to the point that the objective to be achieved is not victory for the entente belligerents but defeat for the german-imperial coalition; that the peoples underlying the defeated governments are not to be dealt with as vanquished enemies but as fellows in undeserved misfortune brought on by their culpable masters; and that no advantage is designed to be taken of these peoples, and no gratuitous hardship to be imposed on them. their masters are evidently to be put away, not as defeated antagonists but as a public nuisance to be provided against as may seem expedient for the peace and security of those nations whom they have been molesting. taking this position as outlined, it should not be extremely difficult to forecast the general line of procedure which it would logically demand,--barring irrelevant regard for precedents and overheated resentment, and provided that the makers of these peace terms have a free hand and go to their work with an eye single to the establishment of an enduring peace. the case of germany would be typical of all the rest; and the main items of the bill in this case would seem logically to run somewhat as follows: ( ) the definitive elimination of the imperial establishment, together with the monarchical establishments of the several states of the empire and the privileged classes; ( ) removal or destruction of all warlike equipment, military and naval, defensive and offensive; ( ) cancelment of the public debt, of the empire and of its members--creditors of the empire being accounted accessory to the culpable enterprise of the imperial government; ( ) confiscation of such industrial equipment and resources as have contributed to the carrying on of the war, as being also accessory; ( ) assumption by the league at large of all debts incurred, by the entente belligerents or by neutrals, for the prosecution or by reason of the war, and distribution of the obligation so assumed, impartially among the members of the league, including the peoples of the defeated nations; ( ) indemnification for all injury done to civilians in the invaded territories; the means for such indemnification to be procured by confiscation of all estates in the defeated countries exceeding a certain very modest maximum, calculated on the average of property owned, say, by the poorer three-fourths of the population,--the kept classes being properly accounted accessory to the empire's culpable enterprise. the proposition to let the war debt be shared by all members of the league on a footing of impartial equality may seem novel, and perhaps extravagant. but all projects put forth for safeguarding the world's peace by a compact among the pacific nations run on the patent, though often tacit, avowal that the entente belligerents are spending their substance and pledging their credit for the common cause. among the americans, the chief of the neutral nations, this is coming to be recognised more and more overtly. so that, in this instance at least, no insurmountable reluctance to take over their due share of the common burden should fairly be looked for, particularly when it appears that the projected league, if it is organised on a footing of neutrality, will relieve the republic of virtually all outlay for their own defense. of course, there is, in all this, no temerarious intention to offer advice as to what should be done by those who have it to do, or even to sketch the necessary course which events are bound to take. as has been remarked in another passage, that would have to be a work of prophesy or of effrontery, both of which, it is hoped, lie equally beyond the horizon of this inquiry; which is occupied with the question of what conditions will logically have to be met in order to an enduring peace, not what will be the nature and outcome of negotiations entered into by astute delegates pursuing the special advantage, each of his own nation. and yet the peremptory need of reaching some practicable arrangement whereby the peace may be kept, goes to say that even the most astute negotiations will in some degree be controlled by that need, and may reasonably be expected to make some approach to the simple and obvious requirements of the situation. * * * * * therefore the argument returns to the united kingdom and the probable limit of tolerance of that people, in respect of what they are likely to insist on as a necessary measure of democratisation in the nations of the second part, and what measure of national abnegation they are likely to accommodate themselves to. the united kingdom is indispensable to the formation of a pacific league of neutrals. and the british terms of adhesion, or rather of initiation of such a league, therefore, will have to constitute the core of the structure, on which details may be adjusted and to which concessive adjustments will have to be made by all the rest. this is not saying that the projected league must or will be dominated by the united kingdom or administered in the british interest. indeed, it can not well be made to serve british particular interests in any appreciable degree, except at the cost of defeat to its main purpose; since the purposes of an enduring peace can be served only by an effectual neutralisation of national claims and interests. but it would mean that the neutralisation of national interests and discriminations to be effected would have to be drawn on lines acceptable to british taste in these matters, and would have to go approximately so far as would be dictated by the british notions of what is expedient, and not much farther. the pacific league of neutrals would have much of a british air, but "british" in this connection is to be taken as connoting the english-speaking countries rather than as applying to the united kingdom alone; since the entrance of the british into the league would involve the entrance of the british colonies, and, indeed, of the american republic as well. the temper and outlook of this british community, therefore, becomes a matter of paramount importance in any attempted analysis of the situation resulting after the war, or of any prospective course of conduct to be entered on by the pacific nations. and the question touches not so much the temper and preconceptions of the british community as known in recent history, but rather as it is likely to be modified by the war experience. so that the practicability of a neutral league comes to turn, in great measure, on the effect which this war experience is having on the habits of thought of the british people, or on that section of the british population which will make up the effectual majority when the war closes. the grave interest that attaches to this question must serve as justification for pursuing it farther, even though there can be no promise of a definite or confident answer to be found beforehand. certain general assertions may be made with some confidence. the experiences of the war, particularly among the immediate participants and among their immediate domestic connections--a large and increasing proportion of the people at large--are plainly impressing on them the uselessness and hardship of such a war. there can be no question but they are reaching a conviction that a war of this modern kind and scale is a thing to be avoided if possible. they are, no doubt, willing to go to very considerable lengths to make a repetition of it impossible, and they may reasonably be expected to go farther along that line before peace returns. but the lengths to which they are ready to go may be in the way of concessions, or in the way of contest and compulsion. there need be no doubt but a profound and vindictive resentment runs through the british community, and there is no reason to apprehend that this will be dissipated in the course of further hostilities; although it should fairly be expected to lose something of its earlier exuberant malevolence and indiscrimination, more particularly if hostilities continue for some time. it is not too much to expect, that this popular temper of resentment will demand something very tangible in the way of summary vengeance on those who have brought the hardships of war upon the nation. the manner of retribution which would meet the popular demand for "justice" to be done on the enemy is likely to be affected by the fortunes of war, as also the incidence of it. should the governmental establishment and the discretion still vest in the gentlemanly classes at the close of hostilities, the retribution is likely to take the accustomed gentlemanly shape of pecuniary burdens imposed on the people of the defeated country, together with diplomatically specified surrender of territorial and colonial possessions, and the like; such as to leave the _de facto_ enemy courteously on one side, and to yield something in the way of pecuniary benefit to the gentlemen-investors in charge, and something more in the way of new emoluments of office to the office-holding class included in the same order of gentlemen. the retribution in the case would manifestly fall on the underlying population in the defeated country, without seriously touching the responsible parties, and would leave the defeated nation with a new grievance to nourish its patriotic animosity and with a new incentive to a policy of watchful waiting for a chance of retaliation. but it is to be noted that under the stress of the war there is going forward in the british community a progressive displacement of gentlemanly standards and official procedure by standards and procedure of a visibly underbred character, a weakening of the hold of the gentlemanly classes on the control of affairs and a weakening of the hold which the sacred rights of property, investment and privilege have long had over the imagination of the british people. should hostilities continue, and should the exigencies of the war situation continue to keep the futility of these sacred rights, as well as the fatuity of their possessors, in the public eye, after the same fashion as hitherto, it would not be altogether unreasonable to expect that the discretion would pass into the hands of the underbred, or into the hands of men immediately and urgently accountable to the underbred. in such a case, and with a constantly growing popular realisation that the directorate and responsible enemy in the war is the imperial dynasty and its pedigreed aids and abettors, it is conceivable that the popular resentment would converge so effectually on these responsible instigators and directors of misfortune as to bring the incidence of the required retribution effectually to bear on them. the outcome might, not inconceivably, be the virtual erasure of the imperial dynasty, together with the pedigreed-class rule on which it rests and the apparatus of irresponsible coercion through which it works, in the fatherland and in its subsidiaries and dependencies. with a sufficiently urgent realisation of their need of peace and security, and with a realisation also that the way to avoid war is to avoid the ways and means of international jealousy and of the national discriminations out of which international jealousy grows, it is conceivable that a government which should reflect the british temper and the british hopes might go so far in insisting on a neutralisation of the peoples of the fatherland as would leave them without the dynastic apparatus with which warlike enterprise is set afoot, and so leave them also perforce in a pacific frame of mind. in time, in the absence of their dearly beloved leavings of feudalism, an enforced reliance on their own discretion and initiative, and an enforced respite from the rant and prance of warlike swagger, would reasonably be expected to grow into a popular habit. the german people are by no means less capable of tolerance and neighbourly decorum than their british or scandinavian neighbours of the same blood,--if they can only be left to their own devices, untroubled by the maggoty conceit of national domination. there is no intention herewith to express an expectation that this out-and-out neutralisation of the fatherland's international relations and of its dynastic government will come to pass on the return of peace, or that the german people will, as a precaution against recurrent imperial rabies, be organised on a democratic pattern by constraint of the pacific nations of the league. the point is only that this measure of neutralisation appears to be the necessary condition, in the absence of which no such neutral league can succeed, and that so long as the war goes on there is something of a chance that the british community may in time reach a frame of mind combining such settled determination to safeguard the peace at all costs, with such a degree of disregard for outworn conventions, that their spokesmen in the negotiations may push the neutralisation of these peoples to that length. the achievement of such an outcome would evidently take time as well as harsh experience, more time and harsher experience, perhaps, than one likes to contemplate. most men, therefore, would scarcely rate the chance of such an outcome at all high. and yet it is to be called to mind that the war has lasted long and the effect of its demands and its experience has already gone far, and that the longer it lasts the greater are the chances of its prolongation and of its continued hardships, at least to the extent that with every month of war that passes the prospect of the allied nations making peace on any terms short of unconditional surrender grows less. and unconditional surrender is the first step in the direction of an unconditional dispossession of the imperial establishment and its war prophets,--depending primarily on the state of mind of the british people at the time. and however unlikely, it is also always possible, as some contend, that in the course of further war experience the common man in the fatherland may come to reflect on the use and value of the imperial establishment, with the result of discarding and disowning it and all its works. such an expectation would doubtless underrate the force of ancient habit, and would also involve a misapprehension of the psychological incidence of a warlike experience. the german people have substantially none of those preconceptions of independence and self-direction to go on, in the absence of which an effectual revulsion against dynastic rule can not come to pass. embedded in the common sense of the british population at large is a certain large and somewhat sullen sense of fair dealing. in this they are not greatly different from their neighbours, if at all, except that the body of common sense in which this british sense of fair dealing lies embedded is a maturer fashion of common sense than that which serves to guide the workday life of many of their neighbours. and the maturity in question appears to be chiefly a matter of their having unlearned, divested themselves of, or been by force of disuse divested of, an exceptionally large proportion of that burden of untoward conceits which western europe, and more particularly middle europe, at large has carried over from the middle ages. they have had time and occasion to forget more of what the exigencies of modern life make it expedient to have forgotten. and yet they are reputed slow, conservative. but they have been well placed for losing much of what would be well lost. among other things, their preconception of national animosity is not secure, in the absence of provocation. they are now again in a position to learn to do without some of the useless legacy out of the past,--useless, that is, for life as it runs today, however it may be rated in the setting in which it was all placed in that past out of which it has come. and the question is whether now, under the pressure of exigencies that make for a disestablishment of much cumbersome inherited apparatus for doing what need not be done, they will be ruled by their sense of expediency and of fair dealing to the extent of cancelling out of their own scheme of life so much of this legacy of conventional preconceptions as has now come visibly to hinder their own material well-being, and at the same time to defeat that peace and security for which they have shown themselves willing to fight. it is, of course, a simpler matter to fight than it is to put away a preconceived, even if it is a bootless, superstition; as, e.g., the prestige of hereditary wealth, hereditary gentility, national vainglory, and perhaps especially national hatred. but if the school is hard enough and the discipline protracted enough there is no reason in the nature of things why the common run of the british people should not unlearn these futilities that once were the substance of things under an older and outworn order. they have already shown their capacity for divesting themselves of outworn institutional bonds, in discarding the main substance of dynastic rule; and when they now come to face the exigencies of this new situation it should cause no great surprise if they are able to see their way to do what further is necessary to meet these exigencies. * * * * * at the hands of this british commonwealth the new situation requires the putting away of the german imperial establishment and the military caste; the reduction of the german peoples to a footing of unreserved democracy with sufficient guarantees against national trade discriminations; surrender of all british tutelage over outlying possessions, except what may go to guarantee their local autonomy; cancelment of all extra-territorial pretensions of the several nations entering into the league; neutralisation of the several national establishments, to comprise virtual disarmament, as well as cancelment of all restrictions on trade and of all national defense of extra-territorial pecuniary claims and interests on the part of individual citizens. the naval control of the seas will best be left in british hands. no people has a graver or more immediate interest in the freedom and security of the sea-borne trade; and the united kingdom has shown that it is to be trusted in that matter. and then it may well be that neither the national pride nor the apprehensions of the british people would allow them to surrender it; whereas, if the league is to be formed it will have to be on terms to which the british people are willing to adhere. a certain provision of armed force will also be needed to keep the governments of unneutral nations in check,--and for the purpose in hand all effectively monarchical countries are to be counted as congenitally unneutral, whatever their formal professions and whether they are members of the league or not. here again it will probably appear that the people of the united kingdom, and of the english-speaking countries at large, will not consent to this armed force and its discretionary use passing out of british hands, or rather out of french-british hands; and here again the practical decision will have to wait on the choice of the british people, all the more because the british community has no longer an interest, real or fancied, in the coercive use of this force for their own particular ends. no other power is to be trusted, except france, and france is less well placed for the purpose and would assuredly also not covet so invidious an honour and so thankless an office. * * * * * the theory, i.e. the logical necessities, of such a pacific league of neutral nations is simple enough, in its elements. war is to be avoided by a policy of avoidance. which signifies that the means and the motives to warlike enterprise and warlike provocation are to be put away, so far as may be. if what may be, in this respect, does not come up to the requirements of the case, the experiment, of course, will fail. the preliminary requirement,--elimination of the one formidable dynastic state in europe,--has been spoken of. its counterpart in the far east will cease to be formidable on the decease of its natural ally in central europe, in so far as touches the case of such a projected league. the ever increasingly dubious empire of the czar would appear to fall in the same category. so that the pacific league's fortunes would seem to turn on what may be called its domestic or internal arrangements. now, the means of warlike enterprise, as well as of unadvised embroilment, is always in the last analysis the patriotic spirit of the nation. given this patriotic spirit in sufficient measure, both the material equipment and the provocation to hostilities will easily be found. it should accordingly appear to be the first care of such a pacific league to reduce the sources of patriotic incitement to the practicable minimum. this can be done, in such measure as it can be done at all, by neutralisation of national pretensions. the finished outcome in this respect, such as would assure perpetual peace among the peoples concerned, would of course be an unconditional neutralisation of citizenship, as has already been indicated before. the question which, in effect, the spokesmen for a pacific league have to face is as to how nearly that outcome can be brought to pass. the rest of what they may undertake, or may come to by way of compromise and stipulation, is relatively immaterial and of relatively transient consequence. a neutralisation of citizenship has of course been afloat in a somewhat loose way in the projects of socialistic and other "undesirable" agitators, but nothing much has come of it. nor have specific projects for its realisation been set afoot. that anything conclusive along that line could now be reached would seem extremely doubtful, in view of the ardent patriotic temper of all these peoples, heightened just now by the experience of war. still, an undesigned and unguided drift in that direction has been visible in all those nations that are accounted the vanguard among modern civilised peoples, ever since the dynastic rule among them began to be displaced by a growth of "free" institutions, that is to say institutions resting on an accepted ground of insubordination and free initiative. the patriotism of these peoples, or their national spirit, is after all and at the best an attenuated and impersonalised remnant of dynastic loyalty, and it amounts after all, in effect, to nothing much else than a residual curtailment or partial atrophy of that democratic habit of mind that embodies itself in the formula: live and let live. it is, no doubt, both an ancient and a very meritorious habit. it is easily acquired and hard to put away. the patriotic spirit and the national life (prestige) on which it centers are the subject of untiring eulogy; but hitherto its encomiasts have shown no cause and put forward no claim to believe that it all is of any slightest use for any purpose that does not take it and its paramount merit for granted. it is doubtless a very meritorious habit; at least so they all say. but under the circumstances of modern civilised life it is fruitful of no other net material result than damage and discomfort. still it is virtually ubiquitous among civilised men, and in an admirable state of repair; and for the calculable future it is doubtless to be counted in as an enduring obstacle to a conclusive peace, a constant source of anxiety and unremitting care. the motives that work out through this national spirit, by use of this patriotic ardor, fall under two heads: dynastic ambition, and business enterprise. the two categories have the common trait that neither the one nor the other comprises anything that is of the slightest material benefit to the community at large; but both have at the same time a high prestige value in the conventional esteem of modern men. the relation of dynastic ambition to warlike enterprise, and the uses of that usufruct of the nation's resources and man-power which the nation's patriotism places at the disposal of the dynastic establishment, have already been spoken of at length above, perhaps at excessive length, in the recurrent discussion of the dynastic state and its quest of dominion for dominion's sake. what measures are necessary to be taken as regards the formidable dynastic states that threaten the peace, have also been outlined, perhaps with excessive freedom. but it remains to call attention to that mitigated form of dynastic rule called a constitutional monarchy. instances of such a constitutional monarchy, designed to conserve the well-beloved abuses of dynastic rule under a cover of democratic formalities, or to bring in effectual democratic insubordination under cover of the ancient dignities of an outworn monarchical system,--the characterisation may run either way according to the fancy of the speaker, and to much the same practical effect in either case,--instances illustrative of this compromise monarchy at work today are to be had, as felicitously as anywhere, in the balkan states; perhaps the case of greece will be especially instructive. at the other, and far, end of the line will be found such other typical instances as the british, the dutch, or, in pathetic and droll miniature, the norwegian. there is, of course, a wide interval between the grotesque effrontery that wears the hellenic crown and the undeviatingly decorous self-effacement of the dutch sovereign; and yet there is something of a common complexion runs through the whole range of establishments, all the way from the quasi-dynastic to the pseudo-dynastic. for reasons unavoidable and persistent, though not inscribed in the constituent law, the governmental establishment associated with such a royal concern will be made up of persons drawn from the kept classes, the nobility or lesser gentlefolk, and will be imbued with the spirit of these "better" classes rather than that of the common run. with what may be uncanny shrewdness, or perhaps mere tropismatic response to the unreasoned stimulus of a "consciousness of kind," the british government--habitually a syndicate of gentlefolk--has uniformly insisted on the installation of a constitutional monarchy at the formation of every new national organisation in which that government has had a discretionary voice. and the many and various constitutional governments so established, commonly under british auspices in some degree, have invariably run true to form, in some appreciable degree. they may be quasi-dynastic or pseudo-dynastic, but at this nearest approach to democracy they always, and unavoidably, include at least a circumlocution office of gentlefolk, in the way of a ministry and court establishment, whose place in the economy of the nation's affairs it is to adapt the run of these affairs to the needs of the kept classes. there need be no imputation of sinister designs to these gentlefolk, who so are elected by force of circumstances to guard and guide the nation's interests. as things go, it will doubtless commonly be found that they are as well-intentioned as need be. but a well-meaning gentleman of good antecedents means well in a gentlemanly way and in the light of good antecedents. which comes unavoidably to an effectual bias in favor of those interests which honorable gentlemen of good antecedents have at heart. and among these interests are the interests of the kept classes, as contrasted with that common run of the population from which their keep is drawn. under the auspices, even if they are only the histrionic and decorative auspices, of so decorous an article of institutional furniture as royalty, it follows of logical necessity that the personnel of the effectual government must also be drawn from the better classes, whose place and station and high repute will make their association with the first gentleman of the realm not too insufferably incongruous. and then, the popular habit of looking up to this first gentleman with that deference that royalty commands, also conduces materially to the attendant habitual attitude of deference to gentility more at large. even in so democratic a country, and with so exanimate a crown as is to be found in the united kingdom, the royal establishment visibly, and doubtless very materially, conduces to the continued tenure of the effectual government by representatives of the kept classes; and it therefore counts with large effect toward the retardation of the country's further move in the direction of democratic insubordination and direct participation in the direction of affairs by the underbred, who finally pay the cost. and on the other hand, even so moderately royal an establishment as the norwegian has apparently a sensible effect in the way of gathering the reins somewhat into the hands of the better classes, under circumstances of such meagerness as might be expected to preclude anything like a "better" class, in the conventional acceptation of that term. it would appear that even the extreme of pseudo-dynastic royalty, sterilised to the last degree, is something of an effectual hindrance to democratic rule, and in so far also a hindrance to the further continued neutralisation of nationalist pretensions, as also an effectual furtherance of upper-class rule for upper-class ends. now, a government by well-meaning gentlemen-investors will, at the nearest, come no nearer representing the material needs and interests of the common run than a parable comes to representing the concrete facts which it hopes to illuminate. and as bears immediately on the point in hand, these gentlemanly administrators of the nation's affairs who so cluster about the throne, vacant though it may be of all but the bodily presence of majesty, are after all gentlemen, with a gentlemanly sense of punctilio touching the large proprieties and courtesies of political life. the national honor is a matter of punctilio, always; and out of the formal exigencies of the national honor arise grievances to be redressed; and it is grievances of this character that commonly afford the formal ground of a breach of the peace. an appeal on patriotic grounds of wounded national pride, to the common run who have no trained sense of punctilio, by the gentlemanly responsible class who have such a sense, backed by assurances that the national prestige or the national interests are at stake, will commonly bring a suitable response. it is scarcely necessary that the common run should know just what the stir is about, so long as they are informed by their trusted betters that there is a grievance to redress. in effect, it results that the democratic nation's affairs are administered by a syndicate composed of the least democratic class in the population. excepting what is to be excepted, it will commonly hold true today that these gentlemanly governments are conducted in a commendably clean and upright fashion, with a conscious rectitude and a benevolent intention. but they are after all, in effect, class governments, and they unavoidably carry the bias of their class. the gentlemanly officials and law-givers come, in the main, from the kept classes, whose living comes to them in the way of income from investments, at home or in foreign parts, or from an equivalent source of accumulated wealth or official emolument. the bias resulting from this state of the case need not be of an intolerant character in order to bring its modicum of mischief into the national policy, as regards amicable relations with other nationalities. a slight bias running on a ground of conscious right and unbroken usage may go far. so, e.g., anyone of these gentlemanly governments is within its legitimate rights, or rather within its imperative duty, in defending the foreign investments of its citizens and enforcing due payment of its citizens' claims to income or principal of such property as they may hold in foreign parts; and it is within its ordinary lines of duty in making use of the nation's resources--that is to say of the common man and his means of livelihood--in enforcing such claims held by the investing classes. the community at large has no interest in the enforcement of such claims; it is evidently a class interest, and as evidently protected by a code of rights, duties and procedure that has grown out of a class bias, at the cost of the community at large. this bias favoring the interests of invested wealth may also, and indeed it commonly does, take the aggressive form of aggressively forwarding enterprise in investment abroad, particularly in commercially backward countries abroad, by extension of the national jurisdiction and the active countenancing of concessions in foreign parts, by subventions, or by creation of offices to bring suitable emoluments to the younger sons of deserving families. the protective tariffs to which recourse is sometimes had, are of the same general nature and purpose. of course, it is in this latter, aggressive or excursive, issue of the well-to-do bias in favor of investment and invested wealth that its most pernicious effect on international relations is traceable. free income, that is to say income not dependent on personal merit or exertion of any kind, is the breath of life to the kept classes; and as a corollary of the "first law of nature," therefore, the invested wealth which gives a legally equitable claim to such income has in their eyes all the sanctity that can be given by natural right. investment--often spoken of euphemistically as "savings"--is consequently a meritorious act, conceived to be very serviceable to the community at large, and properly to be furthered by all available means. invested wealth is so much added to the aggregate means at the community's disposal, it is believed. of course, in point of fact, income from investment in the hands of these gentlefolk is a means of tracelessly consuming that much of the community's yearly product; but to the kept classes, who see the matter from the point of view of the recipient, the matter does not present itself in that light. to them it is the breath of life. like other honorable men they are faithful to their bread; and by authentic tradition the common man, in whose disciplined preconceptions the kept classes are his indispensable betters, is also imbued with the uncritical faith that the invested wealth which enables these betters tracelessly to consume a due share of the yearly product is an addition to the aggregate means in hand. the advancement of commercial and other business enterprise beyond the national frontiers is consequently one of the duties not to be neglected, and with which no trifling can be tolerated. it is so bound up with national ideals, under any gentlemanly government, that any invasion or evasion of the rights of investors in foreign parts, or of other business involved in dealings with foreign parts, immediately involves not only the material interest of the nation but the national honour as well. hence international jealousies and eventual embroilment. the constitutional monarchy that commonly covers a modern democratic community is accordingly a menace to the common peace, and any pacific league of neutrals will be laying up trouble and prospective defeat for itself in allowing such an institution to stand over in any instance. acting with a free hand, if such a thing were possible, the projected league should logically eliminate all monarchical establishments, constitutional or otherwise, from among its federated nations. it is doubtless not within reason to look for such a move in the negotiations that are to initiate the projected league of neutrals; but the point is called to mind here chiefly as indicating one of the difficult passages which are to be faced in any attempted formation of such a league, as well as one of the abiding sources of international irritation with which the league's jurisdiction will be burdened so long as a decisive measure of the kind is not taken. the logic of the whole matter is simple enough, and the necessary measures to be taken to remedy it are no less simple--barring sentimental objections which will probably prove insuperable. a monarchy, even a sufficiently inane monarchy, carries the burden of a gentlemanly governmental establishment--a government by and for the kept classes; such a government will unavoidably direct the affairs of state with a view to income on invested wealth, and will see the material interests of the country only in so far as they present themselves under the form of investment and business enterprise designed to eventuate in investment; these are the only forms of material interest that give rise to international jealousies, discriminations and misunderstanding, at the same time that they are interests of individuals only and have no material use or value to the community at large. given a monarchical establishment and the concomitant gentlemanly governmental corps, there is no avoiding this sinister prime mover of international rivalry, so long as the rights of invested wealth continue in popular apprehension to be held inviolable. quite obviously there is a certain _tu quoque_ ready to the hand of these "gentlemen of the old school" who see in the constitutional monarchy a god-given shelter from the unreserved vulgarisation of life at the hands of the unblest and unbalanced underbred and underfed. the formally democratic nations, that have not retained even a pseudo-dynastic royalty, are not much more fortunately placed in respect of national discrimination in trade and investment. the american republic will obviously come into the comparison as the type-form of economic policy in a democratic commonwealth. there is little to choose between the economic policy pursued by such republics as france or america on the one side and their nearest counterparts among the constitutional monarchies on the other. it is even to be admitted out of hand that the comparison does no credit to democratic institutions as seen at work in these republics. they are, in fact, somewhat the crudest and most singularly foolish in their economic policy of any peoples in christendom. and in view of the amazing facility with which these democratic commonwealths are always ready to delude themselves in everything that touches their national trade policies, it is obvious that any league of neutrals whose fortunes are in any degree contingent on their reasonable compliance with a call to neutralise their trade regulations for the sake of peace, will have need of all the persuasive power it can bring to bear. however, the powers of darkness have one less line of defense to shelter them and their work of malversation in these commonwealths than in the constitutional monarchies. the american national establishment, e.g., which may be taken as a fairly characteristic type-form in this bearing, is a government of businessmen for business ends; and there is no tabu of axiomatic gentility or of certified pedigree to hedge about this working syndicate of business interests. so that it is all nearer by one remove to the disintegrating touch of the common man and his commonplace circumstances. the businesslike régime of these democratic politicians is as undeviating in its advocacy and aid of enterprise in pursuit of private gain under shelter of national discrimination as the circumstances will permit; and the circumstances will permit them to do much and go far; for the limits of popular gullibility in all things that touch the admirable feats of business enterprise are very wide in these countries. there is a sentimental popular belief running to the curious effect that because the citizens of such a commonwealth are ungraded equals before the law, therefore somehow they can all and several become wealthy by trading at the expense of their neighbours. yet, the fact remains that there is only the one line of defense in these countries where the business interests have not the countenance of a time-honored order of gentlefolk, with the sanction of royalty in the background. and this fact is further enhanced by one of its immediate consequences. proceeding upon the abounding faith which these peoples have in business enterprise as a universal solvent, the unreserved venality and greed of their businessmen--unhampered by the gentleman's _noblesse oblige_--have pushed the conversion of public law to private gain farther and more openly here than elsewhere. the outcome has been divers measures in restraint of trade or in furtherance of profitable abuses, of such a crass and flagrant character that if once the popular apprehension is touched by matter-of-fact reflection on the actualities of this businesslike policy the whole structure should reasonably be expected to crumble. if the present conjuncture of circumstances should, e.g., present to the american populace a choice between exclusion from the neutral league, and a consequent probable and dubious war of self-defense, on the one hand; as against entrance into the league, and security at the cost of relinquishing their national tariff in restraint of trade, on the other hand, it is always possible that the people might be brought to look their protective tariff in the face and recognise it for a commonplace conspiracy in restraint of trade, and so decide to shuffle it out of the way as a good riddance. and the rest of the republic's businesslike policy of special favors would in such a case stand a chance of going in the discard along with the protective tariff, since the rest is of substantially the same disingenuous character. not that anyone need entertain a confident expectation of such an exploit of common sense on the part of the american voters. there is little encouragement for such a hope in their past career of gullibility on this head. but this is again a point of difficulty to be faced in negotiations looking to such a pacific league of neutrals. without a somewhat comprehensive neutralisation of national trade regulations, the outlook for lasting peace would be reduced by that much; there would be so much material for international jealousy and misunderstanding left standing over and requiring continued readjustment and compromise, always with the contingency of a breach that much nearer. the infatuation of the americans with their protective tariff and other businesslike discriminations is a sufficiently serious matter in this connection, and it is always possible that their inability to give up this superstition might lead to their not adhering to this projected neutral league. yet it is at least to be said that the longer the time that passes before active measures are taken toward the organisation of such a league--that is to say, in effect, the longer the great war lasts--the more amenable is the temper of the americans likely to be, and the more reluctantly would they see themselves excluded. should the war be protracted to some such length as appears to be promised by latterday pronunciamentos from the belligerents, or to something passably approaching such a duration; and should the imperial designs and anomalous diplomacy of japan continue to force themselves on the popular attention at the present rate; at the same time that the operations in europe continue to demonstrate the excessive cost of defense against a well devised and resolute offensive; then it should reasonably be expected that the americans might come to such a realisation of their own case as to let no minor considerations of trade discrimination stand in the way of their making common cause with the other pacific nations. it appears already to be realised in the most responsible quarter that america needs the succor of the other pacific nations, with a need that is not to be put away or put off; as it is also coming to be realised that the imperial powers are disturbers of the peace, by force of their imperial character. of course, the politicians who seek their own advantage in the nation's embarrassment are commonly unable to see the matter in that light. but it is also apparent that the popular sentiment is affected with the same apprehension, more and more as time passes and the aims and methods of the imperial powers become more patent. hitherto the spokesmen of a pacific federation of nations have spoken for a league of such an (indeterminate) constitution as to leave all the federated nations undisturbed in all their conduct of their own affairs, domestic or international; probably for want of second thought as to the complications of copartnership between them in so grave and unwonted an enterprise. they have also spoken of america's share in the project as being that of an interested outsider, whose interest in any precautionary measures of this kind is in part a regard for his own tranquility as a disinterested neighbour, but in greater part a humane solicitude for the well-being of civilised mankind at large. in this view, somewhat self-complacent it is to be admitted, america is conceived to come into the case as initiator and guide, about whom the pacific nations are to cluster as some sort of queen-bee. now, there is not a little verisimilitude in this conception of america as a sort of central office and a tower of strength in the projected federation of neutral nations, however pharisaical an appearance it may all have in the self-complacent utterances of patriotic americans. the american republic is, after all, the greatest of the pacific nations of christendom, in resources, population and industrial capacity; and it is also not to be denied that the temper of this large population is, on the whole, as pacific as that of any considerable people--outside of china. the adherence of the american republic would, in effect, double the mass and powers of the projected league, and would so place it beyond all hazard of defeat from without, or even of serious outside opposition to its aims. yet it will not hold true that america is either disinterested or indispensable. the unenviable position of the indispensable belongs to the united kingdom, and carries with it the customary suspicion of interested motives that attaches to the stronger party in a bargain. to america, on the other hand, the league is indispensable, as a refuge from otherwise inevitable dangers ahead; and it is only a question of a moderate allowance of time for the american voters to realise that without an adequate copartnership with the other pacific nations the outlook of the republic is altogether precarious. single-handed, america can not defend itself, except at a prohibitive cost; whereas in copartnership with these others the national defense becomes a virtually negligible matter. it is for america a choice between a policy of extravagant armament and aggressive diplomacy, with a doubtful issue, on the one side, and such abatement of national pretensions as would obviate bootless contention, on the other side. yet, it must be admitted, the patriotic temper of the american people is of such a susceptible kind as to leave the issue in doubt. not that the americans will not endeavor to initiate some form of compact for the keeping of the peace, when hostilities are concluded; barring unforeseen contingencies, it is virtually a foregone conclusion that the attempt will be made, and that the americans will take an active part in its promotion. but the doubt is as to their taking such a course as will lead to a compact of the kind needed to safeguard the peace of the country. the business interests have much to say in the counsels of the americans, and these business interests look to short-term gains--american business interests particularly--to be derived from the country's necessities. it is likely to appear that the business interests, through representatives in congress and elsewhere, will disapprove of any peace compact that does not involve an increase of the national armament and a prospective demand for munitions and an increased expenditure of the national funds. with or without the adherence of america, the pacific nations of europe will doubtless endeavour to form a league or alliance designed to keep the peace. if america does not come into the arrangement it may well come to nothing much more than a further continued defensive alliance of the belligerent nations now opposed to the german coalition. in any case it is still a point in doubt whether the league so projected is to be merely a compact of defensive armament against a common enemy--in which case it will necessarily be transient, perhaps ephemeral--or a more inclusive coalition of a closer character designed to avoid any breach of the peace, by disarmament and by disallowance and disclaimer of such national pretensions and punctilio as the patriotic sentiment of the contracting parties will consent to dispense with. the nature of the resulting peace, therefore, as well as its chances of duration, will in great measure be conditioned on the fashion of peace-compact on which it is to rest; which will be conditioned in good part on the degree in which the warlike coalition under german imperial control is effectually to be eliminated from the situation as a prospective disturber of the peace; which, in turn, is a question somewhat closely bound up with the further duration of the war, as has already been indicated in an earlier passage. chapter vii peace and the price system evidently the conception of peace on which its various spokesmen are proceeding is by no means the same for all of them. in the current german conception, e.g., as seen in the utterances of its many and urgent spokesmen, peace appears to be of the general nature of a truce between nations, whose god-given destiny it is, in time, to adjust a claim to precedence by wager of battle. they will sometimes speak of it, euphemistically, with a view to conciliation, as "assurance of the national future," in which the national future is taken to mean an opportunity for the extension of the national dominion at the expense of some other national establishment. in the same connection one may recall the many eloquent passages on the state and its paramount place and value in the human economy. the state is useful for disturbing the peace. this german notion may confidently be set down as the lowest of the current conceptions of peace; or perhaps rather as the notion of peace reduced to the lowest terms at which it continues to be recognisable as such. next beyond in that direction lies the notion of armistice; which differs from this conception of peace chiefly in connoting specifically a definite and relatively short interval between warlike operations. the conception of peace as being a period of preparation for war has many adherents outside the fatherland, of course. indeed, it has probably a wider vogue and a readier acceptance among men who interest themselves in questions of peace and war than any other. it goes hand in hand with that militant nationalism that is taken for granted, conventionally, as the common ground of those international relations that play a part in diplomatic intercourse. it is the diplomatist's _métier_ to talk war in parables of peace. this conception of peace as a precarious interval of preparation has come down to the present out of the feudal age and is, of course, best at home where the feudal range of preconceptions has suffered least dilapidation; and it carries the feudalistic presumption that all national establishments are competitors for dominion, after the scheme of macchiavelli. the peace which is had on this footing, within the realm, is a peace of subjection, more or less pronounced according as the given national establishment is more or less on the militant order; a warlike organisation being necessarily of a servile character, in the same measure in which it is warlike. in much the same measure and with much the same limitations as the modern democratic nations have departed from the feudal system of civil relations and from the peculiar range of conceptions which characterise that system, they have also come in for a new or revised conception of peace. instead of its being valued chiefly as a space of time in which to prepare for war, offensive or defensive, among these democratic and provisionally pacific nations it has come to stand in the common estimation as the normal and stable manner of life, good and commendable in its own right. these modern, pacific, commonwealths stand on the defensive, habitually. they are still pugnaciously national, but they have unlearned so much of the feudal preconceptions as to leave them in a defensive attitude, under the watch-word: peace with honour. their quasi-feudalistic national prestige is not to be trifled with, though it has lost so much of its fascination as ordinarily not to serve the purposes of an aggressive enterprise, at least not without some shrewd sophistication at the hands of militant politicians and their diplomatic agents. of course, an exuberant patriotism may now and again take on the ancient barbarian vehemence and lead such a provisionally pacific nation into an aggressive raid against a helpless neighbour; but it remains characteristically true, after all, that these peoples look on the country's peace as the normal and ordinary course of things, which each nation is to take care of for itself and by its own force. the ideal of the nineteenth-century statesmen was to keep the peace by a balance of power; an unstable equilibrium of rivalries, in which it was recognised that eternal vigilance was the price of peace by equilibration. since then, by force of the object-lesson of the twentieth-century wars, it has become evident that eternal vigilance will no longer keep the peace by equilibration, and the balance of power has become obsolete. at the same time things have so turned that an effective majority of the civilised nations now see their advantage in peace, without further opportunity to seek further dominion. these nations have also been falling into the shape of commonwealths, and so have lost something of their national spirit. with much reluctant hesitation and many misgivings, the statesmen of these pacific nations are accordingly busying themselves with schemes for keeping the peace on the unfamiliar footing of a stable equilibrium; the method preferred on the whole being an equilibration of make-believe, in imitation of the obsolete balance of power. there is a meticulous regard for national jealousies and discriminations, which it is thought necessary to keep intact. of course, on any one of these slightly diversified plans of keeping the peace on a stable footing of copartnery among the pacific nations, national jealousies and national integrity no longer have any substantial meaning. but statesmen think and plan in terms of precedent; which comes to thinking and planning in terms of make-believe, when altered circumstances have made the precedents obsolete. so one comes to the singular proposal of the statesmen, that the peace is to be kept in concert among these pacific nations by a provision of force with which to break it at will. the peace that is to be kept on this footing of national discriminations and national armaments will necessarily be of a precarious kind; being, in effect, a statesmanlike imitation of the peace as it was once kept even more precariously by the pacific nations in severalty. hitherto the movement toward peace has not gone beyond this conception of it, as a collusive safeguarding of national discrepancies by force of arms. such a peace is necessarily precarious, partly because armed force is useful for breaking the peace, partly because the national discrepancies, by which these current peace-makers set such store, are a constant source of embroilment. what the peace-makers might logically be expected to concern themselves about would be the elimination of these discrepancies that make for embroilment. but what they actually seem concerned about is their preservation. a peace by collusive neglect of those remnants of feudalistic make-believe that still serve to divide the pacific nations has hitherto not seriously come under advisement. evidently, hitherto, and for the calculable future, peace is a relative matter, a matter of more or less, whichever of the several working conceptions spoken of above may rule the case. evidently, too, a peace designed to strengthen the national establishment against eventual war, will count to a different effect from a collusive peace of a defensive kind among the pacific peoples, designed by its projectors to conserve those national discrepancies on which patriotic statesmen like to dwell. different from both would be the value of a peace by neglect of such useless national discriminations as now make for embroilment. a protracted season of peace should logically have a somewhat different cultural value according to the character of the public policy to be pursued under its cover. so that a safe and sane conservation of the received law and order should presumably best be effected under cover of a collusive peace of the defensive kind, which is designed to retain those national discrepancies intact that count for so much in the national life of today, both as a focus of patriotic sentiment and as an outlet for national expenditures. this plan would involve the least derangement of the received order among the democratic peoples, although the plan might itself undergo some change in the course of time. * * * * * among the singularities of the latterday situation, in this connection, and brought out by the experiences of the great war, is a close resemblance between latterday warlike operations and the ordinary processes of industry. modern warfare and modern industry alike are carried on by technological processes subject to surveillance and direction by mechanical engineers, or perhaps rather experts in engineering science of the mechanistic kind. war is not now a matter of the stout heart and strong arm. not that these attributes do not have their place and value in modern warfare; but they are no longer the chief or decisive factors in the case. the exploits that count in this warfare are technological exploits; exploits of technological science, industrial appliances, and technological training. as has been remarked before, it is no longer a gentlemen's war, and the gentleman, as such, is no better than a marplot in the game as it is played. certain consequences follow from this state of the case. technology and industrial experience, in large volume and at a high proficiency, are indispensable to the conduct of war on the modern plan, as well as a large, efficient and up-to-date industrial community and industrial plant to supply the necessary material of this warfare. at the same time the discipline of the campaign, as it impinges on the rank and file as well as on the very numerous body of officers and technicians, is not at cross purposes with the ordinary industrial employments of peace, or not in the same degree as has been the case in the past, even in the recent past. the experience of the campaign does not greatly unfit the men who survive for industrial uses; nor does it come in as a sheer interruption of their industrial training, or break the continuity of that range of habits of thought which modern industry of the technological order induces; not in the same degree as was the case under the conditions of war as carried on in the nineteenth century. the cultural, and particularly the technological, incidence of this modern warfare should evidently be appreciably different from what has been experienced in the past, and from what this past experience has induced students of these matters to look for among the psychological effects of warlike experience. it remains true that the discipline of the campaign, however impersonal it may tend to become, still inculcates personal subordination and unquestioning obedience; and yet the modern tactics and methods of fighting bear somewhat more on the individual's initiative, discretion, sagacity and self-possession than once would have been true. doubtless the men who come out of this great war, the common men, will bring home an accentuated and acrimonious patriotism, a venomous hatred of the enemies whom they have missed killing; but it may reasonably be doubted if they come away with a correspondingly heightened admiration and affection for their betters who have failed to make good as foremen in charge of this teamwork in killing. the years of the war have been trying to the reputation of officials and officers, who have had to meet uncharted exigencies with not much better chance of guessing the way through than their subalterns have had. by and large, it is perhaps not to be doubted that the populace now under arms will return from the experience of the war with some net gain in loyalty to the nation's honour and in allegiance to their masters; particularly the german subjects,--the like is scarcely true for the british; but a doubt will present itself as to the magnitude of this net gain in subordination, or this net loss in self-possession. a doubt may be permitted as to whether the common man in the countries of the imperial coalition, e.g., will, as the net outcome of this war experience, be in a perceptibly more pliable frame of mind as touches his obligations toward his betters and subservience to the irresponsible authority exercised by the various governmental agencies, than he was at the outbreak of the war. at that time, there is reason to believe, there was an ominous, though scarcely threatening, murmur of discontent beginning to be heard among the working classes of the industrial towns. it is fair to presume, however, that the servile discipline of the service and the vindictive patriotism bred of the fight should combine to render the populace of the fatherland more amenable to the irresponsible rule of the imperial dynasty and its subaltern royal establishments, in spite of any slight effect of a contrary character exercised by the training in technological methods and in self-reliance, with which this discipline of the service has been accompanied. as to the case of the british population, under arms or under compulsion of necessity at home, something has already been said in an earlier passage; and much will apparently depend, in their case, on the further duration of the war. the case of the other nationalities involved, both neutrals and belligerents, is even more obscure in this bearing, but it is also of less immediate consequence for the present argument. * * * * * the essentially feudal virtues of loyalty and bellicose patriotism would appear to have gained their great ascendency over all men's spirit within the western civilisation by force of the peculiarly consistent character of the discipline of life under feudal conditions, whether in war or peace; and to the same uniformity of these forces that shaped the workday habits of thought among the feudal nations is apparently due that profound institutionalisation of the preconceptions of patriotism and loyalty, by force of which these preconceptions still hold the modern peoples in an unbreakable web of prejudice, after the conditions favoring their acquirement have in great part ceased to operate. these preconceptions of national solidarity and international enmity have come down from the past as an integral part of the unwritten constitution underlying all these modern nations, even those which have departed most widely from the manner of life to which the peoples owe these ancient preconceptions. hitherto, or rather until recent times, the workday experience of these peoples has not seriously worked at cross purposes with the patriotic spirit and its bias of national animosity; and what discrepancy there has effectively been between the discipline of workday life and the received institutional preconceptions on this head, has hitherto been overborne by the unremitting inculcation of these virtues by interested politicians, priests and publicists, who speak habitually for the received order of things. that order of things which is known on its political and civil side as the feudal system, together with that era of the dynastic states which succeeds the feudal age technically so called, was, on its industrial or technological side, a system of trained man-power organised on a plan of subordination of man to man. on the whole, the scheme and logic of that life, whether in its political (warlike) or its industrial doings, whether in war or peace, runs on terms of personal capacity, proficiency and relations. the organisation of the forces engaged and the constraining rules according to which this organisation worked, were of the nature of personal relations, and the impersonal factors in the case were taken for granted. politics and war were a field for personal valor, force and cunning, in practical effect a field for personal force and fraud. industry was a field in which the routine of life, and its outcome, turned on "the skill, dexterity and judgment of the individual workman," in the words of adam smith. the feudal age passed, being done to death by handicraft industry, commercial traffic, gunpowder, and the state-making politicians. but the political states of the statemakers, the dynastic states as they may well be called, continued the conduct of political life on the personal plane of rivalry and jealousy between dynasties and between their states; and in spite of gunpowder and the new military engineering, warfare continued also to be, in the main and characteristically, a field in which man-power and personal qualities decided the outcome, by virtue of personal "skill, dexterity and judgment." meantime industry and its technology by insensible degrees underwent a change in the direction of impersonalisation, particularly in those countries in which state-making and its warlike enterprise had ceased, or were ceasing, to be the chief interests and the controlling preconception of the people. the logic of the new, mechanical industry which has supplanted handicraft in these countries, is a mechanistic logic, which proceeds in terms of matter-of-fact strains, masses, velocities, and the like, instead of the "skill, dexterity and judgment" of personal agents. the new industry does not dispense with the personal agencies, nor can it even be said to minimise the need of skill, dexterity and judgment in the personal agents employed, but it does take them and their attributes for granted as in some sort a foregone premise to its main argument. the logic of the handicraft system took the impersonal agencies for granted; the machine industry takes the skill, dexterity and judgment of the workmen for granted. the processes of thought, and therefore the consistent habitual discipline, of the former ran in terms of the personal agents engaged, and of the personal relations of discretion, control and subordination necessary to the work; whereas the mechanistic logic of the modern technology, more and more consistently, runs in terms of the impersonal forces engaged, and inculcates an habitual predilection for matter-of-fact statement, and an habitual preconception that the findings of material science alone are conclusive. in those nations that have made up the advance guard of western civilisation in its movement out of feudalism, the disintegrating effect of this matter-of-fact animus inculcated by the later state of the industrial arts has apparently acted effectively, in some degree, to discredit those preconceptions of personal discrimination on which dynastic rule is founded. but in no case has the discipline of this mechanistic technology yet wrought its perfect work or come to a definitive conclusion. meantime war and politics have on the whole continued on the ancient plane; it may perhaps be fair to say that politics has so continued because warlike enterprise has continued still to be a matter of such personal forces as skill, dexterity and judgment, valor and cunning, personal force and fraud. latterly, gradually, but increasingly, the technology of war, too, has been shifting to the mechanistic plane; until in the latest phases of it, somewhere about the turn of the century, it is evident that the logic of warfare too has come to be the same mechanistic logic that makes the modern state of the industrial arts. what, if anything, is due by consequence to overtake the political strategy and the political preconceptions of the new century, is a question that will obtrude itself, though with scant hope of finding a ready answer. it may even seem a rash, as well as an ungraceful, undertaking to inquire into the possible manner and degree of prospective decay to which the received political ideals and virtues would appear to be exposed by consequence of this derangement of the ancient discipline to which men have been subjected. so much, however, would seem evident, that the received virtues and ideals of patriotic animosity and national jealousy can best be guarded against untimely decay by resolutely holding to the formal observance of all outworn punctilios of national integrity and discrimination, in spite of their increasing disserviceability,--as would be done, e.g., or at least sought to be done, in the installation of a league of neutral nations to keep the peace and at the same time to safeguard those "national interests" whose only use is to divide these nations and keep them in a state of mutual envy and distrust. * * * * * those peoples who are subject to the constraining governance of this modern state of the industrial arts, as all modern peoples are in much the same measure in which they are "modern," are, therefore, exposed to a workday discipline running at cross purposes with the received law and order as it takes effect in national affairs; and to this is to be added that, with warlike enterprise also shifted to this same mechanistic-technological ground, war can no longer be counted on so confidently as before to correct all the consequent drift away from the ancient landmarks of dynastic, pseudo-dynastic, and national enterprise in dominion. as has been noted above, modern warfare not only makes use of, and indeed depends on, the modern industrial technology at every turn of the operations in the field, but it draws on the ordinary industrial resources of the countries at war in a degree and with an urgency never equalled. no nation can hope to make a stand in modern warfare, much less to make headway in warlike enterprise, without the most thoroughgoing exploitation of the modern industrial arts. which signifies for the purpose in hand that any power that harbors an imperial ambition must take measures to let its underlying population acquire the ways and means of the modern machine industry, without reservation; which in turn signifies that popular education must be taken care of to such an extent as may be serviceable in this manner of industry and in the manner of life which this industrial system necessarily imposes; which signifies, of course, that only the thoroughly trained and thoroughly educated nations have a chance of holding their place as formidable powers in this latterday phase of civilisation. what is needed is the training and education that go to make proficiency in the modern fashion of technology and in those material sciences that conduce to technological proficiency of this modern order. it is a matter of course that in these premises any appreciable illiteracy is an intolerable handicap. so is also any training which discourages habitual self-reliance and initiative, or which acts as a check on skepticism; for the skeptical frame of mind is a necessary part of the intellectual equipment that makes for advance, invention and understanding in the field of technological proficiency. but these requirements, imperatively necessary as a condition of warlike success, are at cross purposes with that unquestioning respect of persons and that spirit of abnegation that alone can hold a people to the political institutions of the old order and make them a willing instrument in the hands of the dynastic statesmen. the dynastic state is apparently caught in a dilemma. the necessary preparation for warlike enterprise on the modern plan can apparently be counted on, in the long run, to disintegrate the foundations of the dynastic state. but it is only in the long run that this effect can be counted on; and it is perhaps not securely to be counted on even in a moderately long run of things as they have run hitherto, if due precautions are taken by the interested statesmen,--as would seem to be indicated by the successful conservation of archaic traits in the german peoples during the past half century under the archaising rule of the hohenzollern. it is a matter of habituation, which takes time, and which can at the same time be neutralised in some degree by indoctrination. still, when all is told, it will probably have to be conceded that, e.g., such a nation as russia will fall under this rule of inherent disability imposed by the necessary use of the modern industrial arts. without a fairly full and free command of these modern industrial methods on the part of the russian people, together with the virtual disappearance of illiteracy, and with the facile and far-reaching system of communication which it all involves, the russian imperial establishment would not be a formidable power or a serious menace to the pacific nations; and it is not easy to imagine how the imperial establishment could retain its hold and its character under the conditions indicated. the case of japan, taken by itself, rests on somewhat similar lines as these others. in time, and in this case the time-allowance should presumably not be anything very large, the japanese people are likely to get an adequate command of the modern technology; which would, here as elsewhere, involve the virtual disappearance of the present high illiteracy, and the loss, in some passable measure, of the current superstitiously crass nationalism of that people. there are indications that something of that kind, and of quite disquieting dimensions, is already under way; though with no indication that any consequent disintegrating habits of thought have yet invaded the sacred close of japanese patriotic devotion. again, it is a question of time and habituation. with time and habituation the emperor may insensibly cease to be of divine pedigree, and the syndicate of statesmen who are doing business under his signature may consequently find their measures of imperial expansion questioned by the people who pay the bills. but so long as the imperial syndicate enjoy their present immunity from outside obstruction, and can accordingly carry on an uninterrupted campaign of cumulative predation in korea, china and manchuria, the patriotic infatuation is less likely to fall off, and by so much the decay of japanese loyalty will be retarded. yet, even if allowed anything that may seem at all probable in the way of a free hand for aggression against their hapless neighbours, the skepticism and insubordination to personal rule that seems inseparable in the long run from addiction to the modern industrial arts should be expected presently to overtake the japanese spirit of loyal servitude. and the opportunity of imperial japan lies in the interval. so also does the menace of imperial japan as a presumptive disturber of the peace at large. * * * * * at the cost of some unavoidable tedium, the argument as regards these and similar instances may be summarised. it appears, in the (possibly doubtful) light of the history of democratic institutions and of modern technology hitherto, as also from the logical character of this technology and its underlying material sciences, that consistent addiction to the peculiar habits of thought involved in its carrying on will presently induce a decay of those preconceptions in which dynastic government and national ambitions have their ground. continued addiction to this modern scheme of industrial life should in time eventuate in a decay of militant nationalism, with a consequent lapse of warlike enterprise. at the same time, popular proficiency in the modern industrial arts, with all that that implies in the way of intelligence and information, is indispensable as a means to any successful warlike enterprise on the modern plan. the menace of warlike aggression from such dynastic states, e.g., as imperial germany and imperial japan is due to their having acquired a competent use of this modern technology, while they have not yet had time to lose that spirit of dynastic loyalty which they have carried over from an archaic order of things, out of which they have emerged at a very appreciably later period (last half of the nineteenth century) than those democratic peoples whose peace they now menace. as has been said, they have taken over this modern state of the industrial arts without having yet come in for the defects of its qualities. this modern technology, with its underlying material sciences, is a novel factor in the history of human culture, in that addiction to its use conduces to the decay of militant patriotism, at the same time that its employment so greatly enhances the warlike efficiency of even a pacific people, at need, that they can not be seriously molested by any other peoples, however valorous and numerous, who have not a competent use of this technology. a peace at large among the civilised nations, by loss of the militant temper through addiction to this manner of arts of peace, therefore, carries no risk of interruption by an inroad of warlike barbarians,--always provided that those existing archaic peoples who might pass muster as barbarians are brought into line with the pacific nations on a footing of peace and equality. the disparity in point of outlook as between the resulting peace at large by neglect of bootless animosities, on the one hand, and those historic instances of a peaceable civilisation that have been overwhelmed by warlike barbarian invasions, on the other hand, should be evident. * * * * * it is always possible, indeed it would scarcely be surprising to find, that the projected league of neutrals or of nations bent on peace can not be brought to realisation at this juncture; perhaps not for a long time yet. but it should at the same time seem reasonable to expect that the drift toward a peaceable settlement of national discrepancies such as has been visible in history for some appreciable time past will, in the absence of unforeseen hindrances, work out to some such effect in the course of further experience under modern conditions. and whether the projected peace compact at its inception takes one form or another, provided it succeeds in its main purpose, the long-term drift of things under its rule should logically set toward some ulterior settlement of the general character of what has here been spoken of as a peace by neglect or by neutralisation of discrepancies. it should do so, in the absence of unforeseen contingencies; more particularly if there were no effectual factor of dissension included in the fabric of institutions within the nation. but there should also, e.g., be no difficulty in assenting to the forecast that when and if national peace and security are achieved and settled beyond recall, the discrepancy in fact between those who own the country's wealth and those who do not is presently due to come to an issue. any attempt to forecast the form which this issue is to take, or the manner, incidents, adjuncts and sequelae of its determination, would be a bolder and a more ambiguous, undertaking. hitherto attempts to bring this question to an issue have run aground on the real or fancied jeopardy to paramount national interests. how, if at all, this issue might affect national interests and international relations, would obviously depend in the first instance on the state of the given national establishment and the character of the international engagements entered into in the formation of this projected pacific league. it is always conceivable that the transactions involving so ubiquitous an issue might come to take on an international character and that they might touch the actual or fanciful interests of these diverse nations with such divergent effect as to bring on a rupture of the common understanding between them and of the peace-compact in which the common understanding is embodied. * * * * * in the beginning, that is to say in the beginnings out of which this modern era of the western civilisation has arisen, with its scheme of law and custom, there grew into the scheme of law and custom, by settled usage, a right of ownership and of contract in disposal of ownership,--which may or may not have been a salutary institutional arrangement on the whole, under the circumstances of the early days. with the later growth of handicraft and the petty trade in western europe this right of ownership and contract came to be insisted on, standardised under legal specifications, and secured against molestation by the governmental interests; more particularly and scrupulously among those peoples that have taken the lead in working out that system of free or popular institutions that marks the modern civilised nations. so it has come to be embodied in the common law of the modern world as an inviolable natural right. it has all the prescriptive force of legally authenticated immemorial custom. under the system of handicraft and petty trade this right of property and free contract served the interest of the common man, at least in much of its incidence, and acted in its degree to shelter industrious and economical persons from hardship and indignity at the hands of their betters. there seems reason to believe, as is commonly believed, that so long as that relatively direct and simple scheme of industry and trade lasted, the right of ownership and contract was a salutary custom, in its bearing on the fortunes of the common man. it appears also, on the whole, to have been favorable to the fuller development of the handicraft technology, as well as to its eventual outgrowth into the new line of technological expedients and contrivances that presently gave rise to the machine industry and the large-scale business enterprise. the standard theories of economic science have assumed the rights of property and contract as axiomatic premises and ultimate terms of analysis; and their theories are commonly drawn in such a form as would fit the circumstances of the handicraft industry and the petty trade, and such as can be extended to any other economic situation by shrewd interpretation. these theories, as they run from adam smith down through the nineteenth century and later, appear tenable, on the whole, when taken to apply to the economic situation of that earlier time, in virtually all that they have to say on questions of wages, capital, savings, and the economy and efficiency of management and production by the methods of private enterprise resting on these rights of ownership and contract and governed by the pursuit of private gain. it is when these standard theories are sought to be applied to the later situation, which has outgrown the conditions of handicraft, that they appear nugatory or meretricious. the "competitive system" which these standard theories assume as a necessary condition of their own validity, and about which they are designed to form a defensive hedge, would, under those earlier conditions of small-scale enterprise and personal contact, appear to have been both a passably valid assumption as a premise and a passably expedient scheme of economic relations and traffic. at that period of its life-history it can not be said consistently to have worked hardship to the common man; rather the reverse. and the common man in that time appears to have had no misgivings about the excellence of the scheme or of that article of natural rights that underlies it. this complexion of things, as touches the effectual bearing of the institution of property and the ancient customary rights of ownership, has changed substantially since the time of adam smith. the "competitive system," which he looked to as the economic working-out of that "simple and obvious system of natural liberty" that always engaged his best affections, has in great measure ceased to operate as a routine of natural liberty, in fact; particularly in so far as touches the fortunes of the common man, the impecunious mass of the people. _de jure_, of course, the competitive system and its inviolable rights of ownership are a citadel of natural liberty; but _de facto_ the common man is now, and has for some time been, feeling the pinch of it. it is law, and doubtless it is good law, grounded in immemorial usage and authenticated with statute and precedent. but circumstances have so changed that this good old plan has in a degree become archaic, perhaps unprofitable, or even mischievous, on the whole, and especially as touches the conditions of life for the common man. at least, so the common man in these modern democratic and commercial countries is beginning to apprehend the matter. some slight and summary characterisation of these changing circumstances that have affected the incidence of the rights of property during modern times may, therefore, not be out of place; with a view to seeing how far and why these rights may be due to come under advisement and possible revision, in case a state of settled peace should leave men's attention free to turn to these internal, as contrasted with national interests. under that order of handicraft and petty trade that led to the standardisation of these rights of ownership in the accentuated form which belongs to them in modern law and custom, the common man had a practicable chance of free initiative and self-direction in his choice and pursuit of an occupation and a livelihood, in so far as rights of ownership bore on his case. at that period the workman was the main factor in industry and, in the main and characteristically, the question of his employment was a question of what he would do. the material equipment of industry--the "plant," as it has come to be called--was subject of ownership, then as now; but it was then a secondary factor and, notoriously, subsidiary to the immaterial equipment of skill, dexterity and judgment embodied in the person of the craftsman. the body of information, or general knowledge, requisite to a workmanlike proficiency as handicraftsman was sufficiently slight and simple to fall within the ordinary reach of the working class, without special schooling; and the material equipment necessary to the work, in the way of tools and appliances, was also slight enough, ordinarily, to bring it within the reach of the common man. the stress fell on the acquirement of that special personal skill, dexterity and judgment that would constitute the workman a master of his craft. given a reasonable measure of pertinacity, the common man would be able to compass the material equipment needful to the pursuit of his craft, and so could make his way to a livelihood; and the inviolable right of ownership would then serve to secure him the product of his own industry, in provision for his own old-age and for a fair start in behalf of his children. at least in the popular conception, and presumably in some degree also in fact, the right of property so served as a guarantee of personal liberty and a basis of equality. and so its apologists still look on the institution. in a very appreciable degree this complexion of things and of popular conceptions has changed since then; although, as would be expected, the change in popular conceptions has not kept pace with the changing circumstances. in all the characteristic and controlling lines of industry the modern machine technology calls for a very considerable material equipment; so large an equipment, indeed, that this plant, as it is called, always represents a formidable amount of invested wealth; and also so large that it will, typically, employ a considerable number of workmen per unit of plant. on the transition to the machine technology the plant became the unit of operation, instead of the workman, as had previously been the case; and with the further development of this modern technology, during the past hundred and fifty years or so, the unit of operation and control has increasingly come to be not the individual or isolated plant but rather an articulated group of such plants working together as a balanced system and keeping pace in common, under a collective business management; and coincidently the individual workman has been falling into the position of an auxiliary factor, nearly into that of an article of supply, to be charged up as an item of operating expenses. under this later and current system, discretion and initiative vest not in the workman but in the owners of the plant, if anywhere. so that at this point the right of ownership has ceased to be, in fact, a guarantee of personal liberty to the common man, and has come to be, or is coming to be, a guarantee of dependence. all of which engenders a feeling of unrest and insecurity, such as to instill a doubt in the mind of the common man as to the continued expediency of this arrangement and of the prescriptive rights of property on which the arrangement rests. there is also an insidious suggestion, carrying a sinister note of discredit, that comes in from ethnological science at this point; which is adapted still further to derange the common man's faith in this received institution of ownership and its control of the material equipment of industry. to students interested in human culture it is a matter of course that this material equipment is a means of utilising the state of the industrial arts; that it is useful in industry and profitable to its owners only because and in so far as it is a creation of the current technological knowledge and enables its owner to appropriate the usufruct of the current industrial arts. it is likewise a matter of course that this technological knowledge, that so enables the material equipment to serve the purposes of production and of private gain, is a free gift of the community at large to the owners of industrial plant; and, under latterday conditions, to them exclusively. the state of the industrial arts is a joint heritage of the community at large, but where, as in the modern countries, the work to be done by this technology requires a large material equipment, the usufruct of this joint heritage passes, in effect, into the hands of the owners of this large material equipment. these owners have, ordinarily, contributed nothing to the technology, the state of the industrial arts, from which their control of the material equipment of industry enables them to derive a gain. indeed, no class or condition of men in the modern community--with the possible exception of politicians and the clergy--can conceivably contribute less to the community's store of technological knowledge than the large owners of invested wealth. by one of those singular inversions due to production being managed for private gain, it happens that these investors are not only not given to the increase and diffusion of technological knowledge, but they have a well-advised interest in retarding or defeating improvements in the industrial arts in detail. improvements, innovations that heighten productive efficiency in the general line of production in which a given investment is placed, are commonly to be counted on to bring "obsolescence by supersession" to the plant already engaged in that line; and therefore to bring a decline in its income-yielding capacity, and so in its capital or investment value. invested capital yields income because it enjoys the usufruct of the community's technological knowledge; it has an effectual monopoly of this usufruct because this machine technology requires large material appliances with which to do its work; the interest of the owners of established industrial plant will not tolerate innovations designed to supersede these appliances. the bearing of ownership on industry and on the fortunes of the common man is accordingly, in the main, the bearing which it has by virtue of its monopoly control of the industrial arts, and its consequent control of the conditions of employment and of the supply of vendible products. it takes effect chiefly by inhibition and privation; stoppage of production in case it brings no suitable profit to the investor, refusal of employment and of a livelihood to the workmen in case their product does not command a profitable price in the market. the expediency of so having the nation's industry managed on a footing of private ownership in the pursuit of private gain, by persons who can show no equitable personal claim to even the most modest livelihood, and whose habitual method of controlling industry is sabotage--refusal to let production go on except it affords them an unearned income--the expediency of all this is coming to be doubted by those who have to pay the cost of it. and it does not go far to lessen their doubts to find that the cost which they pay is commonly turned to no more urgent or useful purpose than a conspicuously wasteful consumption of superfluities by the captains of sabotage and their domestic establishments. this may not seem a veracious and adequate account of these matters; it may, in effect, fall short of the formulation: the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; nor does the question here turn on its adequacy as a statement of fact. without prejudice to the question of its veracity and adequacy, it is believed to be such an account of these matters as will increasingly come easy and seem convincing to the common man who, in an ever increasing degree, finds himself pinched with privation and insecurity by a run of facts which will consistently bear this construction, and who perforce sees these facts from the prejudiced standpoint of a loser. to such a one, there is reason to believe, the view so outlined will seem all the more convincing the more attentively the pertinent facts and their bearing on his fortunes are considered. how far the contrary prejudice of those whose interest or training inclines them the other way may lead them to a different construction of these pertinent facts, does not concern the present argument; which has to do with this run of facts only as they bear on the prospective frame of mind of that unblest mass of the population who will have opportunity to present their proposals when peace at large shall have put national interests out of their preferential place in men's regard. at the risk of what may seem an excessively wide digression, there is something further to be said of the capitalistic sabotage spoken of above. the word has by usage come to have an altogether ungraceful air of disapproval. yet it signifies nothing more vicious than a deliberate obstruction or retardation of industry, usually by legitimate means, for the sake of some personal or partisan advantage. this morally colorless meaning is all that is intended in its use here. it is extremely common in all industry that is designed to supply merchantable goods for the market. it is, in fact, the most ordinary and ubiquitous of all expedients in business enterprise that has to do with supplying the market, being always present in the businessman's necessary calculations; being not only a usual and convenient recourse but quite indispensable as an habitual measure of business sagacity. so that no personal blame can attach to its employment by any given businessman or business concern. it is only when measures of this nature are resorted to by employees, to gain some end of their own, that such conduct becomes (technically) reprehensible. any businesslike management of industry is carried on for gain, which is to be got only on condition of meeting the terms of the market. the price system under which industrial business is carried on will not tolerate production in excess of the market demand, or without due regard to the expenses of production as determined by the market on the side of the supplies required. hence any business concern must adjust its operations, by due acceleration, retardation or stoppage, to the market conditions, with a view to what the traffic will bear; that is to say, with a view to what will yield the largest obtainable net gain. so long as the price system rules, that is to say so long as industry is managed on investment for a profit, there is no escaping this necessity of adjusting the processes of industry to the requirements of a remunerative price; and this adjustment can be taken care of only by well-advised acceleration or curtailment of the processes of industry; which answers to the definition of sabotage. wise business management, and more particularly what is spoken of as safe and sane business management, therefore, reduces itself in the main to a sagacious use of sabotage; that is to say a sagacious limitation of productive processes to something less than the productive capacity of the means in hand. * * * * * to anyone who is inclined to see these matters of usage in the light of their history and to appraise them as phenomena of habituation, adaptation and supersession in the sequence of cultural proliferation, there should be no difficulty in appreciating that this institution of ownership that makes the core of the modern institutional structure is a precipitate of custom, like any other item of use and wont; and that, like any other article of institutional furniture, it is subject to the contingencies of supersession and obsolescence. if prevalent habits of thought, enforced by the prevalent exigencies of life and livelihood, come to change in such a way as to make life under the rule imposed by this institution seem irksome, or intolerable, to the mass of the population; and if at the same time things turn in such a way as to leave no other and more urgent interest or exigency to take precedence of this one and hinder its being pushed to an issue; then it should reasonably follow that contention is due to arise between the unblest mass on whose life it is a burden and the classes who live by it. but it is, of course, impossible to state beforehand what will be the precise line of cleavage or what form the division between the two parties in interest will take. yet it is contained in the premises that, barring unforeseen contingencies of a formidable magnitude, such a cleavage is due to follow as a logical sequel of an enduring peace at large. and it is also well within the possibilities of the case that this issue may work into an interruption or disruption of the peace between the nations. in this connection it may be called to mind that the existing governmental establishments in these pacific nations are, in all cases, in the hands of the beneficiary, or kept classes,--beneficiaries in the sense in which a distinction to that effect comes into the premises of the case at this point. the responsible officials and their chief administrative officers,--so much as may at all reasonably be called the "government" or the "administration,"--are quite invariably and characteristically drawn from these beneficiary classes; nobles, gentlemen, or business men, which all comes to the same thing for the purpose in hand; the point of it all being that the common man does not come within these precincts and does not share in these counsels that assume to guide the destiny of the nations. of course, sporadically and ephemerally, a man out of the impecunious and undistinguished mass may now and again find his way within the gates; and more frequently will a professed "man of the people" sit in council. but that the rule holds unbroken and inviolable is sufficiently evident in the fact that no community will let the emoluments of office for any of its responsible officials, even for those of a very scant responsibility, fall to the level of the habitual livelihood of the undistinguished populace, or indeed to fall below what is esteemed to be a seemly income for a gentleman. should such an impecunious one be thrown up into a place of discretion in the government, he will forthwith cease to be a common man and will be inducted into the rank of gentleman,--so far as that feat can be achieved by taking thought or by assigning him an income adequate to a reputably expensive manner of life. so obvious is the antagonism between a vulgar station in life and a position of official trust, that many a "selfmade man" has advisedly taken recourse to governmental position, often at some appreciable cost, from no apparent motive other than its known efficacy as a levitical corrective for a humble origin. and in point of fact, neither here nor there have the underbred majority hitherto learned to trust one of their own kind with governmental discretion; which has never yet, in the popular conviction, ceased to be a perquisite of the gently-bred and the well-to-do. let it be presumed that this state of things will continue without substantial alteration, so far as regards the complexion of the governmental establishments of these pacific nations, and with such allowance for overstatement in the above characterisation as may seem called for. these governmental establishments are, by official position and by the character of their personnel, committed more or less consistently to the maintenance of the existing law and order. and should no substantial change overtake them as an effect of the war experience, the pacific league under discussion would be entered into by and between governments of this complexion. should difficulties then arise between those who own and those who do not, in any one of these countries, it would become a nice question whether the compact to maintain the peace and national integrity of the several nations comprised in the league should be held to cover the case of internal dissensions and possible disorders partaking of the character of revolt against the established authorities or against the established provisions of law. a strike of the scope and character of the one recently threatened, and narrowly averted, on the american railroads, e.g., might easily give rise to disturbances sufficiently formidable to raise a question of the peace league's jurisdiction; particularly if such a disturbance should arise in a less orderly and less isolated country than the american republic; so as unavoidably to carry the effects of the disturbance across the national frontiers along the lines of industrial and commercial intercourse and correlation. it is always conceivable that a national government standing on a somewhat conservative maintenance of the received law and order might feel itself bound by its conception of the peace to make common cause with the keepers of established rights in neighboring states, particularly if the similar interests of their own nation were thought to be placed in jeopardy by the course of events. antecedently it seems highly probable that the received rights of ownership and disposal of property, particularly of investment, will come up for advisement and revision so soon as a settled state of peace is achieved. and there should seem to be little doubt but this revision would go toward, or at least aim at the curtailment or abrogation of these rights; very much after the fashion in which the analogous vested rights of feudalism and the dynastic monarchy have been revised and in great part curtailed or abrogated in the advanced democratic countries. not much can confidently be said as to the details of such a prospective revision of legal rights, but the analogy of that procedure by which these other vested rights have been reduced to a manageable disability, suggests that the method in the present case also would be by way of curtailment, abrogation and elimination. here again, as in analogous movements of disuse and disestablishment, there would doubtless be much conservative apprehension as to the procuring of a competent substitute for the supplanted methods of doing what is no longer desirable to be done; but here as elsewhere, in a like conjuncture, the practicable way out would presumably be found to lie along the line of simple disuse and disallowance of class prerogative. taken at its face value, without unavoidable prejudice out of the past, this question of a substitute to replace the current exploitation of the industrial arts for private gain by capitalistic sabotage is not altogether above a suspicion of drollery. yet it is not to be overlooked that private enterprise on the basis of private ownership is the familiar and accepted method of conducting industrial affairs, and that it has the sanction of immemorial usage, in the eyes of the common man, and that it is reenforced with the urgency of life and death in the apprehension of the kept classes. it should accordingly be a possible outcome of such a peace as would put away international dissension, that the division of classes would come on in a new form, between those who stand on their ancient rights of exploitation and mastery, and those who are unwilling longer to submit. and it is quite within the possibilities of the case that the division of opinion on these matters might presently shift back to the old familiar ground of international hostilities; undertaken partly to put down civil disturbances in given countries, partly by the more archaic, or conservative, peoples to safeguard the institutions of the received law and order against inroads from the side of the iconoclastic ones. * * * * * in the apprehension of those who are speaking for peace between the nations and planning for its realisation, the outlook is that of a return to, or a continuance of, the state of things before the great war came on, with peace and national security added, or with the danger of war eliminated. nothing appreciable in the way of consequent innovation, certainly nothing of a serious character, is contemplated as being among the necessary consequences of such a move into peace and security. national integrity and autonomy are to be preserved on the received lines, and international division and discrimination is to be managed as before, and with the accustomed incidents of punctilio and pecuniary equilibration. internationally speaking, there is to dawn an era of diplomacy without afterthought, whatever that might conceivably mean. there is much in the present situation that speaks for such an arrangement, particularly as an initial phase of the perpetual peace that is aimed at, whatever excursive variations might befall presently, in the course of years. the war experience in the belligerent countries and the alarm that has disturbed the neutral nations have visibly raised the pitch of patriotic solidarity in all these countries; and patriotism greatly favors the conservation of established use and wont; more particularly is it favorable to the established powers and policies of the national government. the patriotic spirit is not a spirit of innovation. the chances of survival, and indeed of stabilisation, for the accepted use and wont and for the traditional distinctions of class and prescriptive rights, should therefore seem favorable, at any rate in the first instance. presuming, therefore, as the spokesmen of such a peace-compact are singularly ready to presume, that the era of peace and good-will which they have in view is to be of a piece with the most tranquil decades of the recent past, only more of the same kind, it becomes a question of immediate interest to the common man, as well as to all students of human culture, how the common man is to fare under this régime of law and order,--the mass of the population whose place it is to do what is to be done, and thereby to carry forward the civilisation of these pacific nations. it may not be out of place to recall, by way of parenthesis, that it is here taken for granted as a matter of course that all governmental establishments are necessarily conservative in all their dealings with this heritage of culture, except so far as they may be reactionary. their office is the stabilisation of archaic institutions, the measure of archaism varying from one to another. with due stabilisation and with a sagacious administration of the established scheme of law and order, the common man should find himself working under conditions and to results of the familiar kind; but with the difference that, while legal usage and legal precedent remain unchanged, the state of the industrial arts can confidently be expected to continue its advance in the same general direction as before, while the population increases after the familiar fashion, and the investing business community pursues its accustomed quest of competitive gain and competitive spending in the familiar spirit and with cumulatively augmented means. stabilisation of the received law and order will not touch these matters; and for the present it is assumed that these matters will not derange the received law and order. the assumption may seem a violent one to the students of human culture, but it is a simple matter of course to the statesmen. to this piping time of peace the nearest analogues in history would seem to be the roman peace, say, of the days of the antonines, and passably the british peace of the victorian era. changes in the scheme of law and order supervened in both of these instances, but the changes were, after all, neither unconscionably large nor were they of a subversive nature. the scheme of law and order, indeed, appears in neither instance to have changed so far as the altered circumstances would seem to have called for. to the common man the roman peace appears to have been a peace by submission, not widely different from what the case of china has latterly brought to the appreciation of students. the victorian peace, which can be appreciated more in detail, was of a more genial character, as regards the fortunes of the common man. it started from a reasonably low level of hardship and _de facto_ iniquity, and was occupied with many prudent endeavours to improve the lot of the unblest majority; but it is to be admitted that these prudent endeavours never caught up with the march of circumstances. not that these prudent measures of amelioration were nugatory, but it is clear that they were not an altogether effectual corrective of the changes going on; they were, in effect, systematically so far in arrears as always to leave an uncovered margin of discontent with current conditions. it is a fact of history that very appreciable sections of the populace were approaching an attitude of revolt against what they considered to be intolerable conditions when that era closed. much of what kept them within bounds, that is to say within legal bounds, was their continued loyalty to the nation; which was greatly, and for the purpose needfully, reenforced by a lively fear of warlike aggression from without. now, under the projected _pax orbis terrarum_ all fear of invasion, it is hopefully believed, will be removed; and with the disappearance of this fear should also disappear the drag of national loyalty on the counsels of the underbred. if this british peace of the nineteenth century is to be taken as a significant indication of what may be looked for under a régime of peace at large, with due allowance for what is obviously necessary to be allowed for, then what is held in promise would appear to be an era of unexampled commercial prosperity, of investment and business enterprise on a scale hitherto not experienced. these developments will bring their necessary consequences affecting the life of the community, and some of the consequences it should be possible to foresee. the circumstances conditioning this prospective era of peace and prosperity will necessarily differ from the corresponding circumstances that conditioned the victorian peace, and many of these points of difference it is also possible to forecast in outline with a fair degree of confidence. it is in the main these economic factors going to condition the civilisation of the promised future that will have to be depended on to give the cue to any student interested in the prospective unfolding of events. the scheme of law and order governing all modern nations, both in the conduct of their domestic affairs and in their national policies, is in its controlling elements the scheme worked out through british (and french) experience in the eighteenth century and earlier, as revised and further accommodated in the nineteenth century. other peoples, particularly the dutch, have of course had their part in the derivation and development of this modern scheme of institutional principles, but it has after all been a minor part; so that the scheme at large would not differ very materially, if indeed it should differ sensibly, from what it is, even if the contribution of these others had not been had. the backward nations, as e.g., germany, russia, spain, etc., have of course contributed substantially nothing but retardation and maladjustment to this modern scheme of civil life; whatever may be due to students resident in those countries, in the way of scholarly formulation. this nineteenth century scheme it is proposed to carry over into the new era; and the responsible spokesmen of the projected new order appear to contemplate no provision touching this scheme of law and order, beyond the keeping of it intact in all substantial respects. when and in so far as the projected peace at large takes effect, international interests will necessarily fall somewhat into the background, as being no longer a matter of precarious equilibration, with heavy penalties in the balance; and diplomacy will consequently become even more of a make-believe than today--something after the fashion of a game of bluff played with irredeemable "chips." commercial, that is to say business, enterprise will consequently come in for a more undivided attention and be carried on under conditions of greater security and of more comprehensive trade relations. the population of the pacified world may be expected to go on increasing somewhat as in the recent past; in which connection it is to be remarked that not more than one-half, presumably something less than one-half, of the available agricultural resources have been turned to account for the civilised world hitherto. the state of the industrial arts, including means of transport and communication, may be expected to develop farther in the same general direction as before, assuming always that peace conditions continue to hold. popular intelligence, as it is called,--more properly popular education,--may be expected to suffer a further advance; necessarily so, since it is a necessary condition of any effectual advance in the industrial arts,--every appreciable technological advance presumes, as a requisite to its working-out in industry, an augmented state of information and of logical facility in the workmen under whose hands it is to take effect. of the prescriptive rights carried over into the new era, under the received law and order, the rights of ownership alone may be expected to have any material significance for the routine of workday life; the other personal rights that once seemed urgent will for everyday purposes have passed into a state of half-forgotten matter-of-course. as now, but in an accentuated degree, the rights of ownership will, in effect, coincide and coalesce with the rights of investment and business management. the market--that is to say the rule of the price-system in all matters of production and livelihood--may be expected to gain in volume and inclusiveness; so that virtually all matters of industry and livelihood will turn on questions of market price, even beyond the degree in which that proposition holds today. the progressive extension and consolidation of investments, corporate solidarity, and business management may be expected to go forward on the accustomed lines, as illustrated by the course of things during the past few decades. market conditions should accordingly, in a progressively increased degree, fall under the legitimate discretionary control of businessmen, or syndicates of businessmen, who have the disposal of large blocks of invested wealth,--"big business," as it is called, should reasonably be expected to grow bigger and to exercise an increasingly more unhampered control of market conditions, including the money market and the labor market. with such improvements in the industrial arts as may fairly be expected to come forward, and with the possible enhancement of industrial efficiency which should follow from a larger scale of organisation, a wider reach of transport and communication, and an increased population,--with these increasing advantages on the side of productive industry, the per-capita product as well as the total product should be increased in a notable degree, and the conditions of life should possibly become notably easier and more attractive, or at least more conducive to efficiency and personal comfort, for all concerned. such would be the first and unguarded inference to be drawn from the premises of the case as they offer themselves in the large; and something of that kind is apparently what floats before the prophetic vision of the advocates of a league of nations for the maintenance of peace at large. these premises, and the inferences so drawn from them, may be further fortified and amplified in the same sense on considering that certain very material economies also become practicable, and should take effect "in the absence of disturbing causes," on the establishment of such a peace at large. it will of course occur to all thoughtful persons that armaments must be reduced, perhaps to a minimum, and that the cost of these things, in point of expenditures as well as of man-power spent in the service, would consequently fall off in a corresponding measure. so also, as slight further reflection will show, would the cost of the civil service presumably fall off very appreciably; more particularly the cost of this service per unit of service rendered. some such climax of felicities might be looked for by hopeful persons, in the absence of disturbing causes. under the new dispensation the standard of living, that is to say the standard of expenditure, would reasonably be expected to advance in a very appreciable degree, at least among the wealthy and well-to-do; and by pressure of imitative necessity a like effect would doubtless also be had among the undistinguished mass. it is not a question of the standard of living considered as a matter of the subsistence minimum, or even a standard of habitually prevalent creature comfort, particularly not among the wealthy and well-to-do. these latter classes have long since left all question of material comfort behind in their accepted standards of living and in the continued advance of these standards. for these classes who are often spoken of euphemistically as being "in easy circumstances," it is altogether a question of a standard of reputable expenditure, to be observed on pain of lost self-respect and of lost reputation at large. as has been remarked in an earlier passage, wants of this kind are indefinitely extensible. so that some doubt may well be entertained as to whether the higher productive efficiency spoken of will necessarily make the way of life easier, in view of this need of a higher standard of expenditure, even when due account is taken of the many economies which the new dispensation is expected to make practicable. one of the effects to be looked for would apparently be an increased pressure on the part of aspiring men to get into some line of business enterprise; since it is only in business, as contrasted with the industrial occupations, that anyone can hope to find the relatively large income required for such an expensive manner of life as will bring any degree of content to aspirants for pecuniary good repute. so it should follow that the number of businessmen and business concerns would increase up to the limit of what the traffic could support, and that the competition between these rival, and in a sense over-numerous, concerns would push the costs of competition to the like limit. in this respect the situation would be of much the same character as what it now is, with the difference that the limit of competitive expenditures would be rather higher than at present, to answer to the greater available margin of product that could be devoted to this use; and that the competing concerns would be somewhat more numerous, or at least that the aggregate expenditure on competitive enterprise would be somewhat larger; as, e.g., costs of advertising, salesmanship, strategic litigation, procuration of legislative and municipal grants and connivance, and the like. it is always conceivable, though it may scarcely seem probable, that these incidents of increased pressure of competition in business traffic might eventually take up all the slack, and leave no net margin of product over what is available under the less favorable conditions of industry that prevail today; more particularly when this increased competition for business gains is backed by an increased pressure of competitive spending for purposes of a reputable appearance. all this applies in retail trade and in such lines of industry and public service as partakes of the nature of retail trade, in the respect that salesmanship and the costs of salesmanship enter into their case in an appreciable measure; this is an extensive field, it is true, and incontinently growing more extensive with the later changes in the customary methods of marketing products; but it is by no means anything like the whole domain of industrial business, and by no means a field in which business is carried on without interference of a higher control from outside its own immediate limits. all this generously large and highly expensive and profitable field of trade and of trade-like industry, in which the businessmen in charge deal somewhat directly with a large body of customers, is always subject to limitations imposed by the condition of the market; and the condition of the market is in part not under the control of these businessmen, but is also in part controlled by large concerns in the background; which in their turn are after all also not precisely free agents; in fact not much more so than their cousins in the retail trade, being confined in all their motions by the constraint of the price-system that dominates the whole and gathers them all in its impersonal and inexorable net. there is a colloquial saying among businessmen, that they are not doing business for their health; which being interpreted means that they are doing business for a price. it is out of a discrepancy in price, between purchase and sale, or between transactions which come to the same result as purchase and sale, that the gains of business are drawn; and it is in terms of price that these gains are rated, amassed and funded. it is necessary, for a business concern to achieve a favorable balance in terms of price; and the larger the balance in terms of price the more successful the enterprise. such a balance can not be achieved except by due regard to the conditions of the market, to the effect that dealings must not go on beyond what will yield a favorable balance in terms of price between income and outgo. as has already been remarked above, the prescriptive and indispensable recourse in all this conduct of business is sabotage, limitation of supply to bring a remunerative price result. the new dispensation offers two new factors bearing on this businesslike need of a sagacious sabotage, or rather it brings a change of coefficients in two factors already familiar in business management: a greater need, for gainful business, of resorting to such limitation of traffic; and a greater facility of ways and means for enforcing the needed restriction. so, it is confidently to be expected that in the prospective piping time of peace the advance in the industrial arts will continue at an accelerated rate; which may confidently be expected to affect the practicable increased production of merchantable goods; from which it follows that it will act to depress the prices of these goods; from which it follows that if a profitable business is to be done in the conduct of productive industry a greater degree of continence than before will have to be exercised in order not to let prices fall to an unprofitable figure; that is to say, the permissible output must be held short of the productive capacity of such industry by a wider margin than before. on the other hand, it is well known out of the experience of the past few decades that a larger coalition of invested capital, controlling a larger proportion of the output, can more effectually limit the supply to a salutary maximum, such as will afford reasonable profits. and with the new dispensation affording a freer scope for business enterprise on conditions of greater security, larger coalitions than before are due to come into bearing. so that the means will be at hand competently to meet this more urgent need of a stricter limitation of the output, in spite of any increased productive capacity conferred on the industrial community by any conceivable advance in the industrial arts. the outcome to be looked for should apparently be such an effectual recourse to capitalistic sabotage as will neutralise any added advantage that might otherwise accrue to the community from its continued improvements in technology. in spite of this singularly untoward conjuncture of circumstances to be looked for, there need be no serious apprehension that capitalistic sabotage, with a view to maintaining prices and the rate of profits, will go all the way, to the result indicated, at least not on the grounds so indicated alone. there is in the modern development of technology, and confidently to be counted on, a continued flow of new contrivances and expedients designed to supersede the old; and these are in fact successful, in greater or less measure, in finding their way into profitable use, on such terms as to displace older appliances, underbid them in the market, and render them obsolete or subject to recapitalisation on a lowered earning-capacity. so far as this unremitting flow of innovations has its effect, that is to say so far as it can not be hindered from having an effect, it acts to lower the effectual cost of products to the consumer. this effect is but a partial and somewhat uncertain one, but it is always to be counted in as a persistent factor, of uncertain magnitude, that will affect the results in the long run. as has just been spoken of above, large coalitions of invested wealth are more competent to maintain, or if need be to advance, prices than smaller coalitions acting in severalty, or even when acting in collusion. this state of the case has been well illustrated by the very successful conduct of such large business organisations during the past few decades; successful, that is, in earning large returns on the investments engaged. under the new dispensation, as has already been remarked, coalitions should reasonably be expected to grow to a larger size and achieve a greater efficiency for the same purpose. the large gains of the large corporate coalitions are commonly ascribed by their promoters, and by sympathetic theoreticians of the ancient line, to economies of production made practicable by a larger scale of production; an explanation which is disingenuous only so far as it needs be. what is more visibly true on looking into the workings of these coalitions in detail is that they are enabled to maintain prices at a profitable, indeed at a strikingly profitable, level by such a control of the output as would be called sabotage if it were put in practice by interested workmen with a view to maintain wages. the effects of this sagacious sabotage become visible in the large earnings of these investments and the large gains which, now and again, accrue to their managers. large fortunes commonly are of this derivation. in cases where no recapitalisation has been effected for a considerable series of years the yearly earnings of such businesslike coalitions have been known to approach fifty percent on the capitalised value. commonly, however, when earnings rise to a striking figure, the business will be recapitalised on the basis of its earning-capacity, by issue of a stock dividend, by reincorporation in a new combination with an increased capitalisation, and the like. such augmentation of capital not unusually has been spoken of by theoretical writers and publicists as an increase of the community's wealth, due to savings; an analysis of any given case is likely to show that its increased capital value represents an increasingly profitable procedure for securing a high price above cost, by stopping the available output short of the productive capacity of the industries involved. loosely speaking, and within the limits of what the traffic will bear, the gains in such a case are proportioned to the deficiency by which the production or supply under control falls short of productive capacity. so that the capitalisation in the case comes to bear a rough proportion to the material loss which this organisation of sabotage is enabled to inflict on the community at large; and instead of its being a capitalisation of serviceable means of production it may, now and again, come to little else than a capitalisation of chartered sabotage. under the new dispensation of peace and security at large this manner of capitalisation and business enterprise might reasonably be expected to gain something in scope and security of operation. indeed, there are few things within the range of human interest on which an opinion may more confidently be formed beforehand. if the rights of property, in their extent and amplitude, are maintained intact as they are before the law today, the hold which business enterprise on the large scale now has on the affairs and fortunes of the community at large is bound to grow firmer and to be used more unreservedly for private advantage under the new conditions contemplated. the logical result should be an accelerated rate of accumulation of the country's wealth in the hands of a relatively very small class of wealthy owners, with a relatively inconsiderable semi-dependent middle class of the well-to-do, and with the mass of the population even more nearly destitute than they are today. at the same time it is scarcely to be avoided that this wholly dependent and impecunious mass of the population must be given an appreciably better education than they have today. the argument will return to the difficulties that are liable to arise out of this conjuncture of facts, in the way of discontent and possible disturbance. * * * * * meantime, looking to the promise of the pacific future in the light of the pacific past, certain further consequences, particularly consequences of the economic order, that may reasonably be expected to follow will also merit attention. the experience of the victorian peace is almost as pointed in its suggestion on this head as if it had been an experiment made _ad hoc_; but with the reservation that the scale of economic life, after all, was small in the victorian era, and its pace was slack, compared with what the twentieth century should have to offer under suitable conditions of peace and pecuniary security. in the light of this most instructive modern instance, there should appear to be in prospect a growth of well-bred families resting on invested wealth and so living on unearned incomes; larger incomes and consequently a more imposingly well-bred body of gentlefolk, sustained and vouched for by a more munificent expenditure on superfluities, than the modern world has witnessed hitherto. doubtless the resulting growth of gentlemen and gentlewomen would be as perfect after their kind as these unexampled opportunities of gentle breeding might be expected to engender; so that even their british precursors on the trail of respectability would fall somewhat into insignificance by comparison, whether in respect of gentlemanly qualities or in point of cost per unit. the moral, and even more particularly the aesthetic, value of such a line of gentlefolk, and of the culture which they may be expected to place on view,--this cultural side of the case, of course, is what one would prefer to dwell on, and on the spiritual gains that might be expected to accrue to humanity at large from the steady contemplation of this meritorious respectability so displayed at such a cost. but the prosaic necessity of the argument turns back to the economic and civil bearing of this prospective development, this virtual bifurcation of the pacified nation into a small number of gentlemen who own the community's wealth and consume its net product in the pursuit of gentility, on the one hand, and an unblest mass of the populace who do the community's work on a meager livelihood tapering down toward the subsistence minimum, on the other hand. evidently, this prospective posture of affairs may seem "fraught with danger to the common weal," as a public spirited citizen might phrase it. or, as it would be expressed in less eloquent words, it appears to comprise elements that should make for a change. at the same time it should be recalled, and the statement will command assent on slight reflection, that there is no avoiding substantially such a posture of affairs under the promised régime of peace and security, provided only that the price-system stands over intact, and the current rights of property continue to be held inviolate. if the known principles of competitive gain and competitive spending should need enforcement to that effect by an illustrative instance, the familiar history of the victorian peace is sufficient to quiet all doubts. of course, the resulting articulation of classes in the community will not be expected to fall into such simple lines of sheer contrast as this scheme would indicate. the class of gentlefolk, the legally constituted wasters, as they would be rated from the economic point of view, can not be expected personally to take care of so large a consumption of superfluities as this posture of affairs requires at their hands. they would, as the victorian peace teaches, necessarily have the assistance of a trained corps of experts in unproductive consumption, the first and most immediate of whom would be those whom the genial phrasing of adam smith designates "menial servants." beyond these would come the purveyors of superfluities, properly speaking, and the large, indeed redundant, class of tradespeople of high and low degree,--dependent in fact but with an illusion of semi-dependence; and farther out again the legal and other professional classes of the order of stewards, whose duty it will be to administer the sources of income and receive, apportion and disburse the revenues so devoted to a traceless extinguishment. there would, in other words, be something of a "substantial middle class," dependent on the wealthy and on their expenditure of wealth, but presumably imbued with the victorian middle-class illusion that they are of some account in their own right. under the due legal forms and sanctions this, somewhat voluminous, middle-class population would engage in the traffic which is their perquisite, and would continue to believe, in some passable fashion, that they touch the substance of things at something nearer than the second remove. they would in great part appear to be people of "independent means," and more particularly would they continue in the hope of so appearing and of some time making good the appearance. hence their fancied, and therefore their sentimental, interest would fall out on the side of the established law and order; and they would accordingly be an element of stability in the commonwealth, and would throw in their weight, and their voice, to safeguard that private property and that fabric of prices and credit through which the "income stream" flows to the owners of preponderant invested wealth. judged on the state of the situation as it runs in our time, and allowing for the heightened efficiency of large-scale investment and consolidated management under the prospective conditions of added pecuniary security, it is to be expected that the middle-class population with "independent means" should come in for a somewhat meager livelihood, provided that they work faithfully at their business of managing pecuniary traffic to the advantage of their pecuniary betters,--meager, that is to say, when allowance is made for the conventionally large expenditure on reputable appearances which is necessarily to be included in their standard of living. it lies in the nature of this system of large-scale investment and enterprise that the (pecuniarily) minor agencies engaged on a footing of ostensible independence will come in for only such a share in the aggregate gains of the community as it is expedient for the greater business interests to allow them as an incentive to go on with their work as purveyors of traffic to these greater business interests. the current, and still more this prospective, case of the quasi-self-directing middle class may fairly be illustrated by the case of the american farmers, of the past and present. the american farmer rejoices to be called "the independent farmer." he once was independent, in a meager and toil-worn fashion, in the days before the price-system had brought him and all his works into the compass of the market; but that was some time ago. he now works for the market, ordinarily at something like what is called a "living wage," provided he has "independent means" enough to enable him by steady application to earn a living wage; and of course, the market being controlled by the paramount investment interests in the background, his work, in effect, inures to their benefit; except so much as it may seem necessary to allow him as incentive to go on. also of course, these paramount investment interests are in turn controlled in all their manoeuvres by the impersonal exigencies of the price-system, which permits no vagaries in violation of the rule that all traffic must show a balance of profit in terms of price. the independent farmer still continues to believe that in some occult sense he still is independent in what he will do and what not; or perhaps rather that he can by shrewd management retain or regain a tolerable measure of such independence, after the fashion of what is held to have been the posture of affairs in the days before the coming of corporation finance; or at least he believes that he ought to have, or to regain or reclaim, some appreciable measure of such independence; which ought then, by help of the "independent means" which he still treasures, to procure him an honest and assured livelihood in return for an honest year's work. latterly he, that is the common run of the farmers, has been taking note of the fact that he is, as he apprehends it, at a disadvantage in the market; and he is now taking recourse to concerted action for the purpose of what might be called "rigging the market" to his own advantage. in this he overlooks the impregnable position which the party of the second part, the great investment interests, occupy; in fact, he is counting without his host. hitherto he has not been convinced of his own helplessness. and with a fine fancy he still imagines that his own interest is on the side of the propertied and privileged classes; so that the farmer constituency is the chief pillar of conservative law and order, particularly in all that touches the inviolable rights of property and at every juncture where a division comes on between those who live by investment and those who live by work. in pecuniary effect, the ordinary american farmer, who legally owns a moderate farm of the common sort, belongs among those who work for a livelihood; such a livelihood as the investment interests find it worth while to allow him under the rule of what the traffic will bear; but in point of sentiment and class consciousness he clings to a belated stand on the side of those who draw a profit from his work. so it is also with the menial servants and the middle-class people of "independent means," who are, however, in a position to see more clearly their dependence on the owners of predominant wealth. and such, with a further accentuation of the anomaly, may reasonably be expected to be the further run of these relations under the promised régime of peace and security. the class of well-kept gentlefolk will scarcely be called on to stand alone, in case of a division between those who live by investment and those who live by work; inasmuch as, for the calculable future, it should seem a reasonable expectation that this very considerable fringe of dependents and pseudo-independents will abide by their time-tried principles of right and honest living, through good days and evil, and cast in their lot unreservedly with that reputable body to whom the control of trade and industry by investment assigns the usufruct of the community's productive powers. * * * * * something has already been said of the prospective breeding of pedigreed gentlefolk under the projected régime of peace. pedigree, for the purpose in hand, is a pecuniary attribute and is, of course, a product of funded wealth, more or less ancient. virtually ancient pedigree can be procured by well-advised expenditure on the conspicuous amenities; that is to say pedigree effectually competent as a background of current gentility. gentlefolk of such syncopated pedigree may have to walk circumspectly, of course; but their being in this manner put on their good behavior should tend to heighten their effectual serviceability as gentlefolk, by inducing a single-mindedness of gentility beyond what can fairly be expected of those who are already secure in their tenure. except conventionally, there is no hereditary difference between the standard gentlefolk and, say, their "menial servants," or the general population of the farms and the industrial towns. this is a well-established commonplace among ethnological students; which has, of course, nothing to say with respect to the conventionally distinct lines of descent of the "best families." these best families are nowise distinguishable from the common run in point of hereditary traits; the difference that makes the gentleman and the gentlewoman being wholly a matter of habituation during the individual's life-time. it is something of a distasteful necessity to call attention to this total absence of native difference between the well-born and the common, but it is a necessity of the argument in hand, and the recalling of it may, therefore, be overlooked for once in a way. there is no harm and no annoyance intended. the point of it all is that, on the premises which this state of the case affords, the body of gentlefolk created by such an accumulation of invested wealth will have no less of an effectual cultural value than they would have had if their virtually ancient pedigree had been actual. at this point, again, the experience of the victorian peace and the functioning of its gentlefolk come in to indicate what may fairly be hoped for in this way under this prospective régime of peace at large. but with the difference that the scale of things is to be larger, the pace swifter, and the volume and dispersion of this prospective leisure class somewhat wider. the work of this leisure class--and there is neither paradox nor inconsistency in the phrase--should be patterned on the lines worked out by their prototypes of the victorian time, but with some appreciable accentuation in the direction of what chiefly characterised the leisure class of that era of tranquility. the characteristic feature to which attention naturally turns at this suggestion is the tranquility that has marked that body of gentlefolk and their code of clean and honest living. another word than "tranquility" might be hit upon to designate this characteristic animus, but any other word that should at all adequately serve the turn would carry a less felicitous suggestion of those upper-class virtues that have constituted the substantial worth of the victorian gentleman. the conscious worth of these gentlefolk has been a beautifully complete achievement. it has been an achievement of "faith without works," of course; but, needless to say, that is as it should be, also of course. the place of gentlefolk in the economy of nature is tracelessly to consume the community's net product, and in doing so to set a standard of decent expenditure for the others emulatively to work up to as near as may be. it is scarcely conceivable that this could have been done in a more unobtrusively efficient manner, or with a more austerely virtuous conviction of well-doing, than by the gentlefolk bred of the victorian peace. so also, in turn, it is not to be believed that the prospective breed of gentlefolk derivable from the net product of the pacific nations under the promised régime of peace at large will prove in any degree less effective for the like ends. more will be required of them in the way of a traceless consumption of superfluities and an unexampled expensive standard of living. but this situation that so faces them may be construed as a larger opportunity, quite as well as a more difficult task. a theoretical exposition of the place and cultural value of a leisure class in modern life would scarcely be in place here; and it has also been set out in some detail elsewhere.[ ] for the purpose in hand it may be sufficient to recall that the canons of taste and the standards of valuation worked out and inculcated by leisure-class life have in all ages run, with unbroken consistency, to pecuniary waste and personal futility. in its economic bearing, and particularly in its immediate bearing on the material well-being of the community at large, the leadership of the leisure class can scarcely be called by a less derogatory epithet than "untoward." but that is not the whole of the case, and the other side should be heard. the leisure-class life of tranquility, running detached as it does above the turmoil out of which the material of their sustenance is derived, enables a growth of all those virtues that mark, or make, the gentleman; and that affect the life of the underlying community throughout, pervasively, by imitation; leading to a standardisation of the everyday proprieties on a presumably, higher level of urbanity and integrity than might be expected to result in the absence of this prescriptive model. [footnote : cf. _the theory of the leisure class_, especially ch. v.-ix. and xiv.] _integer vitae scelerisque purus_, the gentleman of assured station turns a placid countenance to all those petty vexations of breadwinning that touch him not. serenely and with an impassive fortitude he faces those common vicissitudes of life that are impotent to make or mar his material fortunes and that can neither impair his creature comforts nor put a slur on his good repute. so that without afterthought he deals fairly in all everyday conjunctures of give and take; for they are at the most inconsequential episodes to him, although the like might spell irremediable disaster to his impecunious counterfoil among the common men who have the community's work to do. in short, he is a gentleman, in the best acceptation of the word,--unavoidably, by force of circumstance. as such his example is of invaluable consequence to the underlying community of common folk, in that it keeps before their eyes an object lesson in habitual fortitude and visible integrity such as could scarcely have been created except under such shelter from those disturbances that would go to mar habitual fortitude and integrity. there can be little doubt but the high example of the victorian gentlefolk has had much to do with stabilising the animus of the british common man on lines of integrity and fair play. what else and more in the way of habitual preconceptions he may, by competitive imitation, owe to the same high source is not immediately in question here. * * * * * recalling once more that the canon of life whereby folk are gentlefolk sums itself up in the requirements of pecuniary waste and personal futility, and that these requirements are indefinitely extensible, at the same time that the management of the community's industry by investment for a profit enables the owners of invested wealth to divert to their own use the community's net product, wherewith to meet these requirements, it follows that the community at large which provides this output of product will be allowed so much as is required by their necessary standard of living,--with an unstable margin of error in the adjustment. this margin of error should tend continually to grow narrower as the businesslike management of industry grows more efficient with experience; but it will also continually be disturbed in the contrary sense by innovations of a technological nature that require continual readjustment. this margin is probably not to be got rid of, though it may be expected to become less considerable under more settled conditions. it should also not be overlooked that the standard of living here spoken of as necessarily to be allowed the working population by no means coincides with the "physical subsistence minimum," from which in fact it always departs by something appreciable. the necessary standard of living of the working community is in fact made up of two distinguishable factors: the subsistence minimum, and the requirements of decorously wasteful consumption--the "decencies of life." these decencies are no less requisite than the physical necessaries, in point of workday urgency, and their amount is a matter of use and wont. this composite standard of living is a practical minimum, below which consumption will not fall, except by a fluctuating margin of error; the effect being the same, in point of necessary consumption, as if it were all of the nature of a physical subsistence minimum. loosely speaking, the arrangement should leave nothing appreciable over, after the requirements of genteel waste and of the workday standard of consumption have been met. from which in turn it should follow that the rest of what is comprised under the general caption of "culture" will find a place only in the interstices of leisure-class expenditure and only at the hands of aberrant members of the class of the gently-bred. the working population should have no effectual margin of time, energy or means for other pursuits than the day's work in the service of the price-system; so that aberrant individuals in this class, who might by native propensity incline, e.g., to pursue the sciences or the fine arts, should have (virtually) no chance to make good. it would be a virtual suppression of such native gifts among the common folk, not a definitive and all-inclusive suppression. the state of the case under the victorian peace may, again, be taken in illustration of the point; although under the presumably more effectual control to be looked for in the pacific future the margin might reasonably be expected to run somewhat narrower, so that this virtual suppression of cultural talent among the common men should come nearer a complete suppression. the working of that free initiative that makes the advance of civilisation, and also the greater part of its conservation, would in effect be allowed only in the erratic members of the kept classes; where at the same time it would have to work against the side-draught of conventional usage, which discountenances any pursuit that is not visibly futile according to some accepted manner of futility. now under the prospective perfect working of the price-system, bearers of the banners of civilisation could effectually be drawn only from the kept classes, the gentlefolk who alone would have the disposal of such free income as is required for work that has no pecuniary value. and numerically the gentlefolk are an inconsiderable fraction of the population. the supply of competently gifted bearers of the community's culture would accordingly be limited to such as could be drawn by self-selection from among this inconsiderable proportion of the community at large. it may be recalled that in point of heredity, and therefore in point of native fitness for the maintenance and advance of civilisation, there is no difference between the gentlefolk and the populace at large; or at least there is no difference of such a nature as to count in abatement of the proposition set down above. some slight, but after all inconsequential, difference there may be, but such difference as there is, if any, rather counts against the gentlefolk as keepers of the cultural advance. the gentlefolk are derived from business; the gentleman represents a filial generation of the businessman; and if the class typically is gifted with any peculiar hereditary traits, therefore, they should presumably be such as typically mark the successful businessman--astute, prehensile, unscrupulous. for a generation or two, perhaps to the scriptural third and fourth generation, it is possible that a diluted rapacity and cunning may continue to mark the businessman's well-born descendants; but these are not serviceable traits for the conservation and advancement of the community's cultural heritage. so that no consideration of special hereditary fitness in the well-born need be entertained in this connection. as to the limitation imposed by the price-system on the supply of candidates suited by native gift for the human work of civilisation; it would no doubt, be putting the figure extravagantly high to say that the gentlefolk, properly speaking, comprise as much as ten percent of the total population; perhaps something less than one-half of that percentage would still seem a gross overstatement. but, to cover loose ends and vagrant cases, the gentlefolk may for the purpose be credited with so high a percentage of the total population. if ten percent be allowed, as an outside figure, it follows that the community's scientists, artists, scholars, and the like individuals given over to the workday pursuits of the human spirit, are by conventional restriction to be drawn from one-tenth of the current supply of persons suited by native gift for these pursuits. or as it may also be expressed, in so far as the projected scheme takes effect it should result in the suppression of nine (or more) out of every ten persons available for the constructive work of civilisation. the cultural consequences to be looked for, therefore, should be quite markedly of the conservative order. of course, in actual effect, the retardation or repression of civilisation by this means, as calculated on these premises, should reasonably be expected to count up to something appreciably more than nine-tenths of the gains that might presumably be achieved in the conceivable absence of the price-system and the régime of investment. all work of this kind has much of the character of teamwork; so that the efforts of isolated individuals count for little, and a few working in more or less of concert and understanding will count for proportionally much less than many working in concert. the endeavours of the individuals engaged count cumulatively, to such effect that doubling their forces will more than double the aggregate efficiency; and conversely, reducing the number will reduce the effectiveness of their work by something more than the simple numerical proportion. indeed, an undue reduction of numbers in such a case may lead to the total defeat of the few that are left, and the best endeavours of a dwindling remnant may be wholly nugatory. there is needed a sense of community and solidarity, without which the assurance necessary to the work is bound to falter and dwindle out; and there is also needed a degree of popular countenance, not to be had by isolated individuals engaged in an unconventional pursuit of things that are neither to be classed as spendthrift decorum nor as merchantable goods. in this connection an isolated one does not count for one, and more than the critical minimum will count for several per capita. it is a case where the "minimal dose" is wholly inoperative. there is not a little reason to believe that consequent upon the installation of the projected régime of peace at large and secure investment the critical point in the repression of talent will very shortly be reached and passed, so that the principle of the "minimal dose" will come to apply. the point may readily be illustrated by the case of many british and american towns and neighbourhoods during the past few decades; where the dominant price-system and its commercial standards of truth and beauty have over-ruled all inclination to cultural sanity and put it definitively in abeyance. the cultural, or perhaps the conventional, residue left over in these cases where civilisation has gone stale through inefficiency of the minimal dose is not properly to be found fault with; it is of a blameless character, conventionally; nor is there any intention here to cast aspersion on the desolate. the like effects of the like causes are to be seen in the american colleges and universities, where business principles have supplanted the pursuit of learning, and where the commercialisation of aims, ideals, tastes, occupations and personnel is following much the same lines that have led so many of the country towns effectually outside the cultural pale. the american university or college is coming to be an outlier of the price-system, in point of aims, standards and personnel; hitherto the tradition of learning as a trait of civilisation, as distinct from business, has not been fully displaced, although it is now coming to face the passage of the minimal dose. the like, in a degree, is apparently true latterly for many english, and still more evidently for many german schools. in these various instances of what may be called dry-rot or local blight on the civilised world's culture the decline appears to be due not to a positive infection of a malignant sort, so much as to a failure of the active cultural ferment, which has fallen below the critical point of efficacy; perhaps through an unintended refusal of a livelihood to persons given over to cultivating the elements of civilisation; perhaps through the conventional disallowance of the pursuit of any other ends than competitive gain and competitive spending. evidently it is something much more comprehensive in this nature that is reasonably to be looked for under the prospective régime of peace, in case the price-system gains that farther impetus and warrant which it should come in for if the rights of ownership and investment stand over intact, and so come to enjoy the benefit of a further improved state of the industrial arts and a further enlarged scale of operation and enhanced rate of turnover. * * * * * to turn back to the point from which this excursion branched off. it has been presumed all the while that the technological equipment, or the state of the industrial arts, must continue to advance under the conditions offered by this régime of peace at large. but the last few paragraphs will doubtless suggest that such a single-minded addiction to competitive gain and competitive spending as the stabilised and amplified price-system would enjoin, must lead to an effectual retardation, perhaps to a decline, of those material sciences on which modern technology draws; and that the state of the industrial arts should therefore cease to advance, if only the scheme of investment and businesslike sabotage can be made sufficiently secure. that such may be the outcome is a contingency which the argument will have to meet and to allow for; but it is after all a contingency that need not be expected to derange the sequence of events, except in the way of retardation. even without further advance in technological expedients or in the relevant material sciences, there will still necessarily ensue an effectual advance in the industrial arts, in the sense that further organisation and enlargement of the material equipment and industrial processes on lines already securely known and not to be forgotten must bring an effectually enhanced efficiency of the industrial process as a whole. in illustration, it is scarcely to be assumed even as a tentative hypothesis that the system of transport and communication will not undergo extension and improvement on the lines already familiar, even in the absence of new technological contrivances. at the same time a continued increase of population is to be counted on; which has, for the purpose in hand, much the same effect as an advance in the industrial arts. human contact and mutual understanding will necessarily grow wider and closer, and will have its effect on the habits of thought prevalent in the communities that are to live under the promised régime of peace. the system of transport and communication having to handle a more voluminous and exacting traffic, in the service of a larger and more compact population, will have to be organised and administered on mechanically drawn schedules of time, place, volume, velocity, and price, of a still more exacting accuracy than hitherto. the like will necessarily apply throughout the industrial occupations that employ extensive plant or processes, or that articulate with industrial processes of that nature; which will necessarily comprise a larger proportion of the industrial process at large than hitherto. as has already been remarked more than once in the course of the argument, a population that lives and does its work, and such play as is allowed it, in and by an exactingly articulate mechanical system of this kind will necessarily be an "intelligent" people, in the colloquial sense of the word; that is to say it will necessarily be a people that uses printed matter freely and that has some familiarity with the elements of those material sciences that underlie this mechanically organised system of appliances and processes. such a population lives by and within the framework of the mechanistic logic, and is in a fair way to lose faith in any proposition that can not be stated convincingly in terms of this mechanistic logic. superstitions are liable to lapse by neglect or disuse in such a community; that is to say propositions of a non-mechanistic complexion are liable to insensible disestablishment in such a case; "superstition" in these premises coming to signify whatever is not of this mechanistic, or "materialistic" character. an exception to this broad characterisation of non-mechanistic propositions as "superstition" would be matters that are of the nature of an immediate deliverance of the senses or of the aesthetic sensibilities. by a simile it might be said that what so falls under the caption of "superstition" in such a case is subject to decay by inanition. it should not be difficult to conceive the general course of such a decay of superstitions under this unremitting discipline of mechanistic habits of life. the recent past offers an illustration, in the unemotional progress of decay that has overtaken religious beliefs in the more civilised countries, and more particularly among the intellectually trained workmen of the mechanical industries. the elimination of such non-mechanistic propositions of the faith has been visibly going on, but it has not worked out on any uniform plan, nor has it overtaken any large or compact body of people consistently or abruptly, being of the nature of obsolescence rather than of set repudiation. but in a slack and unreflecting fashion the divestment has gone on until the aggregate effect is unmistakable. a similar divestment of superstitions is reasonably to be looked for also in that domain of preconceptions that lies between the supernatural and the mechanistic. chief among these time-warped preconceptions--or superstitions--that so stand over out of the alien past among these democratic peoples is the institution of property. as is true of preconceptions touching the supernatural verities, so here too the article of use and wont in question will not bear formulation in mechanistic terms and is not congruous with that mechanistic logic that is incontinently bending the habits of thought of the common man more and more consistently to its own bent. there is, of course, the difference that while no class--apart from the servants of the church--have a material interest in the continued integrity of the articles of the supernatural faith, there is a strong and stubborn material interest bound up with the maintenance of this article of the pecuniary faith; and the class in whom this material interest vests are also, in effect, invested with the coercive powers of the law. the law, and the popular preconceptions that give the law its binding force, go to uphold the established usage and the established prerogatives on this head; and the disestablishment of the rights of property and investment therefore is not a simple matter of obsolescence through neglect. it may confidently be counted on that all the apparatus of the law and all the coercive agencies of law and order, will be brought in requisition to uphold the ancient rights of ownership, whenever any move is made toward their disallowance or restriction. but then, on the other hand, the movement to disallow or diminish the prerogatives of ownership is also not to take the innocuous shape of unstudied neglect. so soon, or rather so far, as the common man comes to realise that these rights of ownership and investment uniformly work to his material detriment, at the same time that he has lost the "will to believe" in any argument that does not run in terms of the mechanistic logic, it is reasonable to expect that he will take a stand on this matter; and it is more than likely that the stand taken will be of an uncompromising kind,--presumably something in the nature of the stand once taken by recalcitrant englishmen in protest against the irresponsible rule of the stuart sovereign. it is also not likely that the beneficiaries under these proprietary rights will yield their ground at all amicably; all the more since they are patently within their authentic rights in insisting on full discretion in the disposal of their own possessions; very much as charles i or james ii once were within their prescriptive right,--which had little to say in the outcome. even apart from "time immemorial" and the patent authenticity of the institution, there were and are many cogent arguments to be alleged in favor of the position for which the stuart sovereigns and their spokesmen contended. so there are and will be many, perhaps more, cogent reasons to be alleged for the maintenance of the established law and order in respect of the rights of ownership and investment. not least urgent, nor least real, among these arguments is the puzzling question of what to put in the place of these rights and of the methods of control based on them, very much as the analogous question puzzled the public-spirited men of the stuart times. all of which goes to argue that there may be expected to arise a conjuncture of perplexities and complications, as well as a division of interests and claims. to which should be added that the division is likely to come to a head so soon as the balance of forces between the two parties in interest becomes doubtful, so that either party comes to surmise that the success of its own aims may depend on its own efforts. and as happens where two antagonistic parties are each convinced of the justice of its cause, and in the absence of an umpire, the logical recourse is the wager of battle. granting the premises, there should be no reasonable doubt as to this eventual cleavage between those who own and those who do not; and of the premises the only item that is not already an accomplished fact is the installation of peace at large. the rest of what goes into the argument is the well-known modern state of the industrial arts, and the equally well-known price-system; which, in combination, give its character to the modern state of business enterprise. it is only an unusually broad instance of an institutional arrangement which has in the course of time and changing conditions come to work at cross purposes with that underlying ground of institutional arrangements that takes form in the commonplace aphorism, live and let live. with change setting in the direction familiar to all men today, it is only a question of limited time when the discrepancy will reach a critical pass, and the installation of peace may be counted on to hasten this course of things. that a decision will be sought by recourse to forcible measures, is also scarcely open to question; since the established law and order provides for a resort to coercion in the enforcement of these prescriptive rights, and since both parties in interest, in this as in other cases, are persuaded of the justice of their claims. a decision either way is an intolerable iniquity in the eyes of the losing side. history teaches that in such a quarrel the recourse has always been to force. history teaches also, but with an inflection of doubt, that the outworn institution in such a conjuncture faces disestablishment. at least, so men like to believe. what the experience of history does not leave in doubt is the grave damage, discomfort and shame incident to the displacement of such an institutional discrepancy by such recourse to force. what further appears to be clear in the premises, at least to the point of a strong presumption, is that in the present case the decision, or the choice, lies between two alternatives: either the price-system and its attendant business enterprise will yield and pass out; or the pacific nations will conserve their pecuniary scheme of law and order at the cost of returning to a war footing and letting their owners preserve the rights of ownership by force of arms. the reflection obviously suggests itself that this prospect of consequences to follow from the installation of peace at large might well be taken into account beforehand by those who are aiming to work out an enduring peace. it has appeared in the course of the argument that the preservation of the present pecuniary law and order, with all its incidents of ownership and investment, is incompatible with an unwarlike state of peace and security. this current scheme of investment, business, and sabotage, should have an appreciably better chance of survival in the long run if the present conditions of warlike preparation and national insecurity were maintained, or if the projected peace were left in a somewhat problematical state, sufficiently precarious to keep national animosities alert, and thereby to the neglect of domestic interests, particularly of such interests as touch the popular well-being. on the other hand, it has also appeared that the cause of peace and its perpetuation might be materially advanced if precautions were taken beforehand to put out of the way as much as may be of those discrepancies of interest and sentiment between nations and between classes which make for dissension and eventual hostilities. so, if the projectors of this peace at large are in any degree inclined to seek concessive terms on which the peace might hopefully be made enduring, it should evidently be part of their endeavours from the outset to put events in train for the present abatement and eventual abrogation of the rights of ownership and of the price-system in which these rights take effect. a hopeful beginning along this line would manifestly be the neutralisation of all pecuniary rights of citizenship, as has been indicated in an earlier passage. on the other hand, if peace is not desired at the cost of relinquishing the scheme of competitive gain and competitive spending, the promoters of peace should logically observe due precaution and move only so far in the direction of a peaceable settlement as would result in a sufficiently unstable equilibrium of mutual jealousies; such as might expeditiously be upset whenever discontent with pecuniary affairs should come to threaten this established scheme of pecuniary prerogatives. books by thorstein veblen the theory of the leisure class the theory of business enterprise the instinct of workmanship imperial germany and the industrial revolution the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation the higher learning in america "_i know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education._" --thomas jefferson the invisible government by dan smoot [transcriber's note: although copyrighted in , the author did not renewal his copyright claim after years (which was required to retain copyright for works published before ). therefore, this text is now in the public domain. the text of the copyright notice from the original book is preserved below.] copyright by dan smoot all rights reserved first printing june, ; second printing july, ; third printing august, ; fourth printing september, ; fifth printing october, sixth printing (in pocketsize paperback) august, communists in government during world war ii formulated major policies which the truman administration followed; but when the known communists were gone, the policies continued, under eisenhower, kennedy, johnson. the unseen _they_ who took control of government during world war ii still control it. their tentacles of power are wrapped around levers of political control in washington; reach into schools, big unions, colleges, churches, civic organizations; dominate communications; have a grip on the prestige and money of big corporations. for a generation, _they_ have kept voters from effecting any changes at the polls. voters are limited to the role of choosing between parties to administer policies which _they_ formulate. _they_ are determined to convert this republic into a socialist province of a one-world socialist system. this book tells who _they_ are and how _they_ work. if enough americans had this information, our republic would be saved. please do your utmost to spread the word: order extra copies of this book and help give it wide distribution. see inside of back cover for quantity prices. published by the dan smoot report, inc. p.o. box dallas, texas table of contents foreword i chapter i history and the council chapter ii world war ii and tragic consequences chapter iii fpa-wac-ipr chapter iv committee for economic development chapter v business advisory council chapter vi advertising council chapter vii un and world government propaganda chapter viii foreign aid chapter ix more of the interlock chapter x communications media chapter xi interlocking untouchables chapter xii why? what can we do? appendix i cfr membership list appendix ii auc membership list index foreword on may , , president kennedy departed for europe and a summit meeting with khrushchev[a]. every day the presidential tour was given banner headlines; and the meeting with khrushchev was reported as an event of earth-shaking consequence. it was an important event. but a meeting which was probably far more important, and which had commanded no front-page headlines at all, ended quietly on may , the day before president and mrs. kennedy set out on their grand tour. on may , , dr. philip e. mosely, director of studies of the council on foreign relations, announced that, "prominent soviet and american citizens will hold a week-long unofficial conference on soviet-american relations in the soviet union, beginning may ." dr. mosely, a co-chairman of the american group, said that the state department had approved the meeting but that the americans involved would go as "private citizens" and would express their own views. _the new york times'_ news story on dr. mosely's announcement (may , ) read: "the importance attached by the soviet union to the meeting appears to be suggested by the fact that the soviet group will include three members of the communist party's central committee ... and one candidate member of that body.... "the meeting, to be held in the town of nizhnyaya oreanda, in the crimea, will follow the pattern of a similar unofficial meeting, in which many of the same persons participated, at dartmouth college last fall. the meetings will take place in private and there are no plans to issue an agreed statement on the subjects discussed.... "the topics to be discussed include disarmament and the guaranteeing of ... international peace, the role of the united nations in strengthening international security, the role of advanced nations in aiding under-developed countries, and the prospects for peaceful and improving soviet-united states relations. "the dartmouth conference last fall and the scheduled crimean conference originated from a suggestion made by norman cousins, editor of _the saturday review_ and co-chairman of the american group going to the crimea, when he visited the soviet union a year and a half ago.... "mr. cousins and dr. mosely formed a small american group early last year to organize the conferences. it received financial support from the ford foundation for the dartmouth conference and for travel costs to the crimean meeting. this group selected the american representatives for the two meetings. "among those who participated in the dartmouth conference were several who have since taken high posts in the kennedy administration, including dr. walt w. rostow, now an assistant to president kennedy, and george f. kennan; now united states ambassador to yugoslavia...." * * * * * the head of the soviet delegation to the meeting in the soviet union, may , , was alekesander y. korneichuk, a close personal friend of khrushchev. the american citizens scheduled to attend included besides dr. mosely and mr. cousins: _marian anderson_, the singer; _dean erwin n. griswold_, of the harvard law school; _gabriel hauge_, former economic adviser to president eisenhower and now an executive of the manufacturers trust company; _dr. margaret mead_, a widely known anthropologist whose name (like that of norman cousins) has been associated with communist front activities in the united states; _dr. a. william loos_, director of the church peace union; _stuart chase_, american author notable for his pro-socialist, anti-anti-communist attitudes; _william benton_, former u.s. senator, also well-known as a pro-socialist, anti-anti-communist, now chairman of the board of _encyclopaedia britannica_; _dr. george fisher_, of the massachusetts institute of technology; _professor paul m. doty_, _jr._, of harvard's chemistry department; _professor lloyd reynolds_, yale university economist; _professor louis b. sohn_ of the harvard law school; _dr. joseph e. johnson_, an old friend and former associate of alger hiss in the state department, who succeeded hiss as president of the carnegie endowment for international peace, and still holds that position; _professor robert r. bowie_, former head of the state department's policy planning staff (a job which hiss also held at one time), now director of the center for international affairs at harvard; and _dr. arthur larson_, former assistant to, and ghost writer for, president eisenhower. larson was often called "mr. modern republican," because the political philosophy which he espoused was precisely that of eisenhower (larson is now, , director of the world rule of law center at duke university, where his full-time preoccupation is working for repeal of the connally reservation, so that the world court can take jurisdiction over united states affairs). * * * * * i think the meeting which the council on foreign relations arranged in the soviet union, in , was more important than president kennedy's meeting with khrushchev, because i am convinced that the council on foreign relations, together with a great number of other associated tax-exempt organizations, constitutes the invisible government which sets the major policies of the federal government; exercises controlling influence on governmental officials who implement the policies; and, through massive and skillful propaganda, influences congress and the public to support the policies. i am convinced that the objective of this invisible government is to convert america into a socialist state and then make it a unit in a one-world socialist system. my convictions about the invisible government are based on information which is presented in this book. the information about membership and activities of the council on foreign relations and of its interlocking affiliates comes largely from publications issued by those organizations. i am deeply indebted to countless individuals who, when they learned of my interest, enriched my own files with material they had been collecting for years, hoping that someone would eventually use it. i have not managed to get all of the membership rosters and publications issued by all of the organizations discussed. hence, there are gaps in my information. * * * * * one aspect of the over-all subject, omitted entirely from this book, is the working relationship between internationalist groups in the united states and comparable groups abroad. the royal institute of international affairs in england (usually called chatham house) and the american council on foreign relations were both conceived at a dinner meeting in paris in . by working with the cfr, the royal institute, undoubtedly, has had profound influence on american affairs. other internationalist organizations in foreign lands which work with the american council on foreign relations, include the institut des relations internationales (belgium), danish foreign policy society, indian council of world affairs, australian institute of international affairs, and similar organizations in france, italy, yugoslavia, greece, and turkey. the "bilderbergers" are another powerful group involved in the internationalist web. the "bilderbergers" take their name from the scene of their first known meeting--the bilderberg hotel, oosterbeck, the netherlands, in may, . the group consists of influential western businessmen, diplomats, and high governmental officials. their meetings, conducted in secrecy and in a hugger-mugger atmosphere, are held about every six months at various places throughout the world. his royal highness, prince bernhard of the netherlands, has presided at every known meeting of the bilderberger group. prince bernhard is known to be an influential member of the societé generale de belgique, a mysterious organization which seems to be an association of large corporate interests from many countries. american firms associated with the society are said to be among the large corporations whose officers are members of the council on foreign relations and related organizations. i make no effort to explore this situation in this volume. my confession of limitation upon my research does not embarrass me, because two committees of congress have also failed to make a complete investigation of the great _camarilla_ which manipulates our government. and the congressional committees were trying to investigate only one part of the web--the powerful tax-exempt foundations in the united states. my own research does reveal the broad outlines of the invisible government. d.s. may, chapter history and the council president george washington, in his farewell address to the people of the united states on september , , established a foreign policy which became traditional and a main article of faith for the american people in their dealings with the rest of the world. washington warned against foreign influence in the shaping of national affairs. he urged america to avoid permanent, entangling alliances with other nations, recommending a national policy of benign neutrality toward the rest of the world. washington did not want america to build a wall around herself, or to become, in any sense, a hermit nation. washington's policy permitted freer exchange of travel, commerce, ideas, and culture between americans and other people than americans have ever enjoyed since the policy was abandoned. the father of our country wanted the american _government_ to be kept out of the wars and revolutions and political affairs of other nations. washington told americans that their nation had a high destiny, which it could not fulfill if they permitted their government to become entangled in the affairs of other nations. despite the fact of two foreign wars (mexican war, - ; and spanish american war, ) the foreign policy of washington remained the policy of this nation, _unaltered_, for years--until woodrow wilson's war message to congress in april, . * * * * * wilson himself, when campaigning for re-election in , had unequivocally supported our traditional foreign policy: his one major promise to the american people was that he would keep them out of the european war. yet, even while making this promise, wilson was yielding to a pressure he was never able to withstand: the influence of colonel edward m. house, wilson's all-powerful adviser. according to house's own papers and the historical studies of wilson's ardent admirers (see, for example, _intimate papers of colonel house_, edited by charles seymour, published in by houghton mifflin; and, _the crisis of the old order_ by arthur m. schlesinger, jr., published by houghton mifflin), house created wilson's domestic and foreign policies, selected most of wilson's cabinet and other major appointees, and ran wilson's state department. house had powerful connections with international bankers in new york. he was influential, for example, with great financial institutions represented by such people as paul and felix warburg, otto h. kahn, louis marburg, henry morgenthau, jacob and mortimer schiff, herbert lehman. house had equally powerful connections with bankers and politicians of europe. bringing all of these forces to bear, house persuaded wilson that america had an evangelistic mission to save the world for "democracy." the first major twentieth century tragedy for the united states resulted: wilson's war message to congress and the declaration of war against germany on april , . house also persuaded wilson that the way to avoid all future wars was to create a world federation of nations. on may , , in a speech to the league to enforce peace, wilson first publicly endorsed colonel house's world-government idea (without, however, identifying it as originating with house). * * * * * in september, , wilson (at the urging of house) appointed a committee of intellectuals (the first president's brain trust) to formulate peace terms and draw up a charter for world government. this committee, with house in charge, consisted of about college professors, graduate students, lawyers, economists, writers, and others. among them were men still familiar to americans in the 's: walter lippmann (columnist); norman thomas (head of the american socialist party); allen dulles (former head of c.i.a.); john foster dulles (late secretary of state); christian a. herter (former secretary of state). these eager young intellectuals around wilson, under the clear eyes of crafty colonel house, drew up their charter for world government (league of nations covenant) and prepared for the brave new socialist one-world to follow world war i. but things went sour at the paris peace conference. they soured even more when constitutionalists in the united states senate found out what was being planned and made it quite plain that the senate would not authorize united states membership in such a world federation. bitter with disappointment but not willing to give up, colonel house called together in paris, france, a group of his most dedicated young intellectuals--among them, john foster and allen dulles, christian a. herter, and tasker h. bliss--and arranged a dinner meeting with a group of like-minded englishmen at the majestic hotel, paris, on may , . the group formally agreed to form an organization "for the study of international affairs." the american group came home from paris and formed the council on foreign relations, which was incorporated in . the purpose of the council on foreign relations was to create (and condition the american people to accept) what house called a "positive" foreign policy for america--to replace the traditional "negative" foreign policy which had kept america out of the endless turmoil of old-world politics and had permitted the american people to develop their great nation in freedom and independence from the rest of the world. the council did not amount to a great deal until , when the rockefeller family (through the various rockefeller foundations and funds) began to pour money into it. before long, the carnegie foundations (and later the ford foundation) began to finance the council. in , the council (largely with rockefeller gifts) acquired its present headquarters property: the harold pratt house, east th street, new york city. in , the council began taking over the u.s. state department. shortly after the start of world war ii, in september, , hamilton fish armstrong and walter h. mallory, of the council on foreign relations, visited the state department to offer the services of the council. it was agreed that the council would do research and make recommendations for the state department, without formal assignment or responsibility. the council formed groups to work in four general fields--security and armaments problems, economic and financial problems, political problems, and territorial problems. the rockefeller foundation agreed to finance, through grants, the operation of this plan. in february, , the council on foreign relations' relationship with the state department changed. the state department created the division of special research, which was divided into economic, security, political, territorial sections. leo pasvolsky, of the council, was appointed director of this division. within a very short time, members of the council on foreign relations dominated this new division in the state department. during , the state department set up the advisory committee on postwar foreign policy. secretary of state cordell hull was chairman. the following members of the council on foreign relations were on this committee: under secretary of state sumner welles (vice-chairman), dr. leo pasvolsky (executive officer); hamilton fish armstrong, isaiah bowman, benjamin v. cohen, norman h. davis, and james t. shotwell. other members of the council also found positions in the state department: philip e. mosely, walter e. sharp, and grayson kirk, among others. the crowning moment of achievement for the council came at san francisco in , when over members of the united states delegation to the organizational meeting of the united nations (where the united nations charter was written) were members of the council. among them: alger hiss, secretary of state edward r. stettinius, leo pasvolsky, john foster dulles, john j. mccloy, julius c. holmes, nelson a. rockefeller, adlai stevenson, joseph e. johnson, ralph j. bunche, clark m. eichelberger, and thomas k. finletter. by , the council on foreign relations, and various foundations and other organizations interlocked with it, had virtually taken over the u.s. state department. some cfr members were later identified as soviet espionage agents: for example, alger hiss and lauchlin currie. other council on foreign relations members--owen lattimore, for example--with powerful influence in the roosevelt and truman administrations, were subsequently identified, not as actual communists or soviet espionage agents, but as "conscious, articulate instruments of the soviet international conspiracy." i do not intend to imply by these citations that the council on foreign relations is, or ever was, a communist organization. boasting among its members presidents of the united states (hoover, eisenhower, and kennedy), secretaries of state, and many other high officials, both civilian and military, the council can be termed, by those who agree with its objectives, a "patriotic" organization. the fact, however, that communists, soviet espionage agents, and pro-communists could work inconspicuously for many years as influential members of the council indicates something very significant about the council's objectives. the ultimate aim of the council on foreign relations (however well-intentioned its prominent and powerful members may be) is the same as the ultimate aim of international communism: to create a one-world socialist system and make the united states an official part of it. some indication of the influence of cfr members can be found in the boasts of their best friends. consider the remarkable case of the nomination and confirmation of julius c. holmes as united states ambassador to iran. holmes was one of the cfr members who served as united states delegates to the united nations founding conference at san francisco in . mr. holmes has had many important jobs in the state department since ; but from to , he was out of government service. during that early postwar period, the united states government had approximately merchant marine oil tankers (built and used during world war ii) which had become surplus. a law of congress prohibited the government from selling the surplus vessels to foreign-owned or foreign-controlled companies, and prohibited any american company from purchasing them for resale to foreigners. the purpose of the law was to guarantee that oil tankers (vital in times of war) would remain under the control of the united states government. julius holmes conceived the idea of making a quick profit by buying and selling some of the surplus tankers. holmes was closely associated with edward stettinius, former secretary of state, and with two of stettinius' principal advisers: joe casey, a former u.s. congressman; and stanley klein, a new york financier. in august, , this group formed a corporation (and ultimately formed others) to buy surplus oil tankers from the government. the legal and technical maneuvering which followed is complex and shady, but it has all been revealed and reported by congressional committees. holmes and his associates managed to buy eight oil tankers from the u.s. government and re-sell all of them to foreign interests, in violation of the intent of the law and of the surplus-disposal program. one of the eight tankers was ultimately leased to the soviet union and used to haul fuel oil from communist romania to the chinese reds during the korean war. by the time he returned to foreign service with the state department in september, , holmes had made for himself an estimated profit of about one million dollars, with practically no investment of his own money, and at no financial risk. a senate subcommittee, which, in , investigated this affair, unanimously condemned the holmes-casey-klein tanker deals as "morally wrong and clearly in violation of the intent of the law," and as a "highly improper, if not actually illegal, get-rich-quick" operation which was detrimental to the interests of the united states. holmes and his associates were criminally indicted in --but the department of justice dismissed the indictments on a legal technicality later that same year. a few weeks after the criminal indictment against holmes had been dismissed, president eisenhower, in , nominated julius c. holmes to be our ambassador to iran. enough united states senators in expressed a decent sense of outrage about the nomination of such a man for such a post that holmes "permitted" his name to be withdrawn, before the senate acted on the question of confirming his appointment. the state department promptly sent holmes to tangier with the rank of minister; brought him back to washington in as a special assistant to the secretary of state; and sent him out as minister and consul general in hong kong and macao in . and then, in , kennedy nominated julius c. holmes for the same job eisenhower had tried to give him in --ambassador to iran. arguing in favor of holmes, senator prescott bush admitted that holmes' tanker deals were improper and ill-advised, but claimed that holmes was an innocent victim of sharp operators! the "innocent" victim made a million dollars in one year by being victimized. he has never offered to make restitution to the government. moreover, when questioned, in april, , holmes said he still sees nothing wrong with what he did and admits he would do it again if he had the opportunity--and felt that no congressional committee would ever investigate. all senators, who supported holmes in debate, hammered the point that, although holmes may have done something shady and unsavory during the three-year period in the late 's when he was _out_ of government service, there was no evidence that he had ever misbehaved while he was _in_ government service. this amoral attitude seems to imply that a known chicken thief cannot be considered a threat to turkey growers, unless he has actually been caught stealing turkeys. senate debates on the confirmation of holmes as ambassador to iran are printed in the _congressional record_: pp. - , april , ; pp. - , may , ; and pp. - , may , . the vote was taken on may . after the history of julius c. holmes had been thoroughly exposed, the senate confirmed holmes' nomination to , with senators taking no stand. julius c. holmes was sworn in as united states ambassador to iran on may , . the real reason why holmes was nominated for an important ambassadorship by two presidents and finally confirmed by the senate is obvious--and was, indeed, inadvertently revealed by senator prescott bush: holmes, a council on foreign relations member, is a darling of the leftwing internationalists who are determined to drag america into a socialist one-world system. during the senate debate about holmes' nomination senator bush said: "i believe that one of the most telling witnesses with whom i have ever talked regarding mr. holmes is mr. henry wriston, formerly president of brown university, now chairman of the council on foreign relations, in new york, and chairman of the american assembly. mr. wriston not only holds these distinguished offices, but he has also made a special study of the state department and the career service in the state department. "he is credited with having 'wristonized' the foreign service of the united states. he told me a few years ago ... [that] 'julius holmes is the ablest man in the foreign service corps of the united states.'" dr. wriston was (in ) president (not chairman, as senator bush called him) of the council on foreign relations. but senator bush was not exaggerating or erring when he said that the state department has been _wristonized_--if we acknowledge that the state department has been converted into an agency of dr. wriston's council on foreign relations. indeed, the senator could have said that the united states government has been _wristonized_. here, for example, are _some_ of the members of the council on foreign relations who, in , held positions in the united states government: john f. kennedy, president; dean rusk, secretary of state; douglas dillon, secretary of the treasury; adlai stevenson, united nations ambassador; allen w. dulles, director of the central intelligence agency; chester bowles, under secretary of state; w. averell harriman, ambassador-at-large; john j. mccloy, disarmament administrator; general lyman l. lemnitzer, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; john kenneth galbraith, ambassador to india; edward r. murrow, head of united states information agency; g. frederick reinhardt, ambassador to italy; david k. e. bruce, ambassador to united kingdom; livingston t. merchant, ambassador to canada; lt. gen. james m. gavin, ambassador to france; george f. kennan, ambassador to yugoslavia; julius c. holmes, ambassador to iran; arthur h. dean, head of the united states delegation to geneva disarmament conference; arthur m. schlesinger, jr., special white house assistant; edwin o. reischauer, ambassador to japan; thomas k. finletter, ambassador to the north atlantic treaty organization for economic co-operation and development; george c. mcghee, assistant secretary of state for policy planning; henry r. labouisse, director of international cooperation administration; george w. ball, under secretary of state for economic affairs; mcgeorge bundy, special assistant for national security; paul h. nitze, assistant secretary of defense; adolf a. berle, chairman, inter-departmental committee on latin america; charles e. bohlen, assistant secretary of state. the names listed do not, by any means, constitute a complete roster of all council members who are in the congress or hold important positions in the administration. in the - annual report of the council on foreign relations, there is an item of information which reveals a great deal about the close relationship between the council and the executive branch of the federal government. on page , the report explains why there had been an unusually large recent increase in the number of non-resident members (cfr members who do not reside within miles of new york city hall): "the rather large increase in the non-resident academic category is largely explained by the fact that many academic members have left new york to join the new administration." * * * * * concerning president kennedy's membership in the cfr, there is an interesting story. on june , , mr. kennedy, then a united states senator, wrote a letter answering a question about his membership in the council. mr. kennedy said: "i am a member of the council on foreign relations in new york city. as a long-time subscriber to the quarterly, foreign affairs, and as a member of the senate, i was invited to become a member." on august , , mr. george s. franklin, jr., executive director of the council on foreign relations, wrote a letter answering a question about president kennedy's membership. mr. franklin said: "i am enclosing the latest annual report of the council with a list of members in the back. you will note that president eisenhower is a member, but this is not true of either president kennedy or president truman." president kennedy is not listed as a member in the - annual report of the cfr. the complete roster of cfr members, as set out in the - annual report, is in appendix i of this volume. several persons, besides president kennedy, whom i have called cfr members are not on this roster. i have called them cfr members, if their names have ever appeared on _any_ official cfr membership list. the council is actually a small organization. its membership is restricted to resident members (american citizens whose residences or places of business are within miles of city hall in new york city), and non-resident members (american citizens who reside or do business outside that -mile radius); but most of the members occupy important positions in government, in education, in the press, in the broadcasting industry, in business, in finance, or in some multi-million-dollar tax-exempt foundation. an indication of overall accomplishments of the council can be found in its annual report of - , which reprints a speech by walter h. mallory on the occasion of his retiring after years as executive director of the council. speaking to the board of directors of the council at a small dinner in his honor on may , , mr. mallory said: "when i cast my mind back to , the year that i first joined the council, it seems little short of a miracle that the organization could have taken root in those days. you will remember that the united states had decided not to join the league of nations.... on the domestic front, the budget was extremely small, taxes were light ... and we didn't even recognize the russians. what could there possibly be for a council on foreign relations to do? "well, there were a few men who did not feel content with that comfortable isolationist climate. they thought the united states had an important role to play in the world and they resolved to try to find out what that role ought to be. some of those men are present this evening." the council's principal publication is a quarterly magazine, _foreign affairs_. indeed, publishing this quarterly is the council's major activity; and income from the publication is a principal source of revenue for the council. on june , , _foreign affairs_ had a circulation of only , ; but it is probably the most influential publication in the world. key figures in government--from the secretary of state downward--write articles for, and announce new policies in, _foreign affairs_. other publications of the council include three volumes which it publishes annually (_political handbook of the world_, _the united states in world affairs_ and _documents on american foreign relations_), and numerous special studies and books. the council's financial statement for the - fiscal year listed the following income: membership dues $ , council development fund $ , committees development fund $ , corporation service $ , foundation grants $ , net income from investments $ , net receipt from sale of books $ , _foreign affairs_ subscriptions and sales $ , _foreign affairs_ advertising $ , miscellaneous $ , --------- total $ , "corporation service" on this list means money contributed to the council by business firms. here are firms listed as contributors to the council during the - fiscal year: aluminum limited, inc. american can company american metal climax, inc. american telephone and telegraph company arabian american oil company armco international corporation asiatic petroleum corporation bankers trust company belgian securities corporation bethlehem steel company, inc. brown brothers, harriman and co. cabot corporation california texas oil corp. cameron iron works, inc. campbell soup company the chase manhattan bank chesebrough-pond's inc. chicago bridge and iron co. cities service company, inc. connecticut general life insurance company continental can company continental oil company corn products company corning glass works dresser industries, inc. ethyl corporation i. i. du pont de nemours & co., inc. farrell lines, inc. the first national city bank of new york ford motor company, international division foster wheeler corporation freeport sulphur company general dynamics corporation general motors overseas operations the gillette company w. r. grace and co. gulf oil corporation halliburton oil well cementing company haskins and sells h. j. heinz company hughes tool company ibm world trade corporation international general electric company the international nickel company, inc. international telephone and telegraph corporation irving trust company the m. w. kellogg company kidder, peabody and co. carl m. loeb, rhoades and co. the lummus company merck and company, inc. mobil international oil co. model, roland and stone the national cash register co. national lead company, inc. the new york times the ohio oil co., inc. olin mathieson chemical corporation otis elevator company owens-corning fiberglas corporation pan american airways system pfizer international, inc. radio corporation of america the rand corporation san jacinto petroleum corporation j. henry schroder banking corporation sinclair oil corporation the singer manufacturing company sprague electric company standard oil company of california standard oil company (n. j.) standard-vacuum oil company stauffer chemical company symington wayne corporation texaco, inc. texas gulf sulphur company texas instruments, inc. tidewater oil company time, inc. union tank car company united states lines company united states steel corporation white, weld and co. wyandotte chemicals corporation what do these corporations get for the money contributed to the council on foreign relations? from the - annual report of the council: "subscribers to the council's corporation service (who pay a minimum fee of $ , ) are entitled to several privileges. among them are (a) free consultation with members of the council's staff on problems of foreign policy, (b) access to the council's specialized library on international affairs, including its unique collection of magazine and press clippings, (c) copies of all council publications and six subscriptions to _foreign affairs_ for officers of the company or its library, (d) an off-the-record dinner, held annually for chairmen and presidents of subscribing companies at which a prominent speaker discusses some outstanding issue of united states foreign policy, and (e) two annual series of seminars for business executives appointed by their companies. these seminars are led by widely experienced americans who discuss various problems of american political or economic foreign policy." _all_ speakers at the council's dinner meetings and seminars for business executives are leading advocates of internationalism and the total state. many of them, in fact, are important officials in government. the ego-appeal is enormous to businessmen, who get special off-the-record briefings from cabinet officers and other officials close to the president of the united states. the briefings and the seminar lectures are consistently designed to elicit the support of businessmen for major features of administration policy. for example, during and , the three issues of major importance to both presidents eisenhower and kennedy were disarmament, the declining value of the american dollar, and the tariff-and-trade problem. the eisenhower and kennedy positions on these three issues were virtually identical; and the solutions they urged meshed with the internationalist program of pushing america into a one-world socialist system. the business executives who attended cfr briefings and seminars in the - fiscal year received expert indoctrination in the internationalist position on the three major issues of that year. from "seminars for business executives," pages - of the - annual report of the council on foreign relations: "the fall seminar ... was brought to a close with an appraisal of disarmament negotiations, past and present, by edmund a. gullion, then acting deputy director, united states disarmament administration.... "'the international position of the dollar' was the theme of the spring seminar series. robert triffin, professor of economics at yale university, spoke on the present balance of payments situation at the opening session. at the second meeting, william diebold, jr., director of economic studies at the council, addressed the group on united states foreign trade policy. the third meeting dealt with foreign investment and the balance of payments. august maffry, vice president of the irving trust company, was discussion leader.... "on june , george w. ball, under secretary of state for economic affairs, spoke at the annual corporation service dinner for presidents and board chairmen of participating companies.... secretary ball [discussed] the foreign economic policy of the new kennedy administration." george w. ball was, for several years, a registered lobbyist in washington, representing foreign commercial interests. he is a chief architect of president kennedy's tariff-and-trade proposals--which would internationalize american trade and commerce, as a prelude to amalgamating our economy with that of other nations. in - , leading corporations contributed , tax-exempt dollars to the council on foreign relations for the privilege of having their chief officers exposed to the propaganda of international socialism. a principal activity of the council is its meetings, according to the - annual report: "during - , the council's program of meetings continued to place emphasis on small, roundtable meetings.... of the meetings held during the year, were roundtables.... the balance of the meetings program was made up of the more traditional large afternoon or dinner sessions for larger groups of council members. in the course of the year, the council convened such meetings for premier castro; first deputy premier mikoyan; secretary-general dag hammarskjold...." the council's annual report lists all of the meetings and "distinguished" speakers for which it convened the meetings. it is an amazing list. although the council has tax-exemption as an organization to study international affairs and, presumably, to help the public arrive at a better understanding of united states foreign policy, not one speaker for any council meeting represented traditional u. s. policy. every one was a known advocate of leftwing internationalism. a surprising number of them were known communists or communist sympathizers or admitted socialists. kwame nkrumah, prime minister of ghana, who is widely believed to be a communist; who is admittedly socialist; and who aligned his nation with the soviets--spoke to the council on "free africa," with w. averell harriman presiding. mahmoud fawzi, minister of foreign affairs of the united arab republic, a socialist whose hatred of the united states is rather well known, spoke to the council on "middle east." herbert l. matthews, a member of the editorial board of _the new york times_ (whose articles on castro as the robin hood of cuba built that communist hoodlum a worldwide reputation and helped him conquer cuba) spoke to the council _twice_, once on "a political appraisal of latin american affairs," and once on "the castro regime." m. c. chagla, ambassador of india to the united states, a socialist, spoke to the council on "indian foreign policy." anastas i. mikoyan, first deputy premier, ussr, spoke to the council on "issues in soviet-american relations," with john j. mccloy (later kennedy's disarmament administrator) presiding. fidel castro spoke to the council on "cuba and the united states." here are some other well-known socialists who spoke to the council on foreign relations during the - year: dag hammarskjold, secretary-general of the united nations; per jacobsson, managing director of the international monetary fund; abba eban, ambassador of israel to the united states; willy brandt, mayor of west berlin; stanley de zoysa, minister of finance of ceylon; mortarji desai, minister of finance of india; victor urquidi, president of mexican economic society; fritz erler, co-chairman of the socialist group in the german bundestag; tom mboya, member of the kenya legislative council; sir grantley h. adams, prime minister of the west indies federation; theodore kollek, director-general of the office of the prime minister of israel; dr. gikomyo w. kiano, member of the kenya legislative council. officials of communist governments, in addition to those already listed, who spoke to the council that year, included oscar lange, vice-president of the state council of the polish people's republic; and marko nikezic, ambassador of yugoslavia to the united states. * * * * * throughout this book, i show the close inter-locking connection between the council on foreign relations and many other organizations. the only organizations formally affiliated with the council, however, are the committees on foreign relations, which the council created, which it controls, and which exist in cities: albuquerque, atlanta, birmingham, boise, boston, casper, charlottesville, denver, des moines, detroit, houston, indianapolis, little rock, los angeles, louisville, nashville, omaha, philadelphia, portland (maine), portland (oregon), providence, st. louis, st. paul-minneapolis, salt lake city, san francisco, seattle, tucson, tulsa, wichita, worcester. a booklet entitled _committees on foreign relations: directory of members, january, _, published by the council on foreign relations, contains a roster of members of all the committees on foreign relations, except the one at casper, wyoming, which was not organized until later in . the booklet also gives a brief history of the committees: "in , with the financial assistance of the carnegie corporation of new york, the council began to organize affiliated discussion groups in a few american cities.... "each committee is composed of forty or more men who are leaders in the professions and occupations of their area--representatives of business, the law, universities and schools, the press, and so on. about once a month, from october through may, members come together for dinner and an evening of discussion with a guest speaker of special competence.... since the beginning in , the carnegie corporation of new york has continued to make annual grants in support of the committee program." the following information about the committees on foreign relations is from the - annual report of the council on foreign relations: "during the past season the foreign relations committees carried on their customary programs of private dinner meetings. in all, meetings were held.... "the council arranged or figured in the arrangement of about three-quarters of the meetings held, the other sessions being undertaken upon the initiative of the committees. attendance at the discussions averaged persons, slightly more than in previous years and about the maximum number for good discussion. there was little change in membership--the total being just under . it will be recalled that this membership consists of men who are leaders in the various professions and occupations.... "on june and , the rd annual conference of committee representatives was held at the harold pratt house. mounting pressures throughout the year ... made it advisable to plan a conference program that would facilitate re-examination of the strategic uses of the united nations for american policy in the years ahead. accordingly, the conference theme was designated as _united states policy and the united nations_. emphasis was upon re-appraisal of the united states national interest in the united nations--and the cost of sustaining that interest.... "in the course of the year, officers and members of the council and of the staff visited most of the committees for the purpose of leading discussions at meetings, supervising committee procedures and seeking the strengthening of committee relations with the council." chapter world war ii and tragic consequences although the council on foreign relations had almost gained controlling influence on the government of the united states as early as , it had failed to indoctrinate the american people for acceptance of what colonel house had called a "positive" foreign policy. in , franklin d. roosevelt (although eager to get the united states into the second world war and already making preparations for that tragedy) had to campaign for re-election with the same promise that wilson had made in --to keep us out of the european war. even as late as the day before the japanese attack on pearl harbor in december, , the american people were still overwhelmingly "isolationist"--a word which internationalists use as a term of contempt but which means merely that the american people were still devoted to their nation's traditional foreign policy. it was necessary for roosevelt to take steps which the public would not notice or understand but which would inescapably involve the nation in the foreign war. when enough such sly involvement had been manipulated, there would come, eventually, some incident to push us over the brink into open participation. then, any american who continued to advocate our traditional foreign policy of benign neutrality would be an object of public hatred, would be investigated and condemned by officialdom as a "pro-nazi," and possibly prosecuted for sedition. * * * * * the council on foreign relations has heavy responsibility for the maneuvering which thus dragged america into world war ii. one major step which roosevelt took toward war (at precisely the time when he was campaigning for his third-term re-election on a platform of peace and neutrality to keep america out of war) was his radical alteration of traditional concepts of united states policy in order to declare greenland under the protection of our monroe doctrine. the council on foreign relations officially boasts full responsibility for this fateful step toward war. on pages and of a book entitled _the council on foreign relations: a record of twenty-five years, - _ (written by officials of the council and published by the council on january , ) are these passages: "one further example may be cited of the way in which ideas and recommendations originating at council meetings have entered into the stream of official discussion and action. "on march , , a council group completed a confidential report which pointed out the strategic importance of greenland for transatlantic aviation and for meteorological observations. the report stated: "'the possibility must be considered that denmark might be overrun by germany. in such case, greenland might be transferred by treaty to german sovereignty.' "it also pointed out the possible danger to the united states in such an eventuality, and mentioned that greenland lies within the geographical sphere 'within which the monroe doctrine is presumed to apply.' "shortly after this, one of the members of the group which had prepared the report was summoned to the white house. president roosevelt had a copy of the memorandum in his hand and said that he had turned to his visitor for advice because of his part in raising the question of greenland's strategic importance. "germany invaded denmark on april , . at his press conference three days later, the president stated that he was satisfied that greenland was a part of the american continent. after a visit to the white house on the same day, the danish minister said that he agreed with the president. "on april , , an agreement was signed between the united states and denmark which provided for assistance by the united states to greenland in the maintenance of its status, and granted to the united states the right to locate and construct such airplane landing-fields, seaplane facilities, and radio and meteorological installations as might be necessary for the defense of greenland, and for the defense of the american continent. this was eight months before germany declared war on the united states. "the council's report on greenland was only one item in an extensive research project which offered an unusual instance of wartime collaboration between government agencies and a private institution.... the project ... exhibited the kind of contribution which the council has been uniquely equipped to provide...." * * * * * the danish colony of greenland--a huge island covered by polar ice--lies in the arctic ocean, miles off the coast of denmark. it is miles from canada, miles from the british isles. the extreme southwestern tip of greenland is miles from the most extreme northeastern tip of the united states (maine). in other words, canada and england, which were at war with germany when we undertook to protect greenland from germany, are both much closer to greenland than the united states is. but history gives better proof than geography does, that the learned council members who put greenland in the western hemisphere, within the meaning of the monroe doctrine, were either ignorant or dishonest. the monroe doctrine, closing the western hemisphere to further european colonization, was proclaimed in . denmark, a european nation, colonized greenland, proclaiming sole sovereignty in , without any hint of protest from the united states that this european colonization infringed upon the monroe doctrine. * * * * * members of the council on foreign relations played a key role in getting america into world war ii. they played _the_ role in creating the basic policies which this nation has followed since the end of world war ii. these policies are accomplishing: ( ) the redistribution to other nations of the great united states reserve of gold which made our dollar the strongest currency in the world; ( ) the building up of the industrial capacity of other nations, at our expense, thus eliminating our pre-eminent productive superiority; ( ) the taking away of world markets from united states producers (and even much of their domestic market) until capitalistic america will no longer dominate world trade; ( ) the entwining of american affairs--economic, political, cultural, social, educational, and even religious--with those of other nations until the united states will no longer have an independent policy, either domestic or foreign: until we can not return to our traditional foreign policy of maintaining national independence, nor to free private capitalism as an economic system. the ghastly wartime and post-war decisions (which put the soviet union astride the globe like a menacing colossus and placed the incomparably stronger united states in the position of appeasing and retreating) can be traced to persons who were members of the council on foreign relations. consider a specific example: the explosive german problem. * * * * * in october, , cordell hull (u. s. secretary of state), anthony eden (foreign minister for great britain), and v. molotov (soviet commissar for foreign affairs), had a conference at moscow. eden suggested that they create a european advisory commission which would decide how germany, after defeat, would be partitioned, occupied, and governed by the three victorious powers. molotov approved. hull did not like the idea, but agreed to it in deference to the wishes of the two others. philip e. mosely, of the cfr, was hull's special adviser at this moscow conference. the next month, november, , president franklin d. roosevelt went to tehran for his first conference with stalin and churchill. aboard the u. s. s. _iowa_ en route to tehran, roosevelt had a conference with his joint chiefs of staff. they discussed, among other things, the post-war division and occupation of germany. president roosevelt predicted that germany would collapse suddenly and that "there would definitely be a race for berlin" by the three great powers. the president said: "we may have to put the united states divisions into berlin as soon as possible, because the united states should have berlin." harry hopkins suggested that "we be ready to put an airborne division into berlin two hours after the collapse of germany." roosevelt wanted the united states to occupy berlin and northwestern germany; the british to occupy france, belgium, and southern germany; and the soviets to have eastern germany. at the tehran conference (november -december , ), stalin seemed singularly indifferent to the question of which power would occupy which zones of germany after the war. stalin revealed intense interest in only three topics: ( ) urging the western allies to make a frontal assault, across the english channel, on hitler's fortress europe; ( ) finding out, immediately, the name of the man whom the western allies would designate to command such an operation (eisenhower had not yet been selected); and ( ) reducing the whole of europe to virtual impotence so that the soviet union would be the only major power on the continent after the war. roosevelt approved of every proposal stalin made. a broad outline of the behavior and proposals of roosevelt, churchill, and stalin at tehran can be found in the diplomatic papers published in by the state department, in a volume entitled _foreign relations of the united states: diplomatic papers: the conferences at cairo and tehran _. as to specific agreements on the postwar division and occupation of germany, the tehran papers reveal only that the european advisory commission would work out the details. we know that roosevelt and his military advisers in november, , agreed that america should take and occupy berlin. yet, months later, we did just the opposite. * * * * * in the closing days of world war ii, the american ninth army was rolling toward berlin, meeting little resistance, slowed down only by german civilians clogging the highways, fleeing from the russians. german soundtrucks were circulating in the berlin area, counseling stray troops to stop resistance and surrender to the americans. some twenty or thirty miles east of berlin, the german nation had concentrated its dying strength and was fighting savagely against the russians. our ninth army could have been in berlin within a few hours, probably without shedding another drop of blood; but general eisenhower suddenly halted our army. he kept it sitting idly outside berlin for days, while the russians slugged their way in, killing, raping, ravaging. we gave the russians control of the eastern portion of berlin--and of _all_ the territory surrounding the city. to the south, general patton's forces were plowing into czechoslovakia. when patton was thirty miles from prague, the capital, general eisenhower ordered him to stop--ordered him not to accept surrender of german soldiers, but to hold them at bay until the russians could move up and accept surrender. as soon as the russians were thus established as the conquerors of czechoslovakia, eisenhower ordered patton to evacuate. units of czechoslovakian patriots had been fighting with western armies since . we had promised them that they could participate in the liberation of their own homeland; but we did not let them move into czechoslovakia until after the russians had taken over. czechoslovakian and american troops had to ask the soviets for permission to come into prague for a victory celebration--after the russians had been permitted to conquer the country. western armies, under eisenhower's command, rounded up an estimated five million anti-communist refugees and delivered them to the soviets who tortured them, sent them to slave camps, or murdered them. all of this occurred because we refused to do what would have been easy for us to do--and what our top leaders had agreed just months before that we must do: that is, take and hold berlin and surrounding territory until postwar peace treaties were made. * * * * * who made the decisions to pull our armies back in europe and let the soviets take over? general eisenhower gave the orders; and, in his book, _crusade in europe_ (published in , before the awful consequences of those decisions were fully known to the public), eisenhower took his share of credit for making the decisions. when he entered politics four years later, eisenhower denied responsibility: he claimed that he was merely a soldier, obeying orders, implementing decisions which presidents roosevelt and truman had made. memoirs of british military men indicate that eisenhower went far _beyond_ the call of military duty in his "co-operative" efforts to help the soviets capture political prisoner's and enslave all of central europe. _triumph in the west_, by arthur bryant, published in by doubleday & company, as a "history of the war years based on the diaries of field-marshal lord alanbrooke, chief of the imperial general staff," reveals that, in the closing days of the war, general eisenhower was often in direct communication with stalin, reporting his decisions and actions to the soviet dictator before eisenhower's own military superiors knew what was going on. regardless of what responsibility general eisenhower may or may not have had for _formulating_ the decisions which held our armies back from eastern europe, those decisions seem to have stemmed from the conferences which roosevelt had with stalin at tehran in and at yalta in . * * * * * but who made the decision to isolate berlin miles deep inside communist-controlled territory without any agreements concerning access routes by which the western powers could get to the city? according to arthur krock, of the _new york times_, george f. kennan, (a member of the council on foreign relations) persuaded roosevelt to accept the berlin zoning arrangement. kennan, at the time, was political adviser to ambassador john g. winant, who was the united states representative on the three-member european advisory commission. mr. krock's account (in the _new york times_, june , and july , ) is rather involved; but here is the essence of it: president roosevelt and prime minister churchill agreed to enclose berlin miles within the soviet occupation zone. winant submitted a recommendation, embracing this agreement. winant felt that it would offend the soviets if we asked for guaranteed access routes, and believed that guarantees were unnecessary anyway. when submitting his recommendation to washington, however, winant attached a map on which a specific allied corridor of access into the city was drawn. winant's proposal was never acted on in washington. therefore, the british submitted a recommendation. roosevelt rejected the british plan, and made his own proposal. the british and soviets disliked roosevelt's plan; and negotiations over the zoning of berlin were deadlocked. george f. kennan broke the deadlock by going directly to roosevelt and persuading him to accept the berlin zoning agreement, which mr. krock calls a "war-breeding monstrosity," and a "witless travesty on statecraft and military competence." mr. krock says most of his information came from one of philip e. mosely's articles in an old issue of _foreign affairs_--which i have been unable to get for my files. i cannot, therefore, guarantee the authenticity of mr. krock's account; but i can certainly agree with his conclusion that only joseph stalin and international communism benefitted from the "incredible zoning agreements" that placed "berlin miles within the soviet zone and reserved no guaranteed access routes to the city from the british and american zones." it is interesting to note that philip e. mosely (cfr member who was cordell hull's adviser when the postwar division of germany was first discussed at the moscow conference in ) succeeded george f. kennan as political adviser to john g. winant of the european advisory commission shortly after kennan had persuaded roosevelt to accept the berlin zoning agreements. * * * * * it is easy to see why the soviets wanted the berlin arrangement which roosevelt gave them. it is not difficult to see the british viewpoint: squeezed between the two giants who were his allies, churchill tried to play the soviets against the americans, in the interest of getting the most he could for the future trade and commerce of england. but why would any american want (or, under any conditions, agree to) the crazy berlin agreement? there are only three possible answers: ( ) the americans who set up the berlin arrangement--which means, specifically, george f. kennan and philip e. mosely, representing the council on foreign relations--were ignorant fools; or ( ) they _wanted_ to make berlin a powder keg which the soviets could use, at will, to intimidate the west; or ( ) they wanted a permanent, ready source of war which the united states government could use, at any time, to salvage its own internationalist policies from criticism at home, by scaring the american people into "buckling down" and "tightening up" for "unity" behind our "courageous president" who is "calling the kremlin bluff" by spending to prepare this nation for all-out war, if necessary, to "defend the interests of the free-world" in berlin. george f. kennan and philip e. mosely and the other men associated with them in the council on foreign relations are not ignorant fools. i do not believe they are traitors who wanted to serve the interests of the kremlin. so, in trying to assess their motives, i am left with one choice: they wanted to set berlin up as a perpetual excuse for any kind of program which the council on foreign relations might want the american government to adopt. long, long ago, king henry of england told prince hal that the way to run a country and keep the people from being too critical of how you run it, is to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels. a study of president kennedy's july , , speech to the nation about berlin, together with an examination of the spending program which he recommended to congress a few hours later, plus a review of contemporary accounts of how the stampeded congress rushed to give the president all he asked--such a study, set against the backdrop of our refusal to do anything vigorous with regard to the communist menace in cuba, will, i think, justify my conclusions as to the motives of men, still in power, who created the berlin situation. chapter fpa--world affairs council--ipr through many interlocking organizations, the council on foreign relations "educates" the public--and brings pressures upon congress--to support cfr policies. all organizations, in this incredible propaganda web, work in their own way toward the objective of the council on foreign relations: to create a one-world socialist system and to make america a part of it. all of the organizations have federal tax-exemption as "educational" groups; and they are all financed, in part, by tax-exempt foundations, the principal ones being ford, rockefeller, and carnegie. most of them also have close working relations with official agencies of the united states government. the cfr does not have formal affiliation--and can therefore disclaim official connection with--its subsidiary propaganda agencies (except the committees on foreign relations, organized by the cfr in cities throughout the united states); but the real and effective interlock between all these groups can be shown not only by their common objective (one-world socialism) and a common source of income (the foundations), but also by the overlapping of personnel: directors and officials of the council on foreign relations are also officials in the interlocking organizations. * * * * * the foreign policy association-world affairs center, east th street, new york , new york, is probably the most influential of all the agencies which can be shown as propaganda affiliates of the council on foreign relations in matters concerned primarily with american foreign policy. on april , , the march-april term grand jury of fulton county, georgia, handed down a presentment concerning subversive materials in schools, which said: "an extensive investigation has been made by the jury into the foreign policy association of new york city and its 'great decisions program,' which it is sponsoring in our area.... "this matter was brought to our attention by the americanism committee of the waldo m. slaton post , american legion, and several other local patriotic groups. we were informed that the great decisions program was being taught in our public high schools and by various well-meaning civic and religious groups, who were not aware of the past records of the leaders of the foreign policy association, nor of the authors of the textbooks prescribed for this great decisions program. "evidence was presented to us showing that some of these leaders and authors had a long record, dating back many years, in which they either belonged to, or actively supported left-wing or subversive organizations. "we further found that invitations to participate in these 'study groups' were being mailed throughout our county under the name of one of our local universities.... we learned that the prescribed booklets were available upon request in our local public libraries.... "the range of the activity by this organization has reached alarming proportions in the schools and civic groups in certain other areas in georgia. its spread is a matter of deep concern to this jury and we, therefore, call upon all school officials throughout the state to be particularly alert to this insidious and subversive material. we further recommend that all textbook committee members--city, county and state--recognize the undesirable features of this material and take action to remove it from our schools. "finally, we urge that all grand juries throughout the state of georgia give matters of this nature their serious consideration." on june , , the may-june term grand jury of fulton county, georgia, handed down another presentment, which said: "it is our understanding that the foreign policy association's great decisions program, criticized by the march-april grand jury, fulton county, has been removed from the atlanta and fulton county schools.... "numerous letters from all over the united states have been received by this grand jury, from individuals and associations, commending the presentment of the previous grand jury on the foreign policy association. not a single letter has been received by us criticizing these presentments." in september, , the americanism committee of waldo m. slaton post no. , the american legion, powers ferry road, n.w., atlanta , georgia, published a -page mimeographed book entitled _the truth about the foreign policy association_ (available directly from the post at $ . per copy). in the foreword to this book, the americanism committee says: "how can we account for our apathetic acceptance of the presence of this arch-murderer (khrushchev, during his tour of the united states at eisenhower's invitation) in america? what has so dulled our sense of moral values that we could look on without revulsion while he was being wined and dined by our officials? how could we dismiss with indifference the shameful spectacle of these officials posing for pictures with this grinning russian assassin--pictures which we knew he would use to prove to communism's enslaved populations that the americans are no longer their friends, but the friends of khrushchev? "there is only one explanation for this lapse from the americanism of former days: we are being brainwashed into the belief that we can safely do business with communism--brainwashed by an interlocked group of so-called 'educational' organizations offering 'do-it-yourself' courses which pretend to instruct the public in the intricacies of foreign policy, but which actually mask clever propaganda operations designed to sell 'co-existence' to americans. there are many of these propaganda outfits working to undermine americans' faith in america, but none, in our opinion, is as slick or as smooth or as dangerous as the foreign policy association of russian-born vera micheles dean.... "this documented handbook has been prepared in response to numerous requests for duplicates of the file which formed the basis of the case (before the fulton county grand juries) against the foreign policy association. we hope that it will assist patriots everywhere in resisting the un-american propaganda of the red china appeasers, the pro-soviet apologists, the relativists, and other dangerous propagandists who are weakening americans' sense of honor and their will to survive." _the truth about the foreign policy association_ sets out the communist front record of vera micheles dean (who was research director of the fpa until shortly after the legion post made this exposure, when she resigned amidst almost-tearful words of praise and farewell on the part of fpa-wac officials). the legion post booklet sets out the communist front records of various other persons connected with the fpa; it presents and analyzes several publications of the fpa, including materials used in the great decisions program; it reveals that fpa establishes respectability and public acceptance for itself by publicizing "endorsements" of prominent americans; it shows that many of the fpa's claims of endorsements are false; it shows the interlocking connections and close working relationships between the foreign policy association and other organizations, particularly the national council of churches; and it presents a great deal of general documentation on fpa's activities, operations, and connections. the foreign policy association was organized in and incorporated under the laws of new york in (the council on foreign relations was organized in and incorporated in ). rockefeller and carnegie money was responsible for both fpa and cfr becoming powerful organizations. the late u. s. congressman louis t. mcfadden (pennsylvania), as early as , said that the foreign policy association, working in close conjunction with a comparable british group, was formed, largely under the aegis of felix frankfurter and paul warburg, to promote a "planned" or socialist economy in the united states, and to integrate the american system into a worldwide socialist system. warburg and frankfurter (early cfr members) were among the many influential persons who worked closely with colonel edward m. house, father of the council on foreign relations. * * * * * from its early days, the foreign policy association had interlocking personnel, and worked in close co-operation with the institute of pacific relations, which was formed in as a tax-exempt educational organization, and which was financed by the great foundations--and by the same groups of businessmen and corporations which have always financed the cfr and the fpa. the ipr played a more important role than any other american organization in shaping public opinion and influencing official american policy with regard to asia. for more than twenty years, the ipr influenced directly or indirectly the selection of far eastern scholars for important teaching posts in colleges and universities--and the selection of officials for posts concerning asia in the state department. the ipr publications were standard materials in most american colleges, in thirteen hundred public school systems, and in the armed forces; and millions of ipr publications were distributed to all these institutions. along toward the end of world war ii, there were rumblings that the powerful ipr might be a communist front, despite its respectable façade--despite the fact that a great majority of its members were americans whose patriotism and integrity were beyond question. * * * * * in , the senate internal security subcommittee, under the chairmanship of the late pat mccarran (democrat, nevada) began an investigation which lasted many months and became the most important, careful, and productive investigation ever conducted by a committee of congress. the mccarran investigation of the ipr was predicated on the assumption that united states diplomacy had never suffered a more disastrous defeat than in its failure to avert the communist conquest of china. the communist conquest of china led to the korean war; and the tragic mishandling of this war on the part of washington and united nations officialdom destroyed american prestige throughout asia, and built chinese communist military power into a menacing colossus. the senate investigation revealed that the american policy decisions which produced these disastrous consequences were made by ipr officials who were traitors, or under the influence of traitors, whose allegiance lay in moscow. owen lattimore, guiding light of the ipr during its most important years (and also a member of the council on foreign relations), was termed a conscious articulate instrument of the soviet international conspiracy. alger hiss (a cfr member who was later identified as a soviet spy) was closely tied in with the ipr during his long and influential career in government service. hiss became a trustee of the ipr after his resignation from the state department. the secret information which hiss delivered to a soviet spy ring in the 's kept the soviets apprised of american activity in the far east. lauchlin currie (also a member of the cfr) was an administrative assistant to president roosevelt. harry dexter white virtually ran the treasury department under both roosevelt and truman. both currie and white had strong connections with the ipr; and both were soviet spies--who not only channeled important american secrets to soviet military intelligence, but also influenced and formulated american policies to suit the soviets. by the time the mccarran investigation ended, the whole nation knew that the ipr was, as the mccarran committee had characterized it, a transmission belt for soviet propaganda in the united states. the ipr, thoroughly discredited, had lost its power and influence; but its work was carried on, without any perceptible decline in effectiveness, by the foreign policy association. * * * * * the fpa did this job through its councils on world affairs, which had been set up in key cities throughout the united states. these councils are all "anti-communist." they include among their members the business, financial, social, cultural, and educational leaders of the community. their announced purpose is to help citizens become better informed on international affairs and foreign policy. to this end, they arrange public discussion groups, forums, seminars in connection with local schools and colleges, radio-television programs, and lecture series. they distribute a mammoth quantity of expensively produced material--to schools, civic clubs, discussion groups, and so on, at little or no cost. the councils bring world-renowned speakers to their community. hence, council events generally make headlines and get wide coverage on radio and television. the foreign policy associations' councils on world affairs, through the parent organization, through the council on foreign relations, and through a multitude of other channels, have close working relationships with the state department. hence, many of the distinguished speakers whom the councils present are handpicked by the state department; and they travel (sometimes from distant foreign lands) at united states taxpayers' expense. to avert criticism (or to provide themselves with ammunition against criticism when it arises) that they are nothing but internationalist propaganda agencies, the councils on world affairs distribute a little literature which, and present a few speakers who, give the general appearance of being against the internationalist program of one-world socialism. but their anti-internationalism presentations are generally milk-and-water middle-of-the-roadism which is virtually meaningless. most councils-on-world-affairs presentations give persuasive internationalist propaganda. thus, the foreign policy association, through its councils on world affairs--and another affiliated activity, the great decisions program--has managed to enroll some "conservative" community leadership into an effective propaganda effort for one-world socialism. the world affairs center was set up with national headquarters at east th street in new york city, as a formal affiliate of the foreign policy association, to handle the important job of directing the various "independent" councils on world affairs, located in major cities throughout the nation. in march, , the fpa merged with the world affairs center to form one organization: the foreign policy association-world affairs center. * * * * * the fpa-wac describes its great decisions program as an annual nation-wide review, by local groups under local sponsorship, of problems affecting united states foreign policy. fpa-wac provides fact sheet kits, which contain reading material for these local discussion groups. these kits present what fpa calls a "common fund of information" for all participants. they also provide an "opinion" ballot which permits each participant, at the end of the great decisions discussion program, to register his viewpoint and send it to officials in washington. the old ipr line (fostering american policies which helped communists take over china) was that the chinese communists were not communists at all but democratic "agrarian reformers" whom the chinese people loved and respected, and whom the chinese people were going to install as the rulers of new china, regardless of what america did; and that, therefore, it was in our best interest to be friendly with these "agrarian reformers" so that china would remain a friendly power once the "reformers" took over. a major objective of the fpa-wac--since it fell heir to the work of the ipr--is to foster american diplomatic recognition of red china. the fpa-wac, and its subordinate councils on world affairs, do this propaganda job most cleverly. most fpa spokesmen (except a few like cyrus eaton, who is a darling of the fpa and occasionally writes for its publications) are "anti-communists" who admit that the chinese communists are real communists. they admit that it is not pleasant (in the wake of our memories of korea) to think of extending diplomatic recognition to red china; and they do not always openly advocate such a move; but their literature and great decisions operations and other activities all subtly inculcate the idea that, however much we may dislike the chinese communists, it is highly probable that we can best promote american interests by "eventually" recognizing red china. in this connection, the fpa-wac great decisions program for was especially interesting. one question posed that year was "should u. s. deal with red china?" discussion of this topic was divided into four corollary questions: _why two chinas? what are red china's goals? does red china threaten 'uncommitted' asia? red china's record--what u. s. policy?_ the fpa-wac fact sheet kit, which sets out background information for the "study" and "voting" on the red china question, contains nothing that would remind americans of chinese communist atrocities against our men in korea or in any way make americans really angry at the communists. in the discussion of the "two chinas," the communists sound somewhat more attractive than the nationalists. in the discussion of red china's "goals," there is nothing about the communist goal of enslaving all asia; there are simply statistics showing how much more progress red china has made than "democratic" india--with less outside help than "democratic" india has received from the united states. in the discussion of whether red china threatens the rest of asia, the fpa-wac material makes no inference that the reds are an evil, aggressive power--but it does let the reader know that the reds in china are a mighty military power that we must reckon with, in realistic terms. nothing is said in the fpa-wac fact sheet kit about the communist rape of tibet. rather, one gets the impression that tibet is a normal, traditional province of china which has now returned to the homeland. after studying the problems of communist china from this fpa-wac "fact sheet," great decisions participants were given an opportunity to cast an "opinion ballot" on the four specific questions posed. the "opinions" were already written out on the fpa-wac ballot. the voter had only to select the opinion he liked best, and mark it. here are the five choices of opinions given voters on the foreign policy association's great decisions opinion ballot, concerning u. s. diplomatic recognition of red china. "a. recognize peiping now, because we can deal with far east political and other problems more easily if we have diplomatic relations with peiping. "b. go slow on recognizing them but agree to further talks and, if progress is made, be willing to grant recognition at some future date. "c. refuse to recognize them under any circumstances. "d. acknowledge that the peiping government is the effective government of china (recognition _de facto_) and deal with it as much as seems useful, on this basis, but avoid full diplomatic relations for the present. "e. other." * * * * * general purposes of the foreign policy association-world affairs center are rather well indicated in a fund-raising letter, mailed to american businessmen all over the nation, on february , . the letter was on the letterhead of consolidated foods corporation, south la salle street, chicago , illinois, and was signed by nathan cummings, chairman of the board. here is a part of mr. cummings' appeal to other businessmen to contribute money to the fpa-wac: "in his inaugural address which i had the privilege of personally hearing in washington, president kennedy summoned the american people to responsibility in foreign policy: ... "this call for individual initiative by the president characterizes the kind of citizen responsibility in world affairs which the foreign policy association-world affairs center has been energetically trying to build since its founding in .... "the fpa-wac's national program for informing the american public of the urgent matters of foreign policy such as those mentioned by the president--'the survival and the success of liberty,' 'inspection and control of arms,' the forging of 'a grand and global alliance' to 'assure a more fruitful life for all mankind'--is making remarkable progress. "the enclosed 'memorandum: - ' describes the program and past achievement of this -year-old organization. particularly worthy of mention is their annual 'great decisions' program which last year engaged more than a quarter of a million americans in eight weeks of discussion of u. s. foreign policy and reached hundreds of thousands of others with related radio, television and newspaper background programs and articles on these important topics. "of the basic budget for - of $ , , , nearly one-third must be raised from individual and corporate sources to meet minimal operating needs. the fact that over major corporations, some of whom contribute as much as $ , , already support fpa-wac is evidence of the effectiveness and vitality of its educational program.... "i hope that you and your company will join ours in generously supporting this work." erwin d. canham, editor of _the christian science monitor_, has caustically denounced the american legion post in atlanta for its "attack" on the fpa. mr. canham, in a letter dated april , , accused the american legion post of making a "completely false" statement when the post contended that mr. canham and the _monitor_ advocated the seating of red china in the un. mr. canham said: "this newspaper's editorial policy has never espoused any such position." i have in my file a letter which mr. canham wrote, april , , as editor of _the christian science monitor_, on the _monitor's_ letterhead. in this letter, mr. canham says: "i believe that the united states should open diplomatic relations with communist china." the interesting thing here is the coincidence of mr. canham's policy with regard to red china, and the policy of the foreign policy association-world affairs center. the great decisions program for (discussed above) was obviously intended to lead americans to acceptance of u. s. diplomatic recognition of red china. the same material, however, made it clear that the invisible government was not yet advocating the seating of red china in the un! do these backstairs formulators and managers of united states opinion and governmental policies have more respect for the un than they have for the us? or, do they fear that bringing red china into the un (before u. s. recognition) would finish discrediting that already discredited organization and cause the american people to demand american withdrawal? christian scientists (through mr. canham and the _monitor_), protestants (through the national council of churches), quakers (through the american friends service committee), and jews (through the american jewish committee, the anti-defamation league, and other organizations) are among the religious groups which have publicly supported activities of the foreign policy association. powerful catholic personalities and publications have endorsed fpa work, too. on december , , the right rev. timothy f. o'leary, superintendent of catholic schools for the archdiocese of boston, wrote to all catholic schools in the district, telling them that he was making plans for their participation with the world affairs council and the foreign policy association in the great decisions program. on november , , _our sunday visitor_ (largest and perhaps most influential catholic newspaper in america) featured an article by frank folsom, chairman of the executive committee of the board of directors of the radio corporation of america, and a leading catholic layman. mr. folsom was effusive in his praise of the fpa-wac great decisions program. * * * * * the interlock between the council on foreign relations and the foreign policy association-world affairs center can be seen in the list of officers and directors of the fpa-wac: eustace seligman, chairman of the fpa-wac, is a partner in sullivan and cromwell, the law firm of the late john foster dulles, a leading cfr member. john w. nason, president of fpa-wac, is a member of the council on foreign relations. walter h. wheeler, jr., president of pitney-bowes, inc., is vice chairman of fpa-wac, and also a member of the cfr. gerald f. beal, of the j. henry schroeder banking corporation of new york, is treasurer of fpa-wac, and also a member of the council on foreign relations. mrs. andrew g. carey is secretary of fpa-wac. her husband is a member of the cfr. emile e. soubry, executive vice president and director of the standard oil company of new jersey, is chairman of the executive committee of fpa-wac, and also a member of the cfr. benjamin j. buttenwieser, of kuhn, loeb, and company, in new york, is a member of the executive committee of fpa-wac, and also a member of the cfr. joseph e. johnson (old friend of alger hiss, who succeeded hiss as president of the carnegie endowment for international peace) is a member of the executive committee of the fpa-wac, and also a member of the cfr. harold f. linder, vice chairman of the general american investors company, is a member of the executive committee of fpa-wac, and also a member of the cfr. a. william loos, executive director of the church peace union, is a member of the executive committee of the fpa-wac. mr. loos attended the cfr meeting with high communist party officials in the soviet union in may, . henry siegbert, formerly a partner in the investment banking firm of adolph lewisohn & sons, is a member of the executive committee of the fpa-wac, and also a member of the cfr. chapter committee for economic development on june , , _the san francisco examiner_ published a united press international news story with a june , washington, d. c. date line, under the headline "j.f.k. backs tax cut plan." here are portions of the article: "president kennedy today urged congress and the people to give a close study to a monetary reform proposal which would empower him to cut income taxes in recession periods. "he issued the statement after receiving a bulky report from the commission of [sic] money and credit.... "the -member commission was set up in by the committee for economic development (ced). its three-year study was financed by $ . million in grants from the ced and the ford and merrill foundation. "one of the key recommendations was to give the president limited power to cut the percent tax rate on the first $ of personal income, if needed to help the economy.... "the report also recommended extensive changes in the federal reserve system, set up in as the core of the nation's banking system...." this _san francisco examiner_ article is a classic example of propaganda disguised as straight news reporting. * * * * * a story about the president supporting a plan for reducing taxes could not fail to command sympathetic attention. but the truth is that the tax reform proposals of the commission on money and credit would give the president as much power and leeway to _raise_ taxes as to lower them. in its -page report, the commission made separate proposals. one would permit the president (on his own initiative) to reduce the basic income-tax rate (the one that applies to practically every person who has any income at all) from % to %. it would also permit the president to raise the basic rate from % to %. the idea of giving the president such power is as alien to american political principles as communism itself is. the proposed "machinery" for granting such presidential power would violate every basic principle of our constitutional system. under the commission's proposal, the president would announce that he was going to increase or decrease taxes. if, within sixty days, congress did not veto the plan, it would become law, effective for six months, at which time it would have to be renewed by the same procedure. that is very similar to the soviet way. it could not be more foreign to the american way if it had been lifted from the soviet constitution. other proposals in the report of the commission on money and credit, filed on june , , after a three-year study: . the federal reserve act would be amended to give the president control over the federal reserve system--which, as set up in , is supposed to be free of any kind of political control, from the white house or elsewhere. . the commission recommends elimination of the legal requirement that the federal reserve system maintain a gold reserve as backing for american currency. a bill was introduced in congress (may , , by u. s. congressman abraham multer, new york democrat) to implement this commission recommendation. the bill would take away from american citizens twelve billion dollars in gold which supports their own currency, and enable government to pour this gold out to foreigners, as long as it lasts, leaving americans with a worthless currency, and at the mercy of foreign governments and bankers (see the _dan smoot report_, "gold and treachery," may , ). . the banking laws of individual states would be ignored or invalidated: banking laws of states prohibit mutual savings banks; the commission on money and credit wants a federal law to permit such banks in all states. . the commission would circumvent, if not eliminate, state laws governing the insurance industry: the commission proposes a federal law which would permit insurance companies to obtain federal charters and claim federal, rather than state, regulation. . the commission would subject all private pension funds to federal supervision. . the commission would abolish congressional limitations on the size of the national debt--so that the debt could go as high as the president pleased, without any interference from congress. . the commission recommends that congress approve all federal public works projects three years in advance, so that the president could order the projects _when he felt_ the economy needed stimulation. remembering how president kennedy and his administrative officials and congressional leaders used political extortion and promises of bribes with public money to force the house of representatives, in january, , to pack the house rules committee, imagine how the president could whip congress, and the whole nation, into line if the president had just _some_ of the additional, unconstitutional power which the commission on money and credit wants him to have. * * * * * the objective of the commission on money and credit (to finish the conversion of america into a total socialist state, under the dictatorship of whatever "proletarian" happens to be enthroned in the white house) can be seen, between the lines, in the commission's remarks about the "formidable problem" of unemployment. the commission wants unemployment to drop to the point where the number of jobless workers will equal the number of vacant jobs! and the clear implication is that the federal government must adopt whatever policies necessary to create this condition. such a condition can exist only in a slave system--like the socialist system of communist china where, for example, all "farmers" (men, women, and children) enjoy full employment; under the whips of overseers, on the collective farms of communism. the commission on money and credit was created on november , , by the committee for economic development (ced). in the annual report of the ced, mr. donald k. david, ced chairman, gave the history of the commission on money and credit. mr. david said: "ced began nine years ago [ ] to call attention to the need for a comprehensive reassessment of our entire system of money and credit. "when the last such survey of the economic scene was made by the aldrich commission in , we had no central banking system, no guaranteed deposits or guaranteed mortgages. there were no personal or corporate income taxes; no group insurance plans, pension funds, or social security system.... "although ced had envisaged a commission created by government, the inability of government to obtain the consensus required for launching the study became as apparent as the need for avoiding further delay. so, after receiving encouragement from other research institutions, leaders in congress, the administration, and from various leaders in private life, ced's trustees decided to sponsor the effort, assisted by a grant from the ford foundation...." here is the membership of the ced's commission on money and credit: frazar b. wilde, chairman (president of connecticut general life insurance company) hans christian sonne, vice-chairman (new york; official in numerous foundations and related organizations, such as twentieth century fund; american-scandanavian foundation; national planning association; and so on) adolf a. berle, jr. (new york; berle has been in and out of important posts in government for many years; he is an anti-communist socialist; he resigned from the commission on money and credit to accept his present job handling latin american affairs in the state department) james b. black (chairman of the board of pacific gas and electric company) marriner s. eccles (chairman of the board of the first security corporation; formerly assistant to the secretary of the treasury under roosevelt; governor of federal reserve board; and official in numerous international banking organizations, such as the export-import bank) lamar fleming, jr. (chairman of the board of anderson, clayton & co., houston, texas) henry h. fowler (washington, d.c.; resigned from the commission on february to accept appointment from kennedy as under secretary of the treasury) gaylord a. freeman, jr. (president of the first national bank, chicago) philip m. klutznick (park forest, ill., resigned from the commission on february , to accept appointment from president kennedy as united states representative to the united nations economic and social council) fred lazarus, jr. (chairman of the board of federated department stores, inc.) isador lubin (professor of public affairs at rutgers university) j. irwin miller (chairman of the board of cummins engine company) robert r. nathan (washington, d.c.; has been in and out of many important government jobs since the first roosevelt administration) emil rieve (president emeritus of the textile workers union--afl-cio) david rockefeller (president of chase manhattan bank) stanley h. ruttenberg (research director for afl-cio) charles sawyer (cincinnati lawyer, prominent in democratic party politics in ohio) earl b. schwulst (president of the bowery savings bank in new york) charles b. shuman (president of the american farm bureau federation) jesse w. tapp (chairman of the board, bank of america) john cameron thomson (former chairman of the board of northwest bancorporation, minneapolis) willard l. thorp (director of the merrill center for economics at amherst college) theodore o. yntema (vice president in charge of finance, ford motor company) william f. schnitzler (secretary-treasurer of afl-cio; resigned from the commission in ) joseph m., dodge (chairman of the board of detroit bank and trust co.; resigned from the commission in ) beardsley ruml (well-known and influential new deal economist who held numerous posts with foundations and related organizations; is sometimes called the father of the federal withholding tax law, enacted during world war ii; dr. ruml died before the commission on money and credit completed its report) fred t. greene (president of the home loan bank of indianapolis; died before the commission completed its report) the director of research for the commission was dr. bertrand fox, professor at the harvard graduate school of business administration. his assistant was dr. eli shapiro, professor of finance at the massachusetts institute of technology. of the persons who served as members of the commission on money and credit, (wilde, sonne, berle, fleming, fowler, lubin, nathan, rockefeller, tapp, thorp, yntema, dodge, ruml) were members of the council on foreign relations. in other words, the commission on money and credit was just another tax-exempt propaganda agency of america's invisible government, the council on foreign relations. * * * * * the above discussion of the commission on money and credit, together with the roster of membership, was first published in _the dan smoot report_ dated july , . on september , , mr. charles b. shuman, president of the american farm bureau federation, wrote me a letter, saying: "i was a member of the commission on money and credit but you will notice that i filed very strong objections to several of the recommendations which you brought to the attention of your readers. i do not agree with the commission recommendations to authorize the president of the united states to vary the rate of income tax. neither do i agree that the gold reserve requirement should be abandoned. i agree with several of your criticisms of the report but i cannot agree that 'the objective of the commission on money and credit (to finish the conversion of america into a total socialist state, under the dictatorship of whatever proletarian happens to be enthroned in the white house) can be seen, between the lines, in the commission's remarks about the formidable problem of unemployment.' "at its worst, it was a compromise of the divergent viewpoint of the conservative and liberal members of the commission." i will not argue with mr. shuman, an honest and honorable man, about the objective of the commission; but i will reassert the obvious: recommendations of the commission on money and credit, if fully implemented, would finish the conversion of america into a total socialist state. * * * * * as pointed out before, the various agencies which interlock with the council on foreign relations do not have formal affiliation with the council, or generally, with each other; but their effective togetherness is revealed by their unanimity of purpose: they are all working toward the ultimate objective of creating a one-world socialist system and making america a part of it. this ambitious scheme was first conceived and put into operation, during the administrations of woodrow wilson, by colonel edward m. house, and by the powerful international bankers whom house influenced. house founded the council on foreign relations for the purpose of creating (and conditioning the american people to accept) what house called a "positive" foreign policy for america--a policy which would entwine the affairs of america with those of other nations until this nation would be sucked into a world-government arrangement. colonel house knew, however, that america could not become a province in a one-world socialist system unless america's economy was first socialized. consequently, house laid the groundwork for "positive" domestic policies of government too--policies which could gradually place government in control of the nation's economy until, before the public realized what was happening, we would already have a socialist dictatorship. the following passages are from pages - of _the intimate papers of colonel house_: "the extent of colonel house's influence upon the legislative plans of the administration [wilson's] may be gathered from a remarkable document.... in the autumn of , immediately after the presidential election [when wilson was elected for his first term] there was published a novel, or political romance, entitled _philip dru: administrator_. "it was the story of a young west point graduate ... who was caught by the spirit of revolt against the tyranny of privileged interests. a stupid and reactionary government at washington provokes armed rebellion, in which dru joins whole-heartedly and which he ultimately leads to complete success. he himself becomes a dictator and proceeds by ordinance to remake the mechanism of government, to reform the basic laws that determine the relation of the classes, to remodel the defensive forces of the republic, and to bring about an international grouping or league of powers.... "five years after its publication, an enterprising bookseller, noting the growing influence of house in the wilson administration, wrote with regard to the book: 'as time goes on the interest in it becomes more intense, due to the fact that so many of the ideas expressed by _philip dru: administrator_, have become laws of this republic, and so many of his ideas have been discussed as becoming laws.... is colonel e. m. house of texas the author?' ... "colonel house was, in truth, the author.... "'philip dru' ... gives us an insight into the main political and social principles that actuated house in his companionship with president wilson. through it runs the note of social democracy reminiscent of louis blanc and the revolutionaries of .... "through the book also runs the idea that in the united states, government is unresponsive to popular desires--a 'negative' government, house calls it.... "the specific measures enacted by philip dru as administrator of the nation, indicated the reforms desired by house. "the administrator appointed a 'board composed of economists ... who ... were instructed to work out a tariff law which would contemplate the abolition of the theory of protection as a governmental policy.' "'the administrator further directed the tax board to work out a graduated income tax.... "philip dru also provided for the 'formulation of a new banking law, affording a flexible currency bottomed largely upon commercial assets.... he also proposed making corporations share with the government and states a certain part of their earnings.... "'labor is no longer to be classed as an inert commodity to be bought and sold by the law of supply and demand.' "dru 'prepared an old age pension law and also a laborer's insurance law....' "'he had incorporated in the franchise law the right of labor to have one representative upon the boards of corporations and to share a certain percentage of the earnings above the wages, after a reasonable percent upon the capital had been earned. in turn, it was to be obligatory upon them (the laborers) not to strike, but to submit all grievances to arbitration.'" need it be pointed out that "louis blanc and the revolutionaries of ," on whom colonel house patterned his plan for remaking america, had a scheme for the world virtually identical with that of karl marx and frederick engles--those socialist revolutionaries who wrote the _communist manifesto_ in ? * * * * * in , franklin k. lane, woodrow wilson's secretary of the interior, in a private letter, wrote, concerning the influence of 'philip dru' on president wilson: "all that book has said should be, comes about.... the president comes to _philip dru_, in the end." the _end_ is a socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, identical with that which now exists in the soviet union. we have already "come to" a major portion of colonel house's program for us. the unrealized portions of the program are now promises in the platforms of both our major political parties, they are in the legislative proposals of the administration in power and of its leaders in congress; they are the objectives of the council on foreign relations, whose members occupy key posts in government, from the presidency downward, and who dominate a vast network of influential, tax-exempt "educational" agencies, whose role is to "educate" the congress and the people to accept the total socialist program for america. the committee for economic development (which created the commission on money and credit) is the major propaganda arm of the council on foreign relations, in the important work of socializing the american economy. * * * * * paul g. hoffman is the father of ced. hoffman, an influential member of the cfr, was formerly president of studebaker corp.; former president of ford foundation; honorary chairman of the fund for the republic; has held many powerful jobs in government since the days of roosevelt; and is now director of the special united nations fund for economic development--sunfed--the un agency which is giving american tax money as economic aid to communist castro in cuba. hoffman, in , conceived the idea of setting up a tax-exempt "economic committee" which would prepare new economic policies for the nation and then prepare the public and congress to accept them. hoffman founded the committee for economic development in . the organization was incorporated in september of that year, with paul g. hoffman as chairman. major offices in the committee for economic development have always been occupied by members of the council on foreign relations--persons who generally have important positions in many other interlocking organizations, in the foundations, in the big corporations which finance the great interlock, and/or in government. * * * * * here are the council on foreign relations members who joined paul hoffman in setting up the ced in : william benton (former u.s. senator, now chairman of the board of _encyclopaedia britannica_; former assistant secretary of state; trustee and former vice president, university of chicago) will l. clayton (founder of anderson, clayton & co., houston; former assistant secretary of commerce and under secretary of state under roosevelt and truman; eisenhower's national security training commissioner) ralph e. flanders (former united states senator) marion b. folsom (eisenhower's secretary of the department of health, education, and welfare; many other positions in the roosevelt and truman administrations; board of overseers, harvard) eric a. johnston (former director, economic stabilization agency; many other positions in the roosevelt-truman-eisenhower administrations; former director and president of u.s. chamber of commerce; now president of the motion picture association of america) thomas b. mccabe (former lend-lease administrator; former chairman of the board of governors, federal reserve system; president of scott paper company since ) harry scherman (founder and chairman of the board, book of the month club, inc.) * * * * * here are council on foreign relations members who were chairmen of the committee for economic development from through : paul g. hoffman, - marion b. folsom, - meyer kestnbaum, - (president, hart schaffner & marx; director, fund for the republic; director, chicago and northwestern railroad) j. d. zellerbach, - (eisenhower's ambassador to italy; president and director of crown-zellerbach corp.; chairman of the board and director, fibreboard products, inc.; director, wells fargo bank & union trust co.) donald k. david, - (dean, harvard university; trustee of the ford foundation, carnegie institute, merrill foundation; board of directors, r. h. macy & co., general electric corp., first national city bank of new york, aluminum, ltd., ford motor co.) of the ced board of trustees listed in the ced's annual report, were members of the council on foreign relations. * * * * * the research and policy committee of the committee for economic development is the select inner-group which actually runs the ced. in , the following members of the research and policy committee were also members of the council on foreign relations: frazar b. wilde, chairman frank altschul (chairman of the board, general american investors corp.; vice chairman, national planning association; vice president, woodrow wilson foundation) elliott v. bell (former economic adviser to thomas e. dewey; former research consultant to wendell willkie; now chairman of the executive committee, mcgraw-hill publishing co., inc.; publisher and editor of _business week_; director of bank of manhattan co., new york life insurance co., carrier corp., trustee of the john s. guggenheim memorial foundation) william benton thomas d. cabot (former director of office of international security affairs, state department; now president of godfrey l. cabot, inc.; director of john hancock mutual life insurance co., american mutual liability insurance co.; trustee, hampton institute, radcliff college; member of the corporation of massachusetts institute of technology) walker l. cisler (former member of the atomic energy commission, economic cooperation administration, military government of germany; now president of detroit-edison co., trustee, cornell university) emilio g. collado (former state department career official; now treasurer, standard oil company of new jersey) gardner cowles (former domestic director, office of war information; now president, _des moines register & tribune_, cowles magazines, inc.--_look_, etc.--) donald k. david william c. foster (former under secretary of commerce, deputy secretary of defense; now executive vice president, olin mathieson chemical corp.) philip l. graham (former law secretary to supreme court justices stanley reed and felix frankfurter; now president and publisher of _the washington post and times herald_) meyer kestnbaum thomas b. mccabe don g. mitchell (chairman of the board, sylvania electric products, inc.) alfred c. neal (former official, office of price administration; now member of the board of governors, federal reserve bank of boston; president of ced) howard c. petersen (former council to committee to draft selective service regulations; assistant secretary of war; now president, philadelphia trust company; trustee, temple university) philip d. reed (many positions in the roosevelt and truman administrations; member, u. s. delegation to un conference at san francisco, ; now chairman, finance committee, general electric co.; director of canadian general electric co., bankers trust co., metropolitan life insurance co.) beardsley ruml harry scherman wayne chatfield taylor (many government positions including assistant secretary of treasury, under secretary of commerce; presently an economic adviser) theodore o. yntema * * * * * in its annual report for , the committee for economic development boasted of some of its past accomplishments and its future plans. mr. howard c. petersen, chairman of the ced's subcommittee on economic development assistance (and a member of the council on foreign relations) said that his committee originated the idea of creating the development loan fund, which was authorized by congress in section of the foreign aid bill of , which eisenhower established by executive order on december , , and which may be the most sinister step ever taken by the internationalist foreign-aid lobby. in , when president eisenhower requested an appropriation of $ , , , for foreign aid, he asked congress to authorize foreign aid commitments for the next ten years. congress refused the ten-year plan. in , the internationalists' ideal of a _permanent_ authorization for foreign aid was wrapped up in the development loan fund scheme. only a few congressmen raised any question about it. below are passages taken from the _congressional record_ of july , , the day the development loan fund was discussed in the house. congressman a. s. j. carnahan (democrat, missouri) floor manager for the foreign aid bill, rose to explain section , which established the development loan fund, saying: "the united states, in order to provide effective assistance [to all underdeveloped countries of the world] ... must have available a substantial fund upon which it can draw. the fund must be large enough so that all of the underdeveloped nations of the free world will feel that they will have an opportunity to participate in it. "we cannot wisely say that we should make a small amount available the first year and see how things work out. if we are able to offer assistance only to the select few, we will inevitably antagonize many other countries whose future friendship and cooperation will be important to us ... in addition to an initial authorization of an appropriation of $ million, the bill includes authorization for borrowing from the treasury $ million beginning in fiscal , and an additional $ million beginning in fiscal ." thus, congressman carnahan, arguing for foreign aid, outlined some of the absurd fallacies of foreign aid: namely, if we give foreign aid at all, we must provide enough so that every foreign government in the world will always be able to get all it wants. we can exercise no choice in whom we give or lend our money to. if we give only "to the select few" we offend all others. congressman h. r. gross (republican, iowa) asked a question: "what interest rate will be charged upon the loans that are to be made?" congressman carnahan: "the legislation does not designate the interest rate." mr. gross: "what will be the length of the loan to be made?" mr. carnahan: "the legislation does not designate the length of the loans. the rules for the loans, which will determine the interest rates, the length of time the loans will run, the size of the installment repayments, and other administrative details, will be taken care of by the executive department." congressman john l. pilcher (democrat, georgia) made the point that the manager of the development loan fund, appointed by the president, could lend money to: "any foreign government or foreign government agency, to any corporation, any individual or any group of persons." congressman carnahan: "that is correct." congressman pilcher: "in other words, it would be possible for an individual to borrow $ million or $ million to set up some business in some foreign country, if the manager so agreed; is that correct?" congressman carnahan: "if they met the criteria set up for loans." congressman pilcher: "the manager ... has the authority to collect or compromise any obligation in this fund. in other words, he can make a loan this month and if he so desires he can turn around and compromise it or cancel it next month which is a straight out grant in the disguise of a soft-loan program." congressman porter hardy, jr. (democrat, virginia) said: "the manager of the fund has almost unlimited authority to do anything he pleases." congressman barratt o'hara (democrat, illinois), trying to quiet fears that this bill was granting unlimited, uncontrollable power to some appointed manager, said that the blank-check grant of authority was not really being made to the fund manager at all. the power was being given to the president of the united states, and the manager would merely "perform such functions with respect to this title as the president may direct." congressman gross said: "that is more power than any president should ask for or want the responsibility for." congressman leon h. gavin (republican, pennsylvania) pointed out that we already have or lending agencies in this field: the international co-operation administration; the export-import bank; the international bank; the international monetary fund; the international development corporation; and the world bank. why, then, do we need this new one, the development loan fund? congressman walter h. judd (republican, minnesota) had already answered that question, explaining that development loan fund money would go to foreigners who could not qualify for loans from other agencies. congressman gross said that all foreign nations which will borrow from this fund could get all the american private capital they need if they had political systems which made lending to them sensible or feasible. in short, the development loan fund (which the committee for economic development boasts paternity of) is a scheme for giving american tax money to foreigners who have proven themselves such poor credit risks that they cannot obtain loans even from other governmental and un agencies--and who will use the money to line their own pockets and to build socialistic enterprises which will eliminate possibilities of freedom in their own land, and will compete in world markets with american enterprise. * * * * * in its annual report, the ced also boasted about the work of its area development committee. at that time, the two leading members of this particular committee of the ced (who were also members of the council on foreign relations) were mr. stanley marcus, president of neiman-marcus co., in dallas; and the late dr. beardsley ruml, widely known new deal socialist "economist." mr. jervis j. babb, chairman of the ced's area development committee (president of lever brothers company) said: "the new area development program, approved by the trustees [of ced] at their may [ ] meeting in chicago is underway.... already, close relationships have been established with organizations, both public and private, that are conducting research and administering programs relating to area development.... "five of ced's college-community research centers ... have been selected as a starting point of ced's area development pilot projects. the five centers are: boston, utica, alabama, arkansas, and oklahoma." the ced's area development work has brought ced personnel into close cooperation with the collection of tax-exempt "municipal planning" organizations housed in a rockefeller-financed center at east th street, chicago, which has become national headquarters for the production and placement of experts--who fabricate "progressive" legislation for government at all levels; who rewrite our "archaic" state constitutions; and who take over as city managers, or county managers, or metropolitan managers, or regional managers whenever people in any locality have progressed to the point of accepting government by imported experts as a substitute for government by elected local citizens. in other words, through the area development activities of the committee for economic development, the invisible government of america--the council on foreign relations--has a hand in the powerful drive for metropolitan government. metropolitan government, as conceived by socialist planners, would destroy the whole fabric of government and social organization in the united states. * * * * * metropolitan government would eliminate the individual states as meaningful political entities, would divide the nation into metropolitan regions sprawling across state lines, and would place the management of these regional governments in the hands of appointed experts answerable not to local citizens but to the supreme political power in washington. (for detailed discussion, see _the dan smoot report_, april and , , "metropolitan government--part one," and "metropolitan government--part two.") through the area development activities of the committee for economic development, the council on foreign relations has supported the urban renewal program. urban renewal with federal tax money was authorized in the national housing act of , and enlarged in scope by amendments to the housing acts of , , and ; but it did not become a vigorously promoted nationwide program until late , after the council on foreign relations (through the ced) started pushing it. * * * * * urban renewal is a federally financed program of city planning which requires city governments to seize homes and other private property from some citizens and re-sell them, at below cost, to real estate promoters and other private citizens for developments that the city planners consider desirable. under the ancient, but awesome, right of eminent domain, city governments do not have the power to take private real estate from one citizen for the profit of another citizen. but in november, , the supreme court in an urban renewal case, said that congress and state legislature can do anything they like to the private property of private citizens as long as they claim they are doing it for public good. federal urban renewal has opened rich veins of public money for graft, corruption, and political vote buying; and it is destroying private property rights under the pretext that clearing slums will eliminate the causes of crime. moreover, urban renewal authorizes the seizure not just of slum property, but of all private property in a whole section of a city, for resale to private interests which promise to build something that governmental planners will like. federal urban renewal--since the council on foreign relation's ced started supporting it--has become a national movement with frightful implications and dangers. (for detailed discussion of urban renewal, see _the dan smoot report_, september , , and october , .) * * * * * in its annual report, the committee for economic development gave details on its educational work in public schools and colleges. this work was, at that time, carried on primarily by the ced's business-education committee, and by two subsidiary operations which that committee created: the college-community research centers and the joint council on economic education. from the annual report of the committee for economic development: "ced's efforts to promote and improve economic education in the schools are of special appeal to those who are concerned ... both with education and the progress of the free enterprise system. the business-education program and the numerous college-community research centers it has sponsored, together with the use of ced publications as teaching materials, represent an important contribution to economic education on the college level. "in the primary and secondary schools, the introduction of economics into teaching programs is moving forward steadily, thanks largely to the joint council on economic education which ced helped to establish and continues to support.... "the business-education committee continued in its work with the college-community research centers and with the joint council on economic education. "the joint council's program to improve the teaching of economics in the public schools is now operating in states, and the college-community research centers active last year brought to more than the number of business and academic men who have worked together on economic research projects of local and regional importance.... "in its work, the committee [business-education committee] is finding especially valuable the experience gained through the operation of the college-community research centers. these centers are financed partly by ced, partly by the fund for adult education [a ford foundation operation] and partly by locally-raised funds.... "the joint council [on economic education] is making excellent progress in training teachers and incorporating economics education in all grade levels of public school systems. in addition to its national service programs, the council has developed strong local or state councils which not only help guide its work but last year raised more than $ , to finance local projects. "ced helped to establish and works closely with this independent organization [joint council on economic education] which is now conducting four major types of activities. " . _summer workshops for teachers._ these working sessions, sponsored by colleges and universities, provide three weeks training in economics and develop ways to incorporate economics into the school curriculum. over , persons have participated since the program began. " . _cooperating school program._ twenty school systems are working with the joint council [on economic education] to demonstrate how economics can be incorporated into the present curriculum.... " . _college program._ few students majoring in education now take economics courses; therefore, leading institutions are working with the joint council [on economic education] to develop better training in economics for prospective teachers.... " . _high school-community projects._ the joint council [on economic education] is helping to conduct demonstration programs which show how students can use community resources to improve their economics education. for example, the whittier, california school system conducted a six-week program to help high school seniors understand the kind of economy in which they would live and work. they joined in research studies on regional economic problems being carried on by the southern california college-community research center...." the committee for economic development claims that its educational work in economics is dedicated to progress of free enterprise; and many of its programs in schools and colleges are educational; but its subtle and relentless emphasis is on the governmental interventionism that is the essence of new-dealism, fair-dealism, modern-republicanism, and new-frontierism--the governmental interventionism prescribed long ago as the way to socialize the economy of america in preparation for integrating this nation into a worldwide socialist system. * * * * * paul hoffman's ced has come a long way since . in , the ced's college-community research centers had "projects in progress" in institutions of higher learning: bates college, boston college, boston university, bowdoin college, brown university, colby college, dartmouth college, emory university, harvard graduate school of business administration, iowa state college, lewis & clark college, mcgill university, northeastern university, northwestern university, occidental college, pomona college, reed college, rutgers university, southern methodist university, tulane university, university of alabama, university of arkansas, university of iowa, university of maine, university of michigan, university of minnesota, university of north carolina, university of oklahoma, university of pennsylvania, university of washington, university of wisconsin, utica college of syracuse university, and washington university. * * * * * in , the following institutions of higher learning were participating in the ced's joint council on economic education "college program" to develop training in economics for prospective teachers: brigham young university, george peabody college for teachers, indiana university, montclair state teachers college, new york university, ohio state university, oklahoma a & m college, pennsylvania state university, purdue university, syracuse university, teachers college of columbia university, university of colorado, university of connecticut, university of illinois, university of iowa, university of minnesota, university of southern california, university of tennessee, university of texas, university of washington. * * * * * in , the following school systems were working in the ced's joint council on economic education "cooperating school program," to demonstrate how economics can be incorporated in the school curriculum, beginning in the first grade: akron, ohio; albion, illinois; chattanooga, tennessee; colton, california; dayton, ohio; fort dodge, iowa; hartford, connecticut; kalamazoo, michigan; lexington, alabama; minneapolis, minnesota; new york city, new york; portland, oregon; providence, rhode island; ridgewood, new jersey; seattle, washington; syracuse, new york; university city, missouri; webster groves, missouri; west hartford, connecticut; whittier, california. as indicated, the business-education committee of the ced is the select group which supervises this vast "educational" effort reaching into public schools, colleges, and communities throughout the nation: _james l. allen_, senior partner of booz, allen & hamilton; _jervis j. babb_, chairman of the board of lever brothers, company; _sarah g. blanding_, president of vassar college; _w. harold brenton_, president of brenton brothers, inc.; _james f. brownlee_, former government official who is chairman of the board of the minute maid corporation, and a director of many other large corporations, such as american sugar refining co., bank of manhattan, gillette safety razor, r. h. macy co., pillsbury mills, american express; _everett needham case_, president of colgate university; _james b. conant_, former president of harvard and ambassador to germany; _john t. connor_, president of merck & co.; _john s. dickey_, president of dartmouth college; _john m. fox_, president of minute maid corporation; _paul s. gerot_, president of pillsbury mills; _stanley marcus_, president of neiman-marcus; _w. a. patterson_, president of united air lines; _morris b. pendleton_, president of pendleton tool industries; _walter rothschild_, chairman of the board of abraham & straus; _thomas j. watson, jr._, president of international business machines corporation; _j. cameron thomson_, chairman of the board of northwest bancorporation. note that three of these ced business-education committee members--conant, dickey, and marcus--are influential members of the council on foreign relations and have many connections with the big foundations financing the great cfr interlock. * * * * * in addition to the educational work which it discusses in its annual report, the committee for economic development utilizes many other means to inject its (and the cfr's) economic philosophies into community thought-streams throughout the nation. here, for example, are passages from a news story in _the dallas morning news_, june , : "dallas businessmen and southern methodist university officials monday [june ] launched a $ , business research project financed through agencies of the ford foundation. "stanley marcus of dallas, a national trustee of ford foundation's committee for economic development, said the project would go on two or three years under foundation funds. after that ... the city might foot the bill.... "the smu project--along with several others like it throughout the nation--is designed to foster study in regional and local business problems, marcus commented. "here's how the dallas project will work: "a business executive committee, composed of some of dallas' top businessmen, will be selected. these men then will select a group of younger executives for a business executive research committee. this will be the working group, marcus explained.... "at smu, several of the schools' chief officials will act as a senior faculty committee.... acting as co-ordinator for the project will be warren a. law ... who soon will get his doctorate in economics from harvard university." the "experimental" stage of this business executives research committee lasted five years in dallas. during that time, the researchers filed two major reports: an innocuous one in concerning traffic and transit problems in dallas; and a most significant one in , strongly urging metropolitan government for dallas county, patterned after the metro system in toronto, canada. * * * * * in october, , dr. donald k. david, then chairman of the committee for economic development and vice chairman of the ford foundation (and also a member of the council on foreign relations) went to dallas to speak to the citizens council, an organization composed of leading dallas business executives, whose president that year was stanley marcus. dr. david told the business men that they should give greater support and leadership to the government's foreign aid program; and, of course, he urged vast expansion of foreign aid, particularly to "underdeveloped nations." that was the signal and the build-up. the next month--november, --the experimental business executives research committee, which the ced had formed in and which had already completed its mission with its report and recommendation on metropolitan government for dallas, was converted into "the dallas ced associates." here is a news story about that event, taken from the november , , _dallas morning news_: "a dallas committee for economic development--the first of its kind in the nation--has been founded at southern methodist university. it will give voice to southwestern opinions--and knowledge--on economic, matters or international importance. keystone will be an economic research center to be established soon at smu. "a steering group composed of dallas and southwestern business, industrial and educational leaders laid the groundwork for both committee and center in a weekend meeting at smu." the "steering group" included george mcghee and neil mallon. mr. mcghee (presently assistant secretary of state for policy planning) is, and has been for many years, a member of the council on foreign relations. neil mallon, then chairman of the board of dresser industries and a former official of the foreign policy association, founded the dallas council on world affairs in . dresser industries is one of the big corporations which contribute money to the council on foreign relations. in the group with mr. mcghee and mr. mallon were five smu officials, a dallas banker, a real estate man, and stanley marcus, the head man in the "steering group" which set up the dallas associates of the committee for economic development. the first literary product of the dallas associates of the ced--at least, the first to come to my attention--is a most expensive-looking -page printed booklet entitled "the role of private enterprise in the economic development of underdeveloped nations." the title page reveals that this pamphlet is a policy statement of the dallas associates of ced. it is little more than a rewrite of the speech which dr. donald k. david had made to the dallas citizens council in november, , urging business to give support and leadership to the government's foreign aid programs. chapter business advisory council whereas the foreign policy association-world affairs center is primarily interested in fostering the _foreign_ policy desired by the cfr, and the committee for economic development is primarily interested in formulating economic and other policies which, through governmental controls, will lead us into total socialism--another, smaller (but, in some ways, more powerful) organization has (or, until mid- , had) the primary responsibility of infiltrating government: of selecting men whom the cfr wants in particular jobs, and of formulating, inside the agencies of government, policies which the cfr wants. this small but mighty organization was the business advisory council. daniel c. roper, f. d. roosevelt's secretary of commerce, formed the business advisory council on june , . roper set it up as a panel of big businessmen to act as unofficial advisers to president roosevelt. he was disappointed in it, however. the biggest businessmen in america did, indeed, join; but they did not support the total new deal as roper had expected they would when he made them "advisers." roper, however, was a figurehead. the brains behind the formation of the business advisory council were in the head of sidney j. weinberg, senior partner of the new york investment house of goldman, sachs & co.--and also on the boards of directors of about thirty of the biggest corporations in america. weinberg helped organize the bac. he recruited most of its key members. he was content to let america's big businessmen ripen for a while in the sunshine of the new deal's "new" philosophy of government, before expecting them to give that philosophy full support. secretary of commerce daniel c. roper pouted and ignored the business advisory council when he discovered that the big businessmen, enrolled as governmental "advisors," tried to advise things that governmental leaders did not like. but sidney weinberg was shrewd, and had a definite, long-range plan for the business advisory council. he held the bac together as a kind of social club, keeping the big business men under constant exposure to the "new" economic philosophies of the new deal, waiting for the propitious moment to enlist america's leading capitalists on the side of the socialist revolutionaries, determined to destroy capitalism and create a one-world socialist society. * * * * * the right time came in , when world war ii started in europe and roosevelt developed his incurable ambition to get in that war and become president of the world. plans for america's frenzied spending on national defense began in . with mammoth government contracts in the offing, weinberg had no trouble converting the business advisory council of leading businessmen into an agency for helping governmental leaders plan the policies for war and for the post-war period. * * * * * in september, , _harper's magazine_ published an article by hobart rowen, entitled "america's most powerful private club," with a sub-title, "how a semi-social organization of the very biggest businessmen--discreetly shielded from public scrutiny--is 'advising' the government on its top policy decisions." here are passages from the article: "the business advisory council meets regularly with government officials six times a year.... on two of these six occasions ... the bac convenes its sessions at plush resorts, and with a half-dozen or more important washington officials and their wives as its guests, it indulges in a three-day 'work and play' meeting.... "the guest list is always impressive: on occasion, there have been more cabinet officers at a ... bac meeting than were left in the capital.... "these meetings cost the bac anywhere from $ , to $ , or more, paid out of the dues of members ... which have been judged tax-deductible by the internal revenue service.... "after the election, the bac was having its fall 'work and play' meeting at the cloister, just off the georgia coast and a short distance from augusta, where ike was alternating golf with planning his first-term cabinet. [sidney] weinberg and [general lucius d.] clay [members of the bac executive committee] ... hustled ... to augusta, conferred with ike [a 'close, intimate, personal friend' of both men].... "the result was historic: ike tapped three of the bac leaders ... for his cabinet. they were charles e. wilson of general motors as defense secretary; [george m.] humphrey, then boss of the m. a. hanna co., as treasury secretary; and robert t. stevens of the j. p. stevens & co., as army secretary.... "afterwards, [secretary] humphrey himself dipped into the bac pool for marion folsom of eastman kodak as under secretary of the treasury [later secretary of health, education, and welfare].... "membership in the council gives a select few the chance to bring their views to bear on key government people, in a most pleasant, convivial, and private atmosphere.... "the bac, powerful in its composition and with an inside track, is thus a special force. an intimation of its influence can be gleaned from its role in the mccarthy case.... bac helped push senator joe mccarthy over the brink in , by supplying a bit of backbone to the eisenhower administration at the right time. mccarthy's chief target in the army-mccarthy hearings was the aforementioned robert t. stevens--a big wheel in the bac who had become secretary of the army. the bac didn't pay much--if any--attention to joe mccarthy as a social menace until he started to pick on bob stevens. then, they burned up. "during the may meeting at the homestead [expensive resort hotel in hot springs, virginia, where the bac often holds its 'work and play' sessions with high government officials and their wives], stevens flew down from washington for a weekend reprieve from his televised torture. a special delegation of bac officials made it a point to journey from the hotel to the mountaintop airport to greet stevens. he was escorted into the lobby like a conquering hero. then, publicly, one member of the bac after another roasted the eisenhower administration for its mccarthy-appeasement policy. the bac's attitude gave the administration some courage, and shortly thereafter former senator ralph flanders (a republican and bac member) introduced a senate resolution calling for censure." * * * * * active membership in the business advisory council is limited to about . after a few years as an "active," a member can become a "graduate," still retaining his full voting and membership privileges. i have obtained the names of "active" and "graduate" members of the bac, listed below. those who are members of the council on foreign relations are identified by "cfr" after their names. winthrop w. aldrich (cfr) william m. allen (president of boeing airplane company; member board of directors of pacific national bank of seattle) s. c. allyn (cfr) robert b. anderson clarence avildsen (chairman, avildsen tools & machines, inc.) william m. batten (president, j. c. penney company) s. d. bechtel (cfr) s. clark beise (president, bank of america; member board of directors, national trust and savings association, san francisco) roger m. blough (cfr) harold boeschenstein (president, owens-corning fiberglas corporation; chairman of the board, fiberglas canada, ltd.; member of the board of directors of national distillers products corporation, international paper company, toledo trust company, dow, jones & co.) fred bohen (president of meredith publishing company--_better homes and gardens, better farming_; member of board of directors of meredith radio & television stations, iowa, northwest bancorporation, central life assurance society, allis-chalmers manufacturing co., northwestern bell telephone co., iowa-des moines national bank) ernest r. breech (executive vice president, ford motor, company; member of board of directors of transcontinental & western air, inc., pan-american airways; president of western air express) george r. brown (chairman of the board, texas eastern transmission corp.; executive vice president, brown & root, inc. of houston; president of board of trustees, rice university) carter l. burgess (cfr) paul c. cabot (president of state street investment corp.; partner in state street research & management co.; member of the board of directors of j. p. morgan & co., continental can co., inc., national dairy products corp., tampa electric co., the b. f. goodrich co.; treasurer of harvard university) james v. carmichael (president, scripto, inc.; member of board of directors of lockheed aircraft corp., trust company of georgia, atlanta transit co., the southern co.) walker l. cisler (cfr) general lucius d. clay (cfr) will l. clayton (cfr) john l. collyer (cfr) ralph j. cordiner (chairman of the board and president of general electric co.) john e. corette (president of montana power co.) john cowles (cfr) c. r. cox (cfr) harlow h. curtice (retired president of general motors corp.; chairman of the board of directors of genesee merchants bank & trust co.; member of the board of directors of the national bank of detroit) charles e. daniel (head of daniel construction co., member of board of directors of first national bank of greenville, south carolina, la france industries, j. p. stevens co., inc., textron, inc.; trustee of clemson college) donald k. david (cfr) paul m. davies (president and chairman of the board of food machinery & chemical corp.; member of board of directors of american trust company of california, national distillers products corp., caterpillar tractor co.; professor at stanford university; director of stanford research institute, san jose state college, pacific school of religion; trustee of committee for economic development) frank r. denton (vice chairman and director of mellon national bank and trust company, pittsburgh; member of the board of directors of swindell-dressler corp., westinghouse electric co., jones & laughlin steel corporation, pullman, inc., national union fire insurance co., shamrock oil & gas corp., m. w. kellogg co., pullman standard car manufacturing co., trailmobile, inc., national union indemnity co.; trustee of pennsylvania state university, kansas university endowment association) charles d. dickey (vice president, member of the board of directors, and chairman of the executive committee of morgan guaranty trust co.; member of the board of directors of general electric co., beaver coal, kennekott copper corp., braden copper co., merck & co., inc., panhandle eastern pipeline co., new york life insurance co., church life insurance corp., church fire insurance corp.) frederick g. donner (cfr) william y. elliott (cfr) ralph e. flanders (cfr) marion b. folsom (cfr) henry ford ii (president of ford motor co.; chairman of the board of american heritage foundation) william c. foster (cfr) g. keith funston (president of new york stock exchange; member of the board of directors of metropolitan life insurance co.; trustee of trinity college of connecticut, virginia theological seminary, samuel h. kress foundation) frederick v. geier (cfr) elisha gray ii (president and director of whirlpool corp.) crawford h. greenewalt (president and director of e. i. du pont de nemours company, christiana securities company; member of the board of directors of massachusetts institute of technology; trustee of the carnegie institute, washington) general alfred m. gruenther (cfr) joseph b. hall (president of kroger company, manufacturers and merchants indemnity co., selective insurance co.; member of the board of directors of robert a. cline, inc., avco manufacturing corp., cincinnati and suburban bell telephone co., general stores corp.; member of the board of the federal reserve bank of cleveland) w. averill harriman (cpr) william a. hewitt (president and member of the board of directors of deere & company) milton p. higgins (cfr) paul g. hoffman (cfr) eugene holman (cfr) john holmes (president, member of the board of directors, and retired chairman of swift & company; member of the board of directors of continental illinois national bank and trust company, general electric corporation) herbert hoover, jr. (cfr) preston hotchkis (vice chairman of the board of directors and treasurer of founders' insurance company; executive vice president and member of the board of directors of fred h. bixby ranch company; member of the board of directors of metropolitan coach lines, pacific mutual life insurance co., pacific telephone & telegraph co., blue diamond corp.) amory houghton (cfr) theodore v. houser (retired chairman of the board of sears, roebuck & co.; member of the board of directors of sears, roebuck & co., bell and howell co., quaker oats co., massachusetts institute of technology; trustee of northwestern university, williams college) a. w. hughes (chairman of the board of directors, j. c. penney co.) gilbert w. humphrey (president of m. a. hanna company, hanna mining company; chairman of the board of hausand steam ship company; member of the board of directors of industrial rayon corp., general electric corp., national city bank of cleveland, texaco, inc.; trustee of committee for economic development) eric a. johnston (cfr) alfred w. jones (chairman of the board of sea island company, talbott corp.; member of the board of directors of seaboard construction co., brunswick paper & pulp co., the mead corp., thompson industries, inc., first national bank of atlanta, georgia power co., florida-georgia tv co.) devereux c. josephs (cfr) ernest kanzler (retired chairman of the board of universal c.i.t. credit corp,; member of the board of directors of c.i.t. financial corp., bendix aviation corp.) frederick kappel (president and director of american telephone & telegraph company; retired president of western electric co.; member of the board of directors of chase manhattan bank, metropolitan life insurance co.) john r. kimberly (cfr) e. h. lane (chairman of the board of lane company, inc.) joseph l. lanier (chairman of the board of wellington sears company; president of west point manufacturing company of georgia; member of the board of directors of cabin crafts, inc., first national bank of atlanta, rivington carpets, ltd. of britain) barry l. leithead (president and director of cluett, peabody and company, inc.; chairman of cluett, peabody and company of canada, ltd.; member of the board of directors of b. f. goodrich company) augustus c. long (chairman of the board of texaco, inc.; member of the board of directors of freeport sulphur co., equitable life assurance society of the united states, federal reserve bank of new york) donold b. lourie (president and director of quaker oats company; member of the board of directors of northern trust co., international paper co., pure oil co.; trustee of princeton university) george h. love (chairman of the board of pittsburgh-consolidation coal company, m. a. hanna company; member of the board of directors of union carbide & carbon corp., mellon national bank & trust company of pittsburgh, pullman co., general electric co., national steel corp., hanna mining co.; trustee of princeton university, university of pittsburgh) james spencer love (chairman of the board of burlington mills corp.; chairman and president of burlington industries, inc.; trustee of university of north carolina, davidson college) george p. macnichol, jr. (president and director of libbey-owens-ford glass company; member of the board of directors of wyandotte chemical co., federal reserve bank of cleveland) roswell f. magill (member of cravath, swaine & moore, lawyers; trustee of mutual life insurance company of new york, macy foundation, guggenheim foundation) deane w. malott (president, cornell university; member of the board of directors of pitney-bowes, inc., b. f. goodrich co., general mills, inc., owens-corning fiberglas corp.; former vice president of hawaiian pineapple co.; professor of business at harvard, chancellor of university of kansas) james w. mcafee (president of union electric company of missouri, edison electric institute; member of the board of directors of st. louis union trust co., american central insurance co., north american co.) s. maurice mcashan (president, anderson, clayton & company) thomas b. mccabe (cfr) john l. mccaffrey (retired chairman of international harvester co.; member of the board of directors of harris trust & savings bank of chicago, american telephone & telegraph co., corn products co., midwest stock exchange; trustee of the university of chicago, university of notre dame, eisenhower exchange fellowships, inc.) leonard f. mccollum (cfr) charles p. mccormick (chairman of the board and retired president of mccormick & co., inc.; member of the board of directors of massachusetts mutual life insurance co., equitable trust co. of baltimore, advertising council; chairman of the board of regents, university of maryland) neil h. mcelroy (chairman of the board, procter & gamble co.; secretary of defense - ) earl m. mcgowin (vice president of w. t. smith lumber co.; member of the board of directors of the southern company of new york, alabama power co.) james h. mcgraw, jr. (cfr) paul b. mckee (chairman of pacific power & light co.) john p. mcwilliams (retired president and chairman of the board of youngstown steel door co.; member of the board of directors of national city bank of cleveland, eaton manufacturing co., goodyear tire & rubber co., union carbide & carbon corp.) george g. montgomery (chairman of kern county land co.; member of the board of directors of american trust co., bankers trust co., castle & cook, ltd., general electric co., matson navigation co., matson assurance co., oceanic steam ship co., pacific lumber co.) charles g. mortimer (chairman and retired president of general foods corp.; member of the board of directors of national city bank of new york, union theological seminary) william b. murphy (president of campbell soup co.; member of the board of directors of merck & co.) aksel nielsen (president of title guaranty co., mortgage investments co.; member of the board of directors of c. a. norgren co., united american life insurance co., landon abstract co., empire savings & loan association, united airlines) thomas f. patton (president and director of republic steel corp., union drawn steel co.; member of the board of directors of air-vue products corp., maria luisa ore co., berger manufacturing company of massachusetts, iron ore company of canada, liberia mining co., ltd., liberian navigation corp., union commerce bank, tankore corp., standard oil company of ohio; trustee of ohio state university) charles h. percy (president and director of bell & howell co.; member of the board of directors of chase manhattan bank, harris trust & savings bank, burroughs corp., fund for adult education of the ford foundation; trustee, university of chicago) theodore s. petersen (president and director of standard oil of california; member of the board of directors of pacific mutual insurance co.; trustee of committee on economic development; consulting professor, stanford university) gwilym a. price (chairman and president of westinghouse electric corp.; member of the board of directors of mellon national bank & trust company of pittsburgh, eastman-kodak co., carnegie corp., national union fire insurance co., great atlantic & pacific tea co.; trustee of allegheny college, the hanover bank, carnegie institute, carnegie institute of technology; chairman of the board of trustees, university of pittsburgh; chairman of crusade for freedom) edgar monsanto queeny (chairman of the board, monsanto chemical co.; member of the board of directors of american airlines, union electric co. of missouri, chemstrand corp., sicedison s.p.a. of italy, world rehabilitation fund; trustee herbert hoover foundation) clarence b. randall (chairman of the board, inland steel co.; member of the board of directors, bell & howell co.; trustee, university of chicago) philip d. reed (cfr) richard s. reynolds, jr. (president of reynolds metals co.; chairman of the board of robertshaw-fulton controls co.; member of the board of directors of manufacturers trust co., british aluminum, ltd., u. s. foil co., central national bank of richmond) winfield w. riefler (cfr) william e. robinson (chairman of the coca-cola co.; member of the board of directors of manufacturers trust co.; coca-cola export co., libbey-owens-ford glass co., trustee of new york university; former director and publisher of _new york herald-tribune_) donald j. russell (president and director of southern pacific co.; texas and new orleans railroad co.; chairman of the board of st. louis-southwestern railroad; director of stanford research institute; trustee of stanford university) stuart t. saunders (president of norfolk and western railway; director of first and merchants national bank of richmond) blackwell smith (cpr) c. r. smith (president, american airlines) lloyd b. smith (president, a. o. smith corp.; chairman, a. o. smith of texas) john w. snyder (executive vice president, overland corp.; secretary of treasury of the united states - ) joseph p. spang, jr. (retired president and chairman of gillette co.; member of the board of directors of gillette co., sheraton corp. of america, first national bank of boston, u. s. steel corp., international packers, ltd.) a. e. staley, jr. (chairman of a. e. staley manufacturing co.; trustee, millikin university) frank stanton (president, columbia broadcasting system; chairman of center for advanced study in behavioral sciences; trustee of rand corp.; member of the board of directors of new york life insurance co.) robert t. stevens (president and former chairman of the board, j. p. stevens & co.; member of the board of directors of general electric co., owens-corning fiberglas corp.; trustee of mutual life insurance co. of new york; secretary of the army - ) hardwick stires (partner, scudder, stevens & clark investment counsels) lewis l. strauss (cfr) h. gardiner symonds (chairman and president of tennessee gas and transmission company of houston; vice chairman of petro-texas chemical corp.; chairman of bay petroleum corp., tennessee-venezuela south america, chaco petroleum of south america, tennessee de ecuador, south america, tennessee-argentina, midwest gas transmission co.; member of the board of directors of general telephone & electronics corp., carrier corp., food machinery & chemical corp., national bank of commerce of houston, southern pacific co., advertising council; trustee of committee for economic development; member of the business school, stanford university) a. thomas taylor (chairman of international packers, ltd.; vice president and director of swift & company; member of the board of directors of wedron silica co.) reese h. taylor (chairman of union oil company of california; member of the board of directors of federal reserve bank of san francisco, westinghouse electric corp., collier carbon & chemical corp., manufacturers trust company; trustee, university of southern california, cornell university council) charles allen thomas (president and member of the board of directors of monsanto chemical co.; member of the board of directors of chemstrand corp., first national bank of st. louis, st. louis union trust co.; trustee of carnegie corp.; member of the corporation of the massachusetts institute of technology) juan t. trippe (cfr) solon b. turman (president and director of lykes brothers steam ship co., inc.; vice chairman of lykes brothers, inc.; chairman of gulf and south american steam ship co.) john c. virden (chairman and director of eaton manufacturing co.; member of the board of directors of cleveland electric illuminating co., youngstown steel door co., goodyear tire & rubber co., interlake iron corp., diamond alkali co.) j. carlton ward, jr. (president of vitro corp., american heavy minerals corp.; member of the board of directors of u. s. manganese co.; trustee, cornell university) sidney j. weinberg (partner in goldman, sachs & co.; member of the board of directors of cluett, peabody & co., inc., continental can co., inc., general cigar co., general electric co., general foods corp., b. f. goodrich co., ford motor co., mckesson & robbins, inc., national dairy products corp., champion paper & fibre co., van raalte co., inc.; former governor of new york stock exchange) walter h. wheeler, jr. (cfr) john hay whitney (cfr) langbourne m. williams (cfr) thomas j. watson, jr. (cfr) of these bac members, are members of the council on foreign relations. most of those who are not cfr members have affiliations with foundations or other organizations that are interlocked with the cfr. sidney weinberg, for example (father of the bac), is not listed (in any council on foreign relations annual report in my files) as a member of the cfr; but he is a member of the board of many corporations which support the cfr; and has many close connections with cfr leaders through foundations and other cfr subsidiary agencies. all secretaries of commerce since have served as ex-officio general chairman of the bac. on july , , roger m. blough announced that the business advisory council had changed its name to business council; had severed its connection with the commerce department; and would in the future give its consultative services to any governmental agency that asked for them. the bac had been under intense criticism for the expensive entertainment it had been giving to governmental officials it advised. chapter advertising council the advertising council, west th street, new york , n. y. (with offices at north wabash avenue, chicago; th street, n. w., washington; bush street, san francisco) serves as a public relations operation to promote selected projects supported by the council on foreign relations and its interlocking affiliates. the advertising council was created in (then called war advertising council) as a tax-exempt, non-governmental agency to promote wartime programs of government: rationing, salvage, the selling of war bonds, and so on. the advertising council's specific job was to effect close cooperation between governmental agencies and business firms using the media of mass communication. a governmental agency would bring a particular project (rationing, for example) to the advertising council, for help in "selling" the project to the public. the council would enlist the aid of some advertising agency. the agency (giving its services for nothing, as a contribution to the war effort) would prepare signs, newspaper mats, advertising layouts, broadcasting kits and what not. the advertising council might then enlist the free services of a public relations firm to get this material into newspapers and magazines; get it inserted in the regular ads of business firms; get it broadcast, free, as public-service spot announcements by radio networks; get it inserted into regular commercials on radio broadcasts; get slogans and art work stamped on the envelopes and business forms of corporations. the advertising council rendered a valuable service to advertisers, broadcasting organizations, and publishers. everyone wanted to support projects that would help the war effort. the advertising council did the important job of screening--of presenting projects which were legitimate and urgent. even the advertising agencies and public relations firms, which contributed free services, profited from the arrangement. they earned experience and prestige as agencies which had prepared nationally successful campaigns. * * * * * the advertising council continued after the war to perform this same service--selecting, for free promotion, projects that are "importantly in the public interest." indeed, the service is more valued in peace time than in war by many advertisers and broadcasting officials who are badgered to support countless causes and campaigns, most of which sound good but some of which may be objectionable. investigating to screen the good from the bad is a major job. the advertising council does this job. the council is respected by industry, by the public, and by government. it is safe to promote a project which the advertising council claims to be "importantly in the public interest." thus, officials of the advertising council have become czars in a most important field. they arbitrarily decide what is, and what is not, in the public interest. when the advertising council "accepts" a project, the most proficient experts in the world--leading madison avenue people--go to work, without charge, to create (and saturate the media of mass communication with) the skillful propaganda that "sells" the project to the public. officials of the advertising council are aware of their power as moulders of public opinion. theodore s. repplier, head of the advertising council, was quoted in a june, , issue of _saturday review_, as saying: "there are washington officials hired to collect figures on about every known occupation, to worry about the oil and miners under the ground, the rain in the sky, the wildlife in the woods, and the fish in the streams--but it is nobody's job to worry about america's state of mind, or whether americans misread a situation in a way that could be tragic. "this is a dangerous vacuum. but it is also a vacuum which explains to a considerable degree the important position the advertising council holds in american life today." note, particularly, that the advertising council is responsible to no one. if a business firm should decide on its own to include some "public service" project in its advertising, and the project evoked public indignation, the business firm would lose customers. the advertising council has no customers to please. yet, the advertising council is a private agency, beyond the reach of voter and taxpayer indignation which, theoretically, can exercise some control over public agencies. * * * * * who are these autocrats who have become so powerful that they can condition, if not control, public opinion? they are the members of the public policy committee of the advertising council. here were the members of the advertising council's committee, on june , : _sarah gibson blanding_, president of vassar college; _ralph j. bunche_, united nations under secretary; _benjamin j. buttenwieser_, partner in kuhn, loeb & co.; _olive clapper,_ publicist; _evans clark_, member of the _new york times_ editorial board; _helen hall_, director of henry street settlement; _paul g. hoffman_, chairman of this public policy committee; _charles s. jones_, president of richfield oil corporation; _lawrence a. kimpton_, chancellor of university of chicago; _a. e. lyon_, executive secretary of the railway labor executives association; _john j. mccloy_, chairman of the chase manhattan bank; _eugene meyer_, chairman of the _washington post & times-herald_; _william i. myers_, dean of agriculture at cornell university; _elmo roper_, public opinion analyst; _howard a. rusk_, new york university bellevue medical center; _boris shishkin_, assistant to the president of afl-cio; _george n. shuster_, president of hunter college; _thomas j. watson, jr._, president of international business machines corporation; _henry m. wriston_, executive director of the american assembly. of these , are members of the council on foreign relations--bunche, buttenwieser, hoffman, mccloy, roper, shishkin, shuster, wriston. the remaining are mostly "second level" affiliates of the cfr, or under the thumb of cfr members in the business world. * * * * * some advertising council projects really are "in the public interest." the "stop accidents" campaign and the "smokey bear" campaign to prevent forest fires are among several which probably have done much good. there has never been an advertising council project which insinuated anything to remind anyone of the basic american political idea written into our organic documents of government--the idea that men are endowed by god with inalienable rights; that the greatest threat to those rights is the government under which men live; and that government, while necessary to secure the god-given blessings of liberty, must be carefully limited in power by an inviolable constitution. but there have been many advertising council projects which were vehicles for the propaganda of international socialism. the advertising council has promoted law day, which is an annual occasion for inundating america with "world peace through world law" propaganda, designed to prepare the people for giving the world court jurisdiction over american affairs, as a major step toward world government (see _the dan smoot report_, september , , "the world court"). the advertising council has promoted the "mental health" project, which, superficially, appears to be an admirable effort to make the public aware of the truth that we have more mentally ill people than we have facilities for--but whose underlying, and dubious, purpose is to promote the passage, in all states, of "mental health" laws fabricated by international socialists in the world health organization and in the u. s. public health service. these laws, to "facilitate access to hospital care" for mentally ill people, provide no new facilities, prescribe no better treatment, nor do anything else to relieve the suffering of sick people. the new "mental health" laws, which the advertising council is helping to persuade people in all states to accept, eliminate the constitutional safeguards of a person accused of being mentally ill, thus making it easier for bureaucrats, political enemies and selfish relatives to commit him and get him out of the way. the advertising council has touted action--american council to improve our neighborhoods, box , radio city station, new york , n. y.--an organization for urban renewal. of the persons on the action board of directors, a controlling majority are: known members of the council on foreign relations--such as philip l. graham and stanley marcus; known members of important cfr affiliates--such as, sidney weinberg of the business advisory council; union bosses like harry c. bates, ben fischer, joseph d. keenan, jacob s. potofsky, walter reuther; bureaucrats in charge of various "housing authorities," including dr. robert weaver, kennedy's present housing administrator whose appointment was challenged in the senate because of dr. weaver's alleged communist front record; "liberal" politicians dedicated to the total socialist revolution--such as, joseph s. clark, jr., u. s. senator from pennsylvania; officials of construction and real estate firms which can make mammoth profits on urban renewal projects and who are also "liberal" in their support of all governmental controls and subsidies, the tools for converting capitalism into socialism--such as, william zeckendorf; representatives of organizations also "liberal" in the sense indicated above--such as, philip m. klutznick of b'nai b'rith, and mrs. kathryn h. stone of the league of women voters. * * * * * the advertising council supports united nations propaganda. the annual report of the united states committee for the united nations pays special tribute to the "radio-tv campaign, conducted through the cooperation of the advertising council and the national association of broadcasters." here are some passages, from this tribute, which show how the advertising council gets one-world socialist propaganda into millions of american homes: "perry como read the un spot personally to his audience of , , ." "jack paar ... [showed] a filmed visit to the un by his daughter, randy ... following a splendid statement [by paar]. this -minute segment of the show reached a minimum of , , viewers." "the campaign received tremendous recognition also on meet the press, the today show, i love lucy, the desilu playhouse, and the jack benny show, among many others." "broadcast kits went out to every radio and television station in the country." a recent accomplishment of the advertising council was its saturation bombing ( ) of the american public with propaganda in support of kennedy's youth peace corps. chapter united nations and world government propaganda all american advocates of _supra_-national government, or world government, claim their principal motive is to achieve world peace. yet, these are generally the same americans whose eager interventionism helped push america into the two world wars of this century. the propaganda for involving america in the bloodshed and hatreds of europe--in world war i and world war ii--was the same as that now being used to push us into world government. in world war i, we rushed our soldiers across the wide seas to die in the cause of making the world safe for democracy--of eliminating evil in the world so that there would not be any more war! this was precisely what the world-government interventionists wanted us to do. the so-called american isolationists were _not_ pacifists who recommended refusal to take up arms in defense of their own country: most of them were patriots who would have been among the foremost to fight in defense of america. being intelligent citizens of a peaceful and civilized nation, they wanted to keep it that way. the world-government interventionists used the extraordinary arguments of a man who, though living in an orderly and law-abiding neighborhood, says that he must go carousing around in adjoining communities and get involved in every street fight and barroom brawl he can find in order to avoid violence! such a man not only becomes a party to lawless violence which he claims to deplore, but also creates hatreds and resentments which will ultimately bring to the sane citizens of his own peaceful neighborhood the evils which they had managed to keep out. this is what woodrow wilson's intervention in world war i did to the united states. it sacrificed the lives of , american men--not to mention the hundreds of thousands crippled and otherwise wrecked by war. but this sacrifice of american youth did not make the world safe for anything. it helped make the world a breeding place for communism, fascism, naziism, and other varieties of socialism; and it planted the seeds for a second world war more destructive than the first. but the world-government interventionists--when their bloody crusade proved worse than a tragic failure--did not admit error. they tried to place all the blame on the isolationists who had tried to keep us from making the ghastly mistake. * * * * * if we had stayed out of world war i, the european powers would have arrived, as they have been doing for thousands of years, at some kind of negotiated peace which would have saved not only hundreds of thousands of american lives, but millions of european lives as well. by entering world war i, we merely converted it into total war, prolonged it, and made it more savage. the destruction and slaughter of world war i created power vacuums and imbalances and economic chaos, which inevitably led to world war ii. again, the world-government advocates, who claimed to want peace, insisted that we go to war. they also intensified their efforts to entangle america, irretrievably, in political and economic union with european nations so that there would never again be any _possibility_ of the united states staying out of the endless wars and turmoil of the old world. it is, perhaps, fruitless to question the motives of people leading the campaign to push america into world government. all organizations which have been active in this movement--world fellowship, inc., federal union, inc., atlantic union committee, united world federalists, and so on--have had a sprinkling of communist-fronters among their directors and members. but they have also had the official support of many prominent and respected americans: harry truman, dwight eisenhower, john kennedy, richard nixon, estes kefauver, john sparkman, adlai stevenson, dean acheson, john foster dulles, christian herter, cabinet officers; senators and congressmen; supreme court justices; prominent churchmen, businessmen, financiers, entertainers, judges, union officials; newspaper and magazine editors; famous columnists and radio-television commentators. * * * * * although the cry of "peace" is the perennial clarion call of all world-government advocates, many of them have, in recent years, added the claim that their recommendations (for converting america into a province of world government) are means of "fighting communism." indeed, some of the most vigorous advocates of one-worldism have wide reputations as anti-communists--walter judd, a republican congressman from minnesota, for example. even clarence streit (leader of the now-defunct federal union, inc., and father of that organization's very active and influential tax-exempt successor, atlantic union committee) has ugly things to say about communism. the fact is that every step the united states takes toward political and economic entanglements with the rest of the world is a step toward realization of _the_ end objective of communism: creating a one-world socialist political and economic system in which we will be one of the subjugated provinces. because of the wealth we have created as a free and independent nation, we would be the most heavily taxed province in any conceivable supra-national government--whether in a "limited, federal union of the western democracies," which is what the atlantic union committee people say they want; or in a total one-world system, which is what _all_ advocates of international union really have as their final goal. because of our population, however, we would have minority representation in any supra-national government now being planned. americans would be subjected to laws enacted by an international parliament in which we would have little influence; taxing us, regulating our economic activities, controlling our schools, and dictating our social and cultural relations with each other and with the rest of the world. * * * * * america was founded, populated, and developed by people seeking escape from oppressive governments in europe. now our own leaders ask us to give up the freedom and independence which our forebears won for us with blood and toil and valorous devotion to high ideals, to become subjects in a governmental system that would inevitably be more tyrannical than any which our forefathers rebelled against or any that presently exist. if the world government included the despotic and oligarchic and militaristic, and feudalistic and primitive systems of asia, the middle east, africa, and latin america, it would necessarily become the bloodiest and most oppressive tyranny the world has ever known. nowadays, when two or more nations amalgamate their economic, political, and social systems they necessarily take the lowest common denominator of freedom rather than the highest. in fact, they must take something lower than the lowest: the union government will be more restrictive than the government of any of the nations which formed the union. this will be true of _any_ _supra_-national government that the united states might get into: the union will not extend american freedom to other nations; it will extend to all nations in the union the most restrictive controls of the most oppressive government which enters the union, and make even those controls worse than they were before the union was formed--because the american principle of federalism has been discarded by the "liberals" who manage our national affairs; and american federalism is the only political principle ever to exist in the history of the world that can make individual human freedom possible in a federation of states. hard core american communists know (and some admit) that any move toward american membership in any kind of supra-national government is a move toward the soviet objective of a one-world socialist dictatorship; but all other american advocates of international union claim their schemes are intended to repeat and extend the marvelous achievement of american states which, by forming a political union, created a free and powerful nation. all united states advocates of any kind of world government point to the founding of america: sovereign states, each one proud and nationalistic, all with special interests that were divergent from or in conflict with the interests of the others; yet, they managed to surrender enough sovereignty to join a federal union which gave the united strength of all, while retaining the individuality and freedom of each. * * * * * the american states, in forming a federal union, did not take the lowest common denominator of freedom; they took the highest, and elevated that. the american principle of federalism (indeed, the whole american constitutional system) grew out of the philosophical doctrine (or, rather, statement of faith) which jefferson wrote into the declaration of independence: "_...all men are ... endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights..._" men get their rights from god, not from government. government, a man-made creature, has nothing except what it takes from god-created men. government can give the people nothing that it has not first taken away from them. hence, if man is to remain free, he must have a government which will play a very limited and negative role in his private affairs. the united states is the only nation, ever, whose institutions and organic law were founded on this principle. the united nations' declaration of human rights; the constitution of the soviet union; and the written and unwritten constitutions of every other nation in the world are all built on a political principle exactly opposite in meaning to the basic principle of americanism. that is, the constitution of the soviet union, and of every un agency, and of all other nations, specify a large number of rights and privileges which citizens should have, if possible, and which _government_ will grant them _if_ government can, and _if_ government thinks proper. contrast this with the american constitution and bill of rights which do not contain one statement or inference that the federal government has any responsibility, or power, to grant the people rights, privileges, or benefits of any kind. the total emphasis in these american documents is on telling the federal government _what it cannot do_ to and for the people--on ordering the federal government to stay out of the private affairs of citizens and to leave their god-given rights alone. * * * * * this negative, restricted role of the federal government, and this assumption that god and not government is the source of man's rights and privileges, are clearly stated in the preamble to our constitution. the preamble says that this constitution is being _ordained_ and established, not to _grant_ liberties to the people, but to _secure_ the liberties which the people already had (before the government was ever formed) as _blessings_. the essence of the american constitutional system, which made freedom in a federal union possible, is clearly stated in the first sentence of the first article of our constitution and in the last article (the tenth amendment) of our bill of rights. the first article of our constitution begins with the phrase, "all legislative powers _herein_ granted...." that obviously meant the federal government had no powers which were not granted to it by the constitution. the tenth amendment restates the same thing with emphasis: "the powers not delegated to the united states by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." clearly and emphatically, our constitution says that the federal government cannot legally do anything which is not authorized by a specific grant of power in the constitution. this is the one constitutional concept that made the american governmental system different from all others; it is the one which left our people so free and unmolested by their own government that they converted the backward, american continent into the land of freedom, the most fruitful and powerful nation in history. and this was the constitutional proviso which created the american principle of federalism. the constitution made no grant, or even inferred a grant, of power to the federal government for meddling, to any extent, or for any purpose whatever, in the private cultural, economic, social, educational, religious, or political affairs of individual citizens--or in the legitimate governmental activities of the individual states which became members of the federal union. hence, states could join the federal union without sacrificing the freedom of their citizens. modern "liberalism" which has been continuously in control of the federal government (and of most opinion-forming institutions and media throughout our society) since franklin d. roosevelt's first inauguration, march , , has, by ignoring constitutional restraints, changed our _federal_ government with _limited_ powers into a _central_ government with _limitless_ power over the individual states and their people. modern "liberalism" has abandoned american constitutional government and replaced it with democratic centralism, which, in _fundamental theory, is identical_ with the democratic centralism of the soviet union, and of every other major nation existing today. it was possible to enlarge the size of the old american federal union without diminishing freedom for the people. when you enlarge the land area and population controlled by democratic centralism you must necessarily diminish freedom for the people, because the problems of centralized government increase with the size of population and area which it controls. * * * * * look at what has happened to america since our _federal_ government was converted into a centralized absolutism. the central government in washington arrogated to itself the unconstitutional power and responsibility of regulating the relationships between private employers and their employees, enacting laws which established "collective bargaining" as "national policy," and which, to that end, gave international unions a virtual monopoly over large segments of the labor market. it follows that a minor labor dispute between two unions on the waterfront of new york is no longer a concern only of the people and police in that neighborhood. a handful of union members who have no grievance whatever against their employers but who are in a jurisdictional struggle with another union, can shut down the greatest railroad systems in the world, throw thousands out of work, and paralyze vital transportation for business firms and millions of citizens all over the nation. harry bridges on the west coast can order a political demonstration having nothing to do with "labor" matters, and paralyze the economy of half the nation. imagine what it will be like if we join a world government. then a dock strike in london will cripple, not just the british isles but the whole world. now, the central government in washington sends troops into local communities to enforce, at bayonet point, the illegal edicts of a washington judicial oligarchy concerning the operation of local schools. if we join world government, the edict and the troops will come (depending on what nations are in the international union, of course) from india and japan and the congo. * * * * * there was a time when americans, learning of suffering and want in a distant land, could respond to their christian promptings and native kindliness by making voluntary contributions for relief to their fellow human beings abroad. our central government's foreign aid programs have already taken much of that freedom away from american citizens--taxing them so heavily for what government wants to give away, that private citizens can't spend their own money the way they would like to. what will it be like if we join a world government that embraces the real have-not nations of the earth? the impoverished subcontinent of india, because of population, would have more representatives in the international parliament than we would have. they, with the support of representatives from latin america and africa, could easily vote to lay a tax on "surplus" incomes for the benefit of all illiterate and hungry people everywhere; and outvoted americans would be the only people in the world with incomes high enough to meet the international definition of "surplus." we read with horror of soviet slaughter in hungary when the soviets suppress a local rebellion against their partial world-government. what kind of horror would we feel after we join a world government and see troops from europe and africa and the middle east machinegunning people on the streets of united states cities in order to suppress a rebellion of young americans who somehow heard about the magnificent constitutional system and glorious freedom their fathers used to have and who are trying to make a public demonstration of protest against the international tyranny being imposed upon them? a genuine world government might eliminate the armed conflict (between nations) which we now call war; but it would cause an endless series of bloody uprisings and bloody suppressions, and would cause more human misery than total war itself. * * * * * in , the communist international formally presented its three-stage plan for achieving world government--_stage :_ socialize the economies of all nations, particularly the western "capitalistic democracies" (most particularly, the united states); _stage :_ bring about federal unions of various groupings of these socialized nations; _stage :_ amalgamate all of the federal unions into one world-wide union of socialist states. the following passage is from the official program of the communist international: "...dictatorship can be established only by a victory of socialism in different countries or groups of countries, after which the proletariat republics would unite on federal lines with those already in existence, and this system of federal unions would expand ... at length forming the world union of socialist soviet republics." in (three years after this communist program was outlined) clarence k. streit (a rhodes scholar who was foreign correspondent for _the new york times_, covering league of nations activities from - ) wrote _union now_, a book advocating a gradual approach through regional unions to final world union--an approach identical with that of the communists, except that streit did not say his scheme was intended to achieve world dictatorship, and did not characterize the end result of his scheme as a "world union of socialist soviet republics." * * * * * in , clarence k. streit (together with percival f. brundage, later a director of the budget for eisenhower; and melvin ryder, publisher of the _army times_) formed federal union, inc., to work for the goals outlined in streit's book, _union now_, published the year before. in , streit published another book: _union now with britain_. he claims that the union he advocated would be a step toward "formation of free world government." but the arguments of his book make it very clear that in joining a union with other nations, the united states would not bring to the union old american constitutional concepts of free-enterprise and individual freedom under limited government, but would rather amalgamate with the socialistic-communistic systems that exist in the other nations which became members of the union. the following passages are from page of streit's _union now with britain_: "democrats cannot ... quarrel with soviet russia or any other nation because of its economic collectivism, for democracy itself introduced the idea of collective machinery into politics. it is a profound mistake to identify democracy and union necessarily or entirely with either capitalist or socialist society, with either the method of individual or collective enterprise. there is room for both of these methods in democracy.... "democracy not only allows mankind to choose freely between capitalism and collectivism, but it includes marxist governments, parties and press...." when the year ended, america was in world war ii; and all american advocates of world-peace-through-world-law-and-world-government jubilantly struck while the iron was hot--using the hysteria and confusion of the early days of our involvement in the great catastrophe as a means of pushing us into one or another of the schemes for union with other nations. clarence streit states it this way, in his most recent book (_freedom's frontier atlantic union now_, ): "japan pearl harbored us into the war we had sought to avoid by disunion.... now, we americans had the white heat of war to help leaders form the nuclear atlantic union." * * * * * on january , (when we had been at war less than a month), clarence streit's federal union, inc., bought advertising space in major newspapers for a petition urging congress to adopt a joint resolution favoring immediate union of the united states with several specified foreign nations. such people as harold l. ickes (roosevelt cabinet officer), owen j. roberts (supreme court justice), and john foster dulles (later eisenhower's secretary of state) signed this newspaper ad petitioning congress to drag america into world government. in fact, these notables (especially john foster dulles) had actually written the joint resolution which federal union wanted congress to adopt. the world government resolution (urged upon congress in january, ) provided among other things that in the federal union of nations to be formed, the "union" government would have the right: ( ) to impose a common citizenship; ( ) to tax citizens directly; ( ) to make and enforce all laws; ( ) to coin and borrow money; ( ) to have a monopoly on all armed forces; and ( ) to _admit new members_. the following is from a federal union, inc., ad published in _the washington evening star_, january , , urging upon the people and congress of america an immediate plunge into world government: "....resolved: "that the president of the united states submit to congress a program for forming a powerful union of free peoples to win the war, the peace, the future; "that this program unite our people, on the broad lines of our constitution, with the people of canada, the united kingdom, eire, australia, new zealand, and the union of south africa, together with such other free peoples, both in the old world and the new as may be found ready and able to unite on this federal basis.... "we gain from the fact that all the soviet republics are already united in one government, as are also all the chinese-speaking people, once so divided. surely, we and they must agree that union now of the democracies wherever possible is equally to the general advantage.... "let us begin now a world united states.... "the surest way to shorten and to win this war is also the surest way to guarantee to ourselves, and our friends and foes, that this war will end in a union of the free. the surest way to do all this is for us to start that union now." * * * * * world fellowship, inc., was also busy putting pressure on congress in january, . world fellowship, inc., is one of the oldest world government organizations. it was founded in as the "league of neighbors." in , the league of neighbors united with the union of east and west (which had been founded in india). in , this combined organization reorganized and changed its name to world fellowship of faiths. in late , it changed its name again and incorporated--and has operated since that time as world fellowship, inc. dr. willard uphaus, a notorious communist-fronter, has been executive director of world fellowship, inc., since february, . here is a joint resolution which world fellowship, inc., urged congress to adopt on or before january , --as a _birthday present_ to president franklin d. roosevelt. "now, therefore, be it "resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america, in congress assembled, that the congress of the united states of america does hereby solemnly declare that all peoples of the earth should now be united in a commonwealth of nations to be known as the united nations of the world, and to that end it hereby gives to the president of the united states of america all the needed authority and powers of every kind and description, without limitations of any kind that are necessary in his sole and absolute discretion to set up and create the federation of the world, a world peace government under the title of the 'united nations of the world,' including its constitution and personnel and all other matters needed or appertaining thereto to the end that all nations of the world may by voluntary action become a part thereof under the same terms and conditions. "there is hereby authorised to be appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of million dollars or so much thereof as may be necessary, to be expended by the president in his sole and absolute discretion, to effectuate the purposes of this joint resolution, and in addition, the sum of billion dollars for the immediate use of the united nations of the world under its constitution as set up and created by the president of the united states of america as provided in this joint resolution...." congress rejected the world-government resolutions urged upon it in by federal union, inc., and by world fellowship, inc. * * * * * but the formation of the united nations in was a tremendous step in the direction these two organizations were travelling. the "world peace" aspects of the united nations were emphasized to enlist support of the american public. few americans noticed that the un charter really creates a worldwide social, cultural, economic, educational, and political alliance--and commits each member nation to a program of total socialism for itself and to the support of total socialism for all other nations. the united nations is, to be sure, a weaker alliance than world government advocates want; but the un was the starting point and framework for world government. the massive un propaganda during the first few years after the formation of the un ( ) was so effective in brainwashing the american people, that the united world federalists, beginning with the state assembly of california, managed to get state legislatures to pass resolutions demanding that congress call a constitutional convention for the purpose of amending our constitution in order to "expedite and insure" participation of the united states in a world government. when the american people found out what was going on, all of these "resolutions" were repealed--most of them before the end of . but was a great year for american world government advocates. * * * * * on april , , dean acheson's "brainchild," the north atlantic treaty, was ratified by the united states. president truman signed the proclamation putting nato in force on august , . most americans were happy with this organization. it was supposedly a military alliance to protect the free world against communism. but few americans bothered to read the brief, -article treaty. if they had, article would have sounded rather strange and out of place in a military alliance. here is article of the nato treaty: "the parties will contribute toward the future development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and _well being_. they will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." here in this "military" treaty, which re-affirms the participants' "faith in the purposes and principles of the charter of the united nations," is the legal basis for a union, an atlantic union, a _supra_-national government, all under the united nations. * * * * * immediately upon the formation of nato, clarence k. streit created (in ) the atlantic union committee, inc. strait's old federal union was permitted to become virtually defunct (although it technically still exists, as publisher of streit's books, and so on). streit got federal tax exemption for the atlantic union committee by writing into its charter a proviso that the organisation would not "attempt to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise." yet, the charter of auc states its purposes as follows: "to promote support for congressional action requesting the president of the united states to invite the other democracies which sponsored the north atlantic treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet with delegates of the united states in a federal convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the united nations, the principles of free federal union." an atlantic union committee resolution, providing for the calling of an international convention to "explore" steps toward a limited world government, was actually introduced in the congress in --with the support of a frightful number of "liberals" then in the congress. the resolution did not come to a vote in the st congress ( - ). estes kefauver (democrat, tennessee) gravitated to the leadership in pushing for the resolution in subsequent congresses; and he had the support of the top leadership of both parties, republican and democrat, north and south--including people like richard nixon, william fulbright, lister hill, hubert humphrey, mike mansfield, kenneth keating, jacob javits, christian herter, and so on. from to , the atlantic union resolution was introduced in each congress--except the one republican-controlled congress ( rd-- ). * * * * * in , atlantic union advocates, having got nowhere in ten years of trying to push their resolution through congress, changed tactics. in , streit's atlantic union committee published a pamphlet entitled, _our one best hope--for us--for the united nations--for all mankind_, recommending an "action" program to "strengthen the un." this "action" program asks the u.s. congress to pass a resolution calling for an international convention which would accomplish certain "fundamental objectives," to wit: "that only reasonably experienced democracies be asked to participate; and that the number asked to participate should be small enough to enhance the chance for early agreement, yet large enough to create, if united, a preponderance of power on the side of freedom. "that the delegates be officially appointed but that they be uninstructed by their governments so that they shall be free to act in accordance with their own individual consciences. "that, whatever the phraseology, it should not be such as to preclude any proposal which, in the wisdom of the convention, is the most practical step. "that the findings of the delegates could be only recommendations, later to be accepted or rejected by their legislatures and their fellow citizens." * * * * * the nato citizens commission law of fully carries out the purposes and intent of the new atlantic union strategy fabricated in to replace the old resolution which had failed for ten years. the roll-call vote on this law (published in the february , , issue of _the dan smoot report_) shows what a powerful array of united states congressmen and senators are for this step toward world government. the debates in house and senate (senate: _congressional record_, june , , pp. _ff_; house: _congressional record_, august , , pp. _ff_) show something even more significant. while denying that the nato citizens commission law had any relation to the old atlantic union resolution which congress had refused for ten years to consider, "liberals" in both senate and house used language right out of the atlantic union committee pamphlet of (_our best hope ..._) to "prove" that this nato citizens commission proposal was not dangerous: they argued, for example, that commission members would be free to act in accordance with their own individual consciences; that the meetings of the commission would be purely exploratory, and that commission findings would be "only recommendations," not binding on the u.s. government. congressional "liberals" supporting the nato citizens commission also tried to establish the respectability of the commission by arguing that it was merely being created to explore means of implementing article of the nato treaty. are these "liberal" congressmen and senators so ignorant that they do not know the whole atlantic union movement is built under the canopy of "implementing article of this nato treaty?" or, are they too stupid to understand this? or, are they so dishonest that they distort the facts, thinking that the public is too confused or ignorant to discover the truth? although the liberals in congress loudly denied that the nato citizens commission law of had anything to do with atlantic union, clarence streit knew better--or was more honest. as soon as the law was passed, streit began a hasty revision of his old _union now_. early in , harper & brothers published the revision, under the title _freedom's frontier atlantic union now_. in this new book, streit expresses jubilation about the nato citizens commission law; and, on the second page of the first chapter, he says: "one change in the picture, which has seemed too slight or too recent to be noted yet by the general public, seems to me so significant as to give in itself reason enough for new faith in freedom's future, and for this new effort to advance it. on september , , president eisenhower signed an act of congress authorizing a united states citizens commission on nato to organize and participate in a convention of citizens of north atlantic democracies with a view to exploring fully and recommending concretely how to unite their peoples better." _the atlantic union news_ (published by the atlantic union committee, inc.) in the september, , issue presents an exultant article under the headline "auc victorious: resolution signed by president becomes public law - ." the article says: "members of the atlantic union committee could certainly be forgiven if by now they had decided that the resolution for an atlantic exploratory convention would never pass both houses of congress. however, it has just done so. it was signed into law by the president september , . the incredible size of this victory is hard, even for us in washington, to comprehend...." who actually runs clarence streit's atlantic union committee which finally succeeded in ordering the congress and the president of the united states to take this sinister step toward world government? the council on foreign relations! the three top officials of the atlantic union committee are members of the cfr: elmo roper, president; william l. clayton, vice president; and lithgow osborne, secretary. as of december, , there were members of the atlantic union committee. of these, were also members of the council on foreign relations. the december, , membership list of the auc is in appendix ii of this volume. each council on foreign relations member is designated on that list with cfr in parentheses after his name. * * * * * the nato citizens commission law of provided that the speaker of the house and the vice president should select persons to serve on the commission. in march, , sam rayburn and lyndon johnson appointed the following persons as members of the commission: donald g. agger; will l. clayton; charles william engelhard, jr.; george j. feldman; morris forgash; christian a. herter; dr. francis s. hutchins; eric johnston; william f. knowland; hugh moore; ralph d. pittman, ben regan; david rockefeller; elmo b. roper (jr.); mrs. edith s. sampson; adolph w. schmidt; oliver c. schroeder; burr s. swezey, sr.; alex warden; and douglas wynn. of the members of the nato citizens commission, are members of the council on foreign relations: clayton, herter, johnston, moore, rockefeller, roper, schmidt. roper is president and clayton is vice president of the atlantic union committee. the others are generally second-level affiliates of the cfr. * * * * * the united world federalists does not have as much power and influence as clarence streit's atlantic union, but is clearly the second most influential organization working for world government. the specific objective of the united world federalists is rapid transformation (through expansion of the jurisdiction of the world court, establishment of an international "police force," and so on) of the united nations into an all-powerful world government. the aim of the uwf organization, as expressed in its own literature (the most revealing piece of which is a pamphlet called _beliefs, purposes and policies_) is: "to create a world federal government with authority to enact, interpret, and enforce world law adequate to maintain peace." the world federal government would be, "based upon the following principles and include the following powers.... "membership open to all nations without the right of secession.... world law should be enforceable directly upon individuals.... the world government should have direct taxing power independent of national taxation." the uwf scheme provides for a world police force and the prohibition of "possession by any nation of armaments and forces beyond an approved level required for internal policing." the uwf proposes to work toward its world government scheme, "by making use of the amendment process of the united nations to transform it into such a world federal government; "by participating in world constituent assemblies, whether of private individuals, parliamentary or other groups seeking to produce draft constitutions for consideration and possible adoption by the united nations or by national governments...." norman cousins and james p. warburg (both prominent council on foreign relations members) formed the united world federalists in february, , at ashville, north carolina, by amalgamating three small organizations (world federalists, student federalists, and americans united for world government). cousins is still honorary president of uwf. walter reuther (a "second-level" affiliate of the cfr), cousins, and warburg actually run the uwf at the top. other council on foreign relations members who are officials in the uwf include harry a. bullis, arthur h. bunker, cass canfield, mark f. ethridge, douglas fairbanks, jr., harold k. guinzburg, isador lubin, cord meyer, jr., lewis mumford, harry scherman, raymond gram swing, paul c. smith, walter wanger, james d. zellerbach. * * * * * the institute for international order, west nd street, new york , new york, is another organization working for world government. it was founded on november , , at washington, d.c., as the association for education in world government. on may , , it changed its name to institute for international government. on may , , it changed names again, to the present institute for international order. the purpose of this organization has remained constant, through all the name changing, since it was originally founded in : to strengthen the united nations into a genuine world government. and it is a part of the interlocking apparatus which constitutes our invisible government. the institute for international order gets % of its income from foundations which members of the council on foreign relations control; and the following cfr members are officers of the institute: earl d. osborn (president), henry b. cabot (vice president), edward w. barrett, paul g. hoffman, and irving salomon. in , the state department created the u.s. committee for the un (mentioned in chapter viii, in connection with the advertising council) as a semi-official organization to propagandize for the un in the united states, with emphasis on promoting "un day" each year. the council on foreign relations dominates the u.s. committee for the un. such persons as stanley c. allyn, ralph bunche, gardner cowles, h. j. heinz, ii, eric johnston, milton katz, stanley marcus, hugh moore, john nason, earl d. osborn, jack i. straus, and walter wheeler, jr.--all council on foreign relations members--are members of the u.s. committee for the united nations. walter wheeler, jr., (last name in the list above) is president of pitney-bowes, maker of postage meter machines. in , mr. wheeler tried to stop all pitney-bowes customers from using, on their meter machines, the american patriotic slogan, "this is a republic, not a democracy: let's keep it that way." mr. wheeler said this slogan was controversial. but mr. wheeler supported a campaign to get the slogan of international socialism, _un we believe_, used on pitney-bowes postage meter machines--probably the most controversial slogan ever to appear in american advertising, as we shall see presently. the american association for the united nations--aaun--is another tax-exempt, "semi-private" organization set up (not directly by the cfr, but by the state department which the council runs) as a propaganda agency for the un. it serves as an outlet for un pamphlets and, with chapters in most key cities throughout the united states, as an organizer of meetings, lecture-series, and other programs which propagandize about the ineffable goodness and greatness of the united nations as the maker and keeper of world peace. the council on foreign relations dominates the aaun. some of the leading cfr members who run the aaun are: ralph j. bunche, cass canfield, benjamin v. cohen, john cowles, clark m. eichelberger, ernest a. gross, paul g. hoffman, palmer hoyt, herbert lehman, oscar de lima, irving salomon, james t. shotwell, sumner welles, quincy wright. * * * * * in , the united states committee for the un created an industry participation division for the specific purpose of getting the un emblem and _un we believe_ slogan displayed on the commercial vehicles, stationery, business forms, office buildings, flag poles, and advertising layouts of american business firms. the first major firm to plunge conspicuously into this pro-un propaganda drive was united air lines. w. a. patterson, president of united, is an official of the committee for economic development, a major council on foreign relations propaganda affiliate, and has served on the business-education committee of the ced. mr. patterson had the _un we believe_ emblem painted in a conspicuous place on every plane in the united air lines fleet. there was a massive protest from americans who know that the un is part of the great scheme to destroy america as a free and independent republic. mr. patterson had the un emblems removed from his planes. * * * * * in , the american association for the united nations and the u. s. committee for the un (both enjoying federal tax exemption, as "educational" in the "public interest") created another tax-exempt organization to plaster the un emblem all over the american landscape. the new organization is called un we believe. here is an article from the may-june, , issue of _weldwood news_, a house organ of united states plywood corporation (new york , new york): "a. w. (al) teichmeier, usp director of merchandising, is the company's closest physical link to the united nations--he's president of un we believe. "un we believe, under joint auspices of the american association for the un and the u. s. committee for the un, is a non-profit, year-round program geared to convince industry, organizations and individuals how important public support can mean in preserving world peace. "usp uses the seal ... (un emblem and _un we believe_ slogan) on its postage meters for all new york mailings. among some other active companies in the program are cit, general telephone, texaco, american sugar refining, p. lorillard co., and klm dutch airlines." plywood companies (small ones, producing hardwood plywood, if not big ones like usp) have been grievously hurt by the trade and foreign-aid policies which the un, international-socialist crowd is responsible for. lenin is said to have remarked that when it comes time for communists to hang all capitalists, the capitalists will bid against each other for contracts to sell the rope. the article from _weldwood news_, quoted above, was quoted in the july , , issue of _the dan smoot report_. the companies mentioned received some mail, criticizing them for supporting un we believe. the texaco company denied that it had ever been active in un we believe and said that the editor of _weldwood news_ had apologized for the error in publishing the reference to texaco and had expressed regret for "the embarrassment caused" texaco. while denying support for un we believe, however, mr. augustus c. long, chairman of the board of texaco (and a member of the business advisory council) gave unqualified endorsement of the council on foreign relations. in a letter dated august , , mr. long said: "the council on foreign relations is one of the most effective organizations in this country devoted to spreading information on international problems. the officers and directors of the council are men of reputation and stature. we believe that the council through its study groups makes an outstanding contribution to public information concerning foreign policy issues." chapter foreign aid one day in the spring of , a new york lawyer received a long distance telephone call. concerning this call, the _new york times_ reported: "'this is president kennedy,' the telephone voice said. "'the hell you say,' retorted the lawyer. 'i guess that makes me the prime minister of england, but what can i do for you?' "'nobody's pulling your leg,' the telephone voice said. 'this is president kennedy all right. i want to talk to you about coming down here to washington to help me with this long-term foreign aid legislation.'" one week later, the new york lawyer took an apartment in washington and, as a member of president kennedy's "task force" on foreign aid, started writing the foreign assistance act of . the lawyer is theodore tannenwald, jr., a member of the council on foreign relations, who wrote many of the foreign aid bills which president harry truman presented to congress and who, during the first eisenhower term, was assistant director of the mutual security program. after mr. tannenwald and his task force had finished writing the foreign aid bill, president kennedy appointed tannenwald coordinator in charge of "presenting" the bill to committees of the house and senate. three cabinet officers and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff took their orders from mr. tannenwald, who was, according to the _new york times_, "the administration's composer, orchestrator and conductor of the most important legislative symphony of the congressional session." with admiration, the _times_ said: "mr. tannenwald has been a kind of special white house ambassador to capitol hill. while the legislative committees struggled with the controversial proposal to by-pass the appropriating process and give the president authority to borrow $ , , , ( billion, million) for development lending in the next five years, he was the man in the ante-room empowered to answer questions in the name of the president." * * * * * in july, , president kennedy completed mr. tannenwald's foreign aid "orchestra." on july , in ceremonies at the white house, the president formally announced creation of the newest foreign-aid propaganda organization, the citizens committee for international development, with warren lee pierson as chairman. here is the membership of the citizens committee for international development: _eugenie anderson_ (member of the atlantic union committee); _william benton_ (chairman of the board of _encyclopaedia britannica_; member of the atlantic union committee); _everett n. case_ (president of colgate university); _o. roy chalk_ (president of the district of columbia transit company); _malcolm s. forbes_ (editor and publisher of _forbes magazine_); _eleanor clark french_; _albert m. greenfield_ (honorary chairman of the board of bankers security corporation, philadelphia); _general alfred m. gruenther_ (president of the american national red cross; member of the atlantic union committee); _murray d. lincoln_ (chairman of nationwide insurance company); _sol m. linowitz_ (chairman of zerox corporation); _george meany_ (president of afl-cio); _william s. paley_ (chairman of the board, columbia broadcasting system); _warren lee pierson_ (chairman of the board, trans-world airways); _ross pritchard_ (professor of political science, southwestern university, memphis); _thomas s. nichols_ (chairman of the board of olin mathieson chemical corporation; member of the atlantic union committee); _mrs. mary g. roebling_ (president of trenton trust company); _david sarnoff_ (chairman of radio corporation of america); _walter sterling surrey_ (legal consultant, economic cooperation administration); _thomas j. watson, jr._, (president of international business machines corporation); _walter h. wheeler, jr._, (president of pitney-bowes); _james d. zellerbach_ (president and director of crown-zellerbach corporation; chairman of fibreboard products, inc.; member of the atlantic union committee and united world federalists); _ezra zilkha_ (head of zilkha & sons). of these people, (including the chairman) are members of the council on foreign relations: benton, case, gruenther, paley, pierson, pritchard, nichols, sarnoff, surrey, watson, wheeler, and zellerbach. * * * * * heads of the ford and rockefeller foundations attended the white house luncheon when the committee was formed. vice president johnson, secretary of state dean rusk, and attorney general robert kennedy were also present. the president urged each and all to get foundations, business firms, civic organizations, and the people generally, to put pressure on congress in support of the foreign aid bill. within a week after the july , white house luncheon meeting (which launched the cfr's foreign aid committee), the president and his high-level aides were talking about a grave crisis in berlin and about foreign aid as _the_ essential means of "meeting" that crisis. on july , when congressional debates over the foreign aid bill were in a critical stage, president kennedy spoke to the nation on radio and television, solemnly warning the people that the berlin situation was dangerous. immediate, additional support for the foreign aid bill came from the country's liberal and leftwing forces, who united in a passionate plea--urging the american people to support the president "in this grave hour." * * * * * on august , an associated press release announced that house leader john w. mccormack (democrat, massachusetts), was attempting to enlist the cooperation of , city mayors in support of a long-range foreign aid bill to meet the president's demands. mccormack sent the city officials a statement of his views with a cover letter suggesting that the matter be brought to "the attention of citizens of your community through publication in your local newspaper," and, further, urging their "personal endorsement of this bipartisan program through the medium of your local press...." state department officials scheduled speaking tours throughout the land, and cfr affiliated organizations (like the councils on world affairs) started the build-up to provide audiences--all in the interest of "briefing" the american people on the necessity and beauties of foreign aid. anyone with sense had to wonder how the giving of american tax money to communist governments in europe and to socialist governments all over the earth could help us resist communism in berlin. but with the top leaders in our society (from the president downward to officials in the national council of churches) telling us that the survival of our nation depended on the president's getting all the foreign aid "authorization" he wanted--most americans remained silent, feeling that such consequential and complicated matters should be left in the hands of our chosen leaders. by the end of august, the foreign assistance act of had been passed by both houses of congress; and the berlin crisis moved from front page lead articles in the nation's newspapers to less important columns. thus, in , as always, the foreign aid bill was a special project of our invisible government, the council on foreign relations. and, in , as always, the great, tax-supported propaganda machine used a fear psychology to bludgeon the people into silence and the congress into obedience. president kennedy signed the act as public law - on september , . * * * * * public law - authorized $ , , , ( billion, million, thousand) in foreign aid: $ , , , appropriated for the fiscal year, and $ , , , treasury borrowing authorized for the next five years. the law does require the president to obtain annual appropriations for the treasury borrowing, but permits him to make commitments to lend the money to foreign countries, _before_ he obtains appropriations from congress. it was widely reported in the press that congress had denied the president the long-term borrowing authority he had requested; but the president himself was satisfied. he knew that by promising loans to foreign governments (that is, "committing" the funds in advance of congressional appropriation) he would thus force congress (in the interest of showing "national unity" and of not "repudiating" our president) to appropriate whatever he promised. on august , the president said: "the compromise ... is wholly satisfactory. it gives the united states government authority to make commitments for long-term development programs with reasonable assurance that these commitments will be met." * * * * * former vice president richard m. nixon (a member of the cfr) was happy about the foreign aid bill. on august , nixon, on the abc radio network, said that he favored such "long-range foreign aid planning, financed through multi-year authorizations and annual appropriations." nelson a. rockefeller, republican governor of new york, announced that he too favored "long-range foreign aid planning, financed through multi-year authorizations and annual appropriations"--exactly like nixon. former president eisenhower was also happy. he, too, said he favored this sort of thing. senator j. william fulbright (democrat, arkansas) was almost jubilant: he said congress for the next five years would be under "strong obligation" to put up the money for whatever the president promises to foreign governments. all in all, it is improbable that congress ever passed another bill more destructive of american constitutional principles; more harmful to our nation politically, economically, morally, and militarily; and more helpful to communism-socialism all over the earth--than the foreign assistance act of , which was, from beginning to end, a product of the council on foreign relations. * * * * * our foreign aid does grievous harm to the american people by burdening them with excessive taxation, thus making it difficult for them to expand their own economy. this gives government pretext for intervening with more taxation and controls for domestic subsidies. furthermore, the money that government takes away from us for foreign aid is used to subsidize our political enemies and economic competitors abroad. note, for example, the large quantities of agricultural goods which we give every year to communist satellite nations, thus enabling communist governments to control the hungry people of those nations. note that while we are giving away our agricultural surpluses to communist and socialist nations, we, under the foreign aid bill (as under previous ones), are subsidizing agricultural production in the underdeveloped countries. the foreign aid bill prohibited direct aid to cuba, but authorized contributions to united nations agencies, which were giving aid to cuba. at a time when the american economy was suffering from the flight of american industry to foreign lands, the foreign aid bill offered subsidies and investment guarantees to american firms moving abroad. our foreign aid enriches and strengthens political leaders and ruling oligarchies (which are often corrupt) in underdeveloped lands; and it does infinite harm to the people of those lands, when it inflates their economy and foists upon them an artificially-produced industrialism which they are not prepared to sustain or even understand. * * * * * the basic argument for foreign aid is that by helping the underdeveloped nations develop, we will keep them from falling under the dictatorship of communism. the argument is false and unsound, historically, politically, economically, and morally. the communists have never subjugated a nation by winning the loyalties of the oppressed and downtrodden. the communists first win the support of liberal-intellectuals, and then use them to subvert and pervert all established mores and ideals and social and political arrangements. our foreign aid does not finance freedom in foreign lands; it finances socialism; and a world socialist system is what communists are trying to establish. as early as , joseph stalin said that the advanced western nations must give economic aid to other nations in order to socialize their economies and prepare them for integration in the communist's world socialist system. socializing the economies of all nations so that all can be merged into a one-world system was the objective of colonel edward m. house, who founded the council on foreign relations, and has been the objective of the council, and of all its associated organizations, from the beginning. chapter more of the interlock it is impossible in this volume to discuss all organizations interlocked with the council on foreign relations. in previous chapters, i have discussed some of the most powerful agencies in the interlock. in this chapter, i present brief discussions of a few organizations which make significant contributions to the over-all program of the council. institute for american strategy there are some men in the council on foreign relations who condemn the _consequences_ of the cfr's policies--but who never mention the cfr as responsible for those policies, and who never really suggest any change in the policies. frank r. barnett is such a man. mr. barnett, a member of the council on foreign relations, is research director for the richardson foundation and also program director for the institute for american strategy, which is largely financed by the richardson foundation. the institute for american strategy holds two-day regional "strategy seminars" in cities throughout the united states. participants in the seminars are carefully selected civic and community leaders. the announced official purpose of the seminars is: "...to inform influential private american citizens of the danger which confronts the united states in the realm of world politics. they have been conceived as a means for arousing an informed and articulate patriotism which can provide the basis for the sustained and intensive effort which alone can counter the skillful propaganda and ruthless conquest so successfully practiced by the soviet union and her allies and satellites." mr. barnett is generally one of the featured speakers at these seminars. he speaks effectively, arousing his audience to an awareness of the soviets as an ugly menace to freedom and decency in the world. he makes his audience squirm with anxiety about how america is losing the cold war on all fronts, and makes them burn with desire to reverse this trend. but when it comes to suggesting what can be done about the terrible situation, mr. barnett seems only to recommend that more and more people listen to more and more speakers like him in order to become angrier at the soviets and more disturbed about american losses--so that we can continue the same policies we have, but do a better job with them. mr. barnett never criticizes the basic internationalist policy of entwining the affairs of america with those of other nations, because mr. barnett, like all other internationalists, takes it for granted that america can no longer defend herself, without "allies," whom we must buy with foreign aid. he does imply that our present network of permanent, entangling alliances is not working well; but he never hints that we should abandon this disastrous policy and return to the traditional american policy of benign neutrality and no-permanent-involvement, which offers the only possible hope for our peace and security. rather, mr. barnett would just like us to conduct our internationalist policy in such a way as to avoid the disaster which our internationalist policy is building for us. * * * * * mr. barnett's recommendations on how to fight communism on the domestic front also trail off, generally, into contradictions and confusion. for example, in his speech to the "strategy seminar" arranged by the institute for american strategy and sponsored by the fulton county medical society in atlanta, georgia, june, , mr. barnett urged all citizens to inform themselves about the communist threat and become educated on its aims so that they will be capable of combatting communist propaganda. but, mr. barnett said, citizens are "silly" who concern themselves with trying to find communists and fellow-travelers in the pta! in a speech to reserve officers at the war college in july, , mr. barnett denounced "crackpots" who hunt "pinkos" in local colleges. he said the theory that internal subversion is the chief danger to the united states is fallacious--and is harmful, because it has great popular appeal. belief in this theory, mr. barnett said, makes people mistakenly feel that they "don't have to think about ... strengthening nato, or improving foreign aid management, or volunteering for the peace corps, or anything else that might require sacrifice." mr. barnett, who speaks persuasively as an expert on fighting communism, apparently does not know that the real work of the communist conspiracy is not performed by the shabby people who staff the official apparatus of the communist party, but is done by well-intentioned people (in the pta and similar organizations) who have been brainwashed with communist ideas. communists (whom mr. barnett hates and fears) did not do the tremendous job of causing the united states to abandon her traditional policies of freedom and independence for the internationalist policies which are dragging us into one-world socialism. the most distinguished and respected americans of our time, in the council on foreign relations (of which mr. barnett is a member) did this job. it is interesting to note that the principal book offered for sale and recommended for reading at mr. barnett's, "strategy seminars" is _american strategy for the nuclear age_. the first chapter in the book, entitled "basic aims of united states foreign policy," is a reprint of a council on foreign relations report, compiled by a cfr meeting in , attended by such well-known internationalist "liberals" as frank altschul, hamilton fish armstrong, adolf a. berle, jr., robert blum, robert r. bowie, john cowles, arthur h. dean, thomas k. finletter, william c. foster, w. averell harriman, philip c. jessup, joseph e. johnson, henry r. luce, i. i. rabi, herman b. wells, henry m. wriston. commission on national goals on december , , president eisenhower presented, to president-elect kennedy, a report by the president's commission on national goals, a group of "distinguished" americans whom president eisenhower had appointed months before to find out what america's national purpose should be. the national purpose of this nation _should be_ exactly what it was during the first years of our national life: to stand as proof that free men can govern themselves; to blaze a trail toward freedom, a trail which all people, if they wish, can follow or guide themselves by, without any meddling from us. hydrogen bombs and airplanes and intercontinental ballistic missiles do not change basic principles. the principles on which our nation was founded are eternal, as valid now as in the th century. indeed, modern developments in science should make us cling to those principles. if foreign enemies can now destroy our nation by pressing a button, it seems obvious that our total defense effort should be devoted to protecting our nation against such an attack: it is suicidal for us to waste any of our defense effort on "economic improvement" and military assistance for other nations. all of this being obvious, it is also obvious that the president's commission on national goals was not really trying to discover our "national purpose." "national purpose" was the label for a propaganda effort intended to help perpetuate governmental policies, which are dragging america into international socialism, regardless of who succeeded eisenhower as president. the report is actually a rehash of major provisions in the democrat and republican party platforms. more than that, it is, in several fundamental and specific ways, identical with the published program of the communist party. (for a full discussion of the president's commission on national goals, see _the dan smoot report_, "our national purpose," december , .) who were the "distinguished" americans whom eisenhower appointed to draw this blueprint of america's national purpose? they were: erwin d. canham, editor-in-chief of the _christian science monitor_; james b. conant, former president of harvard; colgate w. darden, jr., former president of the university of virginia and former governor of virginia; crawford h. greenewalt, president of e. i. du pont de nemours & co., inc.; general alfred m. gruenther, president of the american red cross; learned hand, retired judge of the u.s. court of appeals; clark kerr, president of the university of california; james r. killian, jr., chairman of the massachusetts institute of technology; george meany, president of the afl-cio; frank pace, jr., former member of truman's cabinet; henry m. wriston, president of american assembly and president emeritus of brown university. of the , are members of the council on foreign relations--canham, conant, gruenther, hand, killian, pace, wriston. all of the others are lower-level affiliates of the cfr. national planning association the national planning association was established in "to bring together leaders from agriculture, business, labor, and the professions to pool their experience and foresight in developing workable plans for the nation's future...." the quotation is from an npa booklet, which also says: "every year since the npa was organized in , its reports have strongly influenced our national economy, u.s. economic policy, and business decisions." here are members of the council on foreign relations listed as officials of the national planning association: frank altschul, laird bell, courtney c. brown, eric johnston, donald r. murphy, elmo roper, beardsley ruml, hans christian sonne, lauren soth, wayne chatfield taylor, john hay whitney. the following officials of national planning association are generally second-level affiliates of the cfr--or are, at any rate, worth noting: arnold zander, international president of american federation of state, county and municipal employees; solomon barkin, director of research for the textile workers union of america; l. s. buckmaster, general president, united rubber, cork, linoleum & plastic workers of america; james b. carey, secretary-treasurer of cio; albert j. hayes, international president of international association of machinists; and walter p. reuther. american civil liberties union in , the american civil liberties union was founded by felix frankfurter, a member of the council on foreign relations, william z. foster, then head of the u.s. communist party; elizabeth gurley flynn, a top communist party official; dr. harry f. ward, of union theological seminary, a notorious communist-fronter; and roger baldwin. patrick m. malin, a member of the cfr, has been director of the american civil liberties union since . other cfr members who are known to be officials in the american civil liberties union are: william butler, richard s. childs, norman cousins, palmer hoyt, jr., j. robert oppenheimer, elmo roper, arthur m. schlesinger, jr. national conference of christians and jews the late charles evans hughes (a member of the cfr) and the late s. parkes cadman (former president of the federal--now national--council of churches) founded the national conference of christians and jews in . in june, (at the suggestion of paul hoffman) the national conference of christians and jews founded world brotherhood at unesco house in paris, france. the officers of world brotherhood were: konrad adenauer, william benton, arthur h. compton, paul henri-spaak, paul g. hoffman, herbert h. lehman, john j. mccloy, george meany, madame pandit, paul reynaud, eleanor roosevelt, adlai stevenson. * * * * * in august, , world brotherhood held a seminar in bern, switzerland. all of the officers listed above attended and prepared "working papers." here is a summary of conclusions reached at this world brotherhood meeting, as condensed from an article by arthur krock, in _the new york times_, november , : _we must recognize that the communist countries are here to stay and cannot be wished away by propaganda. all is not bad in communist countries. western nations could learn from communist experiments. we should study ways to make changes in both systems--communist and western--in order to bring them nearer together. we should try to eliminate the stereo-type attitudes about, and suspicion of, communism. we must assume that the communist side is not worse than, but merely different from, our side._ in may, , world brotherhood held a conference on "world tensions" at chicago university. lester b. pearson (socialist-internationalist from canada) presided at the conference; and the following members of the council on foreign relations served as officials: william benton, ralph bunche, marquis childs, harlan cleveland, norman cousins, ernest a. gross, paul g. hoffman, and adlai stevenson. the national conference of christians and jews-world brotherhood meeting on "world tensions," at chicago university, concluded that the communists are interested in more trade but not interested in political subversion, and recommended: ( ) a three-billion-dollar-a-year increase in u. s. foreign aid to "poor" countries; ( ) repeal of the connally reservation; ( ) closer relations between the u. s. and communist countries. adlai stevenson told the group that khrushchev is merely a "tough and realistic politician and polemicist," with whom it is possible to "conduct the dialogue of reason." * * * * * in , world brotherhood, inc., changed its name to conference on world tensions. american assembly in , when president of columbia university, general dwight d. eisenhower founded the american assembly--sometimes calling itself the arden house group, taking this name from its headquarters and meeting place. the assembly holds a series of meetings at arden house in new york city about every six months, and other round-table discussions at varying intervals throughout the nation. the th meeting of the arden house group, which ended may , , was typical of all others, in that it was planned and conducted by members of the council on foreign relations--and concluded with recommendations concerning american policy, which, if followed, would best serve the ends of the kremlin. this arden house meeting dealt with the problem of disarmament. henry m. wriston (president of american assembly and director of the council on foreign relations) presided over the three major discussion groups--each group, in turn, was under the chairmanship of a member of the council: raymond j. sontag of the university of california; milton katz, director of international legal studies at harvard; and dr. philip e. mosely, director of studies for the council on foreign relations. john j. mccloy (a member of the cfr) as president kennedy's director of disarmament, sent three subordinates to participate. two of the three (edmund a. gullion, deputy director of the disarmament administration; and shepard stone, a ford foundation official) are members of the cfr. here are two major recommendations which the may, , american assembly meeting made: ( ) that the united states avoid weapons and measures which might give "undue provocation" to the soviets, and which might reduce the likelihood of disarmament agreements; ( ) that the united states strengthen its conventional military forces for participation in "limited wars" but avoid building up an ordnance of nuclear weapons. we cannot match the communist nations in manpower or "conventional military forces" and should not try. our only hope is to keep our military manpower in reserve, and uncommitted, in the united states, while building an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons. when we "strengthen our conventional forces for participation in limited wars," we are leaving the soviets with the initiative to say when and where those wars will be fought; and we are committing ourselves to fight with the kind of forces in which the soviets will inevitably have superiority. more than that, we are consuming so much of our economic resources that we do not have enough left for weaponry of the kind that would defend our homeland. americans for democratic action the ada was founded in april, , at a meeting in the old willard hotel, washington, d. c. members of the council on foreign relations dominated this meeting--and have dominated the ada ever since. here are members of the council on foreign relations who are, or were, top officials in americans for democratic action: francis biddle, chester bowles, marquis childs, elmer davis, william h. davis, david dubinsky, thomas k. finletter, john kenneth galbraith, palmer hoyt, hubert h. humphrey, jacob k. javits, herbert h. lehman, reinhold niebuhr, arthur schlesinger, jr. here are some of the policies which the ada openly and vigorously advocated in : abolition of the house committee on un-american activities congressional investigation of the john birch society total disarmament under united nations control u. s. recognition of red china admission of red china to the united nations, in place of nationalist china federal aid to all public schools drastic overhaul of our immigration laws, to permit a more "liberal" admission of immigrants urban renewal and planning for all cities * * * * * here is a good, brief characterization of the ada, from a _los angeles times_ editorial, september , : "the ada members ... are as an organization strikingly like the british fabian socialists.... the fabians stood for non-marxian evolutionary socialism, to be achieved not by class war but by ballot.... "ada is not an organization for subversive violence like marxist-lenin communism.... the socialism they want to bring about would be quite as total, industrially, as that in russia, but they would accomplish it by legislation, not by shooting, and, of course, by infiltrating the executive branch of the government...." sane nuclear policy, inc. in , bertrand russell (british pro-communist socialist) and the late albert einstein (notorious for the number of communist fronts he supported) held a meeting in london (attended by communists and socialists from all over the world). in a fanfare of publicity, russell and einstein demanded international co-operation among atomic scientists. taking his inspiration from this meeting, cyrus eaton (wealthy american industrialist, notorious for his consistent pro-communist sympathies), in , held the first "pugwash conference," which was a gathering of pro-soviet propagandists, called scientists, from red china, the soviet union, and western nations. another pugwash conference was held in ; and from these pugwash conferences, the idea for a sane nuclear policy, inc., emerged. * * * * * sane nuclear policy, inc., was founded in november, , with national headquarters in new york city, and with bertrand russell of england and swedish socialist gunnar myrdal (among others) as honorary sponsors. officers of sane nuclear policy, inc., are largely second-level affiliates of the council on foreign relations, with a good representation from the cfr itself. here are past and present officials of sane, who are also members of the council on foreign relations: harry a. bullis, henry seidel canby, norman cousins, clark m. eichelberger, lewis mumford, earl d. osborn, elmo roper, james t. shotwell, james p. warburg. other national officials of sane, who are not members of the cfr, but worthy of note, are: steve allen, harry belafonte, walt kelly, martin luther king, linus pauling, norman thomas, bruno walter. a typical activity of sane was a public rally at madison square garden in new york city on may , , featuring speeches by eleanor roosevelt, walter reuther, norman thomas, alf landon, israel goldstein, and g. mennen williams. all speakers demanded disarmament and strengthening the united nations until it becomes strong enough to maintain world peace. commenting on this sane rally at madison square garden, senator james o. eastland, chairman of the senate internal security subcommittee said (in a press release from his office, dated october , ): "the communists publicized the meeting well in advance through their own and sympathetic periodicals.... the affair, in madison square garden may , was sponsored by the committee for a sane nuclear policy.... chief organizer of the garden meeting, however, was one henry h. abrams of riverside drive, new york, new york, who was a veteran member of the communist party.... it is to the credit of the officers of the organization that, when abrams' record of communist connections was brought to their attention, abrams was immediately discharged." free europe committee the free europe committee, inc., was founded in new york, primarily by herbert h. lehman (then united states senator) in . its revenue comes from the big foundations (principally, ford) and from annual fund-raising drives conducted in the name of crusade for freedom. the main activity of the free europe committee (apart from the fund raising) is the running of radio free europe and free europe press. every year, crusade for freedom (with major assistance from washington officialdom) conducts a vigorous nationwide drive, pleading for "truth dollars" from the american people to finance the activities of radio free europe and free europe press, which are supposed to be fighting communism behind the iron curtain by spreading the truth about communism to people in the captive satellite nations. it is widely known among well-informed anti-communists, however, that radio free europe actually helps, rather than hurts, the cause of international communism--particularly in the captive nations. radio free europe broadcasts tell the people behind the iron curtain that communism is bad--as if they did not know this better than the rfe broadcasters do; but the broadcasts consistently support the programs, and present the ideology, of international socialism, always advocating the equivalent of a one-world socialist society as the solution to all problems. this is, of course, the communist solution. and it is also the solution desired by the council on foreign relations. a bill of particulars which reveals that radio free europe helps rather than hurts communism with its so-called "anti-communist" broadcasts can be found in the _congressional record_ for june , . an article, beginning on page a , was put in the _record_ by former congressman albert h. bosch, of new york. it was written by george brada, a czechoslovakian who fled his homeland after the communists had taken over in . brada now lives in western germany and is active in a number of anti-communist groups in western europe. in reality, the free europe committee and its subsidiary organizations constitute another propaganda front for the council on foreign relations. here, for example, are the cfr members who are, or have been, top officials of free europe committee, crusade for freedom, or radio free europe--or all three: adolf a. berle, david k. e. bruce, general lucius d. clay, will l. clayton, allen w. dulles, dwight d. eisenhower, mark f. ethridge, julius fleischmann, henry ford ii, walter s. gifford, joseph c. grew, palmer hoyt, c. d. jackson, herbert h. lehman, henry r. luce, edward r. murrow, irving s. olds, arthur w. page, david sarnoff, whitney h. shepardson, george n. shuster, charles m. spofford, harold e. stassen, h. gregory thomas, walter h. wheeler, jr. national association for the advancement of colored people the council on foreign relations has had a strong (though, probably, not controlling) hand in the naacp. felix frankfurter, cfr member, was an attorney for the naacp for ten years. other cfr members who are, or were, officials of the naacp: ralph bunche, norman cousins, lewis s. gannett, john hammond, herbert h. lehman. american committee on africa the american committee on africa is a propaganda agency which concentrates on condemning the apartheid policies of the government of the union of south africa--a nation of white people (practically encircled by millions of black savages), who feel that their racial policies are their only hope of avoiding total submergence and destruction. in addition to disseminating propaganda to create ill-will for south africa among americans, the american committee on africa gives financial assistance to agitators and revolutionaries in the union of south africa. it has, for example, given financial aid to persons charged with treason under the laws of the union. here are some of the council on foreign relations members who are officials of the american committee on africa: gardner cowles, lewis s. gannett, john gunther, senator hubert h. humphrey, dr. robert l. johnson, dr. reinhold niebuhr, arthur m. schlesinger, jr. mrs. chester bowles is also an official. world population emergency campaign the world population emergency campaign urges the united states government to use american tax money in an effort to solve the world population problem. it specifically endorses the draper report on foreign aid, which recommended that the united states appropriate money for a united nations population control project. leadership of the world population emergency campaign is dominated by such cfr members as: will l. clayton, lammot dupont copeland, major general william h. draper, john nuveen. most of the members of the "campaign" also belong to the atlantic union committee, or to some other second-level affiliate of the cfr. school of international service the school of international service at american university in washington, d. c., initiated a new academic program to train foreign service officers and other officials in newly independent nations, commencing in september, . the foreign diplomats will study courses on land reforms, finance, labor problems, and several courses on soviet and chinese communism. the program (under the newly created center of diplomacy and foreign policy) is directed by former under secretary of state loy w. henderson, a member of the council on foreign relations. institute of international education in , elihu root and stephen duggan (both members of the council on foreign relations) founded the institute of international education, to develop international understanding and goodwill through exchange of students, teachers, and others in the educational field. prior to world war ii, the institute was financed by the carnegie corporation. since the war, the federal government has contributed a little more than one-third of the institute's annual income of about . million dollars. foundations, corporations, individuals, and colleges, contribute the rest. the institute is wholly a cfr operation. its officials are: stanley c. allyn, edward w. barrett, chester bowles, ralph j. bunche, william c. foster, arthur a. houghton, grayson l. kirk, edward r. murrow, george n. shuster, and james d. zellerbach--all members of the cfr. chapter communications media in nine chapters of this volume, i have managed to discuss only a few of the most powerful organizations interlocked with the council on foreign relations, to form an amazing web which is the invisible government of the united states. there are scores of such organizations. i have managed to name, relatively, only a few of the influential individuals who are members of the council on foreign relations, or of affiliated agencies, and who also occupy key jobs in the executive branch of government, including the presidency. i have asserted that the objective of the invisible government is to convert america into a socialist nation and then make it a unit in a one-world socialist system. the managers of the combine do not admit this, of course. they are "liberals" who say that the old "negative" kind of government we used to have is inadequate for this century. the liberals' "positive" foreign policy is said to be necessary for "world peace" and for meeting "america's responsibility" in the world. their "positive" domestic policies are said to be necessary for the continued improvement and progress of our "free-enterprise" system. but the "positive" foreign policy for peace has dragged us into so many international commitments (many of which are in direct conflict with each other: such as, our subsidizing national independence for former colonies of european powers, while we are also subsidizing the european powers trying to keep the colonies) that, if we continue in our present direction, we will inevitably find ourselves in perpetual war for perpetual peace--or we will surrender our freedom and national independence and become an out-voted province in a socialist one-world system. the liberals' "positive" domestic policies always bring the federal government into the role of subsidizing and controlling the economic activities of the people; and that is the known highway to the total, tyrannical socialist state. the council on foreign relations is rapidly achieving its purpose. an obvious reason for its success: it is reaching the american public with its clever propaganda. however much power the cfr combine may have inside the agencies of government; however extensive the reach of its propaganda through organizations designed to "educate" the public to acceptance of cfr ideas--the cfr needs to reach the _mass_ audience of americans who do not belong to, or attend the meetings of, or read material distributed by, the propaganda organizations. council on foreign relations leaders are aware of this need, and they have met it. * * * * * in the annual report of the committee for economic development (a major propaganda arm of the cfr), gardner cowles, then chairman of ced's information committee, did a bit of boasting about how successful ced had been in communicating its ideas to the general public. mr. cowles said: "the value of ced's research and recommendations is directly related to its ability to communicate them ... the organization's role as an agency that can influence private and public economic policies and decisions ... can be effective ... only to the extent that ced gets its ideas across to thinking people.... "during the year [ ], the information division [of ced] distributed pamphlets having a total circulation of , ; issued press releases and texts of statements; arranged press conferences, radio and television appearances, speeches for trustees, magazine articles and the publication of books.... in assessing the year, we are reminded again of the great debt we owe the nation's editors. their regard for the objectivity and non-partisanship of ced's work is reflected in the exceptional attention they give to what ced has to say. the [ced] statement, 'toward a realistic farm policy,' for example not only received extended news treatment but was the subject of editorials. the circulation represented in the editorials alone totaled , , ." mr. cowles was modest. he gave only a hint of the total extent to which the mass-communication media have become a controlled propaganda network for the council on foreign relations and its inter-connecting agencies. i doubt that anyone really knows the full extent. my research reveals a few of the cfr members who have (or have had) controlling, or extremely influential, positions in the publishing and broadcasting industries. my list of _cfr members_ in this field is far from complete; and i have not tried to compile a list of the thousands of people who are _not_ members of the cfr, but who _are_ members of ced, fpa, or of some other cfr affiliate--and who also control important channels of public communications. hence, the following list--of council on foreign relations members whom i know to be influential in the communications industries--is intended to be indicative, rather than comprehensive and informative: herbert agar (former editor, _louisville courier-journal_) hanson w. baldwin (military affairs editor, _new york times_) joseph barnes (editor-in-chief, simon & schuster, publishers) elliott v. bell (chairman of executive committee, mcgraw-hill publishing co.; publisher and editor of _business week_) john mason brown (editor, _saturday review of literature_, drama critic, author) cass canfield (chairman of the editorial board of harper & brothers, publishers) marquis childs (author, syndicated columnist) norman cousins (editor-in-chief, _saturday review of literature_) gardner cowles, quoted above from the ced annual report, and john cowles (they occupy controlling offices in cowles magazine company, which owns such publications as _look_, _minneapolis star and tribune_, and _des moines register and tribune_, and which also owns a broadcasting company.) mark ethridge (publisher, _louisville courier-journal_, _louisville times_) george gallup (public opinion analyst, gallup poll; president, national municipal league) philip graham (publisher, _washington post and times herald_) allen grover (vice president of _time_, inc.) joseph c. harsch (of _the christian science monitor_) august heckscher (editor, _new york herald tribune_) palmer hoyt (publisher, _denver post_) david lawrence (president and editor-in-chief, _u. s. news and world report_) hal lehrman (editor, _new york post_) irving levine (nbc news official and commentator) walter lippmann (author, syndicated columnist) henry r. luce (publisher, _time_, _life_, _fortune_, _sports illustrated_) malcolm muir (chairman of the board and editor-in-chief, _newsweek_) william s. paley (chairman of the board, columbia broadcasting system) ogden reid (former chairman of the board, _new york herald tribune_) whitelaw reid (former editor-in-chief, _new york herald tribune_) james b. reston (editorial writer, _new york times_) elmo roper (public opinion analyst, roper poll) david sarnoff (chairman of the board, radio corporation of america--nbc, rca victor, etc.) harry scherman (founder and chairman of the board, book-of-the-month club) william l. shirer (author, news commentator) paul c. smith (president and editor-in-chief, crowell-collier publishing company) leland stone (head of news reporting for radio free europe, _chicago daily news_ foreign correspondent) robert kenneth straus (former research director for f. d. roosevelt's council of economic advisers; owner and publisher of the san fernando, california, _sun_; largest stockholder and member of board of orange coast publishing company, which publishes the _daily globe-herald_ of costa mesa, the _pilot_ and other small newspapers in california; member of group which owns and publishes _american heritage_ and _horizon_ magazines; treasurer and director of industrial publishing company of cleveland, which publishes trade magazines) arthur hayes sulzberger (chairman of the board, _new york times_) c. l. sulzberger (editorial writer, _new york times_) i do not mean to imply that all of these people are controlled by the council on foreign relations, or that they uniformly support the total program of international socialism which the council wants. the council does not _own_ its members: it merely has varying degrees of influence on each. for example, former president herbert hoover, a member of the council, has fought eloquently against many basic policies which the council supports. spruille braden is another. mr. braden formerly held several important ambassadorial posts and at one time was assistant secretary of state in charge of american republic affairs. in recent years, mr. braden has given leadership to many patriotic organizations and efforts, such as for america and the john birch society; and, in testimony before various committees of congress, he has given much valuable information about communist influences in the state department. mr. braden joined the council on foreign relations in the late 's or early 's, when membership in the council was a fashionable badge of respectability, helpful to the careers of young men in the foreign service, in the same way that membership in expensive country clubs and similar organizations is considered helpful to the careers of young business executives. men who know braden well say that he stayed in the council after he came to realize its responsibility for the policies of disaster which our nation has followed in the postwar era--hoping to exert some pro-american influence inside the council. it apparently was a frustrated hope. there is a story in well-informed new york circles about the last time the council on foreign relations ever called on spruille braden to participate in an important activity. braden was asked to preside over a council on foreign relations meeting when the featured speaker was herbert matthews (member of the _new york times_ editorial board) whose support of communist castro in cuba is notorious. it is said that the anti-communist viewpoint which braden tried to inject into this meeting will rather well guarantee against his ever being asked to officiate at another cfr affair. generally, however, the degree of influence which the cfr exerts upon its own members is very high indeed. * * * * * apart from an occasional article or editorial which criticizes some aspect of, or some leader in, the socialist revolution in america; and despite much rhetoric in praise of "free enterprise" and "the american way," such publications as _time_, _life_, _fortune_, _new york times_, _new york post_, _louisville courier-journal_, _washington post and times herald_, _saturday review of literature_, the _denver post_, _the christian science monitor_ and _look_ (i name only those, in the list above, which i, personally, have read a great deal.) have not one time in the past years spoken editorially against any fundamentally important aspect of the over-all governmental policies which are dragging this nation into socialism and world government--at least, not to my knowledge. on the contrary, these publications heartily support those policies, criticizing them, if at all, only about some detail--or for being too timid, small and slow! in contrast, david lawrence, of _u. s. news & world report_, publishes fine, objective news-reporting, often featuring articles which factually expose the costly fallacies of governmental policy. this is especially true of _u. s. news & world report_ in connection with domestic issues. on matters of foreign policy, david lawrence often goes down the line for the internationalist policy--being convinced (as all internationalists seem to be) that this is the only policy possible for america in the "shrunken world" of the twentieth century. an intelligent man like david lawrence--who must see the endless and unbroken chain of disasters which the internationalist foreign policy has brought to america; and who is thoroughly familiar with the proven record of marvelous success which our traditional policy of benign neutrality and no-permanent-involvement enjoyed: how can he still feel that we are nonetheless inescapably bound to follow the policy of disaster? i wish i knew. chapter interlocking untouchables members of congress are not unaware of the far-reaching power of the tax-exempt private organization--the cfr; but the power of the council is somewhat indicated by the fact that no committee of congress has yet been powerful enough to investigate it or the foundations with which it has interlocking connections and from which it receives its support. on august , , congressman e. e. cox (democrat, georgia) introduced a resolution in the house asking for a committee to conduct a thorough investigation of tax-exempt foundations. congressman cox said that some of the great foundations, "had operated in the field of social reform and international relations (and) many have brought down on themselves harsh and just condemnation." he named the rockefeller foundation, "whose funds have been used to finance individuals and organizations whose business it has been to get communism into the private and public schools of the country, to talk down america and to play up russia." he cited the guggenheim foundation, whose money, "was used to spread radicalism throughout the country to an extent not excelled by any other foundation." he listed the carnegie corporation, the rosenwald fund, and other foundations, saying: "there are disquieting evidences that at least a few of the foundations have permitted themselves to be infiltrated by men and women who are disloyal to our american way of life. they should be investigated and exposed to the pitiless light of publicity, and appropriate legislation should be framed to correct the present situation." congressman cox's resolution, proposing an investigation of foundations, died in committee. * * * * * on march , , cox introduced the same resolution again. because he had mentioned foundation support for langston hughes, a negro communist, congressman cox was accused of racial prejudice. because he had criticized the rosenwald fund for making grants to known communists, he was called anti-semitic. but the cox resolution was adopted in ; and the cox committee to investigate tax-exempt foundations was set up. congressman cox died before the end of the year; and the final report of his committee (filed january , ) was a pathetic whitewash of the whole subject. a republican-controlled congress (the rd) came into existence in january, . * * * * * on april , , the late congressman carroll reece, (republican, tennessee) introduced a resolution proposing a committee to carry on the "unfinished business" of the defunct cox committee. the new committee to investigate tax-exempt foundations (popularly known as the reece committee) was approved by congress on july , . it went out of existence on january , , having proven, mainly, that the mammoth tax-exempt foundations have such power in the white house, in congress, and in the press that they are quite beyond the reach of a mere committee of the congress of the united states. if you want to read this whole incredible (and rather terrifying) story, i suggest _foundations_, a book written by rene a. wormser who was general counsel to the reece committee. his book was published in by the devin-adair company. in the final report on tax-exempt foundations, which the late congressman reece made for his ill-fated special committee (report published december , , by the government printing office), mr. reece said: "miss casey's report (hearings pp. , et seq.) shows clearly the interlock between _the carnegie endowment for international peace_, and some of its associated organizations, such as the _council on foreign relations_ and other foundations, with the state department. indeed, these foundations and organizations would not dream of denying this interlock. they proudly note it in reports. they have undertaken vital research projects for the department; virtually created minor departments or groups within the department for it; supplied advisors and executives from their ranks; fed a constant stream of personnel into the state department trained by themselves or under programs which they have financed; and have had much to do with the formulation of foreign policy both in principle and detail. "they have, to a marked degree, acted as direct agents of the state department. and they have engaged actively, and with the expenditure of enormous sums, in propagandizing ('educating'?) public opinion in support of the policies which they have helped to formulate.... "what we see here is a number of large foundations, primarily _the rockefeller foundation_, _the carnegie corporation of new york_, and the _carnegie endowment for international peace_, using their enormous public funds to finance a one-sided approach to foreign policy and to promote it actively, among the public by propaganda, and in the government through infiltration. the power to do this comes out of the power of the vast funds employed." mr. reece listed the council on foreign relations, the institute of international education, the foreign policy association, and the institute of pacific relations, as among the interlocking organizations which are "agencies of these foundations," and pointed out that research and propaganda which does not support the "globalism" (or internationalism) to which all of these agencies are dedicated, receive little support from the tax-exempt foundations. i disagree with mr. reece here, only in the placing of emphasis. as i see it, the foundations (which do finance the vast, complex, and powerful interlock of organizations devoted to a socialist one-world system) have, nonetheless, become the "agencies" of the principal organization which they finance--the council on foreign relations. * * * * * the reece committee investigation threw some revealing light on the historical blackout which the council on foreign relations has ordered and conducted. men who run the council do not want the policies and measures of franklin d. roosevelt to undergo the critical analysis and objective study which exposed the policies of woodrow wilson after world war i. the council has decided that the official propaganda of world war ii must be perpetuated as history and the public protected from learning the truth. hence, the council sponsors historical works which give the socialist-internationalist version of historical events prior to and during world war ii, while ignoring, or debunking, revisionist studies which attempt to tell the truth. here is how all of this is put in the annual report of the rockefeller foundation: "the committee on studies of the council on foreign relations is concerned that the debunking journalistic campaign following world war i should not be repeated and believes that the american public deserves a clear competent statement of our basic aims and activities during the second world war." in , the rockefeller foundation allotted $ , to the cost of a two-volume history of world war ii, written by william l. langer, a member of the cfr, and s. everett gleason. the generous grant was supplemented by a gift of $ , from the alfred p. sloan foundation. the langer-gleason work was published by harper and brothers for the council on foreign relations: volume i in under the title, _the challenge to isolationism, - _; volume ii in , under the title, _the undeclared war_. the cfr's stated purpose in bringing out this work was to head off the revisionist historians like charles callan tansill, harry elmer barnes, frederic r. sanborn, george morgenstern, frances neilson. the truth, however, is not easy to suppress. though written by and for the cfr, to perpetuate that organization's version of history, the langer-gleason volumes contain a wealth of information which helps to prove the basic thesis of this present volume. * * * * * one thing that the ill-fated reece committee found out in - , when trying to investigate the foundations, is that the tax-exempt organizations are set up, not for the purpose of doing some good in our society, but for the purpose of avoiding the income tax. rene a. wormser, in _foundation_ says: "the chief motivation in the creation of foundations has long ceased to be pure philanthropy--it is now predominantly tax avoidance.... the increasing tax burden on income and estates has greatly accelerated a trend toward creation of foundations as instruments for the retention of control over capital assets that would otherwise be lost.... "the creation of a new foundation very often serves the purpose of contributing to a favorable public opinion for the person or corporation that endows it...." the tax-exempt organizations have a vested interest in the oppressive, inequitable, and wasteful federal-income-tax system. tax experts have devised, for example, a complicated scheme by which a wealthy man can actually save money by giving to tax-exempt organizations. in short, many of the great philanthropies which buy fame and respectability for wealthy individuals, or corporations, are tax-avoidance schemes which, every year, add billions to the billions of private capital which is thus sterilized. these accumulations of tax-exempt billions place a heavier burden on taxpayers. removing billions from taxation, the tax-exempt organizations thus obviously make taxpayers pay more in order to produce all that government demands. * * * * * the big tax-exempt organizations use their tax-exempt billions to buy prestige and power for themselves, and to bludgeon some critics into silence. for example, the ford foundation established the fund for the republic with a million dollar grant in --at a time when public awareness of the communist danger was seeping into the thinking of enough americans to create a powerful anti-communist movement in this country. by late , the fund's activities (publicly granting awards to fifth-amendment communists and so on) had become so blatant that public indignation was rising significantly. just at the right time, the ford foundation announced a gift of million dollars to the colleges of america. newspapers--also beholden in many ways to the big foundations--which will not publish news about the foundations' anti-american activities, give banner headlines to the lavish benefactions for purposes universally believed to be good. where will you find a college administration that will not defend the ford foundation against all critics--if the college has just received, or is in line to receive, a million-dollar gift from the foundation? how far must you search to find college professors or school teachers who will not defend the foundation which gives million dollars at one time, to raise the salaries of professors or school teachers? where will you find a plain john doe citizen who is not favorably impressed that the hospitals and colleges in his community have received a multi-million dollar gift from a big foundation? every significant movement to destroy the american way of life has been directed and financed, in whole or in part, by tax-exempt organizations, which are entrenched in public opinion as benefactors of our society. worst of all: this tremendous power and prestige are in the hands of what rene wormser calls a special elite--a group of eggheads like robert hutchins (or worse) who neither understand nor respect the profit-motivated economic principles and the great political ideal of individual-freedom-under-limited-government which made our nation great. overlapping of personnel clearly shows a tight interlock between the council on foreign relations and the big foundations. the following information, concerning assets and officers of foundations, all comes from _the foundation directory_, prepared by the foundation library center and published by the russell sage foundation, new york city, . ford foundation: assets totaling $ , , , . ( billion, million) on september , . the trustees of the ford foundation are: eugene r. black (cfr); james b. black; james f. brownlee; john cowles (cfr); donald k. david (cfr); mark f. ethridge (cfr); benson ford; henry ford ii; h. rowan gaither, jr. (cfr); laurence m. gould (cfr); henry t. heald (cfr); roy e. larsen; john j. mccloy (cfr); julius a. stratton (cfr); charles e. wyzanski, jr. (cfr). note that of the members of the board of trustees, are members of the council on foreign relations (cfr). fund for the republic, santa barbara, california, a subsidiary of ford, had assets totaling $ , , . on september , . officers and directors: robert hutchins; paul g. hoffman (cfr); elmo roper (cfr); george n. shuster (cfr); harry s. ashmore; bruce catton; charles w. cole (cfr); arthur j. goldberg; william h. joyce, jr.; meyer kestnbaum (cfr); msgr. francis lally; herbert h. lehman (cfr); m. albert linton; j. howard marshall; jubal r. parten; alicia patterson; mrs. eleanor b. stevenson; henry p. van dusen (cfr). note that of the are cfr members. rockefeller foundation, west th street, new york , new york, had assets totaling $ , , . on december , . officers and trustees: john d. rockefeller rd (cfr); dean rusk (cfr); barry bingham; chester bowles (cfr); lloyd d. brace; richard bradfield (cfr); detlev w. bronk (cfr); ralph j. bunche (cfr); john s. dickey (cfr); lewis w. douglas (cfr); lee a. dubridge; wallace k. harrison; arthur a. houghton, jr. (cfr); john r. kimberly (cfr); robert f. loeb; robert a. lovett (cfr); benjamin m. mckelway; henry allen moe; henry p. van dusen (cfr); w. barry wood, jr. of the , are cfr members. rockefeller brothers fund, rockefeller plaza, new york , new york, had assets totaling $ , , . on december , . officers and trustees: laurence s. rockefeller; david rockefeller (cfr); detlev w. bronk (cfr); wallace k. harrison; abby rockefeller mauze; abby m. o'neill; john d. rockefeller rd (cfr); nelson a. rockefeller (cfr); winthrop rockefeller. of the , are cfr members. carnegie corporation of new york, fifth avenue, new york , new york, had assets totaling $ , , . on september , . officers and trustees: john w. gardner (cfr); morris hadley; james a. perkins (cfr); robert f. bacher; caryl p. haskins (cfr); c. d. jackson (cfr); devereux c. josephs (cfr); nicholas kelley (cfr); malcolm a. macintyre (cfr); margaret carnegie miller; frederick osborn (cfr); gwilym a. price; elihu root, jr. (cfr); frederick sheffield; charles spofford (cfr); charles allen thomas. of the , are cfr members. carnegie endowment for international peace, united nations plaza & th street, new york , new york, had a net worth of $ , , . on june , . officers and trustees: joseph e. johnson (cfr); whitney north seymour (cfr); o. frederick nolde; lawrence s. finkelstein (cfr); arthur k. watson (cfr); james m. nicely (cfr); dillon anderson (cfr); charles e. beard; robert blum (cfr); harvey h. bundy (cfr); david l. cole; frederick s. dunn (cfr); arthur j. goldberg; ernest a. gross (cfr); philip c. jessup (cfr); milton katz (cfr); grayson l. kirk (cfr); mrs. clare boothe luce; charles a. meyer (cfr); otto l. nelson, jr.; ellmore c. patterson (cfr); howard c. petersen (cfr); howard p. robertson; david rockefeller (cfr); w. j. schieffelin, jr.; george n. shuster (cfr). of the , are cfr members. carnegie foundation for the advancement of teaching, had assets totaling $ , , . on june , . officers and trustees: carter davidson (cfr); john w. gardner (cfr); james a. perkins (cfr); william f. houston; harvie branscomb; arthur h. dean (cfr); robert f. goheen (cfr); laurence m. gould (cfr); a. whitney griswold (cfr); rufus c. harris; frederick l. hovde (cfr); clark kerr; lawrence a. kimpton; grayson l. kirk (cfr); thomas s. lamont (cfr); robert a. lovett (cfr); howard f. lowry; n. a. m. mackenzie; katharine e. mcbride; millicent c. mcintosh; john s. millis (cfr); franklin d. murphy (cfr); nathan m. pusey (cfr); herman b. wells (cfr); logan wilson; o. meredith wilson. of the , are cfr members. carnegie institute of washington, "p" street, n.w., washington , d. c., had assets totaling $ , , . on june , . officers and trustees: caryl p. haskins (cfr); walter s. gifford (cfr); barklie mckee henry; robert woods bliss (cfr); james f. bell; general omar n. bradley; vannevar bush; crawford h. greenewalt; alfred l. loomis (cfr); robert a. lovett (cfr); keith s. mchugh; margaret carnegie miller; henry s. morgan (cfr); seeley g. mudd; william i. myers; henning w. prentis, jr.; elihu root, jr. (cfr); henry r. shepley; charles p. taft; juan terry trippe (cfr); james n. white; robert e. wilson. of the , are cfr members. alfred p. sloan foundation, fifth avenue, new york , new york, had assets totaling $ , , . on december , . officers and trustees: albert bradley (cfr); alfred p. sloan, jr. (cfr); raymond p. sloan; arnold j. zurcher (cfr); frank w. abrams; henry c. alexander (cfr); walter s. carpenter, jr. (cfr); general lucius d. clay (cfr); john l. collyer (cfr); lewis w. douglas (cfr); frank a. howard; devereux c. josephs (cfr); mervin j. kelly (cfr); james r. killian, jr. (cfr); laurence s. rockefeller; george whitney (cfr). of the , are cfr members. the commonwealth fund of new york, maspeth avenue, new york , new york, had assets totaling $ , , . on june , . officers and trustees: malcolm p. aldrich; john a. gifford; leo d. welch (cfr); george p. berry; roger m. blough (cfr); harry p. davison (cfr); harold b. hoskins; j. quigg newton (cfr); william e. stevenson (cfr); henry c. taylor. of the , are cfr members. twentieth century fund, inc., east th street, new york , new york, had assets totaling $ , , . on december , . officers and trustees: adolf a. berle, jr. (cfr); francis biddle (cfr); august heckscher (cfr); hans christian sonne (cfr); morris b. abram; arthur f. burns (cfr); erwin d. canham (cfr); evans clark (cfr); benjamin v. cohen (cfr); wallace k. harrison (cfr); david e. lilienthal (cfr); robert s. lynd; james g. mcdonald (cfr); j. robert oppenheimer (cfr); edmund orgill; james h. rowe, jr.; arthur m. schlesinger, jr. (cfr); herman w. steinkraus; charles p. taft; w. w. waymack. of the , are cfr members. chapter why? what can we do? claiming to believe in the high destiny of america as a world-leader, our invisible government urges timid policies of appeasement and surrender which make america a world whipping-boy rather than a world leader. claiming to believe in the dignity and worth of the human individual, the modern liberals who run our invisible government urge an ever-growing welfare-state which is destroying individualism--which has already so weakened the american sense of personal responsibility that crime rates have increased percent in our land during the past ten years. why? why do prominent americans support programs which are so harmful? it is a difficult question to answer. * * * * * somewhere at the top of the pyramid in the invisible government are a few sinister people who know exactly what they are doing: they want america to become part of a worldwide socialist dictatorship, under the control of the kremlin. * * * * * some may actually dislike communists, but feel that one-world socialism is desirable and inevitable. they are working with a sense of urgency for a "benign" world socialist dictatorship to forestall the kremlin from imposing its brand of world dictatorship by force. * * * * * some leaders in the invisible government are brilliant and power-hungry men who feel that the masses are unable to govern themselves and who want to set up a great dictatorship which will give them power to arrange things for the masses. the leadership of the invisible government doubtless rests in the hands of a sinister or power-hungry few; but its real strength is in the thousands of americans who have been drawn into the web for other reasons. many, if not most, of these are status-seekers. * * * * * when you are a rising junior executive, or a man of any age looking for good business and social connections, it seems good to go to a luncheon where you can sit at the head table and call leaders of the community by their first names. most of the propaganda agencies affiliated with the council on foreign relations provide such opportunities for members. a businessman enjoys coming home from a black-tie affair in new york or washington where he and a few other "chosen" men have been given a "confidential, off-the-record briefing" by some high governmental official. the council on foreign relations provides such experiences for officials of companies which contribute money to the cfr. this status-seeking is a way of life for thousands of american businessmen. some of them would not give it up even if they knew their activities were supporting the socialist revolution, although at heart they are opposed to socialism. most of them, however, would withdraw from the foreign policy association, and the world affairs councils, and the committee for economic development, and the american association for the un, and the national conference of christians and jews, and the advertising council, and similar organizations, if they were educated to an understanding of what their membership in such organizations really means. the job of every american who knows and cares is to make sure that all of the people in the invisible government network know exactly what they are doing. * * * * * but beyond that, what can we do? what can we americans do about the council on foreign relations and its countless tentacles of power and money and influence and propaganda which are wrapped around all the levers of political power in washington; which reach into the schools and churches and respected civic organizations of america; which control major media of communications; which are insinuated into controlling positions in the big unions; and which even have a grip on the prestige and money of major american corporations? it is often suggested that investigation by the fbi might be the answer. for example, after the march-april term ( ) grand jury in fulton county, georgia, condemned foreign policy association literature as "insidious and subversive" and the american legion post published _the truth about the foreign policy association_ to document the grand jury's findings (see chapter v), supporters of the foreign policy association denounced the legionnaires, saying, in effect, that if there were a need to investigate the fpa, the investigation should be done in proper, legal manner by trained fbi professionals and not by "vigilantes" and "amateurs" and "bigoted ignoramuses" on some committee of an american legion post. this is an effective propaganda technique. it gives many the idea that the organization under criticism has nothing to hide and is willing to have all its activities thoroughly investigated, if the investigation is conducted properly and decently. * * * * * but the fact is that the fbi has no jurisdiction to investigate the kind of activities engaged in by the foreign policy association and its related and affiliated organizations. the foreign policy association is not a _communist_ organization. if it were, it could be handled easily. the attorney general and the committees of congress could simply post it as a communist organization. then, it would receive support only from people who are conscious instruments of the communist conspiracy; and there are not, relatively, very many of those in the united states. the fpa's councils on world affairs are supported by patriotic community leaders. yet, these councils have done more than all _communists_ have ever managed to do, in brainwashing the american people with propaganda _for_ governmental intervention in the economic affairs of the people, and _for_ endless permanent entanglement in the affairs of foreign nations--thus preparing this nation _for_ submergence in a one-world socialist system, which is the objective of communism. * * * * * inasmuch as the invisible government is composed of organizations which enjoy the special privilege of federal tax-exemption (a privilege seldom given to organizations advocating return to traditional american policies) it is often suggested that public pressures might persuade the treasury department to withdraw the tax-exempt privilege from these organizations. how could the treasury department ever be persuaded to take action against the council on foreign relations, when the council controls the department? douglas dillon, secretary of the treasury, is a member of the cfr. it is impractical to think of getting treasury department action against the cfr. moreover, such a solution to the problem could be dangerous. a governmental agency which has limitless power to withdraw special tax-privileges must also have limitless power to grant special privileges. the treasury department could destroy all of the organizations composing the invisible government interlock by the simple action of withdrawing the tax-exempt privilege, thus drying up major sources of revenue. but the treasury department could then create another frankenstein monster by giving tax-exemption to other organizations. it is often suggested that some congressional committee investigate the council on foreign relations and the network of organizations interlocked with it. yet, as we have seen, two different committees of congress--one democrat-controlled and one republican-controlled--_have tried_ to investigate the big tax-exempt foundations which are interlocked with, and controlled by, and provide the primary source of revenue for, the council on foreign relations and its affiliates. both committees were gutted with ridicule and vicious denunciation, not just by the official communist party press, but by internationalists in the congress, by spokesmen for the executive branch of government, and by big respected publishing and broadcasting firms which are a part of the controlled propaganda network of the council on foreign relations. * * * * * the invisible government is not, however, beyond the reach of the whole congress, _if_ the congress has the spur and support of an informed public. our only hope lies in the congress which _is_ responsive to public will, when that will is fully and insistently expressed. every time i suggest that aroused citizens write their congressmen and senators, i get complaints from people who say they have been writing for years and that it does no good. yet, remember the connally reservation issue in january, . the humphrey resolution (to repeal the connally reservation and thus permit the world court to assume unlimited jurisdiction over american affairs) was before the senate foreign relations committee. the chairman of this committee was j. william fulbright (democrat, arkansas) a rhodes-scholar internationalist, determined to repeal the connally reservation. leaders in congress and in the administration were determined to repeal the connally reservation, and so was the invisible government of the united states--which means that the vast thought-controlling machine of the cfr (radio and television networks; major newspapers and magazines; and an imposing array of civic, church, professional, and "educational" organizations) had been in high gear for many months, saturating the public with "world-peace-through-world-law" propaganda intended to shame and scare the public into accepting repeal of the connally reservation. but word got out, and the american public positively stunned congress with protests. fulbright let the resolution die in committee. the expression of public will was massive and explosive in connection with the connally reservation, whereas in connection with many other equally important issues, the public seems indifferent. the reason is that the connally reservation is a simple issue. it is easy for a voter to write or wire his elected representatives saying, "let's keep the connally reservation"; or, "if you vote for repeal of the connally reservation, i'll vote against you." what kind of wire or letter can a voter send his elected representatives concerning the bigger and more important issue which i have labeled "invisible government"? the ultimate solution lies in many sweeping and profound changes in the policies of government, which cannot be effected until a great many more americans have learned a great deal more about the american constitutional system than they know now. * * * * * but there is certain action which the people could demand of congress immediately; and every congressman and senator who refuses to support such action could be voted out of office the next time he stands for re-election. . we should demand that congress amend the internal revenue code in such a way that no agency of the executive branch of government will have the power to grant federal tax-exemption. the constitution gives the power of _taxation_ only to the congress. hence, only congress should have the power to grant _exemption_ from taxation. instead of permitting the internal revenue service of the treasury department to decide whether a foundation or any other organization shall have federal tax-exemption, congress should exercise this power, fully publicizing and frequently reviewing all grants of tax-exemption. . in addition to demanding that congress take the power of granting and withholding federal tax-exemption away from the executive agencies, voters should demand that the house of representatives form a special committee to investigate the council on foreign relations and its associated foundations and other organizations. the investigation should be conducted for the same purpose that the great mccarran investigation of the institute of pacific relations was conducted--that is, to identify the people and organizations involved and to provide an authentic record, of the invisible government's aims and programs, and personnel, for the public to see and study. such an investigation, if properly conducted, would thoroughly discredit the invisible government in the eyes of the american people. * * * * * there is, however, only _one sure_ and _final_ way to stop this great and growing evil--and that is to cut it out as if it were cancerous, which it is. the only way to cut it out is to eliminate the income-tax system which spawned it. the federal income-tax system suckles the forces which are destroying our free and independent republic. abolish the system, and the sucklings will die of starvation. that is the ultimate remedy, but before we can compel congress to provide this remedy, we must have an educated electorate. the problem of educating the public is great--not because of the inability of the people to understand, but because of the difficulty of reaching them with the freedom story. if the federal government, during the fiscal year, had not collected one penny in tax on personal incomes, the government would still have had more tax revenue from other sources than the _total_ of what harry truman collected in his most extravagant peacetime spending year. every american, who knows that, can readily understand the possibility and the necessity of repealing the federal tax on personal incomes. but how many americans know those simple facts? the job of everyone who knows and cares is to get such facts to others. * * * * * even if we did take action to divest the council on foreign relations and its powerful interlock of control over our government; and even if we did reverse the policies which are now dragging us into a one-world socialist dictatorship--what would we do about some of the dangerous messes which our policies already have us involved in? what, for example, could we do about cuba? about berlin? in some ways, the policies of our invisible government have taken us beyond the point of no return. consider the problem of cuba. armed intervention in the affairs of another nation violates the principles of the traditional american policy of benign neutrality, to which i think our nation should return. yet, our intervention in cuban affairs (on the side of communism) has produced such a dangerous condition that we should now intervene with armed might in the interest of our own survival. * * * * * for sixteen years, we have seen the disastrous fallacy of trying to handle the foreign affairs of our great nation through international agencies. this leaves us without a policy of our own, and makes it impossible for us to take any action in our own interest or against the interests of communism, because communists have more actual votes, and infinitely more influence, in all the international agencies than we have. at the same time, our enemies, the communist nations, set and follow their own policies, contemptuously ignoring the international agencies which hamstring america and bleed american taxpayers for subsidies to our mortal enemies. america must do two things soon if she expects to survive as a free and independent nation: ( ) we must withdraw from membership in all international, governmental, or quasi-governmental, organizations--including, specifically, the world court, the united nations, and all un specialized agencies. ( ) we must act vigorously, unilaterally, and quickly, to protect vital american security interests in the western hemisphere--particularly in cuba. we have already passed the time when we can act in cuba easily and at no risk; but if we have any sane, manly concern for protecting the vital security of the american nation and the lives and property of united states citizens, we had better do the only thing left for us to do: send overwhelming american military force to take cuba over quickly, and keep it under american military occupation, as beneficently as possible, until the cuban people can hold free elections to select their own government. the other nations of the world would scream; but they would, nonetheless, respect us. such action in our own interests is the only thing that will restore our "prestige" in the world--and restore american military security in the western hemisphere. * * * * * what should we do about berlin? the berlin problem must be solved soon, because it is too effectively serving the purpose for which it was created in the first place: to justify whatever programs the various governments involved want to pursue. it sometimes looks as if the kremlin and washington officialdom are working hand-in-glove to deceive the people of both nations, turning the berlin "crisis" on and off to cover up failures and to provide excuses for more adventures. berlin will cause a world war only when the united states is willing to go to war with the soviet union to free berlin from the trap it is in. if we won't defend our own vital interests against the aggressive and arrogant actions of communists miles from our shores, what would prompt us to cross the ocean and defend germans from communists? the cold fact of the matter is that we should not defend berlin. this is a job for germans, not americans. the germans are an able and prosperous people. they are capable of fighting their own war, if war is necessary to protect them from communism. it is inaccurate to refer to the eastern part of germany as "communist germany." that part of germany is under communist enslavement; but the germans who live there probably hate communists more than any other people on earth do. the uprisings of , and the endless stream of refugees fleeing from the communist zone in germany, are proof enough that the communists could not hold east germany without the presence of soviet troops. there is enough hunger and poverty and hatred of communism in eastern germany to justify the conclusion that even khrushchev knows he has a bear by the tail there. if we would do our part, khrushchev would either turn loose and run; or the bear would pull loose and destroy khrushchev. what part should we play? we should do exactly what the president and the state department assure the world they will not do: we should present the soviets with a _fait accompli_, and an ultimatum. we should call an immediate conference with the governments of france, england, and west germany to explain that america has devoted years and many billions of dollars to rehabilitating and defending western europe; that europe is now in many ways more soundly prosperous than we are; that the million americans can no longer be expected to ruin their own economy and neglect the defense of their own homeland for the purpose of assisting and defending the million people of western europe; and that, therefore, we are through. we have no need, at home, for all of the vast stores of military equipment which we now have in europe for the defense of europe. what we do not need for the defense of our homeland, we should offer as a gift to west germany, since we produced the material in the first place for the purpose of resisting communism, and since the west germans are the only people in western europe who apparently want to resist it. we should give the west germans (and the other western powers) six months to train whatever manpower they want for manning their own defenses. at the end of that time, we should pull out and devote ourselves to defending america. with or without the consent of france and england, we should sign a peace treaty with the government of western germany, recognizing it as the lawful government of all germany and imposing no restrictions on the sovereignty of germany--that is, leaving germany free to arm as it pleases. immediately following the signing of this treaty, we should announce to the world that, when we pull out of europe at the end of six months, we expect the soviets to pull out of germany entirely. if, within one week after we effect our withdrawal, the soviets are not out--or if they later come back in, against the wishes of the german nation--we should break off diplomatic relations with _all_ communist countries; deny all representatives of all communist nations access to united nations headquarters which are on united states soil; and exert maximum pressures throughout the world to isolate all communist countries, economically and diplomatically, from all non-communist countries. that is an _american_ plan, which would solve the german "problem" in the interests of peace and freedom. * * * * * many americans, who see what the solution to our grave problems ought to be, have lost hope that we will ever achieve such solution, because, in the end, the solution rests with the people. it is the people who must compel their elected representatives to make a thorough investigation of the council on foreign relations and its interlock. it is the people who must compel congress to deny administrative agencies of government the unconstitutional power of granting tax-exemption. it is the people who must compel congress to submit a constitutional amendment calling for repeal of the income tax amendment. it is the people who must compel washington officialdom to do what is right and best for america in foreign affairs, especially in cuba and berlin. many americans are in despair because they feel that the people will never do these things. these pessimists seem to share the late harry hopkins' conviction that the american people are too dumb to think. i do not believe it. i subscribe to the marvelous doctrine of thomas jefferson, who said: "i know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education." appendix council on foreign relations membership roster this roster of membership is from the - annual report of the cfr. _directors_ frank altschul - hamilton fish armstrong - elliott v. bell - isaiah bowman - william a. m. burden - archibald cary coolidge - paul d. cravath - john w. davis - norman h. davis - arthur h. dean - harold w. dodds - lewis w. douglas - stephen p. duggan - allen w. dulles - thomas k. finletter - john h. finley - william c. foster - leon fraser - edwin f. gay - w. averell harrman - caryl p. haskins - david f. houston - charles p. howland - clarence e. hunter - philip c. jessup - joseph e. johnson - devereux c. josephs - otto h. kahn - grayson l. kirk - r. c. leffingwell - walter lippman - walter h. mallory , - george o. may - john j. mccloy - wesley c. mitchell - frank l. polk - philip d. reed - winfield w. riefler - david rockefeller - whitney h. shepardson - william r. shepherd - charles m. spofford - adlai e. stevenson - myron c. taylor - paul m. warburg - edward warner - george w. wickersham - john h. williams - clarence m. woolley - henry m. wriston - owen d. young - _resident members_ albrecht-carrie, rene aldrich, winthrop w. alexander, archibald s. alexander, henry c. alexander, robert j. allan, f. aley allen, charles e. allen, philip e. alley, james b. allport, alexander w. alpern, alan n. altschul, arthur g. altschul, frank ames, amyas ammidon, hoyt anderson, arthur m. anderson, harold f. anderson, robert b. angell, james w. armour, norman armstrong, hamilton fish ascoli, max aubrey, henry g. ault, bromwell backer, george baker, edgar r. baldwin, hanson w. bancroft, harding f. barber, charles f. barber, joseph barker, robert r. barkin, solomon barnes, joseph barnett, a. doak barnett, frank r. barrett, edward w. bastedo, philip baumer, william h. baxter, james p., rd beal, gerald f. beckhart, benjamin h. bedard, pierre beebe, frederick s. bell, elliott v. bennett, john c. benton, william b. beplat, tristan e. berle, adolf a., jr. bessie, simon michael bevis, herman w. bidwell, percy w. bienstock, abraham l. bingham, jonathan b. black, peter blair, floyd g. blake, robert o. blough, roger m. blough, roy blum, john a. boardman, arthur g., jr. bogdan, norbert a. bolte, charles g. bonsal, dudley b. boorman, howard l. boyd, hugh n. braden, spruille bradford, amory h. bramstedt, w. f. braxton, carter m. breck, henry c. brinckeroff, charles m. brittenham, raymond l. bronk, detlev w. brown, courtney c. brown, francis brown, john mason brown, walter l. brownell, george a. brownell, lincoln c. bruce, james brzezinski, zbigniew bullock, hugh bunche, ralph j. bunker, arthur h. bunker, ellsworth bunnell, c. sterling burden, william a. m. burgess, carter l. burkhardt, frederick burns, arthur f. bush, donald f. butler, william f. buttenwieser, benjamin j. cain, charles, jr. calder, alexander, jr. calhoun, alexander d. campbell, h. donald campbell, john c. canfield, cass carey, andrew g. carpenter, george w. carroll, mitchell b. carson, ralph m. case, james h., jr. case, john c. cattier, jean chadbourne, william m. champion, george chase, w. howard cheney, ward childs, thomas w. christie, lansdell k. chubb, percy, nd church, edgar m. clapp, gordon r. clark, brig. gen. edwin n. clark, james f. clay, gen. lucius d. clinchy, everett r. coffin, edmund cohen, jerome b. collado, emilio g. collings, l. v. collingwood, charles p. colwell, kent g. conant, james b. conant, melvin cook, howard a. coombs, charles a. cooper, franklin s. cordier, andrew w. cousins, norman cowan, l. gray cowles, gardner cox, charles r. creel, dana s. cummings, robert l., jr. cusick, peter dallin, alexander danner, arthur v. darrell, norris daum, earl c. davenport, john davis, norman p. davison, w. phillips dean, arthur h. debevoise, eli whitney de lima, oscar a. de vegh, imrie de vries, henry p. dewey, thomas e. d'harnoncourt, rene diebold, william, jr. dillon, clarence dilworth, j. richardson dodge, cleveland e. donner, frederick g. donovan, hedley dorr, goldthwaite h. dorwin, oscar john douglas, lewis w. douglas, percy l. dryfoos, orvil e. dubinsky, david dubois, j. delafield durdin, tillman eagle, vernon a. eaton, fredrick m. eberstadt, ferdinand edelman, albert i. eder, phanor j. eichelberger, clark m. elliott, l. w. emmet, christopher engel, irving m. ernst, albert e. erpf, armand g. evans, roger f. eveleth, george s., jr. ewing, sherman ewing, william, jr. exter, john fahs, charles b. field, william osgood, jr. fischer, john s. fisher, henry j. fleck, g. peter fleischmann, manly florinsky, michael t. ford, nevil forkner, claude e. forrestal, michael v. fosdick, raymond b. fox, joseph c. fox, william t. r. foye, arthur b. franklin, george s., jr. franklin, john m. freedman, emanuel r. french, john freudenthal, david m. friele, berent friendly, henry j. fry, varian fuerbringer, otto fuller, c. dale fuller, robert g. galantiere, lewis gallatin, james p. gamble, sidney d. gant, george f. gardner, john w. garretson, albert h. garrison, lloyd k. gaston, george a. gates, samuel e. gates, thomas s. gay, edward r. geneen, harold s. gevers, max e. gibney, frank b. gideonse, harry d. gifford, walter s. gillespie, s. hazard, jr. gilpatric, chadbourne golden, william t. goldsmith, arthur goldstone, harmon h. goodrich, leland m. gordon, albert h. goss, james h. grace, j. p., jr. graff, robert d. gray, william latimer gray, william steele grazier, joseph a. griffith, thomas grimm, peter grondahl, teg c. gross, ernest a. grover, allen guggenheim, harry f. gunther, john gurfein, murray i. haight, george w. hall, perry e. hamilton, thomas j. hamlin, chauncey j. hammond, capt. paul hance, william a. hanes, john w., jr. harrar, j. g. harriman, e. roland hasler, frederick e. hauge, gabriel hayes, alfred hazard, john n. heald, henry t. heckscher, august heineman, dannie n. henderson, william herod, w. rogers herring, pendleton herzog, paul m. hess, jerome s. hill, forrest f. hill, james t. jr. hill, john a. hills, robert c. hirschman, albert o. hochschild, harold k. hochschild, walter hoglund, elis s. hoguet, robert l., jr. hohenberg, john holland, henry f. holland, kenneth holman, eugene holst, willem holt, l. emmett, jr. homer, sidney, jr. hoopes, townsend hoover, lyman horn, garfield h. horton, philip hottelet, richard c. houghton, arthur a., jr. houston, frank k. howard, john b. howe, john hughes, emmet john hughes, john chambers humphreys, h. e., jr. hupper, roscoe h. hurewitz, j. c. hyde, henry b. hyde, james n. ide, john j. inglis, john b. irwin, john n., nd iselin, o'donnell jackson, c. d. jackson, william e. james, george f. jaretzki, alfred, jr. jay, nelson dean jessup, alpheus w. jessup, john k. johnson, edward f. johnson, howard c. johnson, joseph e. jones, david j. jones, w. alton josephs, devereux c. joubert, richard cheney kaminer, peter h. kane, r. keith kappel, frederick e. keezer, dexter merriam keiser, david m. kelley, nicholas kenney, f. donald kern, harry f. kettaneh, francis a. keyser, paul v., jr. kiaer, herman s. king, frederic r. kirk, adm. alan g. kirk, grayson l. klots, allen t. knoke, l. werner knoppers, antonie t. knowles, john ellis knox, william e. koenig, robert p. kohn, hans kraft, joseph lada-mocarski, v. la farge, francis w. lamb, horace r. lamont, peter t. lamont, thomas s. lang, robert e. larmon, sigurd s. laroche, chester j. laukhuff, perry lebaron, eugene lee, elliott h. lehman, herbert h. lehman, orin lehman, robert lehrman, hal leich, john f. leonard, james g. leroy, norbert g. leslie, john c. levy, walter j. lewis, roger lewisohn, frank lieberman, henry r. lightner, m. c. lilienthal, david e. lindquist, warren t. lissitzyn, oliver j. lockwood, john e. lockwood, mancie def., rd lockwood, william a. lodge, henry cabot loeb, john l. logan, sheridan a. loomis, alfred l. loos, rev. a. william loucks, harold h. lounsbury, robert h. lubin, isador luce, henry r. ludt, r. e. luitweiler, j. c. lunning, just lyford, joseph p. mccance, thomas mccarthy, john g. mccloy, john j. mcdaniel, joseph m., jr. mcdonald, james g. mcgraw, james h., jr. mckeever, porter mclean, donald h., jr. macduffie, marshall maceachron, david w. macintyre, malcolm a. maciver, murdoch macveagh, ewen cameron maffry, august maguire, walter n. malin, patrick murphy mallory, walter h. mark, rev. julius markel, lester martino, joseph a. marvel, william w. masten, john e. mathews, edward j. mattison, graham d. may, a. wilfred may, stacy menke, john r. merz, charles metzger, herman a. mickelson, sig midtbo, harold millar, d. g. millard, mark j. miller, edward g., jr. miller, paul r., jr. miller, william j. millis, walter mills, bradford minor, clark h. mitchell, don g. mitchell, sidney a. model, leo monaghan, thomas e. moore, ben t. moore, edward f. moore, george s. moore, maurice t. moore, william t. morgan, cecil morgan, d. p. morgan, henry s. morris, grinnell mosely, philip e. muir, malcolm munroe, vernon, jr. munyan, winthrop r. murdin, forrest d. murphy, grayson m-p. murphy, j. morden nason, john w. neal, alfred c. nebolsine, george nicely, james m. nichols, thomas s. nichols, william i. nickerson, a. l. nielsen, waldemar a. nolte, richard h. northrop, johnston f. notestein, frank w. noyes, charles phelps oakes, john b. o'brien, justin o'connor, roderic l. ogden, alfred olds, irving sands oppenheimer, fritz e. osborn, earl d. osborn, frederick h. osborn, william h. osborne, stanley de j. ostrander, f. taylor, jr. overby, andrew n. overton, douglas w. pace, frank, jr. page, howard w. page, john h. page, robert g. pagnamenta, g. paley, william s. parker, philo w. patterson, ellmore c. patterson, frederick d. patterson, morehead patterson, richard c., jr. payne, frederick b. payne, samuel b. payson, charles shipman peardon, thomas p. peffer, nathaniel pennoyer, paul g. peretz, don perkins, james a. perkins, roswell b. peters, c. brooks petersen, gustav h. petschek, stephen r. phillips, christopher h. pierce, william c. pierson, warren lee pifer, alan pike, h. harvey plimpton, francis t. p. poletti, charles polk, judd poor, henry v. potter, robert s. powers, joshua b. pratt, h. irving, jr. proudfit, arthur t. quigg, philip w. rabi, isidor i. rathbone, m. j. ray, george w., jr. reber, samuel redmond, roland l. reed, philip d. reeves, jay b. l. reid, ogden reid, whitelaw rheinstein, alfred richardson, arthur berry richardson, dorsey richardson, john r., jr. riegelman, harold ripley, joseph p. roberts, george roberts, henry l. robinson, geroid t. robinson, leland rex rockefeller, david rockefeller, john d., rd rockhill, victor e. rodriguez, vincent a. rogers, lindsay roosevelt, george emlen root, elihu, jr. root, oren roper, elmo rosenberg, james n. rosenman, samuel i. rosenstiel, lewis rosenwald, william rosinski, herbert ross, emory ross, t. j. rouse, robert g. royce, alexander b. ruebhausen, oscar m. rush, kenneth rustow, dankwart a. sachs, alexander sachs, howard j. saltzman, charles e. samuels, nathaniel sargeant, howland h. sargent, noel sarnoff, brig. gen. david sawin, melvin e. schaffner, joseph halle schapiro, j. salwyn scherman, harry schiff, john m. schiller, a. arthur schilthuis, willem c. schmidt, herman j. schmoker, j. benjamin schwartz, harry schwarz, frederick a. o. scott, john sedwitz, walter j. seligman, eustace seymour, whitney north sharp, george c. sharp, james h. shea, andrew b. sheffield, frederick shepard, david a. shepard, frank p. shepardson, whitney h. shepherd, howard c. sherbert, paul c. sherman, irving h. shields, murray shields, w. clifford shirer, william l. shute, benjamin r. siegbert, henry sims, albert g. slater, joseph e. slawson, john sloan, alfred p., jr. smith, carleton sprague smith, david s. smith, hayden n. smith, w. mason, jr. smull, j. barstow solbert, peter o. a. sonne, h. christian soubry, e. e. spaght, monroe e. spang, kenneth m. spencer, percy c. spofford, charles m. stackpole, stephen h. stebbins, james h. stebbins, richard p. stern, h. peter stevenson, adlai e. stevenson, john r. stewart, robert mclean stillman, chauncey stillman, ralph s. stinebower, leroy d. stoddard, george d. stokes, isaac n. p. stone, shepard straka, jerome a. straus, donald b. straus, jack i. straus, oscar s. straus, ralph i. straus, r. peter strauss, simon d. strong, benjamin sulzberger, arthur hays swatland, donald c. swingle, william s. swope, gerard, jr. tannenbaum, frank tannenwald, theodore thomas, h. gregory thompson, earle s. thompson, kenneth w. tibby, john tinker, edward laroque tomlinson, roy e. townsend, edward townsend, oliver traphagan, j. c. travis, martin b., jr. trippe, juan terry truman, david b. tweedy, gordon b. uzielli, giorgio van dusen, rev. henry p. von mehren, robert b. voorhees, tracy s. walker, joseph, jr. walkowicz, t. f. wallace, schuyler c. warburg, eric m. warburg, frederick m. warburg, james p. ward, thomas e. warfield, ethelbert warren, john edwin wasson, donald wasson, r. gordon watson, arthur k. watson, thomas j., jr. wauchope, rear adm. george weaver, sylvester l., jr. webster, bethuel m. welch, leo d. wellborn, vice adm. charles, jr. wernimont, kenneth wheeler, walter h., jr. whidden, howard p. whipple, taggart whipple, brig. gen. william white, frank x. white, h. lee white, theodore h. whitman, h. h. whitney, john hay whitridge, arnold wight, charles a. wilkinson, col. lawrence willcox, westmore williams, langbourne m. willits, joseph h. wilson, john d. wilson, orme wilson, philip d. wingate, henry s. winslow, richard s. wood, bryce woodward, donald b. woodyatt, philip woolley, knight wright, harry n. wriston, henry m. wriston, walter b. yost, charles w. young, john m. zurcher, arnold j. _non-resident members_ acheson, dean achilles, theodore c. adams, roger agar, herbert akers, anthony b. allen, raymond b. allyn, s. c. amory, robert, jr. anderson, dillon anderson, vice adm. george anderson, roger e. anderson, gen. samuel e. armstrong, john a. atherton, j. ballard attwood, william auld, george p. babcock, maj. gen. c. stanton badeau, john s. baker, george p. ball, george w. ballou, george t. barghoorn, frederick c. barker, james m. barnett, robert w. barrows, leland bartholomew, dana t. bass, robert p., jr. bassow, whitman bateman, william h. bates, marston bator, francis m. bayne, edward ashley bechtel, s. d. bell, holley mack benda, harry j. bennett, martin toscan bergson, abram berkner, l. v. bernstein, edward m. betts, brig. gen. thomas j. bissell, richard m., jr. black, cyril e. black, col. edwin f. black, eugene r. blackie, william b. bliss, c. i. bliss, robert woods bloomfield, lincoln p. blum, robert boeschenstein, harold bohlen, charles e. bonesteel, maj. gen. c. h. rd boothby, albert c. borton, hugh bowie, robert r. bowles, chester braden, thomas w. bradfield, richard braisted, paul j. brett, george p., jr. brewster, kingman, jr. briggs, ellis o. brinton, crane bristol, william m. bronwell, arthur brophy, gerald b. brorby, melvin bross, john a. brown, irving brown, sevellon, rd brown, william o. bruce, david k. e. brundage, percival f. bruton, henry j. bundy, harvey h. bundy, mcgeorge bundy, william p. burgess, w. randolph byrne, james macgregor byrnes, robert f. byroade, henry a. cabot, john m. cabot, louis w. cabot, thomas d. caldwell, robert g. calkins, hugh camp, jack l. campbell, kenneth h. canfield, franklin o. caraway, lt. gen. paul w. carpenter, w. samuel, rd carter, william d. cary, william l. case, clifford p. case, everett n. chapin, selden chapman, john f. cheever, daniel s. cherrington, ben m. childs, marquis cisler, walker l. clark, ralph l. clayton, w. l. cleveland, harlan clough, ernest t. coffey, joseph irving cohen, benjamin v. cole, charles w. collbohm, f. r. collyer, john l. conlon, richard p. conrad, brig. gen. bryan considine, rev. john j., m. m. coons, arthur g. copeland, lammot du pont corson, john j. costello, william a. cotting, charles e. cowen, myron m. cowles, john crane, winthrop murray, rd creighton, albert m. cross, james e. crotty, homer d. crowe, philip k. culbertson, col. william s. curran, jean a., jr. curtis, edward p. dangerfield, royden darlington, charles f. david, donald k. davidson, alfred e. davidson, carter davies, fred a. davis, nathanael v. dean, edgar p. decker, william c. de guigne, christian, rd da kiewiet, c. w. de krafft, william deming, frederick l. despres, emile deuel, wallace r. deutch, michael j. dewhurst, j. frederic dexter, byron dickey, john s. dillon, c. douglas dodds, harold willis dollard, charles donkin, mckay donnell, james c., nd donnelly, maj. gen. harold c. dorr, russell h. douglas, donald w., jr. draper, william h., jr. drummond, roscoe ducas, robert duce, james terry duke, angier biddle dulles, allen w. dunn, frederick s. eckstein, alexander edelstein, julius c. c. edwards, a. r. edwards, william h. einaudi, mario einstein, lewis eisenhower, dwight d. elliott, byron k. elliott, randle elliott, william y. elsey, george m. elson, robert t. emeny, brooks emerson, e. a. emerson, rupert eppert, ray r. estabrook, robert h. ethridge, mark evans, j. k. everton, john scott fainsod, merle fairbank, john king fairbanks, douglas farmer, thomas l. fay, sidney b. feely, edward f. feis, herbert ferguson, john h. finkelstein, lawrence s. finlay, luke w. finletter, thomas k. firestone, harvey s., jr. fischer, george fisher, edgar j. fleischmann, julius fleming, lamar, jr. follis, r. g. ford, guy stanton ford, thomas k. foster, austin t. foster, william c. fowler, henry h. foy, fred c. frank, isaiah frank, joseph a. frankfurter, felix fredericks, j. wayne free, lloyd a. fuller, carlton p. furber, holden furniss, edgar s., jr. galbraith, j. kenneth gallagher, charles f. gannett, lewis s. gardiner, arthur z. gardner, richard n. garner, robert l. garthoff, raymond l. gaud, william s. gavin, lt. gen. james m. gaylord, bradley geier, frederick v. geier, paul e. gerhart, lt. gen. john k. giffin, brig. gen. sidney f. gilbert, carl j. gilbert, h. n. gilchrist, huntington gillin, john p. gilpatric, roswell l. gleason, s. everett glennan, t. keith goheen, robert f. goldberg, arthur j. goodhart, arthur l. goodpaster, maj. gen. andrew j. goodrich, carter gordon, lincoln gornick, alan l. gorter, wytze gould, laurence m. graham, philip l. grant, james p. grant, maj. gen. u. s., rd gray, gordon green, joseph c. greene, a. crawford greene, james c. greenewalt, crawford h. greenwood, heman griffith, william e. griswold, a. whitney grove, curtiss c. gruenther, gen. alfred m. gullion, edmund a. halle, louis j., jr. hamilton, fowler hamilton, maj. gen. pierpont m. hammonds, oliver w. hansell, gen. haywood s., jr. harbison, frederick harriman, w. averell harris, irving b. harsch, joseph. c. hart, augustin s. hartley, robert w. haskell, broderick haskins, caryl p. hauck, arthur a. haviland, h. field, jr. hayes, samuel p. hays, brooks hays, john t. heffelfinger, totton p., nd heilperin, michael a. heintzen, harry l. heinz, h. j., nd henderson, loy w. henkin, louis henry, david dodds herter, christian a. hill, george watts hitch, charles j. hofer, philip hoffman, michael l. hoffman, paul g. holborn, hajo holland, william l. holmes, julius c. homer, arthur b. hook, george v. hoover, calvin b. hoover, herbert hoover, herbert, jr. hopkins, d. luke hopper, bruce c. hornbeck, stanley k. hoskins, halford l. hoskins, harold b. houghton, amory hovde, frederick l. hovey, allan, jr. howard, graeme k. howe, walter hoyt, edwin c., jr. hoyt, palmer huglin, brig. gen. h. c. humphrey, hubert h. hunsberger, warren s. hunt, james ramsay, jr. hunter, clarence e. issawi, charles p. iverson, kenneth r. jackson, elmore jackson, william h. jaffe, sam a. jansen, marius b. javits, jacob k. jenney, john k. jessup, philip c. johnson, herschel v. johnson, lester b. johnson, robert l. johnston, henry r. johnstone, w. h. jones, peter t. jordan, col, amos a. jorden, william j. kahin, george mct. kaiser, philip m. kamarck, andrew m. katz, milton katzenbach, edward l., jr. kauffman, james lee kaufmann, william w. kelso, a. donald kempner, frederick c. kennan, george f. kerr, clark killian, james r., jr. kimberly, john h. king, james e., jr. king, john a., jr. kinkaid, adm. thomas c. kintner, col. william r. kissinger, henry a. knight, douglas knorr, klaus kohler, foy d. kohler, walter j. korbel, josef korol, alexander g. kotschnig, walter labouisse, henry r. ladejinsky, wolf lamson, roy, jr. landis, james m. langer, paul f. langer, william l. langsam, walter consuelo lanham, maj. gen. charles t. lansdale, gen. edward g. larson, jens frederick lasswell, harold d. latourette, kenneth s. lattimore, owen lawrence, david lawrence, w. h. laybourne, lawrence e. laylin, john g. leddy, john m. lee, charles henry leghorn, richard s. lemnitzer, gen. l. l. leslie, donald s. lesueur, larry levine, irving r. levy, marion j., jr. lewis, herbert lewis, wilmarth s. lichtenstein, walter lincoln, col. g. a. linder, harold f. lindley, ernest k. lindsay, franklin a. lindsay, john v. lindsay, lt. gen. richard c. linebarger, paul m. a. lingelbach, william e. lingle, walter l., jr. lippmann, walter litchfield, edward h. little, herbert s. little, l. k. lockard, derwood w. locke, edwin a., jr. lockwood, william w. lodge, george cabot loomis, robert h. lunt, samuel d. lyon, e. wilson mccabe, thomas b. mcclintock, robert m. mccone, john alex mccormack, maj. gen. j., jr. mccracken, paul w. mccutcheon, john d. mcdougal, edward d., jr. mcdougal, myres s. mcfarland, ross a. mcgee, gale w. mcghee, george c. mckay, vernon mckittrick, thomas h. mclaughlin, donald h. mcarthur, douglas, nd macchesney, a. brunson, rd macdonald, j. carlisle macveagh, lincoln machold, william f. maddox, william p. maddux, maj. gen. h. r. mallinson, harry mallory, george w. manning, bayless marcus, stanley marshall, charles b. martin, edwin m. martin, william mcc., jr. masland, john w. mason, edward s. mathews, william r. maximov, andre may, oliver mayer, ferdinand[b] l. mayer, gerald m. meagher, robert f. meck, john f. menke, john r. merchant, livingston t. merillat, h. c. l. merriwether, duncan metcalf, george r. meyer, charles a. meyer, clarence e. meyer, cord, jr. milbank, robbins miller, francis p. miller, william b. millikan, clark b. millikan, max f. millis, john s. minor, harold b. mitchell, james p. moore, hugh moran, william e., jr. morgan, george a. morgan, shepard morgenstern, oskar morgenthau, hans j. mott, john l. mudd, henry t. munoz marin, luis munro, dana g. munson, henry lee murphy, donald r. murphy, franklin d. murphy, robert murrow, edward r. myers, denys p. nathan, robert r. nelson, fred m. neumann, sigmund newman, richard t. newton, quigg, jr. nichols, calvin j. niebuhr, reinhold nitze, paul h. nixon, richard m. nover, barnet noyes, w. albert, jr. nuveen, john oakes, george w. oelman, r. s. oppenheimer, j. robert orchard, john e. osborne, lithgow owen, garry paffrath, leslie palmer, norman d. pantzer, kurt f. park, richard l. parker, barrett parsons, john c. patterson, gardner paul, norman s. pelzer, karl j. penfield, james k. perera, guido r. perkins, courtland d. perkins, milo petersen, howard c. phillips, william phleger, herman piquet, howard s. poque, l. welch polk, william r. pool, ithiel desola power, thomas f., jr. prance, p. f. a. preston, jerome price, don k. pritchard, ross j. prizer, john b. prochnow, herbert v. pulling, edward s. pusey, nathan m. pye, lucien w. radway, laurence i. ravenholt, albert reinhardt, g. frederick reischauer, edwin o. reitzel, william rennie, wesley f. reston, james b. rich, john h., jr. richardson, david b. ridgway, gen. matthew b. riefler, winfield w. ries, hans a. riley, edward c. ripley, s. dillon, nd. rivkin, arnold robinson, donald h. rockefeller, nelson a. rogers, james grafton romualdi, serafino roosa, robert v. roosevelt, kermit roosevelt, nicholas rosengarten, adolph g., jr. ross, michael rostow, eugene v. rostow, walt w. rusk, dean russell, donald s. ryan, john t., jr. salomon, irving satterthwaite, joseph c. sawyer, john e. schaetzel, j. robert schelling, t. c. schlesinger, arthur m., jr. schmidt, adolph w. schneider, hubert a. schorr, daniel l. schuyler, gen. c. v. r. schwab, william b. schwebel, stephen m. scott, william ryland seymour, charles seymour, forrest w. sharp, walter r. sharpe, henry d., jr. shaw, g. howland shearer, warren w. sheean, vincent shishkin, boris shulman, marshall d. shuster, george simons, hans simpson, john l. slocum, john j. smith, everett r. smith, gerard g. smith, h. alexander smith, adm. harold page smith, robert w. smithies, arthur smyth, henry dew. snyder, richard c. sontag, raymond james soth, lauren k. southard, frank a., jr. spaatz, gen. carl speers, rev. theodore c. spencer, john h. spiegel, harold r. sprague, mansfield d. sprague, robert c. sproul, robert g. sprout, harold staley, eugene stanton, edwin f. stason, e. blythe stasson, harold e. stein, eric stein, harold stephens, claude o. sterling, j. e. wallace stevenson, william e. stewart, col. george stewart, robert burgess stilwell, col. richard g. stone, donald c. stowe, leland straton, julius a. straus, robert kenneth strauss, lewis l. strausz-hupe, robert strayer, joseph r. struble, adm. a. d. sulzberger, c. l. sunderland, thomas e. surrey, walter sterling sweetser, arthur swensrud, sidney a. swihart, james w. symington, w. stuart talbot, phillips tanham, george k. tapp, jesse w. taylor, george e. taylor, gen. maxwell d. taylor, wayne chatfield teller, edward templeton, richard h. tennyson, leonard b. thayer, charles w. thayer, robert h. thornburg, max w. thorp, willard l. trager, frank n. triffin, robert trowbridge, alexander b. truscott, gen. lucian k., jr. tuck, william hallam ulmer, alfred c., jr. upgren, arthur r. valentine, alan van cleve, thomas c. van slyck, deforest van stirum, john vernon, raymond viner, jacob wadsworth, james j. wait, richard wallich, henry c. walmsley, walter n. wanger, walter ward, rear adm. chester warren, shields washburn, abbott watkins, ralph j. weeks, edward wells, herman b. westmoreland, maj. gen. w. c. westphal, albert c. f. wheeler, oliver p. whitaker, arthur p. white, gilbert f. white, john campbell whiteford, william k. wiesner, jerome b. wilbur, brayton wilbur, c. martin wilcox, francis o. wilcox, robert b. wild, payson s., jr. wilde, frazar b. wilds, walter w. williams, john h. wilmerding, lucius, jr. wilson, carroll l. wilson, howard e. wilson, o. meredith wimpfheimer, jacques winton, david j. wisner, frank g. wohl, elmer p. wohlstetter, albert wolfers, arnold wood, harleston r. wriggins, w. howard wright, adm. jerauld wright, quincy wright, theodore p. wyzanski, charles e., jr. yntema, theodore o. young, kenneth t. young, t. cuyler zellerbach, j. d. appendix atlantic union committee membership roster this membership list was published by the atlantic union committee in december, . "cfr" in parentheses after a name is an editorial indication that the person is also a member of the council on foreign relations. no other biographical information is given for cfr members. the biographical information, on the auc members who are not also cfr members, was taken from _who's who_ and/or the _american dictionary of biography_. abbott, mrs. george abend, hallet achilles, paul s., chairman of the board, psychological corporation; board member, eastman-kodak company adams, james d., partner, mccutchen, doyle, brown & enersen, lawyers, san francisco adams, hon. paul l., attorney general, state of michigan agar, herbert (cfr) agnew, albert c. aiken, hon. paul c., former assistant postmaster general of the u. s. alexander, mrs. sadie t. m. allen, h. julian, general manager, paris office, morgan guaranty trust company allen, dr. max p. alvord, ellsworth c., member, law firm of alvord & alvord, washington, d. c.; board member, general dynamics corp., smith-corona, inc. amen, john harlan, associate trial counsel, nurnburg war criminals trials; member, amen, weisman & butler, new york city amory, copley anderson, don anderson, eugene n., professor of history, university of southern california at los angeles anderson, mrs. eugene anderson, eugenie former ambassador to denmark anderson, maj. gen. frederick l. trustee, rand corp. anderson dr. paul r., president, chatham college, pittsburgh anderson steve anderson, victor e., former governor of nebraska andrews, mark edwin, president, second m. e. andrews, ltd., houston andrews, dr. stanley, executive director, kellogg foundation apperson john w. armour, norman (cfr) armstrong, george s., president, george s. armstrong & co., new york city, trustee, committee for economic development armstrong, o. k., member, editorial staff reader's digest, former congressman; founder, department of journalism, university of florida arnold, remmie l. arnold, thurman, former u. s. assistant attorney general arzt, dr. max, president, jewish theological seminary atherton, warren h., past national commander, american legion aurner, dr. robert r., president, aurner & associates, carmel, california babian, haig bache, harold l., sr., senior partner, bache & co., new york city bacon, mrs. robert low, chairman, administration liaison committee, national federation of republican women bagwell, dr. paul d., past president, u. s. junior chamber of commerce baker, dr. benjamin m., jr. baker, mrs. frank c. baker, rev. richard, bishop, episcopal diocese of north carolina; member, general board, national council of churches balduf, dr. emery w. baldwin, henry p., vice president, water power & paper co., wisconsin; member, national board, national conference of christians and jews, chairman, brotherhood week, baldwin, howard c., chairman of the board of standard federal savings & loan association, detroit; vice president and trustee, the kresge foundation, member, board of publications, methodist church baldwin, hon. raymond e., former u. s. senator and governor of connecticut ball, george (cfr) ball, hon, joseph h., former u. s. senator from minnesota banning, mrs. margaret barclay, dr. thomas swain, professor of political science, stanford university, member, national municipal league; member, american delegation to negotiate the peace, barinowski, r. e. barnes, julius h. (cfr) barrows, mrs. ira bartlett, lynn m., superintendent of public schools, state of michigan; former president, national education assn. barzun, jacques, dean of faculty and provost, columbia. university; author, historian, musicologist batcheller, hiland g., chairman of the board, allegheny-ludlum steel corp. bates, dr. rosalind goodrich, past president, international federation of women lawyers battle, laurie c., former congresswoman from alabama baukhage, h. r., consulting editor, army times publishing company; radio commentator bayne, the rt. rev. stephen f., jr., executive officer, anglican communion beaton, harold d. becker, herman d. becker, ralph e., past chairman, young republican national federation beckett, mrs. r. capel beeley, dr. arthur l. dean emeritus, school of social work, university of utah; official, national association for mental health belknap, william bell, edgar d. bell, robert c., jr. belsheim, dr. edmund o., dean, college of law, university of nebraska benedict, harry e. (cfr) bennet, augustus w. bennett, admiral andrew c. benson, dr. oscar a., president, augustana lutheran church bertholf, dr. lloyd m., president, illinois wesleyan university biddle, george bidgood, dr. lee bingham, alfred m. birkhead, kenneth m. bishop, robert j. bissantz, edgar bixler, j. seelye, president, colby college, maine; former dean, harvard divinity school blackwelder, dr. eliot, professor emeritus of geology, stanford university blair, paxton, solicitor general, state of new york blanchard, rt. rev. roger w. blanshard, dr. brand, professor of philosophy, yale university blewett, edward y., president, westbrook junior college, maine; former dean of liberal arts, university of new hampshire bliss, robert woods (cfr) boas, dr. george, professor of philosophy, john hopkins university boekel, william a. boggs, dr. marion a., moderator, presbyterian church, u.s. bohn, william e. bonds, dr. alfred b., jr., president, baldwin-wallace college, ohio borsody, dr. stephen bowles, mrs. istvan bowles, chester (cfr) boyd, brig. gen. ralph g. bradley, rev. preston, founder and pastor, people's unitarian church, chicago braendel, helmuth g. brand, hon. james t., associate justice, oregon supreme court brandt, dr. karl, director, food research institute, stanford university brannan, charles f., former u. s. secretary of agriculture branscomb, dr. harvie, chancellor, vanderbilt university braucher, robert, professor of law, harvard university breckinridge, john b. brees, orlo m. briefs, dr. goetz a., professor of labor economics, georgetown university briscoe, john d. bronk, dr. detlev w. (cfr) brooklings, mrs. robert s., philanthropist brown, john nicholas, former under secretary of navy for air brown, julius a. brown, mary agnes, member, u. s. board of veterans appeals brown, prentiss m., former u. s. senator from michigan brown, thomas cook, editor emeritus, buffalo courier-express; member, foreign policy association; member advisory board, buffalo council on world affairs browning, gordon brundage, hon. percival f. (cfr) bryson, dr. lyman (cfr) bullis, harry a. (cfr) bunker, arthur h. (cfr) bunker, hon. ellsworth (cfr) bunting, dr. j. whitney, professor of finance, new york university; research consultant, general electric company; former president, oglethorpe university burch, lucius e., jr. burling, edward b., partner, covington & burling, lawyers, washington, d. c. burnett, leo, chairman of the board, leo burnett company; director, advertising council, chicago better business bureau; trustee, american heritage foundation burns, dr. arthur f. (cfr) burns, james macgregor, professor of political science, williams college burt, katharine newlin burwell, w. russell, vice chairman of the board, clevite corp.; past president, cleveland council on world affairs cabot, henry b. (cfr) cahn, mrs. moise s. caldwell, dr. frank h., president, louisville presbyterian seminary caldwell, dr. harmon w., chancellor, university system of georgia caldwell, dr. john t., chancellor, north carolina state college canaday, ward m., president and chairman of the board, the overland corp. canfield, cass (cfr) cantril, dr. hadley, chairman, institute for international social research, princeton capra, frank, motion picture producer carlton, doyle e., former governor of florida carmichael, dr. oliver c. (cfr) carrington, paul, partner, carrington, johnson & stephens, lawyers, dallas; past president, dallas council on world affairs; national councilor, boy scouts of america; trustee southwest legal foundation, s.m.u. carter, edward w., president, broadway-hale stores, inc., los angeles; trustee, committee for economic development; member, board of regents, university of california carter, hodding, pulitzer prize editor, greenville, mississippi carter, john l. cary, sheldon casey, dr. ralph d., director emeritus, school of journalism, university of minnesota catton, bruce, editor, american heritage magazine; pulitzer prize for history, chabrak, thomas chadwick, stephen f., past national commander, american legion chandler, walter c., former congressman from tennessee; former mayor of memphis chenery, william l. chipps, roy b. cisler, walker l. (cfr) clagett, j. r. claypool, mrs. j. gordon clayton, william l. (cfr) clingman, rt. rev. charles clothier, dr. robert c. clough, dr. shepard b., director, casa italiana, columbia university code, dr. charles f., professor of physiology, university of minnesota; consultant, mayo clinic coe, dr. albert buckner, official, national council of churches; delegate to st and nd world council of churches coffee, john m. cohen, harry, retired surgeon; former editor, _american jewish cyclopedia_; editor-in-chief, _american jews: their lives and achievements_ cole, wilton d., chairman of the board, crowell-collier publishing company collier, w. edwin compton, dr. arthur h., professor, washington university, st. louis; nobel prize in physics, ; former co-chairman, national conference of christians and jews; former member, committee for economic development; former general chairman, world brotherhood; dean emeritus, washington university, st. louis compton, dr. wilson, former president, state college of washington; chairman of the board, cameron machine co.; director, international council of christian leadership comstock, alzada comstock, louis k. cook, lyle e. coons, dr. arthur gardiner (cfr) corn, james f. corsi, edward, former commissioner of immigration and naturalization cortney, philip, chairman, u. s. council, international chamber of commerce; president, coty, inc. and coty international cotton, aylett b. cowles, gardner (cfr) cox, c. r. (cfr) crane, dr. henry hitt, official, world council of churches crawford, arthur l., director, college of mines & minerals, university of utah cross, dr. george l., president, university of oklahoma crosswaith, frank, chairman, negro labor committee crouch, harry e. cruikshank, nelson h., director, department of social security, afl-cio, member, federal advisory council, department of labor, member, national planning association; official, national council of churches cruse, mrs. w. c. cutting, fulton (cfr) dail, charles c. daltry, joseph s., director, graduate summer school for teachers, wesleyan university, connecticut dandridge, rt. rev. e. p. darden, hon. colgate w., retired president, university of virginia; former governor of virginia; former congressman from virginia darling, jay n., retired cartoonist, _new york herald-tribune_; pulitzer prize, , daugherty, paul e. davidson, dr. philip g., president, university of louisville davies, mrs. a. powell davis, chester c., associate director, ford foundation davis, j. lionberger davis, dr. stanton ling davis, william h. (cfr) dawson, john p., professor of law, harvard university; former professor of law, university of michigan day, dean john w. deane, maj. gen. john r., former chief, american military mission to u.s.s.r. debevoise, thomas m. (cfr) deinard, amos s. dekiewiet, dr. c. w. (cfr) dempsey, james dennis, don de pasquale, judge luigi de spoelberch, mrs. eric d'estournelles, mrs. julie devers, gen. jacob l., retired commander of sixth army group dewhurst, dr. j. frederic (cfr) dickason, h. l. dickey, dr. frank g., president, university of kentucky diemer, dr. george w. dietz, howard, vice president, mgm dimock, edward jordan, federal district judge, southern district of new york dodge, cleveland e. (cfr) doman, nicholas donohue, f. joseph donovan, dr. herman l., president emeritus, university of kentucky donovan, james g., former congressman from new york; director of the federal housing administration, - dorothy, mrs. dorothy dorr, dr. harold m., dean, state-wide education, university of michigan dorr, john v. n. (cfr) douglass, dr. paul f., former president, american university draper, maj. gen. william h., jr. (cfr) draughon, dr. ralph b., president, alabama polytechnic institute (auburn) dun, the rt. rev. angus, episcopal bishop of washington, d. c.; former official of federal council of churches dunbar, charles e., jr., professor emeritus of law, tulane university; vice president, national civil service league duncan, robert f. earnest, dr. g. brooks, president, fenn college, cleveland; trustee, cleveland council on world affairs eastvold, dr. seth c., first vice president, evangelical lutheran church eberstadt, ferdinand (cfr) eccles, marriner s., former chairman, board of governors, federal reserve system; chairman of the board, first securities corp. edge, nelson j., jr. edgren, mrs. m. c. edmonds, douglas l., former justice, supreme court of california edmunds, j. ollie, president, john b. stetson university, deland, florida edson, col. c. a. edwards, horace h., city manager, richmond, virginia; campaign manager, roosevelt, ; general director, national democratic campaigns , edwards, james e., president, prairie farmer publishing co., radio station wls, chicago eichleay, john w. elligett, mrs. raymond t. elliott, dr. william m., jr., pastor, highland presbyterian church, dallas; former chairman & moderator, world missions, presbyterian church, u. s. ellis, dr. calvert n., president, juanita college, pennsylvania ellis, clyde t. ellis, dr. elmer, president, university of missouri elmendorf, armin emerson, e. a. (cfr) emrich, the rt. rev. richard s. m., episcopal bishop of michigan engel, irving m., president, american jewish committee; member, law firm of engel, judge, miller, sterling & reddy, new york city erlanger, milton s. estwing, ernest ethridge, mrs. mark (husband in cfr) evjue, william t., editor, madison, wisconsin, _capital-times_ fairbanks, douglas, jr. (cfr) farley, eugene shedden, president, wilkes college, pennsylvania farnsley, charles p., lawyer, former mayor of louisville, kentucky feller, karl f., president, international union of united brewery, flour, cereal, soft drink & distillery workers of america; member, american heritage foundation ferguson, charles w., senior editor, _the reader's digest_ ferguson, mrs. walter fischer, louis, author, foreign correspondent; authority on the soviet union, spain and mahatma gandhi fisher, kenneth fitch, h. m., vice-president, american air filter company fitz-hugh, col. alexander flower, henry c., jr., vice chairman, j. walter thompson co. flynt, dr. ralph c. m., assistant u. s. commissioner of education; former president, atlantic treaty association folsom, marion b. (cfr) forgan, j. russell, partner, glore, forgan & co., investments, chicago; board member, national distillers products corp., studebaker-packard corp., borg-warner corp. foster, dr. luther h., president, tuskegee institute fowler, earle b. francis, clarence, former chairman of board, general foods corp. freeman, orville l., secretary of agriculture; former governor of minnesota friedrich, carl j., eaton professor of government, harvard university; author fritchey, clayton, publisher, _northern virginia sun_, arlington; director, foreign policy association; deputy chairman, national democratic committee, - fuller, alfred c., chairman of board, fuller brush company fuller, carlton p. (cfr) fuller, dr. richard e., president, seattle art museum; research professor, university of washington; former chairman, northwest division, institute of pacific relations funk, wilfred, chairman, wilfred funk, inc., publishers; president, funk & wagnalls company, publishers furlong, mrs. margaret k. gammage, dr. grady, president, arizona state university; director, national conference of christians and jews gannon, rev. robert i., s. j., former president, fordham university gape, charles garwood, w. st. john, former justice, supreme court of texas garwood, mrs. w. st. john gaston, c. marion gates, hon. artemus l. (cfr) gavin, lt. gen. james m. (cfr) gerstenfeld, rabbi norman, washington (d.c.) hebrew congregation gettell, dr. richard glenn, president, mt. holyoke college geyer, bertram b., retired chairman of the board, geyer advertising, inc. gideonse, dr. harry d. (cfr) gifford, miss chloe, past president, general federation of women's clubs giles, dr. philip randall, general superintendent, universalist church of america gillette, guy m., former senator from iowa gilliam, miss elsie glenn, dr. c. leslie, professor, mental health institute, university of michigan; former rector, st. john's cathedral, washington, d. c.; former rector, christ church, cambridge, massachusetts golden, clinton s., former vice-president, united steelworkers of america gorin, louis j., jr. gould, dr. laurence m. (cfr) grace, miss charity granger, lester, executive secretary, national urban league grew, joseph c. (cfr) griffith, dr. ernest s., dean, school of international service, american university; member, national municipal league, american association of public administrators; former chairman, national conference of christians and jews; former member, board of missions and church extension, methodist church; director, library of congress legislative reference service, - gross, dr. mason w., president & former provost, rutgers university grosse, dr. aristid v., president, research institute, temple university grover, allen (cfr) gulick, dr. robert l., jr. hackett, mrs. john r. haflich, victor hager, lawrence w., president, owensboro, kentucky _inquirer_, _messenger_, and broadcasting company hager, dr. walter e. hale, robert, former member of congress from maine haley, andrew g., member federal communications commission; member, society for comparative legislation & international law hall, dr. clarence w., editor, _reader's digest_ hall, hon. fred, former governor of kansas hallauer, carl s., chairman of the board, bausch & lomb optical company halverson, rev. dr. w. q. hamilton, g. e. hamlin, chauncey j. (cfr) hammond, h. o. hancher, dr. virgil m., president, state university of iowa hand, dr. george h., vice president, southern illinois university haralson, william harden, dr. edgar l., president, northern michigan college; official, national education association hardin, dr. clifford m., chancellor, university of nebraska hardy, grace c., m. d. hardy, mrs. t. w., sr. hare, james m. hargrave, thomas j., chairman, eastman kodak company; director, executive committee, westinghouse electric corp. harless, richard f. harmer, miss vera harmon, dr. henry gadd, president, drake university harriman, e. roland (cfr) harriman, lewis g., chairman of the board, manufacturers & traders trust company; president, m&t discount corp,; founder, national better business bureau; member, buffalo council on world affairs; vice chairman, university of buffalo; recipient, brotherhood citation, national conference of christians and jews, harris, duncan g., chairman of the board, brown, harris, stevens, inc.; director, paramount pictures corp. harris, morgan harris, dr. rufus carrollton, president, tulane university; former chairman of board, federal reserve bank, atlanta; trustee, eisenhower exchange fellowships, inc. harrison, w. b. hartley, livingston hartung, albert f., international president, international woodworkers of america harvill, dr. richard a., president, university of arizona hawley, james h., jr. hayes, a. j., president, international association of machinists hayt, miss jessie hazard, leland, former professor of law, carnegie institute of technology; vice-president, pittsburgh plate glass co. healy, g. w. jr., past president, american society of newspaper editors; editor, new orleans _times-picayune_; director, the advertising council, inc. heard, gerald, former editor, _the realist_, london; former lecturer, oxford university; founder, irish agriculture co-operative movement; founder, english co-operative movement; lecturer, new school of social research, new york city; lecturer, oberlin college heinsohn, mrs. robert a. heistand, rt. rev. john t. hellyer, dr. david t. helmer, borden helsley, dr. charles w. henderson, ernest, president, sheraton corporation of america; director, boston world affairs council: recipient, brotherhood citation, national conference of christians and jews, henry, gerald b., treasurer, atlantic union committee henry, rev. leland b. herbert, r. beverly herndon, rev. henry hertz, rabbi richard c. hesburgh, rev. theodore, c. s. c., president, university of notre dame; president, institute of international education; member, rockefeller brothers fund special studies project; member, civil rights commission of the united states hicks, dr. weimer k., president, kalamazoo college hill, george watts (cfr) hill, herbert w., professor of history, dartmouth college; director, new hampshire council on world affairs hillis, fred l. hilton, conrad n., president, hilton hotels corporation; recipient, brotherhood citation, national conference of christians and jews hilton, dr. james h., president, iowa state college of a & m arts hines, rt. rev. john e., episcopal bishop of texas hinshaw, david hobby, mrs. oveta culp, former u. s. secretary of health, education & welfare; president, editor, publisher, houston _post_; trustee, american assembly of columbia university, eisenhower exchange fellowships, inc.; director, committee for economic development; chairman of the board, national bank of texas; director, mutual insurance company of new york hobson, rt. rev. henry w., episcopal bishop of southern ohio hodes, gen. henry i., usa, retired, former commander-in-chief, u. s. army, europe hook, sidney, professor of philosophy, new york university; member, international committee for academic freedom, john dewey society; author: _heresy, yes-conspiracy, no_, _common sense and the fifth amendment_, _marx and the marxists_ hopkins, dr. ernest m. (cfr) horn, dr. francis h., president, university of rhode island; former director, mental hygiene society of maryland hornblow, arthur, jr., motion picture producer, mgm horwood, mrs. henry a. hotchkis, preston, vice chairman of the board, founders' insurance company; member, business advisory council houghton, dr. henry s. houston, howard e. hovde, dr. frederick l. (cfr) howard, ernest hoyt, alfred o. hoyt, palmer (cfr) hudson, c. b. hudson, edward f., advertising consultant, ted bates & co., new york city hudson, paul h., retired executive vice president, empire trust company; trustee, new york university humbert, dr. russell j., president, depauw university, indiana; former official, federal council of churches humphrey, wolcott j. hunt, dr. charles w. hunt, mrs. walter s. hunter, dr. frederick hurd, volney, chief, paris bureau, _christian science monitor_ hutchinson, martin b. isaacs, norman e., managing editor, louisville _times_, recipient, journalism medal, southern methodist university, jacobson, albert h., insurance broker; past president, b'nai b'rith jacobson, rabbi david jameson, miss betty jaszi, dr. oscar jenks, almet, author, _the huntsman at the gate; the second chance_ jessel, george, actor, producer, twentieth century-fox films corporation jessen, herman f., mink farmer; national democratic committee-man from wisconsin; member, foreign policy association, americans for democratic action johnson, dr. eldon l., president, university of new hampshire; member, american society of public administrators johnson, herbert f., chairman of the board, s. c. johnson & son, inc.; trustee, profit sharing research foundation, cornell university johnson, iris beatty johnson, leroy, former congressman from california johnson, dr. robert l. (cfr) johnston, t. r. jones, rt. rev. everett h., episcopal bishop of west texas jordan, dr. wilbur k., president, radcliffe college joseph, franz martin kallick, sidney s., chairman, national board of directors, young democratic clubs of america kanzler, ernest, retired chairman of the board, universal c. i. t. credit corporation; member, business advisory council, committee for economic development kaplan, dr. joseph, chairman, u. s. national committee for international geophysical year; professor of physics, university of california; member, administrative board, hebrew union college karelsen, frank e., (jr.) partner, karelsen & karelsen, lawyers, new york city; commissioner, community mental health board, new york city; member, americans for democratic action; honorary chairman, american jewish committee katz, donald l., chairman of the department of chemical engineering, university of michigan keenan, joseph h., chairman, department of mechanical engineering, massachusetts institute of technology keith, william scott keller, oliver j., president & manager, radio station wtax, springfield, illinois kelley, nicholas (cfr) kelly, dr. melvin j. (cfr) kennedy, bishop gerald, president, methodist council of bishops; member, executive committee, national council of churches keppel, a. r., president catawba college, salisbury, n. c. kerr, dr. clark, president, university of california ketchum, carlton g., president, ketchum, inc, campaign director; member, national republican finance committee; director, association for improvement of the poor keyserling, leon h., former chairman, president truman's council of economic advisers; president, conference on economic progress kidder, george v., dean of liberal arts, university of vermont king, glen a. kinsolving, rt. rev. a. b., ii, episcopal bishop of arizona; former president, arizona council of churches kinsolving, rev. arthur lee, rector, st. james episcopal church, new york city; dean, convocation of manhattan; member, department of evangelism, national council of churches kirk, adm. alan goodrich (cfr) kissinger, dr. henry a. (cfr) kizer, benjamin h., partner, graves, kizer & gaiser, lawyers, spokane; chairman, world affairs council of inland empire; trustee, institute of pacific relations; former president, american society of planning officials klutznick, philip m., vice chairman, illinois state housing board; chairman of the international council, b'nai b'rith; member, national council, boy scouts of america; member, commission on money and credit; director, american council to improve our neighborhoods knight, o. a., president, oil, chemical & atomic workers international union knutson[c], coya, former congresswoman from minnesota koessler, horace h. kohn, dr. hans (cfr) kolthoff, isaac m., chairman, department of chemistry, university of minnesota kreps, dr. theodore j., professor of business economy, stanford university kress, ralph h. kretzmann, dr. otto p., president, valparaiso university, indiana kruger, morris lamb, f. gilbert lamont, austin lancoine, nelson, past president, young democratic clubs of america land, adm. emory s., president, air transport association of america lang, reginald d. (cfr) langlie, arthur b., former governor of washington larue, d. w. lawrence, david l., governor of pennsylvania lederberg, dr. joshua, nobel prize winner, medicine & physiology, ; professor of genetics, stanford university lee, dr. russell v. lehman, hon. herbert h. (cfr) leibowitz, judge samuel s., judge, kings county court, brooklyn lemann, mrs. lucy benjamin lerner, abba p. levitas, samuel m. lewis, mrs. dorothy lewis, rt. rev. william f., episcopal bishop of olympia linder, hon. harold f. (cfr) linen, james a., publisher, _time_ magazine linton, m. albert, retired chairman of the board, provident mutual life insurance company of philadelphia; member, american friends service committee lipsky, dr. george a. litchfield, dr. edward h. (cfr) little, dr. clarence c., professor emeritus, harvard university and university of michigan littlejohn, edward lockmiller, dr. david a., president, ohio wesleyan university; former president, university of chattanooga loehr, rev. clement d. loehr, rev. franklin d. louchheim, stuart f. louis, karl n. loveless, herschel c., governor of iowa loynd, h. j., president, parke, davis & co. lubin, isador (cfr) luce, hon. clare boothe, former ambassador to italy; playwright (husband in cfr) luce, henry iii (cfr) lucey, most rev. robert e., s.t.d., archbishop of san antonio; vice president, catholic association for international peace lund, dr. p. edward lunsford, frank mabey, charles r., former governor of utah maclachlan, james a., professor of law, harvard university malott, dr. deane w., president, cornell university mann, gerald c., former secretary of state for texas; former attorney general, state of texas; chairman of the board, diversa, inc., dallas; secretary, board of trustees; southern methodist university marlowe, mark v. marshall, gen. george c., former secretary of state; former secretary of defense marshall, brig. gen. s. l. a., chief editorial writer, detroit _news_ martie, j. e., past national vice commander, american legion martin, dr. b. joseph, president, wesleyan college, macon, georgia martin, laurance c. marts, dr. arnaud c. (cfr) mather, dr. j. paul, president, university of massachusetts mather, wiley w. mathews, lt. col. john a. mathieu, miss beatrice matthews, allan f. mcallister, mrs. dorothy mcashan, mrs. s. m. mccain, dr. james a., president, kansas state college; former president, montana state university mccall, dr. duke, president, southern baptist theological seminary mccalmont, david b. mccann, dr. kevin, president, defiance college, ohio; special assistant and speech writer for president eisenhower, - mccarthy, frank, producer, twentieth century-fox films; former assistant secretary of state; secretary to general george c. marshall, - mccord, dr. james i., president, princeton theological seminary mccormick, charles t., distinguished professor of law, university of texas; former dean of school of law, university of north carolina; former professor of law, northwestern university mccormick, leo h. mccrady, dr. edward, president, university of the south mcdonald, david j., president, united steelworkers of america mcdonald, rt. rev. msgr. william j., rector, catholic university of america. mcfarland, mrs. cole mcfee, william mcintosh, henry t. mcinturff, george l. mckee, frederick c. (cfr) mckeldin, theodore r., former governor of maryland mckinney, robert, publisher & editor, santa fe _new mexican_; former assistant secretary of the interior mclane, john r., retired chairman, new hampshire state board of arbitration and conciliation; trustee, dartmouth college mcmath, sidney s., former governor of arkansas mcmullen, mrs. stewart y. mcnaughton, f. f. mcnaughton, william f. mcnichols, stephen l. r., governor of colorado mcquarrie, mrs. irvine means, paul b., chairman, department of religion, university of oregon meeman, edward j., editor, memphis _press-scimitar_ melvin, crandall, partner, melvin & melvin, lawyers; president, merchants national bank & trust company, syracuse; trustee, syracuse university; member, national council, boy scouts of america menuhin, yehudi, concert violinist and symphony conductor merriam, h. g. mesta, perle, former minister to luxembourg meyer, maj. gen. g. ralph meyner, robert b., governor of new jersey mickle, dr. joe j., president, centenary college, louisiana; member, foreign policy association; recipient, distinguished alumnis award, southern methodist university, midgley, grant w. miller, dr. arthur l., past moderator, united presbyterian church, usa; member, general board, national council of churches miller, francis p. (cfr) miller, harlan, columnist, des moines _register & tribune_ miller, perry, professor of american literature, harvard university miller, mrs. walter i. milligan, mrs. harold, past president, national council of women millikan, dr. clark b. (cfr) millikan, dr. max (cfr) millis, dr. john s. (cfr) mitchell, don g. (cfr) moehlman, w. f. moll, dr. lloyd a. monroe, j. raburn, partner, monroe & lemann, lawyers, new orleans; regional vice president, national municipal association montgomery, greenville d. montgomery, dr. john c. montgomery, dr. riley b., president, college of the bible, lexington, kentucky; official, national council of churches; member, fellowship of reconciliation, world fellowship, national education association, national council of churches; former chairman, committee on activities, virginia council of churches; former member executive committee, federal council of churches montgomery, victor p. mooney, james d. (cfr) moor, n. r. h. moore, bishop arthur j., president, board of missions and church extension, methodist church moore, hugh (cfr) moore, rev. philip s. moore, walden morgan, dr. arthur e., former president, antioch college; former head, tva morgenthau, dr. hans j. (cfr) morrison, delesseps s., u. s. ambassador to the organization of american states; mayor of new orleans, - morse, samuel f. b., realtor, san francisco mueller, bishop reuben h., vice-president, national council of churches; president, board of bishops, united brethren church; vice chairman, world council of christian education; official, world council of churches muir, malcolm (cfr) mullins, dr. david w., president, university of arkansas; member national council, national planning association; official, national education association murphy, dr. franklin d. (cfr) mynders, alfred d. nason, dr. john w. (cfr) nelson, hon. gaylord a., governor of wisconsin neuberger, richard l., senator from oregon; official, american for democratic action newman, dr. james h., executive vice president, university of alabama newstetter, wilbur i., jr. nichols, rt. rev. shirley h., episcopal bishop of kansas nichols, thomas s. (cfr) noble, rev. charles c., dean, chapel of syracuse university noelte, albert e. northrop, dr. filmer s. c., sterling professor of philosophy and law, yale university; author norton, hon. garrison, president, institute for defense analyses; assistant secretary of the navy, - ; assistant secretary of state, - norton, mrs. h. w. norton, r. w., jr. nutting, charles b., president, action-housing, inc.; former vice chancellor, university of pittsburgh; former professor of law, university of nebraska nuveen, john (cfr) odegard, dr. peter, professor of political science, university of california; member, foreign policy association, former official, ford foundation oldham, rt. rev. g. ashton o'neal, f. hodge, professor of law, duke university oppenheimer, dr. j. robert (cfr) oppenheimer, william h., lawyer, st. paul, minnesota orgill, hon. edmund, former mayor of memphis orgill, joseph, jr. ormond, dr. john k., surgeon, pontiac, michigan orr, edgar k. osborn, mrs. chase s., author, sault ste. marie, michigan osborne, hon. lithgow (cfr) osgood, william b. otenasek, dr. mildred otis, courtlandt owens, lee e., official, owens publications, california owens, lee e., jr. pack, rev. john paul palmer, charles forrest, president, palmer, inc., realtor, atlanta; official, national planning association; member, foreign policy association, american society of planning officials palmer, miss hazel, past president, national federation of business and professional women's clubs palmer, robert c. parker, haven parker, mrs. kay peterson parran, dr. thomas, president, avalon foundation; former surgeon general, u.s.; former dean, graduate school of public health, university of pittsburgh parran, mrs. thomas partch, mrs. wallace pasqualicchio, leonard h., president, national council of american-italian friendship patten, james g., president, national farmers' union; president, international federation of agricultural producers; trustee, national planning association patty, dr. ernest n., president, university of alaska pavlo, mrs. hattie may pearl, stuart d. peattie, donald culross, author, roving editor, _reader's digest_ pell, herbert claiborne, former congressman from new york; member, advertising council, rhode island labor department; member, advisory council, yenching university, peiping, china pell, rev. walden, ii perkins, dr. john a., president, university of delaware; undersecretary of health, education & welfare, - ; director, international city managers association; member, committee for economic development; member national planning association perkins, ralph phillips, duncan, director, phillips gallery, washington, d. c. phillips, dr. hubert phillips, dr. j. donald, president, hillsdale college, michigan phillips, william (cfr) pillsbury, philip w., chairman of the board, pillsbury mills, inc. pillsbury, mrs. philip w. pines, rabbi jerome m. pinkerton, roy d., president & editorial director, john p. scripps newspapers pond, harold s. pool, rev. dr. d. desola (cfr) popejoy, dr. tom l., president, university of new mexico porter, paul a., former chairman, federal communications commission posner, stanley i., professor of business administration, american university, washington, d. c. prange, charles h., president, austenal, inc. price, gwilym a., chairman, westinghouse electric corporation; member, business advisory council prickett, william, lawyer, wilmington, delaware puffer, dr. claude e., vice chancellor, university of buffalo; member, committee for economic development qualls, j. winfield quay, richard r. quimby, thomas h. e., democratic national committeeman for michigan; vice president, perry land company quinn, william francis, governor of hawaii raasch, john e., chairman of board, john wanamaker rabb, maxwell m., partner, stroock, stroock & lavan, new york city; secretary to the cabinet of the u. s., - ; former chairman, government division, united jewish appeal; consultant, secretary of the navy, ; administrative assistant to senator henry cabot lodge, - ; administrative assistant to senator sinclair weeks, radley, guy r. raines, bishop richard c., indiana area, methodist church rainey, dr. homer p., former president, university of texas, stephens college, bucknell university; liberal-loyalist democratic candidate for governor of texas, raley, dr. john wesley, president, oklahoma baptist university rasmuson, elmer e., president, national bank of alaska redd, charles reed, alexander p., chairman of the board, fidelity trust company, pittsburgh reed, dr. r. glenn, jr. reese, dr. curtis w., editor, _unity_; member, council of liberal churches reeves, dr. george n. remsen, gerard t. renne, dr. roland r., president, montana state college rettaliata, dr. john t., president, illinois institute of technology reuther, victor g., administrative assistant to the president, united automobile workers reuther, walter p., president, united automobile workers; president, cio division, afl-cio; vice president, united world federalists rhodes, dr. peyton n., president, southwestern university, memphis rhyne, charles s., past president, american bar association; member, executive council, american society for international law rice, dr. allan lake rice, dr. warner g., chairman, department of english, university of michigan roberts, david w. roberts, mrs. owen j. robertson, andrew w. (cfr) robertson, walter s., former assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs; former delegate to u. n. robinson, claude w. robinson, miss elizabeth robinson, j. ben robinson, john q. robinson, thomas l. (cfr) roebling, mrs. mary g., president & chairman of board, trenton trust company rogers, will, jr., newspaper publisher, former congressman rolph, thomas w. roosevelt, nicholas (cfr) roper, elmo (cfr) rose, dr. frank a., president, university of alabama rosenthal, milton f., president, hugo stinnes corp. rostow, dr. eugene v. (cfr) rowland, w. t. rudick, harry j., partner, lord, day & lord; professor of law new york university; member, committee for economic development, national planning association rust, ben ruthenburg, louis, chairman of board, servel, inc. ryder, melvin, publisher, editor, president, army times publishing company sagendorph, robb, publisher, _old farmer's almanack_ sandelius, walter e. sanders, walter b., chairman, department of architecture, university of michigan sanford, arthur sayman, mrs. thomas sayre, francis b., assistant secretary of state, - ; u. s. ambassador to the united nations, - ; professor of law, harvard university, - scherman, harry (cfr) schiff, mrs. dorothy, publisher and owner, _new york post_ schlesinger, dr. arthur, jr. (cfr) schmidt, adolph w. (cfr) schmidt, john f. schmitt, mrs. ralph s. schroeder, walter, president, christian schroeder & sons inc., milwaukee schroth, thomas n., editor & publisher, congressional quarterly, inc. schultz, larry h. scullin, richard j., jr. seedorf, dr. evelyn h. semmes, brig gen. harry h. sengstacke, john h., publisher, _chicago defender_ serpell, mrs. john a. shackelford, francis, lawyer, atlanta; assistant secretary of the army, - shapiro, ascher h., professor of engineering, massachusetts institute of technology shea, george e., jr., financial editor, _wall street journal_ shelton, e. g. shepley, dr. ethan a. h., chancellor, washington university, st. louis; board member, southwestern bell telephone company, anheuser-busch, inc. sherman, dr. mary s. sherwood, carlton m., president, pierce, hedrick & sherwood, inc.; member, executive committee, foundation for integrated education; commission member, national council of churches shirpser, mrs. clara shotwell, dr. james t. (cfr) sibley, brig. gen. alden k. sick, emil g., chairman of the board, sicks' breweries, ltd.; president, washmont corp., sicks' breweries enterprises, inc. sikes, w. e. simons, dolph, president, the world company; publisher, editor, lawrence, kansas _daily journal-world_; director, associated press simonton, theodore e. simpson, james a., lawyer, birmingham, alabama; former state senator sittler, edward l., jr. skouras, spyros p., president, twentieth century-fox film corp.; president of skouras lines slee, james n. slick, tom, chairman of the board, slick oil company; board member, slick airways, inc., dresser industries of dallas sloan, rev. harold p., jr. slosson, dr. preston w., professor of history, university of michigan; author sly, rev. virgil a., vice-president, national council of churches, official, world council of churches smith, bishop a. frank, chairman of the board of trustees, southern methodist university, dallas; methodist bishop of houston and san antonio smith, maj. gen. edward s., former vice-president, southern bell t & t company smith, dr. francis a. smith, h. alexander (cfr) smith, paul c. (cfr) smith, robert jerome smith, russell g. smith, dr. seymour a., president, stephens college smith, sylvester c., jr., lawyer, newark, new jersey snow, miss jessie l. snyder, john i., jr., chairman of the board, president, u. s. industries, inc.; formerly with kuhn, loeb & co.; trustee committee for economic development, national urban league, new york university soffel, judge sara m., judge, court of common pleas, allegheny county, pennsylvania; trustee, university of pittsburgh; official, national conference of christians and jews sommer, mrs. sara sonne, hans christian (cfr) spaulding, rev. clarence spaulding, eugene r., vice-president, _the new yorker_ spaulding, george f. spilsbury, mrs. margaret c. spivak, lawrence e., producer, "meet the press," nbc-tv; former editor & publisher, _american mercury_ sporn, philip, president, american electric power company & subsidiaries springer, maurice sproul, dr. robert gordon (cfr) stafford, mrs. carl standley, rear adm. william h. (cfr) stanton, dr. frank, president, columbia broadcasting system; member, business advisory council starcher, dr. george w., president, university of north dakota stark, george w., arthur, columnist, detroit _news_ steinbicker, dr. paul g., chairman, department of government, st. louis university steiner, dr. celestin john, s. j., president, university of detroit; member, foreign policy association; member, national conference of christians and jews steinkraus, herman w., chairman of the board, bridgeport brass co.; former president, u. s. chamber of commerce; trustee, twentieth century fund steinman, dr. david b., bridge engineer stern, william sterne, dr. theodore e., simon newcomb professor of astrophysics, harvard university stevenson, adlai (cfr) stevenson, dr. william e. (cfr) steward, roy f. stewart, dr. robert b. (cfr) stoddard, ralph stoke, dr. harold walter, president, queens college, flushing, new york; former president, louisiana state university straus, ralph i. (cfr) strausz-hupe, dr. robert (cfr) streit, clarence k., president, federal union, inc.; author stuart, dr. graham h. sturt, dr. daniel w. suits, hollis e. talbott, philip m., past president, u. s. chamber of commerce tally, joseph, jr., past president, kiwanis international tatum, lofton l. tawes, j. millard, governor of maryland taylor, dr. edgar curtis taylor, james l. taylor, gen. maxwell d. (cfr) taylor, brig. gen. telford, u. s. chief of consul, nurnburg war criminals trials taylor, dr. theophilus mills, moderator, united presbyterian church, usa; official, world council of churches taylor, wayne chatfield (cfr) teller, dr. edward (cfr) thom, w. taylor, jr., chairman emeritus of geological engineering, princeton university thomas, j. r. thompson, dr. ernest trice, professor, union theological seminary; co-editor, presbyterian outlook thompson, kelly, president, western kentucky state college tobie, llewellyn a. todd, dr. g. w. todd, george l., vice president, burroughs corp. tolan, mrs. thomas l. towill, john bell towster, julian trickett, dr. a. stanley, chairman, department of history, university of omaha; official, world council of churches truman, harry s., former president of the united states turner, gardner c. turner, jennie m. twiss, rev. malcolm n. upgren, dr. arthur r. (cfr) urey, dr. harold c., nobel prize atomic chemist; professor of chemistry, university of california; former professor of chemistry, university of chicago valimont, col. r. w. van doren, mark, pulitzer prize poet van nierop, h. a. van zandt, j. parker veiller, anthony velte, charles h. vereide, abraham, president, international christian leadership vernon, lester b. vieg, dr. john a. vincent, john h. visson, andre walker, elmer walker, dr. harold blake, president, mccormick theological seminary, evanston, illinois walling, l. metcalfe, director, u. s. operations mission, colombia; vice president, national consumers league walsh, john r. walsh, dr. warren b., chairman of the board, department of russian studies, syracuse university; director, american unitarian association walton, miss dorothy c. wampler, cloud, chairman of board, carrier corporation wanger, walter f. (cfr) wansker, harry a. warner, dr. sam b., publisher, _shore line times, the clinton_ warren, hamilton m. warwick, dr. sherwood waterman, professor leroy watkins, bishop william t., methodist bishop of louisville, kentucky watts, olin e., member, jennings, watts, clarke & hamilton, lawyers; jacksonville, florida; trustee, university of florida waymack, william wesley, former member, atomic energy commission; former editor, des moines _register & tribune_; pulitzer prize, ; member, national committee, american civil liberties union; trustee, twentieth century fund webb, marshall webb, vanderbilt (cfr) wedel, mrs. theodore o., past president, united church women weeks, dr. i. d., president, university of south dakota welch, mrs. george patrick wells, dr. herman b. (cfr) weltner, dr. philip wendover, sanford h. west, donald c. weston, eugene, jr., architect, los angeles; member, american society of planning officials weston, rev. robert g. wetmore, rev. canon j. stuart whitaker, robert b. white, edward s. white, dr. lee a., retired editorial writer, detroit _news_ white, william l., publisher, emporia, kansas _gazette_; author; member, former director, american civil liberties union white, dr. w. r., president, baylor university, waco, texas whitman, walter g., chairman. department of chemical engineering, massachusetts institute of technology; secretary-general, united nations conference on peaceful use of atomic energy, whitney, edward allen whorf, richard, producer, actor, director, warner brothers; producer, cbs, hollywood wiesner, dr. jerome b. (cfr) wigner, dr. eugene p., professor, princeton university wilkin, robert n. willham, dr. oliver s., president, oklahoma state university williams, a. n., former chairman of board, westinghouse air brake company williams, dr. clanton w., president, university of houston williams, herbert h. williams, mrs. lynn a., sr. williams, ray g. williams, whiting williamson, alexander j. willkie, philip, son of wendell willkie wilson, alfred m., vice president, director, minneapolis-honeywell regulator company wilson, dr. logan, president, university of texas; director, center of advanced study in behavioral sciences; former member, fund for the republic wilson, dr. o. meredith, president, university of minnesota wise, watson w., owner, w. w. wise drilling, inc., tyler, texas; member, executive committee, lone star steel co.; dallas; special council, schuman plan, nato, - ; member, national planning association; u. s. delegate, th general assembly of the united nations woodring, harry h., former secretary of war; past national commander, american legion wright, william yarnell, rear adm. h. e. (cfr) young, john l., vice-president, u. s. steel corporation; chairman of the board, dad's root beer bottling company; member, foreign policy association young, john orr, advertising consultant, new york city young, owen d. (cfr) youngdahl, luther w., judge, u. s. district court for district of columbia; former governor of minnesota; trustee, american university zanuck, darryl f., vice-president, twentieth century-fox film corp. zellerbach, harold l., former board chairman, crown zellerbach corp.; member, board of governors, hebrew union college; trustee, university of pennsylvania index this is an index to the text of this volume. names which appear in appendix i and appendix ii (membership rosters of the council on foreign relations and of the atlantic union committee) are not in this index unless they are mentioned in the text. a abraham & straus, ff abram, morris b., abrams, frank w., abrams, henry h., acheson, dean, ; action, ada, ff adams, grantley h., adenauer, konrad, advertising council, ; ; - ; ; public policy committee, ; mental health project, ; support of un, advisory committee on postwar foreign policy, afl-cio, ; ; africa, agar, herbert, agger, donald g., air-vue products corp., alabama power company, alanbrooke, field-marshal, aldrich commission, aldrich, malcolm p., aldrich, winthrop w., alexander, henry c., allen, james l., allen, steve, allen, william m., allis-chalmers manufacturing co., allyn, stanley c., ; ; altschul, frank, ; ; aluminum limited, inc., ; american airlines, american assembly, ; ff american association for the united nations, ff; american can company, american central insurance co., american civil liberties union, american committee on africa, american council to improve our neighborhoods (action), american express, american farm bureau federation, ff american friends service committee, american heavy minerals corp., _american heritage_, american heritage foundation, american jewish committee, american legion (americanism committee of waldo slaton post ), ff; ; american metal climax, inc., american mutual liability insurance co., american national red cross, american-scandanavian foundation, americans for democratic action (ada), ff _american strategy for the nuclear age_, american sugar refining company, ; americans united for world government, american tel. & tel., ; ; american trust company, ; "america's most powerful private club," anderson, clayton, company, ; ; anderson, dillon, anderson, eugenie, anderson, marian, ii anderson, robert b., anti-defamation league, arabian american oil company, arden house group, area development committee, ff armco international corp., armstrong, hamilton fish, ff; army-mccarthy hearings, _army times_, ashmore, harry s., asia, ; ; communist goal to enslave, asiatic petroleum corp., association for education in world government, atlanta transit co., atlantic exploratory convention, atlantic union, ff atlantic union committee, inc., ff; ff; ; ; membership, _atlantic union news_ (quote from), australian institute of international affairs, v avco manuf. corp., avildsen, clarence, b babb, jervis j., ; bacher, robert f., baldwin, hanson w., baldwin, roger, ball, george w., ; bank of america, ; bank of manhattan company, ; bankers security corporation, bankers trust company, ; ; barkin, solomon, barnes, harry elmer, barnes, joseph, barnett, frank r., barrett, edward w., ; bates, harry c., batten, william m., bay petroleum corp., beal, gerald f., beard, charles e., beaver coal co., bechtel, s. d., beise, s. clark, belafonte, harry, _beliefs, purposes and policies_ (quote from uwf pamphlet), ff belgian securities corp., bell and howell co., ; ; bell, elliott v., ; bell, james f., bell, laird, bendix aviation corp., benny, jack, benton, william, affiliations: iii; ; ; ; berger manufacturing co., of mass., berle, adolf a., jr., affiliations: ; , ; ; berlin, ff; , bernhard, prince of the netherlands, v berry, george p., bethlehem steel co., inc., _better farming_, _better homes and gardens_, biddle, francis, , "bilderbergers," v bill of rights, the u. s., ff bingham, barry, birch (john) society, , bixby (fred h.) ranch co., black, eugene r., black, james b., , blanc, louis, - blanding, sarah g., , bliss, robert woods, bliss, tasker h., blough, roger m., , , blue diamond corp., blum, robert, ; b'nai b'rith, boeing airplane co., boeschenstein, harold, bohen, fred, bohlen, charles e., book of the month club, inc., booz, allen and hamilton, bosch, albert h., bowery savings bank, bowie, robert r., iii; bowles, chester, affiliations: , ; ; bowles, mrs. chester, bowman, isaiah, brada, george, brace, lloyd d., braden copper co., braden, spruille, ff bradfield, richard, bradley, albert, bradley, omar n., brandt, willy, branscomb, harvie, breech, ernest r., brenton, w. harold, bridges, harry, british aluminum, ltd., bronk, detlev w., , brown brothers, harriman and co., brown, courtney c., brown, george r., brown, john mason, brown & root, inc., brownlee, james f., , bruce, david k. e., , brundage, percival f., brunswick paper and pulp co., bryant, arthur, buckmaster, l. s., bullis, harry a., , bunche, ralph j., affiliations: , , , ; , , bundy, harvey h., bundy, mcgeorge, bunker, arthur h., burgess, carter l., burlington industries, inc., burns, arthur f., burroughs corp., bush, prescott, (favoring holmes nomination), - bush, vannevar, business advisory council (bac), - ; influence on gov. policy, ; influence on army-mccarthy hearings, ; membership, ff, ; tax-exempt status, business council (_see_ business advisory council) business executives research committee, ff, ff _business week_, butler, william, buttenwieser, benjamin j., ; c cabin crafts, inc., cabot corporation, cabot (godfrey l.) inc., cabot, henry b., cabot, paul c., cabot, thomas d., cadman, s. parkes, california texas oil corp., cameron iron works, inc., campbell soup co., ; canadian general electric co., canby, henry seidel, canfield, cass, ; ; canham, erwin d., ff; ; carey, mrs. andrew g., carey, james b., carmichael, james v., carnahan, a. s. j., ff carnegie corporation of new york, ; ; ; ; ; carnegie endowment for international peace, iii; : ; carnegie foundation for the advancement of teaching, carnegie foundation, ; ; carnegie institute, ; ; carnegie institute of technology, carnegie institute of washington, carpenter, walter s., jr., carrier corp., ; case, everett needham, ; casey, joe, castle & cook, ltd., castro, fidel, ff; ; caterpillar tractor co., catton, bruce, ced (_see_: committee for economic development) center for advanced study in behavioral sciences, center of diplomacy and foreign policy, central government (powers of), central life assurance society, central national bank of richmond, cfr (_see_: council on foreign relations) chaco petroleum of south america, chagla, m. c., chalk, o. roy, _challenge to isolationism, - _, chamber of commerce, the u. s., champion paper and fibre co., chase manhattan bank, the, ; ; ; ; chase, stuart, iii chatham house, iv chemstrand corporation, ; chesebrough-pond's inc., chicago and northwestern railroad, chicago bridge and iron co., _chicago daily news_, childs, marquis, ; ; childs, richard s., china, communist conquest of, - ; employment in red china, ; recognition of red china, _christian science monitor_, ff; ; christiana securities company, christianity (american heritage of), church fire insurance corp., church peace union, iii; churchill, winston, cincinnati and suburban bell telephone co., cisler, walker l., ; c. i. t. financial corp., cities service co., inc., citizens committee for international development, ff citizens of north atlantic democracies (convention), city planning, clapper, olive, clark, evans, ; clark, joseph s., clay, lucius d., affiliations: ; ; ; clayton, william l., affiliations: ; ; ; ; cleveland electric illuminating co., cleveland, harlan, cline (robert a.) inc., cluett, peabody and co., inc., ; coca-cola co., cohen, benjamin v., ; ; cole, charles w., cole, david l., collado, emilio g., college-community research centers, ff colleges (_see_: universities and colleges) collier carbon & chemical corp., collyer, john l., ; columbia broadcasting system, ; committee for economic development (ced), - ; ; annual report ( ), , ff, ff, , , ; area development, ; business-education committee, ff, ; college-community research centers, ff; dallas ced associates, ff; education programs, , ; research and policy committee, commission on money and credit, - commission on national goals, ff committees on foreign relations, ff; commonwealth fund of new york, communications media, communism (world brotherhood's opinion of), communist international (quotation of plan for world government), _communist manifesto_, communist party, i; como, perry, compton, arthur h., conant, james b., ; conference on world tensions, congress, the u. s., auc resolution presented to, ; cfr influence on, ; cmc recommendations to, ff; debates on nato citizens commission law, ff; the rd session, ; foreign aid appropriations, , ; house rules committee, ; investigating committees, v, ff; rejecting world government resolution, ff _congressional record_, debates on holmes nomination, ; debates on nato citizens commission law, ; quoting carnahan on development loan fund, : on radio free europe, connally reservation, iii; ; ff connecticut general life insurance co., ; conner, john t., consolidated foods corp., constitution, the u. s., ; ff; ; preamble, continental can company, ; ; continental illinois national bank & trust, continental oil co., copeland, lammot dupont, cordiner, ralph j., corette, john e., corn products co., corning glass works, council on foreign relations, annual reports, , , ff, , ; corporation service, ff; financial contributors to, ff, , ; financial statement, ; history of, iii ff, ff; influence on: berlin zoning agreements, ff; communications media, ; disarmament discussions, ; greenland protection move, ; foreign aid, ; foreign policy, , ; foundations, ff; national housing acts, ; 'national purpose,' ; radio free europe, ; world war ii, - ; interlocking organizations: - , , ff, ff, ff, ff, , ff, , ff, ff, ff, ff; international affiliations, ; members in u. s. government, ff; membership list, ; organizations formally affiliated with, ; related foreign organizations, v; summary discussion of, ff; tax-exempt status, _council on foreign relations: a record of twenty-five years, - _, councils on world affairs, ff; cousins, norman, affiliations: ii ff; ; ff; ; ; cowles, gardner, affiliations: ; , , ; quote from, cowles, john, affiliations: ; ; ; ; cowles magazines, inc., cox committee, cox, c. r., cox, e. e., ff cravath, swaine & moore, crimean conference, i ff _crises of the old order_, crowell-collier publishing co., crown-zellerbach corporation, crusade for freedom, , _crusade in europe_ (dwight d. eisenhower), cuba, ; cummings, nathan, cummins engine company, currie, lauchlin, ; curtice, harlow h., czechoslovakia, betrayal of, d dallas ced associates, ff dallas citizens council, ff dallas council on world affairs, _dallas morning news_ (quote from), ff daniel, charles e., danish foreign policy society, v darden, colgate w., jr., david, donald k., affiliations: ; ; ff; ; davidson, carter, davies, paul m., davis, elmer, davis, norman h., davis, william h., davison, harry p., dean, arthur h., ; ; dean, vera micheles, declaration of independence, deere and co., de lima, oscar, democracy (definition by streit), democratic centralism, denmark, german invasion of, ff. denton, frank r., _denver post_, desai, mortarji, desilu playhouse, _des moines register and tribune_, detroit bank and trust co., detroit-edison co., development loan fund, ff. devin-adair publishing co., dewey, thomas e., de zoysa, stanley, diamond alkali co., dickey, charles d., dickey, john s., ; diebold, williams, jr., dillon, douglas, ; district of columbia transit co., _documents on american foreign relations_ (cfr publication), dodge, joseph m., donner, frederick, g., doty, paul m., jr., iii douglas, lewis w., ; dow, jones & co., draper, william h., dresser industries, inc., ; dubinsky, david, dubridge, lee a., duggan, stephen, dulles, allen, ; ; ; dulles, john foster, ; ; ; dunn, frederick s., du pont (e. i.) de nemours co., ; e eastland, james o. (quote from), eastman kodak, ; eaton, cyrus, ; eaton manufacturing co., ; eban, ebba, eccles, marriner s., economic collectivism, economic stabilization agency, eden, anthony, edison electric institute, eichelberger, clark m., ; ; einstein, albert, eisenhower administration, eisenhower, dwight d., ; ; , ; ; ; ; army-mccarthy hearings, ; authorizing participation in cnad, ; bac advisors, ; founder of american assembly, ; part in occupation of berlin, ff; president's commission on national goals, eisenhower exchange fellowships, inc., elliott, william y., empire savings and loan association, _encyclopaedia britannica_, iii, ; engelhard, charles william, england, engles, frederick, equitable life assurance society of u.s., equitable trust co., of baltimore, erler, fritz, ethridge, mark f., ; ; ; ethyl corp., europe, european advisory commission, ; export-import bank, ; f fabian socialists, fairbanks, douglas, jr., farrell lines, inc., fawzi, mahmoud, federal aid, to schools, federal bureau of investigation (fbi), federal government, constitutional powers, federal income tax system, federal reserve act, federal reserve bank of boston, federal reserve bank of cleveland, ; federal reserve bank of new york, federal reserve bank of san francisco, federal reserve board, federal reserve system, ff; federal union, inc., ; ff; federated department stores, inc., federation of world governments, plan for, ff feldman, george j., fiberglas canada, ltd., fibreboard products, inc., finkelstein, lawrence s., finletter, thomas k., ; ; ; first national bank of atlanta, first national bank of boston, first national bank, chicago, first national bank of greenville, first national bank of st. louis, first national city bank of new york, ; first security corporation, fischer, ben, fisher, george, iii flanders, ralph e., ; ; fleischmann, julius, fleming, lamar, jr., florida-georgia tv co., flynn, elizabeth gurley, folsom, frank, folsom, marion b., ; ; food machinery & chemical corp., ; for america, _forbes magazine_, forbes, malcolm s., ford, benson, ford foundation, ff; ; ; ; ; recipients of financial aid from: , , , , ff; tax-exempt status, ford, henry, ii, ; ; ford motor company, ; ; ; ; ; international division, _foreign affairs_ (cfr publication), ; ; foreign aid, - ; ; bill, ff; failure of, ; programs, ; to underdeveloped countries, ; foreign assistance act of , ff foreign policy, u. s., ; ; ; ; traditional, , foreign policy association, - ; ; ; foreign policy associations' councils on world affairs, foreign policy association-world affairs center, - ; ; _foreign relations of the united states: diplomatic papers: the conferences at cairo and tehran _, forgash, morris, _fortune_, ; foster wheeler corp, foster, william c. affiliations: ; ; ; foster, william z., _foundations_, , _foundation directory_, foundation library center, founders' insurance co., fowler, henry h., fox, bertrand, fox, john m., france, frankfurter, felix, ; ; ; franklin, george s., jr., freedom, a constitutional concept of, ff _freedom's frontier atlantic union now_, free europe committee, free europe press, freeman, gaylord a., jr., freeport sulphur co., ; french, eleanor clark, fulbright, j. william, ; ; fulton county (georgia) grand jury, ff fulton county medical society, fund for adult education (ford foundation), fund for the republic, ff; ff funston, g. keith, g gaither, h. rowan, jr., galbraith, john kenneth, ; gallup, george, gannett, lewis s., gardner, john w., ff gavin, james m., gavin, leon h., geier, frederick, v., general american investors co., ; general cigar company, general dynamics corporation, general electric corporation, directors' affiliations: ; ; ; ; ; ; ; general foods corp., ; general motors, ; ; overseas operations, general stores corp., general telephone, general telephone & electronics corp., genesee merchants bank & trust co., georgia power company, germany, occupation plans for, ff; west germany, gerot, paul s., gifford, john a., gifford, walter s., ; gillette company, ; gillette safety razor, gleason, s. everett, goheen, robert f., goldberg, arthur j., ff goldman, sachs and co., gold reserve, ff goldstein, israel, goodrich (b. f.) company, ; ; goodyear tire & rubber co., ; gould, laurence m., ; graham, philip, ; ; great atlantic & pacific tea co., grace (w. r.) and co., grand jury presentment (fulton co., ga.) ff; gray, elisha, ii, great decisions program, ff; ; ff greene, fred t., greenfield, albert m., greenland, under the monroe doctrine, ff greenewalt, crawford h., ; ; grew, joseph c., griswold, a. whitney, griswold, erwin n., ii gross, ernest a., ; ; gross, h. r., grover, allen, gruenther, alfred m., ; ; guggenheim memorial foundation, ; ; guinzburg, harold k., gulf and south american steam ship co., gulf oil corporation, gullion, edmund a., ; gunther, john, h hadley, morris, hall, helen, hall, joseph b., halliburton oil well cementing co., hammarskjold, dag, ; hammond, john, hampton institute, hancock (john) mutual life ins. co., hand, learned, hanna (m. a.) company, ; ; hanover bank, hansand steam ship co., hardy, porter, jr., harold pratt house, ; harper & brothers, ; ; _harper's magazine_, harriman, w. averell, ; ; ; harris, rufus, c., harris trust & savings bank, ff harrison, wallace k., ; ; harsch, joseph c., hart schaffner and marx, haskins and sells, haskins, caryl p., hauge, gabriel, ii hawaiian pineapple co., hayes, albert j., heald, henry t., heckscher, august, ; heinz, h. j., ii, heinz (h. j.) company, henderson, loy w., henri-spaak, paul, henry, barklie mckee, henry street settlement, herter, christian a., affiliations: ; ; ; hewitt, william a., higgins, milton p., hill, lister, hiss, alger, iii; ; ; hitler, adolph, hoffman, paul g., affiliations: ff; ; ; ; ; ; holmes-casey-klein, tanker purchases, holmes, john, holmes, julius c., cfr, ; delegate un organiz. meeting, ; violation surplus-disposal program, - ; becomes ambassador to iran, - home loan bank of indianapolis, hoover, herbert, ; foundation, hoover, herbert, jr., hopkins, harry, ; _horizon_, hoskins, harold b., hotchkis, preston, houghton, amory, houghton, arthur a., ; house committee on un-american activities, house, edward m., wilson's adviser, ff; influence on cfr, ff, , ; influence on domestic and foreign policy, ff; one-world aims, ; (_also see: the intimate papers of colonel house_, and _philip dru, administrator_) house of representatives (_see:_ congress) houser, theodore v., houston, william f., hovde, frederick l., howard, frank a., hoyt, palmer, affiliations: ; ; ; ; hughes, a. w., hughes, charles evans, hughes, langston, hughes tool co., hull, cordell, ; ; humphrey, george m., humphrey, gilbert w., humphrey, hubert, ; ; humphrey resolution, hungary, hutchins, francis s., hutchins, robert, ff i ibm world trade corporation, ickes, harold l., "i love lucy," india, indian council of world affairs, v industrial publishing co., industrial rayon corp., information agency, u. s., inland steel corp., institut des relations internationales, v institute for international government, institute for international order, institute of american strategy, ff institute of international education, ; institute of pacific relations (ipr), ff; inter-departmental committee on latin america, interlake iron corp., interlocking untouchables, - internal revenue code, internal revenue service, international bank, international business machines corp., ; international cooperation administration, ; international development corp., international general electric co., international harvester co., international monetary fund, ; international nickel company, inc., international packer, ltd., ff international paper co., ; international telephone and telegraph corp., _intimate papers of colonel house_, ; ff invisible government, appeal of, iowa-des moines national bank, ipr (_see:_ institute of pacific relations) iron ore co. of canada, irving trust co., ; j jackson, c. d., ; jacobsson, per, javits, jacob k., ; jefferson, thomas, ; jessup, philip c., ; johnson, joseph e., affiliations: iii; ; ; ; johnson, lyndon, ; johnson, robert l., johnston, eric a., affiliations: ; : ; ; joint council on economic education, ff; jones, alfred w., jones and laughlin steel corp., jones, charles s., josephs, devereux c., ; ; joyce, william h., jr., judd, walter h., ; k kahn, otto h., kansas university endowment association, kanzler, ernest, kappel, frederick, katz, milton, ; ; keating, kenneth, keenan, joseph, d., kefauver, estes, ; kelley, nicholas, kellogg (m. w.) co., ; kelly, mervin j., kelly, walt, kennan, george f., ii; ; ff kennedy administration, ii kennedy, john f., ; ; ; ; cfr membership, , - ; summit meeting, i; iii; on foreign aid, - kennedy, robert, kennekott copper corp., kern county lend co., kerr, clark, ; kestnbaum, meyer, ; ; keystone economic research center, khrushchev, nikita, problems in germany, ; stevenson's opinion of, ; summit meeting ( ), i; iii; united states tour, kiano, gikomyo w., kidder, peabody and co., killian, james r., jr., ; kimberly, john r., ; kimpton, lawrence a., ; king, martin luther, kirk, grayson, ; ; ; klein, stanley, klm dutch airlines, klutznick, philip m., ; knowland, william f., kollek, theodore, korneichuk, alekesander y., ii korean war, ; ; kress (samuel h.) foundation, krock, arthur, quotes from, ; kroger company, kuhn, loeb and co., l labor (_see_: unions) labouisse, henry r., la france industries, lally, francis, lamont, thomas s., landon abstract co., landon, alf, lane company, inc., lane, e. h., lane, franklin k., lange, oscar, langer, william l., lanier, joseph l., larsen, roy e., larson, arthur, iii latin america, lattimore owen, ; law day, law, warren a., lawrence, david, ; lazarus, fred, jr., league of nations, ; league of nations covenant, league of neighbors, league of women voters, league to enforce peace, lehman, herbert h., affiliations: ; ; ; ; ; ; lehrman, hal, leithead, barry l., lemnitzer, lyman l., lenin, nikolai, lever brothers company, ; levine, irving, lewisohn (adolph) and sons, libbey-owens-ford glass co., ; liberia mining co., ltd., liberian navigation corp., _life_, lilienthal, david e., lincoln, murray d., linder, harold f., linowitz, sol m., linton, m. albert, lippmann, walter, ; lockheed aircraft corp., loeb (carl m.), rhoades and co., loeb, robert f., long, augustus c., ; _look_, ; loomis, alfred l., loos, a. william, iii; lorillard (p.) company, _los angeles times_, _louisville courier-journal_, ; ; _louisville times_, lourie, donold b., love, george h., love, james spencer, lovett, robert a., ; lowry, howard f., lubin, isador, ; luce, clare boothe, luce, henry r., ; ; lummus company, lykes brothers steam ship co., inc., lynd, robert s., lyon, a. e., mc mcafee, james w., mcashan, s. maurice, mcbride, katharine e., mccabe, thomas b., ; ; mccaffrey, john l., mccarran committee, mccarran, pat, committee investigation, ff mccarthy, joseph r., ff mccloy, john j., affiliations: ; ; ; ; ; ; mccollum, leonard f., mccormack, charles p., mccormack, john w., mcdonald, james g., mcelroy, neil h., mcfadden, louis t., mcghee, george c., ; mcgowin, earl m., mcgraw-hill publishing co., inc., mcgraw, james h., jr., mchugh, keith s., mcintosh, millicent c., mckee, paul b., mckelway, benjamin m., mckesson & robbins, inc., mcwilliams, john p., m macintyre, malcolm a., mackenzie, n.a.m., macnichol, george p., jr., macy (r. h.) & co., ; macy foundation, maffry, august, magill, roswell f., malin, patrick m., mallon, neil, mallory, walter h., ; ff malott, deane w., mansfield, mike, manufacturers and merchants indemnity co., manufacturers trust co., iii; ; marburg, louis, marcus, stanley, ; ff; ; maria luisa ore co., marshall, j. howard, marx, karl, massachusetts mutual life insurance co., mathieson (olin) chemical corp., ; ; matson assurance co., matson navigation co., matthews, herbert l., ; mauze, abby rockefeller, mboya, tom, mead corp., mead, margaret, iii meany, george, ; ; "meet the press," mellon national bank & trust co., ; ; merchant, livingston t., merck & co., inc., ; ; ; meredith publishing co., meredith radio & television stations, merrill center for economics, merrill foundation, ; metropolitan coach lines, metropolitan government, ; metropolitan life insurance co., ; ; mexican war ( - ), meyer, charles a., meyer, cord, meyer, eugene, midwest gas transmission co., midwest stock exchange, mikoyan, anastas i., ; miller, j. erwin, miller, margaret carnegie, ff mills, john s., _minneapolis star and tribune_, minute maid corporation, mitchell, don g., mobil international oil co., model, roland and stone, moe, henry allen, molotov, vyacheslav m., monroe doctrine, ; monsanto chemical co., ; montana power co., montgomery, george g., moore, hugh, ; morgan guaranty trust co., morgan, henry s., morgan (j. p.) and company, morgenstern, george, morgenthau, henry, mortgage investments co., mortimer, charles g., moscow conference ( ), ; mosely, philip e., affiliations: ; ; at moscow conference ( ), ; quoted on berlin zoning, ff; quoted on soviet-american relations conference, i ff motion picture association of america, mudd, seeley g., muir, malcolm, multer, abraham, mumford, lewis, ; municipal planning, murphy, donald r., murphy, franklin d., murphy, william b., murrow, edward r., ; ; mutual life insurance co., of n. y., ; myers, william i., ; myrdal, gunnar, n naacp, nason, john w., ; nathan, robert r., national association for the advancement of colored people (naacp), national association of broadcasters, national bank of commerce, houston, national cash register co., national city bank of cleveland, ; national bank of detroit, national city bank of n. y., national conference of christians and jews, ; national council of churches, ; ; ; national dairy products corp., ; national distillers products corp., ff national housing acts ( through ), national lead company, inc., national municipal league, national planning association, ; ; national steel corporation, national trust and savings assoc., national union fire insurance co., ; national union indemnity co., nationwide insurance co., nato citizens commission law, neal, alfred c., neilson, frances, neiman-marcus company, ; nelson, otto l., jr., _newsweek_, newton, henry c., _new york herald-tribune_, ; ; new york life insurance co., ; ; _new york post_, ; new york stock exchange, _new york times_, ; ; ; ; ; ff; quote from: ; ff; nicely, james m., nichols, thomas s., niebuhr, reinhold, ; nielsen, aksel, nikezic, marko, ninth army, u. s., ff nitze, paul h., nixon, richard, ; ; nizhnyaya oreanda (crimea), i nkrumah, kwame, nolde, o. frederick, norfolk and western railway, norgren (c. a.) co., north american company, north atlantic treaty organization (nato), ; northern trust co., northwest bancorporation, ; ; northwestern bell telephone co., nuveen, john, o oceanic steam ship co., o'hara, barratt, ohio oil company, inc., olds, irving s., o'leary, timothy f., o'neill, abby m., oosterbeck, the netherlands, v oppenheimer, j. robert, ; organization for economic co-operation and development, orgill, edmund, osborn, earl d., ; osborn, frederick, osborne, lithgow, otis elevator co., _our one best hope_ (auc pamphlet), ff _our sunday visitor_, overland corporation, owens-corning fiberglas corp., ; ; ; p paar, jack, pace, frank, jr., pacific gas and electric co., pacific lumber co., pacific mutual life ins. co., ; pacific national bank of seattle, pacific power & light co., pacific school of religion, pacific telephone & telegraph co., page, arthur w., paley, william s., ; pan american airways, ; pandit, vijaya l., panhandle eastern pipeline co., parent-teachers association, paris peace conference, parten, jubal r., pasvolsky, leo, patterson, alicia, patterson, ellmore c., patterson, w. a., ; patton, george, patton, thomas f., pauling, linus, peace corps, pearl harbor, ; pearson, lester b., peiping, pendleton, morris b., penney (j. c.) company, ; percy, charles h., perkins, james a., ff petersen, howard c., ff; petersen, theodore s., petro-texas chemical corp., pfizer international, inc., philadelphia trust co., _philip dru: administrator_, ff pierson, warren lee, pilcher, john l., pillsbury mills, pitney bowes, inc., ; pittman, ralph d., pittsburgh-consolidation coal co., plywood industry, polish people's republic, _political handbook of the world_ (cfr publication), potofsky, jacob s., prentis, henning w., jr., price, gwilym a., ; pritchard, ross, proctor & gamble co., public law - , public law, - , public library committee, pugwash conference, ff pullman, inc., ; pure oil co., pusey, nathan m., q quaker oats co., ; queeny, edgar monsanto, r rabi, i. i., radio corp. of america, ; ; radio free europe, ; railway labor executives association, rand corporation, ; randall, clarence b., rayburn, sam, reece, carroll, ff reece committee, reed, philip d., ; reed, stanley, regan, ben, reid, ogden, reid, whitelaw, reinhardt, g. frederick, reischauer, edwin o., repplier, theodore s., republic steel corp., reston, james b., reuther, walter, ; ; ; reynaud, paul, reynolds, lloyd, iii reynolds metals co., reynolds, richard s., jr., richardson foundation, richfield oil corp., riefler, winfield, w., rieve, emil, rivington carpets, ltd., roberts, owen j., robertshaw-fulton controls co., robertson, howard p., robinson, william e., rockefeller brothers fund, rockefeller, david, ; ; rockefeller foundation, ; ; ; ; ; ; ; rockefeller, john d., rd., ff rockefeller, laurence s., ; rockefeller, nelson a., ; ; rockefeller, winthrop, roebling, mary g., _role of private enterprise in the economic development of underdeveloped nations_ (dallas ced (pamphlet)), roosevelt, eleanor, ; roosevelt, franklin d., ; ; ; ; at tehran conference, ; at yalta conference, ; ideas on berlin zoning, ff; policies of, ; campaign, ff root, elihu, jr., ; ; roper, daniel c., ff roper, elmo, affiliations: ; ; ; ; ; ; ; rosenwald fund, ff rostow, walt w., ii rothschild, walter, rowe, james h., jr., rowen, hobart, royal institute of international affairs in england (chatham house), iv ruml, beadsley, ; ; ; rusk, dean, ; ; rusk, howard a., russell, bertrand, russell, donald j., ruttenberg, stanley h., ryder, melvin, s sage (russell) foundation, st. louis-southwestern railroad, st. louis union trust co., ; salomon, irving, ; sampson, edith s., sanborn, frederic r., sane nuclear policy, inc., ff _san francisco examiner_, san jacinto petroleum corp., sarnoff, david, ; ; _saturday review_, ii; ; ; saunders, stuart t., sawyer, charles, scherman, harry, ; ; ; schieffelin, w. j., jr., schiff, jacob, schiff, mortimer, schlesinger, arthur m., jr., affiliations: ; ; ; ; ; schmidt, adolph w., schnitzler, william f., school of international service, schroeder (j. henry) banking corp., ; schroeder, oliver c., schwulst, earl b., scott paper company, scripto, inc., scudder, stevens & clark, seaboard construction co., sea island company, sears, roebuck & co., selective insurance co., seligman, eustace, senate, the u. s., debates on nato citizens commission law, ff; foreign relations committee, ; internal security subcommittee, refuses u. s. membership in world federation, ; rejects first holmes nomination, seymour, whitney north, shamrock oil & gas corp., shapiro, eli, sharp, walter r., sheffield, frederick, shepardson, whitney h., shepley, henry r., sheraton corp. of america, shirer, william l., shishkin, boris, shotwell, james t., ; ; shuman, charles b., - shuster, george n., ; ; ; ; sicedison s. p. a. of italy, siegbert, henry, simon & schuster, sinclair oil corp., singer manufacturing co., slaton, waldo m. (_see:_ american legion) sloan (alfred p.) foundation, ; sloan, alfred p., jr., sloan, raymond p., smith (a. o.) corporation, smith, blackwell, smith, lloyd b., smith, paul c., ; smith (w. t.) lumber co., _smoot report_ (references to) ; - ; ; ; ; ; ; snyder, john w., social security system, societe generale de belgique, v sohn, louis b., iii sonne, hans christian, ; ; sontag, raymond j., soth, lauren, soubry, emile e., southern company, southern company of new york, southern pacific co., ; soviet union, ; ; at crimean conference, i ff; constitution of, , ; democratic centralism in, ; espionage, - ; occupation of berlin, ; post-war strengthening of, ff; propaganda in u. s., spang, joseph p., jr., spanish american war, sparkman, john, special united nations fund for economic development (sunfed), spofford, charles m., ; _sports illustrated_, sprague electric co., staley, a. e., jr., stalin, joseph, ff; ; standard oil company of calif., ; standard oil company of n. j., ; ; standard oil company of ohio, standard-vacuum oil co., stanford research institute, ; stanton, frank, stassen, harold e., state department, the u. s., ; ; ; cfr influence in, - , , , , ; division of special research, ; office of international security affairs, ; policy planning staff, iii state street investment corp., state street research & management co., stauffer chemical co., steinkraus, herman w., stettinius, edward r., ; stevens (j. p.) and co., ; ; stevens, robert t., ff; stevenson, adlai, ; ; ; ff stevenson, mrs. eleanor b., stevenson, william e., stires, hardwick, stone, mrs. kathryn h., stone, leland, stone, shepard, stratton, julius a., straus, jack i., straus, robert kenneth, strauss, lewis l., streit, clarence k., ; ; ; studebaker corporation, student federalists, sullivan and cromwell, sulzberger, arthur hayes, sulzberger, c. l., sunfed, supreme court, the u. s., surplus-disposal program, surrey, walter sterling, swezey, burr s., sr., swift and company, ; swindell-dressler corporation, swing, raymond gram, sylvania electric products, inc., symington, wayne corporation, symonds, h. gardiner, t taft, charles p., ff talbott corporation, tampa electric co., tangier, tankore corp., tannenwald, theodore jr., tansill, charles callan, tapp, jesse w., tariff-and-trade proposals, taxation, presidential power in, tax-exempt foundations report, ff taylor, henry c., taylor, reese h., taylor, thomas a., taylor, wayne chatfield, ; tehran conference, ff; ff teichmeier, a. w., tennessee-argentina, tennessee de ecuador, s. a., tennessee gas & transmission co., tennessee-venezuela s. a., texaco, inc., ; ; texas and new orleans railroad co., texas eastern transmission corp., texas gulf sulphur co., texas instruments, inc., textile workers union (afl-cio), textron, inc., thomas, charles allen, ; thomas, h. gregory, thomas, norman, ; thompson industries, inc., thomson, john cameron, ; thorp, willard l., ff tibet, tidewater oil co., _time_, ; ; title guaranty co., "today show," toledo trust co., trailmobile, inc., transcontinental & western air, inc., trans-world airways, treasury department, the u. s., ; trenton trust co., triffin, robert, trippe, juan t., ; _triumph in the west_, truman, harry s., ; ; ; trust company of georgia, _truth about the foreign policy association_, ff; turman, solon b., twentieth century fund, ; u _undeclared war_, (langer-gleason), unesco house, union carbide & carbon corp., ff union commerce bank, union drawn steel co., union electric company of mo., ; _union now_ (streit), ; _union now with britain_ (streit), union of east and west, union of south africa, union oil co., of calif., union tank car co., unions, ; ; ff; ; united air lines, ; ; united american life insurance co., united nations, ada support of, ; advertising council support of, ; aid to cuba, ; _american_ association for, ; cfr support of, ; charter, creating socialistic alliance, ; declaration of human rights, ; discussed at soviet-american conference, ii; discussed in auc purpose, ; economic and social council, ; iio support of, ; korean war, ; organizational meeting, ; population control, ; sane support of, ; seating red china, ; step toward world government, ff; ff; sunfed, ; _un we believe_, ff; u. s. committee for, ff; u. s. withdrawal, ; uwf plans for, united nations of the world, plan for, united states committee for the un, ff united states communist party, united states foil co., united states government, sovereignty of, ff; traditional foreign policy, , _united states in world affairs_ (cfr publication), united states lines co., united states manganese co., united states plywood corp., united states steel corp., ; united world federalists, ; ff; ff universal c. i. t. credit corp., universities and colleges allegheny college, american university, amherst college, clemson college, colgate university, ; cornell university, ; ; ; dartmouth college, ii; davidson college, duke university, world rule of law center, iii harvard university, ii; ; ; ; harvard university, center for international affairs, iii harvard university, graduate school of business admin., harvard university, international legal studies, hunter college, massachusetts institute of technology, iii; ; : ; ; millikin university, new york university, new york university, bellevue medical center, northwestern university, ohio state university, pacific school of religion, pennsylvania state university, princeton university, radcliff college, rice university, rutgers university, san jose state college, southern methodist university, ff southwestern university, stanford university, ; ff; temple university, trinity college of connecticut, union theological seminary, ; university of california, ; university of chicago, ; ; ; ; ; university of kansas, ; university of maryland, university of north carolina, university of notre dame, university of pittsburgh, ; university of southern california, university of virginia, vassar college, virginia theological seminary, williams college, yale university, iii; uphaus, willard, urban renewal, ff; ff; urquidi, victor, _u. s. news and world report_, v van dusen, henry p., van raalte company, inc., virden, john c., vitro corporation, w walter, bruno, wanger, walter, war advertising council, (_see_: advertising council) warburg, felix, warburg, james p., ; warburg, paul, ; ward, harry f., ward, j. carlton, jr., warden, alex, _washington evening star_, washington, george, farewell address, _washington post and times herald_, ; ; ; watson, arthur k., watson, thomas j., jr., ; ; ; waymack, w. w., weaver, robert, wedron silica co., wemberg, sidney j., ff; ff; welch, leo d., _weldwood news_, welles, sumner, ; wellington sears co., wells fargo bank and union trust co., wells, herman b., ; western air express, westinghouse electric corp., ff; ; west point manufacturing co., wheeler, walter h., jr., ; ; ff; ; whirlpool corp., white, harry dexter, white, james n., white, weld and co., whitney, george, whitney, john hay, ; wilde, frazar b., ; williams, g. mennen, williams, langbourne m., willkie, wendell, wilson, charles e., wilson, logan, wilson, o. meredith, wilson, robert e., wilson, woodrow, ff; ; ; ; ; wilson (woodrow) foundation, winant, john g., - wood, w. barry, jr., world affairs center, ff; ff world affairs councils, ff; ; world bank, world brotherhood, ff world court, iii; ; ff; world federalists, world fellowship, inc., ; world fellowship of faiths, world government, support for, ff; ff; ff; ; ff world health organization, world-peace-through-world-law, ff; world population emergency campaign, world rehabilitation fund, world rule of law center, iii world union of socialist soviet republics, world war i, ; ff; world war ii, ff; ; ; ; ff; ; wormser, rene a., - wright, quincy, wriston, henry m., ff; ; ; ; "wristonized," (foreign service), wyandotte chemicals corporation, ; wynn, douglas, wyzanski, charles e., jr., y yalta conference, yntema, theodore o., ; youngstown steel door co., ; youth peace corps, z zander, arnold, zeckendorf, william, zellerbach, james d., ; ; ; zerox corporation, zilkha, ezra, zurcher, arnold j., transcriber's notes in addition to the following specific changes, several punctuation changes were made for consistency within the text. [a] "khruschchev" changed to "khrushchev". [b] "fedinand" changed to "ferdinand". [c] "kntuson" changed to "knutson". [d] " " changed to " ". [transcriber's note: extensive research found no evidence that the u.s. copyright on this publication was renewed.] the geneva protocol by david hunter miller new york the macmillan company all rights reserved printed in the united states of america. copyright, , by the macmillan company. set up and printed. published march, . {v} foreword the sources and history of the protocol of geneva of course go far back of its date, october , . i have not attempted to trace them except in so far as they have a direct bearing on my legal study of the document itself. the form of the protocol of geneva is certainly not yet finally written; consideration of its legal aspects is perhaps therefore all the more desirable at this time. the protocol of geneva is one chapter in the history of the league of nations, the history of international relations of our time. d. h. m. new york city, december, . {vii} contents. chapter i. the protocol of geneva .................................... ii. points of approach ........................................ iii. the coming into force of the protocol ..................... iv. parties to the protocol ................................... v. relations inter se of the signatories to the protocol ..... vi. international disputes .................................... vii. the status quo ............................................ viii. domestic questions ........................................ ix. covenants against war ..................................... x. aggression ................................................ xi. the japanese amendment .................................... xii. sanctions ................................................. xiii. separate defensive agreements ............................. xiv. the protocol and article ten of the covenant .............. xv. the protocol as to non-signatories ........................ xvi. the disarmament conference ................................ xvii. demilitarized zones ....................................... xviii. security and the protocol ................................. xix. interpretation of the protocol ............................ xx. the "amended" covenant .................................... {viii} annexes. a. the covenant of the league of nations .......................... b. the protocol of geneva ......................................... c. the report to the fifth assembly ............................... d. resolutions .................................................... e. report of the british delegates ................................ f. the american plan .............................................. g. the "amended" covenant ......................................... { } the geneva protocol chapter i. the protocol of geneva. the covenant of the league of nations[ ] lays down the principle that national armaments should be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. thus, in the covenant, the problem of disarmament[ ] and the problem of security are viewed as correlative problems. their study has gone on in the league of nations since its organization. during this same period there has been widespread and increasing public interest in the matter. the theory of the treaties of peace was that the disarmament of germany and her allies was preliminary to a general reduction of armaments the world over.[ ] except as the result of the washington conference, and by that to only a very limited extent, there has been almost no reduction or limitation of armaments by { } international agreement since the war.[ ] such lessening of armaments as has taken place has been by voluntary national action. the study of these questions during the last few years has brought about a much clearer understanding of them, both in the minds of statesmen and generally; and the various proposals that have been made have been the subject of detailed and elaborate criticism from all sides. the latest of these proposals is the paper which is called the protocol of geneva.[ ] the protocol of geneva is, however, much more than a proposal. it has the active support of a considerable number of governments.[ ] it was unanimously recommended for acceptance by the fifth assembly of the league of nations. it deserves the serious attention of all thoughtful minds. the object of the protocol of geneva cannot be better stated than in the words of its authors:[ ] "to facilitate the reduction and limitation of armaments provided for in article of the covenant of the league of nations by guaranteeing the security of states through the development of methods for the pacific settlement of all international disputes and the effective condemnation of aggressive war." while this protocol is, and doubtless always will be, called "the protocol of geneva," its official name is "protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes."[ ] [ ] article . the text of the covenant is annex a, p. . [ ] those who criticize the use of the word "disarmament" as meaning a reduction or limitation of armaments, should consult the dictionaries. the standard dictionary gives the following definition: "the act of disarming; especially, the reduction of a military or naval establishment to a peace footing." the century dictionary gives this: "the act of disarming; the reduction of military and naval forces from a war to a peace footing; as 'a general disarmament is much to be desired.'" the century dictionary also gives the following quotation as an instance from lowe's life of bismarck: "he (napoleon) in a fit of irresolution broached in berlin the question of mutual disarmament." [ ] see, for example, the preamble to the military, naval and air clauses of the treaty of versailles: "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow." [ ] the treaty of lausanne (a. j. i. l., vol. xviii, supp., pp. , ) with its provisions for demilitarized zones, etc., and the convention for the limitation of armaments in central america of february , (a. j. i. l., vol. xvii, supp. , pp. , _et seq._), are to be noted in this regard. [ ] for the text in french and english, see annex b, p. . [ ] sixteen states have signed the protocol and it has been ratified by czechoslovakia. [ ] see report to the fifth assembly, annex c, p. , at p. . this report of mm. benes and politis is a notable document, worthy of the ability and learning of the two rapporteurs. [ ] it is herein generally called "the protocol." { } chapter ii. points of approach. there are various possible points of approach to the consideration of the protocol of geneva. in view of the importance of the document, doubtless all such methods are useful. indeed, in the discussion of such a paper, it is perhaps hardly possible exclusively to adopt only one angle of view, such as the historical, the political, etc. my own consideration of the paper, however, is to be primarily from the legal viewpoint; without attempting wholly to avoid other points of view i shall seek not to stress them. the protocol is an elaborate and technical international document; and even in attempting to consider it primarily from the legal viewpoint there are various methods or arrangements of such a discussion. the general starting point which seems to me to be most desirable is that of the legal effect of the protocol upon the international relations of the states which become parties to it, both as among themselves and as to states not parties. it will of course in this connection be necessary to consider the obligations fixed by the protocol in the event of its breach, as well as those which are imposed by its acceptance and performance. these latter may, however, very properly be first considered. accordingly, the first discussion will relate to the obligations of the states which become parties to the protocol as among themselves, particularly in connection with the due performance of these obligations by those parties. before coming to this first discussion, however, there are certain general observations which may be made. in the first place the paper is called a protocol. the precise reason for the use of this term does not appear; but it is probably due to the fact that the protocol of geneva is in a sense supplementary to other international agreements such as the covenant of the league of nations and the statute of the permanent court of international justice; and perhaps because the { } protocol is intended to be preliminary to amendments to the covenant (article i, paragraph , of the protocol). allusion is made to this provisional character of the protocol of geneva in the report[ ] made by the first and third committees to the fifth assembly of the league of nations, where it is said: "when the covenant has been amended in this way some parts of the protocol will lose their value as between the said states: some of them will have enriched the covenant, while others, being temporary in character, will have lost their object. the whole protocol will remain applicable to relations between signatory states which are members of the league of nations and signatory states outside the league,[ ] or between states coming within the latter category. it should be added that, as the league realizes its aim of universality, the amended covenant will take the place, as regards all states, of the separate régime of the protocol." of course, as is pointed out in some detail by satow (diplomatic practice, second edition, vol. ii, pages _et seq._), the word "protocol" is used with quite a number of different meanings. in the present case the meaning of the word is nothing more nor less than treaty or convention. it is naturally impossible to consider or discuss the effect of the protocol of geneva without constant reference to the text of the covenant, to which the protocol refers throughout. it is also necessary to consider to some extent the statute of the permanent court of international justice and even certain of the provisions of the treaties of peace, other than the covenant. moreover, as any consideration of the legal situation created by the protocol must assume that the document has come into force, it will be interesting to sum up the provisions of the protocol in that regard, particularly as they are somewhat unusual. [ ] the english text of this report is annex c, p. . [ ] from the theory that the protocol may properly be signed by non-members of the league, i dissent. see _infra_, p. ., _et seq._ { } chapter iii. the coming into force of the protocol. the protocol is dated at geneva on october nd, . it is drawn up in both french and english and the text of both languages is authentic. it is written in a single original. it was recommended to the members of the league for acceptance by a resolution[ ] unanimously passed in the assembly by the affirmative vote of members of the league, and it has been signed by the representatives of various countries. this recommendation by the assembly, however, and these signatures, do not, as to any signatories, bring into force the protocol, which, by its terms, must be ratified, the ratifications to be deposited at the secretariat of the league at geneva. the first preliminary to the coming into force of the protocol is its formal ratification by at least members of the league; and these ratifications must include those of at least three of the four great powers which are members--great britain, france, italy and japan. but even these ratifications do not bring the protocol into force. the absence of such ratifications by may st, , _may_ result in the postponement of the disarmament conference from the date provisionally fixed, june th, . but this is a matter which i shall discuss later.[ ] if and when the ratifications above mentioned are deposited, a procès-verbal to that effect is drawn up; but this procès-verbal does not, as is usual when a procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications is drafted, bring into force the protocol. the date of the coming into force of the protocol is stated as follows (article ): "as soon as the plan for the reduction of armaments has been adopted by the conference provided for in article ." in other words, the protocol will not bind any state that { } ratifies it unless and until the conference for the reduction of armaments adopts a plan for such reduction. _if_ such conference is held and _if_ such plan is adopted, the protocol will, on the date of the adoption of the plan, come into force as among the states which have then ratified it. such is the effect of the provisions of article of the protocol. other states, which have not at the date mentioned ratified the protocol, may thereafter accede to it, as is provided by the third paragraph of article , and of course the obligations of these states will commence with the date of such accession. furthermore, provision is made[ ] by which the protocol, even after coming into force, may become, as it says, "null and void." it might well be argued that the becoming "null and void" of the protocol related back to the date when it came into force. however this may be, it is important to notice here the provisions in this regard. the conference for the reduction of armaments has, under the hypothesis, adopted a plan for such reduction. that conference has also to fix the time within which that plan is to be carried out. the council of the league is then to consider whether the plan for the reduction of armaments adopted by the conference has or has not been carried out within that fixed period. presumably such consideration by the council of the league would be had immediately after the expiration of the period fixed by the conference; the council, if it then considers that the plan for the reduction of armaments has not been carried out, being limited, however, in such consideration to "the grounds" (french text--"conditions") laid down by the conference in that respect, then declares that the plan has not been carried out and the protocol becomes "null and void." accordingly, the protocol can come into force as a legal obligation only on the date of the adoption by the conference of the plan for the reduction of armaments; and from that date till the date when the council of the league of nations declares that the plan has or has not been carried out, it may be said { } that the protocol is only _provisionally_ in force; it is subject to avoidance. the question here arises as to what is meant by the language of the protocol when it speaks of the plan for the reduction of armaments being "carried out," or, in the french text, "execute." this is a question rather difficult of answer. certainly the expression can hardly refer to the actual _physical_ carrying out of such a plan; for that might require a very long period. it seems to me that the expression envisages the formalities requisite for such a plan. the conference for the reduction of armaments which is to draw up a plan for such reduction is to draw up, in other words, a treaty or treaties between the parties to bring about such reduction. such treaty, or such treaties, will of course be voluntary agreements and will of course require ratification subsequent to the holding of the conference itself. accordingly, it is my view that the "carrying out" of the plan for the reduction of armaments adopted by the conference means in the protocol the ratification of such plan, that is to say, the transformation of the plan into a binding agreement. of course, the precise terms as to ratification, the number of ratifications required, the time of the deposit of ratifications and all such other formalities are for the conference to decide; the reference here, however, is to those provisions as they may be drafted. accordingly, the "grounds" to be laid down by the conference for the reduction of armaments, on which it may be declared by the council that the plan for the reduction of armaments has not been carried out, will mean, i take it, the laying down of some requirement that the plan for the reduction of armaments be formally ratified within a time stated by a certain number of states, including certain named states; in default whereof, the council may and will declare the plan for the reduction of armaments not to have been carried out. it is to be observed that the protocol in the last paragraph of article speaks of the possibility of a signatory failing to "comply" with the reduction of armaments plan "after the expiration of the period fixed by the conference." { } this refers, i think, to a failure by a particular signatory to ratify the plan for the reduction of armaments, the effect being, so far as article is concerned, that such signatory would be bound by the terms of the protocol but could not benefit by them. the language of this last paragraph of article is, however, broad enough to include the case of a state which had ratified the treaty containing the plan for the reduction of armaments and had then failed to carry out its agreement regarding such reduction. it will thus be seen that the protocol of geneva is wholly dependent upon the success of the conference for the reduction of armaments; and the success of that conference depends wholly upon the voluntary agreement then made. there is nothing in the protocol which requires the states represented at the conference to agree to any particular plan for the reduction of armaments; the assent which they may give to such plan must be voluntary. the question of the proceedings of the disarmament conference will be discussed hereafter.[ ] however, there is one point that may be mentioned here. the plan for the reduction of armaments drawn up by the conference or, in other words, the treaty or treaties drawn up by that conference, will not be perpetual in their operation. no plan for disarmament, no treaty regarding reduction of armaments could possibly be perpetual in its detailed provisions. not only does this follow from the nature of such an agreement, but it is explicitly laid down in article of the covenant that any such plan is to be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years. accordingly, the treaty or treaties for the reduction of armaments to be drawn up by the conference will be in this sense temporary, that they will have a fixed limit of time for their operation, precisely as the treaty limiting naval armament drawn up at the washington conference may be terminated in .[ ] { } there is no provision made in the protocol of geneva for the withdrawal of any state from its obligations, assuming that those obligations come finally into force. on its face the protocol is therefore perpetual; but it is not really so. the obligations of the protocol are so intertwined with the obligations of the covenant that there is no doubt in my mind that the withdrawal from the league by a member thereof (when bound by the protocol) would release that state from the obligations of the protocol as well as from the obligations of the covenant. the obligations of the covenant are terminable by any member of the league, as to itself, on two years notice. the obligations of the protocol go much farther than the obligations of the covenant. the obligations of the protocol are, by its terms, later to be merged in the covenant itself, without in any way impairing the withdrawal clause of the latter document. so clearly it is not to be supposed that the obligations of the protocol of geneva, as to a member of the league, are eternal. if the lesser obligations of the covenant end as to a particular member of the league upon withdrawal, surely the greater obligations of the protocol, as to that league member, end also. the foregoing shows the fallacy, as a matter of logic, of the idea that a non-member of the league may be bound by the protocol and yet not be a party to the covenant; for it would mean that a signatory might be forever bound to a subsidiary instrument (the protocol) although the primary instrument (the covenant) was terminable; but i discuss this more at length later.[ ] furthermore, it should be repeated that the protocol is intended to be only a temporary document in the sense that, if it comes finally into force, it is contemplated that the covenant will be amended substantially in accordance with the provisions of the protocol. [ ] annex d, p. at p. , _et seq._ [ ] p. , _et seq._ it is settled that that conference will be postponed. [ ] article . [ ] _infra_, p. , _et seq._ [ ] article xxiii. see conference on the limitation of armament, government printing office, , p. . [ ] p. , _et seq._ { } chapter iv. parties to the protocol. the theory of the framers of the protocol of geneva is that it may be signed and ratified by non-members of the league of nations as well as by members of the league. various words of the protocol (_e. g._, article ) indicate this, the report to the assembly so states,[ ] and the resolution[ ] of the assembly recommending the protocol for acceptance by the members of the league of nations specifically says that the protocol shall be "open for signature by all other states" as well as by members of the league. now of course all this is conclusive as to the technical question as to whether a non-member of the league of nations _may in fact_ sign the protocol. such a state _may_ legally sign, because the other parties to the protocol invite such signature. and if any such state should sign, and ratify, it becomes a party to the protocol, regardless of logic. nevertheless i submit that the whole idea of the possibility of signatories to the protocol who are non-members of the league, is fundamentally contrary to the whole principle, spirit and terms of the protocol itself. in the first place, the protocol is intended as a development of the covenant; the protocol is meant to be a temporary paper; its provisions are to be merged in the covenant itself by amendment of that document. how then can a state become a party to this temporary and provisional paper if it is not a party to the permanent and definitive document? if we examine the detailed provisions of the protocol, the logical conclusion is equally certain. surely a non-member of the league cannot really "make every effort" to secure "introduction into the covenant of amendments" (article ). is this a matter for non-members of the league? { } article of the protocol contemplates that the signatories thereto shall accede to the special protocol regarding the second paragraph of article of the statute of the permanent court. but if we turn to the provisions regarding the permanent court we find that such states as russia and mexico and egypt are not entitled to accede to that special protocol at all, before entering the league.[ ] accordingly, if any one of these three states, non-members of the league, should sign and ratify the protocol of geneva, it could not legally carry out the engagements of article thereof. all the provisions of articles to inclusive of the protocol of geneva relate to disputes between the signatories and contemplate the possible submission of any such dispute to the council or assembly of the league of nations. but such submission can take place only under the provisions of the covenant; and under article of the covenant a non-member of the league may not come within the provisions of the covenant except upon invitation by the council and upon terms stated. without going into further detail, i repeat that the obligations contemplated by the protocol are, in theory, no more than interpretations, or future elaborations, of the obligations of the covenant. it seems to me logically impossible to suppose that such interpretations or amplifications may be made applicable to states which are free from the obligations in their primary form. if this matter is looked at realistically and concretely we find that there is hardly any possibility of the protocol of geneva being signed by any state which is a non-member of the league. the united states and russia will certainly not sign; the admission of germany and turkey to the league is contemplated. the only other states[ ] of any international consequence outside the { } league are mexico and egypt; and the likelihood of either of these two states becoming a party to the protocol of geneva is too remote for serious consideration. accordingly, in the subsequent discussion, i shall assume that, whatever may be the legal possibilities, there is no real possibility of any state which is not a member of the league of nations becoming a party to the protocol of geneva. [ ] annex c, p. at p. . [ ] annex d, p. at p. . [ ] under the resolution of the council of may , , any state may accept the jurisdiction of the permanent court by filing a declaration to that effect; but this is not the same thing as acceding to the protocol of december , . [ ] see membership in the league of nations, by manley o. hudson, a. j. i. l., july, . { } chapter v. relations inter se of the signatories to the protocol. it is here assumed that only members of the league of nations may become parties to the protocol of geneva[ ]; the protocol is a development of the covenant and it would, in any view, be logically impossible for any state, not a member of the league, to become a signatory to the protocol; on the other hand, members of the league are, of course, not obligated to sign or to ratify the protocol of geneva. accordingly, if the protocol shall come into force, the powers of the world, from the point of view of the protocol, will, at least theoretically, be divided into three classes: . members of the league of nations who are parties to the protocol. . members of the league of nations who are not parties to the protocol. . non-members of the league of nations who are not parties to the protocol. from this it follows, again looking at the matter from the point of view of the protocol of geneva, that the international relations of the various countries of the world would fall into the following six classes: . relations _inter se_ of the signatories to the protocol. . relations _inter se_ of the members of the league not signatories to the protocol. . relations _inter se_ of non-members of the league. . relations of the signatories to the protocol with the members of the league not signatories thereto. . relations of members of the league not signatories to the protocol with states non-members of the league. . relations of the members of the league signatories to the protocol with states non-members of the league. { } it is proposed in this discussion first to consider the first of the above six classes, namely, the relations of the signatories to the protocol, _inter se_; and this discussion will proceed primarily on the assumption that the obligations of the protocol are carried out. in numerous places the protocol speaks of the parties thereto as "the signatory states," _e. g._, articles , , , , , etc. it is curious this is so in view of the meticulous insistence by the british dominions at the peace conference, on the use, throughout the text of the covenant generally, of the expression "members of the league" instead of "states members of the league."[ ] certainly it is contemplated that ratification of the protocol may be made on behalf of the british dominions. accordingly, i think that the use in the protocol of the expression "signatory states" is probably an inadvertence, as in no proper international sense of the word are the british dominions states, despite the fact that they have an international status under the league of nations and even otherwise.[ ] the first point to be noticed is that under article of the protocol there is a very general and a very sweeping obligation on the part of the signatories not to resort to war. this is a point of the utmost importance. the obligation goes very much farther than anything in the covenant; the language of this obligation will be examined in detail hereafter. before coming to that, however, it is well to look at the provisions of the protocol regarding the settlement of international disputes. war is one method for the settlement of such disputes, and, in order to make effective the obligation of the signatories not to resort to war, substitute methods of settlement are provided. it is very natural and proper that this should be done. a mere obligation not to resort to war, without more, would almost imply that disputes between the parties to the obligation should { } find _some_ other method of settlement. for if some other method could not be found, feelings due to the continuance of the dispute might well arouse such passions in one country or another as to sweep away the obligation for peace. the two questions of the ending of war and the settlement of disputes between states are not only logically but realistically very closely related. disputes between states are often regarded as comprising those that relate to international questions and those that relate to domestic questions, the former being divided into justiciable and non-justiciable disputes. i prefer, however, _for this discussion_, to classify possible international disputes in three kinds, namely: . disputes as to international questions. . disputes as to domestic questions. . disputes as to _status quo_. i am aware of the fact that such classification as the foregoing is overlapping. disputes as to the _status quo_ will to some extent fall within the two classes first mentioned; they may relate therefore to questions which are international or which are domestic in their nature. however, i think the classification is justified, at least for reasons of convenience, and also, in my opinion, for reasons which go very much deeper. let me illustrate this by reference to questions arising from frontiers. the existence and the location of a frontier are essentially questions of international import. the location of a frontier may, in a given case, not only be an international question in the sense that it should be settled internationally, but also in the sense that it is justiciable, according to the usual idea of justiciable questions. this would be so in a case where the location of the frontier depended wholly upon the interpretation of a treaty between the two neighboring states. but it is quite possible to imagine an international question regarding a frontier which is not in any way justiciable; such, { } for example, was the question as to where the frontier between poland and russia should be drawn after the world war.[ ] that some frontier had to be drawn was obvious; but there was no possible legal basis for determining _where_ it should be drawn. the question was one of judgment, to be settled by agreement between the parties, if possible; or otherwise, if it was to be peacefully settled, by reference to some sort of tribunal which would decide according to principles[ ] of equity, impossible to express in any precise legal formula. in other words, the question was an international political one. again, suppose that the frontier between the two states has been settled by agreement and that there is no doubt whatever where it is. one of the two states desires to have that frontier changed; in other words, desires that there shall be a cession of territory. here is a question of the _status quo_. in a sense it may be called international, because it relates to an international frontier; but it not only falls wholly outside any idea of justiciable questions in the international sense, but also outside any idea of being a political question which any tribunal whatever could decide on _any_ basis. in other words, it is within that class of cases of an international nature in regard to which two states _may_, if they choose, negotiate, but in regard to which either one of them may at its pleasure refuse even to consider negotiations. in any condition of international affairs which it is possible to visualize under the present state system, this must continue to be so. the state system presupposes necessarily the existence of states. one of the inherent conditions of the existence of a state is its right to the possession of its own undisputed territory as against any other state,[ ] which does not mean, i mention in passing, as against a revolutionary movement _within_ the state; that is another story. the putting in question of this undisputed { } right of one state to hold its own territory as against another state would mean the putting in question of the existing state order as a whole. further, while i have included domestic questions as a separate class of questions in the above list, i think that logically many of them fall within the thought of questions which concern the _status quo_. i do not dispute that these domestic questions may at times have an international aspect; but they are questions which each state has an absolute right under law to regulate according to its own pleasure, and it is for this reason that they fall within the class of cases which are, in theory, not to be questioned internationally. of course a state may, if it chooses, negotiate regarding them, just as it may, if it chooses, negotiate about the cession of part of its territory. but it may also, if it chooses, so to speak end the negotiations by refusing to commence them at all. however, it is proper, none the less, to consider these domestic questions as a separate group, for the reason that there is a possibility of development toward their international consideration within the present state system. i shall pursue that thought further a little later. [ ] those who framed the protocol have a different opinion. see the discussion, _supra_, p. , _et seq._ [ ] _cf._ the expression in article of the court statute "states or members of the league of nations." [ ] the exact position of the british dominions within the league is not yet wholly settled. see the recent british and irish notes regarding the irish treaty, london times, december and , . [ ] see treaty of versailles, article , third paragraph. [ ] such as, perhaps, the idea of self determination, the economic situation of the inhabitants, etc. [ ] see the declaration of the rights and duties of nations adopted by the american institute of international law, specially paragraph iv, a. j. i. l., vol. x, pp. , . { } chapter vi. international disputes. so far as concerns disputes of an international nature, the protocol, taken in connection with the covenant, provides for a final and binding settlement of such disputes between signatories to the protocol in every case whatsoever. in order to determine the precise effect of the protocol in this regard, it is necessary first to examine the provisions of the covenant. the provisions of the covenant which particularly cover this matter are those of articles , and . let us therefore consider the text of these articles,[ ] looking in the first place at the text of articles and and the first paragraph of article , which follow: article . "the members of the league agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report of the council. "in any case under this article, the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute." article . "the members of the league agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration or judicial settlement. "disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and { } nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement. "for the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the permanent court of international justice, established in accordance with article , or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. "the members of the league agree that they will carry out in full good faith any decision or award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a member of the league which complies therewith. in the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto." article (first paragraph). "if there should arise between the members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with article , the members of the league agree that they will submit the matter to the council. any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the secretary-general, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof." looking at these provisions in their entirety, it will be seen that the engagements taken by the members of the league relate to "any dispute likely to lead to a rupture." this is the language of both articles and . we may say that this means any dispute whatever, any serious dispute from the point of view of international peace. we may lay aside trifling disputes which cannot lead to serious differences between states, whether or not they drag on through years of diplomatic negotiation. accordingly, we may say that the covenant in these provisions covers any international dispute whatever as to international questions in the sense above mentioned. further examining the provisions above quoted, we see that { } the members of the league agree in every such possible case to do one of three things: they agree to submit all disputes either (a) to arbitration or (b) to judicial settlement or (c) to the council. they do _not_ agree to submit any particular case or any particular class of cases to arbitration; they do _not_ agree to submit any particular case or any particular class of cases to judicial settlement; but they do specifically agree that all cases that are not submitted to the one or to the other, go to the council. the effect of such submission to the council will be discussed hereafter; at the moment it is only necessary to point out that under these provisions the submission to the council is _obligatory_. that submission _must_, under article , take place, in the absence of submission to arbitration or to the court. but the submission to arbitrators or to the court is voluntary. the first change made in this scheme of the covenant is that parties to the protocol agree to accept the so-called "compulsory" jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice in the cases mentioned in paragraph of article of the statute of the court. thus, in such cases the dispute between the parties would go, as a matter of right, at the demand of either one of them, to the court, where it would be finally determined. to that extent the jurisdiction of the council is lessened. under the protocol, this acceptance of the so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice is to take place by the signatory states within a month after the coming into force of the protocol, which, as we have seen, would mean within a month after the adoption by the conference on reduction of armaments of the plan for such reduction. the parties to the protocol thus agree to accept this so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the permanent court; but it is provided that they may do so with appropriate reservations. accordingly, it is desirable to consider summarily just what this so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice is. all that the word "compulsory" in this connection means is "agreed to in advance." the general provisions of the court { } statute[ ] describe the jurisdiction of the court as extending to any case which the parties, either after it has arisen or by "treaties and conventions in force,"[ ] choose to submit. the so-called optional clause relating to the so-called compulsory jurisdiction in effect provides that as to certain defined classes of cases the parties agree, now, in advance of any dispute, that disputes of those particular characters will be submitted to the court. the definition of these classes of disputes is found in article of the statute of the court, and in this regard follows generally in its language the provisions of the second paragraph of article of the covenant, which declares that these particular classes of disputes are "among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement." by the so-called optional clause relating to the court statute, it is these classes of disputes as to any or all of which the jurisdiction of the court may be accepted as "compulsory _ipso facto_ and without special agreement, in relation to any other member or state accepting the same obligation." the classes of "legal disputes" mentioned in article of the court statute are as follows: "legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation." in regard to these definitions of classes of disputes, it is necessary to make some general observations. no matter what definition may be made in advance as to the classes of disputes which are to be submitted to the court, a difference of opinion { } may exist in any given case as to whether the particular dispute which has arisen is or is not within one of the defined classes. it follows that the mere definition of classes of disputes which, by agreement in advance, are to be submitted to a particular tribunal, is not in itself sufficient; any such definition must be accompanied by a provision for a case when one of the parties to a dispute claims that the particular dispute is within the defined class and the other party to the dispute does not admit that the dispute is within the defined class; some method must be provided for determining that preliminary question of jurisdiction. let me put this concretely: let me suppose that two members of the league have agreed to the optional clause and that a dispute arises between them. one party to the dispute says that the question involved concerns the interpretation of a treaty and accordingly submits the question to the permanent court of international justice in accordance with the procedure under the statute of that court. the other party to the dispute says that the dispute does not in any way concern the interpretation of the treaty and submits the matter to the council of the league under article of the covenant. clearly there would be here for decision a preliminary point of jurisdiction and, in so far as the optional clause is concerned, the matter is covered by the statute of the court in the final paragraph of article , reading as follows: "in the event of a dispute as to whether the court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the court." in other words, by the court statute, it is for the court to say whether or not it has jurisdiction in any such case; so that in the particular case above supposed, where one party was seeking to go to the court and the other party was seeking to go to the council, it would be for the court in the first instance to decide as to the jurisdiction. if the court decided that it had jurisdiction, the dispute would come on for decision by the { } court; if the court decided that it had not jurisdiction, consideration of the dispute would come on before the council. the provision in the last paragraph of article of the court statute is a wise and necessary one. it avoids conflicts of jurisdiction and it permits a preliminary and easily realizable method of determining the question of jurisdiction. it is unnecessary to consider in further detail the described classes of legal disputes mentioned in article of the court statute. any party to the protocol may make reservations in acceding to this optional clause and, as the report of the first and third committees to the assembly points out,[ ] these reservations may be of a very extensive character; but the fact that the signatories to the protocol agree to accede, even to some extent, to this so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the permanent court is of great importance. however, the most important change which the protocol makes in regard to the settlement of international disputes concerns the functions of the council in the case of a dispute submitted to it. the only respect in which the functions of the council in such a case under the protocol are _precisely_ the same as the functions of the council under the covenant is that the council must begin along the lines of mediation and conciliation.[ ] this, we may observe, comes directly from the third paragraph of article of the covenant, which provides that "the council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute." such language relates to the mediatory and conciliatory functions of friendly governments. the council is composed of representatives of governments, of governments friendly to the parties to the dispute, because the governments which are members { } of the council as well as the governments which are parties to the dispute have joined in a covenant of peace. accordingly, the first duty of the council, in the event of any submission of a dispute, is to mediate and conciliate. these are very valuable functions. they permit of delay. the governments which compose the council may prolong the consideration of the point at issue.[ ] the parties to the dispute have come to the council for a settlement; and the council may deliberate during a reasonable period so as to permit passions to cool and reason to resume her sway. now, as i remarked, these mediatory functions of the council remain precisely the same under the protocol as under the covenant. suppose, however, the mediation fails, what is the next duty of the council? under the covenant,[ ] the next duty of the council would be this, to consider the dispute; but under the protocol (article ( )), the next duty of the council is to "endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration." this obviously is a very different thing from consideration of the dispute by the council itself. instead of considering the dispute, the council says to the parties: is there not some kind of a tribunal to which you are willing to refer it? still more striking is the fact that, even if this endeavour fail, it does not even then necessarily become the duty of the council to consider the dispute on its merits. _either one_ of the parties may demand the setting up of a committee of arbitrators. the difference between such a provision as this and the provisions of the covenant is remarkably great. under the covenant, when, as the outcome of the mediation of the council, the parties do not themselves agree upon a settlement, the council is inevitably required to consider the merits of the case. under the protocol, if the parties do not agree, the dispute goes to the court or to a tribunal of some kind, if such a reference is agreed on; it next goes to a committee of arbitrators if only { } one of the parties demands it; this means that the council never gets to consideration of the dispute on the merits, unless the parties to the dispute at the time are unanimous in wishing that this shall happen. it is obvious that when we have a situation where _any_ party to a dispute may demand the appointment of an arbitral committee, the council of the league can only consider cases of dispute which all parties thereto, _after_ the dispute has arisen, _unanimously_ agree should be considered by the council. the reason why i attach the utmost significance to this change, in connection with some other changes which are to be noticed, is that it is a total departure in theory from the idea of the covenant that political disputes should be settled by a political body such as the council of the league of nations. after all, that was the fundamental idea of article of the covenant, that the council of the league should lay hold of the dispute, at least to the extent of preventing war from arising out of it. _the theory of the protocol is that every kind of international dispute should be settled either by a court or by arbitration, that the functions of the council are those of mediation and conciliation and that the council is never to consider the merits of the dispute unless the parties thereto at the time of the dispute unanimously wish such consideration_. even then, as we shall see, a single dissent in the council regarding the merits is sufficient to render its consideration of no effect, and arbitration again comes into play. it should be pointed out here that if the dispute goes to a committee of arbitrators at the request of one of the parties, any point of law in dispute must be sent by the committee of arbitrators to the permanent court of international justice for an opinion.[ ] now, let us proceed with the duties of the council. if the dispute has gone to arbitration, the functions of the council are at an end; but if no party "asks for arbitration,"[ ] then and only { } then the council takes up the consideration of the dispute. in this case, the council in fact becomes an arbitral board, _provided_ it can reach a unanimous conclusion; but its deliberations and recommendations have no effect whatever if it cannot reach a unanimous conclusion. under the present composition of the council the arbitral tribunal which it would become in such circumstances would be composed of from eight to ten members. the council itself would be a body of at least ten members, possibly eleven, possibly twelve (if the dispute were between two outside parties), but the votes of the disputants would not be counted. it is clear that unanimity would be somewhat difficult to reach in a tribunal of that size. it must be remembered that under the protocol no dispute can reach the council for such an arbitral decision unless (a) the mediatory efforts of the council have failed and (b) the parties have refused to agree upon any form of arbitration and (c) neither party wishes arbitration.[ ] clearly a dispute which had reached that stage would be one upon which unanimous agreement by an arbitral tribunal of representatives of from eight to ten governments would be improbable. furthermore, it seems to me almost certain under the new procedure that one of the parties would demand arbitration,[ ] because it would always be in the power of one member of the council to compel such arbitration. this is a point which, so far as i have observed, has not elsewhere been noticed. the final provision of the protocol for the settlement of the dispute is that if the matter goes to the council for consideration; and if the views of the council are not unanimous (aside from the parties), there is then a "compulsory" arbitration. the council proceeds itself to determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the committee of arbitrators. so, taking all the provisions together, the whole result is that a dispute which is past the stage of mediation either goes to arbitration outside the council or must be unanimously decided { } by the members of the council; and this puts it in the power of any one member of the council to compel an arbitral award by an outside body. it should be added that, under the protocol, as under the covenant, the assembly may be substituted for the council in the consideration of a dispute. it would have in such case the same mediatory powers as the council and the same arbitral powers as the council if all the parties refused any other form of arbitration.[ ] a very summary statement of the functions of the council under the covenant shows what a radical change is made by the provisions of the protocol. under the present provisions of article of the covenant, a dispute which passes the stage of mediation is considered by the council. if the council is unanimous in making recommendations, their effect is simply to prevent war, not finally to settle the dispute. if the council is not unanimous, its recommendations may have a moral effect, but have no legal effect whatever. so far as concerns these provisions of the protocol, they may be summed up as follows: they provide that every possible dispute between the parties to the protocol which is subject to international cognizance shall be finally determined by a judicial or arbitral tribunal resulting in a legally binding decision or award; and the parties to the protocol solemnly agree that they will accept any such decision or any such award as final and that they will carry it out in full good faith.[ ] [ ] as amended. [ ] article , first paragraph. [ ] for a collection of such agreements, see publications of the permanent court of international justice, series d, no. . [ ] see the discussion as to this in that report, _infra_, p. . [ ] doubtless the word "conciliation" is not a term of art in this regard. but it seems to me that the functions of the council under article of the covenant go somewhat beyond "mediation" in the strict sense of the writers. see nys, droit international, vol. ii, p. ; also vattel ( edition), p. . the protocol (article ) calls a result from these efforts "an amicable settlement." the french speaks of such efforts as "l'essai de conciliation." [ ] the period of "six months" is mentioned in article of the covenant. [ ] article , paragraph , _et seq._ [ ] protocol, article ( ) c. [ ] by a committee of arbitrators. [ ] by a committee of arbitrators. [ ] the powers and duties of the assembly in such case are stated in the last two paragraphs of article is of the covenant. they are continued, to the extent stated, by article of the protocol. [ ] the question as to what may happen under the protocol if such a decision or award is _not_ carried out is discussed _infra_, p. , _et seq._ { } chapter vii. the status quo. in many recent discussions of international affairs these two originally innocent latin words "_status quo_" have attained a really malevolent significance. they seem to be regarded as meaning the same thing as the motto "whatever is, is wrong," and some who talk about the _status quo_ appear to be in the same mind as omar when he longed "to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire ............................. --and then re-mould it nearer to the heart's desire." it may be well to give some critical examination to this question of the _status quo_ and to see what, if anything, is meant by the ideas which lie back of these criticisms. in the first place, the thought of the critics usually relates to existing international frontiers and, in some instances, to existing international conditions. now as to frontiers, if we look at the _status quo_ historically, we find that it is practically universally the result of changes in a previous _status quo_. the cause of these changes may have been war, may possibly have been agreements and may have been something other than either of these.[ ] i shall refer to them later. but here it should be observed that there is hardly any region of the globe where the _status quo_ does not result from some one or more of these changes within times comparatively recent. of course there are some exceptions to this observation, the arctic and antarctic, for example; but in the populated regions of the globe, the _status quo_, so far as frontiers are concerned, is a thing comparatively new. if we look at this existing situation, this _status quo_ of international frontiers, we find that under modern conditions a { } comparatively short period of time is all that is necessary to give to the _status quo_ the sanctity of universal consent, regardless of its origin. let me give an instance or two of this. the southern frontier of the united states, for part of its extent is the direct result of a war between the united states and mexico, a war which by many, and i am among them, is considered to have been a war of aggression. now no one but a madman would believe that there ought to be a change in the _status quo_ of the communities now existing in new mexico, which in was uninhabited country, by delivering them over to mexican rule. it is true that, during the world war, germany proposed to mexico in the celebrated zimmerman note[ ] that this should be done; but that incident only emphasizes the truth of my remark. one of the most recent instances of a change in the _status quo_, so far as the united states is concerned, is the case of the virgin islands, which were bought from denmark in .[ ] there was a change made by agreement, made for a purchase price which was satisfactory to the ceding country and made after a plebiscite of the inhabitants, who voted almost unanimously for the change. here, again, for reasons differing from those of the foregoing instance, no one in his senses would consider that the existing _status quo_ was not one of justice and common sense. now, if we take the situation generally, we will find, in accordance with the instances that i have mentioned, that the international situation as to frontiers the world over[ ] is, as to perhaps %, either consecrated by usage which is the equivalent of common consent or at least of common sense, or else is the result of agreement which contains in it both elements. the fact is, as any realist will admit, that every frontier, no matter how absurd originally or even now, contains, in the very fact of its existence, elements of stability and of reason which to _some extent_ justify its existence. the ordinary individual near a { } frontier, as distinguished from the agitator, becomes used to it. business transactions adjust themselves to it and in a very short time after its creation any proposed change implies inherently a certain amount of undesirability. it is impossible, perhaps, to imagine or to draw a more absurd frontier than that between switzerland and france in the region of geneva.[ ] it is a monstrosity, geographically and economically, and yet every one is contented with it or at least more contented with it than with the idea of changing it. naturally there are certain attendant annoyances, as in a motor ride out of geneva which involves two or more customs frontier examinations within a few kilometres; and there are certain absurdities involved in catching swiss fish and french fish in different parts of lake leman; and one is amused in reading customs regulations which permit cows to pasture in one country and be milked in the other without duty; but still every one has gotten used to these matters and gets along with them. so on the whole these two maligned words represent a rather peaceful condition. before the world war the irritation produced in the minds of many by the then existing _status quo_ largely related to the frontiers in eastern europe and the somewhat similar irritation now existing among alleged liberal thinkers is due to the frontiers created by the peace treaties in general which are so usually and inaccurately referred to as the treaty of versailles. here, i think it is fair to make a certain distinction regarding the causes internationally of a given _status quo_ at any particular time and of the existing situation in particular. these causes are two, generally speaking--agreement and war. the instances in modern history of changes in frontiers reached by free agreement are innumerable. i do not see how any one who recognizes the existing state system can object to them or believe that force should be used to change them. of course there are critics who object to the existing state system and from { } a theoretical point of view there is something to be said for these objections. the real answer to them at this time is, that whether they are good or bad, the present state system is one that, so far as any human being can see now, is certain to exist for some more centuries at least; and accordingly, outside of dreamland, we must take this system as it is. given that state system, agreements between states as to their frontiers should be sacred. if a state can make an agreement about its frontier, and then, because it made a bad agreement or a stupid agreement or because circumstances changed after the agreement was made, may go to war to set aside the agreement, the result would only be international anarchy--the state system and everything else would have disappeared together. the other source of changes in the _status quo_ is war or strictly speaking the treaties of peace that result from war. i pass by the legal position, which is theoretically correct, that a treaty of peace made by a vanquished power with a victor is supposedly a free agreement. this is true enough from the technical point of view but has no bearing here. the fact is that when one side wins a war and the other loses it, the treaty of peace is made under compulsion and constraint. the argument that is made by those who criticize the _status quo_ of the peace treaties of and runs about as follows; . in certain respects the frontiers and arrangements created by the peace treaties are unjust. . the setting up by the peace treaties of an international organization against war is an attempt to sanctify the wickednesses of the _status quo_. . both the treaties and the international organization which they set up should at least be denounced and probably rejected. this conclusion in various minds is different and uncertain, but i think that i have stated it fairly. let us take these points up in their order. as a preliminary, let me say that the treaties of peace in this connection cannot include the treaty of lausanne with turkey. certainly at the time that that treaty was negotiated there was { } no imposed peace on turkey; as a matter of fact the turkish negotiators had things pretty much their own way with the allies. so that we are considering merely the treaties with germany, austria, hungary and bulgaria. in the first place, the question in many cases as to whether or not there is any such thing as a "just" frontier is at least a very doubtful one. i put it this way. if you have a situation where reasonable, impartial and informed minds can differ, you do not have a situation where it can be arbitrarily said by any one that any one frontier is _the_ just frontier. of course i am not talking of the type of mind which insists that the particular line that he would draw is the one and only line, despite the views of anybody else, because to admit such a theory would mean the admission of the existence of perhaps fifty different frontiers between the same two countries at the same time. now as to the peace treaties, we certainly have that situation to a very large extent. i do not see how any one could contend that the existence of the polish corridor is a perfect solution, nor do i see how any one could contend that the absence of the polish corridor would be a perfect solution. one of the polish delegation said to me in paris in december, , in substance, that it would be impossible to draw a frontier between germany and poland which would not do an injustice to one country or to the other or to both, and i believe that his observation is perfectly sound. the same thing is true as between roumania and hungary, and perhaps more true. my sympathies as to vilna are rather with the lithuanians than with the poles, but no one can read the documents without seeing that the poles have a case. my own view has always been that the frontier between poland and russia is too far to the east, but none the less the russians, after a fashion, agreed to it. most of those whose opinions i respect believe that it was wrong to give the austrian tyrol to italy. despite those views, i have always believed that the decision was defensible. { } different american experts of the highest qualifications, of the utmost sincerity and of complete impartiality took different views as to fiume and the italian-yugo-slav frontier generally. in such circumstances, who could say, what tribunal could decide, the "just" frontier? i am willing to admit that this uncertainty on the question of justice may not exist in every case. i have always believed that some of the cessions of territory forced on bulgaria were utterly indefensible from any point of view whatsoever. i refer, not to macedonia, that impossible jumble of contradictions, but more particularly to western thrace. my own view is that, on the whole and taken by and large, the existing frontiers in europe are more near to justice than ever before in modern history. but i am going to assume for the rest of this discussion that some of these frontiers are wrong and should be changed. what is our answer to that situation? let me point out in the first place that the mere fact that a frontier was imposed by force resulting in a peace treaty is not necessarily anything against it. take the case of alsace-lorraine, for example; or take a still more striking case, the case of germany and denmark. admittedly, in and out of germany, the result as to slesvig was just and should continue. furthermore, it is necessary to point out that the _imposed_ origin of a situation may not continue as the cause of that situation. it _may_ become accepted and voluntary, a full agreement. an instance here is the reparations question. the _status quo_ as to reparations (a very uncertain one) imposed by the treaty of versailles upon germany, has now, under that very treaty, become an agreed _status quo_ by reason of the voluntary adoption by germany of the dawes report; for in reality as well as in strictness of law that plan could not have been adopted, much less be carried out, without the voluntary assent of germany to its provisions. however, taking the frontier _status quo_ of the peace treaties at its worst, that is to say at its alleged worst, admitting, in other { } words, that parts of it are unjust and are the result only of force, what are we to say as to the future? the possibility of change which, under the supposition that i have made, would in itself be admittedly desirable, is along two lines, the line of agreement or the line of war. the so-called fixation or consecration of this _status quo_ under the league of nations in no way precludes a change by agreement, _the utmost that it can do is to preclude a change by war_. accordingly, we are confronted at the outset with the question as to whether the continuance of this _status quo_ is, or is not, a worse evil than war. even those who assume or who believe that war is the preferable of the two must, in order to reach that belief, hold that change by agreement is impossible. such an assumption is contrary to the facts of history, but for the sake of this discussion it may be admitted. in other words, i am willing to assume that a particular part of the frontier _status quo_ is wrong, is unjust, and was brought about by force, and should be changed, and that it cannot be changed by agreement, and come directly to the question if, in these circumstances, it should or should not be changed by war. my answer to this question is: no. and i do not think it is necessary to put this answer merely on the ground of the evil of the war itself, the death, the destruction and so on. it is sufficient to support a negative answer to point out that the effect of the war could not be limited. war never is limited, it goes to lengths that have nothing to do with the supposed injustice for which it is commenced. let me give an instance as a concrete supposition. take the bulgarian-greek frontier and suppose, as i do, that it ought to be changed, and suppose further, as the advocates of war assert, that it should be changed by war between bulgaria and greece; one of two things would happen in all human probability. either greece would be the victor and then not only would the boundary be as unjust to bulgaria as it is now, but much more so. or else bulgaria would be the victor, in which case the injustice would simply be reversed; the frontier would not move to any { } theoretical point of justice, but would move to the point dictated by the new peace treaty. in other words, war is not like a litigation which ends in the settlement of a particular dispute. any war, in its settlement, goes far beyond the dispute which brought it about; every war opens up every possible ambition and desire of the victor.[ ] did the world war end merely in deciding the question about the rights of austria and serbia in connection with the murder of the archduke? where was the fate of the german colonies decided--in east africa and in the pacific, or on the western front? this whole question is of vital importance in connection with the protocol of geneva. if that protocol comes into force and is accepted by germany, by austria, by hungary and by bulgaria, it will have this effect at least; it will change what i may call the status of the _status quo_ in regard to these countries to this extent, that in lieu of that _status quo_ being one imposed by force, it will have become one agreed to, at least to the point that it is agreed that the _status quo_ may not be changed by war but only by agreement.[ ] as a practical example, it will mean, as we now see, that the german effort to regain some of her lost colonies under the mandate system, will again be an effort of negotiation[ ] and not an effort of force. all that the covenant or the protocol of geneva attempts to do about the _status quo_ is to say that frontiers shall not be changed _as a result of aggression_. indeed, the protocol[ ] protects even an aggressor against loss of territory or of independence as a penalty for its aggression; discussion, leading up perhaps to peaceful agreement but to nothing else, is permitted by articles and of the covenant, but that is all. { } my view is that these provisions are sound and that they should not be extended. in saying, as i did, that the possibility of change in the _status quo_ is along only two lines, the line of agreement and the line of war, i did not lose sight of the proposals made in various forms that there should be some method under the league of nations or otherwise by which a tribunal of some sort would be empowered to make such changes from time to time. most of these proposals envisage plebiscites in one form or another. these proposals by their advocates are thought to have the advantage of adaptability to changing conditions and to be more conformable to the theory of the consent of the governed as a basis of government.[ ] of course, changes of frontiers made by any form of tribunal would in a sense be changes of frontiers made by agreement among the parties; for there would be necessarily an agreement in advance setting up such a tribunal and engaging to conform to its conclusions. it may perhaps be imagined that as between two particular countries some such arrangement is possible along limited lines and relating to a particular area or areas. i doubt even this possibility; but certainly no general agreement in accord with such theories is possible and in my judgment it would be highly undesirable if it were possible. a tribunal which was charged with the duty of determining changes in frontiers would clearly be a superstate, full-fledged, and in any sense of that much abused term. obviously, a change of frontier, if it went far enough, might result in the substantial, or even the literal, disappearance of one state by its incorporation within the territories of another. it is inconceivable that any country would agree to such a proposition. even if it were limited very strictly, it would present enormous difficulties and would certainly arouse fierce passions, as is well illustrated by { } discussion regarding the tribunal which is now sitting to consider the frontier between northern and southern ireland. nor would the matter be resolved by the suggested idea of plebiscites. anyone who will consider this question of plebiscites will realize that the determining factor is not wholly the vote itself but to a large extent the terms in which the plebiscite paper is written. he who drafts the agreement for the plebiscite has much to do with what the plebiscite will determine.[ ] the questions are: is the area to vote as a whole or by districts, and where is the line of the voting area to be drawn? the first of these was one of the great questions in the upper silesia case. to apply the idea to an existing episode, let us again refer to the case of ireland. if the plebiscite were in the whole of ireland, it would go for dublin; if it were in ulster, it would go for belfast; if it were in tyrone or fermanagh, the result would perhaps depend on the exact date when it was taken, as recent elections indicate. another difficulty about plebiscites is this: is their effect perpetual or not, and if not how long does it last? if tyrone votes for dublin today, is it an eternal decision or only till another vote in , or till when? there must be some time limit at least; plebiscites cannot be held every year or even every five years, a fact which illustrates the quiet advantages of some kind of a _status quo_. another question about a plebiscite is this: let us concede that an overwhelming vote such as took place in the regions of east prussia under the peace treaties is to be decisive forever. but suppose the vote is very close; how about a vote where a little over half of the population go one way and a trifle under half go the other? is this conclusive? does it have the same moral effect as a larger vote? is a majority of one vote just as good as a majority of ninety per cent.? { } in reality, the truth about these proposals for changing frontiers by some sort of international procedure is that those who advocate them do not believe in them as a general proposition. an englishman who believes in this sort of thing, for example, believes in it as regards macedonia or some such region; he does not for a moment think that such a procedure should enable the people of british columbia, say, to become part of the united states. i do not mean to intimate that the people of british columbia have any such idea; but how is it going to be possible to give the privilege (if it be a privilege) to people along a few selected frontiers? another point, a fatal objection to such a scheme, is the inevitable uncertainty which it would set up. it may be a better thing to live in manitoba than in north dakota, or to live in north dakota than in manitoba; but worse than almost any conceivable place of residence would be a status which might change in the future, so that one could not tell say five years ahead in what country he was going to live. a frontier is not merely a line drawn on a map or demarcated on the ground; a frontier means a _nexus_ of customs, of laws, of traditions and of innumerable other things that directly affect the daily life and conduct of every inhabitant. any lawyer who has had any experience in the matter will realize the enormous difficulties that surround any transfer of territory merely in connection with the drafting of the necessary papers[ ]; and any student who wishes to see how far-reaching the practical difficulties may be need only consider the present situation in alsace-lorraine in its bearing upon the relations between france and the vatican. the impossibility and the undesirability of setting up any system for changing frontiers, such as has been discussed, are equally evident. there is another phase of this general question of the _status { } quo_ which is sometimes discussed by those who seem to have a natural antipathy to the words and that is what i may call the "raw materials" phase. there is, let us say, no coal in switzerland, and yet switzerland must have coal for her people to exist. there are no oil wells in norway, and yet in norway there must be, if civilization is to continue, automotive engines. it is obvious that there can be no physical change in such a _status quo_. people who live in the territory that is now switzerland must get their coal somewhere else, and motor transport in norway must get its gasoline from other lands. what is the international phase of such situations as this? there are perhaps three possibilities. one is a war of conquest commenced by a country in the situation of norway in order to obtain dominion over foreign oil lands; the second is some kind of agreement such as has been suggested in a vague way by the italians and others for some sort of an international supervision in such matters; and the third is that the situation shall continue as it is now--a matter of bargain and sale, of supply and demand. there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that, among these three, the first would be as impossible as it would be wicked; the second is wholly outside the realm of practical politics for centuries to come; the third is the _status quo_, which has not in any case of world peace resulted in any serious injustice. of course, if we go beyond such cases as norway and switzerland and take countries much less favored, it is always a mystery as to why people live in them. it is very difficult to understand, for example, why there are settlers in labrador, or why people are fond of greenland as a home; none the less these things are so. and under the existing system of exchange of commodities there has perhaps never been a time when even the people who live in these countries without certain particular natural resources have not generally been able to obtain sufficient of them as a result of their own efforts in the occupations which the character of those lands permits. of course some countries are naturally richer than others and { } must remain so. in the delta of the nile, the land produces as many as four crops a year and sells for something like $ , an acre. such a condition cannot be duplicated in a climate where only one crop is possible. but the notion that _any_ state or any combination of states, less than world-wide, _could_ be substantially self-sufficient in respect of _all_ raw materials is untenable. even the united states lacks (mentioning minerals only) nickel, cobalt, platinum, tin, diamonds. its supplies of the following are inadequate: antimony, asbestos, kaolin, chromate, corundum, garnet, manganese, emery, nitrates, potash, pumice, tungsten, vanadium, zirconium. outside of minerals we lack jute, copra, flax fiber, raw silk, tea, coffee, spices, etc. this mere enumeration suggests the absurdity of the "raw materials" argument against the _status quo_.[ ] without going into it in detail, the mere fact that there are no copper mines in germany[ ] or in england has never prevented either country from obtaining all the copper that it needed by means of the exchange of its own commodities and its own labor for the copper, say, of spain, or of the united states, or of chili; and from any possible point of view that is now conceivable it is only by the continuance of such a system that the deficiency of particular articles in particular countries can be supplied. all that we can say is, in other words, that so long as the people in a particular country are able to produce enough of something that the rest of the world needs, so long will they be able to supply their own necessities. and if in any country, in labrador, for example, the people are unable, because of the situation of the country, to produce a sufficiency of consumable and exchangeable commodities, the inevitable result will be the evacuation of that country by civilized human beings. if such a result could be changed by conquest, the change would be only temporary. to attempt to change it by agreement would be to attempt a sort of international charity by means of which { } people would be able to live in labrador by the use of part of the surplus production, say, of kentucky, given to them for nothing. there is a very exaggerated notion in the minds of some as to the effect of what is called "control of raw materials." of course, in time of war, control of raw materials _has_ importance. but this does not mean "control" in the sense of _ownership_ of foreign supplies, as, _e. g._, british ownership of persian oil fields or american ownership of bolivian tin mines. it means merely either ( ) the possession of adequate domestic supplies, or ( ) safe and unimpeded _access_ to foreign sources of supply, as, _e. g._, german access, during the war, to swedish iron ore. the military significance of raw materials, aside from purely domestic supplies, is related to such things as naval power, blockade, "freedom of the seas," "free transit," etc., rather than to national _ownership_ of sources of supplies. _access to the market_ is the important thing, although the question of finance may be more difficult in respect of foreign supplies than of domestic. but in time of peace, the "control of raw materials" in the last analysis means that the owners of those materials can do only two things with them, use them or to sell them. this is perhaps most obvious in the case of such raw materials as are perishable, but it is true of all. take such a product as copper, for example. some countries have copper mines, others have none. but the ownership of a copper mine is of no possible advantage unless the copper produced from that mine is manufactured into something else or is sold. of course temporarily a mine owner may leave his ore in the ground or may store a supply of copper above ground; but these are expedients to be resorted to only in some time of over-production and impossible of continuance. if the product of the mine is not either used or sold, its advantage is purely a theoretical possibility of the future. it has no more value in present reality than a bank note on a desert island. the really important factor, as to raw materials, is _access to the market_ on an _equal footing_. { } in practice there are only two ways in which a state or its citizens can be discriminated against, in time of peace, so far as the state's access to supplies of raw materials is concerned. they are as follows: ( ) by discriminatory export duties, or similar duties. in practice these are _not_ important. ( ) by discrimination in respect of prices, or similar matters, by _monopolistic_ producers. to achieve this result it is necessary not merely that one _state_ should have a "monopoly" of the supply of some raw materials, but also that _within_ that state, the production and sales of the raw materials should be in the hands of monopoly. further, the domestic monopolistic organization, must, in order that discrimination should be an outcome of the situation, find it _profitable_ (not merely "patriotic") to discriminate in favor of the domestic market. there is _no_ important instance of such discrimination. such conjunction of circumstances is one which is exceedingly unlikely to occur. there is more chance that there will be discrimination _in favor of_ the foreign buyer. in short, the matter is not one of great practical importance, for ( ) a raw material supplied only by one state and ( ) controlled, _within_ the state, by a monopoly, which also ( ) finds it profitable to discriminate against foreign buyers is something to be found only in imagination. i venture to say that there has never been a time in modern civilization when the people of any country have been prevented by the international situation from obtaining any raw material whatever for which they had the capacity to pay. the only possible exception to this statement has been in time of war[ ]; and the only possible change in the situation in time of peace would, as i have suggested, amount to some form of compulsory international charity. { } if we look generally at this question of the _status quo_ from the international point of view during the past two centuries, we find two divergent and irreconcilable lines of treatment. the jurists and the writers have generally considered that the _status quo_ is or ought to be sacred from the point of view of outside attack.[ ] in most of the books the question is treated under the heading of "intervention" and, perhaps with some qualifications, the writers do not admit the legality of intervention. they make exceptions on the ground of self preservation of the intervening state, sometimes on the ground of protection of human life and so on. but, at least with these exceptions, they generally maintain that the state against which the intervention is directed may legally object to it--that is, may legally insist upon the maintenance of the _status quo_ (or of its right, in a proper case, to change the _status quo_[ ]) and furthermore that such a state might justly, if able (as it usually is not), resort to war against the intervention. on the other hand, the history of international affairs during this period is quite to the contrary.[ ] over and over again states, sometimes individually, sometimes some of them collectively, have interfered with the affairs of another state with which they had strictly no legal concern, on many different occasions and on all sorts of pretexts. they have defended such intervention at times on the vague grounds of the rights of humanity, the interests of commerce, the restoration of order and so on. any one who is familiar, even in a cursory way, with the history of europe will be able to recall numerous such instances; and it must in fairness be admitted that in some of them the result has seemed beneficent.[ ] and it must not be forgotten that it is not only the wicked powers of europe that have acted along these lines. in reference { } to the affairs of other countries, though not its own, the united states has maintained this privilege of paternal intervention by force. we maintained it, for example, in cuba in , chiefly on the ground of the sake of humanity.[ ] in connection with the panama canal, mr. root set up the famous proposition[ ] that the sovereignty of columbia over the isthmus was limited and qualified by the general right of mankind to have a canal between the atlantic and the pacific, and to have that canal kept open for the commerce of all. many other instances might be cited. it is, however, worth while to recall in connection with this alleged limited right of sovereignty of columbia over part of its territory that the united states subsequently paid $ , , to the owner of the qualified fee. it is perhaps unnecessary to add that this alleged right of intervention, as between great powers, was recognized by another name as a method of changing the _status quo_, namely, the method of war. the effect of the protocol is unquestionably to consecrate the international _status quo_ with a definite position of legality, not to be disturbed by force.[ ] the views of the writers, as opposed to the practice of great powers, have been adopted. article of the protocol forbids a resort to war[ ] as against any { } other state, a party to the protocol, "except in case of resistance to acts of aggression."[ ] under article , every signatory agrees to abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression. under these provisions and the provisions of the protocol for the settlement of international disputes, intervention to upset the _status quo_ (or to prevent a state from changing it where it legally may) becomes aggression and is an international crime. [ ] such as discovery, occupation of _terra nullius_, etc. see the treaty of spitzbergen, a. j. i. l., vol. xviii, p. . [ ] a. j. i. l., vol. xi, at p. . [ ] a.j. i. l, vol. xi, supp. , p. . [ ] some regions of asia may be exceptions. [ ] see the franco-swiss free zones, by louis schulthess, in foreign affairs, vol. , no. , p. , with map. [ ] "et il faut bien remarquer, que la guerre ne décide pas la question; la victoire contraint seulement le vaincu à donner les mains au traité qui termine le différend. c'est une erreur non moins absurde que funeste, de dire, que la guerre doit décider les controverses entre ceux qui, comme les nations, ne reconnoissent point de juge." vattel, book iii, section . [ ] in general, this is the theory of article ten of the covenant. [ ] see the genesis of the war, asquith, pp. , . [ ] article . [ ] president wilson's so-called first draft of the covenant contained a provision along these lines in article iii. see woodrow wilson and world settlement, baker, vol. iii, p. . [ ] the statistics of language, etc., even when accurate, do not always forecast the popular wish. upper silesia is an instance of this fact. the statistics, as stated in the note of clemenceau of june , , showed , , poles and , germans. the vote was , for germany and , for poland. [ ] the convention between germany and poland relating to the régime of upper silesia is a document of some pages. [ ] i am greatly indebted to professor a. a. young for some of my economic information; but he is in no way responsible for any of my conclusions. [ ] of course this is an over-statement. germany produces about one-tenth of her consumption of copper. [ ] or a period due to war, such as - . [ ] see hall, international law (seventh edition), chapter viii, for an illuminating discussion. [ ] such as the right of state a to cede territory to state b, notwithstanding the objection of state c to such a cession. [ ] see moore's digest, vol. vi, pp. - . [ ] such as the intervention in greece in by great britain, france and russia. see hertslet's map of europe by treaty, vol. i, p. . [ ] see the message of president mckinley, april , , foreign relations, , p. at p. . [ ] the ethics of the panama question, sen. doc. , rd congress, nd session, p. . [ ] there is a reference to the _status quo_ in the general report (annex c, p. ), which uses this language: "there is a third class of disputes to which the new system of pacific settlement can also not be applied. these are disputes which aim at revising treaties and international acts in force, or which seek to jeopardise the existing territorial integrity of signatory states. the proposal was made to include these exceptions in the protocol, but the two committees were unanimous in considering that, both from the legal and from the political point of view, the impossibility of applying compulsory arbitration to such cases was so obvious that it was quite superfluous to make them the subject of a special provision. it was thought sufficient to mention them in this report." [ ] for the view that this includes acts of force, even in the absence of a state of war, see _infra_, p. . [ ] the other exception "when acting in agreement with the council," etc., is not here material. it is discussed _infra_, p. . { } chapter viii. domestic questions. the treatment in the protocol of so-called domestic questions aroused a great deal of discussion not only at the assembly, last september, but since the adoption there of the text. it may be remembered that there was a similar public discussion at the time of the drafting of the covenant; in that document[ ] a domestic question is defined as "a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state. among instances of domestic questions which have been mentioned from time to time, perhaps the two most commonly referred to in this country are the tariff and immigration. of course it has been pointed out very often that even such questions as these, however inherently domestic, may become international as soon as they are made the subject of a treaty, as they so frequently are. it should be added that almost any question, no matter how "domestic" in its nature originally, _may_ become the subject of international cognizance by virtue of a treaty. there are many treaties of the united states which have related to such questions as the inheritance of land, the right to administer the estates of decedents, etc.; a very recent instance is a treaty between this country and canada regarding the protection of migratory birds, a treaty which has been upheld as valid by the supreme court.[ ] none the less, the absolute right of a country to regulate these matters in its own discretion must be recognized as a matter of strict law. any country, in the absence of treaty, may, at its pleasure, exclude foreigners from entering into its territory, for example. i think no one questions this.[ ] however, as a matter of fact and as a result of the development of the world's commerce, there is hardly any such question which remains exclusively domestic. for example, even in our { } drastic immigration law of ,[ ] there are various treaty rights of entry into the country for the purposes of commerce and so on which are expressly and in terms saved by the statute. furthermore, there is, i suppose, hardly a country in the world which does not have various most-favored-nation treaties which directly affect tariffs. again, modern developments necessitate the extension of international discussions and agreements to matters previously undreamed of; the erection of wireless stations near frontiers is a very practical instance; there must be some kind of agreement to prevent jamming in the air. the negotiations about the opium traffic have gone to the length of discussions as to what areas in certain regions should be planted with the poppy; a more essentially domestic question than the crops to be grown within a country could hardly be imagined. in my opinion, the protocol follows the covenant in its treatment of these domestic questions and goes no farther. the covenant provides that if, upon reference to the council, it is found that a dispute arises "out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction," the council shall report to that effect and shall not even make a recommendation as to its settlement (article , paragraph ). in practice the council will doubtless refer this question of law to the permanent court for an advisory opinion.[ ] the protocol (article , paragraphs and ) continues this provision and applies it also to any arbitration which takes place by its terms. it is provided that if one of the parties to the dispute claims that the dispute "or part thereof" arises out of a domestic question, the arbitrators must take the advice of the permanent court on the point. the opinion of the permanent court is binding on the arbitrators and if the court holds that the matter is "domestic," the power of the arbitrators to decide { } the question is at an end and they are confined merely to recording the court's opinion. the further provision of article on this question is the last paragraph of that article, which reads as follows:[ ] "if the question is held by the court or by the council to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the council or by the assembly under article of the covenant." so far as this provision goes, i do not think that it adds anything to the effect of article of the covenant. the matter would stand precisely where it does now, even if this last paragraph of article of the protocol had been omitted. under article of the covenant, both the council and the assembly have the right to consider any circumstance which threatens to disturb international peace. this does not mean any right of decision or even recommendation in any binding sense. what it does is to give to the council or to the assembly the privilege of attempting, by friendly offices, to avert war. to my mind there is nothing very new in this; indeed, it is rather inherent in the idea of any international association for the prevention of war. after all, there is no doubt that these so-called domestic questions have their international repercussions. the case that was put by way of argument at geneva was the control of the quinine of the world by the dutch, which is said to be practically absolute. what would happen if the dutch put an embargo upon the exportation of this drug? it would be idle to say that such an act, legal as it would be in the strict sense, would not have a profound effect upon civilization generally. under article ,[ ] such an act could be discussed before the council with a representative of the dutch government present, in an effort to obtain some adjustment, some change in what had been done; but that would be all. in , the united states went to war with spain over what { } was, technically at least, from the point of view of spain, a domestic question, namely, the internal situation in cuba. shortly before hostilities broke out, the six then great powers of europe addressed to the united states a friendly note in the matter, to which this government replied.[ ] in principle, i cannot see any difference between such diplomatic correspondence and the discussion of the matter by the council of the league, a discussion to which presumably spain and not the united states would have been the party to object, for the question was a spanish domestic question of which we were complaining. there are other aspects of the treatment by the protocol of domestic questions, in connection with the covenants against war, and with aggression, under which headings it will be discussed.[ ] [ ] article , paragraph . [ ] missouri _v._ holland, u. s., . [ ] see moore's digest, vol. iv, p. , _et seq._, also p. , _et seq._ [ ] act of may , . [ ] as in the case of the tunis and morocco nationality decrees, advisory opinion no. , february , . [ ] this is one part of the so-called japanese amendment, as to which see _infra_, p. , _et seq._ [ ] of the covenant. [ ] foreign relations (u. s.), , pp. - . [ ] see _infra_, p. and p. . also "the japanese amendment," p. . { } chapter ix. covenants against war. under the protocol, the agreement of the parties thereto (article ) not to resort to war with one another is, if the terms of the protocol are carried out, absolute. the only stated exceptions in article of the protocol are ( ) in case of resistance to acts of aggression and ( ) when acting in agreement with the council or the assembly under the covenant or the protocol. the first exception relates to defence and, if there be no aggression, as there would not be if the protocol is lived up to, there would never be any need of defence against aggression. the second exception, so far as it relates to a party to the protocol against whom force might be used, relates primarily to an aggressor, as defined in the protocol. of course this second exception in this regard goes beyond the question of defence, strictly speaking, because it would permit a state, not attacked, to go to the defence of another state attacked if and when the application of the sanctions of the protocol is called for by the council[ ]; but if the parties to the protocol carry out their agreements as therein expressed, there could never be any war between two or more of them. there appears to be another possibility of the use of force within the language of this second exception; this is the case where a state, against which has gone a decision of the court or an arbitral award, fails to carry out the decision or award. the provision of the covenant regarding such a situation is contained in article , where it is said that the council shall "propose what steps should be taken to give effect" to such decision or award. obviously such proposals by the council would not have any binding effect upon the members of the league. however, under the covenant, the state in whose favor the decision or award had gone _might_ lawfully have resorted to war against the state refusing to carry out the decision or award, { } provided merely that it delayed resort to war for three months thereafter, under the language of article of the covenant. in other words, if an award or decision was made and a state refused to carry it out, the successful party, under the covenant agreed merely to refrain from war against the defeated party for a period of three months. the protocol (article ( )), as interpreted by the report to the assembly, still permits the successful party to use force in such a case but only when the council authorizes the use of force, such authorization being brought within the terms of article of the covenant. it is true that the council is first to exert its influence to secure compliance with the decision or award and that, if the use of this influence fails, the council may then propose measures short of force before authorizing the use of force itself. indeed, the report[ ] says that the council may "institute[ ] against the recalcitrant party collective sanctions of an economic or financial order." if this means that the signatories to the protocol are obligated to employ such sanctions in such a case when called on by the council, i can only say that, in my opinion, the statement is not warranted by any language of the protocol or of the covenant. however, the final effect of these provisions is that with the authorization of the council the successful party _may_ use force to execute a judicial decree or arbitral award. furthermore, the report to the assembly says that in such a case the defeated party could not resist, and that, if it did resist, it would become an aggressor against whom all the sanctions of the protocol might be brought into play. to see how this would work out, let us suppose that in an arbitration between state a and state b, state a obtained an award to the effect that state b should pay to it the sum of twenty million dollars. thereupon state b refuses to pay the award and, notwithstanding the efforts of the council, maintains that { } refusal, thereby violating its agreement in the protocol (and in the covenant also) to carry out any such award. thereupon the council authorizes state a to use force to collect the money. it is no answer to this to say that the council would not authorize the use of force, for we are considering what may be done, not what would be done. state a then begins to use force and, if state b resists at all, the entire machinery of the sanctions of the protocol can be brought into play and these include military and naval sanctions. of course, such a result would be highly improbable, but i submit that it ought to be legally impossible. the provisions of the protocol in this regard go very much farther than they ought to go, and very much farther, in my opinion, than the states of the world are now willing to go. the case which i have supposed is one of a money judgment. a more difficult case would be one where the award was for the recovery by state a of certain territory in the possession of state b which state b thereupon refused to give up. in such a case there is more to be said for the use of force than in the other. in any case, the refusal of a state to carry out the judicial decision or the arbitral award after solemnly agreeing to do so is a very serious breach of a treaty; but the idea of the authorization of force to execute such a decision seems to me to present a question of the very gravest character. my own view is against it. i am inclined to think that the penalty of expulsion from the league under the fourth paragraph of article of the covenant should be the utmost permissible. whether this view of mine be correct or not, certainly the countries of the world are not going to accept any provision by which they will be obligated in advance to join in measures to enforce the result of an arbitration or of a litigation before the permanent court. whether they will agree to a provision permitting the successful party, so to speak, to execute the decision or award on its own account is perhaps doubtful; but certainly they will go no farther, if as far; and this is one of the provisions { } of the protocol which will have to be changed before the document becomes a reality. subject to the foregoing exceptions, the general covenant under article of the protocol not to go to war is, in my opinion all inclusive. it obviously includes all cases where there is a dispute of international cognizance, for in such cases all parties agree upon a final and binding method of decision and agree to carry out the decision. it also includes, as pointed out previously,[ ] all cases in which one state would seek to change by force the _status quo_, or to prevent by force a lawful change in the _status quo_.[ ] neither the lawful maintenance of the _status quo_ nor its lawful change would come within the general exceptions of article . furthermore, the covenant against war in article would also exclude the going to war about domestic questions. all that any signatory agrees to do regarding such a question, if, when raised internationally, it is not settled by negotiation, is to discuss it before the council or the assembly.[ ] a state which did that would have fulfilled all its obligations regardless of any action or inaction as to the domestic question itself; and an attack made on it by any other state would then be aggression under the terms of the protocol. there is no exception. as the report to the fifth assembly says,[ ] "our purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it." this, if lived up to by the parties, the paper does, as among them. the detailed provisions of articles to inclusive of the protocol confirm the views above expressed. the provisions of these articles will be more specially considered in connection with the question of aggression.[ ] [ ] see the discussion on this point, _infra_, p. , _et seq._ [ ] annex c, p. ; see also pp. , . [ ] the word in the french text of the report is "déclencher." [ ] p. . [ ] an instance of this would be if states a and b agreed on a cession of territory from one to the other, to which state c objected. [ ] under article of the covenant. [ ] p. , _infra._ [ ] p. , _et seq._ { } chapter x. aggression. the preamble to the protocol asserts that a war of aggression is an international crime. i have discussed above[ ] the agreement of the parties to the protocol not to resort to war except in defence against aggression or in aid of defence against aggression or perhaps in execution of a judicial decision or arbitral award. this is the general covenant of article of the protocol. it is this resort to war, contrary to the terms of the protocol, which is the chief breach of the protocol against which its chief sanctions are ordered. by article of the protocol[ ] every state which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings either in the covenant or in the protocol, is an aggressor. it will be necessary to consider only the provisions of the protocol forbidding a resort to war, for it would be impossible to have a resort to war contrary to the covenant which would not also be a resort to war contrary to the protocol. the provisions of the protocol go farther than those of the covenant in this regard. it is true that there are in the covenant certain engagements by members of the league not to resort to war. these are found in articles , and ; but it is unnecessary to consider them in detail, for any resort to war contrary to the provisions of those articles of the covenant would clearly also be contrary to the general engagements of article of the protocol. the report to the assembly[ ] seems to infer that a violation of the obligation of article of the covenant on the part of all members of the league to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other members might be a resort to war not included in the language of the protocol; but i think that { } any such forcible violation would be within the terms of the protocol also. it is against the aggressor that the sanctions of the protocol are set up and accordingly the provisions of the protocol defining an aggressor and the procedure for determining what state is an aggressor are of the utmost consequence. the definitions of an aggressor under the protocol are complex in their language though not in their fundamental idea, which is that aggression is a resort to war instead of to arbitration.[ ] the language of the definitions is obscured by certain presumptions (article ) and by the procedure laid down for the determination of an aggressor. the general definition of an aggressor in the first paragraph of article of the protocol i have mentioned above. it is well, however, to quote it in full: "every state which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the covenant or in the present protocol is an aggressor. violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarized zone shall be held equivalent to resort to war." this is the general definition of principle. it relates back in its meaning to article of the protocol, the general engagement not to resort to war. beyond that, it makes the violation of the rules for an agreed demilitarized zone the equivalent of a resort to war, the two are assimilated. the first question that arises regarding this general definition is whether the words "resort to war" mean necessarily an actual and technical state of war only, or whether they include all acts of violence and force, even if such acts did not in a particular case result in an actual state of war, because, for example, not resisted. the view of the report to the assembly[ ] in this matter is that such acts of violence are included in the expression. i am { } inclined to agree with this view, though as a mere matter of language an argument to the contrary is possible. suppose, however, that there is an actual state of war; how is it to be determined which one of the two[ ] belligerents is the aggressor? the protocol attempts to meet this difficulty by laying down two different methods of determining the aggressor. one is by creating certain presumptions, which i shall discuss later; the other is for the case in which none of the presumptions is applicable. in this case, that is to say, in the absence of the presumptions, it is for the council to determine the aggressor and, in order to come to such a determination, the council must act unanimously under the general rule of article of the covenant. i have no doubt of this conclusion, which is the conclusion of the report to the assembly. it is true that the language of article of the protocol is not as clear as it might be, since the duty and power of the council to determine the aggressor are not directly stated, but rather to be inferred from the language. what article of the protocol says as to this in its last paragraph but two[ ] is that, apart from the cases when there is a presumption, "if the council does not at once succeed in determining the aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting, if need be, by a two-thirds majority and shall supervise its execution." { } so that in those cases where the presumptions hereafter considered do not arise, it is the duty of the council to determine the aggressor; it must act unanimously in coming to such a determination; as the report to the assembly says, "where there is no presumption, the council has to declare the fact of aggression; a decision is necessary and must be taken unanimously"; and, if the council is not unanimous, it _must_ enjoin an armistice upon the belligerents. before coming to the procedure before the council, i now enumerate those cases in which, because of the existence of certain facts, a state is "presumed" to be an aggressor; any such presumption can be upset only by the _unanimous_ decision of the council to the contrary. these cases are as follows: . if hostilities have broken out and a state has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure for pacific settlement contemplated by the protocol. . if hostilities have broken out and a state has refused to comply with a decision, award, etc. . if hostilities have broken out and a state has disregarded a determination that the matter in dispute is a domestic matter _and_ has not submitted the question for discussion by the council or assembly under article of the covenant. . if hostilities have broken out and a state has violated the provisional measures against mobilization, etc., contemplated by article of the protocol (and which will be mentioned later). certainly the theory of the first three of the four instances above mentioned is the theory stated by herriot in his speech before the assembly that the state that refuses arbitration is an aggressor.[ ] in other words, law is substituted for force. now it is to be observed that in each of the four foregoing { } cases _hostilities must have broken out_ and in each one of them at least one additional fact must have occurred. in other words, given certain facts, there is a presumption as to the aggressor; but who is to say, how it is to be determined, whether or not at any particular moment these facts exist? it is not sufficient to say that the facts will be open and notorious, for they might not be. indeed, if we look critically at each one of what i may call the required facts, we find that doubt might arise. take the primary fact, which is always required for any presumption to arise; this fact is that hostilities shall have broken out. one's first impression might be that this could never be a matter of doubt; but this is not so. take the case of corfu, for example. italian officers had been murdered in greece by somebody; various individuals had been killed at corfu by a bombardment of the italian fleet. had or had not hostilities broken out within the meaning of article of the protocol? surely the point is at least debatable. take the next required fact, that a state has refused to submit a dispute to the procedure for pacific settlement. it is very easy to suppose cases where there would be a difference of view as to this. a state might claim, for example, that the matter was a domestic question which it did not have to submit to the procedure for pacific settlement. there might be a difference of opinion as to whether or not the matter had been actually decided by the tribunal. it is not at all uncommon in municipal law for parties to disagree as to whether a particular question is or is not _res judicata_; there have been many litigations over this very point; and there have been international arbitrations in which it was raised.[ ] similarly, difference of opinion might exist as to whether or not a state had disregarded a determination that the matter in dispute was domestic or as to whether or not a state had { } submitted a question for discussion under article of the covenant. such differences of opinion could easily arise because of the non-formulation in precise terms of just what the dispute was. parties do not always agree as to what it is they are differing about and they may in fact be at the same time differing as to more than one question. as to whether or not a state had violated the provisional measures against mobilization contemplated by article of the protocol, that document itself recognizes that such a question would require investigation, and in such case and in such case only the protocol gives the council the power to determine the question of fact, acting by a two-thirds majority. so we come back to the situation that a presumption as to the aggressor can exist only if certain facts exist; and that the existence of one or more of these facts may very likely be in doubt or dispute and that, with one exception, there is no procedure for determining such questions of fact so as to be able to say with certainty that the presumption _does_ exist. what is the answer to this difficulty? if we look at the matter technically, we must conclude that none of the presumptions created by article of the protocol can ever arise unless the facts[ ] were admitted by the two[ ] disputants. such an admission would mean, in other words, that one of the parties openly admitted that it was an aggressor. if the facts were in dispute or, in other words, if the existence of the presumption was in dispute, the council could not determine the aggressor on the basis of a presumption requiring the unanimous vote of the council to upset it; but would be required to determine the aggressor under the general provision which was first mentioned, under which no presumption exists and when the council is required by affirmative unanimous vote to determine the aggressor. here again, however, there would unquestionably be disputed facts; that is to say, unless one of the parties said that it was the aggressor, it would require an elaborate investigation to { } determine under the language of article of the protocol whether a state _had_ resorted to war in violation of its undertaking, or _had_ violated the rules laid down for a demilitarized zone. it is utterly impossible to suppose that the council could ever immediately determine the aggressor under such circumstances by unanimous vote; and such determination _must_ be immediate. the language of the text is: "at once"; and in the french: "dans le plus bref délai." let us look at the matter concretely and take up the question of procedure, supposing an actual case before the council. there is a crisis; hostilities have or are supposed to have broken out; there are two states which either are or are thought to be at war; the council meets. not only under the realities of the situation, but under the express language of the protocol, the council must act instantly; the peace of the world is at stake. now, under those circumstances, there could be only two situations. one would be when some great power, either by open and announced defiance or by its refusal even to meet with the council, proclaimed itself an aggressor. in that case of course neither the language of article nor any other language would make any difference. the other situation would be that the two states were there before the council, each claiming that the other was in the wrong, each disputing the allegations of fact made by the other's representative. in such case clearly no presumption could arise and in such case the council could not ever immediately determine the aggressor by unanimous vote. the mere fact that it would require time to examine into the truth of the respective allegations would prevent this. so the council, by the compelling facts of the situation and indeed in accordance with the strictest construction of the protocol, would be constrained to declare and would declare an armistice. any dispute as to what state was guilty of aggression prior to that time would be put over for subsequent adjustment; the armistice would be laid down and would be obeyed. of course, in theory, it could be violated and the violator of the armistice { } would become the aggressor; but a state that was going to refuse or violate the armistice, knowing the procedure, would doubtless not go to the council at all. so, to my mind, the vital part of the procedure laid down by article for determining an aggressor is found in the provision giving the council the power immediately to declare an armistice; and, under the procedure, this, in my judgment, is the only power that the council would ever exercise, except in the case suggested, in which a state itself denounced itself as an aggressor. i am aware that the framers of the protocol are not in accord with these views. in their opinion, the presumptions of article establish "an automatic procedure which would not necessarily be based on a decision of the council." they say that where a presumption has arisen and is not unanimously rejected by the council, "the facts themselves decide who is an aggressor" and otherwise that "the council has to declare the fact of aggression." i can only say that their conclusions, while perhaps admissible as a mere matter of language and nothing but language, take no account of the inevitable certainty that there will always be at least two views of what the facts are; to put it from a legalistic viewpoint, tribunals do not deal with facts; they deal with what lawyers call facts, but which are merely conclusions based on such evidence as is available. this sort of a "fact" is arrived at only after a hearing or a trial of some kind; and to suppose that the council could ever conduct such a hearing, and at the same time come to a unanimous and immediate conclusion is to suppose a contradiction in terms.[ ] so while from the language of article of the protocol difficulty may arise in determining an aggressor under its provisions (for there might in any case be a disputed or doubtful question of fact; and the council under the provisions of the covenant would in general have to act unanimously) the protocol provides a solution of any such difficulty by saying that if the council does not immediately determine the aggressor, it _must_ { } (the language is mandatory) proceed to enjoin an armistice, to fix its terms and to supervise its execution, acting for these purposes by two-thirds majority. then the protocol provides that any belligerent which refuses the armistice or violates it shall be the aggressor. these provisions regarding an armistice seem to me to meet any possible objection that might be raised to the absence of a more complete and detailed system of determining in fact and in law what state is an aggressor. no matter what the presumptions were or even what procedure was laid down, it is clear that, after hostilities in any given case had actually commenced, there would be enormous difficulty for any tribunal whatever in laying down conclusively which state was the aggressor. after all, the vital thing is to prevent war; and the opening of hostilities, to be immediately followed by an armistice, would not be very much of a war. so i regard these provisions as to an armistice as the most ingenious [transcriber's note: ingenuous?] and, except its statements of principle, the most important of all the provisions of article of the protocol. the power given to the council to formulate an armistice would be the power exercised if hostilities broke out rather than the power of adjudging the aggressor; unless the aggression was openly admitted, which would mean that one of the parties to the protocol really defied the others; and, in that case, of course, it would defy the terms of an armistice as well as any other terms. but in any other case a new consideration would immediately arise. the council would formulate an armistice and in the absence of an open defiance by one state, or possibly by a group of states, of all the others, the armistice would introduce a new situation, a situation in which hostilities were _not_ going on; and human experience shows that, given an armistice, the recommencement of hostilities on the old grounds is a real impossibility. in the view that i take, the sanctions of the protocol become less important in the light of its provisions as to the determination of an aggressor, for it is only against an aggressor that the { } main sanctions of the protocol can be brought into play; and these provisions for determining the aggressor really mean that an aggressor is a state or a combination of states which has finally and deliberately determined to begin war and to carry it on regardless of its most solemn engagements to the contrary. in other words, there could be no war as between the parties to the protocol without a wilful, wanton and wicked disregard of its provisions. [ ] p. , _et seq._ [ ] first paragraph. [ ] annex c, p. at p. . [ ] i use the word here in its largest sense. [ ] annex c, p. at p. . [ ] of course there may be more than two. [ ] the reason why i have used in regard to article of the protocol this uncouth language, "its last paragraph but two," is that in the english text of article there is a textual error which is extremely confusing. article really consists of five paragraphs, and the second of these five paragraphs has two sub-heads or sub-paragraphs numbered and . the third paragraph of article , in referring to these two sub-heads of the second paragraph calls them "paragraphs and ." in other words, the first words of what is here referred to as the third paragraph of article (the paragraph which i call "the last paragraph but two") read as follows: "apart from the cases dealt with in paragraphs and of the present article." they should read something like this: "apart from the cases dealt with in sub-heads and of the second paragraph of the present article." compare the french text which is perfectly clear: "hors les hypothèses visées aux numeros et du présent article." see the english and french texts of article in full, _infra_, pp. , . [ ] september , . [ ] _e. g._, the pious fund case reported in the hague arbitration cases, p. , and the interest case between russia and turkey, _op. cit._, p. . these two cases are also in stowell and munro's international cases, vol. i, p. , _et seq._ [ ] i mean the facts from which the presumption as to the aggressor would arise. [ ] i assume only two, for convenience. [ ] in the dogger bank case, the commission of inquiry sat for more than two months. hague court reports, scott, p. . { } chapter xi. the japanese amendment. during the framing of the protocol of geneva by the committees of the fifth assembly of the league of nations, the language of the document was changed by what has been called the japanese amendment; and while the provisions which constitute that amendment as part of the protocol have been generally considered in the previous discussion in connection with the application of various articles, still that amendment attained such prominence in the discussions in the fifth assembly and since, that it may well be separately reviewed. the japanese amendment related to domestic questions, questions within the domestic jurisdiction of a state; and before coming to its terms, it will be well to see what the situation as to these domestic questions is under the covenant, taken by itself. the covenant, as we have seen,[ ] provided for the submission to the council of all disputes between members of the league which were not otherwise adjusted by some kind of agreement or by some kind of tribunal. in regard to those disputes submitted to the council, the eighth paragraph of article of the covenant said that if one of the parties claimed, and if the council found, that the dispute related to a question which by international law was entirely within the jurisdiction of a state, the council should so report and make not even a recommendation regarding a settlement. in other words, if the dispute related to a domestic question and one of the parties to the dispute raised the point, the council could not proceed at all to make any recommendation which would bind the parties to the dispute or either of them to anything whatever. at the same time, under the covenant, by article , either the council or the assembly might consider _any_ circumstance tending to threaten or disturb international peace. the language in this regard is general. it means no more than discussion and { } suggestion, except perhaps publicity; but under this language of article , the parties were left with their liberty of action in the matter; and indeed, under the covenant, the members of the league entered into no commitment against going to war in the case of a dispute about a domestic question. so we may sum up the provisions of the covenant as to a dispute regarding a domestic question by saying that while such a dispute might go to the council,[ ] still the council,[ ] if the point were raised, could make no recommendation about it; but the council (or the assembly) might take the matter into consideration as a subject of discussion when it threatened peace, with the hope and duty to preserve the peace if possible; but in regard to this the parties remained free to act as they might themselves finally determine. the protocol of course, as we have also seen,[ ] makes a great change in this situation because it contains a general agreement by the parties not to resort to war, an agreement which is applicable to disputes about domestic questions to the same extent that it is applicable to disputes about international questions; this general agreement not to go to war includes all questions of both kinds. furthermore, the protocol makes it very much more likely that disputes between members of the league will go for a hearing to a committee of arbitrators than to the council; we have seen[ ] that the likelihood of any dispute going to the council under the new régime, for consideration on the merits, is remote. the functions of the council regarding disputes are to some extent delegated to the permanent court of international justice, but even more largely to committees of arbitrators agreed on or appointed _ad hoc_. now the japanese amendment is not strictly a single amendment; it is in two parts. the first part is the last (third) paragraph of article of the protocol, reading as follows: { } "if the question is held by the court or by the council to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the council or by the assembly under article of the covenant." we must bear in mind that by the second paragraph of article , any committee of arbitrators, in its consideration of a dispute is subject to the same limitations concerning a dispute about a domestic question as are provided for the council. the method of so limiting the committee of arbitrators is that the question of law is decided by the permanent court of international justice, and if that court decides that the question is domestic, the committee of arbitrators simply so declares and proceeds no farther. what the paragraph of article above quoted says is that although neither the council nor a committee of arbitrators may consider a dispute regarding a domestic question if the point is raised, still none the less the council or the assembly, under article of the covenant, may consider the situation in its bearing upon the peace of the world. now such consideration under article of the covenant would have been possible without this statement, so that, to my mind, this portion of the japanese amendment makes no change in that regard. the paragraph does not change the legal situation at all, but simply makes explicit what was otherwise implied. the other portion of the japanese amendment is the clause which is added to sub-head of the second paragraph of article , beginning with the word "nevertheless." in order to see just what this other portion of the japanese amendment is, i cite here the second paragraph of article (omitting certain phrases not here material) with the words of the japanese amendment italicised: "in the event of hostilities having broken out, any state shall be presumed to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the council, which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare: { } . if it * * * has disregarded a unanimous report of the council, a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognizing that the dispute between it and the other belligerent state arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter state; _nevertheless, in the last case the state shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the council or the assembly, in accordance with article of the covenant_." the language of article of the protocol is quite involved, i have already discussed it at some length,[ ] endeavoring to show that its real effect differs greatly from the theory of its framers, a theory borne out, perhaps, by the language of article considered as language only. i sum up _that theory_ as follows: laying down the general principle that a state which resorts to war contrary to the covenant or to the protocol is an aggressor, and prescribing a general procedure by which it is for the council to decide, unanimously of course, whether such a violation has taken place (and in the absence of such unanimous decision to declare an armistice) none the less article limits or qualifies this general procedure by enumerating certain classes of cases in which the facts would _supposedly_ be so open, so notorious, so impossible to question, that they would create a presumption as to the state which was the aggressor; and such presumption could be upset only by unanimous vote of the council against it. i repeat that this is the theory of mm. benes and politis; it is not mine. my own view, heretofore expressed, is that in no case could the supposedly notorious facts create a presumption because there would always be a difference of opinion as to those very facts themselves. but proceeding on the other theory, and looking only at the language, the presumptions are important; here it is necessary to refer to only one of them. { } this presumption arises when a state has "disregarded" a decision by the council, by the court or by the arbitrators following the court, that a dispute arises out of a domestic question _and has also not submitted_[ ] the question to the council or the assembly for discussion, under article of the covenant. before the japanese amendment, the text was that the presumption arose when a state "disregarded" such a decision to the effect that the dispute arose out of a domestic question. now let us see what the difference between the two is, that is to say, the difference between the text _prior_ to the japanese amendment and the text _with_ the japanese amendment. in either case the decision on the question of law has gone against the complaining state. the proper tribunal has decided that the question is a domestic question and that decision in either case is and remains conclusive. in either case, the state "disregarding" that decision and going to war is an aggressor. we may see that this is so by supposing that the entire original text as well as the text of this portion of the japanese amendment was stricken out.[ ] then, clearly, the state would be an aggressor under article of the protocol and under the first paragraph of article ; and there is nothing either in the original text that we are considering or in the japanese addition thereto which changes that conclusion.[ ] the difference then between the original text and the text with the amendment is this: in the original text, a complaining state disregarding such a binding decision as to the domestic character of the question was _presumed_ an aggressor if it went { } to war _either before or after_ the consideration of the matter by the council or the assembly under article of the covenant. under the text as amended, such a state is _presumed_ to be an aggressor only if it resorts to war _before_ such consideration under that article . in other words, the difference between the original and amended texts would arise only in the following circumstances: state a brings a dispute against state b before a tribunal (council, committee of arbitrators, etc.). the tribunal renders a binding decision that the dispute arises out of a domestic question. the complaining state, bound by that decision, then brings the matter before the council or the assembly under article of the covenant and no adjustment results; thereupon the complaining state resorts to war. under those circumstances, in the original text, the state resorting to war would be _presumed_ an aggressor, a presumption to be upset only by the unanimous vote of the council against it. under the amended text, the complaining state would be an aggressor, but there would be no presumption; and the determination that it was an aggressor would come on to be made by the council, which would either have to vote unanimously that the complaining state was an aggressor, or else proclaim an armistice. i confess that it is difficult to see why such a refined and subtle and technical distinction about the presumption of aggression should be made. if there is a binding decision by a tribunal that a dispute arises out of a domestic question, surely a complaining state, under the principles of the protocol, is bound not to go to war, because it is legally wrong in its claim and has been so adjudged. just why a state going to war under such circumstances should be _presumed_ to be and be an aggressor if it goes to war _before_ a discussion of the matter subsequent to the decision and not be _presumed_ to be an aggressor but merely be an aggressor, if it goes to war _after_ such discussion, is not logically to be explained. however, the foregoing discussion resulting in such an { } obscure and technical distinction is, as i intimated, based solely on the language of the article and on the legalistic theory of its framers as to its meaning and result. earlier in my discussion,[ ] i pointed out that i do not agree with the conclusions of mm. benes and politis, for i do not think that the presumptions laid down in article of the protocol would ever have any material bearing on the decision reached by the council. in other words, repeating in substance what i said before, i believe that the power to declare an armistice is the only power under article of the protocol which the council would ever exercise, except in a case where a state itself denounced itself as an aggressor. furthermore, it seems to me that the very intricacies of the language of article of the protocol are themselves a very real indication that my conclusion is correct. as a matter of reality, i cannot see that the japanese amendment in any conceivable case would cause any difference in what would happen. we must suppose that war has commenced, for unless there is a resort to war, article of the protocol is out of the picture entirely. assuming then a resort to war, there are, under article , with all its provisions and exceptions and presumptions, only two real possibilities: a. there is an open and admitted and defiant aggression. b. there is a difference as to the facts and it follows that it is not possible for the council _at once_ to reach a unanimous conclusion in the case; accordingly the council declares an armistice which each belligerent must accept or become an aggressor. what these two cases come to is obviously one of two alternatives, namely, either some state is going on with its fighting, with its war, regardless of the council and regardless of the protocol, or else there is an armistice and the fighting stops. under the first circumstance, the provisions as to presumptions and as to the decisions of the council are alike of no { } consequence; and, in the second case, the war ends with an armistice as soon as it commences. the drafting of article of the protocol is unfortunately obscure; but when the language of the whole japanese amendment is carefully looked at, it seems to me that it certainly adds nothing to the powers of either the council or the assembly in considering disputes arising from domestic questions, and that the legal right of any state to determine and control its own domestic matters remains unquestioned; indeed, it may be said to remain more unquestioned than it is now; for, under the protocol, that right cannot be questioned by the league, either in council or in assembly; it cannot be questioned by the permanent court or by arbitrators; and it cannot be questioned by war. all that is possible is friendly discussion and consideration under article of the covenant and that, so far as members of the league are concerned, is possible now. of course it might be argued that the various possible decisions and presumptions under article of the protocol might make some difference as to the charging of the costs of the aggression under article of the protocol; but the possibilities involved are too remote to be worthy of discussion. [ ] _supra_, p. , _et seq._ [ ] or the assembly. [ ] _supra_, p. , _et seq._ [ ] _supra_, p. , _et seq._ [ ] pp. - . [ ] the text says "previously." presumably this means before hostilities broke out. it might mean before the "disregard" of the decision that the dispute was domestic. precisely how a state could "disregard" such a decision, except by resort to war, is not very clear. the french is "qui aura passé outre à un rapport," etc. [ ] that is, all the text above quoted as part of sub-head of the second paragraph of article , beginning "has disregarded a unanimous report of the council." [ ] the japanese proposal regarding this article as it first stood, was to strike out all the words referring to the "domestic jurisdiction," etc.; the addition of the clause commencing "nevertheless" was a compromise; it would have been a much simpler result and a better one, i think, to have omitted the whole clause, as the japanese proposed. [ ] pp. , . { } chapter xii. sanctions. the protocol of geneva provides for sanctions or penalties for its breach by a signatory. before considering the main sanctions which are set up by the protocol, it may be mentioned that there are certain provisional measures which may be taken which fall short of the chief sanctions. under article , in the event of a dispute between signatories they agree, pending its settlement, not to increase their armaments, take mobilization measures, etc., and the council is given the right, upon complaint being made, to make enquiries and investigations as to the maintenance of these agreements, and to decide upon measures in regard thereto, so as to end a threatening situation. similar powers are given to the council under article concerning threats of aggression or preparations for war, and in all these cases, the council may act by a two-thirds majority. the preventive measures which the council may take as to such preliminary matters are not precisely defined. it is to be pointed out, however, that a state violating the engagements of article or article would not be an aggressor against which the main sanctions of the protocol could be directed, assuming that hostilities had not broken out. accordingly, the measures which could be "decided upon" by the council would perhaps be limited to those of warning, of advice and of publicity; certainly they could not be measures of force; and in my opinion, they could not go as far as sanctions of any kind, economic or otherwise; the general report[ ] speaks of "the evacuation of territories" as a possibly appropriate measure; this indicates that the "measures" are to be "taken" by the state guilty of violation of the agreements mentioned; _certainly_ there would be no obligation on the part of any signatory to take any steps against a violation of these agreements of articles and ; but the { } language is very vague and all doubt should be set at rest by changing it particularly as the council may decide by a two-thirds vote. in considering the main sanctions provided by the protocol, the first point to be emphasized is that they cannot come into play until a state of war, in the real sense, exists; hostilities must have broken out, so that the world is confronted with fighting actually taking place. it is true that there is a theoretical exception to this in the fact that a violation of the rules of a demilitarized zone is equivalent to a resort to war; but this exception is more apparent than real for the violation of a demilitarized zone would be only a brief prelude to hostilities. the second condition precedent to the application of the sanctions is the determination of the aggressor.[ ] and in any case the determination by the council as to which state is the aggressor must have taken place before the sanctions are to be applied. this is laid down in the last paragraph of article , which provides that the council shall "call upon" the signatories to apply the sanctions.[ ] as the sanctions contemplated by the protocol are _in theory_ merely a development of the sanctions contemplated by article of the covenant, it is interesting to note that this preliminary calling by the council upon the states to apply the sanctions introduces a new system, at least a system which develops from the view taken by the assembly under article of the covenant in ; for in the elaborate resolutions then adopted,[ ] it was stated, among other things, that the council was to give merely an "opinion" as to whether there had been a breach of the covenant by resort to war, but that it was for each state to decide "for itself" whether or not its duty to apply the sanctions provided by article of the covenant had arisen. { } the reason for this development is easy to see. even though the sanctions of the protocol may in theory be the same as those of article of the covenant, _they are applicable to a very different state of facts_. the sanctions of article of the covenant were to be applied to any member of the league which resorted to war in disregard of certain provisions of the covenant in articles , and , and the difficulty of determining whether or not, in a given case, a resort to war _was_ a violation of those other articles of the covenant was not solved, particularly as the covenant does not preclude a resort to war in _every_ case. under the protocol, however, every resort to war by the parties to it is forbidden (except by way of defense or in aid of defense or perhaps in execution of a judgment of some tribunal), and a procedure which, in theory at least and probably in practice, would always determine the aggressor, is provided. for if my view is correct, an "aggressor" is a state which openly and wilfully defies the other signatories when summoned by the council under article of the protocol. consequently, it is now for the council, upon the determination of the aggressor, to call for the application of the sanctions. of course, in all cases of a serious decision such as this would be, the council is not an outside body "calling" upon governments to do something. the words used lead one almost unconsciously to visualize the council as a sort of entity like a court, laying down a rule of conduct for some one; but this is a false vision; for in any such case the council is a group of representatives of governments agreeing, in the first instance, as such representatives of their own governments, upon a course of action to be taken by those very governments pursuant to a treaty obligation. we must think of any such action by the council as meaning primarily that the british representative and the french representative, and so on, agree that the respective countries which they represent will follow a certain course of action in accord. if the council were composed of all the members of the league, it would be proper to describe its action under such a provision as this as being a conference of the parties to the { } treaty to decide as to what, if anything, those parties should do, and to come to such decision unanimously, if any decision is to be reached. it is only as to the governments which are not represented on the council that the council "calls" for action; so far as the governments represented on the council are concerned, what they do is to _agree_ upon a course of action. in theory, as i have said, the sanctions of the protocol are no more than a development of those of article of the covenant. the language of the protocol indeed, in article , incorporates the provisions of article of the covenant by reference. no provisions of the covenant have been more debated since it was written than those of article . in , various amendments to this article of the covenant were proposed, none of which has gone into force; and, as mentioned above, the assembly then adopted various interpretative resolutions regarding article which, with the proposed amendments (one of which was textually modified in ), are _provisionally_ in force.[ ] it is unnecessary to attempt any detailed consideration of the exact legal effect of article of the covenant at the present time in view of these interpretative resolutions and proposed amendments; in general they are intended to make the system of the economic blockade more flexible in its application so far as may be consistent with the purpose of the first paragraph of article of the covenant, namely, to institute a complete economic and financial boycott of an aggressor. this first paragraph of article of the covenant says also that the aggressor shall _ipso facto_ be deemed to have committed an act of war against the other members of the league; this provision does not create a state of war; it simply gives the other members of the league the right to consider themselves at war with the aggressor if they see fit; this provision is supplemented by the language of article of the protocol which gives to any signatory state called upon to apply sanctions the privilege of exercising the rights of a belligerent, if it chooses. { } paragraph of article of the covenant made it the duty of the council to "recommend" to the various governments what armed forces they should severally contribute for use in protecting the covenants of the league. now what article of the protocol does in its first paragraph is to say that the obligations of all states in regard to the sanctions mentioned in paragraphs and of article of the covenant will, when the call for the application of the sanctions is made by the council, immediately become operative, in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. so far as the first paragraph of article of the covenant is concerned--the economic and financial blockade--i do not see that this first paragraph of article of the protocol adds anything to that first paragraph of article of the covenant, even when the former is read in connection with the second paragraph of article of the protocol. it is true that in the resolutions about the economic weapon in the assembly of , it was recognized that from practical points of view the application of the economic pressure cannot be made equally by all countries. but undoubtedly, subject to the practical difficulties mentioned, a definite obligation exists in article of the covenant to impose economic sanctions against the aggressor, and, as i said, in my judgment this obligation is not changed by the protocol; but it can now become an operative obligation only if and when the council says so. the vital question regarding sanctions under the protocol arises under the second paragraph of article of the covenant in connection with the first and second paragraphs of article of the protocol. indeed, it is because of this second paragraph of article of the protocol that the question regarding the use of the british fleet has been raised in england. article , paragraph of the covenant reads as follows: "it shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective naval, military or air force the members of the league shall severally { } contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league." article , paragraphs and of the protocol read as follows: "as soon as the council has called upon the signatory states to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of article of the present protocol, the obligations of the said states, in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs and of article of the covenant, will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. "those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory states to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the covenant of the league of nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow." on its face, paragraph of article of the protocol merely interprets paragraph of article of the covenant; but unquestionably _it greatly changes it_. under the provisions mentioned of the covenant, the council had merely the duty of recommendation as to forces to be contributed by members of the league. undoubtedly under article of the covenant, paragraph , any member of the league had the right, if it chose, to consider itself at war with an aggressor, but equally under that paragraph any member of the league had the right, if it chose, _not_ to consider itself at war with an aggressor. consequently there was no duty whatever under that article , not even a moral duty, in my judgment, on the part of any member of the league to contribute any armed forces whatever. the council had the duty (under article , paragraph , of the covenant) of making a recommendation; but it was merely a recommendation, and there was no obligation of the member of the league to which the recommendation applied; there was merely a possible privilege to the member of the league to which the recommendation applied--and that is a very different thing. now, let us look at paragraph of article of the protocol, quoted above. each signatory state is "to cooperate loyally and { } effectively" not only "in support of the covenant," but "in resistance to any act of aggression." well, certainly resistance to an act of aggression means force and this fact is not qualified but emphasized by the words: "in the degree which its geographical position and its situation as regards armaments allow." i grant that these words have a qualifying effect in some cases. they would mean, for example, that if denmark had no army, she could not be under any obligation to use infantry. but they also refer to the other side of that picture, that the british do have a navy, that is their particular situation as regards armaments, a very particular situation; and under this article, as i read it, the british would be bound "loyally and effectively" to cooperate in resistance to an act of aggression in the degree which their particular naval situation allowed. furthermore, paragraph of article of the protocol says that the "obligations * * * in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned" not only in paragraph but also in paragraph of article of the covenant "will immediately become operative." this indicates that there are military, naval and air sanctions to be employed and that the parties to the protocol are under obligations to employ them. now, it is no answer to this to say that as to the _extent_ of the armed forces to be used, the signatory state has its own discretion; and it is true that there would be no international command, there would be no turning over of the forces of one country to the general staff of another or to an international staff of all; however, even that did not take place during the first three years of the world war, except with specific detachments. so, for example, the british could say that they would send five destroyers or ten cruisers under their own admiral, or the grand fleet if they chose; but clearly it would be bad faith for them to say with this commitment that they would not send even a gunboat. i am entirely satisfied that these provisions greatly extend the provisions of the covenant; for the first time[ ] there is { } introduced in the league system a definite military commitment--definite in the sense that it is obligatory, and not in the sense that it is defined as to extent of force.[ ] it may be argued that the first paragraph of article of the protocol looks somewhat the other way, but i do not think that it does. that paragraph merely provides that the parties to the protocol, if they see fit, may give to the council "undertakings"[ ] as to the military forces which they would use in applying the sanctions of the document. there is no obligation to give any such undertaking; it is purely optional with each state. doubtless if such an undertaking was given and accepted by the council, the state giving it would at least not have to do anything more in the way of military action than provided in the undertaking; but as the giving of the undertaking is optional, the fact of its not having been given would not, in my opinion, limit or qualify the obligation "interpreted" in the second paragraph of article of the protocol. i point out here that the word "contingent" in the first paragraph of article of the protocol does not relate to the obligatory character of the sanctions but to the necessary uncertainty as to the future existence of the breach required for their applicability (see the french text); and the debate in the third committee and more particularly the report unanimously adopted by the assembly, in its discussion of article ,[ ] make it clear that the above interpretation as to the military sanctions is correct; uniform in obligation, they are flexible in application. consideration of the third paragraph of article of the protocol in connection with the third paragraph of article of the covenant tends to support the views already expressed. without further elaboration, i call particular attention to the last clause of the paragraph of the protocol mentioned and cite { } the respective paragraphs of the two documents in parallel columns: _paragraph of article of _paragraph of article of the covenant._ the protocol._ "the members of the league "in accordance with paragraph agree, further, that they will of article of the mutually support one another covenant the signatory states in the financial and economic give a joint and several measures which are taken undertaking to come to the under this article, in order to assistance of the state attacked minimize the loss and or threatened, and to give each inconvenience resulting from the other mutual support by means above measures, and that they of facilities and reciprocal will mutually support one exchanges as regards the another in resisting any special provision of raw materials and measures aimed at one of their supplies of every kind, openings number by the covenant-breaking of credits, transport and transit, state, and that they and for this purpose to take all will take the necessary steps to measures in their power to afford passage through their preserve the safety of territory to the forces of any communications by land and by sea of the members of the league of the attacked or threatened which are co-operating to state." protect the covenants of the league." there are certain other provisions of the protocol regarding sanctions which should be mentioned at least for the sake of completeness. it is the council[ ] which declares that sanctions are at an end and that "normal conditions be re-established" (article ). to the "extreme limit of its capacity," all costs of an aggression are to be borne by the aggressor (article ). the language concerning the extent of the liability involved is very sweeping, going much farther than the categories of damage mentioned in annex i of the reparation clauses of the treaty of versailles. { } the plans to be drawn up by the council for the detailed application of the economic and financial sanctions are to be "communicated" to the signatories--in other words, they are advisory, not binding (article ). here it should be said that the final words of this article mention "the members of the league and the other signatory states." these words imply the possibility of states signatory to the protocol which are non-members of the league. as pointed out above,[ ] no such possibility exists, in my opinion. even if such a theoretic possibility existed, it would be absurd to suppose that any state would sign the protocol, with obligations going beyond those of the covenant, while still being outside the privileges of the covenant; however, the question is of no special importance here. the main sanctions of the protocol, _as among the parties to the protocol_, may be thus summed up: a war of aggression is an international crime; a signatory which either avows itself an aggressor or refuses an armistice after hostilities have broken out, commits this crime; and accordingly the other signatories, upon the call of the council, unite in the defence of the signatory which is not the aggressor, according to their respective capacities; which means that if and to the extent that they are able to do so, they contribute by force to the defence against the aggression, as well as by economic and financial measures. but in view of the other agreements of the protocol regarding pacific settlement of disputes and its covenants against war, the chief sanctions of the protocol would never come into play against a signatory, unless that state finally decided to defy the public opinion of the world and to make into a scrap of paper its own solemn written pledge. [ ] annex c, p. at p. . [ ] if there were two parties to the conflict, either one or both might be aggressor. see article of the protocol. [ ] i think this means upon _all_ the signatories. the system of the protocol is flexible as to the _extent_ to which the sanctions are to be applied by a particular signatory; but all signatories come under the same legal obligation. [ ] on october , . official journal, october, , special supplement no. , p. . [ ] see league of nations official journal, october, , special supplement no. , pp. - , - , also october, , special supplement no. , p. . [ ] except as to the possibilities of article of the covenant, as to which see _infra_, p. , _et seq._ [ ] the debates in the third committee of the fifth assembly are of interest in this regard. [ ] the french is "engagements." [ ] annex c, p. at p. , _et seq._ [ ] by unanimous vote. [ ] p. , _et seq._ { } chapter xiii. separate defensive agreements. the general character of the protocol of geneva is such that separate defensive agreements between the parties to it lose substantially all of their former importance. the protocol itself is, among other things, a general defensive agreement; and under such an agreement, faithfully lived up to, substantially the only part that could be played by separate agreements would be to make more detailed and more regional, perhaps, in their obligation and execution, the general obligations binding all signatories. the possibility of these separate defensive agreements is mentioned in article of the protocol. it is laid down that they must be public; furthermore, action under them cannot take place until the council "has called upon the signatory states to apply sanctions." finally, there is a most significant provision which illustrates the relatively unimportant character of such separate agreements under the protocol--any such agreement must remain open to all members of the league which desire to accede thereto. this last mentioned provision takes away every possible idea that such defensive agreements under the protocol could be anything like the former "defensive" alliances. obviously, a defensive agreement which is open to any member of the league is merely a part of the general agreement; particularly is this so when the performance of the agreement depends and is conditioned upon the request of the council. indeed, in view of the other provisions of the protocol, it is very difficult to see any substantial difference between these so-called defensive agreements and the undertakings[ ] which, by article , states which are signatory to the protocol may voluntarily give to the council regarding the armed forces which might be used in the application of the sanctions. i say that the { } two things are similar for this reason: if in a given case the council decides that the military sanctions are to be applied any signatory is then entitled, at least if it chooses, to use the whole of its armed forces against the aggressor. this being so, the use of a specified portion of these forces in any given case comes to just the same thing whether it arises from the general agreement to apply sanctions or from a particular undertaking with the council or from a particular agreement with another signatory. we may go to this length in thinking of these defensive agreements hereafter; in view of the fact that they must be public that any member of the league may adhere to them and that they cannot be performed until the council of the league says so, there could be in such a paper no effective provision which would go beyond the engagements under the protocol itself. article of the protocol says that these separate agreements may be acceded to by any member of the league of nations. this language would include a member of the league which was not a signatory of the protocol. under article , it is only the states signatory to the protocol which may make separate agreements. the point is doubtless of no real importance; but it cannot be intended that these separate agreements, if any be made, shall be acceded to by states other than those bound by the protocol, for any such separate agreement would be in reality a paper subsidiary to the protocol. [ ] whether these "undertakings" would have the same legal quality as a treaty is at least doubtful. { } chapter xiv. the protocol and article ten of the covenant. it is to be remembered that in this portion of the discussion consideration is given only to the relations _inter se_ of the signatories to the protocol. as among these states the famous article of the covenant will have lost all its significance. article of the covenant has two distinct aspects. the more important of these is the undertaking by the members of the league to "preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of other members. because of these guarantees article was objected to in this country and in canada chiefly for the reason that it might involve the use of armed force by the guarantor states. the further idea that this use of armed force would necessarily come into play upon a decision of the council of the league of nations was largely fallacious and was practically removed by the resolution of the assembly regarding article .[ ] the other side of these guarantees of article , which has perhaps not always been very well appreciated, is that the obligation of a guarantor state under article _may_ be very limited indeed and may even be nothing at all, even in the case of a wilful attack. article goes only to two things, territorial integrity and political independence. if an aggressor state respects these two things it can do otherwise what it chooses, so far as the guarantor states are concerned. for example, under article alone _and taking nothing else into consideration_, one state could attack another, destroy every building in the country, blow up every mine, and lay waste every field, and then retire, saying: the territorial integrity of the country attacked is now preserved, and its remaining inhabitants retain their full political independence. under such circumstances, no guarantor state under article of the covenant of the league of nations would be obliged to do anything. { } now i say that under the protocol any significance of article , as among the parties to the protocol, has disappeared; clearly this is so. article , so to speak, waited, or at least might wait till the end of the war.[ ] if the aggressor state did not in the treaty of peace or otherwise annex any territory and left the attacked state independent, article did nothing at all.[ ] but the protocol commences to work even before any war commences and certainly at its commencement; there must be no attack.[ ] it is not a question of the final result of the attack; it is merely a question of the existence of the aggression; and it is _then_ that all the other parties to the protocol come to the defence of the attacked state. the lesser article of the covenant is swallowed up in the greater protocol. the other aspect of article of the covenant was the undertaking by each member of the league to _respect_ the territorial integrity and political independence of the other members. this, of course, is an undertaking in regard only to the acts of the state giving it. such a self-denying clause would be implied in the covenant if it were not expressed and equally, of course, it is inherent in the protocol. indeed, in the protocol it was thought necessary to insert a provision regarding the political independence and territorial integrity, not of the attacked state but of the aggressor. all that is left now of article , so far as the signatories to the protocol _inter se_ are concerned, is to be found in the second paragraph of article of the protocol, which says that the territorial integrity and the political independence of the aggressor state shall not be affected by the application of the sanctions of the protocol. a development of the covenant by which article becomes unimportant, except as a measure of protection _for_ an aggressor, is perhaps the most remarkable and unforeseen of all possible developments. [ ] september , . technically, the resolution was not adopted, the vote not being unanimous, in favor, one, persia, opposed, and absent or abstaining. league of nations official journal, october, , special supplement no. , p. . [ ] _i. e._, so far as the guarantor states are concerned. [ ] in the debates of the first committee of the fourth assembly it was asserted that "no forcible invasion" is possible without a violation of article of the covenant; but in certain circumstances war is permissible under the covenant (article , paragraph ); and with a permissible war, there could be a permissible invasion. see oppenheim, rd edition, vol. , page . [ ] _i. e._, no aggression, in the sense intended by the protocol. { } chapter xv. the protocol as to non-signatories. at the beginning of this discussion[ ] it was pointed out that upon the coming into force of the protocol, there would, in theory at least, and from the point of view of its provisions, be three classes of powers in the world, to wit, the parties to the protocol, the members of the league not parties to the protocol and the non-members of the league, the last named of course being also not parties to the protocol. it should also be mentioned again that the possibility of this second class of states, namely, the members of the league not parties to the protocol, is a temporary possibility only. for certainly if the protocol comes finally into force, its provisions will in due course be embodied in the covenant, as indeed is contemplated by article of the protocol; and thereupon those members of the league who have not ratified the protocol will either become parties to the amended covenant or will, under the provisions of article of the covenant, cease to be members of the league. however, temporarily, there will doubtless be certain members of the league of nations who do not ratify the protocol and the relation of these states to others during this provisional period is to be considered. so far as concerns the relations _inter se_ of this temporary or provisional class of states (those which remain members of the league without ratifying the protocol) it may be said at once that these relations, from this point of view, will continue to be governed by the covenant and by the covenant alone. the protocol does not make or purport to make any change in this regard; so that, as among those states, we might envisage during this temporary period the theoretic possibility of a war not forbidden by the covenant, just as we might envisage the possibility, during that period, of a dispute among those powers remaining { } unsettled. it is, i suppose, fair to add that both of these speculations are here of juristic interest only. similarly, the relations of non-members of the league _inter se_ will continue, as they are now, to be governed neither by the covenant nor by the protocol. these states would not have bound themselves by either document and so far as concerns their relations with each other, neither the covenant nor the protocol attempts to regulate them. the only provision of either document which has any bearing in this regard is to be found in article of the covenant, which says in substance that in case of a dispute between states not members of the league, such non-members shall be invited to become _ad hoc_ members upon conditions laid down by the council. if they refuse, the council, under the last paragraph of article of the covenant, may take measures toward the prevention of hostilities; but these measures would be in the nature of good offices or mediation only and could be accepted or rejected by the two non-members of the league as they saw fit; they could decline them wholly and go to war at their pleasure. there is indeed one question which suggests itself to the mind under article of the covenant concerning a dispute between two non-members of the league. suppose they should be both invited for the purpose of settling the dispute to become members _ad hoc_, and one of them accepted the invitation and the other refused, would the dispute then be considered as being a dispute between a member and a non-member? the real answer to this question probably is that on issuing the invitation the council would make it a condition that both parties to the dispute should accept it. the legal answer as to the possibility of the case supposed is a matter of some doubt. i incline to the view that the invitation contemplated by article of the covenant in a case when the dispute is between two non-members, is a joint invitation and a joint invitation only. i do not think that it is intended that a non-member of the league may temporarily seek the protection and guarantees of the covenant against another non-member. { } however, the question is of interest only from the point of view of the meaning of language; if the possibility should arise, it would doubtless be taken care of by the council. another and also comparatively unimportant point may be here noticed and that is in regard to the relations between the signatories to the protocol and the members of the league not signatory thereto, another phase of the temporary situation heretofore considered. as to this, it may be said very briefly that such relations would continue to be governed wholly by the covenant. the members of the league which do not ratify the protocol could not during this temporary period be regarded as being in any way affected by what, as to them, would be in the nature of proposed amendments to the text of the covenant itself. these non-signatories of the protocol would therefore continue to look only to the covenant for the regulation of their relations with any member of the league. the protocol does not contemplate a league within a league; it simply contemplates, during this temporary phase, a situation where certain members of the league had assumed certain obligations without any constraint or effect whatever upon such members as might not choose to assume them. the really vital question is as to the effect of the protocol and of the covenant upon non-members of the league in their relations with signatories to the protocol. even assuming that the plans now proposed for the admission of germany to the league are carried out, there will remain for a considerable period two great powers, the united states and russia, outside the league; and there are two other states of occasional international importance, the admission of which to the league is not, so far as i know, presently contemplated, these being mexico and egypt. accordingly, the possible effect of the covenant and the protocol on non-members of the league is one of very great consequence. it is a question which is being actively discussed in so far as it may have a bearing on the relations between great britain and the united states. { } it is unquestionably true that the protocol may have a real effect on non-members of the league. of course there is a legal formula which correctly says that a treaty cannot bind states not parties thereto, _res inter alios acta_; but even in the strictest legal sense this formula is only part of the truth in international matters. any one who questions this will be convinced by reading roxburgh's international conventions and third states.[ ] a treaty between state a and state b may harm state c or it may benefit state c, as the treaty of versailles benefited denmark by the cession of slesvig, though denmark was a neutral and not a party to the treaty of peace.[ ] let us consider the matter first from the point of view of the covenant. there are sanctions which may be applied under the covenant and the application of these sanctions might affect a non-member of the league either because they were applied against that particular non-member or because they were applied against some other state. it is rather curious that this question has not been very much considered under the covenant; interest in it has been greatly revived by the protocol; but the possible realities under the covenant are, it seems to me, _in some respects_ more important than those under the protocol alone. in considering this question it is well to look at it from the concrete point of view with a specific instance or example before us. the sanctions of the covenant[ ] are an economic and financial blockade. these sanctions may be applied either as against a member of the league which resorts to war contrary to the provisions of the covenant or they may be applied against a non-member of the league which resorts to war against a member after refusing to settle its dispute with that member (covenant, article , paragraph ). suppose at the time of the corfu dispute, italy had gone on { } to war against greece, and the british had deemed it their duty to apply an economic blockade against italy. suppose another case; suppose that russia attacked poland and that the british deemed it their duty to apply the economic blockade against russia. we are speaking here in both of these cases merely of the provisions of the covenant; and the question raised is what attitude might the united states take in such a case as one of these. i have suggested two instances for the reason that there is a slight difference between them. that difference lies in the fact that in the first instance supposed, italy, as a member of the league, would have agreed to the application of the sanctions; they would have been applied by the british as a result of italy breaking her treaty. but in the second instance, russia never having agreed to the covenant, the sanctions would be applied by the british solely as a result of the british agreement to apply them and not because of any legal breach by russia, however morally wrong her attack on poland might be. i do not think that the difference between the two supposed cases would make any difference legally in the attitude that the united states might take in the one case or the other. the blockade would arise from the provisions of the covenant in either case. to that document the united states is not a party. in each case our correct legal position would be that our international rights were not limited by the agreement of others. accordingly, let us consider the case of the blockade of russia by the british, recalling that, under the hypothesis, russia has attacked poland and that the economic and financial blockade of the first paragraph of article of the covenant has come into full force. now, so far as that blockade cut off relations between great britain and russia, it would be none of our business. but the language of article includes "the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals (residents)[ ] of the covenant-breaking state (russia, under the hypothesis; { } see covenant, article ) and the nationals (residents) of any other state, whether a member of the league or not." what this would mean would be that all intercourse between russia and the united states would be cut off by the british fleet so far as they could do it. the questions suggested are: could the united states protest; and would we protest? the first question is a question of law. would the united states have the right under international law to object to such a blockade? as a preliminary to the answer to this question, it must be pointed out that a blockade of russia by the british might result in two different situations. russia could undoubtedly regard such a blockade as being war, and if she did, no other country, neither the united states nor any other country, could then object to the blockade. the reason for that is that, without going into the much debated question as to the "legality" of war, under present international law it can at least be said that a neutral may not object to the belligerent status of two countries at war with each other. of course a neutral may object to the manner of carrying on the war, or to particular incidents during the fighting; a neutral may protest that a particular blockade is not binding because not effective, and so on; but these things are not immediately important here. the important thing here is that if the blockade resulted in war, we could not object to the fact of war and its incidents. on the other hand, a blockade _might_ continue merely as a blockade, without the technical status of war arising. this is, i suppose, not very likely in the case of the blockade of a great power, but still it is legally possible under the terms of the covenant. the situation created would be new under international law. it would have to be considered as arising wholly from treaty and consequently not a situation binding on third states, but as to them simply a situation in which their rights were governed by the principles of international law. under these rules, the nearest approach to such a situation is the so-called pacific blockade of the past. { } in my view, which is the view of the vast majority of writers on the question, third states do not have to respect a pacific blockade. (see oppenheim, rd edition, vol. ii, page .) accordingly, it seems to me that the united states would be entitled to regard such a blockade as not affecting her commerce with russia.[ ] if the united states took such a position, as probably she would, the practical value of such a blockade would be very largely diminished, for i do not think there is any doubt that the members of the league would admit that the blockade only applied to such third states outside the league of nations as might acquiesce in it. under the protocol, precisely the same legal situation as to the blockade of russia exists as under the covenant and the same conclusions would follow. however, the probability of such a blockade under the protocol, without an actual state of war resulting, is much less than under the covenant. the protocol provides definitely for military sanctions and it can hardly be doubted, as a matter of reality, that if the sanctions of the protocol commenced to be applied to a state in or out of the league and that state resisted, the result would be war as between that resisting state and at least those of the members of the league, like great britain, that were taking a real part in the application of the sanctions. and, as pointed out above, the legal situation is much clearer in the case of war than in the case of this economic and financial boycott of the covenant. it would be much "easier"[ ] to go to war than it would be to apply the economic and financial sanctions alone. the world has gotten more or less used, in a legal sense, to the legalities and illegalities of war; but there are no precedents as to the corresponding situations[ ] in such a { } blockade as has been suggested; and it is, above all, custom and general agreement that make international law. i may sum up my views on this point as follows: if under either the covenant or the protocol, the economic sanctions were applied either against a member of the league or a non-member of the league and the application of these sanctions did not result in war, the united states legally could, and very likely would, contend that any resulting blockade was not applicable to the united states and the commerce and intercourse of her residents; and this view would be accepted by the members of the league as being legally sound; and the result of course would be that the practical effect of any such blockade would be very much weakened. however, if the application of the sanctions either of the covenant or of the protocol resulted in war between the state against which the sanctions were applied and the states applying them, the united states could not object to that state of war, although of course it would have its rights as a neutral in such a war as in any other war and these neutral rights would not be affected by any provision of either the covenant or the protocol. the next consideration is the possible application of sanctions against the united states. from the foregoing review of the provisions of the covenant and of the protocol it is evident that such action against the united states is possible from a theoretic point of view. it is, however, important here to repeat that there is no possible sanction in either paper against a non-member of the league except after war breaks out, a war which the non-member of the league has commenced against a member or against a signatory to the protocol as the case may be. in other words, the sanctions of either paper could only become operative against the united states after the united states had gone to war against a member of the league. continuing the theoretic view of the matter, it would be idle to discuss any difference between one kind of sanction and another in such a case. if the united states went to war with state a, a member of the league, and any other state undertook to { } apply economic or any other sanctions on behalf of state a and against the united states, it would here be regarded simply as an act of war, creating two or more enemies instead of one. perhaps from the common sense outlook, such contingencies are not worthy of discussion, for what they would mean if they happened would be either that there was another world war, in which case the provisions of no document would be very important, or else there would be some kind of a minor war such as that between the united states and spain, in which the other powers of the world would find some way of keeping their hands off, regardless of legalistic arguments based on the covenant or on the protocol or on both. it may be suggested that in the foregoing discussion i have omitted any thought of the possibility of war between the united states and japan; but i have kept that possibility in mind. its theoretical possibilities, so far as they might exist by reason of the united states attacking japan have been considered above. let us consider the opposite possibility, an attack by japan on the united states. suppose, then, that japan attempted to raise before the league the question of the treatment of her nationals by the united states; there is no way in which such a question could be considered by the league except under the vague general clauses of article of the covenant; all that the league could do, even in theory, would be to ask if the united states cared to discuss the matter; and the united states would presumably decline to take part in any such discussion. further, it may be supposed that the united states would not have the slightest desire to commence a war in the matter as the united states is satisfied with the situation as it is--it is japan which is dissatisfied. the united states would merely refuse to discuss a question which it deemed domestic. suppose then that japan went to the length of declaring war on the united states for this cause. while immaterial from the point of view of the united states, i cannot see that such a war would violate the covenant in its letter; of course it would { } violate its spirit of peace; but i do not think there is any specific provision of the covenant which, in terms, forbids it. the protocol in this regard goes farther in its language. the general covenant not to resort to war in article includes such a resort to war, not only against a signatory, but also against a state which "accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out"; in other words, against a sort of _ad hoc_ adherent to the protocol (article ), but we may assume that these last words would not include the united states. the preamble asserts that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of the solidarity of the members of the international community, and also an international crime. article of the protocol says that every state which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the present protocol is an aggressor; and in article the document goes to its greatest length, so far as non-signatories are concerned, by saying that the signatory states undertake to abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against another state. these last words "against another state" are the important words, because they include every state in the world, not only a signatory. furthermore, in that same article any signatory can bring to the notice of the council its view that "another state" is making preparations for war, which of course would include another signatory. so it is perhaps arguable that under the protocol an attack by a signatory against a state which is not a signatory might be an aggression and that the sanctions of the protocol might be brought into play in favor of the non-signatory. if that view be correct, then, in the case supposed, namely, an attack by japan upon the united states, it would seem that, if the matter were brought before the council by _any_ signatory (as it undoubtedly would be) the council _might_ declare japan to be an aggressor under the protocol; and it would then become the duty of the other signatories to apply against japan all the sanctions of the protocol, at least unless the united states objected to such a course and preferred to go it alone. { } however, there is at least grave doubt as to all this. the provisions of article of the protocol and of article of the covenant rather indicate that a state which pays no attention to an invitation to become an _ad hoc_ member or signatory takes its chances as they exist _dehors_ the covenant or the protocol. i think myself that this is the better view. to suppose otherwise would be to suppose that states outside the league (or the protocol) had all the advantages of states within, and none of the burdens or obligations, a difficult thing to envisage. so, on the whole, i conclude that an attack by japan upon the united states because of a "domestic" or other question would permit the members of the league, both under the covenant and under the protocol, to be interested onlookers and nothing more. [ ] _supra_, p. . [ ] longmans, green & co., . [ ] a subsequent treaty between denmark and the principal allied powers confirmed the cession. a. j. i. l. supplement , vol. xvii, p. . [ ] article . [ ] the discussions in the assembly of article of the covenant show that the word "nationals" is to be read as "residents." [ ] see moore's digest, vol. vii, pp. - . [ ] that is, in the sense that there would to some extent be known and applicable rules of conduct for all states. [ ] innumerable questions of difficulty as to private contracts might be suggested; but i am thinking here of relations between states. { } chapter xvi. the disarmament conference. under article of the protocol, a disarmament conference to which all states of the world are to be invited is to meet at geneva on june th, . it is made the duty of the council to draw up a general programme for reduction and limitation of armaments to be laid before the conference and to be communicated to the various governments not later than march th, . the provision to this effect says that the council shall give due regard to the undertakings of the protocol regarding sanctions, but the preparation of this general programme is in substantial accord with article of the covenant. the assembly adopted a quite elaborate resolution[ ] regarding this conference. this resolution makes seven or eight suggestions in general terms for the agenda of the disarmament conference. while the resolution was adopted, it was pointed out in the discussion that the council has a perfectly free hand in the matter and that the requests of the assembly regarding the agenda were nothing more than requests. there is perhaps no occasion to go over them in detail, but one or two points may be mentioned. the matter of demilitarized zones figures in this assembly list. as such zones are specifically mentioned in articles and of the protocol there is no doubt that this is one of the questions that would be on the agenda. another suggestion of the assembly for the agenda of the conference is "the control and investigation of armaments in the contracting states." such control and investigation were a part of the so-called american plan,[ ] and in view of the fact that the control and investigation of the armaments of the former enemy states are now before the league, there can be no doubt that this matter also would be on the agenda of the disarmament conference prepared by the council. { } it was pointed out previously[ ] that the date of the disarmament conference may be postponed. it now seems very likely that it will be.[ ] indeed, i feel that there was a little too much optimism at geneva in fixing the date as early as june th, , involving the completion of a programme by march th. of course, in getting up a programme of general disarmament, and an agenda for the conference on disarmament, it is true that the council would have available the advice of the permanent military commission and of the different bureaus of the secretariat. even so, the task of finishing these preparations in three or four months, getting them approved by the council and also by at least the chief of the interested governments, is one that seems to me to be very doubtful of accomplishment. it is perhaps not generally understood what an amount of work and how great a number of questions are involved in such discussions as are proposed. there are something like twenty european governments that are vitally interested. some of these governments have quite different points of view and all of them have their military, naval, air and chemical programmes in force and subject to the control of their own parliaments.[ ] the idea of a general reduction of armaments involves, at least provisionally, the recasting of the entire military system of europe. it is complicated by numerous possibilities of regional agreements which in themselves would create new problems of complexity. furthermore, it is not generally recognized that a great deal of the work of such a conference as this has to be done in advance. doubtless no conference in plenary session ever drew up a paper; no legislature ever wrote a law. the utmost that any such body can do is to consider concrete proposals drawn up often by one individual, but certainly always by very small groups. i venture to say that ten lawyers could hardly draw a { } deed without appointing a sub-committee. the success or failure of the disarmament conference will very largely depend on the care and judgment used in the preparations for its meeting. we can look back on the washington conference and see the truth of some of these observations there. that conference dealt with only a portion of the field of naval armaments, among only five powers, only three of which had any substantial naval force. the naval staffs of the countries particularly interested had to prepare in advance elaborate studies, and yet with all this the conference lasted nearly three months. certainly the task of a general conference on disarmament is very much greater than that of the washington conference was. it took nearly four months to draw up the treaty of versailles, which is by far the most elaborate and complex international agreement ever written. in the circumstances this was a remarkably short time. the most serious detailed criticism that i have seen of the time involved suggests that it might have been two or three weeks less. it is to be remembered, however, that the peace conference worked at that time under a perfectly enormous pressure from all sides to complete its task, which, as a matter of fact, would never have been completed within anything like the time taken if the decisions had not finally been left to three or four men to take. i need not dwell further on the difficulties of the details. any one who reads the disarmament treaty drawn up at the washington conference will appreciate something of their nature; but, looking at the matter from the larger point of view, there is a question of real statesmanship involved. the possible field to be covered by a general conference on disarmament cannot perhaps be limited; but the extent to which the first discussion shall go will determine its success or failure. if it attempts to go too far, that will be fatal; if, on the other hand, the attempt is only to go a short distance now and to continue on the road further later on, the conference may be a success, despite the fact that it will meet with the criticisms of those who want to do everything at once. { } the question of a permanent, or rather of a recurrent, conference on disarmament, as proposed by the so-called american plan,[ ] is one that is inevitably bound to come up at any such conference, for whatever the conference does or whatever it tries to do, it will have to leave much undone. many questions will remain open, many changes of the future will not be foreseen, and those who meet in the conference will see when they end their work that they have only begun it. it is also to be noted again that the conference is to fix the period within which the plan of reduction which it adopts is to be carried out. if within that time the plan is not carried out, the council is to make a declaration rendering the protocol null and void. the conference is also to lay down the grounds on which the council may make such a declaration. in other words, the protocol itself is to depend wholly upon the work of the conference; it is to the conference that the whole responsibility is transferred. if the conference does not adopt the plan, and then if that plan is not carried out[ ] within the time and on the conditions that the conference declares, the protocol falls. never, i venture to say, has any important treaty ever been drawn up depending upon a more impressive condition subsequent. [ ] see annex d, p. at p. , _et seq._ [ ] annex f, p. . [ ] p. . [ ] this was written before the meeting of the council in rome in december, . the disarmament conference certainly cannot meet before . the present situation of the preliminaries is stated in a note to the resolution of the council of october , , _infra_, p. . [ ] for a statement of existing european armaments, see note to page . [ ] annex f, p. . [ ] see the discussion as to this, _supra_, p. , showing that the "plan" will be another treaty or treaties and that the "carrying out" probably means ratification thereof. note.--a statement of existing european forces was made to parliament on june , (hansard, parliamentary debates [commons], n. s., vol. , page ). it gave the following figures: great britain ........ , latvia ............... , germany .............. , lithuania ............ , austria .............. , poland ............... , hungary .............. , norway ............... , jugo slavia .......... , sweden ............... , rumania .............. , denmark .............. , czecho slovakia ...... , greece ............... , netherlands .......... , bulgaria ............. , italy ................ , turkey ............... , switzerland .......... , france ............... , soviet union ......... , , belgium .............. , finland .............. , spain ................ , esthonia ............. , portugal ............. , total armed forces in europe, ........... , , { } chapter xvii. demilitarized zones. emphasis is laid by the protocol on the creation and maintenance of demilitarized zones along frontiers. article of the protocol treats of such zones, and their violation is, by article made the equivalent of a resort to war. any question of the real value, in the strict military sense, of agreements for demilitarized zones, may be left at one side. undoubtedly, expert opinions differ in this matter. at least it may be said that such agreements have a value in the realm of feeling, which is as much a reality in international affairs as is a fleet of battleships. if countries feel more secure because of the creation of such zones, certainly agreements regarding them are worth while on each side of a frontier. as mentioned above, the question of demilitarized zones will certainly be one of the items of the agenda of the conference on disarmament. there are quite a number of precedents for the creation of such zones in recent international agreements. for example, the treaty of versailles[ ] creates a demilitarized zone for fifty kilometres east of the rhine. the aaland islands were demilitarized by the treaty[ ] which attributed them to finland; and the treaty of lausanne[ ] creates certain demilitarized zones, not only on each side of the straits, but also in western thrace. it is such agreements as these that are referred to in article of the protocol as those "already existing under the terms of certain treaties." it is these zones, and others which may be established by consent of the neighboring states, which, according to article , may be placed under a system of supervision by the league, either temporary or permanent. obviously, any such supervision would come about by means of the voluntary agreement of the states concerned; and, in view of the fact that the protocol makes a violation of a demilitarized zone the { } equivalent of a resort to war (article ), supervision by the league of the carrying out of these essential agreements would seem to be highly desirable. indeed, it may be said here that it will almost certainly be found that a system of international inspection will inevitably be a part of agreements for the reduction and limitation of armaments. a system of general international inspection was suggested as one of the parts of the so-called american plan,[ ] and the proposal for a system of supervision of demilitarized zones under the league of nations is a part of that general idea. i do not think it should be lost sight of that the thought of certain places where violence is forbidden has roots which go far back in human history. the idea of "sanctuary" is as old as any records that we have; and, if it be thought that i am going very far afield in speaking of sanctuary, i mention that the legal development of this general notion is a very early development. at least as long ago as anglo-saxon law in england, it was a peculiarly heinous offence to commit a crime on the king's highway. it was a much more serious matter to break the peace there than elsewhere, because it was a breach of the king's peace; and this notion of the king's peace is said by high authority to be as old as the salic law. we have heard much in the past of strategic frontiers. a great deal of ability and learning have been devoted toward the problem of making frontiers available for attack or for defence. it is perhaps true, as some critics appear to think, that the development of war in the air and of chemical warfare has made questions of strategic frontiers in general less important than heretofore. perhaps that is so. i suggest, however, that even if it is so, that same ability and learning may be able to find in a combination of the ideas of demilitarized zones and international supervision a real solution of the problems arising from these new methods and discoveries; and, as i have pointed out, there is a very ancient human feeling behind this whole idea of peaceful places, on which popular support for such a programme may be based. [ ] articles to . [ ] a. j. i. l. supplement , vol. xvii, p. . [ ] a. j. i. l., vol. xviii, january, , pp. , . [ ] annex f, p. . { } chapter xviii. security and the protocol. for me to discuss the bearing of the protocol of geneva upon the security of states means that i go outside my brief. no technical juristic reasoning is applicable to a feeling which lies at the heart of national sentiments, sentiments of patriotism and of devotion to country, which are as deep rooted in the souls of millions as are the love of family and the belief in religion. this matter of security is in verity a matter of national feeling, a state of mind in the truest sense. for no human agency, no belief, no will, outside of the country concerned, can alter or affect it. ourselves alone must say, we and our rulers, whether or not we are in fact secure--if we say yes, that is enough; but if we say no, it is not for any one else to question, much less for any one else to seek to argue the matter. so i shall merely seek to state the theory of the protocol in regard to this matter of security. that theory is this: if the nations of the world will agree to outlaw war, if they will agree to substitute law for force, to settle by pacific means all disputes among them, if they will agree to unite against any people which so agrees but then betrays humanity by tearing up its own agreement, then we may develop intra-nationally a belief in security, a confidence in a settled order, a hope for the future, which will slowly but inevitably disarm the forces for war and lift the curtain on a new day. such is the theory of the protocol of geneva. { } chapter xix. interpretation of the protocol. article of the protocol provides that any dispute as to its interpretation shall be submitted to the permanent court of international justice. no provision similar to this is to be found in the covenant. the importance of this provision does not consist chiefly in its application to the protocol. even if and when the protocol comes into effect the provision in itself will not be very important, because the protocol is only a temporary document to be transformed into amendments to the covenant. if these amendments include the incorporation into the covenant of a similar provision to the effect that any dispute as to its interpretation shall be submitted to the permanent court of international justice, such an amendment will be of supreme importance. with the protocol embodied in the covenant, the latter document will be by far the most important international treaty in existence. if all questions of its interpretation are to be submitted to the permanent court, that tribunal will have judicial powers of the most far-reaching character. it is true that the extension of the powers of the court so that they would include the interpretation of the covenant is logical in so far as it relates to the settlement of disputes between members of the league or other states; but the covenant contains many other provisions bearing only indirectly upon such disputes. the covenant provides for the council and the assembly and for their meetings, their powers and procedure, powers which under articles and of the covenant, for example, are expressed in the most general terms. the covenant provides for the mandate system for certain territories and for the supervision by the league of numerous international agreements and bureaus of all sorts. now, in most of these matters the method of interpreting the covenant has been by consent. members of the council or, as the case may be, of the assembly agree on what { } they may do and proceed accordingly. if differences of view as to the interpretation of the covenant in this regard are to be submitted to the permanent court, that tribunal would have in some respects a power superior to that of either the council or the assembly. let me give an instance. the fifth paragraph of article of the covenant provides as follows: "any member of the league not represented on the council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interest of that member of the league." this paragraph gave rise to a difference of opinion as to what states are entitled to sit on the council when it considered questions arising under article of the treaty of versailles and similar articles in the other peace treaties relating to the investigations by the council of the armaments of germany and other countries. when the question came up, the council took the opinion of jurists on it and reached a common sense result.[ ] under a general clause giving jurisdiction to the court in all matters of interpretation,[ ] it would seem that any member of the league could require a question as to the composition of the council on a particular occasion to be decided by the court before the council could meet. it is obvious that any such method of regulating procedure would give rise to impossibilities which should be avoided. [ ] see league of nations official journal, july, , p. and cmd. (miscellaneous no. , ), p. . [ ] many people suppose that the supreme court of the united states has such general powers regarding our constitution, but this is not so. read, for example, article i, section of the constitution; and see massachusetts _v._ melton, u. s., . { } chapter xx. the "amended" covenant. i trust that no one appreciates better than myself that examination of a document bit by bit and piece by piece tends to blind the vision. one sees the trees and not the forest. worse than that, one gets a false vision, a picture, if i may change the metaphor, of the buttons on the coat but not of the man wearing the coat and still less of the soul within the man. a critical examination of an international legal document leads to a discussion of trivialities and to hypotheses of almost impossible possibilities. of course it is true that the carrying out of a great international agreement in the light of the facts and conditions of international life as they arise does not proceed along the technical lines that i have followed, but rather along those lines of policy which really control international action. i do not mean necessarily selfish policy, but policy in the larger sense of decisions based upon the best judgment of those in power for the time being. what really ought to be done in studying any proposal such as the protocol of geneva, is to realize, if possible, the ultimate purpose of the document and to visualize, so far as we can, what would happen if it came into force, not so much what _might_ happen under a particular phrase, but how the international relations of the world would proceed if the whole agreement were a reality. i have mentioned more than once that the protocol of geneva contemplates that its provisions shall form part of the covenant; in other words, that the two documents shall be amalgamated, forming an amended covenant. with the hope of facilitating a general view, i have endeavored to put the two documents together in the form of an "amended" covenant, and the result of this effort is set out below.[ ] looking at the text of this "amended" covenant, one may observe that while twenty of the present twenty-six articles { } remain unchanged in form, articles to , inclusive, are expanded and somewhat rewritten; and eight articles are added; and i do not think that the text of the "amended" covenant could be phrased in much less language than it appears below. of course the length of a document in itself is not of much consequence; but it is not unimportant to observe that the "amended" covenant is very much longer than the covenant as it now reads. this fact, i say, is important, because it is the visible evidence of a reality. the protocol of geneva is not a mere completion of the provisions of the covenant. advocates of the protocol make a very serious mistake when they erroneously say that the protocol of geneva is merely a rounding out of incomplete and partial agreements of the covenant. and it must be borne in mind that new or varied phrases in one article may change the whole; the amended covenant is altered not only in those articles which may be textually amended, but throughout; i attempted to show this in detail as to article of the covenant[ ]; like any other document, the entire new paper must be read together. what the protocol of geneva does is to create a new and a different league of nations. it is true that what i may call the procedural and structural functions of the league are not changed; but the system of international relations which is now set up under the league is so much changed that one may properly say that it is an entirely new and different system. to my mind, there are three outstanding features of the "amended" covenant. it creates a complete system of compulsory arbitration; it consecrates the legality of the _status quo_; and it is a general defensive alliance. now let us compare these three features of the "amended" covenant with the ideas of the existing covenant. the first mentioned, the system of compulsory arbitration, is by far the most important and the one that should be the starting point for any view of the "amended" covenant as a whole. in this arbitration system is contained the idea of outlawry of { } war which the document embodies. the arbitration of disputes under the new system is to take the place of war, which is outlawed. all that the covenant did was to forbid some wars, to provide for delay in every case, and otherwise to rely wholly upon voluntary arbitration and, in cases where they could be obtained, upon unanimous recommendations of the council. the framers of the covenant were most careful to avoid the idea of compulsory arbitration, for all that even the unanimous recommendation of the council could do was to prevent hostilities. under the "amended" covenant, the defensive alliance of the members of the league becomes complete. it is intended to see to it that arbitral decrees are carried out; to see to it that the _status quo_ remains untouched, except by voluntary agreement; and to see to it that the violator is met by the combined forces of other states. contrast the provisions of the covenant, which contemplate no concerted action, unless agreed to at the time, other than economic and financial pressure; and the preservation of the _status quo_ only so far as article of the covenant extends. it would be unfair and untrue to call this new system a super-state, for it is nothing of the sort; but it would be in a sense untrue also to say that this new system is merely a development of the covenant itself; it is the sort of change that one might call a development if it had taken two or three generations or a century to bring it about; but not properly to be called a development when it all comes at once. the natural conclusion to be reached is that such a complete change cannot be realized at this time, and that is the sound conclusion. that a system of law should be built up governing the international relations of the states of the world, by which their differences should be adjusted by the orderly processes of legality, excluding as a method of adjustment the chaos of war, may be admitted. thus far, the changes proposed by the protocol of geneva are desirable; the question is merely as to the length to which the countries of the world are willing to go in { } this direction at this time; and i include as a part of this development, the outlawry of war, the agreement that war is not to be resorted to by any state, that it should disappear from international relations, except in so far as force must necessarily remain as defence. it is to be hoped that this part of the protocol may stand; and it must be admitted that there is inherently and _ipso facto_ to some extent a consecration of the legality of the _status quo_ by the outlawry of war and by peaceful settlement of disputes by legal means. on the other hand, various features of what i may call the defensive alliance portion of the protocol seem to me to be impossible and at this time inadvisable. they are supposed to flow logically from the system of compulsory arbitration; and certainly the problem which they attempt to solve does follow logically from any system of compulsory arbitration and outlawry of war. if we assume war to be outlawed and a system by which there is to be a legal settlement of disputes in place of war, the question of course arises: well, what is to happen in a given case if some state which has accepted this system and has agreed to it should refuse to abide by it, should not carry out an award or decision or should even take up arms against it, what then? the continental mind very logically answers this question by saying there must be a system of execution of decrees and that if you outlaw war, you must have a combination for defence. this is true from the point of view of logic; but it is not true from the point of view of life. compulsory arbitration and outlawry of war are untried ideas, and we cannot say now, under all circumstances, what should be done in the course of their working, if they are put to work; much less can nations now bind themselves as to a definite and complete course of action under all possible and varying future circumstances. that such a system of concerted action against aggression as is proposed by the protocol of geneva may perhaps in time be worked out along with the growth and development of the ideas of outlawry of { } war and of arbitration, may be admitted. that it can be done now is, to my mind, contrary to the realities of life and to the lessons of history. there is another phase of this last discussion which should be particularly noticed. it is impossible for any such agreement for concerted action not to have a direct bearing upon countries which are not parties to the agreement; in other words, russia and the united states. we must admit at least the theoretic possibility of a conflict between one of the members of the league and one of these two great powers, insisting, if we will, that such a possibility is highly remote so far as the united states is concerned, and utterly unknowable so far as russia is concerned; but none the less a possibility. and certainly, in view of that possibility, any provisions of a document which looks toward force as a last resort of defence should, in my judgment, be drawn with the utmost care to avoid the idea of a possible conflict between the parties to the document on the one hand and an outside state on the other. outlawry of war and arbitration are things to be agreed upon and not to be compelled against those who are unwilling to agree; for the breach of such an agreement is a much more serious and a very different thing than a refusal to arbitrate, or even than going to war when there is no agreement. that the hospitality, if i may call it so, of the league of nations should be extended to states which are unwilling to join it; that its facilities should be offered to these states for the settlement of disputes in every case where they are willing to accept them; that the covenants of the members of the league for justice toward an outside state should be as explicit and complete as its covenants toward a member, i quite agree; the covenants of the members of the league should be covenants of peace among themselves, and of justice toward all. this is the road to a universal league of all nations. if it be said that to finland or the baltic states or poland or roumania or turkey there is danger from their great neighbour, { } i cannot deny such a possibility; and if any members of the league are willing to join with such states in protection against such danger, either in advance of its occurrence or when it happens, i would see no objection to it, if such agreements were coupled with all the offers of peaceful settlement that could be written, as well as with offers of membership in the league, either permanent or _ad hoc_. to a state which is contemplating the possibility of signing the protocol of geneva, it may well be that the provisions of that document regarding sanctions stand out as the most important, the ones having the greatest possibilities as to obligations of future action. this is a very natural point of view, and even a very proper one. and, while i myself am very deeply convinced that, from the point of view of world politics, the most far-reaching and vital provisions of this document are those which refer to arbitration and to the outlawry of war, yet perhaps for that very reason, i am equally convinced that the most serious changes which are necessary in the paper are changes in its provisions for sanctions and for enforcement. with the principles of compulsory arbitration i am wholly in accord; with the principle that outlawry of war should follow as the necessary and natural consequence of the substitution of a reign of law for a reign of force i quite agree; and that some tribunal should determine, if need arise, that the agreement has been broken and that there is an "outlaw," is a natural consequence of those principles; and that there may be defence against aggression, if it comes, almost no one will deny. but there, i think, we must stop so far as present agreement is concerned. that any state may, _if it chooses_, go to the defence of another against an adjudged aggressor i would concede; but that all states can be or should be now required to sign an agreement so to go to such defence, i deny. in the present state of world opinion and when its own direct interests are not involved, any free people can well say that it will not or ought not to sign such an undertaking. so i say that, while arbitration may be agreed to in advance { } and outlawry of war may be agreed to in advance, sanctions and assistance in defence must be voluntary. where does all this leave the problems of disarmament and security? i answer by saying that the solution of these problems is very difficult, because with it are involved feelings of national fear and haunting doubts of possible national disaster. the feeling of security must be a plant of slow growth, and progress toward disarmament cannot be realized except to the extent that that growth comes. all that can be done now is to make a beginning, and, if too much is attempted, less will be accomplished. the world must rely on the development of the new idea of the reign of law and reach its feeling of security as that reign succeeds and triumphs. the protocol of geneva is one of the most important of modern international documents. this is true whether it comes into force as a binding treaty or whether it does not; and it is true because the protocol represents a development of international thought since the world war along lines of what may be called international morality, of what may almost be called international religion, which, while not novel in the realm of thought, were wholly novel in the diplomatic field of action. the belief that international law must be strengthened, the thought that it must lay hold of international questions before the time of war and the idea that the security of a country is to be a security for peace and not simply a security in war, were the principles upon which the covenant of the league of nations was based; but in that document they were to some extent formulated only as hopes for the future. these ideas which the protocol of geneva seeks to make complete realities have fundamentally become a part of international life. to my mind, they are certain to be carried out in some document in the near future and one of their incidents will be the realization of schemes for the reduction of armament as an incident of the development of the feeling which exists as to security. { } the protocol of geneva will undoubtedly be much changed as a result of the consideration which is now being given to it by the various important governments of the world.[ ] in various respects the protocol goes farther than cautious public sentiment of countries like great britain and her dominions is, or ought to be, willing now to proceed; but it is these very matters which can easily be changed and which will be changed. the conference on disarmament and its result are the cornerstones on which the protocol of geneva rests. that conference must be held and it must have a result; the public sentiment of the world demands it; and the satisfaction of that demand involves the adoption by the members of the league of the protocol of geneva, not the document as it now is, but as it will be. [ ] see annex g, p. . [ ] _supra_, p. . [ ] since this monograph was written, i have received the text of the report of the british delegates regarding the protocol of geneva (miscellaneous no. , , cmd. ). it is reprinted as annex e, page . it is a most valuable and interesting document. i have carefully considered its conclusions, some of which are not the same as my own, and despite my very high regard for its authors, i see no reason to change anything that i have written. { } annexes. page a. the covenant of the league of nations .......................... b. the protocol of geneva ......................................... c. the report to the fifth assembly ............................... d. resolutions .................................................... e. report of the british delegates ................................ f. the american plan .............................................. g. the "amended" covenant ......................................... { } annex a. the covenant of the league of nations.[ ] the high contracting parties, in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, agree to this covenant of the league of nations. article . the original members of the league of nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this covenant and also such of those other states named in the annex as shall accede without reservation to this covenant. such accession shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the covenant. notice thereof shall be sent to all other members of the league. any fully self-governing state, dominion or colony not named in the annex may become a member of the league if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the league in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments. { } any member of the league may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the league, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. article . the action of the league under this covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an assembly and of a council, with a permanent secretariat. article . the assembly shall consist of representatives of the members of the league. the assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the seat of the league or at such other place as may be decided upon. the assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world. at meetings of the assembly each member of the league shall have one vote, and may have not more than three representatives. article . the council shall consist of representatives of the principal allied and associated powers, together with representatives of four other members of the league. these four members of the league shall be selected by the assembly from time to time in its discretion. until the appointment of the representatives of the four members of the league first selected by the assembly, representatives of belgium, brazil, spain and greece shall be members of the council. with the approval of the majority of the assembly, the council may name additional members of the league whose representatives shall always be members of the council; the council { } with like approval may increase the number of members of the league to be selected by the assembly for representation on the council. the council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the league, or at such other place as may be decided upon. the council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world. any member of the league not represented on the council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member of the league. at meetings of the council, each member of the league represented on the council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one representative. article . except where otherwise expressly provided in this covenant or by the terms of the present treaty, decisions at any meeting of the assembly or of the council shall require the agreement of all the members of the league represented at the meeting. all matters of procedure at meetings of the assembly or of the council, including the appointment of committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the assembly or by the council and may be decided by a majority of the members of the league represented at the meeting. the first meeting of the assembly and the first meeting of the council shall be summoned by the president of the united states of america. article . the permanent secretariat shall be established at the seat of the league. the secretariat shall comprise a secretary general and such secretaries and staff as may be required. { } the first secretary general shall be the person named in the annex; thereafter the secretary general shall be appointed by the council with the approval of the majority of the assembly. the secretaries and staff of the secretariat shall be appointed by the secretary general with the approval of the council. the secretary general shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the assembly and of the council. the expenses of the league shall be borne by the members of the league in the proportion decided by the assembly. article . the seat of the league is established at geneva. the council may at any time decide that the seat of the league shall be established elsewhere. all positions under or in connection with the league, including the secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. representatives of the members of the league and officials of the league when engaged on the business of the league shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. the buildings and other property occupied by the league or its officials or by representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable. article . the members of the league recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. the council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments. such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years. after these plans shall have been adopted by the several { } governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the council. the members of the league agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. the council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those members of the league which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety. the members of the league undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes. article . a permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the council on the execution of the provisions of articles and and on military, naval and air questions generally. article . the members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. in case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. article . any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole league, and the league shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. in case any such emergency should arise the secretary general shall on the request of any member of the league forthwith summon a meeting of the council. { } it is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the league to bring to the attention of the assembly or of the council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. article . the members of the league agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the council. in any case under this article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute. article . the members of the league agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement. disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement. for the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the permanent court of international justice, established in accordance with article , or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. { } the members of the league agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a member of the league which complies therewith. in the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. article . the council shall formulate and submit to the members of the league for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice. the court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. the court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the council or by the assembly. article . if there should arise between members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with article , the members of the league agree that they will submit the matter to the council. any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the secretary general, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. for this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the secretary general, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the council may forthwith direct the publication thereof. the council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the council may deem appropriate. if the dispute is not thus settled, the council either { } unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto. any member of the league represented on the council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same. if a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report. if the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. if the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement. the council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the assembly. the dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the council. in any case referred to the assembly, all the provisions of this article and of article relating to the action and powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all the members thereof { } other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. article . should any member of the league resort to war in disregard of its covenants under articles , or , it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the league or not. it shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the league shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league. the members of the league agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the league which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the league. any member of the league which has violated any covenant of the league may be declared to be no longer a member of the league by a vote of the council concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the league represented thereon. { } article . in the event of a dispute between a member of the league and a state which is not a member of the league, or between states not members of the league, the state or states not members of the league shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the council may deem just. if such invitation is accepted, the provisions of articles to inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the council. upon such invitation being given the council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. if a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member of the league, the provisions of article shall be applicable as against the state taking such action. if both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, the council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. article . every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any member of the league shall be forthwith registered with the secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered. article . the assembly may from time to time advise the { } reconsideration by members of the league of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. article . the members of the league severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_ which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. in case any member of the league shall, before becoming a member of the league, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. article . nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace. article . to those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant. the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this { } responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the league. the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. certain communities formerly belonging to the turkish empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory. other peoples, especially those of central africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the league. there are territories, such as south-west africa and certain of the south pacific islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. in every case of mandate, the mandatory shall render to the council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. { } the degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the league, be explicitly defined in each case by the council. a permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatories and to advise the council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates. article . subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the members of the league: (_a_) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations; (_b_) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; (_c_) will entrust the league with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; (_d_) will entrust the league with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest; (_e_) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the league. in this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of - shall be borne in mind; (_f_) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease. { } article . there shall be placed under the direction of the league all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. all such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the league. in all matters of international interest which are regulated by general convention but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the secretariat of the league shall, subject to the consent of the council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable. the council may include as part of the expenses of the secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the league. article . the members of the league agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national red cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world. article . amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the league whose representatives compose the council and by a majority of the members of the league whose representatives compose the assembly. no such amendments shall bind any member of the league which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the league. [ ] including amendments adopted to december, . _the text of the protocol of geneva, which follows as annex b, is printed in french and english on opposite pages._ [transcriber's note: in the source book, the french and english texts were on facing pages, french on the even/left-hand pages, english on the odd/right-hand pages. the same page order has been preserved in this etext, occasionally resulting split paragraphs.] { } annex b. protocole pour le reglement pacifique des differends internationaux. animés de la ferme volonté d'assurer le maintien de la paix générale et la sécurité des peuples dont l'existence, l'indépendance ou les territoires pourraient être menacés; reconnaissant la solidarité qui unit les membres de la communauté internationale; affirmant que la guerre d'agression constitue une infraction à cette solidarité et un crime international; désireux de faciliter la complète application du système prévu au pacte de la société des nations pour le règlement pacifique des différends entre les etats et d'assurer la répression des crimes internationaux; et afin de réaliser, comme l'envisage l'article du pacte, la réduction des armements nationaux au minimum compatible avec la sécurité nationale et avec l'exécution des obligations internationales imposées par une action commune, les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes: article premier. les etats signataires s'engagent à faire tous efforts en leur pouvoir pour l'introduction dans le pacte d'amendements conformes au sens des dispositions contenues dans les articles suivants. ils conviennent que ces dispositions deviendront obligatoires dans leurs rapports respectifs à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent protocole et que, vis-à-vis d'eux, l'assemblée et le conseil de la société des nations seront, dès lors, autorisés à exercer tous les droits et devoirs qui leur sont conférés par ce protocole. article . les etats signataires conviennent qu'en aucun cas ils ne { } annex b. protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes. animated by the firm desire to ensure the maintenance of general peace and the security of nations whose existence, independence or territories may be threatened; recognising the solidarity of the members of the international community; asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and an international crime; desirous of facilitating the complete application of the system provided in the covenant of the league of nations for the pacific settlement of disputes between states and of ensuring the repression of international crimes; and for the purpose of realising, as contemplated by article of the covenant, the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations; the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, agree as follows: article . the signatory states undertake to make every effort in their power to secure the introduction into the covenant of amendments on the lines of the provisions contained in the following articles. they agree that, as between themselves, these provisions shall be binding as from the coming into force of the present protocol and that, so far as they are concerned, the assembly and the council of the league of nations shall thenceforth have power to exercise all the rights and perform all the duties conferred upon them by the protocol. article . the signatory states agree in no case to resort to war either { } doivent recourir à la guerre, ni entre eux ni contre tout etat qui, le cas échéant, accepterait toutes les obligations ci-après définies, excepté dans le cas de résistance à des actes d'agression ou quand ils agissent en accord avec le conseil ou l'assemblée de la société des nations, selon les dispositions du pacte et du présent protocole. article . les etats signataires s'engagent à reconnaître comme obligatoire, de plein droit et sans convention spéciale, la juridiction de la cour permanente de justice internationale dans les cas visés au paragraphe de l'article du statut de la cour, mais sans préjudice de la faculté pour un etat quelconque, lorsqu'il adhérera au protocole special ouvert le décembre , prévu par ledit article, de formuler les réserves compatibles avec ladite clause. l'adhésion à ce protocole spécial ouvert le décembre devra être faite dans le délai d'un mois qui suivra la mise en vigueur du présent protocole. les etats qui adhéreront au présent protocole après sa mise en vigueur devront s'acquitter de l'obligation ci-dessus dans le mois qui suivra leur adhésion. article . en vue de compléter les dispositions des alinéas , , et de l'article du pacte, les etats signataires conviennent de se conformer à la procedure suivante: . si le différend soumis au conseil n'a pu être réglé par lui ainsi qu'il est prévu au paragraphe dudit article , le conseil engagera les parties à soumettre le différend à un règlement judiciaire ou arbitral. . a) si les parties s'y refusent, il est procédé, à la demande d'au moins l'une des parties, à la constitution d'un comité d'arbitres. le comité sera constitué, autant que possible, par l'accord des parties. { } with one another or against a state which, if the occasion arises accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the council or the assembly of the league of nations in accordance with the provisions of the covenant and of the present protocol. article . the signatory states undertake to recognise as compulsory, _ipso facto_ and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice in the cases covered by paragraph of article of the statute of the court, but without prejudice to the right of any state, when acceding to the special protocol provided for in the said article and opened for signature on december th, , to make reservations compatible with the said clause. accession to this special protocol, opened for signature on december th, , must be given within the month following the coming into force of the present protocol. states which accede to the present protocol, after its coming into force, must carry out the above obligation, within the month following their accession. article . with a view to render more complete the provisions of paragraphs , , , and of article of the covenant, the signatory states agree to comply with the following procedure: . if the dispute submitted to the council is not settled by it as provided in paragraph of the said article , the council shall endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration. . (_a_) if the parties cannot agree to do so, there shall, at the request of at least one of the parties, be constituted a committee of arbitrators. the committee shall so far as possible be constituted by agreement between the parties. { } _b_) si, dans le délai que le conseil aura fixé, elles ne se sont pas entendues en tout ou en partie sur le nombre, le nom et les pouvoirs des arbitres, ainsi que sur la procedure, le conseil réglera les points en suspens. il choisira d'urgence--en consultant les parties--les arbitres et leur président, parmi les personnes qui, par leur nationalité, leur caractère et leur expérience, lui paraîtront donner les plus hautes garanties de compétence et d'impartialité. _c_) après que les conclusions des parties auront été formulées, le comité d'arbitres, à la demande de toute partie, sollicitera, par l'entremise du conseil, sur les points de droit contestés, l'avis consultatif de la cour permanente de justice internationale qui, dans ce cas, se réunira d'urgence. . si aucune des parties ne demande l'arbitrage, le conseil reprendra l'examen du différend. au cas où le conseil établit un rapport voté à l'unanimité de ses membres autres que les représentants de toute partie au différend, les etats signataires conviennent de se conformer aux solutions recommandées par lui. . au cas où le conseil ne peut établir un rapport accepté par tous ses membres autres que les représentants de toute partie au différend, il soumettra le différend a l'arbitrage. il réglera lui-même la composition, les pouvoirs et la procedure du comité d'arbitres et aura égard, dans le choix des arbitres, aux garanties de compétence et d'impartialité visées au no. _b_ ci-dessus. . en aucun cas ne pourront être remises en question les solutions ayant déjà fait l'objet d'une recommandation unanime du conseil acceptée par l'une des parties interéssées. . les etats signataires s'engagent à éxecuter de bonne foi les sentences judiciaires ou arbitrales et à se conformer, comme il a été dit a l'alinéa ci-dessus, aux solutions recommandées par le conseil. dans le cas où un etat manquerait à ces engagements, le conseil exercera toute son influence pour en assurer le respect. s'il ne peut y réussir, il proposera les mesures qui doivent en assurer { } (_b_) if within the period fixed by the council the parties have failed to agree, in whole or in part, upon the number, the names and the powers of the arbitrators and upon the procedure, the council shall settle the points remaining in suspense. it shall with the utmost possible despatch select in consultation with the parties the arbitrators and their president from among persons who by their nationality, their personal character and their experience, appear to it to furnish the highest guarantees of competence and impartiality. (_c_) after the claims of the parties have been formulated, the committee of arbitrators, on the request of any party, shall through the medium of the council request an advisory opinion upon any points of law in dispute from the permanent court of international justice, which in such case shall meet with the utmost possible despatch. . if none of the parties asks for arbitration, the council shall again take the dispute under consideration. if the council reaches a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute, the signatory states agree to comply with the recommendations therein. . if the council fails to reach a report which is concurred in by all its members, other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute, it shall submit the dispute to arbitration. it shall itself determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the committee of arbitrators and, in the choice of the arbitrators, shall bear in mind the guarantees of competence and impartiality referred to in paragraph (_b_) above. . in no case may a solution, upon which there has already been a unanimous recommendation of the council accepted by one of the parties concerned, be again called in question. . the signatory states undertake that they will carry out in full good faith any judicial sentence or arbitral award that may be rendered and that they will comply, as provided in paragraph above, with the solutions recommended by the council. in the event of a state failing to carry out the above undertakings, the council shall exert all its influence to secure compliance { } l'effet, ainsi qu'il est dit à la fin de l'article du pacte. dans le cas où un etat, manquant à ces engagements, recourrait à la guerre, les sanctions prévues à l'article du pacte, interpretées de la manière indiquée au présent protocole, lui deviendraient immédiatement applicables. . les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas au règlement des différends qui pourraient s'élever à la suite des mesures de guerre prises par un ou plusieurs etats signataires en accord avec le conseil ou l'assemblée. article . la disposition de l'alinéa de l'article du pacte demeure applicable devant le conseil. si, pendant le cours d'une des procédures d'arbitrage prévues à l'article ci-dessus, l'une des parties prétend que le différend, ou une partie du différend, porte sur une question que le droit international laisse à la compétence exclusive de cette partie, les arbitres consulteront sur ce point la cour permanente de justice internationale par l'entremise du conseil. l'avis de la cour liera les arbitres qui se borneront, si cet avis est affirmatif, à le constater dans leur sentence. si la question est reconnue par la cour permanente ou par le conseil comme étant de la compétence exclusive d'un etat, la décision intervenue n'empêchera pas que la situation soit examinée par le conseil ou par l'assemblée, conformément à l'article du pacte. article . si, conformément à l'alinéa de l'article du pacte, le différend est porté devant l'assemblée, celle-ci aura, pour le règlement du différend, tous les pouvoirs dévolus au conseil en ce qui concerne l'essai de conciliation des parties, tel qu'il est prévu aux alinéas , ct de l'article du pacte et au no. de l'article ci-dessus. a défaut de reglement amiable obténu par l'assemblée: { } therewith. if it fails therein, it shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto, in accordance with the provision contained at the end of article of the covenant. should a state in disregard of the above undertakings resort to war, the sanctions provided for by article of the covenant, interpreted in the manner indicated in the present protocol, shall immediately become applicable to it. . the provisions of the present article do not apply to the settlement of disputes which arise as the result of measures of war taken by one or more signatory states in agreement with the council or the assembly. article . the provisions of paragraph of article of the covenant shall continue to apply in proceedings before the council. if in the course of an arbitration, such as is contemplated in article above, one of the parties claims that the dispute, or part thereof, arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the arbitrators shall on this point take the advice of the permanent court of international justice through the medium of the council. the opinion of the court shall be binding upon the arbitrators, who, if the opinion is affirmative, shall confine themselves to so declaring in their award. if the question is held by the court or by the council to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the council or by the assembly under article of the covenant. article . if in accordance with paragraph of article of the covenant a dispute is referred to the assembly, that body shall have for the settlement of the dispute all the powers conferred upon the council as to endeavouring to reconcile the parties in the manner laid down in paragraphs , and of article of the covenant and in paragraph of article above. should the assembly fail to achieve an amicable settlement: { } si l'une des parties demande l'arbitrage, il est procédé par le conseil à la constitution du comité d'arbitres, dans les conditions prevues au no. de l'article ci-dessus, lettres _a_, _b_ et _c_; si aucune des parties ne demande l'arbitrage, l'assemblée reprend, avec les mêmes pouvoirs que le conseil, l'examen du différend. les solutions recommandées par le rapport de l'assemblée, dans les conditions d'approbation prévues à la fin de l'alinéa de l'article du pacte, ont la même valeur et produiront les mêmes effets, en tout ce qui concerne le présent protocole, que celles recommandées par le rapport du conseil dans les conditions prévues au no. de l'article ci-dessus. si la majorité nécessaire ne peut être obtenue, le différend sera soumis a l'arbitrage et le conseil réglera lui-même la composition, les pouvoirs et la procédure du comité d'arbitres, comme il est dit au no. dudit article . article . dans le cas d'un différend s'elevant entre deux ou plusieurs etats signataires, ceux-ci conviennent que, soit avant que le differénd ait été soumis à une procédure de règlement pacifique, soit au cours d'une telle procédure, ils ne procéderont à aucune augmentation d'armements ou d'effectifs qui pourrait modifier la situation fixée par la conférence pour la réduction des armements prévue à l'article du présent protocole; ils ne procederont non plus à aucune mesure de mobilisation militaire, navale, aerienne, industrielle ou économique, ni en géneral à aucun acte de nature à aggraver ou à étendre le différend. conformément aux dispositions de l'article du pacte, il est du devoir du conseil d'examiner toute plainte en violation des engagements ci-dessus, qui pourrait lui être adressée par un ou plusieurs des etats parties au différend. si le conseil considère que la plainte est recevable, il doit, s'il l'estime convenable, organiser des enquêtes et des investigations dans un ou plusieurs des pays intéressés. ces enquêtes et ces investigations doivent être faites dans les délais les plus brefs, et les etats signataires s'engagent à donner toutes facilités pour leur exécution. { } if one of the parties asks for arbitration, the council shall proceed to constitute the committee of arbitrators in the manner provided in sub-paragraphs (_a_), (_b_) and (_c_) of paragraph of article above. if no party asks for arbitration, the assembly shall again take the dispute under consideration and shall have in this connection the same powers as the council. recommendations embodied in a report of the assembly, provided that it secures the measure of support stipulated at the end of paragraph of article of the covenant, shall have the same value and effect, as regards all matters dealt with in the present protocol, as recommendations embodied in a report of the council adopted as provided in paragraph of article above. if the necessary majority cannot be obtained, the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration and the council shall determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the committee of arbitrators as laid down in paragraph of article . article . in the event of a dispute arising between two or more signatory states, these states agree that they will not, either before the dispute is submitted to proceedings for pacific settlement or during such proceedings, make any increase of their armaments or effectives which might modify the position established by the conference for the reduction of armaments provided for by article of the present protocol, nor will they take any measure of military, naval, air, industrial or economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute. it shall be the duty of the council, in accordance with the provisions of article of the covenant, to take under consideration any complaint as to infraction of the above undertakings which is made to it by one or more of the states parties to the dispute. should the council be of opinion that the complaint requires investigation, it shall, if it deems it expedient, arrange for enquiries and investigations in one or more of the countries concerned. such enquiries and investigations shall be carried { } les mesures ainsi prises par li conseil sont destinées uniquement à faciliter li règlement pacifique des différends et ne doivent préjuger en rien du règlement lui-même. si, à la suite de ces enquêtes et investigations, une infraction quelconque aux dispositions du premier alinéa du présent article est établie, il est du devoir du conseil de sommer l'etat ou les etats coupables de l'infraction de la faire disparaître. si l'etat ou les etats en question ne se conforment pas à cette sommation, le conseil déclare lesdits etats coupables d'une violation du pacte ou du présent protocole et doit décider les mesures à prendre en vue de faire cesser au plus tôt une situation de nature à menacer la paix du monde. pour l'application du présent article, le conseil prendra sa décision à la majorite des deux tiers. article . les etats signataires s'engagent à s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait constituer une menace d'agression contre un autre etat. dans li cas où un des etats signataires estime qu'un autre etat procédé à des préparatifs de guerre, il a le droit d'en saisir le conseil. celui-ci, après avoir vérifié les faits, opère comme il est dit à l'article , alinéas , et . article . l'existence de zones demilitarisées étant de nature à prévenir les agressions et à en faciliter la détermination sans équivoque conformément à l'article ci-dessous, l'établissement de pareilles zones est recommandé entre les etats qui y seraient également consentants, comme un moyen d'éviter une violation du présent protocole. les zones démilitarisées déjà existantes en vertu de certains traités ou conventions, ou qui seraient établies à l'avenir entre etats également consentants, pourront faire l'objet d'un contrôle temporaire ou permanent, organisé par le conseil, à la demande et aux frais d'un ou de plusieurs etats limitrophes. { } out with the utmost possible despatch, and the signatory states undertake to afford every facility for carrying them out. the sole object of measures taken by the council as above provided is to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes and they shall in no way prejudge the actual settlement. if the result of such enquiries and investigations is to establish an infraction of the provisions of the first paragraph of the present article, it shall be the duty of the council to summon the state or states guilty of the infraction to put an end thereto. should the state or states in question fail to comply with such summons, the council shall declare them to be guilty of a violation of the covenant or of the present protocol, and shall decide upon the measures to be taken with a view to end as soon as possible a situation of a nature to threaten the peace of the world. for the purposes of the present article decisions of the council may be taken by a two-thirds majority. article . the signatory states undertake to abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against another state. if one of the signatory states is of opinion that another state is making preparations for war, it shall have the right to bring the matter to the notice of the council. the council, if it ascertains that the facts are as alleged, shall proceed as provided in paragraphs , , and of article . article . the existence of demilitarised zones being calculated to prevent aggression and to facilitate a definite finding of the nature provided for in article below, the establishment of such zones between states mutually consenting thereto is recommended as a means of avoiding violations of the present protocol. the demilitarised zones already existing under the terms of certain treaties or conventions, or which may be established in future between states mutually consenting thereto, may at the request and at the expense of one or more of the conterminous states, be placed under a temporary or permanent system of supervision to be organized by the council. { } article . est agresseur tout etat qui recourt à la guerre en violation des engagements prévus au pacte ou au présent protocole. est assimilée au recours à la guerre la violation du statut d'une zone démilitarisée. dans le cas d'hostilités engagées, est présumé agresseur, sauf décision contraire du conseil prise à l'unanimité: . tout etat qui aura refusé de soumettre le différend à la procédure pour règlement pacifique prévue aux articles et du pacte, complétés par le présent protocole--ou qui aura refusé de se conformer, soit à une décision judiciaire ou arbitrale, soit à une recommandation unanime du conseil--ou qui aura passé outre à un rapport unanime du conseil, à une décision judiciaire ou arbitrale reconnaissant que le différend qui s'est élevé entre lui et l'autre etat belligérant porte sur une question que le droit international laisse à la compétence exclusive de cet etat; toutefois, dans ce dernier cas, l'etat ne sera présumé agresseur que s'il n'a pas soumis auparavant la question au conseil ou à l'assemblée, conformément à l'article du pacte. . tout etat qui aura violé une des mesures provisoires prescrites par le conseil pendant la période de procédure, visées à l'article du présent protocole. hors les hypothèses visées aux numéros et du présent article, si le conseil n'a pu déterminer dans le plus bref délai l'agresseur, il aura l'obligation de prescrire aux belligérants un armistice dont il fixera les conditions à la majorité des deux tiers et dont il surveillera l'observation. tout belligérant ayant refusé l'armistice ou en ayant violé les conditions, sera réputé agresseur. le conseil enjoindra aux etats signataires d'appliquer sans retard contre l'agresseur les sanctions visées à l'article du présent protocole, et tout etat signataire, ainsi requis, sera dès lors fondé à exercer les droits d'un belligérant. { } article . every state which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the covenant or in the present protocol is an aggressor. violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone shall be held equivalent to resort to war. in the event of hostilities having broken out, any state shall be presumed to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the council, which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare: . if it has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of pacific settlement provided by articles and of the covenant as amplified by the present protocol, or to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award or with a unanimous recommendation of the council, or has disregarded a unanimous report of the council, a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognising that the dispute between it and the other belligerent state arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter state; nevertheless, in the last case the state shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the council or the assembly, in accordance with article of the covenant. . if it has violated provisional measures enjoined by the council for the period while the proceedings are in progress as contemplated by article of the present protocol. apart from the cases dealt with in paragraphs and of the present article, if the council does not at once succeed in determining the aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting, if need be, by a two-thirds majority and shall supervise its execution. any belligerent which has refused to accept the armistice or has violated its terms shall be deemed an aggressor. the council shall call upon the signatory states to apply forthwith against the aggressor the sanctions provided by article of the present protocol, and any signatory state thus called upon shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent. { } article . dès que le conseil a fait aux etats signataires l'injonction prévue au dernier alinéa de l'article du présent protocole, les obligations desdits etats en ce qui concerne les sanctions de toute nature visées aux alinéas et de l'article du pacte, deviennent immédiatement opérantes afin que ces sanctions puissent porter leurs effets contre l'agresseur sans aucun retard. ces obligations doivent être interprétées en ce sens que chacun des etats signataires est tenu de collaborer loyalement et effectivement pour faire respecter le pacte de la société des nations et pour s'opposer à tout acte d'agression dans la mésure que lui permettent sa situation géographique et les conditions spéciales de ses armements. conformément à l'alinéa de l'article du pacte, les etats signataires prennent l'engagement, individuel et collectif, de venir à l'aide de l'etat attaqué ou menacé, et de se prêter un mutuel appui, grâce à des facilités et à des échanges réciproques en ce qui concerne le ravitaillement en matières premières et denrées de toute nature, les ouvertures de crédit, les transports et le transit et, à cet effet, de prendre toutes mesures en leur pouvoir pour maintenir la sécurité des communications terrestres et maritimes de l'etat attaqué ou menacé. si les deux parties au différend sont agresseurs au sens de l'article , les sanctions économiques et financières s'appliquent a l'une et à l'autre. article . en raison de la complexité des conditions dans lesquelles le conseil pourrait être appelé à remplir les fonctions visées à l'article ci-dessus concernant les sanctions économiques et financières et pour préciser les garanties qui sont offertes par le présent protocole aux etats signataires, le conseil invitera immédiatement les organisations économiques et financières de la société des nations à procéder à une étude et à { } article . as soon as the council has called upon the signatory states to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of article of the present protocol, the obligations of the said states, in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs and of article of the covenant, will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory states to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the covenant of the league of nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow. in accordance with paragraph of article of the covenant the signatory states give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the state attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened state. if both parties to the dispute are aggressors within the meaning of article , the economic and financial sanctions shall be applied to both of them. article . in view of the complexity of the conditions in which the council may be called upon to exercise the functions mentioned in article of the present protocol concerning economic and financial sanctions, and in order to determine more exactly the guarantees afforded by the present protocol to the signatory states, the council shall forthwith invite the economic and financial organisations of the league of nations to consider and report { } soumettre un rapport sur la nature des dispositions à prendre pour mettre en vigueur les sanctions et mesures de coopération économique et financière, visées à l'article du pacte et à l'article du present protocole. en possession de ces informations, le conseil établira par ses organismes compétents: . les plans d'action destinés à faire jouer les sanctions economiques et financières contre un etat agresseur; . les plans de coopération économique et financière entre un etat attaqué et les divers etats lui portant assistance, et il communiquera ces plans aux membres de la société et aux autres etats signataires. article . eu égard aux sanctions militaires, navales et aériennes dont l'application éventuelle est prévue à l'article du pacte et à l'article du présent protocole, le conseil aura qualité pour recevoir les engagements d'etats déterminant par avance les forces militaires, navales et aériennes que ces etats pourraient faire intervenir immédiatement afin d'assurer l'exécution des obligations dérivant à ce sujet du pacte et du présent protocole. dès que le conseil a fait aux etats signataires l'injonction prévue au dernier alinéa de l'article ci-dessus, ces etats peuvent en outre faire entrer en ligne, suivant les accords antérieurement faits, leurs forces militaires, navales et aériennes au secours d'un etat particulier, victime de l'agression. les accords visés au précédent alinéa sont enregistrés et publiés par le secrétariat de la société des nations; ils restent ouverts à tout etat membre de la société, qui voudrait y accéder. article . le conseil a seul qualité pour déclarer qui'l y a lieu de faire cesser l'application des sanctions et de rétablir les conditions normales. { } as to the nature of the steps to be taken to give effect to the financial and economic sanctions and measures of co-operation contemplated in article of the covenant and in article of this protocol. when in possession of this information, the council shall draw up through its competent organs: . plans of action for the application of the economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor state; . plans of economic and financial co-operation between a state attacked and the different states assisting it; and shall communicate these plans to the members of the league and to the other signatory states. article . in view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by article of the covenant and by article of the present protocol, the council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from states determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the covenant and the present protocol. furthermore, as soon as the council has called upon the signatory states to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of article above, the said states may, in accordance with any agreements which they may previously have concluded, bring to the assistance of a particular state, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air forces. the agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be registered and published by the secretariat of the league of nations. they shall remain open to all states members of the league which may desire to accede thereto. article . the council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re-established. { } article . pour répondre à l'esprit du présent protocole, les etats signataires conviennent que la totalité des frais de toute opération d'ordre militaire, naval ou aérien, entreprise pour la répréssion d'une agression, conformément aux termes de ce protocole, ainsi que la réparation de tous dommages subis par les personnes civiles ou militaires, et de tous dommages matériels occasionnés par les opérations de part et d'autre, seront supportés par l'etat agresseur jusqu'à l'extréme limite de sa capacité. toutefois, vu l'article du pacte, il ne pourra, comme suite à l'application des sanctions visées au présent protocole, être porté atteinte en aucun cas à l'intégrité territoriale ou à l'indépendance politique de l'etat agresseur. article . les etats signataires conviennent qu'en cas de différend entre un ou plusieurs parmi eux et un ou plusieurs etats non signataires du présent protocole értangers à la société des nations, ces etats étrangers seront invités, aux conditions prévues à l'article du pacte, à se soumettre aux obligations acceptées par les signataires du présent protocole aux fins de règlement pacifique. si l'etat invité, refusant d'accepter les dites conditions et obligations, recourt à la guerre centre un etat signataire, les dispositions de l'article du pacte, telles qu'elles sont précisées par le présent protocole, lui sont applicables. article . les etats signataires s'engagent à prendre part à une conférence internationale pour la réduction des armements qui devra être convoquée par le conseil et qui se réunira à geneve le lundi juin . tous autres etats, membres ou non de la société, seront invités à cette conférence. en vue de la convocation de la conférence, le conseil { } article . in conformity with the spirit of the present protocol the signatory states agree that the whole cost of any military, naval or air operations undertaken for the repression of an aggression under the terms of the protocol, and reparation for all losses suffered by individuals, whether civilians or combatants, and for all material damage caused by the operations of both sides, shall be borne by the aggressor state up to the extreme limit of its capacity. nevertheless, in view of article of the covenant, neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of the aggressor state shall in any case be affected as the result of the application of the sanctions mentioned in the present protocol. article . the signatory states agree that in the event of a dispute between one or more of them and one or more states which have not signed the present protocol and are not members of the league of nations, such non-member states shall be invited, on the conditions contemplated in article of the covenant, to submit, for the purpose of a pacific settlement, to the obligations accepted by the states signatories of the present protocol. if the state so invited, having refused to accept the said conditions and obligations, resorts to war against a signatory state, the provisions of article of the covenant, as defined by the present protocol, shall be applicable against it. article . the signatory states undertake to participate in an international conference for the reduction of armaments which shall be convened by the council and shall meet at geneva on monday, june th, . all other states, whether members of the league or not, shall be invited to this conference. in preparation for the convening of the conference, the { } préparera, en tenant compte des engagements prévus aux articles et du présent protocole, un programme général pour la reduction et la limitation des armements qui sera mis à la disposition de cette conférence et communiqué aux gouvernements le plus tôt possible, et au plus tard trois mois avant la réunion. si au moins la majorité des membres représentés en permanence au conseil et dix autres membres de la société n'ont pas déposé leur ratification pour le er mai , le sécretaire général de la société devra prendre immédiatement l'avis du conseil pour savoir s'il doit annuler les invitations ou simplement ajourner la conférence à une date ultérieure, qui sera fixée par le conseil pour permettre la réunion du nombre necessaire de ratifications. article . toutes les fois que, dans l'article ou dans toutes autres dispositions du présent protocole, il est fait mention d'une décision du conseil, elle s'entend dans le sens de l'article du pacte, à savoir que le vote des représentants des parties au différend ne compte pas dans le calcul de l'unanimité ou de la majorité requise. article . a défaut de stipulations expresses, le présent protocole n'affecte pas les droits et les obligations des membres de la société des nations, tels qu'ils résultent du pacte. article . tout différend relatif à l'interpretation du présent protocole sera soumis à la cour permanente de justice internationale. article l. le présent protocole, dont les textes français et anglais feront foi, sera ratifié. { } council shall draw up with due regard to the undertakings contained in articles and of the present protocol a general programme for the reduction and limitation of armaments, which shall be laid before the conference and which shall be communicated to the governments at the earliest possible date, and at the latest three months before the conference meets. if by may st, , ratifications have not been deposited by at least a majority of the permanent members of the council and ten other members of the league, the secretary-general of the league shall immediately consult the council as to whether he shall cancel the invitations or merely adjourn the conference to a subsequent date to be fixed by the council so as to permit the necessary number of ratifications to be obtained. article . wherever mention is made in article , or in any other provision of the present protocol, of a decision of the council, this shall be understood in the sense of article of the covenant, namely that the votes of the representatives of the parties to the dispute shall not be counted when reckoning unanimity or the necessary majority. article . except as expressly provided by its terms, the present protocol shall not affect in any way the rights and obligations of members of the league as determined by the covenant. article . any dispute as to the interpretation of the present protocol shall be submitted to the permanent court of international justice. article . the present protocol, of which the french and english texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. { } le dépôt des ratifications sera effectué au secrétariat de la société des nations le plus tôt qu'il sera possible. les etats dont le gouvernement a son siège hors d'europe auront la faculté de se borner à faire connaître au secrétariat de la societe des nations que leur ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, ils devront en transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra. dès que la majorité des membres représentés en permanence au conseil et dix autres membres de la société auront déposé ou effectué leur ratification, un procès-verbal sera dressé par le secrétariat pour le constater. la mise en vigueur du protocole aura lieu après que ce procès-verbal aura été dressé et dès que le plan de réduction des armements aura été adopté par la conférence prevue à l'article . si, dans un délai, à fixer par ladite conférence après l'adoption du plan de réduction des armements, ce plan n'a pas été exécuté, il appartiendra au conseil de le constater; par l'effet de cette constatation le présent protocole deviendra caduc. les conditions en vertu desquelles le conseil pourra constater que le plan établi par la conférence internationale pour la réduction des armements n'a pas été exécuté et que, par conséquent, le présent protocole est devenu caduc, seront définies par la conférence elle-même. tout etat signataire qui ne se conformerait pas, après l'expiration du délai fixé par la conférence, au plan adopté par elle, ne pourra bénéficier des dispositions du présent protocole. en foi de quoi les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé le présent protocole. fait à genève, le deux octobre, mil neuf cent vingt-quatre, en un seul exemplaire qui restera déposé dans les archives du secretariat de la société des nations et qui sera enregistré par lui à la date de son entrée en vigueur. { } the deposit of ratifications shall be made at the secretariat of the league of nations as soon as possible. states of which the seat of government is outside europe will be entitled merely to inform the secretariat of the league of nations that their ratification has been given; in that case, they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible. so soon as the majority of the permanent members of the council and ten other members of the league have deposited or have effected their ratifications, a _procès-verbal_ to that effect shall be drawn up by the secretariat. after the said _procès-verbal_ has been drawn up, the protocol shall come into force as soon as the plan for the reduction of armaments has been adopted by the conference provided for in article . if within such period after the adoption of the plan for the reduction of armaments as shall be fixed by the said conference, the plan has not been carried out, the council shall make a declaration to that effect; this declaration shall render the present protocol null and void. the grounds on which the council may declare that the plan drawn up by the international conference for the reduction of armaments has not been carried out, and that in consequence the present protocol has been rendered null and void, shall be laid down by the conference itself. a signatory state which, after the expiration of the period fixed by the conference, fails to comply with the plan adopted by the conference, shall not be admitted to benefit by the provisions of the present protocol. in faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorised for this purpose, have signed the present protocol. done at geneva, on the second day of october, nineteen hundred and twenty-four, in a single copy, which will be kept in the archives of the secretariat of the league and registered by it on the date of its coming into force. { } annex c. general report submitted to the fifth assembly on behalf of the first and third committees by m. politis (greece) and m. benes (czechoslovakia). i introduction. after being examined for several years by the third committee, the problem of the reduction of armaments has this year suddenly assumed a different, a wider and even an unexpected form. last year a draft treaty of mutual assistance was prepared, which the assembly sent to the members of the league for their consideration. the replies from the governments were to be examined by the fifth assembly. at the very beginning of its work, however, after a memorable debate, the assembly indicated to the third committee a new path. on september th, , on the proposal of the prime ministers of france and great britain, m. edouard herriot and mr. ramsay macdonald, the assembly adopted the following resolution: "the assembly, "noting the declarations of the governments represented, observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding tending to establish a secure peace, "decides as follows: "with a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergences between certain points of view which have been expressed and, when agreement has been reached, to enable an international conference upon armaments to be summoned by the league of nations at the earliest possible moment: "( ) the third committee is requested to consider the { } material dealing with security and the reduction of armaments, particularly the observations of the governments on the draft treaty of mutual assistance, prepared in pursuance of resolution xiv of the third assembly and other plans prepared and presented to the secretary-general since the publication of the draft treaty, and to examine the obligations contained in the covenant of the league in relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require: "( ) the first committee is requested: "(_a_) to consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the covenant relating to the settlement of disputes; "(_b_) to examine within what limits the terms of article , paragraph , of the statute establishing the permanent court of international justice might be rendered more precise and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause; and thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between states." this resolution had two merits, first, that of briefly summarising all the investigations made in the last four years by the different organisations of the league in their efforts to establish peace and bring about the reduction of armaments, and, secondly, that of indicating the programme of work of the committees in the hope that, with the aid of past experience, they would at last attain the end in view. the assembly had assigned to each committee a distinct and separate task; to the first committee, the examination of the pacific settlement of disputes by methods capable of being applied in every case; to the third committee, the question of the security of nations considered as a necessary preliminary condition for the reduction of their armaments. each committee, after a general discussion which served to { } detach the essential elements from the rest of the problem, referred the examination of its programme to a sub-committee, which devoted a large number of meetings to this purpose. the proposals of the sub-committees then led to very full debates by the committees, which terminated in the texts analysed below. as, however, the questions submitted respectively to the two committees form part of an indivisible whole, contact and collaboration had to be established between the committees by means of a mixed committee of nine members and finally by a joint drafting committee of four members. for the same reason, the work of the committees has resulted in a single draft protocol accompanied by two draft resolutions for which the committees are jointly responsible. upon these various texts, separate reports were submitted, which, being approved by the committees respectively responsible for them, may be considered as an official commentary by the committees. these separate reports have here been combined in order to present as a whole the work accomplished by the two committees and to facilitate explanation. before entering upon an analysis of the proposed texts, it is expedient to recall, in a brief historical summary, the efforts of the last four years, of which the texts are the logical conclusion. historical statement. the problem of the reduction of armaments is presented in article of the covenant in terms which reveal at the outset the complexity of the question and which explain the tentative manner in which the subject has been treated by the league of nations in the last few years. "the members of the league recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to { } the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." here we see clearly expressed the need of reducing the burden which armaments imposed upon the nations immediately after the war and of putting a stop to the competition in armaments which was, in itself, a threat to the peace of the world. but, at the same time, there is recognised the duty of safeguarding the national security of the members of the league and of safeguarding it, not only by the maintenance of a necessary minimum of troops, but also by the co-operation of all the nations, by a vast organisation for peace. such is the meaning of the covenant, which, while providing for reduction of armaments properly so called, recognises at the same time the need of _common action_, by all the members of the league, with a view to compelling a possible disturber of the peace to respect his _international obligations_. thus, in this first paragraph of article , which is so short but so pregnant, mention is made of all the problems which have engaged the attention of our predecessors and ourselves and which the present assembly has specially instructed us to solve, the problems of _collective security_ and the _reduction of armaments_. taking up article of the covenant, the first assembly had already outlined a programme. at its head it placed a pronouncement of the supreme council: "in order to diminish the economic difficulties of europe, armies should everywhere be reduced to a peace footing. armaments should be limited to the lowest possible figure compatible with national security." the assembly also called attention to a resolution of the international financial conference of brussels held a short time before: "recommending to the council of the league of nations the { } desirability of conferring at once with the several governments concerned with a view to securing a general reduction of the crushing burdens which, on their existing scale, armaments still impose on the impoverished peoples of the world, sapping their resources and imperilling their recovery from the ravages of war." it also requested its two advisory commissions to set to work at once to collect the necessary information regarding the problem referred to in article of the covenant. from the beginning the work of the temporary mixed commission and of the permanent advisory commission revealed the infinite complexity of the question. the second assembly limited its resolutions to the important, but none the less (if one may say so) secondary, questions of traffic in arms and their manufacture by private enterprise. it only touched upon the questions of military expenditure and budgets in the form of recommendations and, as regards the main question of reduction of armaments, it confined itself to asking the temporary mixed commission to formulate a definite scheme. it was between the second and third assemblies that the latter commission, which was beginning to get to grips with the various problems, revealed their constituent elements. in its report it placed on record that: "the memory of the world war was still maintaining in many countries a feeling of insecurity, which was represented in the candid statements in which, at the request of the assembly, several of them had put forward the requirements of their national security, and the geographical and political considerations which contributed to shape their policy in the matter of armaments." at the same time, however, the commission stated: "consideration of these statements as a whole has clearly revealed not only the sincere desire of the governments to reduce national armaments and the corresponding { } expenditure to a minimum, but also the importance of the results achieved. these facts"--according to the commission--"are indisputable, and are confirmed moreover, by the replies received from governments to the recommendation of the assembly regarding the limitation of military expenditure." that is the point we had reached _two years ago_; there was a _unanimous desire to reduce armaments_. reductions, though as yet inadequate, had been begun, and there was a _still stronger desire to ensure the security of the world_ by a stable and permanent organisation for peace. that was the position which, after long discussions, gave rise _at the third assembly to the famous resolution xiv_ and at the fourth assembly _to the draft treaty of mutual assistance_, for which we are now substituting the protocol submitted to the fifth assembly. what progress has been made during these four years? although the treaty of mutual assistance was approved in principle by eighteen governments, it gave rise to certain misgivings. we need only recall the most important of these, hoping that a comparison between them and an analysis of the new scheme will demonstrate that the first and third committees have endeavoured, with a large measure of success, to dispose of the objections raised and that the present scheme consequently represents an immense advance on anything that has hitherto been done. in the first place, a number of governments or delegates to the assembly argued that the guarantees provided by the draft treaty of mutual assistance did not imply with sufficient definiteness the reduction of armaments which is the ultimate object of our work. the idea of the treaty was to give effect to article of the covenant, but many persons considered that it did not, in fact, secure the automatic execution of that article. even if a reduction of armaments was achieved by its means, the amount { } of the reduction was left, so the opponents of the treaty urged, to the estimation of each government, and there was nothing to show that it would be considerable. with equal force many states complained that no provision had been made for the development of the _juridicial and moral elements of the covenant_ by the side of material guarantees. the novel character of the charter given to the nations in lay essentially in the advent of a moral solidarity which foreshadowed the coming of a new era. that principle ought to have, as its natural consequence, _the extension of arbitration and international jurisdiction_, without which no human society can be solidly grounded. a considerable portion of the assembly asked that efforts should also be made in this direction. the draft treaty seemed from this point of view to be insufficient and ill-balanced. finally, the articles relating to partial treaties gave rise, as you are aware, to certain objections. several governments considered that they would lead to the establishment of groups of powers animated by hostility towards other powers or groups of powers and that they would cause political tension. the absence of the barriers of compulsory arbitration and judicial intervention was evident here as everywhere else. thus, by a logical and gradual process, there was elaborated the system at which we have now arrived. the reduction of armaments required by the covenant and demanded by the general situation of the world to-day led us to consider the question of security as a necessary complement to disarmament. the support demanded from different states by other states less favourably situated had placed the former under the obligation of asking for a sort of moral and legal guarantee that the states which have to be supported would act in perfect good faith and would always endeavor to settle their disputes by pacific means. it became evident, however, with greater clearness and force { } than ever before, that if the security and effective assistance demanded in the event of aggression was the condition _sine quâ non_ of the reduction of armaments, it was at the same time the necessary complement of the pacific settlement of international disputes, since the non-execution of a sentence obtained by pacific methods of settlement would necessarily drive the world back to the system of armed force. sentences imperatively required sanctions or the whole system would fall to the ground. _arbitration was therefore considered by the fifth assembly to be the necessary third factor, the complement of the two others with which it must be combined in order to build up the new system set forth in the protocol._ thus, after five years' hard work, we have decided to propose to the members of the league _the present system of arbitration, security and reduction of armaments_--a system which we regard as being complete and sound. that is the position with which the fifth assembly has to deal to-day. the desire to arrive at a successful issue is unanimous. a great number of the decisions adopted in the past years have met with general approval. there has arisen a thoroughly clear appreciation of the undoubted gaps which have to be filled and of the reasonable apprehensions which have to be dissipated. conditions have therefore become favourable for arriving at an agreement. an agreement has been arrived at on the basis of the draft protocol which is now submitted to you for consideration. { } ii analysis of the scheme. .--work of the first committee. (_rapporteur_: m. politis) draft protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes. _preamble._ the object of the protocol, which is based upon the resolution of september th, , is to facilitate the reduction and limitation of armaments provided for in article of the covenant of the league of nations by guaranteeing the security of states through the development of methods for the pacific settlement of all international disputes and the effective condemnation of aggressive war. these general ideas are summarised in the preamble of the protocol. compulsory arbitration. (_articles to , , , and of the protocol_) .--introduction. compulsory arbitration is the fundamental basis of the proposed system. it has seemed to be the only means of attaining the ultimate aim pursued by the league of nations, viz. the establishment of a pacific and legal order in the relations between peoples. the realisation of this great ideal, to which humanity aspires with a will which has never been more strongly affirmed, presupposes, as an indispensable condition, the elimination of war, the extension of the rule of law and the strengthening of the sentiment of justice. the covenant of the league of nations erected a wall of protection around the peace of the world, but it was a first attempt { } at international organisation and it did not succeed in closing the circle sufficiently thoroughly to leave no opening for war. it reduced the number of possible wars. it did not condemn them all. there were some which it was forced to tolerate. consequently, there remained, in the system which it established, numerous fissures, which constituted a grave danger to peace. the new system of the protocol goes further. it closes the circle drawn by the covenant; it prohibits all wars of aggression. henceforth no purely private war between nations will be tolerated. this result is obtained by strengthening the pacific methods of procedure laid down in the covenant. the protocol completes them and extends them to all international disputes without exception, by making arbitration compulsory. in reality, the word "arbitration" is used here in a somewhat different sense from that which it has generally had up to now. it does not exactly correspond with the definition given by the hague conferences which, codifying a century-old custom, saw in it "the settlement of disputes between states by judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect for law" (article of the convention of october th, , for the pacific settlement of international disputes). the arbitration which is now contemplated differs from this classic arbitration in various respects: (_a_) it is only part of a great machinery of pacific settlement. it is set up under the auspices and direction of the council of the league of nations. (_b_) it is not only an instrument for the administration of justice. it is, in addition and above all, an instrument of peace. the arbitrators must no doubt seek in the first place to apply the rules and principles of international law. this is the reason why, as will be seen below, they are bound to consult the permanent court of international justice if one of the parties so requests. but if international law furnishes no rule or principle applicable to the particular { } case, they cannot, like ordinary arbitrators, refuse to give a decision. they are bound to proceed on grounds of equity, for in our system arbitration is always of necessity to lead to a definitive solution of the dispute. this is not to be regretted, for to ensure the respect of law by nations it is necessary first that they should be assured of peace, (_c_) it does not rest solely upon the loyalty and good faith of the parties. to the moral and legal force of an ordinary arbitration is added the actual force derived from the international organisation of which the kind of arbitration in question forms one of the principal elements; the absence of a sanction which has impeded the development of compulsory arbitration is done away with under our system. in the system of the protocol, the obligation to submit disputes to arbitration is sound and practical because it has always a sanction. its application is automatically ensured, by means of the intervention of the council; in no case can it be thrown on one side through the ill-will of one of the disputant states. the awards to which it leads are always accompanied by a sanction, adapted to the circumstances of the case and more or less severe according to the degree of resistance offered to the execution of the sentence. { } .--nature of the rules op the protocol. _article ._ the rules laid down in the protocol do not all have the same scope or value for the future. as soon as the protocol comes into force, its provisions will become compulsory as between the signatory states, and in its dealings with them the council of the league of nations will at once be able to exercise all the rights and fulfil all the duties conferred upon it. as between the states members of the league of nations, the protocol may in the first instance create a dual régime, for, if it is not immediately accepted by them all, the relations between signatories and non-signatories will still be governed by the covenant alone while the relations between signatories will be governed by the protocol as well. but this situation cannot last. apart from the fact that it may be hoped that all members of the league will adhere to it, the protocol is in no sense designed to create among the states which accept it a restricted league capable of competing with or opposing in any way the existing league. on the contrary, such of its provisions as relate to articles of the covenant will, as soon as possible, be made part of the general law by amendment of the covenant effected in accordance with the procedure for revision laid down in article thereof. the signatory states which are members of the league of nations undertake to make every effort to this end. when the covenant has been amended in this way, some parts of the protocol will lose their value as between the said states: some of them will have enriched the covenant, while others, being temporary in character, will have lost their object. the whole protocol will remain applicable to relations between signatory states which are members of the league of nations and signatory states outside the league, or between states coming within the latter category. { } it should be added that, as the league realises its aim of universality, the amended covenant will take the place, as regards all states, of the separate régime of the protocol. .--condemnation of aggressive war. _article ._ the general principle of the protocol is the prohibition of aggressive war. under the covenant, while the old unlimited right of states to make war is restricted, it is not abolished. there are cases in which the exercise of this right is tolerated; some wars are prohibited and others are legitimate. in future the position will be different. in no case is any state signatory of the protocol entitled to undertake on its own sole initiative an offensive war against another signatory state or against any non-signatory state which accepts all the obligations assumed by the signatories under the protocol. the prohibition affects only aggressive war. it does not, of course, extend to defensive war. the right of legitimate self-defence continues, as it must, to be respected. the state attacked retains complete liberty to resist by all means in its power any acts of aggression of which it may be the victim. without waiting for the assistance which it is entitled to receive from the international community, it may and should at once defend itself with its own force. its interests are identified with the general interest. this is a point on which there can be no doubt. the same applies when a country employs force with the consent of the council or the assembly of the league of nations under the provisions of the covenant and the protocol. this eventuality may arise in two classes of cases: either a state may take part in the collective measures of force decided upon by the league of nations in aid of one of its members which is the victim of aggression; or a state may employ force with the authorisation of the council or the assembly in order to enforce { } a decision given in its favour. in the former case, the assistance given to the victim of aggression is indirectly an act of legitimate self-defence. in the latter, force is used in the service of the general interest, which would be threatened if decisions reached by a pacific procedure could be violated with impunity. in all these cases the country resorting to war is not acting on its private initiative but is in a sense the agent and the organ of the community. it is for this reason that we have not hesitated to speak of the exceptional authorisation of war. it has been proposed that the word "force" should be used in order to avoid any mention of "war"--in order to spare the public that disappointment which it might feel when it found that, notwithstanding the solemn condemnation of war, war was still authorised in exceptional cases. we preferred, however, to recognise the position frankly by retaining the expression "resort to war" which is used in the covenant. if we said "force" instead of "war," we should not be altering the facts in any way. moreover, the confession that war is still possible in specific cases has a certain value, because the term describes a definite and well-understood situation, whereas the expression "resort to force" would be liable to be misunderstood, and also because it emphasises the value of the sanctions at the disposal of the community of states bound by the protocol. .--compulsory jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice. _article ._ the general principle of the protocol could not be accepted unless the pacific settlement of all international disputes without distinction were made possible. this solution has been found, in the first place, in the extension of the compulsory jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice. { } according to its statute, the jurisdiction of the court is, in principle, optional. on the other hand, article , paragraph , of the statute, offers states the opportunity of making the jurisdiction compulsory in respect of all or any of the classes of legal disputes affecting: (_a_) the interpretation of a treaty; (_b_) any question of international law; (_c_) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (_d_) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. states have only to declare their intention through the special protocol annexed to the statute. the undertaking then holds good in respect of any other state which assumes the same obligation. it may be given either unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain other states; either permanently or for a fixed period. so far such compulsory jurisdiction has only been accepted by a small number of countries. the majority of states have abstained because they did not see their way to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the court in certain cases falling within one or another of the classes of dispute enumerated above, and because they were not sure whether, in accepting, they could make reservations to that effect. it was for this reason that the assembly in its resolution of september th, requested the first committee to render more precise the terms of article , paragraph , in order to facilitate its acceptance. careful consideration of the article has shown that it is sufficiently elastic to allow of all kinds of reservations. since it is open to the states to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the court in respect of certain of the classes of dispute mentioned and not to accept it in respect of the rest, it is also open to them only to accept it in respect of a portion of one of those classes; rights need not be exercised in their full extent. in giving the undertaking in question, therefore, states are free to declare that it { } will not be regarded as operative in those cases in which they consider it to be inadmissible. we can imagine possible and therefore legitimate, reservations either in connection with a certain class of dispute or, generally speaking, in regard to the precise stage at which the dispute may be laid before the court. while we cannot here enumerate all the conceivable reservations, it may be worth while to mention merely as examples those to which we referred in the course of our discussions. from the class of disputes relating to "the interpretation of a treaty" there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the interpretation of certain specified classes of treaty such as political treaties, peace treaties, etc. from the class of disputes relating to "any point of international law" there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the application of a political treaty, a peace treaty, etc., or as to any specified question or disputes which might arise as the outcome of hostilities initiated by one of the signatory states in agreement with the council or the assembly of the league of nations. again, there are many possible reservations as to the precise stage at which a dispute may be laid before the court. the most far-reaching of these would be to make the resort to the court in connection with every dispute in respect of which its compulsory jurisdiction is recognised contingent upon the establishment of an agreement for submission of the case which, failing agreement between the parties, would be drawn up by the court itself, the analogy of the provisions of the hague convention of dealing with the permanent court of arbitration being thus followed. it might also be stated that the recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court does not prevent the parties to the dispute from agreeing to resort to a preliminary conciliation procedure before the council of the league of nations or any other { } body selected by them, or to submit their disputes to arbitration in preference to going before the court. a state might also, while accepting compulsory jurisdiction by the court, reserve the right of laying disputes before the council of the league with a view to conciliation in accordance with paragraphs - of article of the covenant, with the proviso that neither party might, during the proceedings before the council, take proceedings against the other in the court. it will be seen, therefore, that there is a very wide range of reservations which may be made in connection with the undertaking referred to in article , paragraph . it is possible that apprehensions may arise lest the right to make reservations should destroy the practical value of the undertaking. there seems, however, to be no justification for such misgivings. in the first place, it is to be hoped that every government will confine its reservations to what is absolutely essential. secondly, it must be recognised that, however restrictive the scope of the undertaking may be, it will always be better than no undertaking at all. the fact that the signatory states undertake to accede, even though it be with reservations, to paragraph of article may therefore be held to constitute a great advance. such accession must take place at latest within the month following upon the coming into force or subsequent acceptance of the protocol. it goes without saying that such accession in no way restricts the liberty which states possess, under the ordinary law, of concluding special agreements for arbitration. it is entirely open to any two countries signatory of the protocol which have acceded to paragraph of article to extend still further, as between themselves, the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, or to stipulate that before having recourse to its jurisdiction they will submit their disputes to a special procedure of conciliation or even to stipulate, either before or after a dispute { } has arisen, that it shall be brought before a special tribunal of arbitrators or before the council of the league of nations rather than to the court. it is also certain that up to the time of the coming into force or acceptance of the protocol accession to paragraph of article which will thenceforth become compulsory, will remain optional, and that if such accession has already taken place it will continue to be valid in accordance with the terms under which it was made. the only point which may cause difficulty is the question what is the effect of accessions given to the protocol if the latter becomes null and void. it may be asked whether such accessions are to be regarded as so intimately bound up with the protocol that they must disappear with it. the reply must be in the negative. the sound rule of interpretation of international treaties is that, unless there is express provision to the contrary, effects already produced survive the act from which they sprang. the natural corollary is that any state which wishes to make the duration of its accession to article dependent on the duration of the protocol must make an express stipulation to this effect. as article permits acceptance of the engagement in question for a specified term only, a state may, when acceding, stipulate that it only undertakes to be bound during such time as the protocol shall remain in force. .--strengthening of pacific methods of procedure. _article ._ we have, in the second place, succeeded in making possible the pacific settlement of all disputes by strengthening the procedure laid down in the covenant. _article , paragraph ._ _action by the council with a view to reconciliation_.--if a dispute does not come within the compulsory jurisdiction of the { } permanent court of international justice and if the parties have been unable to come to an agreement to refer it to the court or to submit it to arbitration, it should, under the terms of article of the covenant, be submitted to the council, which will endeavour to secure a settlement by reconciling the parties. if the council's efforts are successful, it must, so far as it considers it advisable, make public a statement giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as it may deem appropriate. in this connection no change has been made in the procedure laid down by the covenant. it appeared unnecessary to specify what particular procedure should be followed. the council is given the utmost latitude in choosing the means most appropriate for the reconciliation of the parties. it may take advice in various quarters; it may hear expert opinions; it may proceed to investigations or expert enquiries, whether by itself or through the intermediary of experts chosen by it; it may even, upon application by one of the parties, constitute a special conciliation committee. the essential point is to secure, if possible, a friendly settlement of the dispute; the actual methods to be employed are of small importance. it is imperative that nothing should in any way hamper the council's work in the interests of peace. it is for the council to examine the question whether it would be expedient to draw up for its own use and bring to the notice of the governments of the signatory states general regulations of procedure applicable to cases brought before it and designed to test the good-will of the parties with a view to persuading them more easily to reach a settlement under its auspices. experience alone can show whether it will be necessary to develop the rules laid down in the first three paragraphs of article of the covenant. for the moment it would appear to be expedient to make no addition and to have full confidence in the wisdom of the council, it being understood that, whether at the moment in question or at any other stage of the procedure, it will be open to the { } parties to come to an agreement for some different method of settlement: by way of direct understanding, constitution of a special committee of mediators or conciliators, appeal to arbitration or to the permanent court of international justice. the new procedure set up by the protocol will be applicable only in the event of the council's failing in its efforts at reconciliation and of the parties failing to come to an understanding in regard to the method of settlement to be adopted. in such case, before going further, the council must call upon the parties to submit their dispute to judicial settlement or to arbitration. it is only in the case where this appeal--which the council will make in the manner which appears to it most likely to secure a favourable hearing--is not listened to that the procedure will acquire the compulsory character which is necessary to make certain the final settlement of all disputes. there are three alternatives: (_a_) compulsory arbitration at the request of one of the parties; (_b_) a unanimous decision by the council; (_c_) compulsory arbitration enjoined by the council. appropriate methods are laid down for all three cases. _article , paragraph ._ _first case of compulsory arbitration_.--if the parties, being called upon by the council to submit their dispute to a judicial or arbitral settlement, do not succeed in coming to an agreement on the subject, there is no question of optional arbitration, but if a single party desires arbitration, arbitration immediately becomes compulsory. the dispute is then _ipso facto_ referred to a committee of arbitrators, which must be constituted within such time limit as the council shall fix. { } full liberty is left to the parties themselves to constitute this committee of arbitrators. they may agree between themselves in regard to the number, names and powers of the arbitrators and the procedure. it is to be understood that the word "powers" is to be taken in the widest sense, including, _inter alia_, the questions to be put. it was not considered desirable to develop this idea further. it appeared to be sufficient to state that any result which could be obtained by means of an agreement between the parties was preferable to any other solution. it also appeared inexpedient to define precisely the powers which should be conferred upon the arbitrators. this is a matter which depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. according to the case, the arbitrators, as is said above, may fill the rôle of judges giving decisions of pure law or may have the function of arranging an amicable settlement with power to take account of considerations of equity. it has not been thought necessary to lay this down in the form of a rule. it has appeared preferable to leave it in each case to the parties to agree between themselves to decide the matter according to the circumstances of the case. nevertheless, consideration has been given to the possibility that the arbitrators need not necessarily be jurists. it has therefore been decided that, when called upon to deal with points of law, they shall, if one of the parties so desires, request, through the medium of the council, the advisory opinion of the permanent court of international justice, which must, in such a case, meet with the utmost possible despatch. the opinion of the court is obtained for the assistance of the arbitrators; it is not legally binding upon them, although its scientific authority must, in all cases, exercise a strong influence upon their judgment. with a view to preventing abusively frequent consultations of this kind, it is understood that the opinion of the court in regard to disputed points of law can only be asked on a single occasion in the course of each case. { } the extension which, in the new system of pacific settlement of disputes, has been given to the advisory procedure of the court has suggested the idea that it might be desirable to examine whether, even in such cases, it might not be well to adopt the system of adding national judges which at present only obtains in litigious proceedings, and also that of applying to the advisory procedure the provisions of article of the statute of the court relating to withdrawal of judges. if the parties have not been able to come to an understanding on all or on some of the points necessary to enable the arbitration to be carried out, it lies with the council to settle the unsettled points, with the exception of the formulation of the questions to be answered, which the arbitrators must seek in the claims set out by the parties or by one of them if the others make default. in cases where the selection of arbitrators thus falls upon the council, it has appeared necessary--however much confidence may be felt in the council's wisdom--to lay down for the selection of the arbitrators certain rules calculated to give the arbitration the necessary moral authority to ensure that it will in practice be respected. the first rule is that the council shall, before proceeding to the selection of arbitrators, have regard to the wishes of the parties. it was suggested that this idea should be developed by conferring on the parties the right to indicate their preferences and to challenge a certain number of the arbitrators proposed by the council. this proposal was set aside on account of the difficulty of laying down detailed regulations for the exercise of this double right. but it is understood that the council will have no motive for failing to accept candidates proposed to it by the different parties nor for imposing upon them arbitrators whom they might wish to reject, nor, finally, for failing to take into account any other suggestion which the parties might wish to make. it is indeed evident that the council will always be desirous of acting { } in the manner best calculated to increase to the utmost degree the confidence which the committee of arbitrators should inspire in the parties. the second rule is based on the same point of view. it lays down the right of the council to select the arbitrators and their president from among persons who, by their nationality, their personal character and their experience, appear to furnish the highest guarantees of competence and impartiality. here, too, experience will show whether it would be well for the council to draw up general regulations for the composition and functioning of the compulsory arbitration now in question and of that above referred to, and for the conciliation procedure in the council itself. such regulations would be made for the council's own use but would be communicated to the governments of the signatory states. _article , paragraph ._ _unanimous decision by the council_.--if arbitration is refused by both parties the case will be referred back to the council, but this time it will acquire a special character. refusal of arbitration implies the consent of both parties to a final settlement of the dispute by the council. it implies recognition of an exceptional jurisdiction of the council. it denotes that the parties prefer the council's decision to an arbitral award. resuming the examination of the question, the council has not only the latitude which it customarily possesses. it is armed with full powers to settle the question finally and irrevocably if it is unanimous. its decision, given unanimously by all the members other than those representing parties to the dispute, is imposed upon the parties with the same weight and the same force as the arbitration award which it replaces. _article , paragraph ._ _second case of compulsory arbitration_.--if the council does not arrive at a unanimous decision, it has to submit the dispute { } to the judgment of a committee of arbitrators, but this time, owing to the parties being deemed to have handed their case over to the council, the organisation of the arbitration procedure is taken entirely out of their hands. it will be for the council to settle all the details, the composition, the powers and the procedure of the committee of arbitrators. the council is of course at liberty to hear the parties and even to invite suggestions from them, but it is under no obligation to do so. the only regulation with which it must comply is that, in the choice of arbitrators, it must bear in mind the guarantees of competence and impartiality which, by their nationality, their personal character and their experience, these arbitrators must always furnish. _article . paragraph ._ _effect of, and sanction enforcing, decisions_.--failing a friendly arrangement, we are, thanks to the system adopted, in all cases certain of arriving at a final solution of a dispute, whether in the form of a decree of the permanent court of international justice or in the form of an arbitral award or, lastly, in the form of a unanimous decision of the council. to this solution the parties are compelled to submit. they must put it into execution or comply with it in good faith. if they do not do so, they are breaking an engagement entered into towards the other signatories of the protocol, and this breach involves consequences and sanctions according to the degree of gravity of the case. if the recalcitrant party confines itself to offering passive resistance to the solution arrived at, it will first be the object of pacific pressure from the council, which must exercise all its influence to persuade it to respect its engagements. if the council is unsuccessful, it must propose measures calculated to ensure effect being given to the decision. on this point the protocol has been guided solely by the regulation contained at the end of article of the covenant. the { } council may thus institute against the recalcitrant party collective sanctions of an economic and financial order. it is to be supposed that such sanctions will prove sufficient. it has not appeared possible to go further and to employ force against a state which is not itself resorting to force. the party in favour of which the decision has been given might, however, employ force against the recalcitrant party if authorised to do so by the council. but if the state against which the decision has been given takes up arms in resistance thereto, thereby becoming an aggressor against the combined signatories, it deserves even the severe sanctions provided in article of the covenant, interpreted in the manner indicated in the present protocol. _sphere of application of methods of pacific procedure_.--necessary as the system which we have laid down is for the purpose of ensuring settlement of all disputes, in applying it, the pacific aim which underlies it must be the only guide. it must not be diverted to other purposes and used as an occasion for chicanery and tendencious proceedings by which the cause of peace would lose rather than gain. a few exceptions to the rule have also had to be made in order to preserve the elasticity of the system. these are cases in which the claimant must be nonsuited, the claim being one which has to be rejected _in limine_ by the council, the permanent court of international justice or the arbitrators, as the case may be. the disputes to which the system will not apply are of three kinds: _article , paragraph ._ . the first concerns disputes relating to questions which, at some time prior to the entry into force of the protocol have been the subject of a unanimous recommendation by the council accepted by one of the parties concerned. it is essential to { } international order and to the prestige of the council that its unanimous recommendations, which confer a right upon the state accepting them, shall not be called into question again by means of a procedure based upon compulsory arbitration. failing a friendly arrangement, the only way which lies open for the settlement of disputes to which these recommendations may give rise is recourse to the council in accordance with the procedure at present laid down in the covenant. _article , paragraph ._ . the same applies to disputes which arise as the result of measures of war taken by one or more signatory states in agreement with the council or the assembly of the league of nations. it would certainly not be admissible that compulsory arbitration should become a weapon in the hands of an enemy to the community to be used against the freedom of action of those who, in the general interest, seek to impose upon that enemy respect for his engagements. in order to avoid all difficulty of interpretation, these first two classes of exceptions have been formally stated in the protocol. . there is a third class of disputes to which the new system of pacific settlement can also not be applied. these are disputes which aim at revising treaties and international acts in force, or which seek to jeopardise the existing territorial integrity of signatory states. the proposal was made to include these exceptions in the protocol, but the two committees were unanimous in considering that, both from the legal and from the political point of view, the impossibility of applying compulsory arbitration to such cases was so obvious that it was quite superfluous to make them the subject of a special provision. it was thought sufficient to mention them in this report. { } .--role of the assembly under the system set up by the protocol. _article ._ the new procedure should be adapted to the old one, which gave the assembly the same powers as the council when a dispute is brought before it, either by the council itself or at the request of one of the parties. the question has arisen whether the system of maintaining in the new procedure this equality of powers between the two organs of the league of nations is a practical one. some were of opinion that it would be better to exclude intervention by the assembly. finally, however, the opposite opinion prevailed; an appeal to the assembly may, indeed, have an important influence from the point of view of public opinion. without going so far as to assign to the assembly the same rôle as to the council, it has been decided to adopt a mixed system by which the assembly is, in principle, substituted for the council in order that, when a dispute is referred to it in conformity with paragraph of article of the covenant, it may undertake, in the place of the council, the various duties provided for in article of the present protocol with the exception of purely executive acts which will always devolve upon the council. for example, the organisation and management of compulsory arbitration, or the transmission of a question to the permanent court of international justice, must always be entrusted to the council, because, in practice, the latter is the only body qualified for such purposes. the possible intervention of the assembly does not affect in any way the final result of the new procedure. if the assembly does not succeed in conciliating the parties and if one of them so requests, compulsory arbitration will be arranged by the council in accordance with the rules laid down beforehand. if none of the parties asks for arbitration, the matter is referred back to the assembly, and if the solution recommended { } by the assembly obtains the majority required under paragraph of article of the covenant, it has the same value as a unanimous decision of the council. lastly, if the necessary majority is not obtained, the dispute is submitted to a compulsory arbitration organised by the council. in any event, as in the case where the council alone intervenes, a definitive and binding solution of the dispute is reached. .--domestic jurisdiction of states. _article ._ the present protocol in no way derogates from the rule of article , paragraph , of the covenant, which protects national sovereignty. in order that there might be no doubt on this point, it appeared advisable to say so expressly. before the council, whatever be the stage in the procedure set up by the protocol at which the council intervenes, the provision referred to applies without any modification. the rule is applied also to both cases of compulsory arbitration. if one of the states parties to the dispute claims that the dispute or part thereof arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within its jurisdiction, the arbitrators must on this point take the advice of the permanent court of international justice through the medium of the council, for the question thus put in issue is a legal question upon which a judicial opinion should be obtained. the court will thus have to give a decision as to whether the question in dispute is governed by international law or whether it falls within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned. its functions will be limited to this point and the question will in any event be referred back to the arbitrators. but, unlike other opinions requested of the court in the course of a compulsory arbitration--opinions which for the arbitrators are purely { } advisory--in the present case the opinion of the court is compulsory in the sense that, if the court has recognised that the question in dispute falls entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned, the arbitrators will simply have to register this conclusion in their award. it is only if the court holds that the question in dispute is governed by international law that the arbitrators will again take the case under consideration in order to give a decision upon its substance. the compulsory character of the court's opinion, in this case, increases the importance of the double question referred to above, in connection with article , relating to the calling-in of national judges, and the application of article of the statute of the court in matters of advisory procedure. while the principle of article , paragraph , of the covenant is maintained, it has been necessary, in order to make its application more flexible, to call in aid the rule contained in article of the covenant, which makes it the duty of the league of nations, in the event of war or a threat of war, to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effective to safeguard the peace of nations," and obliges the secretary-general to summon forthwith a meeting of the council on the request of any member of the league. it is in this way understood that when it has been recognised that a dispute arises out of a matter which is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the parties, that party or its opponent will be fully entitled to call upon the council or the assembly to act. there is nothing new in this simple reference to article . it leaves unimpaired the right of the council to take such action as it may deem wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. it does not confer new powers of functions on either the council or the assembly. both these organs of the league simply retain the powers now conferred upon them by the covenant. in order to dispel any doubt which may arise from the { } parallel which has been drawn between article , paragraph , and article of the covenant, a very clear explanation was given in the course of the discussion in the first committee. where a dispute is submitted to the council under article and it is claimed by one party that the dispute arises out of a matter left exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction by international law, paragraph prevents the council from making any recommendations upon the subject if it holds that the contention raised by the party is correct and that the dispute does in fact arise out of a matter exclusively within that state's jurisdiction. the effect of this paragraph is that the council cannot make any recommendation in the technical sense in which that term is used in article , that is to say, it cannot make, even by unanimous report, recommendations which become binding on the parties in virtue of paragraph g. unanimity for the purpose of article implies a report concurred in by all the members of the council other than the parties to the dispute. only a report so concurred in is one which the parties to the dispute are bound to observe, in the sense that, if they resort to war with any party which complies with the recommendations, it will constitute a breach of article of the covenant and will set in play the sanctions which are there referred to. on the other hand, article is of different scope: first, it operates only in time of war or threat of war; secondly, it confers no right on the council or on the assembly to impose any solution of a dispute without the consent of the parties. action taken by the council or the assembly under this article cannot become binding on the parties to the dispute in the sense in which recommendations under article become binding, unless they have themselves concurred in it. one last point should be made clear. the reference which is made to article of the covenant holds good only in the eventuality contemplated in article , paragraph , of the covenant. it is obvious that when a unanimous decision of the { } council or an arbitral award has been given upon the substance of a dispute, that dispute is finally settled and cannot again be brought either directly or indirectly under discussion. article of the covenant does not deal with situations which are covered by rules of law capable of application by a judge. it applies only to cases which are not yet regulated by international law. in fact, it demonstrates the existence of loop-holes in the law. the reference to article in two of the articles of the protocol (articles and ) has advantages beyond those to which attention is drawn in the commentary on the text of those articles. it will be an incitement to science to clear the ground for the work which the league of nations will one day have to undertake with a view to bringing about, through the development of the rules of international law, a closer reconciliation between the individual interests of its members and the universal interests which it is designed to serve. .--determination of the aggressor. _article ._ in order that the procedure of pacific settlement may be accompanied by the necessary sanctions, it has been necessary to provide for determining exactly the state guilty of aggression to which sanctions are to be applied. this question is a very complex one, and in the earlier work of the league the military experts and jurists who had had to deal with it found it extremely difficult. there are two aspects to the problem: first, aggression has to be defined, and, secondly, its existence has to be ascertained. the definition of aggression is a relatively easy matter, for it is sufficient to say that any state is the aggressor which resorts in any shape or form to force in violation of the engagements contracted by it either under the covenant (if, for instance, being a member of the league of nations, it has not respected the territorial integrity or political independence of another member { } of the league) or under the present protocol (if, for instance, being a signatory of the protocol, it has refused to conform to an arbitral award or to a unanimous decision of the council). this is the effect of article , which also adds that the violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone is to be regarded as equivalent to resort to war. the text refers to resort to war, but it was understood during the discussion that, while mention was made of the most serious and striking instance, it was in accordance with the spirit of the protocol that acts of violence and force, which possibly may not constitute an actual state of war, should nevertheless be taken into consideration by the council. on the contrary, to ascertain the existence of aggression is a very difficult matter, for although the first of the two elements which together constitute aggression, namely, the violation of an engagement, is easy to verify, the second, namely, resort to force, is not an easy matter to ascertain. when one country attacks another, the latter necessarily defends itself, and when hostilities are in progress on both sides, the question arises which party began them. this is a question of fact concerning which opinions may differ. the first idea which occurs to the mind is to make it the duty of the council to determine who is the aggressor. but, immediately, the question arises whether the council must decide this question unanimously, or whether a majority vote would suffice. there are serious disadvantages in both solutions and they are therefore unacceptable. to insist upon a unanimous decision of the council exposes the state attacked to the loss of those definite guarantees to which it is entitled, if one single member of the council--be it in good faith or otherwise--insists on adhering to an interpretation of the facts different from that of all his colleagues. it is impossible to admit that the very existence of a nation should be subject to such a hazard. it is not sufficient to point out that { } the council would be bound to declare the existence of aggression in an obvious case and that it could not fail to carry out its duty. the duty would be a duty without a sanction and if by any chance the council were not to do its duty, the state attacked would be deprived of all guarantees. but it would also be dangerous to rely on a majority vote of the council. in that case, the danger would be incurred by the state called upon to furnish assistance and to support the heavy burden of common action, if it still entertained some doubt as to the guilt of the country against which it had to take action. such a country would run the risk of having to conform to a decision with which it did not agree. the only escape from this dilemma appeared to lie in some automatic procedure which would not necessarily be based on a decision of the council. after examining the difficulty and discussing it in all its aspects, the first committee believes that it has found the solution in the idea of a presumption which shall hold good until the contrary has been established by a unanimous decision of the council. the committee is of opinion that this presumption arises in three cases, namely, when a resort to war is accompanied: by a refusal to accept the procedure of pacific settlement or to submit to the decision resulting therefrom; by violation of provisional measures enjoined by the council as contemplated by article of the protocol; or by disregard of a decision recognising that the dispute arises out of a matter which lies exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the other party and by failure or by refusal to submit the question first to the council or the assembly. in these cases, even if there is not absolute certainty, there exists at any rate a very strong presumption which should suffice for the application of sanctions unless proof to the contrary has been furnished by a unanimous decision of the council. it will be noticed that there is a characteristic difference between the first two cases and the third. { } in the first two cases the presumption exists when, in addition to a state of war, the special condition referred to is also fulfilled. in the third case, however, the presumption is dependent upon three conditions: disobedience to a decision, wilful failure to take advantage of the remedy provided in article of the covenant, and the existence of a state of war. this difference is due to the necessity of taking into account the provisions of article analysed above, which, by its reference to article of the covenant, renders the application of paragraph of article of the covenant more flexible. after very careful consideration it appeared that it would be unreasonable and unjust to regard as _ipso facto_ an aggressor a state which, being prevented through the operation of paragraph of article from urging its claims by pacific methods and being thus left to its own resources, is in despair driven to war. it was considered to be more in harmony with the requirements of justice and peace to give such a state which has been non-suited on the preliminary question of the domestic jurisdiction of its adversary, a last chance of arriving at an amicable agreement by offering it the final method of conciliation prescribed in article of the covenant. it is only if, after rejecting this method, it has recourse to war that it will be presumed to be an aggressor. this mitigation of the rigid character of paragraph of article has been accepted, not only because it is just, but also because it opens no breach in the barrier set up by the protocol against aggressive war: it in no way infringes the principle--which remains unshaken--that a war undertaken against a state whose exclusive jurisdiction has been formally recognised is an international crime to be avenged collectively by the signatories of the protocol. when a state whose demands have been met with the plea of the domestic jurisdiction of its adversary has employed the resource provided for in article of the covenant, the presumption of aggression falls to the ground. the aggression itself { } remains. it will be for the council to decide who is responsible for the aggression in accordance with the procedure which will be described below. apart from the above cases, there exists no presumption which can make it possible automatically to determine who is the aggressor. but this fact must be determined, and, if no other solution can be found, the decision must be left to the council. the same principle applies where one of the parties is a state which is not a signatory of the protocol and not a member of the league. if the council is unanimous, no difficulty arises. if, however, the council is not unanimous, the difficulty is to be overcome by directing that the council must enjoin upon the belligerents an armistice the terms of which it will fix if need be by a two-thirds majority and the party which rejects the armistice or violates it is to be held to be an aggressor. the system is therefore complete and is as automatic as it can be made. where a presumption has arisen and is not rejected by a unanimous decision of the council, the facts themselves decide who is an aggressor; no further decision by the council is needed and the question of unanimity or majority does not present itself; the facts once established, the council is bound to act accordingly. where there is no presumption, the council has to declare the fact of aggression; a decision is necessary and must be taken unanimously. if unanimity is not obtained, the council is bound to enjoin an armistice, and for this purpose no decision properly speaking has to be taken: there exists an obligation which the council must fulfil; it is only the fixing of the terms of the armistice which necessitates a decision, and for this purpose a two-thirds majority suffices. it was proposed to declare that, in cases of extreme urgency, the council might determine the aggressor, or fix the conditions of an armistice, without waiting for the arrival of the { } representative which a party not represented among its members has been invited to send under the terms of paragraph of article of the covenant. it seemed preferable, however, not to lay down any rule on this matter at present but to ask the special committee which the council is to appoint for the drafting of amendments to the covenant on the lines of the protocol, to consider whether such a rule is really necessary. it may in fact be thought that the council already possesses all the necessary powers in this matter and that, in cases of extreme urgency, if the state invited to send a representative is too far distant from the seat of the council, that body may decide that the representative shall be chosen from persons near at hand and shall attend the meeting within a prescribed period, on the expiry of which the matter may be considered in his absence. the fact of aggression having been established by presumption or by unanimous decision of the council or by refusal to accept or violation of the armistice, it will only remain to apply the sanctions and bring into play the obligations of the guarantor states. the council will merely call upon them to fulfil their duty; here, again, there is no decision to be taken but an obligation to be fulfilled, and the question of majority or unanimous vote does not arise. it is not, indeed, a matter of voting at all. in order to leave no room for doubt, it has been formally laid down that a state which, at the invitation of the council, engages in acts of violence against an aggressor is in the legal position of a belligerent and may consequently exercise the rights inherent in that character. it was pointed out in the course of the discussion that such a state does not possess entire freedom of action. the force employed by it must be proportionate to the object in view and must be exercised within the limits and under the conditions recommended by the council. { } _article ._ likewise, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, it has been stipulated, in a special article, that unanimity or the necessary majority in the council is always calculated according to the rule referred to on several occasions in article of the covenant and repeated in article of the covenant for the case of expulsion of a member from the league, viz., without counting the votes of the representatives of the parties to the dispute. .--disputes between states signatory and states non-signatory of the protocol. _article ._ as regards the settlement of disputes arising between a state signatory and one or more states non-signatory and non-members of the league of nations, the new system has had to be adapted to the former system. in order that states signatory might enjoy the essential advantages offered by the protocol, which forbids all wars of aggression, it has been necessary to bring the rule laid down in article of the covenant into harmony with the provisions of the protocol. it has therefore been decided that states non-signatory and non-members of the league of nations in conflict with a state signatory shall be invited to conform to the new procedure of pacific settlement and that, if they refuse to do so and resort to war against a state signatory, they shall be amenable to the sanctions provided by article of the covenant as defined by the protocol. there is no change in the arrangements laid down in the covenant for the settlement of disputes arising between states members of the league of nations of which one is a signatory of the protocol and the other is not. the legal nexus established by the covenant between two such parties does not allow the signatory states to apply as of right the new procedure of pacific settlement to non-signatory but member states. all that { } signatory states are entitled to expect as regards such other states is that the council should provide the latter with an opportunity to follow this procedure and it is to be hoped that they will do so. but such states can only be offered an opportunity to follow the new procedure; they cannot be obliged to follow it. if they refuse, preferring to adhere to the procedure laid down in the covenant, no sanctions could possibly be applied to them. the above indicated solution of the case of states non-signatory but members of the league of nations appears to be so obvious as to require no special mention in the protocol. a proposal to make a special mention of the matter was made, but after explanations had been given, the authors withdrew their suggestion, declaring that they would be satisfied with the above reference to the subject. at first sight the difference in the way it is proposed to treat non-signatories non-members of the league of nations and non-signatories members of the league may cause some surprise, for it would seem that the signatory states impose greater obligations on the first category than on the second. this, however, is only an appearance. in reality, the signatory states impose no obligations on either category. they cannot do so because the present protocol is _res inter alias acta_ for all non-signatory states, whether they are members of the league of nations or not. the signatories merely undertake obligations as between themselves as to the manner in which they will behave if one of them becomes involved in a conflict with a third state. but whereas, in possible conflicts with a state non-signatory and non-member of the league, they are entirely free to take such action as they choose, in conflicts which may arise between them and states non-signatory but members, like themselves, of the league of nations, their freedom of action is to some extent circumscribed because both parties are bound by legal obligations arising under the covenant. { } .--work of the third committee. (_rapporteur_: m. benes) security and reduction of armaments. (_articles to , to , and of the protocol_) .--introduction. the special work of the third committee was to deal with the problem of security (sanctions) and the reduction of armaments. the work required, above all, important political negotiations. while the question of arbitration only required one political decision of principle, namely, the acceptance of compulsory arbitration, and the remainder was principally a matter of drafting--without question an extremely difficult task--of a scheme for the application of such arbitration, the questions of security and disarmament necessitated long and laborious political negotiations; for they involved fundamental interests, questions of vital importance to the states, engagements so far-reaching as radically to change the general situation of the various countries. although in the work of the first committee the assembly had distinctly indicated in its resolution of september th that there was a likelihood--indeed, a necessity--of amending the covenant, the work of the third committee as regards questions of security and reduction of armaments had, in conformity with the debates of the assembly, to remain within the framework of the covenant. above all, it was a question of developing and rendering more precise what is already laid down in the covenant. all our discussions, all our labours, were guided by these principles, and a delicate task was thus imposed upon us. but the spirit of conciliation which pervaded all the discussions has permitted us to resolve the two problems which were placed before us. this is, indeed, an important result, and if the solution of the problem of arbitration which has been so { } happily arrived at by the first committee be also taken into consideration, we are in the presence of a system the adoption of which may entirely modify our present political life. this is the real import of the articles of the protocol concerning the questions of security and reduction of armaments. .--threat of aggression: preventive measures. _article ._ the pacific settlement of disputes being provided for in the present protocol, the signatory states undertake, should any conflict arise between them, not to resort to preparations for the settlement of such dispute by war and, in general, to abstain from any act calculated to aggravate or extend the said dispute. this principle applies both to the period preceding the submission of the dispute to arbitration or conciliation and to the period in which the case is pending. this provision is not unaccompanied by sanctions. any appeal against the violation of the aforesaid undertakings may, in conformity with article of the covenant, be brought before the council. one might say that, in addition to such primary dispute as is or might be submitted to the council or to some other competent organ, a second dispute arises, caused by the violation of the undertakings provided for in the first paragraph. the council, unless it be of opinion that the appeal is not worthy of consideration, will proceed with the necessary enquiries and investigations. should it be established that an offence has been committed against the provisions of the first paragraph, it will be the duty of the council, in the light of the results of such enquiries and investigations, to call upon any state guilty of the offence to put an end thereto. any such state failing to comply will be declared by the council to be guilty of violation of the covenant (article ) or the protocol. the council must, further, take the necessary measures to put an end, as soon as possible, to a situation calculated to { } threaten the peace of the world. the text does not define the nature of these preventive measures. its elasticity permits the council to take such measures as may be appropriate in each concrete case, as, for example, the evacuation of territories. any decisions which may be taken by the council in virtue of this article may be taken by a two-thirds majority, except in the case of decisions dealing with questions of procedure which still come under the general rule of article , paragraph , of the covenant. the following decisions, therefore, can be taken by a two-thirds majority: the decision as to whether there has or has not been an offence against the first paragraph; the decision calling upon the guilty state to remedy the offence; the decision as to whether there has or has not been refusal to remedy the offence; lastly, the decision as to the measures calculated to put an end, as soon as possible, to a situation calculated to threaten the peace of the world. the original text of article provided that, in the case of enquiries and investigations, the council should avail itself of the organisation to be set up by the conference for the reduction of armaments in order to ensure respect for the decisions of that conference. there is no longer any mention of this organisation, but this omission does not prejudice any decisions which the conference may be called upon to take regarding the matter. it will be entirely free to set up an organisation, if it judges this necessary, and the council's right to make use of this body for the enquiries and investigations contemplated will, _a fortiori_, remain intact. _article ._ article must be considered in relation to article . article establishes the obligation not to resort to war, while article , giving effect to article of the covenant, goes further. the { } signatories undertake to abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against any other state. thus, every act which comes within the scope of this idea of a threat of war--and its scope is sufficiently elastic--constitutes a breach of the protocol, and therefore a dispute with which the council is competent to deal. if, for example, one state alleges that another state is engaged in preparations which are nothing less than a particular form of threat of war (such as any kind of secret mobilisation, concentration of troops, formation of armed bodies with the connivance of the government, etc.), the council, having established that there is a case for consideration, will apply the procedure which may be defined as the procedure of preventive measures; it will arrange for suitable enquiries and investigations, and, in the event of any breach of the provisions of paragraph being established, will take the steps described in article , paragraph . .--security--sanctions. _article ._ (_article , paragraphs and , of the protocol in its relation to articles and of the covenant_) according to article of the covenant, members of the league undertake to preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. in case of aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. according to article , should any member of the league resort to war in disregard of its engagements under articles , or , all other members of the league undertake immediately to apply economic sanctions; furthermore, it shall be the duty of the council to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air forces the members of the league shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the engagements of the league. { } at the time when they were drafted at the peace conference in paris in , these articles gave rise to keen controversy as to the exact scope of the engagements entered into in these provisions, that is to say, as to the nature and extent of the obligations referred to in article , the exact moment at which such obligations arose, and the legal consequences of the council recommendations referred to in article , paragraph . this controversy continued, as is well known, in the debates here in geneva, where the question has been discussed in previous years. article is intended to settle this controversy. the signatories of the present protocol accept the obligation to apply against the aggressor the various sanctions laid down in the covenant, as interpreted in article of the protocol, when an act of aggression has been established and the council has called upon the signatory states immediately to apply such sanctions (article , last paragraph). should they fail so to do, they will not be fulfilling their obligations. the nature and extent of this obligation is clearly defined in paragraph of article . according to this paragraph, the reply to the question whether a signatory to the protocol has or has not fulfilled its obligation depends on whether it has loyally and effectively co-operated in resisting the act of aggression to an extent consistent with its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments. the state remains in control of its forces, and itself, and not the council, directs them, but paragraph of article gives us positive material upon which to form a judgment as to whether or not the obligation has been carried out in any concrete case. this criterion is supplied by the term: _loyally and effectively_. in answering the question whether a state has or has not fulfilled its obligations in regard to sanctions, a certain elasticity in the obligations laid down in article allows of the possibility of _taking into account, from every point of view, the position of each state which is a signatory to the present protocol_. the signatory states are not all in possession of equal facilities for { } acting when the time comes to apply the sanctions. this depends upon the geographical position and economic and social condition of the state, the nature of its population, internal institutions, etc. indeed, during the discussion as to the system of sanctions, certain delegations declared that their countries were in a special situation by reason of their geographical position or the state of their armaments. these countries desired to co-operate to the fullest extent of their resources in resistance to every act of aggression, but they drew attention to their special conditions. in order to take account of this situation, an addition has been made to paragraph of article pointing out this state of affairs and laying stress on the particular situation of the countries in question. moreover, article of the protocol allows such countries to inform the council of these matters beforehand. i would further add that the obligations i refer to are imperfect obligations in the sense that no sanctions are provided for against any party which shall have failed loyally and effectively to co-operate in protecting the covenant and resisting every act of aggression. it should, however, be emphasised that such a state would have failed in the fulfilment of its duties and would be guilty of a violation of engagements entered into. in view of the foregoing, the gist of article , paragraphs and , might be expressed as follows: each state is the judge of the manner in which it shall carry out its obligations but not of the existence of those obligations, that is to say, each state remains the judge of what it will do but no longer remains the judge of what it should do. now that the present protocol has defined more precisely the origin, nature and extent of the obligations arising out of the covenant, _the functions of the council, as provided in articles and , have become clearer and more definite_. directly the council has called upon the signatories to the protocol to apply without delay the sanctions provided in { } article , it becomes a regulating, or rather an advisory, body, but not an executive body. the nature of the acts of aggression may vary considerably; the means for their suppression will also vary. it would frequently be unnecessary to make use of all the means which, according to paragraphs and of article , are, so to speak, available for resisting an act of aggression. it might even be dangerous if, from fear of failing in their duties, states made superfluous efforts. it will devolve upon the council, which, under article can be put in possession of the necessary data, to give _its opinion_, should need occur, as to the best means of executing the obligations which arise directly it enjoins the application of sanctions, especially as to the sequence in which the sanctions must be applied. the practical application of the sanctions would, however, always devolve upon the governments; the real co-operation would ensue upon their getting into touch, through diplomatic channels--perhaps by conferences--and by direct relations between different general staffs, as in the last war. the council would, of course, be aware of all these negotiations, would be consulted and make recommendations. the difference between the former state of affairs and the new will therefore be as follows: according to the system laid down by the covenant: . the dispute arises. . in cases where neither the arbitral procedure nor the judicial settlement provided for in article of the covenant is applied, the council meets and discusses the dispute, attempts to effect conciliation, mediation, etc. . if it be unsuccessful and war breaks out, the council, if unanimous, has to express an opinion as to which party is guilty. the members of the league then decide for themselves whether this opinion is justified and whether their obligations to apply economic sanctions become operative. . it then has, _by a unanimous decision, to recommend_ military sanctions. { } . if unanimity cannot be obtained, the council ceasing to take action, each party is practically free to act as it chooses. according to the new system defined in the protocol, the situation is as follows: . the dispute arises. . the system of peaceful settlement provided for by the protocol comes into play. . the council intervenes, and if, after arbitration has been refused, war is resorted to, if the provisional preventive measures are not observed, etc., the council decides which party is the aggressor and calls upon the signatory states to apply the sanctions. . this decision implies that such sanctions as the case requires--economic, financial, military, naval and air--shall be applied forthwith, and without further recommendations or decisions. we have therefore the following new elements: (_a_) the obligation to apply the necessary sanctions of every kind as a direct result of the decision of the council. (_b_) the elimination of the case in which all parties would be practically free to abstain from any action. the introduction of a system of arbitration and of provisional measures which permits of the determination in every case of the aggressor. (_c_) no decision is taken as to the strength of the military, naval and air forces, and no details are given as to the measures which are to be adopted in a particular case. none the less, objective criteria are supplied which define the obligation of each signatory; it is bound, in resistance to an act of aggression, to collaborate _loyally and effectively_ in applying the sanctions in accordance with its geographical situation and its particular situation as regards armaments. that is why i said that _the great omission in the covenant has been made good_. { } it is true that no burden has been imposed on states beyond the sanctions already provided for in the covenant. but, at present, a state seeking to elude the obligations of the covenant can reckon on two means of escape: ( ) the council's recommendations need not be followed. ( ) the council may fail to obtain unanimity, making impossible any declaration of aggression, so that no obligation to apply military sanctions will be imposed and everyone will remain free to act as he chooses. we have abandoned the above system and both these loopholes are now closed. _article , paragraphs and ._ paragraph of article has been drafted with a view to giving greater precision to certain provisions of article , paragraph , of the covenant. article , paragraph , refers to mutual support in the application of financial and economic measures. article , paragraph , of the present protocol establishes real economic and financial co-operation between a state which has been attacked and the various states which come to its assistance. as, under article of the protocol, it may happen that both states involved in a dispute are declared to be aggressors, the question arose as to what would be the best method of settling this problem. there were three alternatives: to apply the principle contained in paragraph , which is practically equivalent to making a sort of police war on both parties--or to leave the matter to pursue its course, or, finally, to compel states which disturb the peace of the world to desist from acts of war by the employment of means less severe than those indicated in paragraph . it is the last method which has been chosen. only economic measures will be taken against such states, and naturally they will not be entitled to receive the assistance referred to in article , paragraph . { } _article ._ article , paragraph , of the covenant provides for the immediate severance of all trade or financial relations with the aggressor state, and paragraph of the same article provides, _inter alia_, for economic and financial co-operation between the state attacked and the various states coming to its assistance. as has already been pointed out, these engagements have been confirmed and made more definite in article of the protocol. but the severance of relations and the co-operation referred to necessarily involve measures so complex that, when the moment arises, doubts may well occur as to what measures are necessary and appropriate to give effect to the obligations assumed under the above provisions. these problems require full consideration in order that states may know beforehand what their attitude should be. article defines the conditions of such investigation. it is not expressly stated that the problem will be examined by the council in collaboration with the various governments, but the council will naturally, if it deems it necessary, invite the governments to furnish such information as it may require for the purpose of carrying out the task entrusted to it under article . _article , paragraph ._ the above explanation of article , paragraphs and , contains many references to article . as i have already pointed out, in case sanctions have to be applied, it is highly important that there should exist some organ competent to express an opinion as to the best way in which their obligations could be carried out by the signatories. as you are aware, this organ, according to the covenant, is the council. in order that the council may effectively fulfil this duty, article empowers it to receive undertakings from states, determining _in advance_ the military, naval and air forces which they would { } be able to bring into action immediately in order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions arising, out of the covenant and the present protocol. it is also necessary to emphasise the fact that the means which the states signatories to the present protocol have at their disposal for the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of article vary considerably owing to the differences in the geographical, economic, financial, political and social condition of different states. information as to the means at the disposal of each state is therefore indispensable in order that the council may in full understanding give its opinion as to the best method by which such obligations may best be carried out. finally, as regards the question of the reduction of armaments, which is the final goal to which our efforts are tending, the information thus furnished to the council may be of very great importance, as every state, knowing what forces will be available for its assistance in case it is attacked, will be able to judge to what extent it may reduce its armaments without compromising its existence as a state, and every state will thus be able to provide the international conference for the reduction of armaments with very valuable data. i should add, moreover, that article , paragraph , does not render it compulsory for states to furnish this information. it is desirable that states should furnish the council with this information, but they are at liberty not to do so. _article , paragraphs and ._ the provisions of article , paragraphs and , refer to the special agreements which were discussed at such length last year. in view of the fact that, according to paragraph , such agreements can only come into force when the council has invited the signatory states to apply the sanctions, the nature of these agreements may be defined as follows: special agreements must be regarded as the means for the rapid application of sanctions of every kind in a particular case { } of aggression. they are additional guarantees which give weaker states an absolute assurance that the system of sanctions will never fail. they guarantee that there will always be states prepared immediately to carry out the obligations provided for in article of the protocol. in accordance with article of the covenant, it is expressly stated that these agreements will be registered and published by the secretariat, and it has also been decided that they will remain open for signature to any state member of the league of nations which may desire to accede to them. .--ending of sanctions: punishment of the aggressor. _article ._ article is in perfect keeping with the last paragraphs of articles and . in the paragraphs in question, the coming into operation of the sanctions depends upon an injunction by the council; it therefore also devolves upon the council to declare that the object for which the sanctions were applied has been attained. just as the application of the sanctions is a matter for the states, so it rests with them to liquidate the operations undertaken with a view to resisting the act of aggression. _article ._ paragraph is similar to article of the draft treaty of mutual assistance drawn up last year. paragraph is designed to prevent the sanctions provided for in article from undergoing any change in character during the process of execution and developing into a war of annexation. in view of the observations of various delegations regarding the punishment of the aggressor, it should be added that it would be incorrect to interpret this article as meaning that the only penalties to be apprehended by the aggressor as the result of his act shall be the burdens referred to in paragraph . if { } necessary, securities against fresh aggression, or pledges guaranteeing the fulfilment of the obligations imposed in accordance with paragraph , might be required. only annexation of territory and measures involving the loss of political independence are declared inadmissible. "territory" is to be taken to mean the whole territory of a state, no distinction being made between the mother-country and the colonies. .--reduction of armaments. _articles and ._ although it has not been possible to solve the problem of the reduction of armaments in the clauses of the document submitted to the assembly for approval, our work paves the way to it and makes it possible. the reduction of armaments will result, in the first place, from the general security created by a diminution of the dangers of war arising from the compulsory pacific settlement of all disputes. it will also ensue from the certainty which any state attacked will have of obtaining the economic and financial support of all the signatory states, and such support would be especially important should the aggressor be a great power, capable of carrying on a long war. nevertheless, for states which, owing to their geographical position, are especially liable to attack, and for states whose most important centres are adjacent to their frontiers, the dangers of a sudden attack are so great that it will not be possible for them to base any plan for the reduction of their armaments simply upon the political and economic factors referred to above, no matter what the importance of such factors may be. it has also been repeatedly declared that many states would require to know what military support they could count on, before the convening of the conference, if they are to submit to { } the conference proposals for large reductions of armaments; this might necessitate negotiations between the governments and with the council before the meeting of the conference for the reduction of armaments provided for in article . the undertakings referred to in article of the protocol should be interpreted in the light of the above. in drawing up the general programme of the conference, it will also be necessary, as stated in paragraph of article , for the council, apart from other criteria "to take into account the undertakings mentioned." in view of the close interdependence of the three great problems involved, namely, the pacific settlement of disputes, sanctions against those who disturb the peace of the world, and reduction of armaments, the protocol provides for the convening by the council of a general conference for the reduction of armaments and for the preparation of the work of such a conference. furthermore, the application of the clauses concerning arbitration and sanctions will be conditional on the adoption by the said conference of a plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments. moreover, in order to preserve the connection between the three big problems referred to above, it is provided that the whole protocol will lapse in the event of the non-execution of the scheme adopted by the conference. it devolves upon the council to declare this under conditions to be determined by the conference itself. the last paragraph of article provides for the case of the partial lapsing of the protocol after it has been put into force. should the plan adopted by the conference be regarded as having been put into effect, any state which fails to execute it, so far as it is concerned, will not benefit by the provisions of the protocol. { } .--the covenant and the protocol. _article ._ the present protocol emphasises and defines certain obligations arising out of the covenant. those of which the present protocol makes no mention are not affected in any manner. they still exist. examples which might be quoted are those laid down in article , paragraph , of the covenant, namely, the obligation of the states to give one another mutual support in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the application of the economic and financial sanctions or the obligation of the states to take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to forces which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the league. moreover, as the swiss delegation suggests, attention should be directed to the fact that the present protocol does not in any way affect the special position of switzerland arising out of the declaration of the council at london on february th, . as the special position of switzerland is in accordance with the covenant, it will also be in accordance with the protocol. iii. conclusion. no further explanations need be added to these comments on the articles. the main principles of the protocol are clear, as are the detailed provisions. our purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it. to do this, we had to create a system for the pacific settlement of all disputes which might arise. in other words, it meant the creation of a system of arbitration from which no international dispute, whether legal or political, could escape. the plan drawn up leaves no loophole; it prohibits wars of every description and lays down that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means. { } but this absolute character which has been given to the system of arbitration should also belong to the whole of the scheme, to the treatment of every question of principle. if there were one single gap in the system, if the smallest opening were left for any measure of force, the whole system would collapse. to this end arbitration is provided for every kind of dispute, and aggression is defined in such a way as to give no cause for hesitation when the council has to take a decision. these reasons led us to fill in the gaps in the covenant and to define the sanctions in such a way that no possible means could be found of evading them, and that there should be a sound and definite basis for the feeling of security. finally, the conference for the reduction of armaments is indissolubly bound up with this whole system: _there can be no arbitration or security without disarmament, nor can there be disarmament without arbitration and security_. the peace of the world is at stake. the fifth assembly has undertaken a work of worldwide political importance which, if it succeeds, is destined profoundly to modify present political conditions. this year great progress in this direction has been made in our work. if we succeed, the league of nations will have rendered an inestimable service to the whole modern world. such success depends partly upon the assembly itself and partly upon individual governments. we submit to the assembly the fruit of our labours: a work charged with the highest hopes. we beg the assembly to examine our proposals with care, and to recommend them to the various governments for acceptance. in this spirit and with such hopes do we request the assembly to vote the draft resolutions and that are presented with this report. { } annex d. resolutions. resolution of the assembly, september th, . the assembly, noting the declarations of the governments represented, observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding tending to establish a secure peace, decides as follows: with a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergences between certain points of view which have been expressed and, when agreements have been reached, to enable an international conference upon armaments to be summoned by the league of nations at the earliest possible moment: ( ) the third committee is requested to consider the material dealing with security and the reduction of armaments, particularly the observations of the governments on the draft treaty of mutual assistance prepared in pursuance of resolution xiv of the third assembly and other plans prepared and presented to the secretary-general, since the publication of the draft treaty, and to examine the obligations contained in the covenant of the league in relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require: ( ) the first committee is requested: (_a_) to consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the covenant relating to the settlement of disputes; (_b_) to examine within what limits the terms of article , paragraph , of the statute establishing the permanent court of international justice might be rendered more precise and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause; and thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between states. { } resolution of the assembly, september th, . whereas the work of the league of nations in connection with the reduction of armaments is entering this year upon a period of re-organisation which requires the direct attention of the council, the assembly entrusts to the council the question of the co-ordination of the work of its commissions for the reduction of armaments. the assembly recommends the council to re-organise the temporary mixed commission in conformity with the following principles: ( ) the commission shall include the representatives of a certain number of governments; ( ) the commission shall include qualified delegates of the technical organisation of the league of nations, that is to say: representatives of the economic committee, " " " financial committee, " " " transit committee, " " " permanent advisory commission, " " " employers' and labour groups of the international labour office, experts, jurists or others elected by the council. ( ) delegates of states not represented on the commission may be invited to attend whenever the commission thinks fit. ( ) the council may invite any states not members of the league of nations which may have notified their intention of taking part in the international conference for the reduction of armaments to appoint representatives to participate in the work of the commission. resolution of the assembly, october nd, . i. the assembly, having taken note of the reports of the first and third { } committees on the questions referred to them by the assembly resolution of september th, , welcomes warmly the draft protocol on the pacific settlement of international disputes proposed by the two committees, of which the text is annexed to this resolution, and decides ( ) to recommend to the earnest attention of all the members of the league the acceptance of the said draft protocol; ( ) to open immediately the said protocol in the terms proposed for signature by those representatives of members of the league who are already in a position to sign it and to hold it open for signature by all other states; ( ) to request the council forthwith to appoint a committee to draft the amendments to the covenant contemplated by the terms of the said protocol; ( ) to request the council to convene an international conference for the reduction of armaments, which shall meet at geneva as provided by the following stipulations of article of the draft protocol: "in preparation for the convening of the conference, the council shall draw up, with due regard to the undertakings contained in articles and of the present protocol, a general programme for the reduction and limitation of armaments which shall be laid before the conference and be communicated to the governments at the earliest possible date, and at the latest, three months before the conference meets. "if by may st, , ratifications have not been deposited by at least a majority of the permanent members of the council and ten other members of the league, the secretary-general of the league shall immediately consult the council as to whether he shall cancel the invitations or merely adjourn the conference to a subsequent date to be fixed by the council so as to permit the necessary number of ratifications to be obtained." { } ( ) to request the council to put into immediate execution the provisions of article of the draft protocol. recommendation of the assembly, october nd, . ii. the assembly, having taken cognisance of the report of the first committee upon the terms of article , paragraph , of the statute of the permanent court of international justice; considering that the study of the said terms shows them to be sufficiently wide to permit states to adhere to the special protocol, opened for signature in virtue of article , paragraph , with the reservations which they regard as indispensable; convinced that it is in the interest of the progress of international justice, and consistent with the expectations of the opinion of the world, that the greatest possible number of states should, to the widest possible extent, accept as compulsory the jurisdiction of the court. recommends: states to accede at the earliest possible date to the special protocol opened for signature in virtue of article , paragraph , of the statute of the permanent court of international justice. resolution of the assembly, october nd, . i. the assembly recommends the council to place the question of regional agreements for the reduction of armaments on the agenda of the international conference for the reduction of armaments. ii. whereas the majority of the states which have replied have stated that, with certain exceptions, they have not exceeded the expenditure on armaments shown in their last budgets, and whereas the recommendation addressed to the governments relates to the period which must elapse before the meeting of the international conference for the reduction of armaments, which is to take place next year: { } the assembly does not consider it necessary to repeat the recommendation regarding the limitation of expenditure on armaments, as this question is to be placed upon the agenda of the international conference for the reduction of armaments. iii. the assembly is of the opinion: . that another technical conference on naval disarmament is unnecessary. . that the question of naval disarmament should be discussed as part of the general question of disarmament dealt with by the international conference proposed in the resolution of september th, , adopted by the fifth assembly, and that it rests with the council to settle the programme. iv. the assembly requests the council, in preparing the general programme of the conference for the reduction of armaments provided for in article of the protocol, to consider the advisability of including in that programme the following points: . general plan for a reduction of armaments in accordance with article of the covenant, in particular: (_a_) basis and methods of reduction (budget, peace-time effectives, tonnage of naval and air fleets, population, configuration of frontiers, etc.); (_b_) preparation of a typical budget for expenditure on armaments. . special position of certain states in relation to the reduction of armaments: (_a_) temporary reservations by countries exposed to special risks; (_b_) recommendation of regional agreements for the reduction (or limitation) of armaments, . recommendation of the establishment of demilitarised zones (article ). . control and investigation of armaments in the contracting states. { } the assembly also requests the council to instruct the competent organisations of the league to examine the schemes relating to the above questions which have already been submitted to the third committee, or which may subsequently be received by the secretariat, and to take them into consideration in preparing the programme of the conference. resolution of the council, october rd, . . with a view to the preparation of the conference for the reduction of armaments, the council decides to form itself into a committee. the representatives on the council who consider that it will not be possible to attend the committee in person will, as soon as possible, send to the secretary-general the names of their substitutes on this committee. the committee will hold its first meeting on november th, in order to draw up a general programme of the work connected with the application of article of the protocol and with the reduction of armaments. the governments of the states represented on the council are requested to give their representatives on the committee the necessary instructions in order that the general lines of the programme may be laid down during its meeting of november th.[ ] { } the secretary-general will invite the governments of the states members of the league not represented on the council to forward through him to the committee any suggestions which they may think useful with a view to the preparation of this programme. . the secretariat is requested to collect the data necessary for the economic and financial investigations relative to the application of article of the protocol, and is authorised to distribute these data to the competent organs of the league (economic and financial organisation and transit organisation) with a view to the work which will subsequently be required of them by the committee. the secretariat will obtain information from the official documents at the disposal of the league or from documents which might, if necessary, be furnished by the governments. . in conformity with the assembly resolution, and in order to assist the committee in co-ordinating the preparatory work for the conference, the temporary mixed commission shall be re-organised and shall take the name of the co-ordination commission, and be composed as follows: (_a_) the committee of the council (ten members) assisted by: (_b_) the president and one member or two members of each of the three organisations, economic, financial and transit (six members); (_c_) six members appointed by the permanent advisory commission (six members); (_d_) two members of the employers' group and two members of the workers' group of the governing body of the international labour office, appointed by the latter (four members); (_e_) if considered advisable, a certain number of experts--jurists and others--appointed by the council. the secretary-general is requested to invite at a suitable moment the above-mentioned organisations to appoint their representatives. [ ] the council, at its st session at brussels, october th, , "decided itself to undertake at its session in rome (december, ) the work of preparing for the conference on the reduction of armaments," instructing the council committee to continue and complete this work and report to the council at its session in march, . the work of either the council or its committee was dependent to a large extent upon the receipt of suggestions from members of the league which had been requested from them in a circular letter of the secretary-general, october , . various items regarding the protocol of geneva were on the agenda of the council for its december, , meeting at rome. preparatory work regarding "the general program" under the second paragraph of article of the protocol was the most important. two other relevant items were ( ) the reorganization of the temporary mixed commission and the permanent advisory commission into a single co-ordinated commission; and ( ) the date of the meeting of the commission of jurists (appointed at the brussels session of the council in october, ) to draft the amendments to the covenant contemplated by the protocol. a conservative government came into power in great britain early in november, , mr. austen chamberlain becoming foreign secretary. at the request of the british government, the agenda items for the december, meeting of the council at rome relating to the protocol of geneva were postponed until the march meeting. in the meantime, the british government has suggested to the dominions a meeting of the imperial conference for the purpose of adopting a policy of the british commonwealth of nations regarding the protocol of geneva. whether such a meeting will be held, or whether the general british policy will be decided on as a result of correspondence, is not at this writing certain. { } annex e. report of the british delegates relating to the protocol for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. _london, november_ , . sir, we have the honour to submit herewith a report on the proceedings at the fifth assembly of the league of nations at geneva this year in connection with the draft protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes. i.--introduction. the first assembly of the league of nations in prepared to give effect to article of the covenant, the first two paragraphs of which read: "the members of the league recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. the council .......... shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments." that assembly decided "to instruct a temporary commission to prepare reports and proposals for the reduction of armaments as provided for by article of the covenant." in the following year the second assembly defined the task more clearly in a resolution instructing the temporary mixed commission to make proposals for the reduction of armaments which, in order to secure precision, "should be in the form of a draft treaty or other equally defined plan, to be presented to the council, if possible, before the assembly next year" ( ). in the course of the ensuing year the temporary mixed commission was able to formulate certain principles which, in its opinion, might serve as a basis for the draft treaty which it had been instructed to draw up. after discussion of these principles the third assembly passed a resolution--the famous { } resolution --recognising that in existing circumstances many governments would be unable to accept responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country, and suggesting that such guarantee could be found in a defensive agreement binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance, in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, in the event of one of them being attacked. the temporary mixed commission were instructed to prepare a draft treaty on these lines. the result of their labours was submitted to the fourth assembly last year in the form of the draft treaty of mutual assistance, which was referred by the assembly to the governments for their observations. . certain governments accepted the draft treaty in principle: very few intimated their readiness to adhere to its actual terms. his majesty's government, in a note which has already been made public,[ ] explained the reasons which would render it impossible for them to subscribe to the treaty. . when, therefore, the fifth assembly met on the st september of this year, the labours of four years, which had been devoted to the preparation of a scheme for giving effect to the obligation undertaken by all signatories in article of the covenant, had not succeeded in establishing agreement, and there seemed no prospect of making any further advance along the path which had hitherto been followed. . some new direction would have to be given, and the presence in geneva of the british and french prime ministers gave a special importance to the meeting. . it was realised that the problem was not merely to find a general scheme of disarmament and security, but that the particular question of french security was of immediate political importance, and would shortly require a solution. the question of "security" had already been raised in conversations between mr. macdonald and m. herriot in july last, at chequers { } and in paris. during the latter meeting, the subject was discussed at some length, and the position as it was then left by the two prime ministers was set out in the franco-british memorandum of the th july concerning the application of the dawes plan. the relevant paragraph read as follows: "the two governments have likewise proceeded to a preliminary exchange of views on the question of security. they are aware that public opinion requires pacification: they agree to co-operate in devising through the league of nations or otherwise, as opportunity presents itself, means of securing this, and to continue the consideration of the question until the problem of general security can be finally solved." in a declaration made in the chamber on the st august, reporting on the results of the london conference, m. herriot said "security must be the object of another conference. he did not see why france should not take the initiative .......... for the rest, the security question would be dealt with at geneva." . the debate in the league assembly was opened by the british prime minister on the th september. mr. ramsay macdonald began by explaining that it was not because they were indifferent to the problem of national security that his majesty's government had given an adverse opinion on the draft treaty of mutual assistance. they believed that security could not be based on military alliances, and they hesitated to become involved in any agreements which committed them to vague and indefinite obligations. in this respect the treaty of mutual assistance was open to criticism, especially in its article and in its definition of aggression. mr. ramsay macdonald emphasised that the main problem was the problem of national security in relation to national armaments, and the initial difficulty was encountered in the definition of such terms as "security" and "aggression." in regard to the latter, he said, "the one method by which we can approximate to an accurate attribution of responsibility for aggression is arbitration," and he proposed that the article of the statute of the permanent court dealing with { } arbitration should be carefully examined by a commission, with a view to its being placed before the assembly in a somewhat more precise, expanded and definite form than it now had. such a step would be necessary as a preliminary to the discussion of disarmament, which could produce no good result unless an atmosphere of confidence were previously created. to summon a conference on disarmament without such a preparation of the ground would be to court immediate and disastrous failure. such a conference must be the ultimate aim, and it must include all the nations and must be held in europe. in his view the covenant already contained ample provisions for starting arbitration, for the sanctions that were necessary and for all other eventualities that might arise: what was now required was that the covenant should be elaborated. "the british government thinks that the matter should now be explored, beginning with the covenant, applying the covenant to our present circumstances, and, in the spirit of the league of nations, developing a policy that will give security and reduce armaments. the british government stands by the covenant. the british government has no wish to reduce the authority of the council. it rather wishes to extend the authority of the council consistently with the continued existence and prosperity of the league. articles , , , and of the covenant might well form themselves into a charter of peace if we would only apply them and fill them out." . speaking on the following day, the french prime minister expressed a similar view: "it is in the development and the fullest possible application of the articles of this solemn instrument (the covenant) that france seeks for the rules which are to guide her future action and her foreign policy." m. herriot welcomed mr. ramsay macdonald's suggestion that arbitration should be the test of aggression, and he expressed the hope that the fifth assembly would be able to accept the principle of arbitration, which would solve the difficulties, as henceforth the aggressor would be the party which refused arbitration. m. herriot { } added: "arbitration is essential, but it is not sufficient. it is a means, but not an end. it does not entirely fulfil the intentions of article of the covenant, which are security and disarmament. we in france regard three terms--arbitration, security and disarmament--as inseparable." a nation which accepted arbitration had a right to security. "justice without might is impotent. might without justice is tyranny." in conclusion: "we stand by the covenant, but we wish to make it a living covenant. we simply claim for each nation the rights conferred upon it by the covenant, no more and no less." . it is unnecessary to indicate in detail the views expressed by other speakers who participated in this opening debate, from which it was evident that there was general agreement on a number of points:-- (_a_.) that as a preliminary to disarmament there must be provided an inclusive scheme for the pacific settlement of international disputes of all kinds. (_b_.) that the covenant of the league itself provided the basis of such a scheme, but that it required elaboration, precision and extension in certain directions. (_c_.) that to give effect to such a scheme states should develop the principle of compulsory arbitration. (_d_.) that a state, having accepted this principle, would, if it resorted to force in disregard of its obligation to submit to arbitration, be automatically declared an aggressor, and outlawed. (_e_.) that some form of co-operation must be devised for effective resistance to aggression, both as a deterrent to any possible aggressor and as a guarantee of security to all states enabling them to contemplate a reduction of their own armed forces, which at present constituted their sole guarantee of safety. . in order to give effect to these ideas, a resolution was submitted to the assembly on the th september by the british and french delegations in the following terms:-- { } "the assembly, "noting the declarations of the governments represented, observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding tending to establish a secure peace, "decides as follows:-- "with a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergencies between certain points of view which have been expressed, and when agreement has been reached, to enable an international conference upon armaments to be summoned by the league of nations at the earliest possible moment-- "( .) the third committee is requested to consider the material dealing with security and reduction of armaments, particularly the observations of the governments on the draft treaty of mutual assistance prepared in pursuance of resolution of the third assembly, and other plans prepared and presented to the secretary-general since the publication of the draft treaty, and to examine the obligations contained in the covenant of the league in relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require; "( .) the first committee is requested-- "(_a_.) to consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the covenant relating to the settlement of disputes; "(_b_.) to examine within what limits the terms of article , paragraph , of the statute establishing the permanent court of international justice might be rendered more precise, and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause; "and thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the nations of the world by settling, by pacific means, all disputes which may arise between states." . this resolution was carried unanimously by the assembly, which thus deputed the preparatory work to its first committee (dealing with legal and constitutional questions) and its third committee (dealing with reduction of armaments). { } . it will be more convenient at once to consider the final results of the labours of the two committees, leaving for the moment any detailed account of the progress of their work, in order to see how the draft protocol which they submitted to the full assembly on the st october gave effect to the ideas which had been proclaimed in the course of the earlier debate. . in the first place it was necessary to complete the scheme of arbitration and conciliation provided in the covenant. the covenant itself did not provide for every eventuality, and by failing to offer pacific means of settlement of all disputes, it left open, or seemed to leave open, in certain circumstances resort to force. especially was this so in article of the covenant, whereby the members of the league agreed "in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the council." further, paragraph of article of the covenant laid down that "if the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice." under article of the protocol "the signatory states _agree_ in no case to resort to war either with one another or against a state which, if the occasion arises, accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the council or the assembly of the league of nations in accordance with the provisions of the covenant and of the present protocol." the signatory states having agreed in no case to resort to war, the protocol proceeds to prohibit the arbitrament of force and to provide a complete system for the pacific settlement of disputes. as regards cases covered by paragraph of article of the statute of the permanent court of international justice, the signatory states bind themselves to recognize as obligatory the jurisdiction of that court, "but without prejudice to the right of any state, when { } acceding to the special protocol provided for in the said article and opened for signature on the th december, , to make reservations compatible with the said clause" (article ). as regards other subjects of dispute, the protocol provides a procedure (article ) which supplements and completes that defined in article of the covenant. briefly, under this procedure, if the council is at the outset unable to effect a settlement, it persuades the parties to submit to arbitration. if neither party should be willing to go to arbitration, the council again takes the matter into consideration: if it reaches a unanimous decision, the parties are bound to accept that decision: if it fails to achieve unanimity, the council itself refers to arbitrators, whose award is final and binding on the parties to the dispute. . thus for every dispute that may arise there is a procedure of pacific settlement, and provision has been made in the protocol for meeting points (_a_), (_b_) and (_c_) in paragraph above. . the establishment of a complete and comprehensive system for the pacific settlement of all disputes that might arise rendered it easier to approach the problem of the definition of "aggression." as the prime minister had said, "the one method by which we can approximate to an accurate attribution of responsibility for aggression is arbitration." in other words, any state which refused to avail itself of the means at hand for a peaceful settlement of a dispute, or which refused to accept the award given by the arbitral body or bodies now provided, and proceeded to an act of war, would brand itself as the aggressor. this principle is embodied in article of the protocol, which thus gives effect to the idea indicated in paragraph (_d_) above. the definition of aggression is extended by articles and of the protocol to apply to military measures taken before or during proceedings for a pacific settlement, and to acts constituting a threat of aggression against another state. . the point raised in paragraph (_e_) above is dealt with in article of the protocol. directly aggression takes place, { } the council calls upon the signatory states to apply sanctions against the aggressor (article ). as soon as the council has thus called upon the signatory states, "the obligations of the said states, in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs and of article of the covenant, will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory states to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the covenant of the league of nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow." article of the protocol provides for the establishment of plans for putting into effect economic and financial sanctions, and article , "in view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by article of the covenant," empowers the council "to receive undertakings from states determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the covenant and the present protocol." . article --the "sanctions" article--has been more closely scrutinized and has been the subject of more criticism than any other article of the draft protocol, and a hasty examination of it by some critics has led them to object that it goes beyond article of the covenant and imposes fresh obligations on the signatory states. in reply to such critics, it may be best to quote the words used by the british delegate in his speech to the third committee on the nd september:-- "it cannot be too strongly emphasized that everything in this article is already stated or implied in article of the covenant. we are remaining within the terms of the covenant and we are undertaking no new obligations .......... surely loyal and effective co-operation in support of the covenant is what may confidently be expected from every member of the league of { } nations .......... the extent of the co-operation must depend on the actual circumstances not only as regards the aggression but also as regards the geographical position and the resources of all kinds of individual states. it would be no use to bind oneself to do a variety of things which may not be required. we must and we can rely on the good faith of the members of the league to decide themselves how their effective co-operation can best be given if and when the necessity arises." . in order to complete the fulfilment of the task assigned to the committees by the assembly's resolution of the th september, the protocol finally provides (article ) for the summoning in june next year of an international conference for the reduction of armaments, to meet in geneva and to include representatives of all states whether members of the league or not. m. herriot first, and other speakers after him, had emphasised the interdependence of the three great problems of arbitration, security and disarmament, and the framers of the protocol, bearing this in mind, have been careful to preserve this interdependence in the document itself. thus if sufficient ratifications of the protocol have not been received by a certain date, the conference on disarmament is to be postponed. in any case, the protocol does not come into force until that conference shall have adopted a plan for the reduction of armaments. and if within a further period, that plan has not been carried out, the protocol becomes null and void. . the above brief summary indicates how in the protocol the committees of the assembly have sought to embody, in concrete form, the proposals made to the assembly itself by the british and french prime ministers. the protocol is an attempt to complete the covenant, to facilitate and develop the procedure of pacific settlement provided therein, and to define more clearly the obligations imposed by it on states members of the league. the protocol is based on the covenant and keeps within its terms except in so far that it extends the covenant procedure to give an alternative procedure by peaceful { } settlement, even in those cases for which the framers of the covenant in were unable to find a remedy. so far as it contains anything new, it is to be found in the definition of aggression which follows as a necessary corollary to the limitations inserted in the establishment of a universal system of peaceful settlement. but even here the principle is not new. article of the covenant decreed that sanctions should be applied against any member of the league that might "resort to war in disregard of its covenants under articles , or ." article of the protocol decrees sanctions against any state resorting to war without availing itself or in defiance of, the procedure of pacific settlement provided in the covenant as amplified by the protocol itself. the amplification of that procedure to cover all cases, so as to remove all excuse for resort to war, has enabled the framers of the protocol to give a more exact definition of aggression, and to make that definition more certain and more automatic. the protocol is thus free from the reproach that had been levelled against the draft treaty of mutual assistance, which left a wide and dangerous discretion to the council in determining which party to a dispute was the aggressor. it further discards the system proposed in the draft treaty, whereby power was given to the council to decide on and to direct the military sanctions required. the draft treaty tended towards the realisation of the idea of the league as a "super-state": the protocol respects the principle of national sovereignty. every state retains its own liberty of action: it is still free to choose what it will do. the protocol has stated in clearer terms what is expected of those who signed the covenant in , and it is to be hoped that this more explicit declaration may serve to deter those who would contemplate a violation of the spirit of the covenant, whilst reassuring those who have hitherto sought safety in their own armed strength, by giving them confidence in the solidarity of the civilised nations and in their determination to resist all unscrupulous attempts to plunge the world again into the disaster of war. { } . it remains only to say a few words as to the actual procedure adopted by the assembly for putting into effect the scheme thus elaborated. it was generally agreed that mere resolutions of the assembly would not give sufficient assurance of progress. the famous resolution of the third assembly had been discussed and debated and had seemed to lead to an impasse with the rejection of the treaty of mutual assistance. the prime minister, in his speech to the assembly, had said: "let us see to it that even before we rise, before the assembly breaks up, some substantial progress shall be made in co-ordinating these ideas and in producing from their apparent diversities some measure of agreement and consent." it was therefore decided that the scheme should be embodied in the form of a protocol, ready for signature, and that the assembly should pass a resolution endorsing the principles contained therein, recommending the protocol to the governments for their acceptance, and directing that it should be opened immediately for signature. the terms of this resolution, which was carried unanimously, have already been published. . the protocol itself was signed in geneva by delegates of the governments of albania, bulgaria, esthonia, france, greece, latvia, poland, portugal, the serb-croat-slovene state and czechoslovakia. the delegate of france at the same time signed on behalf of his government the special protocol opened for signature in virtue of article , paragraph , of the statute of the permanent court of international justice, making the following declaration:-- "i hereby declare that, subject to ratification, the french government gives its adhesion to the optional clause of article , paragraph , of the statute of the court, on the condition of reciprocity, for a period of fifteen years, with power of denunciation, should the protocol of arbitration, security and the reduction of armaments, signed this day, lapse, and further, subject to the observations made at the first committee of the fifth assembly, according to the terms of which 'one of the { } parties to the dispute may bring the said dispute before the council of the league of nations for the purposes of the pacific settlement laid down in paragraph of article of the covenant, and during such proceedings neither party may take proceedings against the other in the court.'" . having briefly summarized the discussion which gave rise to the elaboration of the draft protocol, and having examined in what way that instrument embodies the ideas expressed in that discussion, it may be of interest to review summarily the progress of the work of the two committees of the assembly that were charged with the drafting of the scheme, and to show how the various articles were evolved. . it will be seen from the terms of the resolution of the th september that the scheme of "arbitration, security and disarmament," though forming one indivisible whole, would require the deliberation of two of the regular committees of the assembly. the first committee, dealing with the legal questions, would have to develop the principle of arbitration, while the third committee, dealing with the reduction of armaments, would have to consider the problems of security and disarmament. . it was realised that the work would overlap at many points, and the two committees kept in constant touch throughout, the result of their labours being finally co-ordinated by a joint drafting sub-committee. . during the whole period of discussion the british delegation kept in close touch with the dominion and indian delegations, who were consulted on all points of difficulty, and who were given every opportunity of expressing their views. this was done, not only by means of private consultation, but also at fourteen formal meetings of the delegations. . in the following sections an attempt is made to trace the evolution of the protocol through its various stages in the first and third committees. { } ii.--work of the first committee. . the first plenary meeting of the first committee was held on the nd september, when sir littleton groom (australia) was elected chairman, and m. limburg (netherlands) vice-chairman. sir c. hurst represented the british empire. . on the th september the committee began its deliberations on the assembly resolution of the th september regarding arbitration, security and disarmament. the assembly, by this resolution, instructed the first committee:-- "(_a_.) to consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the covenant relating to the settlement of disputes; "(_b_.) to examine within what limits the terms of article , paragraph , of the statute establishing the permanent court of international justice might be rendered more precise, and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause; "and thus strengthen the solidarity and security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between states." . the british delegation commenced their labours by considering the second of these two tasks, as it was a british suggestion emanating from the prime minister himself. the question of the acceptance by his majesty's government of the principle of compulsory arbitration for legal disputes, as provided in the optional clause referred to in article , paragraph , of the statute establishing the permanent court of international justice, had been examined in london before the meeting of the assembly. this examination had shown so clearly the difficulties which might arise in connection with disputes with neutral powers arising out of british naval action in time of war, that the limitation of the acceptance by his majesty's government of the optional clause by the exclusion of disputes arising out of british belligerent action at sea was suggested. to achieve this it was proposed that his majesty's government { } should make a reservation as to disputes arising out of action taken in conformity with the covenant, or at the request, or with the approval, of the council of the league. . the suggestion was accepted by the british delegation. as however, the question was clearly one which affected the empire as a whole, the dominion and indian delegations were especially consulted in regard to it. the position as it appeared to the british delegation was fully explained to them, and it was understood that they would telegraph to their respective governments, making clear the nature of the reservation proposed. . the general discussion by the first committee of the subject of the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice took place at the third plenary meeting on the th september. the british delegate reminded the committee that the views of his majesty's government had already been explained in the assembly in regard to the optional clause. the prime minister had then stated that the british government wished to sign a clause of this kind, subject to its being clearly drafted. the british delegate proceeded to discuss the position of the british empire supposing that it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, and was then forced, in support of the covenant, to go to war at sea. sea warfare, he said, inevitably brought a belligerent into sharp conflict with the nationals of foreign powers carrying on trade with the enemy state. the british empire might therefore find itself forced to support before the international court the legality of action taken at the request of the league itself. the british delegation therefore asked the committee to consider whether it would be possible, either by amendment of article , paragraph , of the statute of the court or by the admission of a reservation acceptable to other members of the league, to exclude from the acceptance of that clause disputes which arose out of action taken, either in accordance with the covenant, or at the request, or with the sanction, of the council of the league. { } . the french delegation were content with the idea of such a reservation, and both the belgian and brazilian delegations stated that they had no objection to it. the delegate of brazil, however, said he would prefer to proceed by way of a reservation rather than by any modification of the text. though the representatives of the netherlands and of sweden were slightly more critical, it became apparent that no real objection would be raised to the british reservation. . the belgian delegate suggested even going further still and excluding, when accepting the optional clause, the whole of sub-heading (_b_), which relates to questions of international law. the effect of this would be to exclude all questions of international law where that law has not yet been codified, as where it has been codified the dispute becomes one of the interpretation of a treaty. this, the british delegation thought, would be going too far. it would deprive the international court of the power to build up a case law in the international field. it would, moreover, have gone further than the delegation felt necessary, because it was only in the field of established international law, where there are two distinct schools of thought--the continental and the anglo-saxon--that the difficulties referred to by the british delegate would arise. . as regards the question of amendments to the covenant, the french representative did not, during the general discussion in a plenary meeting of the first committee, specify the nature of the amendments suggested by the french delegation. he contented himself with drawing attention to three points. the first was the last sentence of article of the covenant, which provides that in the event of any failure to carry out an arbitration award, the council shall propose what steps shall be taken to give effect thereto. this the french delegation regarded as inadequate. the second was the provision of article by which, if the council cannot reach a unanimous decision, the parties to a dispute which is submitted to the council recover their liberty of action. here, he said, was a gap in the { } covenant which must be filled. was the position to be perpetuated, he asked, by which any one member of the council could completely prevent a peaceful settlement of a dispute? the third was paragraph of article , which provides that in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state the council can make no recommendation. the french delegation asked the committee to consider whether it would not be possible to discover a method of friendly conciliation over matters relating to domestic jurisdiction. . after the general discussion had been declared closed, the first committee adjourned for a week and entrusted to a sub-committee, known as the fifth sub-committee, the task of formulating concrete proposals. the work done by this sub-committee was of such importance that it is considered desirable to indicate its composition, which was as follows: mr. adatci (japan). count albert apponyi (hungary). m. loucheur (france). mr. john o'byrne (irish free state). m. erich (finland). m. raul fernandez (brazil). sir cecil hurst (british empire). m. nicolas politis (greece). m. rolin (belgium). m. vittorio scialoja (italy). m. nicolas titulesco (roumania). m. torriente (cuba). m. limburg (netherlands). m. unden (sweden). . the discussion was taken up on the th september in the sub-committee on the lines of the general debate in the full committee. the meetings were not open to the public. as regards the proposed british reservation to the acceptance of the obligatory jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice, by signing the optional clause in the statute of the court, some opposition developed at first from two quarters. subsequently, however, it waned and did not reappear. { } . as regards the extension of the principle of arbitration by amendments to the covenant, it at once became clear that there were many conflicting views as to the best system to adopt. the days were spent mainly in ascertaining, inside and outside the sub-committee, the extent and the nature of the different points of view. . the work on which the sub-committee was engaged was intimately related to the questions of security and disarmament with which the third committee was dealing. on the th september, dr. benes, chairman of the sub-committee of the third committee, who had been in close touch with the british and french delegations, produced a draft protocol covering the whole ground, in which he had attempted to reconcile opposing points of view and which was intended to serve as a basis for discussion. articles , , and of this draft protocol concerned the first committee and were referred to the sub-committee. they may be summarised as follows:-- . _article_ .--the signatories recognise the jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice as compulsory, "subject to the following reserves":-- . _article_ .--the signatories undertake to submit all disputes, not covered by articles , and of the covenant, to the council of the league, subject to an express reserve as to the right given exclusively to the assembly in article of the covenant, whereby the assembly alone is entitled to advise the reconsideration of existing treaties. the council in such cases to act as an arbitration tribunal and to decide by a majority vote. pending an examination of the dispute the council may, by a majority, define measures to be taken by the parties to avert or put an end to armed conflict. similarly, the council may, in case of imminent danger, call upon the parties to discontinue any measure likely to cause the dispute to become more acute. . _article_ .--the procedure laid down in article to apply to the permanent court in cases concerning the competence of that court. { } . _article_ .--any signatory which does not submit its disputes to the methods of pacific settlement indicated above, or which does not comply with the provisional measures referred to in article , or which does not carry out an award of a duly qualified arbitral body, shall, if these acts of non-compliance are likely to disturb the peace of the world, be declared to be an aggressor and outlawed, the declaration to be made by the permanent court or by the council acting, if need be, by a majority. when this declaration has been made, the council is to call on members of the league to put into operation the sanctions contained in article . . consideration of these proposals and of those contained in two other schemes submitted led to long discussions in the committee. these discussions served mainly to bring into relief the different schools of thought. one favoured the widest possible extension of the jurisdiction of the permanent court, even into the field of disputes of a political nature; the other held that the court's jurisdiction should be rigidly limited to disputes of a legal character, while a far-reaching system of arbitration should be established to deal with political disputes. strong disinclination was shown towards any increase in the existing powers of the council. on the other hand, it was made clear that no decrease of those powers would be tolerated. on one side it was urged that the council, when acting as an arbitral body, should make its decisions by a majority vote; on the other, strong exception was taken to any departure from the unanimity rule. as regards the application of sanctions, one group held that mere refusal to arbitrate or failure to carry out an award should justify their application. another contended equally strongly that sanctions should only be applied when such refusal or failure was accompanied by a resort to war. the extent to which war was legitimate under the covenant in cases relating to domestic jurisdiction was very fully discussed. the net result was a unanimous agreement to leave paragraph of article untouched. { } . as regards the filling of the gap in article of the covenant, little progress was made. on the th september, therefore, the british representative submitted a scheme to the sub-committee, in which he had endeavoured to meet the differences of opinion which had been expressed. this scheme provided for the acceptance as compulsory of the jurisdiction of the permanent court in the cases covered by article , paragraph , of the statute of the court, with such reserves as may be consistent therewith. its main object was, however, the amendment of the covenant on the lines of the following text:-- "the undersigned will support the introduction of amendments to article of the covenant for the purpose of amplifying paragraphs , , and of that article on the following lines:-- "if the dispute submitted to the council is not settled by it as provided in paragraph , the council shall endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration. "if the parties cannot agree to do so, the council shall again take the dispute under consideration, and, if it reaches a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league agree to accept the recommendations contained in the report. "if the council fails to reach a report which is concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute, and if the parties are still unable to agree to refer the dispute to arbitration, the council is empowered to refer the dispute to arbitration on their behalf. one-half of the members of the tribunal, excluding the president, shall be appointed by the council, after consultation with one party to the dispute, and the other half after consultation with the other party to the dispute. the president shall be appointed by the council after consultation with the permanent court of international justice if in session, or, if not in session, with the members of its chamber of summary jurisdiction. "the members of the league agree that they will comply with the { } recommendations contained in any award of the arbitration tribunal set up by the council as above. "in the event of any failure to comply with the recommendations of a report concurred in by all the members of the council other than the parties to the dispute or in any award of an arbitration tribunal set up by the council as above, the council shall exert all its influence to secure compliance therewith. if such failure to carry out the recommendations is accompanied by any resort to war, the sanctions provided for in article , interpreted as provided in this protocol, shall be applied." . the british delegate explained that the willingness of governments to amend the covenant must be clearly expressed in the protocol. in no other way could the danger of creating within the league an inner ring of powers, bound towards each other by ties and obligations more close than those binding the ordinary members of the league, be avoided. the drafting of amendments to the covenant was, however, a technical matter, and time was short. he therefore suggested that the council should be asked to set up a committee of experts to draft the amendments to the covenant contemplated by the protocol. . these proposals provided the bases of articles , and of the protocol and of paragraph of the assembly resolution of the nd october. the bases of articles and had already been established. article was beginning to take shape in new drafts in substitution for dr. benes's definition of an aggressor. on the st september these articles were provisionally adopted by the joint drafting committee of the first and third committees. at this stage, therefore, for the first time, the substance of a workable text on the subjects referred to the first committee began to emerge from the shadow of discussion. . throughout this period, however, the negotiations had been carried on entirely in the sub-committee in secret sessions. although the closest possible touch had been kept by the british delegation with the dominion and indian delegations, the british representative felt himself to be in a position { } of great responsibility in carrying on the work in the sub-committee. he felt that a stage had been reached where a wider consultation was necessary, as, with the exception of the attorney-general of the irish free state, who was unfortunately obliged to return to ireland about this date, he was the only british member. he proposed, therefore, that the work of the sub-committee should be reported to the full committee on which all the dominion and indian delegations were represented. the full committee thereupon met on the th september, and then and at further meetings held on the th, th, th and th september, the articles of the protocol were fully discussed in public sessions. the articles of the protocol under consideration thus took their shape in the sub-committee, they were then submitted to the joint drafting committee representing the first and third committees, and were then finally approved after public discussions in committee no. . here, then, it will be convenient to deal with the purpose and evolution of each article separately. _the preamble._ . the draft of the preamble, as revised by the joint drafting committee of the first and third committees, was adopted at a plenary session of the first committee on the th september. the lithuanian delegate made a reservation that the reference to territorial security in no way prejudiced existing disputes between states signing the protocol. the portuguese delegate proposed an amendment to substitute for the word "territories" in the first sentence, the phrase "territories under the sovereignty of states." the object was to make it clear that oversea territories under the sovereignty of a state were not excluded, but the british representative reminded the committee of the nature of the varied character of the territories of the british empire, and said that if one class of oversea territories were mentioned, all must be mentioned. the amendment was rejected. { } _article ._ . article was designed to ensure that the universality of the league should be maintained even if the protocol comes into force. for a while there must no doubt be a dual régime. states signatory to the protocol will be bound by its terms, and the régime of the covenant will continue to exist and to be binding upon states members of the league. this will, however, not last, as the principal provisions of the protocol will be transformed into amendments to the covenant. _article ._ . article was intended to make all aggressive war illegal. exceptions were, however, made to safeguard ( ) the right of a state to fight in self-defence, and ( ) the position of a state acting in accordance with the provisions of the covenant or the protocol. a proposal, strongly urged, to substitute the words "resort to force" for the words "resort to war" was rejected. _article ._ . article provides for the compulsory recognition of the jurisdiction of the permanent court. the joint drafting committee proposed to remove this article from the protocol, as certain delegations felt it went beyond the assembly resolution. the british empire delegation feared that this might result in the separation of the three principles--arbitration, security and disarmament. at the suggestion of the british representative, therefore, the article was retained. as a result of the discussions on this matter, it was generally agreed that the power to make reservations to article of the permanent court statute was much wider than had been at first believed. it was understood that the proposed british reservation was within the limits admissible. _article ._ . article was designed to extend the system of { } arbitration contained in the covenant and to fill the existing gap in article of the covenant, by which the parties to a dispute recover their liberty of action and are entitled to resort to war if the members of the council are unable to agree upon a unanimous report. in the sub-committee a strong feeling manifested itself against unanimous decisions of the council being binding in cases where one party to a dispute, but not both, desired arbitration. certain of the smaller states, in particular, felt that such a system gave too much power to the council, which was already regarded as a body which expressed only the will of the great powers. . paragraphs (_a_) and (_b_) of article were drafted to avoid this difficulty. arbitration is to be compulsory at the request of one of the parties, and the council is given power to appoint the arbitral body if the parties cannot agree as to its constitution. a unanimous decision of the council is only to be binding where none of the parties ask for arbitration. if, therefore, any party wishes to avoid a decision by the council, it has only to ask for arbitration. for similar reasons, the words "accepted by one of the parties" were added after the words "decision of the council" in paragraph . . discussions in the sub-committee revealed a divergence of view as to whether or not sanctions should be applied in the event of passive resistance to the award of the arbitral commission. it was finally agreed that the provision contained at the end of article of the covenant would be sufficient to meet a case of passive resistance and that the sanctions of article should only be applied when such resistance was accompanied by a resort to war (_vide_ paragraph of article ). . at the request of the british representative, paragraph was added to ensure that reservations, similar to that which the british delegation considered that it would be obliged to make if the british empire accepted article of the statute of the permanent court, would also exist in the case of the new system of compulsory arbitration. { } _article ._ . article was inserted as the result of a unanimous decision of the sub-committee to leave untouched paragraph of article of the covenant, which safeguards the rights of states members in regard to matters of domestic jurisdiction. the whole british empire delegation held the view that when the arbitration commissions were faced with such questions, they should be bound to refer them to the permanent court, and that the opinion of the court should be binding. as the permanent court itself is bound to apply international law, and paragraph of article refers to questions which by _international law_ are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned, this provision ensures that a uniform rule will be applied by the council, the permanent court and the arbitral bodies to be set up under the new system. . the last sentence of article was added to meet certain difficulties raised by the japanese delegation. they pointed out that the second gap in the covenant, referred to by the french delegation during the general discussion, had not been filled. on the th september, they accordingly proposed an amendment to article , which appeared to have the effect of giving the council power, in cases relating to domestic jurisdiction, to recommend the parties to adopt some solution which would ensure a pacific settlement of the dispute. after the discussion in the sub-committee, the japanese delegation modified this proposal and suggested that the following words be added as the final paragraph of article :-- "the above provisions do not prejudice the duty of the council to endeavour to bring the parties to an agreement so as to ensure the maintenance of peace and a good understanding between nations." this proposal came up before the plenary session of the first committee on the th september. the british delegation asked for a postponement of the discussion. immediate steps were { } taken to consult the dominion and indian delegations, and in the subsequent negotiations the closest co-operation with them was maintained. . it transpired that the japanese delegation, if they failed to secure acceptance of this amendment to article , intended to press for the exclusion from article of the sentence at the end of paragraph ( ), which included in the definition of an "aggressor" a state which resorted to war and disregarded a unanimous report of the council or a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognising that the dispute arose out of a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the other state concerned. they pointed out that it was unjust that in such cases the league, while refusing pacific means of settlement to an injured state, should denounce that state as an aggressor if it took steps to defend its legitimate interests by force. . the possible effect of this alternative amendment was regarded by many delegations with great concern. it would have suggested the legitimacy of a resort to war in connection with a dispute arising out of some domestic matter as to which the council could give no help and make no recommendation for its solution. . in these circumstances the british empire delegation was agreed that the best course was to endeavour to find a solution by enlarging article of the protocol, so as to make it clear that the existing power of the council, under article of the covenant, of endeavouring to achieve a pacific settlement in any case where the peace of the world was endangered, was not prejudiced by the provisions of the protocol. though the discussions of the matter remained very friendly in tone this proposal did not prove acceptable to the japanese delegation. accordingly, when the amendment came before the plenary meeting of the first committee on the th september, the japanese delegation withdrew their amendment to article and proposed the amendment to article . at the suggestion of the french delegate the question was referred back to the sub-committee. { } . late on the th september the basis of solution was found. it was immediately submitted to the representatives of the dominions and india, and was fully considered by them at two further meetings on the following day. after slight modifications the text of two amendments proved acceptable to the british empire delegation, and after being accepted by the japanese and french delegations, these amendments were adopted by the first committee. they involved the addition to the last sentence of article of the words "this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the council or the assembly under article of the covenant," and the addition at the end of paragraph ( ) of article of the words "nevertheless in the last case the state shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the council or the assembly in accordance with article of the covenant." . in the opinion of the british empire delegation these amendments conferred no new powers or functions on either the council or the assembly. they merely served to make clear the relationship between paragraph of article and article of the covenant. article of the covenant only operates in time of war or threat of war, and it confers no right on the council or the assembly to impose a solution of a dispute without the consent of the parties. the council or the assembly may mediate and conciliate, but they cannot make recommendations which are binding under paragraph of article of the covenant. when these amendments were adopted at the final plenary meeting of the first committee on the th september, the british representative made a statement on the above lines. this interpretation proved generally acceptable, and it was agreed to incorporate it in the report to be submitted to the assembly. . at the final plenary meeting of the first committee the british representative drew attention to the difficulty in which many delegations were placed, in that they had had no { } opportunity to consult their governments in regard to these amendments. the delegations of australia and several other countries thereupon stated that, though they accepted the texts, they could not commit their governments in any way. _article ._ . article . when the system of compulsory arbitration, contained in article , had been established, the british representative pointed out that under paragraphs and of article of the covenant a dispute might still be referred to the assembly. article was therefore drafted to ensure that the provisions referring to the actions and powers of the council should apply to the assembly under the new system. after considerable discussion it was decided to reserve questions of procedure to the council as being a more suitable body. _article ._ . article , which contains the definition of an aggressor, provided one of the most difficult tasks of the first committee. by the rd september a number of drafts had been considered but no satisfactory text had been found. the original idea was that it should be the duty of the council to determine the aggressor, but the question then arose as to whether, in making this decision, the council should act unanimously or by majority vote. adherence to the unanimity rule would have made it possible for one state to prevent a decision being reached. procedure by a majority vote might have resulted in a state being obliged to apply sanctions against its own judgment. the only way out of this difficulty was to avoid a decision by the council at all, and to make the test of aggression automatic, when once certain conditions had been found to obtain. this is achieved by establishing a presumption which is to hold good until the council has made a unanimous decision to the contrary. if the presumption stands it is considered sufficient to justify the application of sanctions. even then it was thought that there would have to be something in the nature of a { } "declaration of aggression" in order to initiate the enforcement of sanctions, and that this declaration would have to be made by unanimity. objections were raised to this, but these objections were finally satisfied by the insertion of paragraph , according to which the council, if it cannot at once determine the aggressor is bound, as a matter of course, to enjoin an armistice upon the belligerents. . the japanese delegation were opposed to any presumption of aggression arising against a state which was involved in a dispute covered by paragraph of article of the covenant, and found as the result that, though it had submitted the dispute to the council, the council were unable to make any recommendations on the subject. to meet this view, the amendment previously referred to was made to article , and the words "nevertheless in the last case the state shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the council or the assembly in accordance with article of the covenant" were added to paragraph ( ) of article . in the opinion of the british delegation, this amendment does not affect paragraph of article . if a resort to war occurs, and the council cannot determine the aggressor, it is still bound to impose an armistice upon the belligerents. . to the final paragraph of article the words "and any signatory state thus called upon shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent" were added at the suggestion of the british representative. this addition was made to safeguard the position of a state which, though no party to the dispute, joined in coercive measures to uphold the covenant of the league and in so doing took forcible measures against the persons or the property of nationals of another state. _article ._ . the relations between states signatory to the protocol and states non-signatory and non-members of the league presented a problem the solution of which required great care. { } the various aspects of the question were thoroughly examined, and it was finally agreed that it would be sufficient to bring the principle contained in article of the covenant into harmony with the provisions of the protocol. sanctions can only be imposed on a state which is not a member of the league if it refuses to accept the conditions and obligations of the protocol when invited to do so, and resorts to war against a signatory state. . the question was raised of the relationship between states members of the league signatory to the protocol and non-signatory states members. after careful examination, it was generally agreed that no special arrangement was necessary. the members of the league are bound _inter se_ by the covenant and non-signatory members are entitled, if they wish, to prefer the procedure laid down in the covenant to the new procedure of the protocol. _article ._ . article was inserted to satisfy apprehensions which had been expressed in certain quarters. the british delegation were not convinced of its necessity, but saw no reason to object to it. _article ._ . article was inserted as a saving clause. it emphasises the intention to preserve the covenant as the principal document governing the relations between states members of the league. the relations between signatories and non-signatories to the protocol are still to be governed by the covenant. the covenant is to stand, but it is to be enriched by the principal provisions of the protocol. the amended covenant is intended ultimately to take the place of the separate régime of the protocol. _resolution no. ._ . it had been originally suggested that the provisions of { } the protocol should be embodied in the form of resolutions to be submitted for adoption by the assembly. in view, however, of the fact that adoption of such resolutions by the assembly might be held to commit the governments there represented to the acceptance of its provisions, and in view of the difficulty which delegations found in consulting their governments, this proposal was found to be impracticable. it was thereupon decided that the protocol should be drawn up as a separate instrument, and that its acceptance should be recommended by the assembly to all states members of the league. . the draft of a resolution on these lines, which had been drawn up by the british representative, was discussed by the first committee on the th september. paragraph recommends the acceptance of the protocol. paragraph provides that the protocol shall be open immediately for signature for those representatives who were already in a position to sign. this was added in view of the fact that the french and several other delegations had announced their intention to sign the protocol before leaving geneva. paragraph was inserted because it was felt that the drafting of amendments to the covenant was too technical a matter to be done hastily. . the remaining paragraphs of the resolution relate to the proposed disarmament conference which was dealt with by the third committee. the resolution was unanimously adopted by the assembly on the nd october. _resolution no. ._ . this resolution recommends the acceptance of the obligatory jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice at the hague by all members of the league. the discussions regarding the special protocol opened for signature in virtue of article , paragraph , of the statute of the permanent court, had revealed that the power to make reservations was wider than had been at first thought. it was therefore decided that no new protocol was required, but that the power to make { } reservations should be clearly recognised in the resolution of the assembly. _m. politis's report._ . m. politis's draft report on the work of the first committee was presented to the committee on the th september, and the discussion upon it lasted all day. this draft, which was very ably drawn up, gave a remarkably clear and adequate account of the achievement of the first committee. . some criticism was made by the representative of hungary and others of a tendency in the report to give peace a secondary position to that of justice in the predominating idea of arbitration. as a result, the offending passages were redrafted. . in its final form m. politis's report was incorporated in the general report submitted to the fifth assembly by the first and third committees. this general report[ ] was adopted unanimously by the assembly on the nd october, and it can thus be regarded as the official document containing the views of the members of the league in regard to the interpretation of the protocol. iii.--work of the third committee. . the third committee began its deliberations on the assembly resolution on arbitration, security and disarmament on the th september, under the presidency of m. duca (roumania) (subsequently replaced by m. politis [greece]), and the proceedings opened with a general discussion, which was continued until the th. lord parmoor and mr. henderson represented the british empire. . after the method of procedure had been settled, a statement was made expressing the standpoint of the british delegation on the questions of arbitration under the three heads of arbitration, court decisions and conciliation, and the views then expressed were maintained at the subsequent meetings. a short { } reference was made to the question of sanctions, but any detail was avoided in order to leave room for free discussion with the members of the french delegation. the note of the british government on the draft treaty of mutual assistance was referred to as expressing the final view and not requiring any further comment. . most of the speakers devoted some time to a statement of the views of their governments on the draft treaty of mutual assistance, against which the main objections urged were the uncertainty in regard to the definition of aggression, the too wide discretion and powers conferred upon the council and the evils attendant on the system of "complementary agreements" sanctioned by the treaty. the first defect might now be remedied by the extension of the system of arbitration, which would simplify the definition of aggression. as regards the "complementary agreements," even those who recognized their harmful possibilities were compelled to admit that they could not be abolished or prevented, and that their power for evil might be lessened if they were controlled and brought within a general scheme of mutual assistance under the league. . all the speakers were in substance agreed that the covenant itself afforded the best basis for any scheme of mutual assistance; that it needed only to be developed and carried to its logical conclusion in order that it might provide an adequate basis of security. . in summing up the debate the president observed that there appeared to be general agreement on the interdependence of the three problems of arbitration, security and disarmament, and on the point that a complete system could be evolved from the covenant itself. everyone was prepared to accept the principle of economic and financial sanctions, though some difference might exist on the subject of military sanctions. little had been said about disarmament, which could only follow as a consequence of the solution of the twin problems of arbitration and security. { } . it was then agreed, on the morning of the th september, to appoint a sub-committee of representatives of twelve delegations to formulate concrete proposals. . the sub-committee, known as the fourth sub-committee of the third committee, was composed as follows:-- lord parmoor or mr. henderson (british empire). m. paul-boncour (france). m. schanzer (italy). m. branting (sweden). m. benes (czechoslovakia). m. villegas (chile). m. kalfov (bulgaria). m. poullet (belgium). m. titulesco (roumania). mr. matsuda (japan). m. lange (norway). m. skrzynski (poland). . the sub-committee met for the first time on the afternoon of the th september, under the presidency of dr. benes. the first meeting was occupied by a discussion on procedure. in the first instance, it was proposed to appoint a drafting committee of three members to draw up proposals, keeping in close touch with a similar committee to be appointed by the first committee, but this idea was subsequently abandoned, and the president was requested to draw up the outline of a scheme, to be submitted to the sub-committee, if possible, on the th september. this the president undertook to do, but he was only able to submit his proposals for the first time on the th september. the delay was due mainly to the necessity of consulting with representatives of the first committee and with certain delegations. in particular, meetings were held on the th september between representatives of the french and british delegations who went carefully through the scheme and reached a preliminary agreement on a number of points of principle. this agreement greatly facilitated the eventual completion of the work. { } . these proposals were in the form of a draft protocol, of which articles , , and concerned the first committee, and have already been dealt with in the preceding section of this report. the remaining articles, as originally proposed, may be summarised as follows:-- . _article_ .--the council or the permanent court may appoint international control commissions, composed of civilian and military experts, to ensure that during the course of the arbitral procedure none of the parties makes preparations for economic or military mobilisation. . _article_ recommends the establishment of demilitarised zones and their control, if desired, by the league of nations. . _article_ .--as soon as the declaration of aggression has been made, the obligations of the signatories in regard to the sanctions of all kinds in article , paragraphs and , of the covenant will immediately become operative against the aggressor. these obligations to be interpreted as obliging each of the members of the league to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the covenant of the league and in resistance to any act of aggression. . in accordance with article of the covenant the signatories undertake, individually or collectively, to come to the assistance of the state attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards supplies of raw materials and food-stuffs of every kind, openings of credits, transports, transit, and for this purpose to ensure the safety of the land and sea communications of the attacked or threatened state. . if both parties to the dispute are declared aggressors according to the above provisions, the economic sanctions to be applied to both of them. . _article_ a.--the council of the league of nations to instruct the economic and financial committees, temporary mixed commission and permanent advisory commission to draw up ( ) plans of action for establishing the blockade of { } the aggressor state, and ( ) plans of economic and financial co-operation between the state attacked and the different states assisting it. . _article_ .--the council to be entitled to accept individual or collective undertakings entered into by states, determining in advance the military forces which they would immediately place at the council's disposal in order to carry out the measures decided upon, in accordance with the preceding articles. . when the aggressor has been designated, the signatories may, in accordance with undertakings previously entered into, place in the field the whole, or such proportion as they may consider necessary, of their military forces against the aggressor. . _article_ a.--in view of article of the covenant, the above sanctions must not include the violation of the political or territorial independence of the aggressor. . _article_ .--the signatories to take part as soon as possible in an international conference for the reduction of armaments under the auspices of the league. the council to draw up the programme for this conference. . if, within a time limit of (transcriber's note: blank space in source) after the coming into force of the protocol, the conference has not met, or the scheme for the reduction of armaments drawn up by it has not been adopted and carried out, the council may record the fact, and each signatory shall regain its freedom of action. . if, during the time limit specified above, a dispute arises, the provisions in the protocol to be applicable in full. . _supplementary clause_ (to be inserted in article ).--the conditions in which the council may declare that the scheme of the international conference has not been carried out, shall be defined by the conference itself. . _article_ .--differences relating to the carrying out or interpretation of the protocol to be submitted to the permanent court of international justice. . _article_ .--the protocol to be open for signature by { } all states, to be ratified, and the ratifications to be deposited with the league. the protocol to come into force between the signatories ratifying it, as from the date of ratification. . the sub-committee held eight meetings in all, finishing its work on the nd september. the articles were not discussed in their numerical order, and a discussion of one article was often adjourned while the examination of another article was begun. as it is not attempted here to give a full summary of the discussions, it will perhaps be convenient to take the articles in order and show what modifications were introduced. . _article_ .--objection was raised to this article, mainly on the ground that it gave the council or the permanent court too wide powers of interference, and introduced the idea of a "super-state." after consultation with other delegations, the british delegation produced an alternative draft which was adopted, and which was substantially embodied in the eventual protocol itself (becoming article ). the only essential difference between this draft and the eventual text was that the former provided, in paragraph , that the investigations should be carried out "by the organisation set up by the conference for the reduction of armaments to ensure respect for the decisions of that conference. . _article_ .--words were inserted to the effect that demilitarised zones were recommended "as a means of avoiding violations of the present protocol." they were to be placed under the supervision of the council at the request "and at the expense" of one or more of the conterminous states. . _article_ .--there was considerable discussion on the first paragraph, and some demand for a distinction to be drawn, as in the covenant, between economic and financial sanctions on the one hand, and military sanctions on the other. it was, however, explained that the proposed definition of the aggressor had produced a clearer situation, in which there was no reason why the application of sanctions of all kinds under article of the covenant should not be justified. it was pointed out that the { } wording of this first paragraph was illogical. the "obligations" could not "become operative against an aggressor." accordingly, it was agreed to substitute the words "the obligations will immediately come into force in order that the sanctions provided may immediately become operative." the paragraph was then passed with the above amendment. . exception was taken to the words in the third paragraph "undertake individually or collectively to come to the assistance." it might prove difficult to evolve collective plans, and it was agreed, on the proposal of the british delegate, to substitute the words "give a joint and several undertaking to." . in the same paragraph the use of the expression "to ensure the safety of the land and sea communications of the attacked or threatened state" was questioned in the first place, because it seemed that it might imply naval or military operations. in reply, it was pointed out that the words in the same sentence "for this purpose" showed that this paragraph related solely to economic and financial sanctions. in the second place the word "ensure" was objected to, on the score that to undertake to ensure communications might be to undertake an impossibility. finally, the words "take measures to preserve the safety of communications" were substituted. it was further pointed out that these provisions were to be applied to protect an attacked or threatened state and that a similar distinction was expressly contained in the covenant. . _article_ a.--the british delegation desired a redraft of this article, taking exception in particular to sub-paragraph ( ), in which the word "blockade" seemed to suggest belligerent naval action. they at first suggested omitting all words after "council of the league of nations" and substituting "shall, as soon as possible after the protocol has been ratified, take steps to ascertain from each of the signatories what organisation or legislation is necessary to give effect to the economic and financial sanctions." an alternative suggestion from another quarter was to substitute the words "putting into force the economic and { } financial sanctions against" for the words "establishing the blockade of" in sub-paragraph ( ). it was agreed to combine both amendments--to adopt the british text above, and to begin a second paragraph with the words "when in possession of this information the council shall draw up, through its competent organs: ( ) plans of action for the application of the economic and financial sanctions of article of the covenant against an aggressor state," &c. . later, the british delegation proposed to redraft the first paragraph in the form in which it finally appears in the protocol (having become article ), to delete the remainder, and to substitute "it shall communicate this report to the members of the league and to the other signatories." the redraft of the first paragraph was accepted, but it was decided to allow the second paragraph to stand, as amended above. . _article_ .--the british delegation had objections to raise against both paragraphs of this article. in the first paragraph they objected to the words "place at the council's disposal," and the second paragraph they regarded as an attempt to revert to what was the operative principle of the draft treaty of mutual assistance. . they suggested as an alternative text:-- "having regard to the fact that military sanctions are foreseen in article of the covenant, the council may receive undertakings from states fixing in advance the military forces which they would be willing to employ against a member of the league which was declared to be an aggressor. "in view of the right of members of the league to enter into such arrangements with the council, no agreement shall in future be concluded between states members of the league, providing for military action to be taken by them." . it became evident that the sub-committee could not be induced to accept the second paragraph of this alternative text, and it was accordingly withdrawn. exception was also taken { } to the words in the first paragraph, "against a member of the league," &c., and it was agreed to substitute the words, "to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the covenant and the present protocol." . the french delegation then proposed that the article should read:-- "in view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for in article of the covenant, and article of the present protocol, the council shall be entitled to receive undertakings entered into by states determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the covenant and the present protocol. "when the aggressor is designated, the signatory states may, moreover, place in the field, in accordance with agreements previously entered into, the whole or such part of their military, naval and air forces as they may consider necessary for the assistance of a state which shall have been the victim of aggression. "the obligations of the second paragraph shall be duly registered and published by the league of nations, and shall remain open for adherence by any state member of the league which so desires." . it was the right of states, as the matter then stood, to enter into special agreements with one another for determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would bring to the assistance of one another under the conditions indicated. under the protocol, these special agreements would only come into force when the council had decided which state is the aggressor: they would simply provide means for applying rapidly the sanctions prescribed in the covenant and the protocol. . before, however, agreeing to this text a statement was made on behalf of the british delegation, expressing regret that the sub-committee had not seen its way to make the protocol an instrument whereby the league would only act as a whole. it was, however, recognised that the last paragraph introduced { } an improvement, as, if separate agreements must exist, it would be better that they should be registered with the league. "but that does not alter the fact that you are making provision on the face of a new document for that which has been turned down in connection with the draft treaty of mutual assistance." further opposition to the draft article was not pressed, but the british delegation made known their desire that words should be recorded expressing regret that the league was not to act as a whole, and to set its face "like flint against anything like the old balance of power by allowing these regional pacts to go on under this new instrument." the above text was then adopted. . _article_ a.--the british delegation proposed that the article should read: "shall not affect the territorial integrity or political independence of the aggressor state." this was agreed to, and it was also decided to prefix a paragraph relating to the costs of military, naval or air operations, similar to article of the draft treaty of mutual assistance. . _article_ .--objection was raised by the british delegation to the last paragraph of article , and they moved that the following be substituted:-- "the provisions of the present protocol in regard to arbitration and sanctions shall come into force when the scheme for the reduction of armaments, drawn up by the international conference, has been effectively carried out in accordance with the conditions fixed by the conference itself." . the french delegation maintained strongly that the protocol must be brought into operation before the international conference could meet. the british delegation offered a compromise with the suggestion that their government might sign the protocol, and ask parliament to approve it before the conference met. but preparatory arrangements for the conference should go on concurrently. directly agreement was reached by the conference, ratifications could 'be deposited. as this failed to meet the views of the french delegation, the british { } delegation made a final proposal whereby endeavours should be made to secure ratification and deposit of ratifications before the conference met, provided the protocol itself contained a provision to the effect that it should only become operative when the international conference reached a conclusion. the french delegation indicated their willingness in principle to accept this, but wished to consider an actual text. . at the next meeting the chairman submitted the following version:-- "the undersigned members of the league of nations undertake to participate in an international conference for the reduction of armaments which shall be convened by the council of the league and shall meet at geneva on monday, the th june, . states not members of the league of nations shall be invited to this conference. "the ratifications of the present protocol shall be deposited with the secretariat of the league of nations at the latest by the st may, . if at least fifteen members of the league, of which four are permanently represented on the council, have not deposited their ratification by the st, may , the secretary-general of the league shall cancel the invitations. "the entry into force of the present protocol shall be suspended until a plan for the reduction of armaments has been adopted by the conference. "with a view to the summoning of the latter, the council, taking into account the undertakings contained in articles and of the present protocol, will prepare a general programme for the reduction of armaments which will be placed at the disposal of the conference. "if, within a period of (transcriber's note: blank space in source) after the adoption of the plan for the reduction of armaments, that plan has not been carried out, the council shall make a declaration to that effect; this declaration shall under the present protocol be null and void. "the grounds on which the council may declare that the plan drawn up by the international conference for the reduction of armaments has not been carried out, and that in consequence the present { } rendered null and void, shall be laid down by the conference itself. "a signatory state which, after the expiration of the period fixed above, fails to comply with the plan adopted by the conference, shall not be admitted to benefit by the application of sanctions provided in the present protocol." . the sub-committee adopted a proposal to add to the third paragraph "and communicated to governments two months previously." in view of representations made by the japanese delegation, this was subsequently altered to "and communicated to governments at the earliest possible date, and at the latest three months before the conference meets." . the swedish delegation proposed that a clause should be added to the effect that "the present protocol in no way effects obligations arising out of the covenant." it was agreed that a clause to this effect could be either added or inserted as a separate article. the latter alternative was eventually adopted (see article of the final protocol). . after some discussion, the number of ratifications required in paragraph of this article was finally fixed as now provided in the protocol (see paragraph of article of the final protocol). (n. b.--the joint drafting committee of the first and third committees made a final revise of the whole text, with a view to checking the wording of the various articles, their logical arrangement, &c. in the course of this work they removed paragraphs , , and of this article and incorporated them in the "ratification" article of the final protocol--no. .) . _article_ .--the british delegation proposed the suppression of the words "carrying out." it was decided to consult the first committee on this point. (the words are omitted in the final protocol.) . _article_ .--in view of the new text of article , it was decided to omit the second paragraph of this article. . this concluded the work of the sub-committee, and { } the text of the above articles of the protocol were submitted to the third committee on the nd september. dr. benes, as chairman and _rapporteur_ of the sub-committee, made a general report on the sub-committee's work, and it was then agreed to discuss the articles seriatim. . on _article_ a debate ensued on an objection raised by the italian delegation to the proposal that investigations should be carried out by the organisation to be set up by the international conference. in the first place, they disliked the idea of a permanent organ of investigation--they considered that, if an investigation were necessary, this should be carried out by a special body appointed for the purpose if and when the occasion arose. in the second place, they suggested that it would be improper to anticipate, in the protocol, any decision that the international conference might take. the british delegation explained that this proposal had been inserted in their draft merely as a matter of convenience: thinking that it would be necessary for the conference to appoint some body to ensure that the decisions of the conference were carried out, it had seemed to them that it would be only duplicating labour for any other body to be set up by the council to carry out these special investigations. the italian delegation finally suggested that the text should run, "such enquiries and investigations shall be carried out with the utmost possible despatch, and the signatory states undertake to afford every facility for carrying them out." this was accepted, with the consequential amendment to the fourth paragraph, which should now begin: "if, as a result of these enquiries and investigations, any infraction," &c. the article thus adopted became article of the final protocol. . _articles_ _and_ were adopted without modification, becoming articles and respectively of the final protocol. . _article_ .--owing to a change introduced by the first committee in the text of article , in consequence of which it was no longer incumbent on the council to make a declaration of aggression, it became necessary to alter the wording of the beginning of article . it was decided that this should run, "as { } soon as the council has called upon the signatory states to apply sanctions against the aggressor state, in accordance with article , the obligations," &c. . in paragraph the words "signatory states" were substituted for "members of the league." . the article as a whole came in for some criticism, mainly from the netherlands and scandinavian delegations. certain remarks made by dr. benes in introducing the text to the third committee had caused misgivings to those delegations, who wished to be assured that the obligations in this article did not go beyond those of article of the covenant. they observed, as had members of the sub-committee, that the distinction drawn in the covenant between economic and financial sanctions on the one hand, and military, naval and aerial sanctions on the other, had disappeared from the present text, and they sought a clear declaration that no fresh obligations were incurred in regard to the latter category, and that each member of the league retained the right to decide its own course of action. in the course of his reply dr. benes said, "the real application of the sanctions will always be within the province of the government themselves, and true co-operation will always take place by direct contract between the governments." the danish delegation were not entirely satisfied, and moved to alter the second paragraph so as to make it read, "co-operate loyally and effectively in the carrying out of the obligations provided for in article of the covenant." after consultation with the _rapporteur_, they abandoned this amendment, and declared themselves satisfied with the addition to paragraph of the words, "in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow." as thus amended, the article was adopted, and became article of the final protocol. . _article_ a was adopted without amendment, becoming article of the final protocol. . _article_ .--the change, referred to above, in the text of article , rendered necessary an alteration in the wording of the second paragraph of this article, which it was agreed should { } begin: "furthermore, as soon as the council has called upon the signatory states to apply sanctions, as provided," &c. . in the same paragraph it was decided to omit the words, "the whole or such part of," and make it read, "bring to the assistance of a particular state, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air forces." with these modifications, the article was adopted, and became article of the final protocol. . _article_ a was adopted, and figures as article in the final protocol. it was suggested that an addition should be made to this article to the effect that "the council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re-established." the committee decided that this should be inserted as a separate article, and it appears in the final protocol as article . . _articles_ _and_ were adopted without modification, article being embodied, as explained, in articles and of the final protocol, and article becoming article . . the text of an additional article (which became article of the final protocol) was also approved. after the work of the first and third committees had been concluded, the reports of these committees were submitted as a whole to the assembly. the assembly unanimously, with the assent of every delegation represented at that time in the assembly, approved the reports so presented them, and passed the resolutions, the text of which has already been published.[ ] we are, sir, your obedient servants, arthur henderson. parmoor. gilbert murray. cecil j. b. hurst. the right. hon. j. ramsay macdonald, m. p., &c. &c. &c. [ ] miscellaneous no. ( ), cmd. . [ ] see annex c, p. . [ ] see annex d, p. . { } annex f. proposals of the american group.[ ] declaration outlawing aggressive war. chapter i. outlawry of aggressive war. article .--the high contracting parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime. they severally undertake not to be guilty of its commission. article .--a state engaging in war for other than purposes of defense commits the international crime described in article . article .--the permanent court of international justice shall have jurisdiction, on the complaint of any signatory, to make a judgment to the effect that the international crime described in article has or has not in any given case been committed. chapter ii. acts of aggression. article .--the high contracting parties solemnly declare that acts of aggression, even when not amounting to a state of war, and preparations for such acts of aggression, are hereafter to be deemed forbidden by international law. { } article .--in the absence of a state of war, measures of force by land, by sea or in the air taken by one state against another and not taken for the purpose of defense against aggression or for the protection of human life shall be deemed to be acts of aggression. general or partial mobilisation may be deemed to be preparation for an act of aggression. any signatory which claims that another signatory has violated any of the terms of this declaration shall submit its case to the permanent court of international justice. a signatory refusing to accept the jurisdiction of the court in any such case shall be deemed an aggressor within the terms of this declaration. failure to accept the jurisdiction of the court within four days after notification of submission of a claim of violation of this declaration shall be deemed a refusal to accept the jurisdiction. article .--the court shall also have jurisdiction on the complaint of any signatory to make a judgment to the effect that there has or has not in any given case been committed a violation of international law within the terms of article . article .--the court shall, in any case, have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to reserve the respective rights of either party. pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties. chapter iii. sanctions. article .--in the event of any h.c.p. having been adjudged an aggressor pursuant to this declaration, all commercial, trade, financial and property interests of the aggressor shall cease to be entitled, either in the territory of the other signatories or on { } the high seas, to any privileges, protection, rights or immunities accorded by either international law, national law or treaty. any h.c.p. may in such case take such steps towards the severence of trade, financial, commercial and personal intercourse with the aggressor and its nationals as it may deem proper and the h.c.p. may also consult together in this regard. the period during which any such economic sanction may be continued shall be fixed at any time by the court at the request of any signatory. in the matter of measures of force to be taken, each signatory shall consult its own interests and obligations. article .--if any h.c.p. shall be adjudged an aggressor by the permanent court of international justice, such power shall be liable for all damage to all other h.c.p. resulting from its aggression. chapter iv. decrees of the permanent court. article .--the h.c.p. agree to accept the judgment of the permanent court of international justice as to the fulfilment of violation of the contracts of this declaration. any question arising under this declaration is _ipso facto_ within the jurisdiction of the court. article .--if a dispute arising under this declaration shall be submitted to the permanent court of international justice, it is for the court to decide as to its jurisdiction and also whether or not its decree has been complied with. article .--the high contracting parties, recognising that excessive armaments constitute a menace of war, agree to participate in the permanent advisory conference on disarmament decided upon by the fifth assembly of the league of nations. article .--the present declaration shall be ratified. the ratifications shall be deposited as soon as possible with the secretary general of the league of nations. { } any signatory to this declaration desiring to withdraw therefrom may give notice thereof to the secretary-general of the league of nations. such notice shall take effect one year from the date of deposit thereof and only as to the signatory so withdrawing. notice of each ratification and of each withdrawal shall be communicated by the secretary-general of the league of nations to each signatory hereto. resolution concerning the declaration outlawing aggressive war. . the assembly unanimously declares its approval of the declaration outlawing aggressive war which was prepared by the third committee of the assembly and submitted to the assembly for its approval. . the said declaration shall be submitted within the shortest possible time to the members of the league of nations for adoption in the form of a protocol duly ratified and declaring their recognition of this declaration. it shall be the duty of the council to submit the declaration to the members. the said protocol shall likewise remain open for signature by states not members of the league of nations. . as soon as this protocol has been ratified by the majority of the members of the league the said declaration shall go into force. disarmament resolution "a." . the assembly, having considered the report of the temporary mixed commission and having also considered the replies of the various governments commenting on the proposed treaty of mutual assistance, reaffirms the principles set forth in resolution of the third assembly, . furthermore, the assembly is of the opinion that all the { } nations of the world, whether or not members of the league of nations, should agree a. to limit or reduce their armaments to the basis necessary for the maintenance of peace and national security. b. to study the ways and means for future reduction of armaments either as between all nations or as between any two of them. . the assembly is further of the opinion that reciprocal agreements between two or more neighbouring countries for the establishment of demilitarised zones would facilitate the security necessary to progressive disarmament. . in order to facilitate the reduction and limitation of armaments, the assembly requests the council to call a permanent advisory conference upon disarmament which shall meet periodically at intervals of not less than once every three years. invitations to participate in this permanent conference shall be sent to all nations whether members of the league or not. the said conference should from time to time consider the further codifying of the principles of international law particularly in relation to acts of aggression and preparations for such acts. in this regard the conference should take into account matters bearing upon the security of the powers represented and the steps taken toward disarmament. the recommendations of the conference shall be submitted to the powers for their adoption, and shall also be transmitted to the permanent court of international justice. the said conference should publish periodical reports concerning the actual conditions of the armaments of the powers. the said conference should advise the powers concerning measures to be taken to ensure the carrying out of the principles of the present resolution and it may prepare draft treaties for the establishment of demilitarised zones and for the further promotion of disarmament and peace. { } . the said conference should appoint a permanent technical committee. . the said conference or its permanent technical committee should give advice on technical questions to the permanent court of international justice at the request of said court. . the expenses of the said conference and of its agencies should be borne by the powers in the proportion of their respective budgets for defense. disarmament resolution "b." . considering that by the terms of article of the covenant of the league of nations "the members of the league undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes," the assembly, in order to facilitate the carrying out of the said engagement, requests the council to set up a commission charged with the duty of making the necessary official examinations and reports. . the said commission shall proceed under such regulations as the council and the assembly shall from time to time approve. . subject to such regulations the members of the commission shall be entitled, when they deem it desirable, to proceed to any point within the territory of any member of the league or to send sub-commissions or to authorize one or more of their members so to proceed on behalf of the commission. . the members of the league will give all necessary facilities to the said commission in the performance of its duties. . all reports made by the said commission shall be communicated to the members of the league. { } disarmament resolution "c." the assembly, taking account of the provisions of the declaration outlawing aggressive war, is of opinion . powers which have ratified the said declaration may, subject to the following provisions, conclude, either as between two of them or as between a larger number, agreements complementary to the said declaration, exclusively for the purpose of their mutual defense and intended solely to facilitate the carrying out of the measures prescribed in said declaration, determining in advance the assistance which they would give to each other in the event of any act of aggression. such agreements may, if the h.c.p. interested so desire, be negotiated and concluded under the auspices of the council. . complementary agreements as defined in the preceding paragraph, shall, before being registered, be examined by the council with a view to deciding whether they are in accordance with the principles of said declaration and of the covenant. in particular, the council shall consider if the cases of aggression contemplated in these agreements are of a nature to give rise to an obligation to give assistance on the part of the other h.c.p. the council may, if necessary, suggest changes in the texts of the agreements submitted to it. when recognised, the agreements shall be registered in conformity with article of the covenant. they shall be regarded as complementary to the said declaration and shall in no way limit the general obligations of the h.c.p. nor the sanctions contemplated against an aggressor under the terms of said declaration. they will be open to any other h.c.p., party to said declaration with the consent of the signatory states. . in all cases of aggression, for which provision is made in the agreement constituting a defensive group, the h.c.p. which are members of such group may undertake to put into operation { } automatically the plan of assistance agreed upon between them; and in all other cases of aggression or menace or danger of aggression, directly aimed at them, they will consult each other before taking action, and will inform the council of the measures which they are contemplating. . the council, taking into account the reports and opinions of the commission set up under resolution b of this assembly, shall at any time when requested, consider summarily whether (a) the armaments of any state are in excess of those fixed under the provisions of any agreement relating to reduction or limitation or armaments; or (b) the military or other preparations of any state are of such a nature as to cause apprehension of aggression or an eventual outbreak of hostilities. . if the council shall upon such request be of the opinion that there is reasonable ground for thinking that a menace of aggression has arisen, the parties to the defensive agreements hereinbefore mentioned may put into immediate execution the plan of assistance which they have agreed upon. . if the council shall, upon such request, not be of the opinion that a menace of aggression has arisen, a public report to the effect shall be made and in such case no state shall be under any obligation to put into execution any plan of assistance to which it is a party; but any member of the league, believing itself to be threatened with a menace of aggression, notwithstanding the fact that the council has not been of such opinion, may forthwith notify the council to that effect, and such member shall thereupon have full liberty of action in military or other preparations for defense, subject, however, to the limitations as to armament which are imposed by any treaty now in force. [ ] in their earlier form, as a draft treaty of disarmament and security, these proposals were circulated to the members of the council of the league in june, . for the text, see world peace foundation pamphlets, vol. vii, no. . in the form here printed, the so-called "american plan" was given out at geneva on august , , with the following note by general bliss, professor shotwell and myself: "it has been suggested that the proposals of the draft treaty of disarmament and security prepared by the american group, of which we are members, might be drawn up in some form other than that of one treaty. "in order to facilitate the examination of this suggestion, we have prepared the four draft papers which follow. these papers are a draft declaration outlawing aggressive war (with a draft assembly resolution regarding the same) and three draft resolutions of the assembly regarding disarmament. "aside from the necessary drafting changes required by the change of form, the text of these papers is substantially, and except in a few instances, literally the same as that of the draft treaty of disarmament and security above mentioned." { } annex g. the covenant of the league of nations. incorporating the provisions of the protocol of geneva.[ ] [sidenote: two clauses added from the preamble to the protocol.] recognising the solidarity of the members of the international community, and asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and an international crime, the high contracting parties, in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, agree to this covenant of the league of nations. articles to , inclusive. unchanged. article a. [sidenote: article of the protocol with verbal changes.] the members of the league agree in no case to resort to war either with one another or against a state which, if the occasion arises, accepts all the obligations of the covenant, except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the council or the assembly in accordance with the provisions of the covenant. { } article . [sidenote: phrase agreeing not to resort to war for three months, omitted as unnecessary.] the members of the league agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the council. in any case under this article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute. article . the members of the league agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement. disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement. [sidenote: a verbal change in the third paragraph.] for the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the permanent court of international justice, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. the members of the league agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a member of the league which complies therewith. in the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. article . [sidenote: article of the covenant, verbally changed.] the permanent court of international justice shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. the court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the council or by the assembly. [sidenote: article of the protocol, with some words added.] the members of the league undertake to recognize as compulsory, _ipso facto_ and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the permanent court of international justice in the cases covered by paragraph of article of the statute of the court, but without prejudice to the right of any member, when acceding to the special protocol provided for in the said article and opened for signature on december th, , to make reservations compatible with the said clause. { } accession to this special protocol, opened for signature on december th, , must be given within a month after the coming into force hereof, and in the case of members of the league hereafter admitted, within a month after such admission. [sidenote: article of the protocol.] any dispute as to the interpretation of the covenant shall be submitted to the permanent court of international justice. article . [sidenote: the first three paragraphs of article of the covenant, unchanged.] if there should arise between members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with article , the members of the league agree that they will submit the matter to the council. any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the secretary-general, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. for this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the secretary-general, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the council may forthwith direct the publication thereof. the council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and, if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the council may deem appropriate. [sidenote: numbers and of article of the protocol, very slightly changed.] if the dispute is not thus settled, the council shall endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration. if the parties cannot agree to do so, there shall, at the request of at least one of the parties, be constituted a committee of arbitrators. the committee shall so far as possible be constituted by agreement between the parties. if within the period fixed by the council the parties have failed to agree, in whole or in part, upon the number, the names and the powers of the arbitrators and upon the procedure, the council shall settle the points remaining in suspense. the council shall with the utmost possible dispatch select in consultation with the parties the arbitrators and their president from among persons who by their nationality, their personal character and their experience, appear to furnish the highest guarantees of competence and impartiality. after the claims of the parties have been formulated, the committee of arbitrators, on the request of any party, shall through the medium of the council, request an advisory opinion upon any points of law in dispute from the permanent court of international justice, which in such case shall meet with the utmost possible dispatch. { } [sidenote: of article of the protocol, and the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of article of the covenant] if none of the parties asks for arbitration, the council shall take the dispute under consideration and, either unanimously or by a majority vote, shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto. any member of the league represented on the council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same. if a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league agree to comply with the recommendations of the report. [sidenote: of article of the protocol, with verbal changes. eighth paragraph of article of the covenant.] in no case may a solution, in accordance with a unanimous recommendation of the council accepted by one of the parties concerned, be again called in question. if the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement. [sidenote: seventh paragraph of article of the covenant, as modified by of article of the protocol.] if the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute, it shall submit the dispute to arbitration. the council shall itself determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the committee of arbitrators and, in the choice of the arbitrators, shall bear in mind the guarantees of competence and impartiality referred to above. [sidenote: of article of the protocol, omitting clauses now unnecessary.] the members of the league undertake that they will carry out in full good faith any judicial sentence or arbitral award that may be rendered and that they will comply, as provided in paragraph ten hereof, with the solutions recommended by the council. in the event of a member of the league failing to carry out the above undertakings, the council shall exert all its influence to secure compliance therewith. if the council fails therein, it shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. [sidenote: paragraphs nine and ten of article of the covenant, and article of the protocol.] the council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the assembly. the dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the council. in any case referred to the assembly, all the provisions of this article and of article relating to the action and powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the { } dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all the members thereof, other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute; and provided further that in any case referred to the assembly, the powers of the council under paragraphs five, six, seven and fourteen hereof shall continue. [sidenote: of article of the protocol.] the provisions of this article do not apply to the settlement of disputes which arise as the result of measures of war taken by one or more members of the league in agreement with the council or the assembly. article a. [sidenote: from article of the protocol.] if in the course of an arbitration, such as is contemplated in article , one of the parties claims that the dispute, or part thereof, arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the arbitrators shall on this point take the advice of the permanent court of international justice through the medium of the council. the opinion of the court shall be binding upon the arbitrators, who, if the opinion is affirmative, shall confine themselves to so declaring in their award. if the question is held by the court or by the council to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the council or by the assembly under article . article b. [sidenote: articles and of the protocol, slightly changed.] the members of the league undertake to abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against another state. if a member of the league is of opinion that another state is making preparations for war, it shall have the right to bring the matter to the notice of the council. in the event of a dispute arising between two or more members of the league, they agree that they will not, either before the dispute is submitted to proceedings for pacific settlement or during such proceedings, make any increase of their armaments or effectives which might modify the position established by any agreement in force, nor will they take any measure of military, naval, air, industrial or economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute. it shall be the duty of the council, in accordance with the provisions of article , to take under consideration any complaint as to infraction of the above undertakings which is made to it by one or more of the parties to the dispute. should the council be of opinion that the complaint requires investigation, it shall, if it deems it expedient, arrange for inquiries and investigations in one or more of the countries concerned. such inquiries and investigations shall be carried out with the utmost possible dispatch and the members of the league undertake to afford every facility for carrying them out. { } the sole object of measures taken by the council as above provided is to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes and they shall in no way prejudge the actual settlement. if the result of such inquiries and investigations is to establish an infraction of the above undertakings, it shall be the duty of the council to summon the member or members of the league guilty of the infraction to put an end thereto. should any member of the league in question fail to comply with such summons, the council shall declare it to be guilty of a violation of the covenant, and shall recommend measures to be taken with a view to end as soon as possible a situation of a nature to threaten the peace of the world. for the purposes of this article decisions of the council may be taken by a two-thirds majority. article c. [sidenote: article of the protocol, slightly changed.] the existence of demilitarised zones being calculated to prevent aggression and to facilitate a definite finding of the nature provided for in article d, the establishment of such zones between states mutually consenting thereto is to recommend as a means of preserving peace. the demilitarised zones already existing under the terms of certain treaties or conventions, or which may be established in future between states mutually consenting thereto, may at the request and at the expense of one or more of the conterminous states, be placed under a temporary or permanent system of supervision to be organised by the council. article d. [sidenote: article of the protocol, with verbal changes.] any member of the league which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the covenant is an aggressor. violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone shall be held equivalent to resort to war. in the event of hostilities having broken out, any member of the league shall be presumed to be an aggressor (unless a decision of the council, which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare) which (a) has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of pacific settlement provided by the covenant, or (b) has refused to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award or with a unanimous recommendation of the council, or (c) has disregarded a unanimous report of the council, a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognizing that the dispute between it and the other belligerent arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter state, and has not previously submitted the question to the council or the assembly, in accordance with article , or (d) has violated provisional measures enjoined by the council { } for the period while the proceedings are in progress as contemplated by article b. apart from the cases dealt with in sub-heads a, b, c and d of this article, if the council does not at once, by unanimous vote, succeed in determining the aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting if need be, by a two-thirds majority and shall supervise its execution. any belligerent which refuses to accept the armistice or violates its terms shall be deemed an aggressor. the council shall call upon the members of the league to apply forthwith against the aggressor the sanctions provided by the covenant, and any member of the league thus called upon shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent. [sidenote: article of the protocol.] the council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be reestablished. article . [sidenote: this combines article of the covenant and article of the protocol. it omits much of the pending amendments to article of the covenant as superfluous.] should any member of the league resort to war, in disregard of its covenants, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations and to prohibit all intercourse, at least between persons resident within their territories and persons resident within the territory of the covenant-breaking state, and, if they deem it expedient, also between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse at least between persons resident within the territory of that state and persons resident within the territory of every other state, and, if they deem it expedient, also between the nationals of that state and the nationals of every other state. it shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the league shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league. as soon as the council has called upon the members of the league to apply sanctions, as provided in article d, the obligations of the members of the league in regard to the sanctions mentioned in paragraphs one and two of this article will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each member of the league to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the covenant, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow. the members of the league agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures { } which are taken under this article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the league which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the league. the members of the league jointly and severally undertake to come to the assistance of the state attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened state. if both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept of article d, the economic and financial sanctions shall be applied to both of them. any member of the league which has violated any covenant of the league may be declared to be no longer a member of the league by a vote of the council concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the league represented thereon. article a. [sidenote: article of the protocol, with slight changes.] in view of the complexity of the conditions in which the council may be called upon to exercise the functions mentioned in article concerning economic and financial sanctions, and in order to determine more exactly the guarantees afforded to the members of the league, the council shall from time to time invite the economic and financial organizations of the league to consider and report as to the nature of the steps to be taken to give effect to the financial and economic sanctions and measures of co-operation contemplated in article . from time to time, the council shall draw up through its competent organs: . plans of action for the application of the economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor state; . plans of economic and financial co-operation between a state attacked and the different states assisting it; and shall communicate these plans to the members of the league. article b. [sidenote: article of the protocol, with slight changes.] in view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by article , the council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from members of the league determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the covenant. { } furthermore, as soon as the council has called upon the members of the league to apply sanctions, as provided in article d, the said members of the league may, in accordance with any agreements which they may previously have concluded, bring to the assistance of a particular state, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air forces. the agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be registered and published by the secretariat. they shall remain open to all members of the league which may desire to accede thereto. article . [sidenote: article of the covenant, with verbal changes.] in the event of a dispute between a member of the league and a state which is not a member of the league, or between states not members of the league, the state or states not members of the league shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the council may deem just. if such invitation is accepted, the provisions of the covenant shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the council. upon such invitation being given, the council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. if a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute and shall resort to war against a member of the league, the provisions of article shall be applicable as against the state taking such action. if both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, the council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. article a. [sidenote: article of the protocol, with verbal changes.] the members of the league agree that the whole cost of any military, naval or air operations undertaken for the repression of an aggression under the terms of the covenant, and reparation for all losses suffered by individuals, whether civilians or combatants, and for all material damage caused by the operations of both sides, shall be borne by the aggressor state up to the extreme limit of its capacity. nevertheless, in view of article , neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of the aggressor state shall in any case be affected as the result of the applications of the sanctions of the covenant. articles to , inclusive. unchanged. [ ] this is my draft. see _supra_, p. . in the text it is called the "amended" covenant. transcriber's notes: in the source book, footnotes on each page were lettered from 'a'. for this ebook, each chapter's footnotes were numbered, sequentially from , and moved to the end of the chapter. page numbers in this ebook are indicated by numbers enclosed in curly braces, e.g. { }. they have been located where page breaks occurred in the original book, in accordance with project gutenberg's faq-v- . from isolation to leadership revised a review of american foreign policy by john holladay latane, ph.d., ll.d. professor of american history and dean of the college faculty in the johns hopkins university author of "the united states and latin america" "america as a world power" etc. garden city ------ new york doubleday, page & company copyright, , , by doubleday, page & company all rights reserved, including that of translation into foreign languages, including the scandinavian preface the first edition of this book appeared in october, , a few weeks before the signing of the armistice, when the united states was at the high tide of its power and influence. in view of the subsequent course of events, some of my readers may question the propriety of the original title. in fact, one of my friends has suggested that a more appropriate title for the new edition would be "from isolation to leadership, and back." but i do not regard the verdict of as an expression of the final judgment of the american people. the world still waits on america, and sooner or later we must recognize and assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power. the first nine chapters are reprinted with only a few verbal changes. chapter x has been rewritten, and chapters xi and xii have been added. john h. latanÉ. baltimore, june , . contents chapter i. origin of the policy of isolation ii. formulation of the monroe doctrine iii. the monroe doctrine and the european balance of power iv. international cooperation without the sanction of force v. the open-door policy vi. anglo-american relations vii. imperialistic tendencies of the monroe doctrine viii. the new pan-americanism ix. the failure of neutrality and isolation x. the war aims of the united states xi. the treaty of versailles xii. the washington conference index from isolation to leadership i origin of the policy of isolation the monroe doctrine and the policy of political isolation are two phases of american diplomacy so closely related that very few writers appear to draw any distinction between them. the monroe doctrine was in its origin nothing more than the assertion, with special application to the american continents, of the right of independent states to pursue their own careers without fear or threat of intervention, domination, or subjugation by other states. president monroe announced to the world that this principle would be upheld by the united states in this hemisphere. the policy of isolation was the outgrowth of washington's warning against _permanent_ alliances and jefferson's warning against _entangling_ alliances. both washington and jefferson had in mind apparently the form of european alliance common in their day, which bound one nation to support another both diplomatically and by force in any dispute that might arise no matter whether it concerned the interests of the first state or not. such alliances were usually of the nature of family compacts between different dynasties, or between different branches of the same dynasty, rather than treaties between nations. in fact, dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently, if not usually, at variance with the real interests of the peoples affected. it will be shown later that neither washington nor jefferson intended that the united states should refrain permanently from the exercise of its due influence in matters which properly concern the peace and welfare of the community of nations. washington did not object to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did jefferson object to special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects. their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning that the united states must hold aloof from world politics and attend strictly to its own business. the monroe doctrine was a perfectly sound principle and it has been fully justified by nearly a century of experience. it has saved south america from the kind of exploitation to which the continents of africa and asia have, during the past generation, fallen a prey. the policy of isolation, on the other hand, still cherished by so many americans as a sacred tradition of the fathers, is in principle quite distinct from the monroe doctrine and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the position and importance of the united states as a world power. the difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps best be illustrated by the following supposition. if the united states were to sign a permanent treaty with england placing our navy at her disposal in the event of attack from germany or some other power, on condition that england would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any european power in latin america, such a treaty would not be a violation of the monroe doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle. such a treaty would, however, be a departure from our traditional policy of isolation. of the two policies, that of avoiding political alliances is the older. it was announced by washington under circumstances that will be considered in a moment. in the struggle for independence the colonies deliberately sought foreign alliances. in fact, the first treaty ever signed by the united states was the treaty of alliance with france, negotiated and ratified in . the aid which france extended under this treaty to our revolutionary ancestors in men, money, and ships enabled them to establish the independence of our country. a few years later came the french revolution, the establishment of the french republic followed by the execution of louis xvi, and in the war between england and france. with the arrival in this country of genet, the minister of the newly established french republic, there began a heated debate in the newspapers throughout the country as to our obligations under the treaty of alliance and the commercial treaty of . president washington requested the opinions in writing of the members of his cabinet as to whether genet should be received and the new government which had been set up in france recognized, as to whether the treaties were still binding, and as to whether a proclamation of neutrality should be issued. hamilton and jefferson replied at great length, taking as usual opposite sides, particularly on the question as to the binding force of the treaties. hamilton took the view that as the government of louis xvi, with which the treaties had been negotiated, had been overthrown, we were under no obligations to fulfill their stipulations and had a perfect right to renounce them. jefferson took the correct view that the treaties were with the french nation and that they were binding under whatever government the french people chose to set up. this principle, which is now one of the fundamental doctrines of international law, was so ably expounded by jefferson that his words are well worth quoting. "i consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source of all authority in that nation, as free to transact their common concerns by any agents they think proper, to change these agents individually, or the organization of them in form or function whenever they please: that all the acts done by those agents under the authority of the nation, are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them, and enure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any change in the form of the government, or of the persons administering it. consequently the treaties between the united states and france were not treaties between the united states and louis capet, but between the two nations of america and france, and the nations remaining in existence, tho' both of them have since changed their forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes." the argument was so heated that washington was reluctant to press matters to a definite conclusion. from his subsequent action it appears that he agreed with jefferson that the treaties were binding, but he held that the treaty of alliance was purely defensive and that we were under no obligation to aid france in an offensive war such as she was then waging. he accordingly issued his now famous proclamation of neutrality, april, . of this proclamation w. e. hall, a leading english authority on international law, writing one hundred years later, said: "the policy of the united states in constitutes an epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality. there can be no doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the obligations then incumbent upon neutrals. but it represented by far the most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were; and in some points it even went farther than authoritative international custom has up to the present time advanced. in the main, however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now adopted by the community of nations." washington's proclamation laid the real foundations of the american policy of isolation. the very novelty of the rigid neutrality proclaimed by washington made the policy a difficult one to pursue. in the revolutionary and napoleonic wars, which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, the united states was the principal neutral. the problems to which this situation gave rise were so similar to the problems raised during the early years of the world war that many of the diplomatic notes prepared by jefferson and madison might, with a few changes of names and dates, be passed off as the correspondence of wilson and lansing. washington's administration closed with the clouds of the european war still hanging heavy on the horizon. under these circumstances he delivered his famous farewell address in which he said: "the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little _political_ connection as possible. so far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. here let us stop. "europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. "our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. if we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. "why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of european ambitions, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? "it is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, i mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. i hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the best policy. i repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. but in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. "taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." it will be observed that washington warned his countrymen against _permanent_ alliances. he expressly said that we might "safely trust to _temporary_ alliances for extraordinary emergencies." further than this many of those who are continually quoting washington's warning against alliances not only fail to note the limitations under which the advice was given, but they also overlook the reasons assigned. in a succeeding paragraph of the farewell address he said: "with me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes." the expression "entangling alliances" does not occur in the farewell address, but was given currency by jefferson. in his first inaugural address he summed up the principles by which he proposed to regulate his foreign policy in the following terms: "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." during the brief interval of peace following the treaty of amiens in , napoleon undertook the reëstablishment of french power in santo domingo as the first step in the development of a colonial empire which he determined upon when he forced spain to retrocede louisiana to france by the secret treaty of san ildefonso in . fortunately for us the ill-fated expedition to santo domingo encountered the opposition of half a million negroes and ultimately fell a prey to the ravages of yellow fever. as soon as jefferson heard of the cession of louisiana to france, he instructed livingston, his representative at paris, to open negotiations for the purchase of new orleans and west florida, stating that the acquisition of new orleans by a powerful nation like france would inevitably lead to friction and conflict. "the day that france takes possession of new orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. it seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. from that moment we must marry ourselves to the british fleet and nation. we must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very high grounds: and having formed and cemented together a power which may render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to france, make the first cannon, which shall be fired in europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of america in sequestration for the common purposes of the united british and american nations. this is not a state of things we seek or desire. it is one which this measure, if adopted by france, forces on us, as necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its necessary effect." monroe was later sent to paris to support livingston and he was instructed, in case there was no prospect of a favorable termination of the negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the spring and "in the meantime enter into conferences with the british government, through their ambassador at paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us in peace until congress meets." jefferson had already informed the british minister at washington that if france should, by closing the mouth of the mississippi, force the united states to war, "they would throw away the scabbard." monroe and livingston were now instructed, in case they should become convinced that france meditated hostilities against the united states, to negotiate an alliance with england and to stipulate that neither party should make peace or truce without the consent of the other. thus notwithstanding his french proclivities and his warning against "entangling alliances," the author of the immortal declaration of independence was ready and willing in this emergency to form an alliance with england. the unexpected cession of the entire province of louisiana to the united states made the contemplated alliance with england unnecessary. the united states was no more successful in its effort to remain neutral during the napoleonic wars than it was during the late war, though the slow means of communication a hundred years ago caused the struggle for neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer period of time. neither england nor france regarded us as having any rights which they were bound to respect, and american commerce was fairly bombarded by french decrees and british orders in council. there was really not much more reason why we should have fought england than france, but as england's naval supremacy enabled her to interfere more effectually with our commerce on the sea and as this interference was accompanied by the practice of impressing american sailors into the british service, we finally declared war against her. no effort was made, however, to form an alliance or even to coöperate with napoleon. the united states fought the war of without allies, and while we gained a number of single-ship actions and notable victories on lake erie and lake champlain, we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupy canada, and the final result of the conflict was that our national capitol was burned and our commerce absolutely swept from the seas. jackson's victory at new orleans, while gratifying to our pride, took place two weeks after the treaty of ghent had been signed and had, consequently, no effect on the outcome of the war. ii formulation of the monroe doctrine the international situation which gave rise to the monroe doctrine was the most unusual in some respects that modern history records. the european alliance which had been organized in for the purpose of bringing about the overthrow of napoleon continued to dominate the affairs of europe until . this alliance, which met at the congress of vienna in and held later meetings at aix-la-chapelle in , at troppau in , at laybach in , and at verona in , undertook to legislate for all europe and was the nearest approach to a world government that had ever been tried. while this alliance publicly proclaimed that it had no other object than the maintenance of peace and that the repose of the world was its motive and its end, its real object was to uphold absolute monarchy and to suppress every attempt at the establishment of representative government. as long as england remained in the alliance her statesmen exercised a restraining influence, for england was the only one of the allies which professed to have a representative system of government. as castlereagh was setting out for the meeting at aix-la-chapelle lord liverpool, who was then prime minister, warned him that, "the russian must be made to feel that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government." the reactionary spirit of the continental members of the alliance was soon thoroughly aroused by the series of revolutions that followed one another in . in march the spanish army turned against the government of ferdinand vii and demanded the restoration of the constitution of . the action of the army was everywhere approved and sustained by the people and the king was forced to proclaim the constitution and to promise to uphold it. the spanish revolution was followed in july by a constitutional movement in naples, and in august by a similar movement in portugal; while the next year witnessed the outbreak of the greek struggle for independence. thus in all three of the peninsulas of southern europe the people were struggling for the right of self-government. the great powers at once took alarm at the rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. at troppau and laybach measures were taken for the suppression of the revolutionary movements in italy. an austrian army entered naples in march, , overthrew the constitutional government that had been inaugurated, and restored ferdinand ii to absolute power. the revolution which had broken out in piedmont was also suppressed by a detachment of the austrian army. england held aloof from all participation in the conferences at troppau and laybach, though her ambassador to austria was present to watch the proceedings. the next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for october, , at verona. here the affairs of greece, italy, and in particular spain came up for consideration. at this congress all five powers of the alliance were represented. france was especially concerned about the condition of affairs in spain, and england sent wellington out of self-defense. the congress of verona was devoted largely to a discussion of spanish affairs. wellington had been instructed to use all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in spain. when he found that the other powers were bent upon this step and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. the four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of verona, november , , as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the treaty of the holy alliance, which had been signed at paris in by austria, russia, and prussia. this last mentioned treaty sprang from the erratic brain of the czar alexander under the influence of baroness krüdener, and is one of the most remarkable political documents extant. no one had taken it seriously except the czar himself and it had been without influence upon the politics of europe. the text of the treaty of verona was never officially published, but the following articles soon appeared in the press of europe and america: "article i.--the high contracting powers being convinced that the system of representative government is equally as incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative governments, in whatever country it may exist in europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known. "article ii.--as it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those of princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it, not only in their own states, but, also, in the rest of europe. "article iii.--convinced that the principles of religion contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which they owe to their princes, the high contracting parties declare it to be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of the authority of princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their thanks to the pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit his constant coöperation in their views of submitting the nations. "article iv.--the situation of spain and portugal unite unhappily all the circumstances to which this treaty has particular reference. the high contracting parties, in confiding to france the care of putting an end to them, engage to assist her in the manner which may the least compromise them with their own people and the people of france, by means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to the end of the war." such was the code of despotism which the continental powers adopted for europe and which they later proposed to extend to america. it was an attempt to make the world safe for autocracy. wellington's protest at verona marked the final withdrawal of england from the alliance which had overthrown napoleon and naturally inclined her toward a rapprochement with the united states. the aim of the holy allies, as the remaining members of the alliance now called themselves, was to undo the work of the revolution and of napoleon and to restore all the peoples of europe to the absolute sway of their legitimate sovereigns. after the overthrow of the constitutional movements in piedmont, naples, and spain, absolutism reigned supreme once more in western europe, but the holy allies felt that their task was not completed so long as spain's revolted colonies in america remained unsubjugated. these colonies had drifted into practical independence while napoleon's brother joseph was on the throne of spain. nelson's great victory at trafalgar had left england supreme on the seas and neither napoleon nor joseph had been able to establish any control over spain's american colonies. when ferdinand was restored to his throne in , he unwisely undertook to refasten on his colonies the yoke of the old colonial system and to break up the commerce which had grown up with england and with the united states. the different colonies soon proclaimed their independence and the wars of liberation ensued. by it was evident that spain unassisted could never resubjugate them, and the united states after mature deliberation recognized the new republics and established diplomatic intercourse with them. england, although enjoying the full benefits of trade with the late colonies of spain, still hesitated out of regard for the mother country to take the final step of recognition. in the late summer of circular letters were issued inviting the powers to a conference at paris to consider the spanish-american question. george canning, the british foreign secretary, at once called into conference richard rush, the american minister, and proposed joint action against the schemes of the holy alliance. rush replied that he was not authorized to enter into such an agreement, but that he would communicate the proposal at once to his government. as soon as rush's dispatch was received president monroe realized fully the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an anglo-american alliance. before submitting the matter to his cabinet he transmitted copies of rush's dispatch to ex-presidents jefferson and madison and the following interesting correspondence took place. in his letter to jefferson of october th, the president said: "i transmit to you two despatches, which were receiv'd from mr. rush, while i was lately in washington, which involve interests of the highest importance. they contain two letters from mr. canning, suggesting designs of the holy alliance, against the independence of so. america, & proposing a co-operation, between g. britain & the u states, in support of it, against the members of that alliance. the project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of opinion, somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected by mr. canning, will have a great political effect, by defeating the combination. by mr. rush's answers, which are also enclosed, you will see the light in which he views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone. many important considerations are involved in this proposition. st shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in european politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert, by agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result? d if a case can exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is not the present instance, precisely that case? d has not the epoch arriv'd when g. britain must take her stand, either on the side of the monarchs of europe, or of the u states, & in consequence, either in favor of despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware of that necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce & mark the commenc'ment of that career? "my own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the british govt. & to make it known, that we would view an interference on the part of the european powers, and especially an attack on the colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us. i am sensible however of the extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, & mr. madison's opinions on it." jefferson's reply dated monticello, october th, displays not only a profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of the possibilities involved. he said: "the question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence. that made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. and never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of europe. our second, never to suffer europe to intermeddle with cis-atlantic affairs. america, north and south, has a set of interests distinct from those of europe, and peculiarly her own. she should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of europe. while the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. one nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. by acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. great britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. with her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. not that i would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. but the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. its object is to introduce and establish the american system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. it is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. and if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the european powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. but i am clearly of mr. canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking war. with great britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all europe combined would not undertake such a war. for how would they propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets? nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless alliance, calling itself holy." madison not only agreed with jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting the british proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the american republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion of spain and of any interference with the greeks who were then struggling for independence from turkey. monroe, it appears, was strongly inclined to act on madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a different view of the situation. from the diary of john quincy adams, monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of november was taken up by cabinet discussions on canning's proposals and on russia's aggressions in the northwest. adams stoutly opposed any alliance or joint declaration with great britain. the composition of the president's message remained in doubt until the th, when the more conservative views of adams were, according to his own statement of the case, adopted. he advocated an independent course of action on the part of the united states, without direct reference to canning's proposals, though substantially in accord with them. adams defined his position as follows: "the ground that i wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the european powers by force with south america, but to disclaim all interference on our part with europe; to make an american cause and adhere inflexibly to that." adams's dissent from monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to the influence of clay who advocated a pan-american system, partly to the fact that the proposed coöperation with great britain would bind the united states not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the spanish possessions, and partly to the fear that the united states as the ally of great britain would be compelled to play a secondary part. he probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that the sea power of great britain would be used to prevent the reconquest of south america by the european powers. monroe, as we have seen, thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was supported by his two predecessors in the presidency. the opinions of monroe, jefferson, and madison in favor of an alliance with great britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculed by others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete change in our point of view. after the beginning of the great world conflict, especially after our entrance into it, several writers raised the question as to whether, after all, the three elder statesmen were not right and adams and clay wrong. if the united states and england had come out in favor of a general declaration against intervention in the concerns of small states and established it as a world-wide principle, the course of human history during the next century might have been very different, but adams's diary does not tell the whole story. on his own statement of the case he might be justly censured by posterity for persuading the president to take a narrow american view of a question which was world-wide in its bearing. an important element in the situation, however, was canning's change of attitude between the time of his conference with rush in august and the formulation of the president's message. two days after the delivery of his now famous message monroe wrote to jefferson in explanation of the form the declaration had taken: "mr. canning's zeal has much abated of late." it appears from rush's correspondence that the only thing which stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was canning's unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the south american republics. on august th, rush stated to canning that it would greatly facilitate joint action if england would acknowledge at once the full independence of the south american colonies. in communicating the account of this interview to his government mr. rush concluded: "should i be asked by mr. canning, whether, in case the recognition be made by great britain without more delay, i am on my part prepared to make a declaration, in the name of my government, that it will not remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states by the holy alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that i will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before the world." about three weeks later canning, who was growing restless at the delay in hearing from washington, again urged rush to act without waiting for specific instructions from his government. he tried to show that the proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the american policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at issue was american as much as european, if not more. rush then indicated his willingness to act provided england would "immediately and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states." canning did not care to extend full recognition to the south american states until he could do so without giving unnecessary offense to spain and the allies, and he asked if mr. rush could not give his assent to the proposal on a promise of future recognition. mr. rush refused to accede to anything but immediate acknowledgment of independence and so the matter ended. as canning could not come to a formal understanding with the united states, he determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the british cabinet to france and to this end he had an interview with prince polignac, the french ambassador at london, october , , in which he declared that great britain had no desire to hasten recognition, but that any foreign interference, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for immediate recognition; that england "could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of spanish america upon an equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed upon that question." this declaration drew from polignac the admission that he considered the reduction of the colonies by spain as hopeless and that france "abjured in any case, any design of acting against the colonies by force of arms." this admission was a distinct victory for canning, in that it prepared the way for ultimate recognition by england, and an account of the interview was communicated without delay to the allied courts. the interview was not communicated to rush until the latter part of november, and therefore had no influence upon the formation of monroe's message. the monroe doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs that occur in the message of december , . the first, relating to russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the beginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the american continents had assumed an independent condition and were no longer open to european colonization. this may be regarded as a statement of fact. no part of the continent at that time remained unclaimed. the second paragraph, relating to spanish america and occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the extension to the american continents of the system of intervention adopted by the holy alliance for the suppression of popular government in europe. the language used by president monroe is as follows: . "at the proposal of the russian imperial government, made through the minister of the emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the united states at st. petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the north-west coast of this continent. a similar proposal had been made by his imperial majesty to the government of great britain, which has likewise been acceded to. the government of the united states has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government. in the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the united states are involved, that the american continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any european powers." . "in the wars of the european powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. it is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. with the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. the political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of america. this difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. we owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the united states and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. with the existing colonies or dependencies of any european power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. but with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any european power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the united states." the message made a profound impression on the world, all the more profound for the fact that canning's interview with polignac was known only to the chancelleries of europe. to the public at large it appeared that the united states was blazing the way for democracy and liberty and that canning was holding back through fear of giving offense to the allies. the governments of europe realized only too well that monroe's declaration would be backed by the british navy, and all thought of intervention in latin america was therefore abandoned. a few months later england formally recognized the independence of the spanish-american republics, and canning made his famous boast on the floor of the house of commons. in a speech delivered december , , in defense of his position in not having arrested the french invasion of spain, he said: "i looked another way--i sought for compensation in another hemisphere. contemplating spain, such as our ancestors had known her, i resolved that, if france had spain, it should not be spain _with the indies_. i called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old." iii the monroe doctrine and the european balance of power president monroe said in effect that the western hemisphere must be made safe for democracy. it was reserved for our own generation and for president wilson to extend the declaration and to say that the world must be made safe for democracy. president monroe announced that we would uphold international law and republican government in this hemisphere, and as _quid pro quo_ he announced that it was the settled policy of the united states to refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of european states. he based his declaration, therefore, not mainly on right and justice, but on the doctrine of the separation of the european and american spheres of politics. the monroe doctrine and the policy of isolation thus became linked together in the public mind as compensating policies, neither one of which could stand without the other. even secretary olney as late as declared that "american non-intervention in europe implied european non-intervention in america." it is not strange, therefore, that the public at large should regard the policy of isolation as the sole justification for the monroe doctrine. there is, however, neither logic nor justice in basing our right to uphold law and freedom in this hemisphere on our promise not to interfere with the violation of law and humanity in europe. the real difficulty is that the monroe doctrine as interpreted in recent years has developed certain imperialistic tendencies and that the imperialistic implications of the policy resemble too closely the imperialistic aims of the european powers. for three quarters of a century after monroe's declaration the policy of isolation was more rigidly adhered to than ever, the principal departure from it being the signature and ratification of the clayton-bulwer treaty in . by the terms of this treaty we recognized a joint british interest in any canal that might be built through the isthmus connecting north and south america, undertook to establish the general neutralization of such canal, and agreed to invite other powers, european and american, to unite in protecting the same. owing to differences that soon arose between the united states and england as to the interpretation of the treaty, the clause providing for the adherence of other powers was never carried out. for nearly a hundred years we have successfully upheld the monroe doctrine without a resort to force. the policy has never been favorably regarded by the powers of continental europe. bismarck described it as "an international impertinence." in recent years it has stirred up rather intense opposition in certain parts of latin america. until recently no american writers appear to have considered the real nature of the sanction on which the doctrine rested. how is it that without an army and until recent years without a navy of any size we have been able to uphold a policy which has been described as an impertinence to latin america and a standing defiance to europe? americans generally seem to think that the monroe doctrine has in it an inherent sanctity which prevents other nations from violating it. in view of the general disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired, during the early stages of the late war, this explanation will not hold good and some other must be sought. americans have been so little concerned with international affairs that they have failed to see any connection between the monroe doctrine and the balance of power in europe. the existence of a european balance of power is the only explanation of our having been able to uphold the monroe doctrine for so long a time without a resort to force. some one or more of the european powers would long ago have stepped in and called our bluff, that is, forced us to repudiate the monroe doctrine or fight for it, had it not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon as they became engaged with us some other european power would attack them in the rear. a few illustrations will be sufficient to establish this thesis. the most serious strain to which the monroe doctrine was ever subjected was the attempt of louis napoleon during the american civil war to establish the empire of maximilian in mexico under french auspices. he was clever enough to induce england and spain to go in with him in for the avowed purpose of collecting the claims of their subjects against the government of mexico. before the joint intervention had gone very far, however, these two powers became convinced that napoleon had ulterior designs and withdrew their forces. napoleon's mexican venture was deliberately calculated on the success of the southern confederacy. hence, his friendly relations with the confederate commissioners and the talk of an alliance between the confederacy and maximilian backed by the power of france. against each successive step taken by france in mexico mr. seward, lincoln's secretary of state, protested. as the civil war drew to a successful conclusion his protests became more and more emphatic. finally, in the spring of , the united states government began massing troops on the mexican border and mr. seward sent what was practically an ultimatum to the french emperor; he requested to know when the long-promised withdrawal of the french troops would take place. napoleon replied, fixing the dates for their withdrawal in three separate detachments. american historians have usually attributed napoleon's backdown to seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the united states, which was, of course, greater then than at any previous time in our history. all this undoubtedly had its effect on napoleon's mind, but it appears that conditions in europe just at that particular moment had an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his mexican scheme. within a few days of the receipt of seward's ultimatum napoleon was informed of bismarck's determination to force a war with austria over the schleswig-holstein controversy. napoleon realized that the territorial aggrandizement of prussia, without any corresponding gains by france, would be a serious blow to his prestige and in fact endanger his throne. he at once entered upon a long and hazardous diplomatic game in which bismarck outplayed him and eventually forced him into war. in order to have a free hand to meet the european situation he decided to yield to the american demands. as the european situation developed he hastened the final withdrawal of his troops and left maximilian to his fate. thus the monroe doctrine was vindicated! let us take next president cleveland's intervention in the venezuelan boundary dispute. here surely was a clear and spectacular vindication of the monroe doctrine which no one can discount. let us briefly examine the facts. some , square miles of territory on the border of venezuela and british guiana were in dispute. venezuela, a weak and helpless state, had offered to submit the question to arbitration. great britain, powerful and overbearing, refused. after secretary olney, in a long correspondence ably conducted, had failed to move the british government, president cleveland decided to intervene. in a message to congress in december, , he reviewed the controversy at length, declared that the acquisition of territory in america by a european power through the arbitrary advance of a boundary line was a clear violation of the monroe doctrine, and asked congress for an appropriation to pay the expenses of a commission which he proposed to appoint for the purpose of determining the true boundary, which he said it would then be our duty to uphold. lest there should be any misunderstanding as to his intentions he solemnly added: "in making these recommendations i am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow." congress promptly voted the appropriation. here was a bold and unqualified defiance of england. no one before had ever trod so roughly on the british lion's tail with impunity. the english-speaking public on both sides of the atlantic was stunned and amazed. outside of diplomatic circles few persons were aware that any subject of controversy between the two countries existed, and no one had any idea that it was of a serious nature. suddenly the two nations found themselves on the point of war. after the first outburst of indignation the storm passed; and before the american boundary commission completed its investigation england signed an arbitration agreement with venezuela. some persons, after looking in vain for an explanation, have concluded that lord salisbury's failure to deal more seriously with mr. cleveland's affront to the british government was due to his sense of humor. but here again the true explanation is to be found in events that were happening in another quarter of the globe. cleveland's venezuelan message was sent to congress on december th. at the end of the year came dr. jameson's raid into the transvaal and on the third of january the german kaiser sent his famous telegram of congratulation to paul kruger. the wrath of england was suddenly diverted from america to germany, and lord salisbury avoided a rupture with the united states over a matter which after all was not of such serious moment to england in order to be free to deal with a question involving much greater interests in south africa. the monroe doctrine was none the less effectively vindicated. in germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to test out the monroe doctrine and see whether we would fight for it. in that year germany, england, and italy made a naval demonstration against venezuela for the purpose of forcing her to recognize as valid certain claims of their subjects. how england was led into the trap is still a mystery, but the kaiser thought that he had her thoroughly committed, that if england once started in with him she could not turn against him. but he had evidently not profited by the experience of napoleon iii in mexico. through the mediation of herbert bowen, the american minister, venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of the foreign powers and to arbitrate the amount. england and italy accepted this offer and withdrew their squadrons. germany, however, remained for a time obdurate. this much was known at the time. a rather sensational account of what followed next has recently been made public in thayer's "life and letters of john hay." into the merits of the controversy that arose over thayer's version of the roosevelt-holleben interview it is not necessary to enter. the significant fact, that germany withdrew from venezuela under pressure, is, however, amply established. admiral dewey stated publicly that the entire american fleet was assembled at the time under his command in porto rican waters ready to move at a moment's notice. why did germany back down from her position? her navy was supposed to be at least as powerful as ours. the reason why the kaiser concluded not to measure strength with the united states was that england had accepted arbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack the united states with the british navy in his rear. again the nicely adjusted european balance prevented the monroe doctrine from being put to the test of actual war. while england has from time to time objected to some of the corollaries deduced from the monroe doctrine, she has on the whole been not unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy. the reason for this is that the monroe doctrine has been an open-door policy, and has thus been in general accord with the british policy of free trade. the united states has not used the monroe doctrine for the establishment of exclusive trade relations with our southern neighbors. in fact, we have largely neglected the south american countries as a field for the development of american commerce. the failure to cultivate this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but to the fact that we have had employment for all our capital at home and consequently have not been in a position to aid in the industrial development of the latin-american states, and to the further fact that our exports have been so largely the same and hence the trade of both north and south america has been mainly with europe. there has, therefore, been little rivalry between the united states and the powers of europe in the field of south american commerce. our interest has been political rather than commercial. we have prevented the establishment of spheres of influence and preserved the open door. this situation has been in full accord with british policy. had great britain adopted a high tariff policy and been compelled to demand commercial concessions from latin america by force, the monroe doctrine would long since have gone by the board and been forgotten. americans should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any time during the past twenty years great britain could have settled all her outstanding difficulties with germany by agreeing to sacrifice the monroe doctrine and give her rival a free hand in south america. in the face of such a combination our navy would have been of little avail. iv international cooperation without the sanction of force president monroe's declaration had a negative as well as a positive side. it was in effect an announcement to the world that we would not use force in support of law and justice anywhere except in the western hemisphere, that we intended to stay at home and mind our own business. washington and jefferson had recommended a policy of isolation on grounds of expediency. washington, as we have seen, regarded this policy as a temporary expedient, while jefferson upon two separate occasions was ready to form an alliance with england. probably neither one of them contemplated the possibility of the united states shirking its responsibilities as a member of the family of nations. monroe's message contained the implied promise that if europe would refrain from interfering in the political concerns of this hemisphere, we would abstain from all intervention in europe. from that day until our entrance into the world war it was generally understood, and on numerous occasions officially proclaimed, that the united states would not resort to force on any question arising outside of america except where its material interests were directly involved. we have not refrained from diplomatic action in matters not strictly american, but it has always been understood that such action would not be backed by force. in the existing state of world politics this limitation has been a serious handicap to american diplomacy. to take what we could get and to give nothing in return has been a hard rule for our diplomats, and has greatly circumscribed their activities. diplomatic action without the use or threat of force has, however, accomplished something in the world at large, so that american influence has by no means been limited to the western hemisphere. during the first half of the nineteenth century the subject of slavery absorbed a large part of the attention of american statesmen. the fact that they were not concerned with foreign problems outside of the american hemisphere probably caused them to devote more time and attention to this subject than they would otherwise have done. slavery and isolation had a very narrowing effect on men in public life, especially during the period from to . as the movement against slavery in the early thirties became world-wide, the retention of the "peculiar institution" in this country had the effect of increasing our isolation. the effort of the american colonization society to solve or mitigate the problem of slavery came very near giving us a colony in africa. in fact, liberia, the negro republic founded on the west coast of africa by the colonization society, was in all essentials an american protectorate, though the united states carefully refrained in its communications with other powers from doing more than expressing its good will for the little republic. as liberia was founded years before africa became a field for european exploitation, it was suffered to pursue its course without outside interference, and the united states was never called upon to decide whether its diplomatic protection would be backed up by force. the slave trade was a subject of frequent discussion between the united states and england during the first half of the nineteenth century, and an arrangement for its suppression was finally embodied in article viii of the webster-ashburton treaty of . the only reason why the two countries had never been able to act in accord on this question before was that great britain persistently refused to renounce the right of impressment which she had exercised in the years preceding the war of . the united states therefore refused to sign any agreement which would permit british naval officers to search american vessels in time of peace. in the united states declared the slave trade to be a form of piracy, and great britain advanced the view that as there was no doubt of the right of a naval officer to visit and search a ship suspected of piracy, her officers should be permitted to visit and search ships found off the west coast of africa under the american flag which were suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. the united states stoutly refused to acquiesce in this view. in the webster-ashburton treaty of it was finally agreed that each of the two powers should maintain on the coast of africa a sufficient squadron "to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws, rights, and obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the slave trade." it was further agreed that the officers should act in concert and coöperation, but the agreement was so worded as to avoid all possibility of our being drawn into an entangling alliance. the united states has upon various occasions expressed a humanitarian interest in the natives of africa. in two delegates were sent to the berlin conference which adopted a general act giving a recognized status to the kongo free state. the american delegates signed the treaty in common with the delegates of the european powers, but it was not submitted to the senate for ratification for reasons stated as follows by president cleveland in his annual message of december , : "a conference of delegates of the principal commercial nations was held at berlin last winter to discuss methods whereby the kongo basin might be kept open to the world's trade. delegates attended on behalf of the united states on the understanding that their part should be merely deliberative, without imparting to the results any binding character so far as the united states were concerned. this reserve was due to the indisposition of this government to share in any disposal by an international congress of jurisdictional questions in remote foreign territories. the results of the conference were embodied in a formal act of the nature of an international convention, which laid down certain obligations purporting to be binding on the signatories, subject to ratification within one year. notwithstanding the reservation under which the delegates of the united states attended, their signatures were attached to the general act in the same manner as those of the plenipotentiaries of other governments, thus making the united states appear, without reserve or qualification, as signatories to a joint international engagement imposing on the signers the conservation of the territorial integrity of distant regions where we have no established interests or control. "this government does not, however, regard its reservation of liberty of action in the premises as at all impaired; and holding that an engagement to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the remote valley of the kongo would be an alliance whose responsibilities we are not in a position to assume, i abstain from asking the sanction of the senate to that general act." the united states also sent delegates to the international conference held at brussels in for the purpose of dealing with the slave trade in certain unappropriated regions of central africa. the american delegates insisted that prohibitive duties should be imposed on the importation of spirituous liquors into the kongo. the european representatives, being unwilling to incorporate the american proposals, framed a separate tariff convention for the kongo, which the american delegates refused to sign. the latter did, however, affix their signatures to the general treaty which provided for the suppression of the african slave trade and the restriction of the sale of firearms, ammunition, and spirituous liquors in certain parts of the african continent. in ratifying the treaty the senate reaffirmed the american policy of isolation in the following resolution: "that the united states of america, having neither possessions nor protectorates in africa, hereby disclaims any intention, in ratifying this treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the possessions or protectorates established or claimed on that continent by the other powers, or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or lawfulness thereof, and does not join in any expressions in the said general act which might be construed as such a declaration or acknowledgement; and, for this reason, that it is desirable that a copy of this resolution be inserted in the protocol to be drawn up at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty on the part of the united states." the united states has always stood for legality in international relations and has always endeavored to promote the arbitration of international disputes. along these lines we have achieved notable success. it is, of course, sometimes difficult to separate questions of international law from questions of international politics. we have been so scrupulous in our efforts to keep out of political entanglements that we have sometimes failed to uphold principles of law in the validity of which we were as much concerned as any other nation. we have always recognized international law as a part of the law of the land, and we have always acknowledged the moral responsibilities that rested on us as a member of the society of nations. in fact, the constitution of the united states expressly recognizes the binding force of the law of nations and of treaties. as international law is the only law that governs the relations between states, we are, of course, directly concerned in the enforcement of existing law and in the development of new law. when the declaration of paris was drawn up by the european powers at the close of the crimean war in , the united states was invited to give its adherence. the four rules embodied in the declaration, which have since formed the basis of maritime law, are as follows: first, privateering is, and remains, abolished. second, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. third, neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag. fourth, blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective. the united states government was in thorough accord with the second, third, and fourth rules but was unwilling, as matters then stood, to commit itself to the first rule. it had never been our policy to maintain a large standing navy. in the war of , as in the revolution, we depended upon privateers to attack the commerce of the enemy. in reply to the invitation to give our adherence to the declaration, secretary marcy made a counter proposition, namely, that the powers of europe should agree to exempt all private property, except of course contraband of war, from capture on the high seas in time of war. he said that if they would agree to this, the united states would agree to abolish privateering. the powers of europe refused to accept this amendment. we refrained from signing the declaration of paris, therefore, not because it went too far, but because it did not go far enough. during the civil war the united states government used its diplomatic efforts to prevent the recognition of the independence of the confederacy and the formation of hostile alliances. it made no effort to form any alliance itself and insisted that the struggle be regarded as an american question. the dispute with england over the _alabama_ claims came near precipitating war, but the matter was finally adjusted by the treaty of washington. the most significant feature of this treaty, as far as the present discussion is concerned, was the formal adoption of three rules which were not only to govern the decision of the "alabama claims," but which were to be binding upon england and the united states for the future. it was further agreed that these rules should be brought to the knowledge of other maritime powers who should be invited to accede to them. the rules forbade the fitting out, arming, or equipping within neutral jurisdiction of vessels intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which the neutral is at peace; they forbade the use of neutral ports or waters as a base of naval operations; and they imposed upon neutrals the exercise of due diligence to prevent these things from being done. while these rules have never been formally adopted by the remaining powers, they are generally recognized as embodying obligations which are now incumbent upon all neutrals. when the united states decided to accept the invitation of the czar of russia to attend the first peace conference at the hague in , grave misgivings were expressed by many of the more conservative men in public life. the participation of the united states with the powers of europe in this conference was taken by many americans to mark the end of the old order and the beginning of a new era in american diplomacy. the conference, however, was concerned with questions of general international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of any state, european or american. lest there should be any misapprehension as to the historic policy of the united states, the final treaty was signed by the american delegation under the express reservation of a declaration previously read in open session. this declaration was as follows: "nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the united states of america to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the united states of america of its traditional attitude toward purely american questions." the establishment of the permanent court of arbitration at the hague which resulted from the first conference was a notable achievement, although the court has accomplished less than its advocates hoped. this was the most important occasion on which american delegates had sat together with european diplomats in a general conference. our delegation was the object of considerable interest and was not without influence in shaping the provisions of the final treaty. it was through the personal influence of andrew d. white that the emperor of germany was persuaded to permit his delegation to take part in the proceedings establishing the court of arbitration. the second hague conference revised the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, drew up a plan for an international prize court, and attempted a codification of the rules of international law on a number of subjects relating to the conduct of war and the rights of neutrals. the american delegates, headed by mr. choate, not only took a prominent part in these proceedings, but, acting under instructions from secretary root, they proposed to the conference the creation of a permanent international court of justice. the creation of an international court of justice whose decisions would have the force of law, as distinguished from an international court of arbitration whose decisions are usually arrived at by a compromise of conflicting legal or political points of view, had long been advocated by advanced thinkers, but the proposition had always been held by practical statesmen to be purely academic. the serious advocacy of the proposition at this time by a great nation like the united states and the able arguments advanced by mr. choate marked an important step forward and made a profound impression. there were two difficulties in the way of establishing such a court at the second hague conference. in the first place, the delegation of the united states was the only one which had instructions on this subject, and in the second place it was found to be impossible to agree upon a method of selecting the judges. the great world powers, with the exception of the united states, demanded permanent representation on the court. the smaller nations, relying on the doctrine of the equality of states, demanded likewise to be represented. if each nation could have been given the right to appoint a judge, the court could have been organized, but there would have been forty-four judges instead of fifteen, the number suggested in the american plan. the draft convention for the establishment of the court of arbitral justice, as it was agreed the new court should be designated, was submitted to the conference and its adoption recommended to the signatory powers. this draft contained thirty-five articles and covered everything except the method of appointing judges. this question was to be settled by diplomatic negotiation, and it was agreed that the court should be established as soon as a satisfactory agreement with regard to the choice of judges could be reached. after the adjournment of the conference the united states continued its advocacy of the international court of justice through the ordinary diplomatic channels. the proposal was made that the method of selecting judges for the prize court be adopted for the court of justice, that is, that each power should appoint a judge, that the judges of the larger powers should always sit on the court while the judges of the other powers should sit by a system of rotation for limited periods. it was found, however, that many of the smaller states were unwilling to accept this suggestion, and as difficulties which we will mention presently prevented the establishment of the prize court, the whole question of the court of justice was postponed. most of the conventions adopted by the second hague conference were ratified by the united states without reservation. the fact, however, that certain of these conventions were not ratified by all the powers represented at the conference, and that others were ratified with important reservations, left the status of most of the conventions in doubt, so that at the beginning of the world war there was great confusion as to what rules were binding and what were not binding. the conference found it impossible to arrive at an agreement on many of the most vital questions of maritime law. under these circumstances the powers were not willing to have the proposed international prize court established without the previous codification of the body of law which was to govern its decisions. in order to supply this need the london naval conference was convened in december, , and issued a few months later the declaration of london. the london naval conference was attended by representatives of the principal maritime powers including the united states, and the declaration which it issued was avowedly a codification of the existing rules of international law. this was not true, however, of all the provisions of the declaration. on several of the most vital questions of maritime law, such as blockade, the doctrine of continuous voyage, the destruction of neutral prizes, and the inclusion of food stuffs in the list of conditional contraband, the declaration was a compromise and therefore unsatisfactory. it encountered from the start the most violent opposition in england. in parliament the naval prize bill, which was to give the declaration effect, was discussed at considerable length. it passed the house of commons by a small vote, but was defeated in the house of lords. it was denounced by the press, and a petition to the king, drawn up by the imperial maritime league protesting against it, was signed by a long list of commercial associations, mayors, members of the house of lords, general officers, and other public officials. one hundred and thirty-eight naval officers of flag rank addressed to the prime minister a public protest against the declaration. in the debate in the house of lords the main objections to the declaration were ( ) that it made food stuffs conditional contraband instead of placing them on the free list, ( ) that the clause permitting the seizure of conditional contraband bound for a fortified place or "other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy" would render all english ports liable to be treated as bases by an enemy, and ( ) that it permitted the destruction of neutral prizes. the refusal of england to ratify the declaration of london sealed its fate. the united states senate formally ratified it, but this ratification was, of course, conditional on the ratification of other powers. at the beginning of the great war the united states made a formal proposal to the belligerent powers that they should agree to adopt the declaration for the period of the war in order that there might be a definite body of law for all parties concerned. this proposal was accepted by germany and austria, but england, france, and russia were not willing to accept the declaration of london without modifications. the united states, therefore, promptly withdrew its proposal and stated that where its rights as a neutral were concerned it would expect the belligerent powers to observe the recognized rules of international law and existing treaties. the hague conferences were concerned with questions of general international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of states. such, however, was not the character of the conference which convened at algeciras, spain, in december, , for the purpose of adjusting the very serious dispute that had arisen between france and germany over the status of morocco. france had been engaged for some years in the peaceful penetration of morocco. by the terms of the entente of england recognized morocco as being within the french sphere of influence and france agreed to recognize england's position in egypt. the german kaiser had no idea of permitting any part of the world to be divided up without his consent. in march, , while on a cruise in the mediterranean, he disembarked at tangier and paid a visit to the sultan "in his character of independent sovereign." as the russian armies had just suffered disastrous defeats at the hands of the japanese, france could not count on aid from her ally and the kaiser did not believe that the recently formed entente was strong enough to enable her to count on english support. his object in landing at tangier was, therefore, to check and humiliate france while she was isolated and to break up the entente before it should develop into an alliance. delcassé, the french foreign minister, wanted to stand firm, but germany demanded his retirement and the prime minister accepted his resignation. in recognition of this triumph, the german chancellor count von bülow was given the title of prince. not satisfied with this achievement, the kaiser demanded a general european conference on the moroccan question, and, in order to avoid war, president roosevelt persuaded france to submit the whole dispute to the powers interested. the algeciras conference turned out to be a bitter disappointment to germany. not only did france receive the loyal support of england, but she was also backed by the united states and even by italy--a warning to germany that the triple alliance was in danger. as the conference was called nominally for the purpose of instituting certain administrative reforms in morocco, president roosevelt decided, in view of our rights under a commercial treaty of , to take part in the proceedings. the american delegates were henry white, at that time ambassador to italy, and samuel r. gummeré, minister to morocco. as the united states professed to have no political interests at stake, its delegates were instrumental in composing many of the difficulties that arose during the conference and their influence was exerted to preserve the european balance of power. the facts in regard to america's part in this conference were carefully concealed from the public. there was nothing in any published american document to indicate that the participation of our representatives was anything more than casual. andré tardieu, the well-known french publicist, who reported the conference and later published his impressions in book form, first indicated that president roosevelt was a positive factor in the proceedings. but it was not until the publication of bishop's "theodore roosevelt and his time" that the full extent of roosevelt's activities in this connection became known. there can be no doubt that our participation in the moroccan conference was the most radical departure ever made from our traditional policy of isolation. roosevelt's influence was exerted for preserving the balance of power in europe. as we look back upon the events of that year we feel, in view of what has since happened, that he was fully justified in the course he pursued. had his motives for participating in the conference been known at the time, they would not have been upheld either by the senate or by public opinion. there are many serious objections to secret diplomacy, but it cannot be entirely done away with even under a republican form of government until the people are educated to a fuller understanding of international politics. the german kaiser was relentless in his attempt to score a diplomatic triumph while france was isolated. he was thwarted, however, by the moral support which england, italy, and the united states gave to france. during the proceedings of the conference the american delegates declared in open session that the united states had no political interest in morocco and that they would sign the treaty only with the understanding that the united states would thereby assume no "obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof." this declaration did not satisfy the united states senate, which no doubt suspected the part that was actually played by america in the conference. at any rate, when the treaty was finally ratified the senate attached to its resolution of ratification the following declaration: "resolved further. that the senate, as a part of this act of ratification, understands that the participation of the united states in the algeciras conference and in the formation and adoption of the general act and protocol which resulted therefrom, was with the sole purpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in morocco, the protection as to life, liberty, and property of its citizens residing or traveling therein, and of aiding by its friendly offices and efforts, in removing friction and controversy which seemed to menace the peace between powers signatory with the united states to the treaty of , all of which are on terms of amity with this government; and without purpose to depart from the traditional american foreign policy which forbids participation by the united states in the settlement of political questions which are entirely european in their scope." the determination of the united states not to interfere in the internal politics of european states has not prevented occasional protests in the name of humanity against the harsh treatment accorded the jews in certain european countries. on july , , secretary hay protested in a note to the rumanian government against a policy which was forcing thousands of jews to emigrate from that country. the united states, he claimed, had more than a philanthropic interest in this matter, for the enforced emigration of the jews from rumania in a condition of utter destitution was "the mere transplantation of an artificially produced diseased growth to a new place"; and, as the united states was practically their only place of refuge, we had a clearly established right of remonstrance. in the case of russia information has repeatedly been sought through diplomatic channels as to the extent of destitution among the jewish population, and permission has been requested for the distribution of relief funds raised in the united states. such inquiries have been so framed as to amount to diplomatic protests. in his annual message of president roosevelt went further and openly expressed the horror of the nation at the massacre of the jews at kishenef. these protests, however, were purely diplomatic in character. there was not the slightest hint at intervention. during the early stages of the great war in europe the government of the united states endeavored to adhere strictly to its historic policy. the german invasion of belgium with its attendant horrors made a deep impression upon the american people and aroused their fighting spirit even more perhaps than the german policy of submarine warfare, but it was on the latter issue, in which the interests and rights of the united states were directly involved, that we finally entered the war. v the open-door policy in the orient american diplomacy has had a somewhat freer hand than in europe. commodore perry's expedition to japan in - was quite a radical departure from the general policy of attending strictly to our own business. it would hardly have been undertaken against a country lying within the european sphere of influence. there were, it is true, certain definite grievances to redress, but the main reason for the expedition was that japan refused to recognize her obligations as a member of the family of nations and closed her ports to all intercourse with the outside world. american sailors who had been shipwrecked on the coast of japan had failed to receive the treatment usually accorded by civilized nations. finally the united states decided to send a naval force to japan and to force that country to abandon her policy of exclusion and to open her ports to intercourse with other countries. japan yielded only under the threat of superior force. the conduct of the expedition, as well as our subsequent diplomatic negotiations with japan, was highly creditable to the united states, and the japanese people later erected a monument to the memory of perry on the spot where he first landed. the acquisition of the philippine islands tended to bring us more fully into the current of world politics, but it did not necessarily disturb the balancing of european and american spheres as set up by president monroe. various explanations have been given of president mckinley's decision to retain the philippine group, but the whole truth has in all probability not yet been fully revealed. the partition of china through the establishment of european spheres of influence was well under way when the philippine islands came within our grasp. american commerce with china was at this time second to that of england alone, and the concessions which were being wrung from china by the european powers in such rapid succession presented a bad outlook for us. the united states could not follow the example of the powers of europe, for the seizure of a sphere of influence in china would not have been supported by the senate or upheld by public opinion. it is probable that president mckinley thought that the philippine islands would not only provide a market for american goods, which owing to the dingley tariff were beginning to face retaliatory legislation abroad, but that they would provide a naval base which would be of great assistance in upholding our interests in china. talcott williams made public some years later another explanation of president mckinley's decision which is interesting and appears to be well vouched for. he was informed by a member of mckinley's cabinet that while the president's mind was not yet made up on the question, a personal communication was received from lord salisbury who warned the president that germany was preparing to take over the philippine islands in case the united states should withdraw; that such a step would probably precipitate a world war and that in the interests of peace and harmony it would be best for the united states to retain the entire group. the famous open-door policy was outlined by secretary hay in notes dated september , , addressed to great britain, germany, and russia. each of these powers was requested to give assurance and to make a declaration to the following effect: ( ) that it would not interfere with any treaty port or vested interests in its so-called sphere of influence; ( ) that it would permit the chinese tariff to continue in force in such sphere and to be collected by chinese officials; ( ) that it would not discriminate against other foreigners in the matter of port dues or railroad rates. similar notes were later addressed to france, italy, and japan. england alone expressed her willingness to sign such a declaration. the other powers, while professing thorough accord with the principles set forth by mr. hay, avoided committing themselves to a formal declaration and no such declaration was ever made. mr. hay made a skillful move, however, to clinch matters by informing each of the powers to whom the note had been addressed that in view of the favorable replies from the other powers, its acceptance of the proposals of the united states was considered "as final and definitive." americans generally are under the impression that john hay originated the open-door policy and that it was successfully upheld by the united states. neither of these impressions is correct. a few months before john hay formulated his famous note lord charles beresford came through america on his return from china and addressed the leading chambers of commerce from san francisco to new york, telling americans what was actually taking place in china and urging this country to unite with england and japan in an effort to maintain the open door. like the monroe doctrine, the open-door policy was thus anglo-american in origin. there is little doubt that england and japan were willing to form an alliance with the united states for the purpose of maintaining the open door in china, but our traditional policy of isolation prevented our committing ourselves to the employment of force. president mckinley, following the example of president monroe, preferred announcing our policy independently and requesting the other powers to consent to it. had john hay been able to carry out the plan which he favored of an alliance with england and japan, the mere announcement of the fact would have been sufficient to check the aggressions of the powers in china. instead of such an alliance, however, we let it be known that while we favored the open door we would not fight for it under any conditions. the utter worthlessness of the replies that were made in response to hay's note of september , , became fully apparent in the discussions that soon arose as to the status of consuls in the various spheres of influence. japan claimed that sovereignty did not pass with a lease and that even if china should surrender jurisdiction over her own people, the lessee governments could not acquire jurisdiction over foreigners in leased territory. this position was undoubtedly correct if the territorial integrity of china was really to be preserved, but after negotiations with russia and the other powers concerned mr. hay wrote to minister conger on february , , that "the united states consuls in districts adjacent to the foreign leased territories are to be instructed that they have no authority to exercise extra-territorial consular jurisdiction or to perform ordinary non-judicial consular acts within the leased territory under their present chinese exequaturs." application was then made to the european powers for the admission of american consuls in the leased territories for the performance of the ordinary consular functions, but in no case were they to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction within a leased territory. the exploitation of china which continued at a rapid rate naturally aroused an intense anti-foreign sentiment and led to the boxer uprising. events moved with startling rapidity and united states troops took a prominent part with those of england, france, russia, and japan in the march to peking for the relief of the legations. in a note to the powers july , , secretary hay, in defining the attitude of the united states on the chinese question, said: "the policy of the government of the united states is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to china, preserve chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the chinese empire." mr. hay's notes were skillfully worded and had some influence in helping to formulate public opinion on the chinese question both in this country and abroad, but we know now from his private letters which have recently been made public that he realized only too fully the utter futility of his efforts to stay the course of events. during the exciting days of june, , when the foreign legations at peking were in a state of siege, mr. hay wrote to john w. foster as follows: "what can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind? there is such a mad-dog hatred of england prevalent among newspapers and politicians that anything we should now do in china to take care of our imperiled interests would be set down to 'subservience to great britain'. . . . every senator i see says, 'for god's sake, don't let it appear we have any understanding with england.' how can i make bricks without straw? that we should be compelled to refuse the assistance of the greatest power in the world, in carrying out our own policy, because all irishmen are democrats and some germans are fools--is enough to drive a man mad. yet we shall do what we can." a little later (september , ) in confidential letters to henry adams, he exclaimed: "about china, it is the devil's own mess. we cannot possibly publish all the facts without breaking off relations with several powers. we shall have to do the best we can, and take the consequences, which will be pretty serious, i do not doubt. 'give and take'--the axiom of diplomacy to the rest of the world--is positively forbidden to us, by both the senate and public opinion. we must take what we can and give nothing--which greatly narrows our possibilities. "i take it, you agree with us that we are to limit as far as possible our military operations in china, to withdraw our troops at the earliest day consistent with our obligations, and in the final adjustment to do everything we can for the integrity and reform of china, and to hold on like grim death to the open door. . . ." again, november , : "what a business this has been in china! so far we have got on by being honest and naïf. . . . at least we are spared the infamy of an alliance with germany. i would rather, i think, be the dupe of china, than the chum of the kaiser. have you noticed how the world will take anything nowadays from a german? bülow said yesterday in substance--'we have demanded of china everything we can think of. if we think of anything else we will demand that, and be d--d to you'--and not a man in the world kicks." during the long negotiations that followed the occupation of peking by the powers, the united states threw the weight of its influence on the side of moderation, urging the powers not to impose too many burdens on china and declaring that the only hope for the future lay in a strong, independent, responsible chinese government. contrary to the terms of the final protocol, however, russia retained in manchuria the troops concentrated there during the boxer movement with a view to exacting further concessions from china. the open-door policy was again ignored. the seriousness of the situation led england and japan to sign a defensive agreement january , , recognizing england's interest in china and japan's interest in korea, and providing that if either party should be attacked in defense of its interest, the other party would remain neutral, unless a third power joined in, in which event the second party would come to the assistance of the first. a formal protest made by the united states, february , against some of the demands russia was making on china led russia to conclude that the american government had an understanding with england and japan, but mr. hay gave the assurance that he had known nothing about the anglo-japanese agreement until it was made public. he succeeded in securing from russia, however, a definite promise to evacuate manchuria, but as the time for the withdrawal of her troops drew near, russia again imposed new conditions on china, and deliberately misrepresented to the united states the character of the new proposals. after the suppression of the boxer uprising, china had agreed to extend the scope of her commercial treaties with the powers. when the negotiation of a new treaty with the united states was begun, our representative demanded that at least two new ports in manchuria be opened to foreign trade and residence. the chinese commissioners declined to discuss the subject on the alleged ground that they had no instructions to do so. it was evident that there was secret opposition somewhere, and after considerable difficulty mr. hay finally secured evidence that it came from russia. when confronted with the evidence the russian government finally admitted the facts. we were told that we could not be admitted to one of the ports that we had designated because it was situated within the russian railway zone, and therefore not under the complete jurisdiction of china, but that another port would be substituted for it. secretary hay and president roosevelt were helpless. they accepted what they could get and kept quiet. "the administrative entity" of china was again utterly ignored. the difficulty was that we did not have a strong enough navy in the pacific to fight russia alone, and president roosevelt and secretary hay realized that neither the senate nor public opinion would consent to an alliance with england and japan. had these three powers made a joint declaration in support of the open-door policy, the exploitation of china would have ceased, there would have been no russo-japanese war, and the course of world history during the period that has since intervened might have been very different. when we backed down and abandoned manchuria to russian exploitation japan stepped into the breach. after long negotiations the japanese government finally delivered an ultimatum to russia which resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations and war. after a series of notable victories on land and sea japan was fast approaching the end of her resources, and it is now an open secret that the emperor wrote a personal letter to president roosevelt requesting him to intervene diplomatically and pave the way for peace. the president was quick to act on the suggestion and the commissioners of russia and japan met at portsmouth, new hampshire. here president roosevelt's intervention should have ceased. the terms of the treaty of portsmouth were a bitter disappointment to the japanese people and the japanese commissioners undertook to shift the burden from their shoulders by stating that president roosevelt had urged them to surrender their claim to the island of saghalien and to give up all idea of an indemnity. japanese military triumph had again, as at the close of the chino-japanese war, been followed by diplomatic defeat, and for this defeat japanese public opinion held president roosevelt responsible. from the days of commodore perry and townsend harris to the treaty of portsmouth, relations between the united states and japan had been almost ideal. since the negotiations at portsmouth there has been a considerable amount of bad feeling, and at times diplomatic relations have been subjected to a severe strain. having fought a costly war in order to check the russian advance in manchuria, the japanese naturally felt that they had a paramount interest in china. they consequently sharply resented the attempts which the united states subsequently made, particularly secretary knox's proposal for the neutralization of the railways of manchuria, to formulate policies for china. they took the position that we had had our day and that we must henceforth remain hands off so far as china was concerned. this attitude of mind was not unnatural and during the world war the united states, in order to bind the japanese government more closely to the allied cause, agreed to recognize, in the lansing-ishii agreement, the "special interests" of japan in china. vi anglo-american relations a few years ago george l. beer, one of our leading students of british colonial policy, said "it is easily conceivable, and not at all improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take such a course that the american revolution will lose the great significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity was obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilar economic and social conditions." this statement does not appear as extravagant to-day as it did ten years ago. as early as , captain mahan, the great authority on naval history, published an essay entitled "possibilities of an anglo-american reunion," in which he pointed out that these two countries were the only great powers which were by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armies and dependent upon the sea for intercourse with the other great nations. in a volume dealing with questions of american foreign policy, published in , the present writer concluded the last paragraph with this statement: "by no means the least significant of recent changes is the development of cordial relations with england; and it seems now that the course of world politics is destined to lead to the further reknitting together of the two great branches of the anglo-saxon race in bonds of peace and international sympathy, in a union not cemented by any formal alliance, but based on community of interests and of aims, a union that will constitute the highest guarantee of the political stability and moral progress of the world." the united states has very naturally had closer contact with england than with any other european power. this has been due to the fact that england was the mother country, that after independence was established a large part of our trade continued to be with the british isles, that our northern boundary touches british territory for nearly four thousand miles, and that the british navy and mercantile marine have dominated the atlantic ocean which has been our chief highway of intercourse with other nations. having had more points of contact we have had more disputes with england than with any other nation. some writers have half jocularly attributed this latter fact to our common language. the englishman reads our books, papers, and magazines, and knows what we think of him, while we read what he writes about us, and in neither case is the resulting impression flattering to the national pride. any one who takes the trouble to read what was written in england about america and the americans between and will wonder how war was avoided. a large number of english travellers came to the united states during this period and published books about us when they got home. the books were bad enough in themselves, but the great english periodicals, the _edinburgh review_, _blackwood's_, the _british review_, and the _quarterly_, quoted at length the most objectionable passages from these writers and made malicious attacks on americans and american institutions. american men were described as "turbulent citizens, abandoned christians, inconstant husbands, unnatural fathers, and treacherous friends." our soldiers and sailors were charged with cowardice in the war of . it was stated that "in the southern parts of the union the rites of our holy faith are almost never practised. . . . three and a half millions enjoy no means of religious instruction. the religious principle is gaining ground in the northern parts of the union; it is becoming fashionable among the better orders of society to go to church . . . the greater number of states declare it to be unconstitutional to refer to the providence of god in any of their public acts." the _quarterly review_ informed its readers that "the supreme felicity of a true-born american is inaction of body and inanity of mind." dickens's _american notes_ was an ungrateful return for the kindness and enthusiasm with which he had been received in this country. de tocqueville's _democracy in america_ was widely read in england and doubtless had its influence in revising opinion concerning america. richard cobden was, however, the first englishman to interpret correctly the significance of america as an economic force. his essay on america, published in , pointed out that british policy should be more concerned with economic relations with america than with european politics. as professor dunning says, "cobden made the united states the text of his earliest sermon against militarism and protectionism." notwithstanding innumerable disputes over boundaries, fisheries, and fur seals, trade with the british west indies and canada, and questions of neutral rights and obligations, we have had unbroken peace for more than a hundred years. upon several occasions, notably during the canadian insurrection of and during our own civil war, disturbances along the canadian border created strained relations, but absence of frontier guards and forts has prevented hasty action on the part of either government. the agreement of , effecting disarmament on the great lakes, has not only saved both countries the enormous cost of maintaining navies on these inland waters, but it has prevented hostile demonstrations in times of crisis. during the canadian rebellion of americans along the border expressed openly their sympathy for the insurgents who secured arms and munitions from the american side. in december a british force crossed the niagara river, boarded and took possession of the _caroline_, a vessel which had been hired by the insurgents to convey their cannon and other supplies. the ship was fired and sent over the falls. when the _caroline_ was boarded one american, amos durfee, was killed and several others wounded. the united states at once demanded redress, but the british government took the position that the seizure of the _caroline_ was a justifiable act of self-defense against people whom their own government either could not or would not control. the demands of the united states were still unredressed when in a canadian named alexander mcleod made the boast in a tavern on the american side that he had slain durfee. he was taken at his word, examined before a magistrate, and committed to jail in lockport. mcleod's arrest created great excitement on both sides of the border. the british minister at washington called upon the government of the united states "to take prompt and effectual steps for the liberation of mr. mcleod." secretary of state forsyth replied that the offense with which mcleod was charged had been committed within the state of new york; that the jurisdiction of each state of the united states was, within its proper sphere, perfectly independent of the federal government; that the latter could not interfere. the date set for the trial of mcleod was the fourth monday in march, . van buren's term ended and harrison's began on the th of march, and webster became secretary of state. the british minister was given instructions by his government to demand the immediate release of mcleod. this demand was made, he said, because the attack on the _caroline_ was an act of a public character; because it was a justifiable use of force for the defense of british territory against unprovoked attack by "british rebels and american pirates"; because it was contrary to the principles of civilized nations to hold individuals responsible for acts done by order of the constituted authorities of the state; and because her majesty's government could not admit the doctrine that the federal government had no power to interfere and that the decision must rest with the state of new york. the relations of foreign powers were with the federal government. to admit that the federal government had no control over a state would lead to the dissolution of the union so far as foreign powers were concerned, and to the accrediting of foreign diplomatic agents, not to the federal government, but to each separate state. webster received the note quietly and sent the attorney-general to lockport to see that mcleod had competent counsel. after considerable delay, during which webster replied to the main arguments of the british note, mcleod was acquitted and released. in the midst of the dispute over the case of the _caroline_ serious trouble arose between the authorities of maine and new brunswick over the undetermined boundary between the st. croix river and the highlands, and there ensued the so-called "aroostook war." during the summer of british and american lumbermen began operating along the aroostook river in large numbers. the governor of maine sent a body of militia to enforce the authority of that state, and the new brunswick authorities procured a detachment of british regulars to back up their position. bloodshed was averted by the arrival of general winfield scott, who managed to restrain the maine authorities. the administration found it necessary to take up seriously the settlement of the boundary question, and for the next three years the matter was under consideration, while each side had surveyors employed in a vain attempt to locate a line which would correspond to the line of the treaty. as soon as the mcleod affair was settled, webster devoted himself earnestly to the boundary question. he decided to drop the mass of data accumulated by the surveyors and historians, and to reach an agreement by direct negotiation. in april, , alexander baring, lord ashburton, arrived in washington and the following august the webster-ashburton treaty was signed. the boundary fixed by the treaty gave maine a little more than half the area which she claimed and the united states appropriated $ , to compensate maine for the territory which she had lost. the settlement of these matters did not, however, insure peace with england. settlers were crowding into oregon and it was evident that the joint occupation, established by the convention of , would soon have to be terminated and a divisional line agreed upon. great britain insisted that her southern boundary should extend at least as far as the columbia river, while americans finally claimed the whole of the disputed area, and one of the slogans of the presidential campaign of was "fifty-four-forty or fight." at the same time great britain actively opposed the annexation of texas by the united states. her main reason for this course was that she wished to encourage the development of texas as a cotton-growing country from which she could draw a large enough supply to make her independent of the united states. if texas should thus devote herself to the production of cotton as her chief export crop, she would, of course, adopt a free-trade policy and thus create a considerable market for british goods. as soon as it became evident that tyler contemplated taking definite steps toward annexation, lord aberdeen secured the coöperation of the government of louis philippe in opposing the absorption of texas by the american republic. while the treaty for the annexation of texas was before the senate, lord aberdeen came forward with a proposition that england and france should unite with texas and mexico in a diplomatic act or perpetual treaty, securing to texas recognition as an independent republic, but preventing her from ever acquiring territory beyond the rio grande or joining the american union. while the united states would be invited to join in this act, it was not expected that the government of that country would agree to it. mexico obstinately refused to recognize the independence of texas. lord aberdeen was so anxious to prevent the annexation of texas that he was ready, if supported by france, to coerce mexico and fight the united states, but the french government was not willing to go this far, so the scheme was abandoned. the two foremost issues in the campaign of were the annexation of texas and the occupation of oregon. texas was annexed by joint resolution a few days before the inauguration of polk. this act, it was foreseen, would probably provoke a war with mexico, so polk's first task was to adjust the oregon dispute in order to avoid complications with england. the fate of california was also involved. that province was not likely to remain long in the hands of a weak power like mexico. in fact, british consular agents and naval officers had for several years been urging upon their government the great value of upper california. aberdeen refused to countenance any insurrectionary movement in california, but he directed his agents to keep vigilant watch on the proceedings of citizens of the united states in that province. had england and mexico arrived at an understanding and joined in a war against the united states, the probabilities are that england would have acquired not only the whole of oregon, but california besides. in fact, in may, , just as we were on the point of going to war with mexico, the president of mexico officially proposed to transfer california to england as security for a loan. fortunately, the oregon question had been adjusted and england had no reason for wishing to go to war with the united states. mexico's offer was therefore rejected. polk managed the diplomatic situation with admirable promptness and firmness. notwithstanding the fact that the democratic platform had demanded "fifty-four-forty or fight," as soon as polk became president he offered to compromise with england on the th parallel. when this offer was declined he asked permission of congress to give england the necessary notice for the termination of the joint occupation agreement, to provide for the military defense of the territory in dispute, and to extend over it the laws of the united states. a few months later notice was given to england, but at the same time the hope was expressed that the matter might be adjusted diplomatically. as soon as it was evident that the united states was in earnest, england gracefully yielded and accepted the terms which had been first proposed. as war with mexico was imminent the public generally approved of the oregon compromise, though the criticism was made by some in the north that the south, having secured in texas a large addition to slave territory, was indifferent about the expansion of free territory. in fact, henry cabot lodge, in his recent little book, "one hundred years of peace," says: "the loss of the region between the forty-ninth parallel and the line of - was one of the most severe which ever befell the united states. whether it could have been obtained without a war is probably doubtful, but it never ought to have been said, officially or otherwise, that we would fight for - unless we were fully prepared to do so. if we had stood firm for the line of - without threats, it is quite possible that we might have succeeded in the end; but the hypotheses of history are of little practical value, and the fact remains that by the treaty of we lost a complete control of the pacific coast." that the united states lived through what professor dunning calls "the roaring forties" without a war with england seems now little less than a miracle. during the next fifteen years relations were much more amicable, though by no means free from disputes. the most important diplomatic act was the signature in of the clayton-bulwer treaty which conceded to england a joint interest in any canal that might be built through the isthmus connecting north and south america. one of the interesting episodes of this period was the dismissal of crampton, the british minister, who insisted on enlisting men in the united states for service in the crimean war, an act which pales into insignificance in comparison with some of the things which bernstorff did during the early stages of the great war. relations between the united states and england during the american civil war involved so many highly technical questions that it is impossible to do more than touch upon them in the present connection. diplomatic discussions centred about such questions as the validity of the blockade established by president lincoln, the recognition by england of confederate belligerency, the _trent_ affair, and the responsibility of england for the depredations committed by the _alabama_ and other confederate cruisers. when the united states first demanded reparation for the damage inflicted on american commerce by the confederate cruisers, the british government disclaimed all liability on the ground that the fitting out of the cruisers had not been completed within british jurisdiction. even after the close of the war the british government continued to reject all proposals for a settlement. the american nation, flushed with victory, was bent on redress, and so deep-seated was the resentment against england, that the fenian movement, which had for its object the establishment of an independent republic in ireland, met with open encouragement in this country. the house of representatives went so far as to repeal the law forbidding americans to fit out ships for belligerents, but the senate failed to concur. the successful war waged by prussia against austria in disturbed the european balance, and rumblings of the approaching franco-prussian war caused uneasiness in british cabinet circles. fearing that if great britain were drawn into the conflict the american people might take a sweet revenge by fitting out "alabamas" for her enemies, the british government assumed a more conciliatory attitude, and in january, , lord clarendon signed with reverdy johnson a convention providing for the submission to a mixed commission of all claims which had arisen since . though the convention included, it did not specifically mention, the _alabama_ claims, and it failed to contain any expression of regret for the course pursued by the british government during the war. the senate, therefore, refused by an almost unanimous vote to ratify the arrangement. when grant became president, hamilton fish renewed the negotiations through motley, the american minister at london, but the latter was unduly influenced by the extreme views of sumner, chairman of the senate committee on foreign relations, to whose influence he owed his appointment, and got things in a bad tangle. fish then transferred the negotiations to washington, where a joint high commission, appointed to settle the various disputes with canada, convened in . a few months later the treaty of washington was signed. among other things it provided for submitting the _alabama_ claims to an arbitration tribunal composed of five members, one appointed by england, one by the united states, and the other three by the rulers of italy, switzerland, and brazil. when this tribunal met at geneva, the following year, the united states, greatly to the surprise of everybody, presented not only the direct claims for the damage inflicted by the confederate cruisers, but also indirect claims for the loss sustained through the transfer of american shipping to foreign flags, for the prolongation of the war, and for increased rates of insurance. great britain threatened to withdraw from the arbitration, but charles francis adams, the american member of the tribunal, rose nobly to the occasion and decided against the contention of his own government. the indirect claims were rejected by a unanimous vote and on the direct claims the united states was awarded the sum of $ , , . although the british member of the tribunal dissented from the decision his government promptly paid the award. this was the most important case that had ever been submitted to arbitration and its successful adjustment encouraged the hope that the two great branches of the english-speaking peoples would never again have to resort to war. between the settlement of the _alabama_ claims and the controversy over the venezuelan boundary, diplomatic intercourse between the two countries was enlivened by the efforts of blaine and frelinghuysen to convince the british government that the clayton-bulwer treaty was out of date and therefore no longer binding, by the assertion of american ownership in the seal herds of bering sea and the attempt to prevent canadians from taking these animals in the open sea, and by the summary dismissal of lord sackville-west, the third british minister to receive his passports from the united states without request. president cleveland's bold assertion of the monroe doctrine in the venezuelan boundary dispute, while the subject of much criticism at the time both at home and abroad, turned out to be a most opportune assertion of the intention of the united states to protect the american continents from the sort of exploitation to which africa and asia have fallen a prey, and, strange to say, it had a clarifying effect on our relations with england, whose attitude has since been uniformly friendly. the venezuelan affair was followed by the proposal of lord salisbury to renew the negotiations for a permanent treaty of arbitration which had been first entered into by secretary gresham and sir julian pauncefote. in the spring of the congress of the united states had adopted a resolution in favor of the negotiation of arbitration treaties with friendly nations, and the british house of commons had in july, , expressed its hearty approval of a general arbitration treaty between the united states and england. the matter was then taken up diplomatically, as stated above, but was dropped when the venezuelan boundary dispute became acute. lord salisbury's proposal was favorably received by president cleveland, and after mature deliberation the draft of a treaty was finally drawn up and signed by secretary olney and sir julian pauncefote. this treaty provided for the submission of pecuniary claims to the familiar mixed commission with an umpire or referee to decide disputed points. controversies involving the determination of territorial claims were to be submitted to a tribunal composed of six members, three justices of the supreme court of the united states or judges of the circuit court to be nominated by the president of the united states, and three judges of the british supreme court of judicature or members of the judicial committee of the privy council to be nominated by the british sovereign, and an award made by a majority of not less than five to one was to be final. in case of an award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award was also to be final unless either power should within three months protest against it, in which case the award was to be of no validity. this treaty was concluded in january, , and promptly submitted to the senate. when president cleveland's term expired in march no action had been taken. president mckinley endorsed the treaty in his inaugural address and urged the senate to take prompt action, but when the vote was taken, may th, it stood forty-three for, and twenty-six against, the treaty. it thus lacked three votes of the two thirds required for ratification. the failure of this treaty was a great disappointment to the friends of international arbitration. the opposition within his own party to president cleveland, under whose direction the treaty had been negotiated, and the change of administration, probably had a good deal to do with its defeat. public opinion, especially in the northern states of the union, was still hostile to england. irish agitators could always get a sympathetic hearing in america, and politicians could not resist the temptation to play on anti-british prejudices in order to bring out the irish vote. the spanish war was the turning point in our relations with england as in many other things. the question as to who were our friends in was much discussed at the time, and when revived by the press upon the occasion of the visit of prince henry of prussia to the united states in february, , even the cabinets of europe could not refrain from taking part in the controversy. in order to diminish the enthusiasm over the prince's visit the british press circulated the story that lord pauncefote had checked a movement of the european powers to prevent any intervention of the united states in cuba; while the german papers asserted that lord pauncefote had taken the initiative in opposing american intervention. it is certain that the attitude of the british government, as well as of the british people, from the outbreak of hostilities to the close of the war, was friendly. as for germany, while the conduct of the government was officially correct, public sentiment expressed itself with great violence against the united states. the conduct of the german admiral, diederichs, in manila bay has never been satisfactorily explained. shortly after dewey's victory a german squadron, superior to the american in strength, steamed into the bay and displayed, according to dewey, an "extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse." dewey finally sent his flag-lieutenant, brumby, to inform the german admiral that "if he wants a fight he can have it right now." the german admiral at once apologized. it is well known now that the commander of the british squadron, which was in a position to bring its guns to bear on the germans, gave dewey to understand that he could rely on more than moral support from him in case of trouble. in fact, john hay wrote from london at the beginning of the war that the british navy was at our disposal for the asking. great britain's change of attitude toward the united states was so marked that some writers have naïvely concluded that a secret treaty of alliance between the two countries was made in . the absurdity of such a statement was pointed out by senator lodge several years ago. england's change of attitude is not difficult to understand. for a hundred years after the battle of trafalgar, england had pursued the policy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers. with the rapid growth of other navies during the closing years of the nineteenth century, england realized that she could no longer pursue this policy. russia, japan, and germany had all adopted extensive naval programs when we went to war with spain. our acquisition of the philippines and porto rico and our determination to build an isthmian canal made a large american navy inevitable. great britain realized, therefore, that she would have to cast about for future allies. she therefore signed the hay-pauncefote treaty with us in , and a defensive alliance with japan in . in view of the fact that the united states was bent on carrying out the long-deferred canal scheme, great britain realized that a further insistence on her rights under the clayton-bulwer treaty would lead to friction and possible conflict. she wisely decided, therefore, to recede from the position which she had held for half a century and to give us a free hand in the construction and control of the canal at whatever point we might choose to build it. while the hay-pauncefote treaty was limited in terms to the canal question, it was in reality of much wider significance. it amounted, in fact, to the recognition of american naval supremacy in the west indies, and since its signature great britain has withdrawn her squadron from this important strategic area. the supremacy of the united states in the caribbean is now firmly established and in fact unquestioned. the american public did not appreciate at the time the true significance of the hay-pauncefote treaty, and a few years later congress inserted in the panama tolls act a clause exempting american ships engaged in the coast-wise trade from the payment of tolls. great britain at once protested against the exemption clause as a violation of the hay-pauncefote treaty and anti-british sentiment at once flared up in all parts of the united states. most american authorities on international law and diplomacy believed that great britain's interpretation of the treaty was correct. fortunately president wilson took the same view, and in spite of strong opposition he persuaded congress to repeal the exemption clause. this was an act of simple justice and it removed the only outstanding subject of dispute between the two countries. the hay-pauncefote treaty was by no means the only evidence of a change of attitude on the part of great britain. as we have already seen, great britain and the united states were in close accord during the boxer uprising in china and the subsequent negotiations. during the russo-japanese war public sentiment in both england and the united states was strongly in favor of japan. at the algeciras conference on moroccan affairs in the united states, in its effort to preserve the european balance of power, threw the weight of its influence on the side of england and france. the submission of the alaskan boundary dispute to a form of arbitration in which canada could not win and we could not lose was another evidence of the friendly attitude of great britain. the boundary between the southern strip of alaska and british columbia had never been marked or even accurately surveyed when gold was discovered in the klondike. the shortest and quickest route to the gold-bearing region was by the trails leading up from dyea and skagway on the headwaters of lynn canal. the canadian officials at once advanced claims to jurisdiction over these village ports. the question turned on the treaty made in between great britain and russia. whatever rights russia had under that treaty we acquired by the purchase of alaska in . not only did a long series of maps issued by the canadian government in years past confirm the american claim to the region in dispute, but the correspondence of the british negotiator of the treaty of shows that he made every effort to secure for england an outlet to deep water through this strip of territory and failed. under the circumstances president roosevelt was not willing to submit the case to the arbitration of third parties. he agreed, however, to submit it to a mixed commission composed of three americans, two canadians, and lord alverstone, chief justice of england. as there was little doubt as to the views that would be taken by the three americans and the two canadians it was evident from the first that the trial was really before lord alverstone. in case he sustained the american contention there would be an end of the controversy; in case he sustained the canadian view, there would be an even division, and matters would stand where they stood when the trial began except that a great deal more feeling would have been engendered and the united states might have had to make good its claims by force. fortunately lord alverstone agreed with the three americans on the main points involved in the controversy. the decision was, of course, a disappointment to the canadians and it was charged that lord alverstone had sacrificed their interest in order to further the british policy of friendly relations with the united states. at the beginning of the great war the interference of the british navy with cargoes consigned to germany at once aroused the latent anti-british feeling in this country. owing to the fact that cotton exports were so largely involved the feeling against great britain was even stronger in the southern states than in the northern. the state department promptly protested against the naval policy adopted by great britain, and the dispute might have assumed very serious proportions had not germany inaugurated her submarine campaign. the dispute with england involved merely property rights, while that with germany involved the safety and lives of american citizens. the main feature of british policy, that is, her application of the doctrine of continuous voyage, was so thoroughly in line with the policy adopted by the united states during the civil war that the protests of our state department were of little avail. in fact great britain merely carried the american doctrine to its logical conclusions. we have undertaken in this brief review of anglo-american relations to outline the more important controversies that have arisen between the two countries. they have been sufficiently numerous and irritating to jeopardize seriously the peace which has so happily subsisted for one hundred years between the two great members of the english-speaking family. after all, they have not been based on any fundamental conflict of policy, but have been for the most part superficial and in many cases the result of bad manners. in this connection lord bryce makes the following interesting observations: "there were moments when the stiff and frigid attitude of the british foreign secretary exasperated the american negotiators, or when a demagogic secretary of state at washington tried by a bullying tone to win credit as the patriotic champion of national claims. but whenever there were bad manners in london there was good temper at washington, and when there was a storm on the potomac there was calm on the thames. it was the good fortune of the two countries that if at any moment rashness or vehemence was found on one side, it never happened to be met by the like quality on the other." "the moral of the story of anglo-american relations," lord bryce says, "is that peace can always be kept, whatever be the grounds of controversy, between peoples that wish to keep it." he adds that great britain and the united states "have given the finest example ever seen in history of an undefended frontier, along which each people has trusted to the good faith of the other that it would create no naval armaments; and this very absence of armaments has itself helped to prevent hostile demonstrations. neither of them has ever questioned the sanctity of treaties, or denied that states are bound by the moral law." it is not strange that so many controversies about more or less trivial matters should have obscured in the minds of both englishmen and americans the fundamental identity of aim and purpose in the larger things of life. for notwithstanding the german influence in america which has had an undue part in shaping our educational methods, our civilization is still english. bismarck realized this when he said that one of the most significant facts in modern history was that all north america was english-speaking. our fundamental ideals are the same. we have a passion for liberty; we uphold the rights of the individual as against the extreme claims of the state; we believe in government through public opinion; we believe in the rule of law; we believe in government limited by fundamental principles and constitutional restraints as against the exercise of arbitrary power; we have never been subjected to militarism or to the dominance of a military caste; we are both so situated geographically as to be dependent on sea power rather than on large armies, and not only do navies not endanger the liberty of peoples but they are negligible quantities politically. great britain had in only , officers and men in her navy and , reserves, a wholly insignificant number compared to the millions that formed the army of germany and gave a military color to the whole life and thought of the nation. not only are our political ideals the same, but in general our attitude toward world politics is the same, and most people are surprised when they are told that our fundamental foreign policies are identical. the two most characteristic american foreign policies, the monroe doctrine and the open door, were both, as we have seen, anglo-american in origin. vii imperialistic tendencies of the monroe doctrine in its original form the monroe doctrine was a direct defiance of europe, and it has never been favorably regarded by the nations of the old world. latterly, however, it has encountered adverse criticism in some of the latin-american states whose independence it helped to secure and whose freedom from european control it has been instrumental in maintaining. the latin-american attacks on the doctrine during the last few years have been reflected to a greater or less extent by writers in this country, particularly in academic circles. the american writer who has become most conspicuous in this connection is professor bingham of yale, who has travelled extensively in south america and who published in a little volume entitled "the monroe doctrine, an obsolete shibboleth." the reasons why the monroe doctrine has called forth so much criticism during the last few years are not far to seek. the rapid advance of the united states in the caribbean sea since has naturally aroused the apprehensions of the feebler latin-american states in that region, while the building of the panama canal has rendered inevitable the adoption of a policy of naval supremacy in the caribbean and has led to the formulation of new political policies in the zone of the caribbean--what admiral chester calls the larger panama canal zone--that is, the west indies, mexico and central america, colombia and venezuela. some of these policies, which have already been formulated to a far greater extent than is generally realized, are the establishment of protectorates, the supervision of finances, the control of all available canal routes, the acquisition of coaling stations, and the policing of disorderly countries. the long-delayed advance of the united states in the caribbean sea actually began with the spanish war. since then we have made rapid strides. porto rico was annexed at the close of the war, and cuba became a protectorate; the canal zone was a little later leased on terms that amounted to practical annexation, and the dominican republic came under the financial supervision of the united states; president wilson went further and assumed the administration of haitian affairs, leased from nicaragua for a term of ninety-nine years a naval base on fonseca bay, and purchased the danish west indies. as a result of this rapid extension of american influence the political relations of the countries bordering on the caribbean will of necessity be profoundly affected. our latin-american policy has been enlarged in meaning and limited in territorial application so far as its newer phases are concerned. in president roosevelt made a radical departure from our traditional policy in proposing that we should assume financial supervision over the dominican republic in order to prevent certain european powers from forcibly collecting debts due their subjects. germany seemed especially determined to force a settlement of her demands, and it was well known that germany had for years regarded the monroe doctrine as the main hindrance in the way of her acquiring a foothold in latin america. the only effective method of collecting the interest on the foreign debt of the dominican republic appeared to be the seizure and administration of her custom houses by some foreign power or group of foreign powers. president roosevelt foresaw that such an occupation of the dominican custom houses would, in view of the large debt, constitute the occupation of american territory by european powers for an indefinite period of time, and would, therefore, be a violation of the monroe doctrine. he had before him also the results of a somewhat similar financial administration of egypt undertaken jointly by england and france in , and after arabi's revolt continued by england alone, with the result that egypt soon became a possession of the british crown to almost as great a degree as if it had been formally annexed, and during the world war it was in fact treated as an integral part of the british empire. president roosevelt concluded, therefore, that where it was necessary to place a bankrupt american republic in the hands of a receiver, the united states must undertake to act as receiver and take over the administration of its finances. he boldly adopted this policy and finally forced a reluctant senate to acquiesce. the arrangement has worked admirably. in spite of the criticism that this policy encountered, the taft administration not only continued it in santo domingo, but tried to extend it to nicaragua and honduras. in january, , a treaty placing the finances of honduras under the supervision of the united states was signed by secretary knox, and in june a similar treaty was signed with nicaragua. these treaties provided for the refunding of the foreign debt, in each case through loans made by american bankers and secured by the customs duties, the collector in each case to be approved by the united states and to make an annual report to the department of state. these treaties were not ratified by the senate. secretary knox then tried another solution of the question. on february , , a new treaty with nicaragua was submitted to the senate by the terms of which nicaragua agreed to give the united states an exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and a naval base in fonseca bay, in return for the payment of three millions of dollars. the senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of the taft administration was then at hand. the wilson administration followed the same policy, however, and in july, , mr. bryan submitted to the senate a third treaty with nicaragua containing the provisions of the second knox treaty and in addition certain provisions of the platt amendment, which defines our protectorate over cuba. this treaty aroused strong opposition in the other central american states, and costa rica, salvador, and honduras filed formal protests with the united states government against its ratification on the ground that it would convert nicaragua into a protectorate of the united states and thus defeat the long-cherished plan for a union of the central american republics. the senate of the united states objected to the protectorate feature of the treaty and refused to ratify it, but the negotiations were renewed by the wilson administration and on february , , a new treaty, which omits the provisions of the platt amendment, was accepted by the senate. this treaty grants to the united states in perpetuity the exclusive right to construct a canal by way of the san juan river and lake nicaragua, and leases to the united states for ninety-nine years a naval base on the gulf of fonseca, and also the great corn and little corn islands as coaling stations. the consideration for these favors was the sum of three millions of dollars to be expended, with the approval of the secretary of state of the united states, in paying the public debt of nicaragua and for other public purposes to be agreed on by the two contracting parties. the treaty with the black republic of haiti, ratified by the senate february , , carries the new caribbean policies of the united states to the farthest limits short of actual annexation. it provides for the establishment of a receivership of haitian customs under the control of the united states similar in most respects to that established over the dominican republic. it provides further for the appointment, on the nomination of the president of the united states, of a financial adviser, who shall assist in the settlement of the foreign debt and direct expenditures of the surplus for the development of the agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources of the republic. it provides further for a native constabulary under american officers appointed by the president of haiti upon nomination by the president of the united states. it further extends to haiti the main provisions of the platt amendment. by controlling the internal financial administration of the government the united states hopes to remove all incentives for those revolutions which have in the past had for their object a raid on the public treasury, and by controlling the customs and maintaining order the united states hopes to avoid all possibility of foreign intervention. the treaty is to remain in force for a period of ten years and for another period of ten years if either party presents specific reasons for continuing it on the ground that its purpose has not been fully accomplished. prior to the roosevelt administration the monroe doctrine was regarded by the latin-american states as solely a protective policy. the united states did not undertake to control the financial administration or the foreign policy of any of these republics. it was only after their misconduct had gotten them into difficulty and some foreign power, or group of foreign powers, was on the point of demanding reparation by force that the united states stepped in and undertook to see to it that foreign intervention did not take the form of occupation of territory or interference in internal politics. the monroe doctrine has always been in principle a policy of american intervention for the purpose of preventing european intervention, but american intervention always awaited the threat of immediate action on the part of some european power. president roosevelt concluded that it would be wiser to restrain the reckless conduct of the smaller american republics before disorders or public debts should reach a point which gave european powers an excuse for intervening. in a message to congress in he laid down this new doctrine, which soon became famous as the big stick policy. he said: "if a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the united states. chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in america, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the adherence of the united states to the monroe doctrine may force the united states, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." in other words, since we could not permit european powers to restrain or punish american states in cases of wrongdoing, we must ourselves undertake that task. as long as the monroe doctrine was merely a policy of benevolent protection which latin-american states could invoke after their unwise or evil conduct had brought european powers to the point of demanding just retribution, it was regarded with favor and no objection was raised to it; but the roosevelt doctrine, that if we were to continue to protect latin-american states against european intervention, we had a right to demand that they should refrain from conduct which was likely to provoke such intervention, was quite a different thing, and raised a storm of criticism and opposition. the roosevelt application of the monroe doctrine was undoubtedly a perfectly logical step. it was endorsed by the taft administration and further extended by the wilson administration and made one of our most important policies in regard to the zone of the caribbean. president roosevelt was right in drawing the conclusion that we had arrived at a point where we had either to abandon the monroe doctrine or to extend its application so as to cover the constantly increasing number of disputes arising from the reckless creation of public debts and loose financial administration. it was absurd for us to stand quietly by and witness the utterly irresponsible creation of financial obligations that would inevitably lead to european intervention and then undertake to fix the bounds and limits of that intervention. it is interesting to note that president wilson did not hesitate to carry the new policy to its logical conclusion, and that he went so far as to warn latin-american countries against granting to foreign corporations concessions which, on account of their extended character, would be certain to give rise to foreign claims which would, in turn, give an excuse for european intervention. in discussing our latin-american policy shortly after the beginning of his administration, president wilson said: "you hear of 'concessions' to foreign capitalists in latin america. you do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the united states. they are not granted concessions. they are invited to make investments. the work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. we do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. it is an invitation, not a privilege; and states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs--a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. . . . what these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate." these remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which pearson and son of london had arranged with the president of colombia. this concession is said to have covered practically all of the oil interests in colombia, and carried with it the right to improve harbors and dig canals in the country. however, before the meeting of the colombian congress in november, , which was expected to confirm the concession, lord cowdray, the president of pearson and son, withdrew the contract, alleging as his reason the opposition of the united states. unfortunately president roosevelt's assertion of the big stick policy and of the duty of the united states to play policeman in the western hemisphere was accompanied by his seizure of the canal zone. this action naturally aroused serious apprehensions in latin america and gave color to the charge that the united states had converted the monroe doctrine from a protective policy into a policy of selfish aggression. colombia felt outraged and aggrieved, and this feeling was not alleviated by mr. roosevelt's speech several years later to the students of the university of california, in which he boasted of having taken the canal zone and said that if he had not taken it as he did, the debate over the matter in congress would still be going on. before the close of his administration president roosevelt undertook to placate colombia, but the sop which he offered was indignantly rejected. in january, , secretary root proposed three treaties, one between the united states and panama, one between the united states and colombia, and one between colombia and panama. these treaties provided for the recognition of the republic of panama by colombia and for the transference to colombia of the first ten installments of the annual rental of $ , which the united states had agreed to pay to panama for the lease of the canal zone. the treaties were ratified by the united states and by panama, but not by colombia. the taft administration made repeated efforts to appease colombia, resulting in the formulation of a definite proposition by secretary knox shortly before the close of president taft's term. his proposals were that if colombia would ratify the root treaties just referred to, the united states would be willing to pay $ , , for an exclusive right of way for a canal by the atrato route and for the perpetual lease of the islands of st. andrews and old providence as coaling stations. these proposals were also rejected. the american minister, mr. du bois, acting, he said, on his own responsibility, then inquired informally whether $ , , without options of any kind would satisfy colombia. the answer was that colombia would accept nothing but the arbitration of the whole panama question. mr. knox, in reporting the matter to the president, said that colombia seemed determined to treat with the incoming democratic administration. secretary bryan took up the negotiations where knox dropped them, and concluded a treaty, according to the terms of which the united states was to express regret at what had occurred and to pay colombia $ , , . the senate of the united states refused to ratify this treaty while wilson was in the white house, but as soon as harding became president they consented to the payment and ratified the treaty with a few changes in the preamble. the facts stated above show conclusively that the two most significant developments of american policy in the caribbean during the last twenty years have been the establishment of formal protectorates and the exercise of financial supervision over weak and disorderly states. our protectorate over cuba was clearly defined in the so-called platt amendment, which was inserted in the army appropriation bill of march , , and directed the president to leave control of the island of cuba to its people so soon as a government should be established under a constitution which defined the future relations with the united states substantially as follows: ( ) that the government of cuba would never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power which would impair the independence of the island; ( ) that the said government would not contract any public debt which could not be met by the ordinary revenues of the island; ( ) that the government of cuba would permit the united states to exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of cuban independence, and for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty; ( ) that all acts of the united states in cuba during its military occupancy thereof should be ratified and validated; ( ) that the government of cuba would carry out the plans already devised for the sanitation of the cities of the island; and finally that the government of cuba would sell or lease to the united states lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the president of the united states. it is understood that these articles, with the exception of the fifth, which was proposed by general leonard wood, were carefully drafted by elihu root, at that time secretary of war, discussed at length by president mckinley's cabinet, and entrusted to senator platt of connecticut, who offered them as an amendment to the army appropriation bill. the wilson administration, as already stated, embodied the first three provisions of the platt amendment in the haitian treaty of . prior to the world war, which has upset all calculations, it seemed highly probable that the platt amendment would in time be extended to all the weaker states within the zone of the caribbean. if the united states is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right to intervene and the conditions of intervention should be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed. hitherto whatever action we have taken in latin america has been taken under the monroe doctrine--a policy without legal sanction--which an international court might not recognize. action under a treaty would have the advantage of legality. in other words, the recent treaties with caribbean states have converted american policy into law. the charge that in establishing protectorates and financial supervision over independent states we have violated the terms of the monroe doctrine is one that has been frequently made. those who have made it appear to be laboring under the illusion that the monroe doctrine was wholly altruistic in its aim. as a matter of fact, the monroe doctrine has never been regarded by the united states as in any sense a self-denying declaration. president monroe said that we should consider any attempt on the part of the european powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." the primary object of the policy outlined by president monroe was, therefore, the peace and safety of the united states. the protection of latin-american states against european intervention was merely a means of protecting ourselves. while the united states undertook to prevent the encroachment of european powers in latin america, it never for one moment admitted any limitation upon the possibility of its own expansion in this region. the whole course of american history establishes the contrary point of view. since the monroe doctrine was enunciated we have annexed at the expense of latin-american states, texas, new mexico, california, and the canal zone. upon other occasions we emphatically declined to bind ourselves by treaty stipulations with england and france that under no circumstance would we annex the island of cuba. shortly after the beginning of his first term president wilson declared in a public address at mobile that "the united states will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." this declaration introduces a new chapter in american diplomacy. viii the new pan-americanism when president wilson assumed office march , , there was nothing but the huerta revolution, the full significance of which was not then appreciated, to suggest to his mind the forecast that before the close of his term questions of foreign policy would absorb the attention of the american people and tax to the limit his own powers of mind and body. it seems now a strange fact that neither in his writings nor in his public addresses had president wilson ever shown any marked interest in questions of international law and diplomacy. he had, on the contrary, made a life-long study of political organization and legislative procedure. those who knew him had always thought that he was by nature fitted to be a great parliamentary leader and it soon appeared that he had a very definite legislative program which he intended to put through congress. the foreign problems that confronted him so suddenly and unexpectedly were doubtless felt to be annoying distractions from the work which he had mapped out for himself and which was far more congenial to his tastes. as time went by, however, he was forced to give more and more thought to our relations with latin america on the one hand and to the european war on the other. his ideas on international problems at first cautiously set forth, soon caught step with the rapid march of events and guided the thought of the world. the mexican situation, which reached a crisis a few days before mr. wilson came into office, at once demanded his attention and led to the enunciation of a general latin-american policy. he had scarcely been in office a week when he issued a statement which was forwarded by the secretary of state to all american diplomatic officers in latin america. in it he said: "one of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of central and south america, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents. . . . "the united states has nothing to seek in central and south america except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the profit and advantage of both, and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither. "from these principles may be read so much of the future policy of this government as it is necessary now to forecast, and in the spirit of these principles i may, i hope, be permitted with as much confidence as earnestness, to extend to the governments of all the republics of america the hand of genuine disinterested friendship and to pledge my own honor and the honor of my colleagues to every enterprise of peace and amity that a fortunate future may disclose." the policy here outlined, and elaborated a few months later in an address before the southern commercial congress at mobile, alabama, has been termed the new pan-americanism. the pan-american ideal is an old one, dating back in fact to the panama congress of . the object of this congress was not very definitely stated in the call, which was issued by simon bolivar, but his purpose was to secure the independence and peace of the new spanish republics through either a permanent confederation or a series of diplomatic congresses. president adams through henry clay, who was at that time secretary of state, promptly accepted the invitation to send delegates. the matter was debated at such length, however, in the house and senate that the american delegates did not reach panama until after the congress had adjourned. in view of the opposition which the whole scheme encountered in congress, the instructions to the american delegates were very carefully drawn and their powers were strictly limited. they were cautioned against committing their government in any way to the establishment of "an amphictyonic council, invested with power fully to decide controversies between the american states or to regulate in any respect their conduct." they were also to oppose the formation of an offensive and defensive alliance between the american powers, for, as mr. clay pointed out, the holy alliance had abandoned all idea of assisting spain in the reconquest of her late colonies. after referring to "the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading maxim" of our foreign policy, mr. clay continued: "without, therefore, asserting that an exigency may not occur in which an alliance of the most intimate kind between the united states and the other american republics would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely said that the occasion which would warrant a departure from that established maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such is believed now to exist." the british government sent a special envoy to reside near the congress and to place himself in frank and friendly communication with the delegates. canning's private instructions to this envoy declared that, "any project for putting the u. s. of north america at the head of an american confederacy, as against europe, would be highly displeasing to your government. it would be felt as an ill return for the service which has been rendered to those states, and the dangers which have been averted from them, by the countenance and friendship, and public declarations of great britain; and it would probably, at no distant period, endanger the peace both of america and of europe." the panama congress was without practical results and it was more than half a century before the scheme for international coöperation on the part of american states was again taken up. in secretary blaine issued an invitation to the american republics to hold a conference at washington, but the continuance of the war between chile and peru caused an indefinite postponement of the proposed conference. toward the close of president cleveland's first administration the invitation was renewed and the first international conference of american states convened at washington in . it happened that when the conference met mr. blaine was again secretary of state and presided over its opening sessions. the most notable achievement of this conference was the establishment of the bureau of american republics, now known as the pan-american union. the second international conference of american states, held in the city of mexico in , arranged for all american states to become parties to the hague convention of for the pacific settlement of international disputes and drafted a treaty for the compulsory arbitration, as between american states, of pecuniary claims. the third conference, held at rio janeiro in , extended the above treaty for another period of five years and proposed that the subject of pecuniary claims be considered at the second hague conference. added significance was given to the rio conference by the presence of secretary root who, although not a delegate, made it the occasion of a special mission to south america. the series of notable addresses which he delivered on this mission gave a new impetus to the pan-american movement. the fourth conference, held at buenos ayres in , was occupied largely with routine matters. it extended the pecuniary claims convention for an indefinite period. the conferences above referred to were political or diplomatic in character. there have been held two pan-american scientific congresses in which the united states participated, one at chile in and one at washington, december, , to january, . a very important pan-american financial congress was held at washington in may, . these congresses have accomplished a great deal in the way of promoting friendly feeling as well as the advancement of science and commerce among the republics of the western hemisphere. the american institute of international law, organized at washington in october, , is a body which is likely to have great influence in promoting the peace and welfare of this hemisphere. the institute is composed of five representatives from the national society of international law in each of the twenty-one american republics. at a session held in the city of washington, january , , the institute adopted a declaration of the rights and duties of nations. this declaration, designed to give a solid legal basis to the new pan-americanism, was as follows: i. every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to conserve its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states. ii. every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself without interference or control from other states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states. iii. every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the right to claim and, according to the declaration of independence of the united states, "to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's god entitle them." iv. every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all persons whether native or foreign found therein. v. every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of all to observe. vi. international law is at one and the same time both national and international; national in the sense that it is the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its principles; international in the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and applicable as such to all questions between and among the members of the society of nations involving its principles. this declaration has been criticised as being too altruistic for a world in which diplomacy has been occupied with selfish aims, yet mr. root, in presenting it at the annual meeting of the american society of international law, claimed that every statement in it was "based upon the decisions of american courts and the authority of american publicists." the mexican situation put the principles of the new pan-americanism to a severe test. on february , , francisco madero was seized and imprisoned as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals, victoriano huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dictator. four days later madero was murdered while in the custody of huerta's troops. henry lane wilson, the american ambassador, promptly urged his government to recognize huerta, but president taft, whose term was rapidly drawing to a close, took no action and left the question to his successor. president wilson thus had a very disagreeable situation to face when he assumed control of affairs at washington. he refused to recognize huerta, whose authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs in various parts of the country. it was claimed by the critics of the administration that the refusal to recognize huerta was a direct violation of the well-known american policy of recognizing de facto governments without undertaking to pass upon the rights involved. it is perfectly true that the united states has consistently followed the policy of recognizing de facto governments as soon as it is evident in each case that the new government rests on popular approval and is likely to be permanent. this doctrine of recognition is distinctively an american doctrine. it was first laid down by thomas jefferson when he was secretary of state as an offset to the european doctrine of divine right, and it was the natural outgrowth of that other jeffersonian doctrine that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. huerta could lay no claim to authority derived from a majority or anything like a majority of the mexican people. he was a self-constituted dictator, whose authority rested solely on military force. president wilson and secretary bryan were fully justified in refusing to recognize his usurpation of power, though they probably made a mistake in announcing that they would never recognize him and in demanding his elimination from the presidential contest. this announcement made him deaf to advice from washington and utterly indifferent to the destruction of american life and property. the next step in the president's course with reference to mexico was the occupation of vera cruz. on april , , the president asked congress for authority to employ the armed forces of the united states in demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest of american marines at vera cruz, and the next day admiral fletcher was ordered to seize the custom house at that port. this he did after a sharp fight with huerta's troops in which nineteen americans were killed and seventy wounded. the american chargé d'affaires, nelson o'shaughnessy, was at once handed his passports, and all diplomatic relations between the united states and mexico were severed. a few days later the representatives of the so-called abc alliance, argentina, brazil, and chile, tendered their good offices for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and president wilson promptly accepted their mediation. the resulting conference at niagara, may , was not successful in its immediate object, but it resulted in the elimination of huerta who resigned july , . on august , general venustiano carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions, assumed control of affairs at the capital, but his authority was disputed by general francisco villa, another insurrectionary chief. on carranza's promise to respect the lives and property of american citizens the united states forces were withdrawn from vera cruz in november, . in august, , at the request of president wilson, the six ranking representatives of latin america at washington made an unsuccessful effort to reconcile the contending factions of mexico. on their advice, however, president wilson decided in october to recognize the government of carranza, who now controlled three fourths of the territory of mexico. as a result of this action villa began a series of attacks on american citizens and raids across the border, which in march, , compelled the president to send a punitive expedition into mexico and later to dispatch most of the regular army and large bodies of militia to the border. the raids of villa created a very awkward situation. carranza not only made no real effort to suppress villa, but he vigorously opposed the steps taken by the united states to protect its own citizens along the border, and even assumed a threatening attitude. there was a loud and persistent demand in the united states for war against mexico. american investments in land, mines, rubber plantations, and other enterprises were very large, and these financial interests were particularly outraged at the president's policy of "watchful waiting." the president remained deaf to this clamor. no country had been so shamelessly exploited by foreign capital as mexico. furthermore, it was suspected and very generally believed that the recent revolutions had been financed by american capital. president wilson was determined to give the mexican people an opportunity to reorganize their national life on a better basis and to lend them every assistance in the task. war with mexico would have been a very serious undertaking and even a successful war would have meant the military occupation of mexico for an indefinite period. after our entrance into the world war many of those americans who dissented radically from wilson's mexican policy became convinced that his refusal to become involved in war with mexico was a most fortunate thing for us. it has been charged that there was a lack of consistency between the president's mexican policy and his haitian policy. the difference between the two cases, however, was that order could be restored in haiti with a relatively small force of marines, while any attempt to apply force to mexico would have led to a long and bloody conflict. the most novel feature of the president's mexican policy was his acceptance of the mediation of the abc alliance and his subsequent consultation with the leading representatives of latin america. this action brought the pan-american ideal almost to the point of realization. it was received with enthusiasm and it placed our relations with latin america on a better footing than they had been for years. it was suggested by more than one critic of american foreign policy that if we were to undertake to set the world right, we must come before the bar of public opinion with clean hands, that before we denounced the imperialistic policies of europe, we should have abandoned imperialistic policies at home. the main features of president wilson's latin-american policy, if we may draw a general conclusion, were to pledge american republics not to do anything which would invite european intervention, and to secure by treaty the right of the united states to intervene for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and for the establishment of self-government. such a policy, unselfishly carried out, was not inconsistent with the general war aims defined by president wilson. ix the failure of neutrality and isolation in washington's day the united states was an experiment in democracy. the vital question was not our duty to the rest of the world, but whether the rest of the world would let us live. the policy of wisdom was to keep aloof from world politics and give as little cause for offense as possible to the great powers of europe. washington pointed out that "our detached and distant situation" rendered such a course possible. this policy was justified by events. we were enabled to follow unhindered the bent of our own political genius, to extend our institutions over a vast continent and to attain a position of great prosperity and power in the economic world. while we are still a young country, our government is, with the possible exception of that of great britain, the oldest and most stable in the world, and since we declared ourselves a nation and adopted our present constitution the british government has undergone radical changes of a democratic character. by age and stability we have long been entitled to a voice and influence in the world, and yet we have been singularly indifferent to our responsibilities as a member of the society of nations. we have been in the world, but not of it. our policy of isolation corresponded with the situation as it existed a hundred years ago, but not with the situation as it exists to-day and as it has existed for some years past. we no longer occupy a "detached and distant situation." steam and electricity, the cable and wireless telegraphy have overcome the intervening space and made us the close neighbors of europe. the whole world has been drawn together in a way that our forefathers never dreamed of, and our commercial, financial, and social relations with the rest of the world are intimate. under such circumstances political isolation is an impossibility. it has for years been nothing more than a tradition, but a tradition which has tied the hands of american diplomats and caused the american public to ignore what was actually going on in the world. the spanish war and the acquisition of the philippines brought us into the full current of world politics, and yet we refused to recognize the changes that inevitably followed. the emergence of japan as a first-class power, conscious of achievement and eager to enter on a great career, introduced a new and disturbing element into world politics. our diplomacy, which had hitherto been comparatively simple, now became exceedingly complex. formerly the united states was the only great power outside the european balance. the existence of a second detached power greatly complicated the international situation and presented opportunities for new combinations. we have already seen how germany undertook to use the opportunity presented by russia's war with japan to humiliate france and that the united states took a prominent part in the algeciras conference for the purpose of preventing the threatened overthrow of the european balance of power. thus, even before the world war began, it had become evident to close observers of international affairs that the european balance would soon be superseded by a world balance in which the united states would be forced to take its place. it took a world war, however, to dispel the popular illusion of isolation and to arouse us to a temporary sense of our international responsibilities. when the war began the president, following the traditions of a hundred years, issued, as a matter of course, a proclamation of neutrality, and he thought that the more scrupulously it was observed the greater would be the opportunity for the united states to act as impartial mediator in the final adjustment of peace terms. as the fierceness of the conflict grew it became evident that the role of neutral would not be an easy one to play and that the vital interests of the united states would be involved to a far greater extent than anyone had foreseen. neutrality in the modern sense is essentially an american doctrine and the result of our policy of isolation. if we were to keep out of european conflicts, it was necessary for us to pursue a course of rigid impartiality in wars between european powers. in the napoleonic wars we insisted that neutrals had certain rights which belligerents were bound to respect and we fought the war of with england in order to establish that principle. half a century later, in the american civil war, we insisted that neutrals had certain duties which every belligerent had a right to expect them to perform, and we forced great britain in the settlement of the _alabama_ claims to pay us damages to the extent of $ , , for having failed to perform her neutral obligations. we have thus been the leading champion of the rights and duties of neutrals, and the principles for which we have contended have been written into the modern law of nations. when two or three nations are engaged in war and the rest of the world is neutral, there is usually very little difficulty in enforcing neutral rights, but when a majority of the great powers are at war, it is impossible for the remaining great powers, much less for the smaller neutrals, to maintain their rights. this was true in the napoleonic wars, but at that time the law of neutrality was in its infancy and had never been fully recognized by the powers at war. the failure of neutrality in the great war was far more serious, for the rights of neutrals had been clearly defined and universally recognized. notwithstanding the large german population in this country and the propaganda which we now know that the german government had systematically carried on for years in our very midst, the invasion of belgium and the atrocities committed by the germans soon arrayed opinion on the side of the allies. this was not a departure from neutrality, for it should be remembered that neutrality is not an attitude of mind, but a legal status. as long as our government fulfilled its obligations as defined by the law of nations, no charge of a violation of neutrality could be justly made. to deny to the citizens of a neutral country the right to express their moral judgments would be to deny that the world can ever be governed by public opinion. the effort of the german propagandists to draw a distinction between so-called ethical and legal neutrality was plausible, but without real force. while neutrality is based on the general principle of impartiality, this principle has been embodied in a fairly well-defined set of rules which may, and frequently do, in any given war, work to the advantage of one belligerent and to the disadvantage of the other. in the great war this result was brought about by the naval superiority of great britain. so far as our legal obligations to germany were concerned she had no cause for complaint. if, on the other hand, our conduct had been determined solely by ethical considerations, we would have joined the allies long before we did. the naval superiority of great britain made it comparatively easy for her to stop all direct trade with the enemy in articles contraband of war, but this was of little avail so long as germany could import these articles through the neutral ports of italy, holland, and the scandinavian countries. under these circumstances an ordinary blockade of the german coast would have had little effect. therefore, no such blockade was proclaimed by great britain. she adopted other methods of cutting off overseas supplies from germany. she enlarged the lists of both absolute and conditional contraband and under the doctrine of continuous voyage seized articles on both lists bound for germany through neutral countries. as to the right of a belligerent to enlarge the contraband lists there can be no doubt. even the declaration of london, which undertook for the first time to establish an international classification of contraband, provided in article that "articles and materials which are exclusively used for war may be added to the list of absolute contraband by means of a notified declaration," and article provided that the list of conditional contraband might be enlarged in the same manner. under modern conditions of warfare it would seem impossible to determine in advance what articles are to be treated as contraband. during the great war many articles regarded in previous wars as innocent became indispensable to the carrying on of the war. great britain's application of the doctrine of continuous voyage was more open to dispute. she assumed that contraband articles shipped to neutral countries adjacent to germany and austria were intended for them unless proof to the contrary was forthcoming, and she failed to draw any distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. the united states protested vigorously against this policy, but the force of its protest was weakened by the fact that during the civil war the american government had pursued substantially the same policy in regard to goods shipped by neutrals to nassau, havana, matamoros, and other ports adjacent to the confederacy. prior to the american civil war goods could not be seized on any grounds unless bound directly for a belligerent port. under the english doctrine of continuous voyage as advanced during the napoleonic wars, goods brought from the french west indies to the united states and reshipped to continental europe were condemned by the british admiralty court on the ground that notwithstanding the unloading and reloading at an american port the voyage from the west indies to europe was in effect a continuous voyage, and under the rule of great britain refused to admit the right of neutral ships to engage in commerce between france and her colonies. great britain, however, seized ships only on the second leg of the voyage, that is, when bound directly for a belligerent port. during the american civil war the united states seized goods under an extension of the english doctrine on the first leg of the voyage, that is, while they were in transit from one neutral port to another neutral port, on the ground that they were to be subsequently shipped in another vessel to a confederate port. great britain adopted and applied the american doctrine during the boer war. the doctrine of continuous voyage, as applied by the united states and england, was strongly condemned by most of the continental writers on international law. the declaration of london adopted a compromise by providing that absolute contraband might be seized when bound through third countries, but that conditional contraband was not liable to capture under such circumstances. as the declaration of london was not ratified by the british government this distinction was ignored, and conditional as well as absolute contraband was seized when bound for germany through neutral countries. while great britain may be charged with having unwarrantably extended the application of certain rules of international law and may have rendered herself liable to pecuniary damages, she displayed in all her measures a scrupulous regard for human life. her declaration that "the whole of the north sea must be considered a military area," was explained as an act of retaliation against germany for having scattered floating mines on the high seas in the path of british commerce. she did not undertake to exclude neutral vessels from the north sea, but merely notified them that certain areas had been mined and warned them not to enter without receiving sailing directions from the british squadron. the german decree of february , , establishing a submarine blockade or "war zone" around the british isles, on the other hand, was absolutely without legal justification. it did not fulfill the requirements of a valid blockade, because it cut off only a very small percentage of british commerce, and the first requirement of a blockade is that it must be effective. the decree was aimed directly at enemy merchant vessels and indirectly at the ships of neutrals. it utterly ignored the well-recognized right of neutral passengers to travel on merchant vessels of belligerents. the second decree announcing unrestricted submarine warfare after february , , was directed against neutral as well as enemy ships. it undertook to exclude all neutral ships from a wide zone extending far out on the high seas, irrespective of their mission or the character of their cargo. it was an utter defiance of all law. the citizens of neutral countries have always had the right to travel on the merchant vessels of belligerents, subject, of course, to the risk of capture and detention. the act of the german ambassador in inserting an advertisement in a new york paper warning americans not to take passage on the _lusitania_, when the president had publicly asserted that they had a perfect right to travel on belligerent ships, was an insolent and unparalleled violation of diplomatic usage and would have justified his instant dismissal. some action would probably have been taken by the state department had not the incident been overshadowed by the carrying out of the threat and the actual destruction of the _lusitania_. the destruction of enemy prizes at sea is recognized by international law under exceptional circumstances and subject to certain definite restrictions, but an unlimited right of destruction even of enemy merchant vessels had never been claimed by any authority on international law or by any government prior to the german decree. the destruction of neutral prizes, though practised by some governments, has not been so generally acquiesced in, and when resorted to has been attended by an even more rigid observance of the rules designed to safeguard human life. article of the declaration of london provided that, "a captured neutral vessel is not to be destroyed by the captor, but must be taken into such port as is proper in order to determine there the rights as regards the validity of the capture." unfortunately article largely negatived this statement by leaving the whole matter to the discretion of the captor. it is as follows: "as an exception, a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent ship, and which would be liable to condemnation, may be destroyed if the observance of article would involve danger to the ship of war or to the success of the operations in which she is at the time engaged." the next article provided the following safeguards: "before the destruction the persons on board must be placed in safety, and all the ship's papers and other documents which those interested consider relevant for the decision as to the validity of the capture must be taken on board the ship of war." the declaration of london was freely criticised for recognizing an unlimited discretionary right on the part of a captor to destroy a neutral prize. under all the circumstances the main grievance against germany was not that she destroyed prizes at sea, but that she utterly ignored the restrictions imposed upon this right and the rules designed to safeguard human life. germany sought to justify her submarine policy on the ground ( ) that the american manufacture and sale of munitions of war was one-sided and therefore unneutral, and ( ) that the united states had practically acquiesced in what she considered the unlawful efforts of great britain to cut off the food supply of germany. the subject of the munitions trade was brought to the attention of the united states by germany in a note of april , . while not denying the legality of the trade in munitions under ordinary circumstances the contentions of the german government were that the situation in the present war differed from that of any previous war; that the recognition of the trade in the past had sprung from the necessity of protecting existing industries, while in the present war an entirely new industry had been created in the united states; and it concluded with the following statement which was the real point of the note: "this industry is actually delivering goods to the enemies of germany. the theoretical willingness to supply germany also, if shipments were possible, does not alter the case. if it is the will of the american people that there should be a true neutrality, the united states will find means of preventing this one-sided supply of arms or at least of utilizing it to protect legitimate trade with germany, especially that in food stuffs." to this note secretary bryan replied that "any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress of the war which would affect unequally the relations of the united states with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality." two months later the discussion was renewed by the austro-hungarian government. the austrian note did not question the intention of the united states to conform to the letter of the law, but complained that we were not carrying out its spirit, and suggested that a threat to withhold food stuffs and raw materials from the allies would be sufficient to protect legitimate commerce between the united states and the central powers. to this note secretary lansing replied at length. he held: ( ) that the united states was under no obligation to change or modify the rules of international usage on account of special conditions. ( ) he rejected what he construed to be the contention of the austrian government that "the advantages gained to a belligerent by its superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral powers by the establishment of a system of non-intercourse with the victor." ( ) he called attention to the fact that austria-hungary and germany had during the years preceding the present european war produced "a great surplus of arms and ammunition which they sold throughout the world and especially to belligerents. never during that period did either of them suggest or apply the principle now advocated by the imperial and royal government." ( ) "but, in addition to the question of principle, there is a practical and substantial reason why the government of the united states has from the foundation of the republic to the present time advocated and practised unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies. it has never been the policy of this country to maintain in time of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well-equipped and powerful enemy. it has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies and navies. in consequence of this standing policy the united states would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset of the war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms and ammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities to supply the requirements of national defense. the united states has always depended upon the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack. this right, which it claims for itself, it cannot deny to others." the german and austrian authorities were fully aware that their arguments had no basis in international law or practice. indeed, their notes were probably designed to influence public opinion and help the german propagandists in this country who were making a desperate effort to get congress to place an embargo on the export of munitions. having failed in this attempt, an extensive conspiracy was formed to break up the trade in munitions by a resort to criminal methods. numerous explosions occurred in munition plants destroying many lives and millions of dollars' worth of property, and bombs were placed in a number of ships engaged in carrying supplies to the allies. the austrian ambassador and the german military and naval attachés at washington were involved in these activities and their recall was promptly demanded by secretary lansing. the violations of international law by germany were so flagrant, her methods of waging war so barbarous, the activities of her diplomats so devoid of honor, and her solemn pledges were so ruthlessly broken that the technical discussion of the rules of maritime law was completely overshadowed by the higher moral issues involved in the contest. all further efforts to maintain neutrality finally became intolerable even to president wilson, who had exercised patience until patience ceased to be a virtue. having failed in his efforts to persuade congress to authorize the arming of merchantmen, the president finally concluded, in view of germany's threat to treat armed guards as pirates, that armed neutrality was impracticable. he accepted the only alternative and on april , , went before congress to ask for a formal declaration of war against germany. had germany observed the rules of international law, the united states would probably have remained neutral notwithstanding the imminent danger of the overthrow of france and the possible invasion of england. the upsetting of the european balance would eventually have led to a conflict between germany and the united states. the violation of american rights forced us to go to war, but having once entered the war, we fought not merely for the vindication of american rights, but for the establishment of human freedom and the recognition of human rights throughout the world. in his war address president wilson said: "neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. we have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances." having once abandoned neutrality and isolation we are not likely to remain neutral again in any war which involves the balance of power in the world or the destinies of the major portion of mankind. neutrality and isolation were correlative. they were both based on the view that we were a remote and distant people and had no intimate concern with what was going on in the great world across the seas. the failure of neutrality and the abandonment of isolation marked a radical, though inevitable, change in our attitude toward world politics. president wilson did not propose, however, to abandon the great principles for which we as a nation had stood, but rather to extend them and give them a world-wide application. in his address to the senate on january , , he said: "i am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of president monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. "i am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. there is no entangling alliance in a concert of power." in other words, the monroe doctrine, stripped of its imperialistic tendencies, was to be internationalized, and the american policy of isolation, in the sense of avoiding secret alliances, was to become a fundamental principle of the new international order. if the united states was to go into a league of nations, every member of the league must stand on its own footing. we were not to be made a buffer between alliances and ententes. x the war aims of the united states the advent of the united states into the family of nations nearly a century and a half ago was an event of worldwide significance. our revolutionary ancestors set up a government founded on a new principle, happily phrased by jefferson in the statement that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. this principle threatened, although remotely, the existence of the aristocratic governments of the old world which were still based on the doctrine of divine right. the entrance of the united states into the world war was an event of equal significance because it gave an american president, who was thoroughly grounded in the political philosophy of the virginia bill of rights, the declaration of independence, and the writings of the founders of the republic, an opportunity to proclaim to the world the things for which america has always stood. in this connection h. w. v. temperley in "a history of the peace conference of paris" (vol. i, page ) says: "the utterances of president wilson have a unique significance, not only because they were taken as the legal basis of the peace negotiations, but because they form a definite and coherent body of political doctrine. this doctrine, though developed and expanded in view of the tremendous changes produced by the war, was not formed or even altered by them. his ideas, like those of no other great statesman of the war, are capable of being worked out as a complete political philosophy. a peculiar interest, therefore, attaches to his pre-war speeches, for they contain the germs of his political faith and were not influenced by the terrifying portents of to-day. the tenets in themselves were few and simple, but their consequences, when developed by the war, were such as to produce the most far-reaching results. it is not possible or necessary to discuss how far these tenets were accepted by the american people as a whole, for, as the utterances of their legal representative at a supreme moment of world history, they will always retain their value." the principal features of wilson's political philosophy were revealed in his policy toward latin america before he had any idea of intervening in the european situation. at the outset of his administration he declared that the united states would "never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." in december, , he declared: "from the first we have made common cause with all partisans of liberty on this side of the sea and . . . have set america aside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and political freemen." a few weeks later he proposed that the nations of america should unite "in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity." this proposal was actually embodied in a treaty, but this plan for an american league of nations did not meet with the approval of the other states, who probably feared that the united states would occupy too dominant a position in such a league. president wilson's refusal to recognize the despotic power of huerta, while expressing sympathy for the people of mexico, was the first application of the policy which later so successfully drove a wedge in between the kaiser and the german people. his refusal to invade mexico and his determination to give the people of that country a chance to work out their own salvation gave evidence to the world of the unselfishness and sincerity of his policies, and paved the way for the moral leadership which he later exercised over the peoples of europe. president wilson's insistence on neutrality in "thought, word, and deed," the expression "too proud to fight," and his statement in regard to the war, may , , that "with its causes and objects we are not concerned," caused deep offense to many of his countrymen and were received with ridicule by others at home and abroad. his reasons for remaining neutral were best stated in the speech accepting his second nomination for the presidency, september , : "we have been neutral not only because it was the fixed and traditional policy of the united states to stand aloof from the politics of europe and because we had had no part either of action or of policy in the influences which brought on the present war, but also because it was manifestly our duty to prevent, if it were possible, the indefinite extension of the fires of hate and desolation kindled by that terrible conflict and seek to serve mankind by reserving our strength and our resources for the anxious and difficult days of restoration and healing which must follow, when peace will have to build its house anew." other speeches made during the year show, however, that he was being gradually forced to the conclusion that "peace is not always within the choice of the nation" and that we must be "ready to fight for our rights when those rights are coincident with the rights of man and humanity." after the german peace proposals of december , , president wilson called on all the belligerents to state publicly what they were fighting for. this demand caused a searching of hearts everywhere, led to a restatement of aims on the part of the allies, and threw the central governments on the defensive. in formulating their replies the allies were somewhat embarrassed by the secret treaties relating to russia and italy, which were later made public by the bolsheviki. in march, , england and france had made an agreement with russia by which she was to get constantinople, the aim of her policy since the days of peter the great. by the secret treaty of london, signed april , , england, france, and russia had promised italy that she should receive the trentino and southern tyrol, including in its population more than , germans. italy was also promised trieste and the istrian peninsula, the boundary running just west of fiume, over which city, it should be remembered, she acquired no claim under this treaty. italy was also to receive about half of dalmatia, including towns over half of whose population were jugo-slavs. to president wilson's note the allies had to reply, therefore, in somewhat general terms. their territorial demands were: "the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the italians, as also of the slavs, roumanes, and czecho-slovaks from foreign domination, the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the turks; and the turning out of europe of the ottoman empire as decidedly foreign to western civilization." the german reply contained no statement of territorial claims and gave no pledge even as to the future status of belgium. in reporting the results of this interchange of views to the senate, january , , president wilson delivered the first of that series of addresses on the essentials of a just and lasting peace which made him the recognized spokesman of the liberal element in all countries and gained for him a moral leadership that was without parallel in the history of the world. "in every discussion of the peace that must end this war," he declared, "it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted." in fact, there was no dissent from this statement. most of our leading men, including taft, roosevelt, and lodge, were committed to the idea of a league of nations for the maintenance of law and international peace. the league to enforce peace, which had branches in all the allied countries, had done a great work in popularizing this idea. the president came before the senate, he said, "as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations," to formulate the conditions upon which he would feel justified in asking the american people to give "formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace." he disclaimed any right to a voice in determining what the terms of peace should be, but he did claim a right to "have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant." first of all, the peace must be a "peace without victory," for "only a peace between equals can last." and, he added, "there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. no peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." he cited poland as an example, declaring that statesmen everywhere were agreed that she should be "united, independent, and autonomous." he declared that every great people "should be assured a direct outlet to the sea," and that "no nation should be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce." he added: "the freedom of the seas is the _sine qua non_ of peace, equality, and coöperation." this problem, he said, was closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments. "the question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind." the russian revolution, which came in march, , and resulted in the overthrow of the czar's government, cleared the political atmosphere for the time being, and enabled president wilson in his address to congress on april to proclaim a war of democracy against autocracy. the new russian government repudiated all imperialistic aims and adopted the formula: "self-determination, no annexations, no indemnities." poland was given her freedom and the demand for constantinople was abandoned. the allies were thus relieved from one of their most embarrassing secret treaties. even after america entered the war, president wilson continued to advance the same ideas as to the ultimate conditions of peace. his attitude remained essentially different from that of the allies, who were hampered by secret treaties wholly at variance with the president's aims. in his war address he declared that we had "no quarrel with the german people. we have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. it was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war." prussian autocracy was the object of his attack. "we are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. we are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the german peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. the world must be made safe for democracy. its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. we have no selfish ends to serve. we desire no conquest, no dominion. we seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. we are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. we shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them." about the time that the united states declared war, austria and germany began another so-called "peace offensive." overtures were made by austria to france in march, and in august the pope made a direct appeal to the powers. this move was unmasked by president wilson in a public address at the washington monument, june , . "the military masters under whom germany is bleeding," he declared, "see very clearly to what point fate has brought them: if they fall back or are forced back an inch, their power abroad and at home will fall to pieces. it is their power at home of which they are thinking now more than of their power abroad. it is that power which is trembling under their very feet. deep fear has entered their hearts. they have but one chance to perpetuate their military power, or even their controlling political influence. if they can secure peace now, with the immense advantage still in their hands, they will have justified themselves before the german people. they will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it--an immense expansion of german power and an immense enlargement of german industrial and commercial opportunities. their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their political power. if they fail, their people will thrust them aside. a government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in germany, as has been the case in england, the united states, and france--in all great countries of modern times except germany. if they succeed they are safe, and germany and the world are undone. if they fail, germany is saved and the world will be at peace. if they succeed, america will fall within the menace, and we, and all the rest of the world, must remain armed, as they will remain, and must make ready for the next step in their aggression. if they fail, the world may unite for peace and germany may be of the union." the task of replying to the pope was left by the allied governments to wilson, who was not hampered by secret treaties. in this remarkable document he drove still further the wedge between the german people and the kaiser. "the american people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the imperial german government, but they desire no reprisal upon the german people who have themselves suffered all things in this war which they did not choose. they believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments--the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful--their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the german people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination." in conclusion he said: "we cannot take the word of the present rulers of germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the german people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the german government, no man, no nation could now depend on. we must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the central powers. god grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of covenanted peace." early in november, , the kerensky government was overthrown in russia and the bolsheviki came into power. they at once proposed a general armistice and called upon all the belligerents to enter into peace negotiations. the central powers accepted the invitation, and early in december negotiations began at brest-litovsk. the russian peace proposals were: the evacuation of occupied territories, self-determination for nationalities not hitherto independent, no war indemnities or economic boycotts, and the settlement of colonial questions in accordance with the above principles. the austrian minister, count czernin, replied for the central powers, accepting more of the russian program than had been expected, but rejecting the principle of a free plebiscite for national groups not hitherto independent, and conditioning the whole on the acceptance by the allies of the offer of general peace. the conference called on the allies for an answer by january . no direct reply was made to this demand, but the russian proposals had made a profound impression on the laboring classes in all countries, and both lloyd george and president wilson felt called on to define more clearly the war aims of the allies. in a speech delivered january , , lloyd george made the first comprehensive and authoritative statement of british war aims. he had consulted the labor leaders and viscount grey and mr. asquith, as well as some of the representatives of the overseas dominions, and he was speaking, he said, for "the nation and the empire as a whole." he explained first what the british were not fighting for. he disclaimed any idea of overthrowing the german government, although he considered military autocracy "a dangerous anachronism"; they were not fighting to destroy austria-hungary, but genuine self-government must be granted to "those austro-hungarian nationalities who have long desired it"; they were not fighting "to deprive turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of thrace, which are predominantly turkish in race," but the passage between the mediterranean and the black sea must be "internationalized and neutralized." the positive statement of aims included the complete restoration of belgium, the return of alsace-lorraine to france, rectification of the italian boundary, the independence of poland, the restoration of serbia, montenegro, and the occupied parts of france, italy, and rumania, and a disposition of the german colonies with "primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies." he insisted on reparation for injuries done in violation of international law, but disclaimed a demand for war indemnity. in conclusion he declared the following conditions to be essential to a lasting peace: "first, the sanctity of treaties must be reëstablished; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and lastly, we must seek, by the creation of some international organization, to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war." on january , , three days after lloyd george's speech, president wilson appeared before both houses of congress and delivered the most important of all his addresses on war aims. it contained the famous fourteen points: i. open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. ii. absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. iii. the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. iv. adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. v. a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. vi. the evacuation of all russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. the treatment accorded russia by her sister nations will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. vii. belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. no other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. viii. all french territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to france by prussia in in the matter of alsace-lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. ix. a readjustment of the frontiers of italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. x. the peoples of austria-hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. xi. rumania, serbia, and montenegro should be evacuated: occupied territories restored; serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several balkan states should be entered into. xii. the turkish portions of the present ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. xiii. an independent polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. xiv. a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. in february negotiations at brest-litovsk were broken off as a result of the excessive demands of the germans and the armistice was declared at an end. the germans quickly overran poland and the baltic provinces and occupied ukraine under a treaty which virtually placed the material resources of that country at the disposal of the central powers. in an address at baltimore, april , the anniversary of our entrance into the war, president wilson denounced the insincerity and perfidy of the german rulers, who, he said, were "enjoying in russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride." he concluded with these strong words: "germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as america conceives it or dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. there is, therefore, but one response possible from us: force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust." between the addresses of january and the armistice, the president delivered other addresses in which he elaborated some of the principles of the fourteen points. of special significance were his speeches of february , july , and september . in the last his mind centered on the league of nations. "there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the league of nations," he declared, and "there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the league, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world, may be vested in the league of nations itself as a means of discipline and control." in conclusion he said that the united states was prepared "to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest." we now know from the published memoirs of german and austrian statesmen that president wilson's speeches made a profound impression on the peoples of central europe. his utterances in behalf of the oppressed nationalities, not only belgium, serbia, and poland, but also the czecho-slovaks and the jugo-slavs, became stronger and more frequent during the spring and summer of , and solidified the opposition to germany at a critical period of the war. on september he recognized the czecho-slovak national council as a belligerent government. this meant the break-up of the austro-hungarian empire, which had not been contemplated at an earlier period, but, as he stated in his reply to the austrian request for an armistice in october, conditions had changed since the announcement of the fourteen points, and these peoples would no longer be satisfied with mere autonomy. as a result of the russian collapse and the negotiations at brest-litovsk, the germans withdrew their divisions from the eastern front and staked everything on the great western drive of march, . when this movement was finally checked and the allied advance began, the german military leaders knew that the game was up, but they did not have the courage to face the facts, for an acknowledgment of defeat meant the overthrow of the old system of government based on military success. they waited in vain for some military advantage which would give them an opportunity to open negotiations without openly acknowledging defeat. finally the state of demoralization at headquarters became so complete that there was no alternative but to ask for an immediate armistice. in order to pave the way for this step, the ministry resigned october , and prince max of baden was called on to form a new government. on the th he dispatched a note to president wilson through the swiss government, requesting him to call a peace conference and stating that the german government "accepts the program set forth by the president of the united states in his message to congress of the th january, , and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of the th september, as a basis for peace negotiations." in reply the president asked for a clearer understanding on three points: ( ) did the imperial chancellor mean that the german government accepted the terms laid down in the president's addresses referred to, and "that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?" ( ) the president would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the allied governments so long as the armies of the central powers were upon their soil. ( ) the president asked whether the chancellor was speaking for the constituted authorities of the empire who had so far conducted the war. the german reply of october was satisfactory on the first point. with respect to the withdrawal of their troops from occupied territory they proposed a mixed commission to arrange the details. on the third point it was stated that the new government had been formed in agreement with the great majority of the reichstag. having accomplished this much, the president's next step was skilfully taken. he replied that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice were matters which must be left to the judgment of the military advisers of the united states and the allied governments, but that he would not agree to any arrangement which did not provide "absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the united states and of the allies in the field." referring next to submarine warfare, he declared that the united states and the allied governments could not consider an armistice "so long as the armed forces of germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in." in conclusion he referred to a clause contained in his speech of july , now accepted by the german government as one of the conditions of peace, namely, "the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world." he added: "the power which has hitherto controlled the german nation is of the sort here described. it is within the choice of the german nation to alter it." he demanded that the united states and the allied governments "should know beyond a peradventure" with whom they were dealing. in reply the chancellor assured the president that a bill had been introduced in the reichstag to alter the constitution of the empire so as to give the representatives of the people the right to decide for war or peace, but the president was not satisfied that there had been any real change. "it may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the german people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing." he was not willing to accept any armistice which did not make a renewal of hostilities on the part of germany impossible. if, he concluded, the united states "must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the german empire, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender. nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid." this note was written october . four days later the chancellor replied: "the president knows the deep-rooted changes which have taken place and are still taking place in german constitutional life. the peace negotiations will be conducted by a people's government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests in accordance with the constitution, and to which the military power will also be subject. the german government now awaits the proposals for an armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the president in his manifestations has described." the terms of the armistice were drawn up by the interallied council at versailles and completed by november . they were much more severe than the public had expected them to be. germany was required immediately to evacuate belgium, france, alsace-lorraine, and luxemburg; to withdraw her armies from the entire territory on the left bank of the rhine, and from russia, austria-hungary, rumania, and turkey; she was to surrender enormous quantities of heavy artillery and airplanes, all her submarines, and most of her battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. this was practically unconditional surrender. contrary to the general belief at the time, it is now known that foch and haig considered these terms too severe and feared that germany would not accept them. they wanted an armistice that germany would accept. general bliss, on the other hand, wanted to demand "the complete disarmament and demobilization of the military and naval forces of the enemy." in america there was much criticism of the president for being willing to negotiate with germany at all. "on to berlin" was a popular cry, and it was thought that the president was preventing a complete military triumph. on october senator lodge declared in the senate: "the republican party stands for unconditional surrender and complete victory, just as grant stood. my own belief is that the american people mean to have an unconditional surrender. they mean to have a dictated, not a negotiated peace." after reviewing the armistice negotiations andré tardieu, a member of the french cabinet and delegate to the peace conference, says: "what remains of the fiction, believed by so many, of an armistice secretly determined upon by an american dictator; submitted to by the european governments: imposed by their weakness upon the victorious armies, despite the opposition of the generals? the armistice was discussed in the open light of day. president wilson only consented to communicate it to his associates on the triple condition that its principle be approved by the military authorities and its clauses would be drawn up by them; that it be imposed upon the enemy and not discussed with him; that it be such as to prevent all resumption of hostilities and assure the submission of the vanquished to the terms of peace. so it was that the discussion went on with berlin till october , and in paris from that date till november . it was to the commander-in-chief [foch] that final decision was left not only on the principle of the armistice but upon its application. he it was who drew up the text. and it was his draft that was adopted. the action of the governments was limited to endorsing it and making it more severe. that is the truth:--it is perhaps less picturesque but certainly more in accord with common sense." the terms of the armistice were delivered to the germans by marshal foch november , and they were given seventy-two hours to accept or reject them. meanwhile germany's allies were rapidly deserting her. bulgaria surrendered september , and on october turkey signed an armistice. finally on november , the rapidly disintegrating austro-hungarian monarchy also signed an armistice. on october there had been a naval mutiny at kiel which spread rapidly to the other ports. on the st the emperor departed for army headquarters, leaving berlin on the verge of revolution. on the th of november the social democrats demanded the abdication of the emperor and the crown prince. on the th prince max resigned the chancellorship, and the kaiser abdicated and ignominiously fled across the border into holland. on the th at a. m. the armistice was signed by the german delegates and marshal foch, and it went into effect at o'clock that day. in two particulars the wilson principles had been modified by the allies. in the american note to germany of november secretary lansing stated that the president had submitted his correspondence with the german authorities to the allied governments and that he had received in reply the following memorandum: "the allied governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the president of the united states and the german government. subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the government of germany on the terms of peace laid down in the president's address to congress of january , , and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. they must point out, however, that clause , relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. they must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference. further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to congress of january , , the president declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the allied governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. by it they understand that compensation will be made by germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the allies and their property by the aggression of germany by land, by sea, and from the air." in transmitting this memorandum secretary lansing stated that he was instructed by the president to say that he agreed with this interpretation. with these modifications the wilson principles were accepted by all parties as the legal basis of the peace negotiations. xi the treaty of versailles it was agreed that the peace conference should meet at paris, and president wilson considered the issues involved of such magnitude that he decided to head the american delegation himself. great britain, france, and italy were to be represented by their premiers, and it was fitting that the united states should be represented by its most responsible leader, who, furthermore, had been the chief spokesman of the allies and had formulated the principles upon which the peace was to be made. but the decision of the president to go to paris was without precedent in our history and, therefore, it met with criticism and opposition. when he announced the names of the other members of the delegation, the criticism became even more outspoken and severe. they were secretary of state lansing, henry white, former ambassador to france, colonel edward m. house, and general tasker h. bliss. there had been a widespread demand for a non-partisan peace commission, and many people thought that the president should have taken root, or roosevelt, or taft. mr. white was a republican but he had never been active in party affairs or in any sense a leader. in the senate there was deep resentment that the president had not selected any members of that body to accompany him. president mckinley had appointed three senators as members of the commission of five that negotiated the treaty of peace at the close of the spanish war. with that exception, senators had never taken part directly in the negotiation of a treaty. the delegation was attended by a large group of experts on military, economic, geographical, ethnological, and legal matters, some of whom were men of great ability, and in their selection no party lines were drawn. but just before the signing of the armistice, the president had suffered a serious political defeat at home. there had been severe criticism of democratic leadership in congress and growing dissatisfaction with some of the members of the cabinet. in response to the appeals of democratic congressmen, the president issued a statement from the white house on october , asking the people, if they approved of his leadership and wished him to continue to be their "unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad," to vote for the democratic candidates for congress. he acknowledged that the republicans in congress had loyally supported his war measures, but he declared that they were hostile to the administration and that the time was too critical for divided leadership. this statement created a storm of criticism, and did more than any other act in his administration to turn the tide of public opinion against the president. the elections resulted in a republican majority of thirty-nine in the house and two in the senate. the president had followed the practice of european premiers in appealing to the people, but under our constitutional system he could not very well resign. had he not issued his appeal, the election would have been regarded as a repudiation of the democratic congress, but not necessarily as a repudiation of the president. the situation was most unfortunate, but the president made no comments and soon after announced his intention of going to paris. in december lloyd george went to the country, and on pledging himself to make germany pay for the war and to hang the kaiser, he was returned by a substantial majority. these pledges were unnecessary and had a most unfortunate influence on the subsequent negotiations at paris. the president sailed for france december , leaving a divided country behind him. his enemies promptly seized the opportunity to assail him. senator sherman introduced a resolution declaring the presidency vacant because the president had left the territory of the united states, and senator knox offered another resolution declaring that the conference should confine itself solely to the restoration of peace, and that the proposed league of nations should be reserved for consideration at some future time. while his enemies in the senate were busily organizing all the forces of opposition against him, the president was welcomed by the war-weary peoples of europe with demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm such as had been the lot of few men in history to receive. sovereigns and heads of states bestowed the highest honors upon him, while great crowds of working men gathered at the railroad stations in order to get a glimpse of the man who had led the crusade for a peace that would end war and establish justice as the rule of conduct between the nations of the world, great and small nations alike. no mortal man could have fulfilled the hopes and expectations that centered in wilson when he landed on the shores of france in december, . the armistice had been signed on the basis of his ideals, and the peoples of europe confidently expected to see those ideals embodied in the treaty of peace. he still held the moral leadership of the world, but the war was over, the german menace ended, and national rivalries and jealousies were beginning to reappear, even among those nations who had so recently fought and bled side by side. this change was to be revealed when the conference met. there was no sign of it in the plaudits of the multitudes who welcomed the president in france, in england, and in italy. he returned on january , , from italy to paris, where delegates to the conference from all the countries which had been at war with germany were gathering. the first session of the peace conference was held january . the main work of the conference was carried on by the supreme council, constituted at this meeting and composed of the two ranking delegates of each of the five great powers, great britain, france, italy, the united states, and japan. the decisions which this council arrived at, with the aid of the large groups of technical advisers which accompanied the delegations of the great powers, were reported to the conference in plenary session from time to time and ratified. the supreme council was, however, gradually superseded by the "big four," wilson, lloyd george, clemenceau, and orlando, while the "five," composed of ministers of foreign affairs, handled much of the routine business, and made some important decisions, subject to the approval of the "four." according to statistics compiled by tardieu, the council of ten held seventy-two sessions, the "five" held thirty-nine, and the "four" held one hundred and forty-five. as one of the american experts puts it: "the 'ten' fell into the background, the 'five' never emerged from obscurity, the 'four' ruled the conference in the culminating period when its decisions took shape." at the plenary session of january , president wilson made a notable speech in which he proposed the creation of a league of nations, and a resolution to organize such a league and make it an integral part of the general treaty was unanimously adopted. a commission to draft a constitution for the league was appointed with president wilson as chairman. on february the first draft of the covenant of the league was presented by him to the conference, and on the following day he sailed for the united states in order to consider the bills passed by congress before the expiration of the session on march . the first draft of the covenant was hastily prepared, and it went back to the commission for revision. as soon as the text was made known in the united states, opposition to the covenant was expressed in the senate. during the president's brief visit to washington, he gave a dinner at the white house to members of the senate committee on foreign relations and of the house committee on foreign affairs for the purpose of explaining to them the terms of the covenant. there was no official report of what occurred at this dinner, but it was stated that some of the senators objected to the covenant on the ground that it was contrary to our traditional policies and inconsistent with our constitution and form of government. on march , the day before the president left new york to resume his duties at the conference, senators lodge and knox issued a round robin, signed by thirty-seven senators, declaring that they would not vote for the covenant in the form proposed, and that consideration of the league of nations should be postponed until peace had been concluded with germany. that same night the president made a speech at the metropolitan opera house in new york city in which, after explaining and defining the covenant, he said: "when that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant that you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure." in this same address he also said: "the first thing i am going to tell the people on the other side of the water is that an overwhelming majority of the american people is in favour of the league of nations. i know that this is true. i have had unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country, and the voice rings true in every case." the president was evidently quite confident that public sentiment would compel the senate to ratify the peace treaty, including the covenant of the league. a nation-wide propaganda was being carried on by the league to enforce peace and other organizations, and public sentiment for the league appeared to be overwhelming. the president took back to paris with him various suggestions of changes in the covenant, and later ex-president taft, elihu root, and charles e. hughes proposed amendments which were forwarded to him and carefully considered by the commission. some of these suggestions, such as the reservation of the monroe doctrine and the right of withdrawal from the league, were embodied in the final draft. when the president returned to paris he found that secretary lansing and colonel house had consented to the separation of the league from the treaty of peace. he immediately reversed this decision, but the final adoption of the covenant was delayed by the demand of japan that a clause be inserted establishing "the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals," which would have brought within the jurisdiction of the league the status of japan's subjects in california and in the british dominions. france urged the inclusion of a provision creating a permanent general staff to direct the military operations of the league, and belgium insisted that brussels rather than geneva should be the seat of the league. meanwhile other national aspirations were also brought forward which delayed the general treaty of peace. france wanted the entire left bank of the rhine; italy put forth a claim to fiume; and japan, relying on secret agreements with england, france, and italy, insisted on her claims to shantung. no economic settlement had as yet been agreed upon, and the question of reparations was threatening the disruption of the conference. the most difficult problem that the conference had to solve was the establishment of a new franco-german frontier. there was no question about alsace-lorraine. that had been disposed of by the fourteen points, and germany had acquiesced in its return to france in the pre-armistice agreement. but no sooner was the armistice signed than foch addressed a note to clemenceau, setting forth the necessity of making the rhine the western frontier of germany. the left bank, extending from alsace-lorraine to the dutch frontier, embraced about , square miles and , , people. the debate on this question continued at intervals for six months and at times became very acrimonious. the french representatives did not demand the direct annexation of the left bank, but they proposed an independent or autonomous rhineland and french, or inter-allied, occupation of the rhine for an indefinite period, or at least until the full execution by germany of the financial clauses of the treaty. both the british and american delegates opposed the french proposals. lloyd george repeatedly said: "we must not create another alsace-lorraine." he also remarked on one occasion: "the strongest impression made upon me by my first visit to paris was the statue of strasburg veiled in mourning. do not let us make it possible for germany to erect a similar statue." this discussion was being carried on with great earnestness and intensity of feeling when wilson returned to paris march . that very afternoon he met lloyd george and clemenceau. the french argument was set forth again at length and with great skill. the fact was again pointed out that the destruction of the german fleet had relieved england from all fear of german invasion, and that the atlantic ocean lay between germany and the united states, while france, which had suffered two german invasions in half a century, had no safeguard but the league of nations, which she did not deem as good a guarantee as the rhine bridges. finally wilson and lloyd george offered the guarantee treaties, and clemenceau agreed to take the proposal under consideration. three days later he came back with a counter proposition and a compromise was reached. france gave up her demand for a separate rhineland, but secured occupation of the left bank, including the bridge-heads, for a period of fifteen years as a guarantee of the execution of the treaty. in return the united states and great britain pledged themselves to come to the immediate aid of france, in case of an unprovoked attack, by an agreement which was to be binding only if ratified by both countries. this treaty the united states senate refused to ratify. foch was opposed to this compromise, and adopted a course of action which was very embarrassing to clemenceau. fierce attacks on the french government and on the representatives of great britain and the united states, inspired by him, appeared in the papers. when the treaty was finally completed, he even went so far as to refuse to transmit the note summoning the german delegates to versailles to receive it. wilson and lloyd george finally protested so vigorously to clemenceau that foch had to give way. in view of the promises of clemenceau and lloyd george that germany should pay the cost of the war, the question of reparations was an exceedingly difficult one to adjust. president wilson stoutly opposed the inclusion of war costs as contrary to the pre-armistice agreement, and lloyd george and clemenceau finally had to give in. the entire american delegation and their corps of experts endeavored to limit the charges imposed on germany rigidly to reparation for damage done to civilians in the occupied areas and on land and sea. lloyd george, remembering the promises which he had made prior to the december elections, insisted that pensions paid by the allied governments should be included as damage done to the civilian population. this claim was utterly illogical, for pensions fall properly into the category of military expenses, but it was pressed with such skill and determination by lloyd george and general smuts that president wilson finally gave his assent. from the first the american delegates and experts were in favor of fixing definitely the amount that germany was to pay in the way of reparations and settling this question once for all. they hoped to agree upon a sum which it was within germany's power to pay. but clemenceau and lloyd george had made such extravagant promises to their people that they were afraid to announce at this time a sum which would necessarily be much less than the people expected. they, therefore, insisted that the question should be left open to be determined later by a reparations commission. they declared that any other course would mean the immediate overthrow of their governments and the reorganization of the british and french delegations. president wilson did not care to put himself in the position of appearing to precipitate a political crisis in either country, so he finally gave way on this point also. these concessions proved to be the most serious mistakes that he made at paris, for they did more than anything else to undermine the faith of liberals everywhere in him. the italian delegation advanced a claim to fiume which was inconsistent both with the treaty of london and the fourteen points. when disagreement over this question had been delaying for weeks the settlement of other matters, president wilson finally made a public statement of his position which was virtually an appeal to the italian people over the heads of their delegation. the entire delegation withdrew from the conference and went home, but premier orlando received an almost unanimous vote of confidence from his parliament, and he was supported by an overwhelming tide of public sentiment throughout italy. this was the first indication of wilson's loss of prestige with the peoples of europe. as already stated, the japanese had insisted on the insertion in the covenant of the league of the principle of racial equality. it is very doubtful whether they ever expected to succeed in this. the probability is that they advanced this principle in order to compel concessions on other points. japan's main demand was that the german leases and concessions in the chinese province of shantung should be definitely confirmed to her by the treaty. two weeks after the outbreak of the world war, japan had addressed an ultimatum to germany to the effect that she immediately withdraw all german vessels from chinese and japanese waters and deliver not later than september "to the imperial japanese authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of kiao-chau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to china." in a statement issued to the press count okuma said: "as premier of japan, i have stated and i now again state to the people of america and all the world that japan has no ulterior motive or desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving china or any other peoples of anything which they now possess." the germans had spent about $ , , in improving tsing-tau, the principal city of kiao-chau, and they had no intention of surrendering. after a siege of two months the city was captured by the japanese army and navy, assisted by a small force of british troops. this was the first act in the drama. on january , , japan suddenly presented to the chinese government the now famous twenty-one demands, deliberately misrepresenting to the united states and other powers the nature of these demands. among other things, japan demanded not only that china should assent to any agreement in regard to shantung that japan and germany might reach at the conclusion of the war, but that she should also grant to her greater rights and concessions in shantung than germany had enjoyed. china was finally forced to agree to these demands. japan's next step was to acquire from the allies the assurance that they would support her claims to shantung and to the islands in the pacific north of the equator on the conclusion of the war. this she did in secret agreements signed in february and march, , with england, france, italy, and russia. england agreed to support japan's claim on condition that japan would support her claims to the pacific islands south of the equator. france signed on condition that japan would use her influence on china to break relations with germany and place at the disposal of the allies the german ships interned in chinese ports. the allies were evidently uneasy about japan, and were willing to do anything that was necessary to satisfy her. this uncertainty about japan may also be the explanation of the lansing-ishii agreement signed november , , in which the united states recognized the "special interests" of japan in china. the secret treaties of the allies relating to the japanese claims were not revealed until the disposition of the german islands in the pacific was under discussion at the peace conference. when informed by baron makino that the islands north of the equator had been pledged to japan by agreements signed two years before, president wilson inquired whether there were other secret agreements, and was informed that the german rights in shantung had also been promised to japan. as the other powers were pledged to support japan's claims, president wilson found himself in a very embarrassing situation, especially as he had also to oppose japan's demand that a clause recognizing racial equality be inserted in the covenant of the league. this was a moral claim that japan urged with great strategic effect. in pushing her claims to shantung she ignored all moral considerations and relied entirely upon her legal status, secured ( ) by the secret treaties with the allies, ( ) by the treaty of with china, and ( ) by right of conquest. when charged with having coerced china into signing the treaty of , japan replied with truth that most of the important treaties with china had been extorted by force. japan declared, however, that she had no intention of holding shantung permanently, but that she would restore the province in full sovereignty to china, retaining only the economic privileges transferred from germany. in view of this oral promise, president wilson finally acquiesced in the recognition of japan's legal status in shantung. on may the completed treaty was presented to the german delegates who had been summoned to versailles to receive it. when the text was made public in berlin there was an indignant outcry against the alleged injustice of certain provisions which were held to be inconsistent with the pledges given by president wilson in the pre-armistice negotiations, and the germans made repeated efforts to draw the allies into a general discussion of principles. they were, however, finally given to understand that they must accept or reject the treaty as it stood, and on june it was signed in the hall of mirrors at versailles--the same hall in which william i had been crowned emperor of germany forty-eight years before. the next day president wilson sailed for the united states, and on july personally presented the treaty to the senate with an earnest appeal for prompt ratification. the committee on foreign relations, to which the treaty was referred, proceeded with great deliberation, and on july began a series of public hearings which lasted until september . the committee called before it secretary lansing and several of the technical advisors to the american delegation, including b. m. baruch, economic adviser, norman h. davis, financial adviser, and david hunter miller, legal adviser. the committee also called before it a number of american citizens who had had no official connection with the negotiations but who wished to speak in behalf of foreign groups, including thomas f. millard for china, joseph w. folk for egypt, dudley field malone for india, and a large delegation of americans of irish descent, who opposed the league of nations on the ground that it would stand in the way of ireland's aspiration for independence. the rival claims of jugo-slavs and italians to fiume, the demand of albania for self-determination, the claims of greece to thrace, and arguments for and against the separation of austria and hungary were all presented at great length to the committee. on august the president received the committee at the white house, and after submitting a written statement on certain features of the covenant, he was questioned by members of the committee and a general discussion followed. meanwhile, the treaty was being openly debated in the senate. the president had been an advocate of publicity in diplomacy as well as in other things, and the senate now undertook to use his own weapon against him by a public attack on the treaty. although the opposition to the treaty was started in the senate by lodge, borah, johnson, sherman, reed, and poindexter, it was not confined to that body. throughout the country there were persons of liberal views who favored the league of nations but objected to the severe terms imposed on germany, and charged the president with having proved false to the principles of the fourteen points. there were others who did not object to a severe peace, but who were bound fast by the tradition of isolation and thought membership in the league of nations would involve the sacrifice of national sovereignty. the main object of attack was article x, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of all the members of the league. president wilson stated to the senate committee that he regarded article x as "the very backbone of the whole covenant," and that "without it the league would be hardly more than an influential debating society." the opponents of the league declared that this article would embroil the united states in the internal affairs of europe, and that it deprived congress of its constitutional right to declare war. in the senate there were three groups: the small number of "irreconcilables" who opposed the ratification of the treaty in any form; a larger group who favored ratification without amendments, but who finally expressed their willingness to accept "interpretative reservations"; and a large group composed mainly of republicans who favored the ratification of the treaty only on condition that there should be attached to it reservations safeguarding what they declared to be the fundamental rights and interests of the united states. this group differed among themselves as to the character of the reservations that were necessary, and some of them became known as "mild reservationists." it is probable that at the outset only the small group of "irreconcilables" hoped or intended to bring about the defeat of the treaty, but as the debate proceeded and the opposition to the treaty received more and more popular support, the reservationists determined to defeat the treaty altogether rather than to accept any compromise. the republican leaders were quick to realize that the tide of public opinion had turned and was now running strongly against the president. they determined, therefore, to ruin him at all hazards, and thus to bring about the election of a republican president. when president wilson realized that the treaty was really in danger of defeat, he determined to go on an extended tour of the country for the purpose of explaining the treaty to the people and bringing pressure to bear on the senate. beginning at columbus, ohio, on september , he proceeded through the northern tier of states to the pacific coast, then visited california and returned through colorado. he addressed large audiences who received him with great enthusiasm. he was "trailed" by senator hiram johnson, who was sent out by the opposition in the senate to present the other side. johnson also attracted large crowds. on the return trip, while delivering an address at wichita, kansas, september , the president showed signs of a nervous breakdown and returned immediately to washington. he was able to walk from the train to his automobile, but a few days later he was partially paralyzed. the full extent and seriousness of his illness was carefully concealed from the public. he was confined to the white house for five months, and had to abandon all efforts in behalf of the treaty. on september the committee on foreign relations reported the treaty to the senate with a number of amendments and reservations. the committee declared that the league was an alliance, and that it would "breed wars instead of securing peace." they also declared that the covenant demanded "sacrifices of american independence and sovereignty which would in no way promote the world's peace," and that the amendments and reservations which they proposed were intended "to guard american rights and american sovereignty." the following day the minority members of the committee submitted a report opposing both amendments and reservations. a few days later senator mccumber presented a third report representing the views of the "mild reservationists." it objected to the phraseology of the committee's reservations as unnecessarily severe and recommended substitute reservations. the treaty then became the regular order in the senate and was read section by section and debated each day for over two months. the amendments of the text of the treaty were all rejected by substantial majorities for the reason that their adoption would have made it necessary to resubmit the treaty not only to the allies but also to germany. the majority of the senators were opposed to such a course. the committee, therefore, decided to substitute reservations for amendments, and senator lodge finally submitted, on behalf of the committee, fourteen reservations preceded by a preamble, which declared that the ratification of the treaty was not to take effect or bind the united states until these reservations had been accepted as a condition of ratification by at least three of the four principal allied and associated powers, namely, great britain, france, italy, and japan. the first reservation provided that in case of withdrawal from the league the united states should be the sole judge as to whether its international obligations under the covenant had been fulfilled. this reservation was adopted by a vote of to . the second reservation declared that the united states assumed no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations under the provisions of article x "or to employ the military or naval forces of the united states under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the congress, which, under the constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the united states, shall by act or joint resolution so provide." this reservation was adopted by a vote of to . reservation number , providing that no mandate under the treaty should be accepted by the united states except by action of congress, was adopted by a vote of to . number , excluding domestic questions from consideration by the council or the assembly of the league, was adopted by a vote of to . number , declaring the monroe doctrine "to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said league of nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in said treaty of peace with germany," and reserving to the united states the sole right to interpret the monroe doctrine, was adopted by a vote of to . number , withholding the assent of the united states from the provisions of the treaty relating to shantung and reserving full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which might arise under said articles between china and japan, was adopted by a vote of to . number , reserving to congress the right to provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the united states in the assembly and council of the league and members of commissions, committees or courts under the league, and requiring the confirmation of all by the senate, was adopted by a vote of to . number , declaring that the reparations commission should not be understood as having the right to regulate or interfere with exports from the united states to germany or from germany to the united states without an act or joint resolution of congress, was adopted by a vote of to . number , declaring that the united states should not be under any obligation to contribute to any of the expenses of the league without an act of congress, was adopted by a vote of to . number , providing that if the united states should at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the council of the league, it reserved "the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the council whenever the united states is threatened with invasion or engaged in war," was adopted by a vote of to . number , reserving the right of the united states to permit the nationals of a covenant-breaking state residing within the united states to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the united states, was adopted by a vote of to . number , relating to the very complicated question of private debts, property rights and interests of american citizens, was adopted by a vote of to . number , withholding the assent of the united states from the entire section of the treaty relating to international labor organization until congress should decide to participate, was adopted by a vote of to . number declared that the united states would not be bound by any action of the council or assembly in which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions or colonies should cast in the aggregate more than one vote. this reservation was adopted by a vote of to . a number of other reservations were offered and rejected. under the rules of the senate, amendments and reservations to a treaty may be adopted by a majority vote, while a treaty can be ratified only by a two-thirds vote. a number of senators who were opposed to the treaty voted for the lodge reservations in order to insure its defeat. when the vote on the treaty with the reservations was taken november , it stood for and against. a motion to reconsider the vote was then adopted, and senator hitchcock, the democratic leader, proposed five reservations covering the right of withdrawal, domestic questions, the monroe doctrine, the right of congress to decide on the employment of the naval and military forces of the united states in any case arising under article x, and restrictions on the voting powers of self-governing colonies or dominions. these reservations were rejected, the vote being to . another vote was then taken on the treaty with the lodge reservations, the result being for and against. senator underwood then offered a resolution to ratify the treaty without reservations of any kind. the vote on this resolution was for and against. it was now evident that there was little prospect of securing the ratification of the treaty without compromise. on january , , a letter from the president was read at the jackson day dinner in washington, in which he refused to accept the decision of the senate as final and said: "there can be no reasonable objection to interpretations accompanying the act of ratification itself. but when the treaty is acted upon, i must know whether it means that we have ratified or rejected it. we cannot rewrite this treaty. we must take it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it, and then, after the rest of the world has signed it, we must face the unthinkable task of making another and separate kind of treaty with germany." in conclusion he declared: "if there is any doubt as to what the people of the country think on this vital matter, the clear and single way out is to submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum, a referendum as to the part the united states is to play in completing the settlements of the war and in the prevention in the future of such outrages as germany attempted to perpetrate." during the last week of january a compromise was discussed by an informal by-partisan committee, and the president wrote a letter saying he would accept the hitchcock reservations, but lodge refused to accept any compromise. on february the senate again referred the treaty to the committee on foreign relations with instructions to report it back immediately with the reservations previously adopted. after several weeks of fruitless debate a fifteenth reservation, expressing sympathy for ireland, was added to the others, by a vote of to . it was as follows: "in consenting to the ratification of the treaty with germany the united states adheres to the principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the irish people for a government of their own choice adopted by the senate june , , and declares that when such government is obtained by ireland, a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as a member of the league of nations." with a few changes in the resolutions previously adopted and an important change in the preamble, the ratifying resolution was finally put to the vote march , . the result was votes for and against. on the following day the secretary of the senate was instructed by a formal resolution to return the treaty to the president and to inform him that the senate had failed to ratify it. the treaty thus became the leading issue in the presidential campaign, but unfortunately it was not the only issue. the election proved to be a referendum on the wilson administration as a whole rather than on the treaty. the republican candidate, senator harding, attacked the wilson administration for its arbitrary and unconstitutional methods and advocated a return to "normalcy." he denounced the wilson league as an attempt to set up a super-government, but said he favored an association of nations and an international court. governor cox, the democratic candidate, came out strongly for the treaty, particularly during the latter part of his campaign. the result was an overwhelming victory for harding. president wilson had been too ill to take any part in the campaign. his administration had been the chief issue, and the people had, certainly for the time being, repudiated it. he accepted the result philosophically and refrained from comments, content, apparently, to leave the part he had played in world affairs to the verdict of history. in december, , the nobel peace prize was awarded to him as a foreign recognition of the services he had rendered to humanity. xii the washington conference after the rejection of the treaty of versailles by the senate, president wilson withdrew as far as possible from participation in european affairs, and after the election of harding he let it be known that he would do nothing to embarrass the incoming administration. the public had been led to believe that when harding became president there would be a complete reversal of our foreign policy all along the line, but such was not to be the case. the new administration continued unchanged the wilson policy toward mexico and toward russia, and before many months had passed was seeking from congress the authority, withheld from wilson, to appoint a member on the reparations commission. on the question of our rights in mandated areas, secretary hughes adopted in whole the arguments which had been advanced by secretary colby in his note to great britain of november , , in regard to the oil resources of mesopotamia. by the san remo agreement of april , , great britain and france had agreed upon a division of the oil output of mesopotamia by which france was to be allowed per cent. and great britain per cent. the british government had intimated that the united states, having declined to join the league of nations, had no voice in the matter. on this point secretary colby took sharp issue in the following statement: "such powers as the allied and associated nations may enjoy or wield, in the determination of the governmental status of the mandated areas, accrued to them as a direct result of the war against the central powers. the united states, as a participant in that conflict and as a contributor to its successful issue, cannot consider any of the associated powers, the smallest not less than herself, debarred from the discussion of any of its consequences, or from participation in the rights and privileges secured under the mandates provided for in the treaties of peace." japan likewise assumed that we had nothing to do with the disposition of the former german islands in the pacific. when the supreme council at paris decided to give japan a mandate over the islands north of the equator, president wilson reserved for future consideration the final disposition of the island of yap, which lies between guam and the philippines, and is one of the most important cable stations in the pacific. the entire question of cable communications was reserved for a special conference which met at washington in the autumn of , but this conference adjourned about the middle of december without having reached any final conclusions, and the status of yap became the subject of a very sharp correspondence between the american and japanese governments. when hughes became secretary of state, he restated the american position in a note of april , , as follows: "it will not be questioned that the right to dispose of the overseas possessions of germany was acquired only through the victory of the allied and associated powers, and it is also believed that there is no disposition on the part of the japanese government to deny the participation of the united states in that victory. it would seem to follow necessarily that the right accruing to the allied and associated powers through the common victory is shared by the united states and that there could be no valid or effective disposition of the overseas possessions of germany, now under consideration, without the assent of the united states." the discussion between the two governments was still in progress when the washington conference convened, and at the close of the conference it was announced that an agreement had been reached which would be embodied in a treaty. the united states recognized japan's mandate over the islands north of the equator on the condition that the united states should have full cable rights on the island of yap, and that its citizens should enjoy certain rights of residence on the island. the agreement also covered radio telegraphic service. during the presidential campaign harding's position on the league of nations had been so equivocal that the public knew not what to expect, but when hughes and hoover were appointed members of the cabinet, it was generally expected that the new administration would go into the league with reservations. this expectation was not to be fulfilled, however, for the president persistently ignored the existence of the league, and took no notice of the establishment of the permanent court of international justice provided for in article of the covenant. meanwhile elihu root, who as secretary of state had instructed our delegates to the hague conference of to propose the establishment of such a court, had been invited by the council of the league to be one of a commission of distinguished jurists to draft the statute establishing the court. this service he performed with conspicuous ability. as another evidence of europe's unwillingness to leave us out, when the court was organized john bassett moore, america's most distinguished authority on international law, was elected one of the judges. meanwhile a technical state of war with germany existed and american troops were still on the rhine. on july , , congress passed a joint resolution declaring the war at an end, but undertaking to reserve to the united states "all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages" to which it was entitled under the terms of the armistice, or by reason of its participation in the war, or which had been stipulated for its benefit in the treaty of versailles, or to which it was entitled as one of the principal allied and associated powers, or to which it was entitled by virtue of any act or acts of congress. on august the united states government, through its commissioner to germany, signed at berlin a separate treaty of peace with germany, reserving in detail the rights referred to in the joint resolution of congress. about the same time a similar treaty was signed with austria, and the two treaties were ratified by the senate of the united states october . the proclamation of peace produced no immediate results of any importance. american troops continued on the rhine, and there was no apparent increase in trade, which had been carried on before the signing of the treaty by special licenses. if mankind is capable of learning any lessons from history, the events leading up to the world war should have exploded the fallacy that the way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. competition in armament, whether on land or sea, inevitably leads to war, and it can lead to nothing else. and yet, after the terrible lessons of the recent war, the race for armaments continued with increased momentum. france, russia, and poland maintained huge armies, while the united states and japan entered upon the most extensive naval construction programs in the history of the world. great britain, burdened with debt, was making every effort to keep pace with the united states. this naval rivalry between powers which had so lately been united in the war against germany, led thoughtful people to consider the probable outcome and to ask against whom these powers were arming. we had no quarrel with england, but england was the ally of japan, and relations between japan and the united states in the pacific and in eastern asia were far from reassuring. the question of the continuance of the anglo-japanese alliance was discussed at the british imperial conference, which met at london in the early summer of . the original purpose of this compact was to check the russian advance in manchuria. it was renewed in revised form in against germany, and again renewed in against germany for a period of ten years. with the removal of the german menace, what reasons were there for great britain to continue the alliance? it bore too much the aspect of a combination against the united states, and was of course the main reason for the naval program which we had adopted. so long as there were only three navies of importance in the world and two of them united in a defensive alliance, it behooved us to safeguard our position as a sea power. one of the main objects of the formation of the league of nations was to bring about a limitation of armaments on land and sea, and a commission was organized under the league to consider this question, but this commission could not take any steps toward the limitation of navies so long as a great naval power like the united states refused to coöperate with the league of nations or even to recognize its existence. as president harding had promised the american people some substitute for the league of nations, he decided, soon after coming into office, to convene an international conference to consider the limitation of armament on land and sea. by the time the conference convened it was evident that no agreement was possible on the subject of land armament. it was recognized from the first that the mere proposal to limit navies would be utterly futile unless effective steps could be taken to remove some of the causes of international conflict which make navies necessary. therefore the formal invitation to the conference extended to the governments of great britain, france, italy and japan, august , , linked the subject of limitation of armament with pacific and far eastern questions. the european powers accepted the invitation without much enthusiasm, but japan's answer was held back for some time. she was reluctant to have the powers review the course she had pursued in china and siberia while they were at war with germany. after agreeing to attend the conference, japan endeavored to confine the program to as narrow limits as possible, and she soon entered into negotiations with china over the shantung question with the hope of arriving at a settlement which would prevent that question from coming before the conference. invitations to the conference were later sent to the governments of belgium, the netherlands, portugal, and china. portugal was interested because of her settlement at macao, the oldest european settlement in china. holland of course is one of the great colonial powers of the pacific. while belgium has no territorial interests in the orient, she has for years been interested in chinese financial matters. the washington conference convened in plenary session november , , in memorial continental hall. seats were reserved on the main floor for press representatives, and the galleries were reserved for officials and those individuals who were fortunate enough to secure tickets of admission. the question of open diplomacy which had been much discussed, was settled at the first session by secretary hughes, who, in his introductory speech, boldly laid the american proposals for the limitation of navies before the conference. there were in all seven plenary sessions, but the subsequent sessions did little more than confirm agreements that had already been reached in committee. the real work of the conference was carried on by committees, and from the meetings of these committees the public and press representatives were as a matter of course excluded. there were two principal committees, one on the limitation of armament, and the other on pacific and far eastern questions. there were various sub-committees, in the work of which technical delegates participated. minutes were kept of the meetings of the two principal committees, and after each meeting a communiqué was prepared for the press. in fact, the demand for publicity defeated to a large extent its own ends. so much matter was given to the press that when it was published in full very few people had time to read it. as a general rule, the less real information there was to give out, the longer were the communiqués. experienced correspondents maintained that decisions on delicate questions were made with as much secrecy in washington as at paris. the plan of the united states for the limitation of armament presented by secretary hughes at the first session proposed ( ) that all programs for the construction of capital ships, either actual or projected, be abandoned; ( ) that a large number of battleships of older types still in commission be scrapped; and ( ) that the allowance of auxiliary combatant craft, such as cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and airplane carriers, be in proportion to the tonnage of capital ships. these proposals, it was claimed, would leave the powers under consideration in the same relative positions. under this plan the united states would be allowed , tons of capital ships, great britain , tons, and japan , tons. japan objected to the - - ratio proposed by secretary hughes, and urged a - - ratio as more in accord with existing strength. the american proposal included the scrapping of the _mutsu_, the pride of the japanese navy, which had been launched but not quite completed. the sacrifices voluntarily proposed by the united states for its navy were much greater than those which england or japan were called upon to make, and in this lay the strength of the american position. the japanese refused, however, to give up the _mutsu_, and they were finally permitted to retain it, but in order to preserve the - - ratio, it was necessary to increase the tonnage allowance of the united states and great britain. in the treaty as finally agreed upon, japan was allowed , tons of capital ships and the united states and great britain each , tons. in his address at the opening session, secretary hughes said: "in view of the extraordinary conditions due to the world war affecting the existing strength of the navies of france and italy, it is not thought to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnage allowance of these nations, but the united states proposes that this subject be reserved for the later consideration of the conference." this somewhat blunt, matter-of-fact way of stating the case gave unexpected offense to the french delegation. during the next four or five weeks, while great britain, the united states, and japan were discussing the case of the _mutsu_ and the question of fortifications in the pacific, the french delegates were cherishing their resentment at being treated as the representatives of a second-class power. hughes's failure to regard the susceptibilities of a great nation like france undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the upsetting of that part of the naval program relating to subsidiary craft and submarines. when, after the agreement on the - - ratio, the question of the allowance of capital ship tonnage for france and italy was taken up in committee, the other powers were wholly unprepared for france's demand of , tons of capital ships. according to hughes's figures based on existing strength, she was entitled to , tons. it is not probable that the french delegates intended to insist on such a large tonnage. it is more likely that they put forth this proposal in the committee in order to give the other delegates to understand that france could not be ignored or dictated to with impunity and in order to pave the way for their submarine proposal. unfortunately the french demands were given to the press through some misunderstanding and caused an outburst of criticism in the british and american papers. in the committee the relations between the british and french delegates became very bitter over the refusal of the latter to abandon the submarine, or even agree to a moderate proposal as to submarine tonnage. on december secretary hughes cabled an appeal, over the heads of the french delegation, to briand, who had returned to paris. as a result, the french finally agreed to accept the . ratio for capital ships, but refused to place any reasonable limits upon cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or aircraft. italy accepted the same ratio as france. thus an important part of the hughes program failed. as a result, the treaty leaves the contracting parties free to direct their energies, if they so desire, to the comparatively new fields of submarine and aerial warfare. as is well known, many eminent naval authorities, such as sir percy scott in england and admiral sims in this country, believe that the capital ship is an obsolete type, and that the warfare of the future will be carried on by submarines, aircraft, and lighter surface ships. the unfortunate feature of the situation created by the naval treaty is, therefore, that those who regard the capital ship as obsolete will now have an opportunity to bring forward and press their submarine and aircraft programs. there is no limitation upon the building of cruisers, provided they do not exceed , tons displacement or carry guns with a calibre exceeding eight inches. by article of the naval treaty the united states, great britain, and japan agreed to maintain the _status quo_ as regards fortifications and naval bases in the islands of the pacific with certain exceptions, notably the hawaiian islands, australia, and new zealand. this agreement relieves japan of all fear of attack from us, and let us hope that it may prove as beneficent and as enduring as the agreement of between the united states and great britain for disarmament on the great lakes. the - - ratio puts the navies of great britain, the united states, and japan, for the present at least, on a strictly defensive basis. each navy is strong enough to defend its home territory, but no one of them will be able to attack the home territory of the others. of course it is possible that the development of aircraft and submarines, together with cruisers and other surface craft, may eventually alter the situation. hitherto navies have existed for two purposes: national defense and the enforcement of foreign policies. the new treaty means that as long as it lasts the navies of the ratifying powers can be used for defense only and not for the enforcement of their policies in distant quarters of the globe. in other words, when disputes arise, british policies will prevail in the british area, american policies in the american area, and japanese policies in the japanese area. having agreed to place ourselves in a position in which we cannot attack japan, the only pressure we can bring to bear upon her in china or elsewhere is moral pressure. through what was considered by some a grave strategical error, the naval treaty was completed before any settlement of the chinese and siberian questions had been reached. the french insistence on the practically unlimited right to build submarines caused much hard feeling in england. the british delegates had proposed the total abolition of submarines, and this proposal had been ably supported by the arguments of mr. balfour and lord lee. unfortunately the united states delegation stood for the submarine, proposing merely certain limits upon its use. the five naval powers finally signed a treaty reaffirming the old rules of international law in regard to the search and seizure of merchant vessels, and declaring that "any person in the service of any power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found." by the same treaty the signatory powers solemnly bound themselves to prohibit the use in war of poisonous gases. the attempt to limit by treaty the use of the submarine and to prohibit altogether the use of gases appears to many to be utterly futile. after the experience of the late war, no nation would readily trust the good faith of another in these matters. each party to a war would probably feel justified in being prepared to use the submarine and poison gases, contrary to law, in case the other party should do so. we would thus have the same old dispute as in the late war in regard to floating mines as to which party first resorted to the outlawed practice. what is the use in solemnly declaring that a submarine shall not attack a merchant vessel, and that the commander of a submarine who violates this law shall be treated as a pirate, when the contracting parties found it utterly impossible to agree among themselves upon a definition of a merchant vessel? but the reader may ask, what is the use in signing any treaty if nations are so devoid of good faith? the answer is that the vast majority of treaties are faithfully kept in time of peace, but that very few treaties are fully observed in time of war. had these five powers signed a treaty pledging themselves not to build or maintain submarines of any kind or description, we would have every reason to expect them to live up to it. but when a nation is engaged in war and has a large flotilla of submarines which it has agreed to use only for certain purposes, there is apt to come a time when the temptation to use them for wholly different purposes will be overwhelming. the committee on pacific and far eastern questions held its first meeting november . this committee was primarily concerned with the very delicate situation created by the aggressive action and expansion of japan during the past twenty years. in , by the treaty of portsmouth, japan succeeded to the russian rights in southern manchuria; in she annexed korea; in , during the chinese revolution, she stationed troops at hankow and later constructed permanent barracks; in , after the defeat of the germans at kiao-chau, she took over all the german interests in the shantung peninsula; in she presented the twenty-one demands to china and coerced that power into granting most of them; and in , in conjunction with the united states, great britain, and france, she landed a military force in the maritime province of siberia for the definite purpose of rescuing the czecho-slovak troops who had made their way to that province and of guarding the military stores at vladivostok. the other powers had all withdrawn their contingents, but japan had increased her force from one division to more than , troops. the eastern coast of asia was thus in the firm grip of japan, and she had secured concessions from china which seriously impaired the independence of that country. it was commonly supposed that the united states delegation had prepared a program on the far eastern question, and that this would be presented in the same way that hughes had presented the naval program. if this was the intention there was a sudden change of plan, for between one and two o'clock at night the chinese delegates were aroused from their slumbers and informed that there would be an opportunity for them to present china's case before the committee at eleven o'clock that morning. they at once went to work with their advisers, and a few minutes before the appointed hour they completed the drafting of the ten points, which minister sze read before the committee. these points constituted a chinese declaration of independence, and set forth a series of general principles to be applied in the determination of questions relating to china. several days later the committee adopted four resolutions, presented by mr. root, covering in part some of the chinese principles. by these resolutions the powers agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of china, to give china the fullest opportunity to develop and maintain an effective and stable government, to recognize the principle of equality for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of china, and to refrain from taking advantage of present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges. this somewhat vague and general declaration of principles appeared to be all that china was likely to get. had mr. hughes presented a far eastern program and gotten nothing more than this, it would have been a serious blow to the prestige of the united states. that is probably why he decided at the last moment to let china present her own case. at the fourth plenary session of the conference the treaty relating to the pacific islands, generally known as the four-power treaty, was presented by senator lodge. by the terms of this treaty, the united states, great britain, france, and japan agreed "to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the pacific ocean," and in case of any dispute arising out of any pacific question to refer the matter to a joint conference for consideration and adjustment. this article appeared harmless enough, but article seemed to lay the foundations of an alliance between these powers. it was as follows: "if the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power, the high contracting parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." this treaty is to remain in force for ten years, after which it may be terminated by any of the high contracting parties on twelve months' notice. it supersedes the anglo-japanese alliance which, it expressly provided, should terminate on the exchange of ratifications. in presenting the treaty, senator lodge assured his hearers that "no military or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or under cover of these plain and direct clauses," and secretary hughes in closing the discussion declared that it would probably not be possible to find in all history "an international document couched in more simple or even briefer terms," but he added, "we are again reminded that the great things are the simple ones." in view of these statements the members of the conference and the public generally were completely flabbergasted some days later when secretary hughes and the president gave out contradictory statements as to whether the treaty included the japanese homeland. hughes stated to the correspondents that it did, the president said it did not. whereupon some wag remarked that at paris president wilson did not let the american delegation know what he did, while at washington the delegates did not let president harding know what they were doing. in deference to the president's views and to criticisms of the treaty in the japanese press a supplementary treaty was later signed expressly declaring that the term "insular possessions and insular dominions" did not include the japanese homeland. meanwhile the shantung question was being discussed by china and japan outside of the conference, but with representatives of the british and american governments sitting as observers ready to use their good offices if called on. the reason for not bringing the question before the conference was that great britain, france, and italy were parties to the treaty of versailles, which gave japan a legal title to the german leases in shantung. the restoration of the province to china was vital to a satisfactory adjustment of chinese affairs generally. japan, however, was in no hurry to reach an agreement with china, wishing for strategical purposes to keep the matter in suspense to the last, if not to avoid a settlement until after the adjournment of the conference and continue negotiations under more favorable conditions at peking or tokio. by christmas it seemed that the conference had accomplished about all that was possible, and that it would adjourn as soon as the agreements already reached could be put into treaty form and signed. at the end of the first week in january it looked as if the chinese and japanese had reached a deadlock, and that the conference would adjourn without a satisfactory adjustment of any of the chinese problems. mr. balfour and other important delegates had engaged return passage, and all indications pointed to an early dissolution of the conference. but the unexpected happened. at an informal gathering of administration leaders at the white house on saturday night, january , stock was taken of the work of the conference, and some of the senators present expressed the opinion that if it adjourned without doing more for china, there would be little hope of getting the treaties ratified. as a result secretary hughes persuaded the british and japanese delegates to cancel their sailings, and with characteristic energy and determination took personal charge of the far eastern situation, which up to this time had been left mainly to mr. root. after a little pressure had been brought to bear on the chinese by president harding, and probably on the japanese by mr. balfour, secretary hughes was finally able to announce at the plenary session of february that china and japan had reached an agreement as to the terms on which shantung was to be restored. at the same session the agreements in regard to china reached by the committee on far eastern affairs were announced. these agreements were finally embodied in two treaties, one dealing with the tariff and the other with the open door, and a series of ten resolutions. since the middle of the last century chinese tariffs have been regulated by treaties with foreign powers, the customs service organized and administered by foreigners, and the receipts mortgaged to meet the interest on foreign loans. china has never been permitted to levy duties in excess of per cent., and, in fact, as a result of the methods of valuation the duties have not averaged above / per cent. this has been an unjust state of affairs, and has deprived the chinese government of what would naturally be one of its main sources of revenue. by the new agreement there is to be an immediate revision of tariff valuations so as to make the per cent. effective. china is also to be allowed to levy a surtax on certain articles, mainly luxuries, which will yield an additional revenue. it is estimated that the total annual increase in revenue derived from maritime customs will be about $ , , silver. it is claimed by some, with a certain degree of truth, that any increase in chinese customs duties will be immediately covered by liens to secure new loans, and that putting money into the chinese treasury just now is like pouring it into a rat hole. as soon as china is able to establish a stable and honest government, she should, without question, be relieved of all treaty restrictions on her tariffs. the conference also took certain steps to restore to china other sovereign rights long impaired by the encroachments of foreign powers. a commission is to be appointed to investigate the administration of justice with a view to the ultimate extinction of extraterritorial rights now enjoyed by foreigners. the powers also agreed to abandon not later than january , , their existing postal agencies in china, provided an efficient chinese postal service be maintained. the system of foreign post offices in china has been the subject of great abuses, as through these agencies goods of various kinds, including opium and other drugs, have been smuggled into china. the powers further made a general promise to aid the chinese government in the unification of railways into a general system under chinese control. they also agreed to restore to china all radio stations other than those regulated by treaty or maintained by foreign governments within their legation limits. in the treaty relating to the open door, the contracting powers other than china pledged themselves to the following principles: "( ) to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of china; "( ) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to china to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; "( ) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of china; "( ) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in china in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states." china on her part accepted fully the principle of the open door, and pledged herself for the first time to respect it. pledges to respect the open door in china have been made by foreign powers upon various occasions in the past and broken as often as made. the expression "equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations" is not new. it occurs in the anglo-japanese alliance of , in the root-takahira agreement of , and in numerous other documents. in recent years, however, the united states has been the only power which has tried to preserve the open door in china. most of the other powers have regarded the chinese situation as hopeless, and have believed that the only solution was to let foreign powers come in and divide and rule the territory of the empire. in view of the new treaty the open door is no longer merely an american policy, but an international policy, and responsibility for its enforcement rests not on the united states alone but on all nine parties to the treaty. the agenda or program of the conference offered as one of the subjects to be considered the status of existing commitments in china. when secretary hughes brought this subject up before the far eastern committee, japan entered an emphatic objection to its consideration, and the matter was dropped immediately without argument. the treaty, therefore, is not retroactive, for it recognizes the status quo in manchuria and to a less extent in other parts of china. the saving clause of the new agreement is, however, a resolution providing for the establishment of an international board of reference, to which questions arising in regard to the open door may be referred. will japan respect the pledges she has made and live up to the spirit of her promises? if she does, the washington conference will prove to be a great success. if, on the contrary, japan does not intend to live up to her pledges or intends to fulfill them only in part, her position in asia has been greatly strengthened. she is more firmly intrenched in manchuria than ever. she holds the maritime province of siberia under a promise to get out, which she has repeatedly made and repeatedly broken, as was plainly stated by secretary hughes before the full committee on far eastern affairs, and repeated at a plenary session of the conference. his statement was one of the most remarkable, by reason of its directness and unvarnished truth, in the history of american diplomacy. after reviewing the correspondence between the two governments and the reiterated assurances of japan of her intention to withdraw from siberia, assurances which so far had not been carried out, mr. hughes expressed his gratification at the renewal of these assurances before the conference in plenary session. unless japan is utterly devoid of moral shame, she will have to make good her word this time. when the treaties drafted by the conference were submitted by the president to the senate, they encountered serious opposition, but were finally ratified. the republican leaders, particularly senator lodge, were twitted with charges of inconsistency in advocating certain features of these treaties when they had violently opposed the league of nations. the four-power treaty is much more of an entangling alliance than the covenant of the league, and the naval treaty deprives congress for a period of fifteen years of its constitutional right to determine the size of the navy and to provide for the defense of guam and the philippines. in fact, there were very few objections raised to the league of nations which could not with equal force be applied to the four-power and naval treaties. the four-power treaty was the main object of attack, and senators lodge and underwood were greatly embarrassed in attempting to explain its meaning. its "baffling brevity" demanded explanations, but no satisfactory explanations were forthcoming. they talked in general terms about the tremendous importance of the treaty, but they dared not state the real fact that the treaty was drafted by mr. balfour and baron kato as the most convenient method of terminating the anglo-japanese alliance without making it appear to the japanese public that their government had surrendered the alliance without due compensation. according to an associated press dispatch from tokio, january , , baron uchida, the japanese minister of foreign affairs, replying to interpolations in the house of peers, said: "the four-power treaty was not intended to abrogate the anglo-japanese alliance, but rather to widen and extend it." the real _quid pro quo_ for the termination of the anglo-japanese alliance was the agreement of the united states not to construct naval bases or new fortifications in guam and the philippines, and the clause terminating the anglo-japanese alliance might just as well have been attached to the naval treaty, but this would not have satisfied japanese public opinion. great britain and japan were permitted to terminate their alliance in any way that they might deem best. after the four-power treaty was accepted by the american delegates, they feared that it would look too much as if the united states had merely been drawn into the anglo-japanese alliance. it was decided, therefore, at the eleventh hour to give the agreement a more general character by inviting france to adhere to it. france agreed to sign, although she resented not having been consulted during the negotiation of the treaty. the achievements of the conference, although falling far short of the extravagant claims made by the president and the american delegates, are undoubtedly of great importance. the actual scrapping of millions of dollars' worth of ships in commission or in process of construction gives the world an object lesson such as it has never had before. one of the most significant results of the conference was the development of a complete accord between england and the united states, made possible by the settlement of the irish question and furthered by the tact and gracious bearing of mr. balfour. one of the unfortunate results was the increased isolation of france, due to the failure of her delegates to grasp the essential elements of the situation and to play any but a negative role. the success of the conference was due largely to secretary hughes who, though handicapped at every point by fear of the senate and by the unfortunate commitments of president harding during the last campaign, may be said on the whole to have played his hand reasonably well. meanwhile we are still drifting, so far as a general european policy is concerned. president harding's idea of holding aloof from "europe's league," as he prefers to designate the league of nations, and of having a little league of our own in the pacific, will not work. the world's problems cannot be segregated in this way. europe's league includes all of the principal american nations except the united states and mexico, while our pacific league includes the two leading european powers. as soon as the american people realize--and there are indications that they are already waking up to the reality--that the depression in domestic industry and foreign commerce is due to conditions in europe and that prosperity will not return until we take a hand in the solution of european problems, there will be a general demand for a constructive policy and america will no longer hesitate to reassume the leadership which she renounced in the referendum of , but which the rest of the world is ready to accord to her again. index abc alliance, , . aberdeen, lord, opposes annexation of texas by united states, . adams, charles francis, . adams, henry, letter from hay to, . adams, john quincy, opposes joint action with england, ; accepts invitation to send delegates to panama congress, . "alabama claims," , , . alaskan boundary dispute, , . algeciras conference, ; american participation in, , . alliance, of with france, - ; proposed alliance with england, , ; holy alliance, , ; anglo-japanese alliance, , . _see_ "entangling alliances." alverstone, lord, member of alaskan boundary commission, . american colonisation society, . american delegation to peace conference, . american institute of international law, . american republics, bureau of, . american revolution, significance of, . anglo-american ideals, , . anglo-japanese alliance, , , , , . arbitration, international, . _see_ hague court, olney-pauncefote treaty. armistice, negotiations preceding, - . arms and ammunition. _see_ munitions of war. "aroostook war," . austria-hungary, protests against trade in munitions, . balfour, arthur james, , , . beer, george l., quoted, . belgium, german invasion of, ; restoration of, demanded, . beresford, lord charles, advocates open door in china, . berlin conference of , l. "big four," at peace conference, . bingham, hiram, on monroe doctrine, . bismarck, prince, on monroe doctrine, ; on english control of north america, ; forces war on austria, ; forces war on france, . blaine, james g., efforts to modify clayton-bulwer treaty, ; issues invitation to international conference of american states, , . bliss, gen. tasker h., . board of reference, in china, . bolivar, simon, . bolsheviki, . bonaparte, napoleon, acquires louisiana, ; fails to establish control over spain's colonies, . bowen, herbert, . boxer uprising in china, brest-litovsk, peace negotiations at, , , . brussels conference on african slave trade, . bryan, william jennings, negotiates treaty with nicaragua, ; with colombia, ; refuses to modify neutrality laws at demand of germany, . bryce, lord, quoted, , . bülow, prince von, , . california, danger of english occupation of, . canada, insurrection of , . canning, george, british foreign secretary, proposes anglo-american alliance, ; delays recognition of south american republics, , ; interview with prince polignac, ; boasts of calling new world into existence, ; opposes pan-american movement, . caribbean sea, american supremacy in, ; advance of united states in, ; new american policies in, , , . _caroline_, the, . carranza, venustiano, , . castlereagh, viscount, . china, treaties relating to tariff and open door, - . _see_ open-door policy. choate, joseph h., at second hague conference, , . civil war, foreign policy of united states during, ; disputes with england, . clay, henry, opposes joint action with england, ; instructions to delegates to panama congress, . clayton-bulwer treaty, , . cleveland, grover, intervenes in venezuelan boundary dispute, ; withholds kongo treaty from senate, ; venezuelan policy justified by events, ; favours general arbitration treaty with england, . cobden, richard, essay on america, . colby, bainbridge, secretary of state, , . colombia, aggrieved at seizure of canal zone, ; attempts of united states to settle controversy, , . consuls, status of, in european leases in china, , . continuous voyage, doctrine of, , , , . cowdray, lord, seeks concession from colombia, . cox, james m., candidate for president, . crampton, british minister to united states, dismissal of, . declaration of london, - , , . declaration of paris, , . declaration of rights and duties of nations, adopted by american institute of international law, , . democracy against autocracy, . dewey, admiral george, on withdrawal of germany from venezuela, ; demands apology from german admiral in manila bay, . dickens, charles, "american notes," . diederichs, german admiral, . diplomacy, secret, , . dunning, william a., "british empire and the united states," quoted, , . durfee, amos, . egypt, financial administration of, by great britain, . england. _see_ great britain. "entangling alliances," warning of jefferson against, ; wilson's views on, . entente treaty of between england and france, . european balance of power, interest of united states in preserving, ; disturbed by japan, . fenian movement, encouraged in united states, , . ferdinand vii, king of spain, , . fish, hamilton, secretary of state, renews negotiations for settlement of "alabama claims," , . fiume, and treaty of london, . foch, ferdinand, - , . fonseca bay, united states acquires naval base on, , . forsyth, john, secretary of state, . fortifications in the pacific, limitation of, . foster, john w., letter from hay, to, . four-power treaty, - , - . fourteen points, - , , . france, treaty of alliance with, - ; refuses to accept plan for limitation of navies, , ; isolation of, . gases, use of poisonous, prohibited, , . gênet, edmond c., minister of the french republic, . george, david lloyd, defines british war aims, - ; pre-election pledges of, ; opposes french demand for left bank of rhine, . germany, intervenes in venezuela, ; excluded from south america by aid of england, ; designs of, on philippine islands, ; adopts naval policy, ; influence of, in america, ; submarine policy of, , ; attempts of, to justify, ; protests against munitions trade, ; organizes propaganda and conspiracy in united states, . great britain, withdraws from european alliance, ; intervenes in mexico, ; not unfavorable to monroe doctrine, , ; forms alliance with japan, ; points of contact with united states, ; unfriendly attitude, ; change of attitude in spanish war, ; naval policy of, ; interference with shipments to germany resented in united states, ; size of navy, ; so-called blockade of germany, - . _see_ anglo-american ideals. great lakes, disarmament on, . guarantee treaties, offered to france, . gummeré, s. r., delegate to algeciras conference, . hague conference, of , ; of , . hague conventions, status of, . hague court of arbitration, . haiti, republic of, united states acquires financial supervision over, , . hamilton, alexander, opinion on french treaty of , . harding, warren g., elected president, ; ignores league of nations, ; calls washington conference, ; differs with hughes as to meaning of four-power treaty, ; attitude toward europe, . harris, townsend, . hay, john, secretary of state, protests against persecution of jews in rumania, ; formulates open-door policy for china, ; defines status of consuls in european leases in china, ; insists on "territorial and administrative entity" of china, ; private correspondence on chinese situation, - . hay-pauncefote treaty, , . henry, of prussia, prince, visit of, to united states, . hitchcock, senator g. h., . holy alliance, , . house, edward m., , . huerta, victoriano, , , . hughes, charles e., suggests changes in covenant of league, ; asserts rights of the united states in mandated areas, ; proposes reduction of navies, ; details of plan, , ; offends the french delegates, ; takes personal charge of far eastern question, ; success of washington conference, due to, . international conference of american states, . international court of arbitral justice, plan for, ; permanent court of international justice, . international law, attitude of united states toward, ; attempts to codify, , . international law, american institute of, . international prize court, plan for, adopted by second hague conference, . isolation, policy of, distinct from monroe doctrine, , ; policy no longer possible, . jameson raid, in the transvaal, . japan, beginning of american intercourse with, , ; forms alliance with great britain, ; goes to war with russia, ; disturbing factor in world politics, ; advocates principle of racial equality, , ; demands german leases in shantung, ; secures consent of allies, ; reluctantly accepts invitation to washington conference, ; objects to - - ratio, ; expansion of, . jefferson, thomas, opinion on french treaty of , ; warns against "entangling alliances," ; plans alliance with england against france, - ; favors joint action with england against holy alliance, - ; author of doctrine of recognition, . jews, diplomatic protests against harsh treatment of, , . johnson, senator hiram, . johnson-clarendon convention, . knox, philander c., proposes neutralisation of railways of manchuria, ; negotiates treaties with honduras and nicaragua, , ; proposes settlement with colombia, ; opposes league of nations, , . kongo free state, treaty establishing, signed by american delegates but withheld from senate by president cleveland, l, . kruger, paul, . lansing, robert, secretary of state, replies to austro-hungarian note on munitions trade, , ; dismisses austrian ambassador and german military and naval attachés, ; delegate to peace conference, , . lansing-ishii agreement, . league of nations, , , , , , , - . league to enforce peace, , . left bank of rhine, french demand for, . liberia, republic of, limitation of armament, commission of league on, ; conference on, - . liverpool, lord, . livingston, robert r., minister to france, . lodge, senator henry cabot, on oregon dispute, , ; denies existence of secret treaty with england, ; stands for unconditional surrender of germany, ; issues round robin, ; presents reservations to treaty of versailles, ; presents four-power treaty, , inconsistency of, . london naval conference, . _lusitania_, sinking of, . madero, francisco, . madison, james, favors joint action with england against holy alliance, . mahan, alfred t., . maine, boundary dispute with new brunswick, . manchuria, russian encroachments on, - , . marcy, william l., secretary of state, views on declaration of paris, . maximilian, prince, placed by louis napoleon on throne of mexico, . merchant vessels, proposal to arm, . mexico, french intervention in, ; huerta revolution in, ; american policy toward, - . monroe, james, sent to paris to aid livingston in negotiations for purchase of new orleans and west florida, ; consults jefferson and madison on subject of british proposals for joint action against holy alliance, - ; message of december , , - ; emphasizes separation of european and american politics, . monroe doctrine, compared with policy of isolation, ; justification of, ; formulation of, ; text of, - ; reception of, in europe, ; basis of, ; sanction of, ; relation of, to european balance of power, , ; attitude of england toward, ; negative side of, ; adverse criticism of, ; not a self-denying declaration, ; reservation of, , . moore, john bassett, . moroccan question. _see_ algeciras conference. motley, john l., . munitions of war, sale of to belligerents, - . mckinley, william, reasons for retaining philippine islands, , . mcleod, alexander, arrest of, ; acquittal of, . napoleon, louis, intervenes in mexico, ; decides to withdraw, , . neutral prizes, destruction of, , . neutrality, washington's proclamation of , ; failure of, in napoleonic wars, , ; wilson's proclamation of, ; nature of, , ; so-called ethical neutrality, ; abandonment of, . new brunswick, boundary dispute with maine, . niagara conference on mexican question, . olney, richard, on monroe doctrine, ; conducts correspondence on venezuelan boundary dispute, ; signs general arbitration treaty with england, . olney-pauncefote treaty, , . open-door policy in china, hay's note of september , , ; anglo-american origin of, ; guaranteed by treaty, . oregon, joint occupation of, . o'shaughnessy, nelson, . pacific and far eastern questions, conference on, - . panama canal, effect of, on naval policy, . panama canal zone, seizure of, . panama congress of , , . panama tolls act, . pan-american financial congress, . pan-american scientific congress, . pan-american union, . pan-americanism, - . pauncefote, sir julian, signs general arbitration treaty with united states, ; signs canal treaty, . platt amendment, provisions of, , . peace conference of paris, - . _see_ hague conference. perry, commodore matthew c. commands expedition to japan, , , . philippine islands, mckinley's reasons for retaining, , . polignac, prince, interview with canning on subject of the spanish colonies, . polk, james k., settles oregon dispute, . portsmouth, treaty of, . prize court. _see_ international prize court. prizes, destruction of, , . recognition, doctrine of, discussed with reference to mexican question, . reparations, , . reservations to treaty of versailles, - , . roosevelt, theodore, forces germany to withdraw from venezuela, ; sends delegates to algeciras conference, ; exerts influence to preserve european balance of power, ; protests against persecution of jews in rumania and russia, , ; invites russia and japan to peace conference, ; incurs ill will of japan, ; submits alaskan boundary dispute to limited arbitration, ; establishes financial supervision over dominican republic, , ; big-stick policy, ; extension of monroe doctrine, ; seizure of canal zone, . root, elihu, proposes international court of justice, ; author of platt amendment, ; visits south america, ; suggests changes in covenant of league, ; member of commission to draft statute of permanent court of international justice, ; presents resolutions on china, . rush, richard, conferences with canning on south american situation, , , . russia, occupies manchuria, , ; opposes opening of manchurian ports to american commerce, ; goes to war with japan, ; revolution, of march, , ; of november, , . russo-japanese war, . sackville-west, lord, dismissal of, . salisbury, lord, backs down in venezuelan dispute, ; warns president mckinley of germany's designs on philippines. san remo agreement, , . santo domingo, financial supervision over, , . secret treaties, . self-determination, , , . senate of the united states, debates treaty of versailles, - . seward, william h., protests against french occupation of mexico, . shantung question, at peace conference of paris, - ; at washington conference, - . siberia, japanese troops in, ; promise of japan to evacuate, . slave trade, provision for suppression of, in webster-ashburton treaty, , ; brussels conference on, . slavery, and isolation, . south america, neglected by united states as field for commercial development, ; open door in, . spanish colonies, revolt of, . spanish revolution of , . spanish war, turning point in relations of united states and england, . submarines, question of, discussed at washington conference, , ; use of, limited by treaty, , . sumner, charles, . taft, william h., proposes to bring nicaragua and honduras under financial supervision of united states, , ; tries to reëstablish friendly relations with colombia, ; suggests changes in covenant of league, . tardieu, andré, report of algeciras conference, ; quoted on armistice negotiations, , . temperley, h. w. v., "history of the peace conference of paris," . "ten points," . texas, annexation of, opposed by great britain, , . thayer, william r., gives version of roosevelt-holleben interview, . tocqueville, alexis de, "democracy in america," . treaty of london, . treaty of peace with austria, . treaty of peace with germany, . treaty of versailles, signed, ; laid before senate, ; debate on, - ; votes on, - . twenty-one demands, . vera cruz, american occupation of, ; evacuation of, . verona, congress of, , , secret treaty of, - . vienna, congress of, . villa, francisco, , . war aims, of allies, ; british, . war of , . washington, george, requests opinions of cabinet on french treaty, ; issues proclamation of neutrality, ; farewell address, - . washington conference, - . washington, treaty of, , . webster, daniel, secretary of state, , . webster-ashburton treaty, , , . wellington, duke of, at congress of verona, ; protest and withdrawal, . west indies, american supremacy in, . white, henry, delegate to algeciras conference, ; to peace conference, . william ii, german kaiser, telegram to president kruger, ; forced to withdraw from venezuela, ; visits morocco, ; demands retirement of delcassé, ; insists on general conference on morocco, ; thwarted in efforts to humiliate france, ; abdicates and flees to holland, . williams, talcott, on mckinley's reasons for retaining philippines, . wilson, henry lane, . wilson, woodrow, secures modification of panama tolls act, ; extends financial supervision over nicaragua and haiti, , ; warns latin-american states against granting concessions to european syndicates, , ; attitude of, on questions of international law and diplomacy, , ; general latin-american policy, , ; new pan-americanism, ; mexican policy, - ; asks for declaration of war on germany, ; views on extension of monroe doctrine, ; political philosophy of, ; refusal to recognize huerta, ; reasons for neutrality, ; calls on all belligerents to state war aims, ; first discussion of war aims, ; war address, ; draws distinction between german people and german government, - ; reply to pope, ; announces fourteen points, - ; decides to go to paris, ; suffers political defeat, , ; greeted with enthusiasm in europe, ; proposes league of nations, ; returns temporarily to the united states, ; makes concessions to french and british, ; returns to the united states and lays treaty before senate, ; tours the country on behalf of league of nations, ; illness of, ; letter read at jackson day dinner proposing referendum on treaty of versailles, , ; awarded nobel peace prize, ; withdraws from participation in european affairs, . wood, general leonard, . yap, island of, - . contributions to international law and diplomacy edited by l. oppenheim, m.a., ll.d. membre de l'institut de droit international, whewell professor of international law in the university of cambridge, honorary member of the royal academy of jurisprudence at madrid, corresponding member of the american institute of international law. the league of nations and its problems contributions to international law and diplomacy. edited by l. oppenheim, m.a., ll.d., whewell professor of international law in the university of cambridge. a guide to diplomatic practice. by the right hon. sir ernest satow, g.c.m.g., ll.d., d.c.l., formerly envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. volumes. vo. _s._ net. international conventions and third states. a monograph. by ronald f. roxburgh, of the middle temple, barrister-at-law; formerly whewell international law scholar in the university of cambridge; formerly scholar of trinity college, cambridge. vo. _s._ _d._ net. longmans, green and co., london, new york, bombay, calcutta, and madras. the league of nations and its problems three lectures by l. oppenheim, m.a., ll.d. whewell professor of international law in the university of cambridge membre de l'institut de droit international. honorary member of the royal academy of jurisprudence at madrid, corresponding member of the american institute of international law _festina lente_ longmans, green and co. paternoster row, london fourth avenue & th street, new york, bombay, calcutta, and madras. preface the three lectures collected in this volume were prepared without any intention of publication. they were delivered for the purpose of drawing attention to the links which connect the proposal for a league of nations with the past, to the difficulties which stand in the way of the realisation of the proposal, and to some schemes by which these difficulties might be overcome. when it was suggested that the lectures should be brought before the public at large by being issued in book form i hesitated, because i was doubtful whether the academic method natural to a university lecture would be suitable to a wider public. after consideration, however, i came to the conclusion that their publication might be useful, because the lectures attempt to show how the development initiated by the two hague peace conferences could be continued by turning the movement for a league of nations into the road of progress that these conferences opened. professional international lawyers do not share the belief that the outbreak of the world war and its, in many ways, lawless and atrocious conduct have proved the futility of the work of the hague conferences. throughout these anxious years we have upheld the opinion that the progress initiated at the hague has by no means been swept away by the attitude of lawlessness deliberately--'because necessity knows no law'--taken up by germany, provided only that she should be utterly defeated, and should be compelled to atone and make ample reparation for the many cruel wrongs which cry to heaven. while i am writing these lines, there is happily no longer any doubt that this condition will be fulfilled. we therefore believe that, after the map of europe has been redrawn by the coming peace congress, the third conference ought to assemble at the hague for the purpose of establishing the demanded league of nations and supplying it with the rudiments of an organisation. how this could be accomplished in a very simple way the following three lectures attempt to show. they likewise offer some very slight outlines of a scheme for setting up international councils of conciliation as well as an international court of justice comprising a number of benches. i would ask the reader kindly to take these very lightly outlined schemes for what they are worth. whatever may be their defects they indicate a way out of some of the great difficulties which beset the realisation of the universal demand for international councils of conciliation and an international court of justice. it is well known that several of the allied governments have appointed committees to study the problem of a league of nations and to prepare a scheme which could be put before the coming peace congress. but unless all, or at any rate all the more important, neutral states are represented, it will be impossible for an all-embracing league of nations to be created by that congress; although a scheme could well be adopted which would keep the door open for all civilised states. however, until all these states have actually been received within the charmed circle, the league will not be complete nor its aims fully realised. whatever the coming peace congress may be able to achieve with regard to a scheme for the establishment of the league of nations, another--the third--hague peace conference will be needed to set it going. l. oppenheim. p.s.--while this preface and volume were going through the press, austria-hungary and germany surrendered, and unprecedented revolutions broke out which swept the hapsburg, the hohenzollern, and all the other german dynasties away. no one can foresee what will be the ultimate fate and condition of those two once mighty empires. it is obvious that, had the first and second lectures been delivered after these stirring events took place, some of the views to be found therein expressed would have been modified or differently expressed. i may ask the reader kindly to keep this in mind while reading the following pages. however, the general bearing of the arguments, and the proposals for the organisation of the league of nations and the establishment of an international court of justice and international councils of conciliation, are in no way influenced by these later events. contents page first lecture: the aims of the league of nations i. the purpose of the three lectures is to draw attention to the links which connect the proposed league of nations with the past, to the difficulties involved in the proposal, and to the way in which they can be overcome ii. the conception of a league of nations is not new, but is as old as international law, because any kind of international law and some kind of a league of nations are interdependent and correlative iii. during antiquity no international law in the modern sense of the term was possible, because the common interests which could force a number of independent states into a community of states were lacking iv. but during the second part of the middle ages matters began to change. during the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries an international law, and with it a kind of league of nations, became a necessity and therefore grew by custom. at the same time arose the first schemes for a league of nations guaranteeing permanent peace, namely those of pierre dubois ( ), antoine marini ( ), sully ( ), and emeric crucée ( ). hugo grotius' immortal work on 'the law of war and peace' ( ) v. the league of nations thus evolved by custom could not undertake to prevent war; the conditions prevailing up to the outbreak of the french revolution made it impossible; it was only during the nineteenth century that the principle of nationality made growth vi. the outbreak of the present world war is epoch-making because it is at bottom a fight between the principle of democratic and constitutional government and the principle of militarism and autocratic government. the three new points in the present demand for a league of nations vii. how and why the peremptory demand for a new league of nations arose, and its connection with so-called internationalism viii. the league of nations now aimed at is not really a league of nations but of states. the ideal of the national state ix. the two reasons why the establishment of a new league of nations is conditioned by the utter defeat of the central powers x. why--in a sense--the new league of nations may be said to have already started its career xi. the impossibility of the demand that the new league of nations should create a federal world state xii. the demand for an international army and navy xiii. the new league of nations cannot give itself a constitution of a state-like character, but only one _sui generis_ on very simple lines xiv. the three aims of the new league of nations, and the four problems to be faced and solved in order to make possible the realisation of these aims second lecture: organisation and legislation of the league of nations i. the community of civilised states, the at present existing league of nations, is a community without any organisation, although there are plenty of legal rules for the intercourse of the several states one with another ii. the position of the great powers within the community of states is a mere political fact not based on law iii. the pacifistic demand or a federal world state in order to make the abolition of war a possibility iv. every attempt at organising the desired new league of nations must start from, and keep intact, the independence and equality of the several states, with the consequence that the establishment of a central political authority above the sovereign states is an impossibility v. the development of an organisation of the community of states began before the outbreak of the world war and is to be found in the establishment of the permanent court of arbitration at the hague by the first hague peace conference of . but more steps will be necessary to turn the hitherto unorganised community of states into an organised league of nations vi. the organisation of the desired new league of nations should start from the beginning made by the hague peace conferences, and the league should therefore include all the independent civilised states vii. the objection to the reception of the central powers, and of germany especially, into the league viii. the objection to the reception of the minor transoceanic states into the league ix. the seven principles which ought to be accepted with regard to the organisation of the new league of nations x. the organisation of the league of nations is not an end in itself but only a means of attaining three objects, the first of which is international legislation. the meaning of the term 'international legislation' in contradistinction to municipal legislation. international legislation in the past and in the future xi. the difficulty in the way of international legislation on account of the language question xii. the difficulty created by the conflicting national interests of the several states xiii. the difficulty caused by the fact that international statutes cannot be created by a majority vote of the states. the difference between universal and general international law offers a way out xiv. the difficulty created by the fact that there are as yet no universally recognised rules concerning interpretation and construction of international statutes and ordinary conventions. the notorious article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare _appendix_: correspondence with the foreign office respecting the interpretation of article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare third lecture: administration of justice and mediation within the league of nations i. administration of justice within the league is a question of international courts, but it is incorrect to assert that international legislation necessitates the existence of international courts ii. the permanent court of arbitration created by the first hague peace conference iii. the difficulties connected with international administration of justice by international courts iv. the necessity for a court of appeal above the international court of first instance v. the difficulties connected with the setting up and manning of international courts of justice vi. details of a scheme which recommends itself because it distinguishes between the court as a whole and the several benches which would be called upon to decide the cases vii. the advantages of the recommended scheme viii. a necessary provision for so-called complex cases of dispute ix. a necessary provision with regard to the notorious clause _rebus sic stantibus_ x. the two starting points for a satisfactory proposal concerning international mediation by international councils of conciliation. article of the hague convention concerning pacific settlement of international disputes. the permanent international commissions of the bryan peace treaties xi. details of a scheme which recommends itself for the establishment of international councils of conciliation xii. the question of disarmament xiii. the assertion that states renounce their sovereignty by entering into the league xiv. conclusion: can it be expected that, in case of a great conflict of interests, all the members of the league will faithfully carry out their engagements? alphabetical index first lecture the aims of the league of nations synopsis i. the purpose of the three lectures is to draw attention to the links which connect the proposed league of nations with the past, to the difficulties involved in the proposal, and to the way in which they can be overcome. ii. the conception of a league of nations is not new, but is as old as international law, because any kind of international law and some kind of a league of nations are interdependent and correlative. iii. during antiquity no international law in the modern sense of the term was possible, because the common interests which could force a number of independent states into a community of states were lacking. iv. but during the second part of the middle ages matters began to change. during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries an international law, and with it a kind of league of nations, became a necessity and therefore grew by custom. at the same time arose the first schemes for a league of nations guaranteeing permanent peace, namely those of pierre dubois ( ), antoine marini ( ), sully ( ), and emeric crucée ( ). hugo grotius' immortal work on 'the law of war and peace' ( ). v. the league of nations thus evolved by custom could not undertake to prevent wars; the conditions prevailing up to the outbreak of the french revolution made it impossible; it was only during the nineteenth century that the principle of nationality made growth. vi. the outbreak of the present world war is epoch-making because it is at bottom a fight between the principle of democratic and constitutional government and the principle of militarism and autocratic government. the three new points in the present demand for a league of nations. vii. how and why the peremptory demand for a new league of nations arose, and its connection with so-called internationalism. viii. the league of nations now aimed at is not really a league of nations but of states. the ideal of the national state. ix. the two reasons why the establishment of a new league of nations is conditioned by the utter defeat of the central powers. x. why--in a sense--the new league of nations may be said to have already started its career. xi. the impossibility of the demand that the new league of nations should create a federal world state. xii. the demand for an international army and navy. xiii. the new league of nations cannot give itself a constitution of a state-like character, but only one _sui generis_ on very simple lines. xiv. the three aims of the new league of nations, and the four problems to be faced and solved in order to make possible the realisation of these aims. the lecture i. dr. whewell, the founder of the chair of international law which i have the honour to occupy in this university, laid the injunction upon every holder of the chair that he should 'make it his aim,' in all parts of his treatment of the subject, 'to lay down such rules and suggest such measures as may tend to diminish the evils of war and finally to extinguish war between nations.' it is to comply with the spirit, if not with the letter, of this injunction that i have announced the series of three lectures on a league of nations. the present is the first, and in it i propose to treat of the aims of the league. but, before i enter into a discussion of these aims, i should like to point out that i have no intention of dealing with the question whether or no a league of nations should be founded at all. to my mind, and probably to the minds of most of you here, this question has been satisfactorily answered by the leading politicians of all parties and all countries since ex-president taft put it soon after the outbreak of the world war; it suffices to mention earl grey in great britain and president wilson in america. in giving these lectures i propose to draw your attention, on the one hand, to the links which connect the proposal for a league of nations with the past, and, on the other hand, to the difficulties with which the realisation of the proposal must necessarily be attended; and also to the ways in which, in my opinion, these difficulties can be overcome. there is an old adage which says _natura non facit saltus_, nature takes no leaps. everything in nature develops gradually, step by step, and organically. it is, at any rate as a rule, the same with history. history in most cases takes no leaps, but if exceptionally history does take a leap, there is great danger of a bad slip backwards following. we must be on our guard lest the proposed league of nations should take a leap in the dark, and the realisation of proposals be attempted which are so daring and so entirely out of keeping with the historical development of international law and the growth of the society of nations, that there would be great danger of the whole scheme collapsing and the whole movement coming to naught. the movement for a league of nations is sound, for its purpose is to secure a more lasting peace amongst the nations of the world than has hitherto prevailed. but a number of schemes to realise this purpose have been published which in my opinion go much too far because they comprise proposals which are not realisable in our days. you know that not only an international court of justice and an international council of conciliation have been proposed, but also some kind of international government, some kind of international parliament, an international executive, and even an international army and navy--a so-called international police--by the help of which the international government could guarantee the condition of permanent peace in the world. ii. you believe no doubt, because nearly everyone believes it, that the conception of a league of nations is something quite new. yet this is not the case, although there is something new in the present conception, something which did not exist previously. the conception of a league of nations is very old, is indeed as old as modern international law, namely about four hundred years. international law could not have come into existence without at the same time calling into existence a league of nations. _any kind of an international law and some kind or other of a league of nations are interdependent and correlative._ this assertion possibly surprises you, and i must therefore say a few words concerning the origin of modern international law in order to make matters clear. iii. in ancient times no international law in the modern sense of the term existed. it is true there existed rules of religion and of law concerning international relations, and ambassadors and heralds were everywhere considered sacrosanct. but these rules were not rules of an _international_ law, they were either religious rules or rules which were part of the municipal law of the several states. for instance: the romans had very detailed rules concerning their relations with other states in time of peace and war; but these were rules of roman law, not rules of the law of other countries, and certainly not _international_ rules. now what was the reason that antiquity did not know of any international law? the reason was that between the several independent states of antiquity no such intimate intercourse arose and no such common views existed as to necessitate a law between them. only between the several city states of ancient greece arose some kind of what we should now call 'international law,' because these city states formed a community fostered by the same language, the same civilisation, the same religion, the same general ideas, and by constant commercial and other intercourse. on the other hand, the roman empire was a world empire, it gradually absorbed all the independent nations in the west. and when the roman empire fell to pieces in consequence of the migration of the peoples, the old civilisation came to an end, international commerce and intercourse ceased almost entirely, and it was not till towards the end of the middle ages that matters began to change. iv. during the second part of the middle ages more and more independent states arose on the european continent, and during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the necessity for a law of nations made itself felt. a multitude of sovereign states had now established themselves which, although they were absolutely independent of one another, were knitted together by constant commercial and other intercourse, by a common religion, and by the same moral principles. gradually and almost unconsciously the conviction had grown upon these independent states that, in spite of everything which separated them, they formed a community the intercourse of which was ruled by certain legal principles. international law grew out of custom because it was a necessity according to the well-known rule _ubi societas ibi jus_, where there is a community of interests there must be law. the several independent states had thus gradually and unconsciously formed themselves into a society, the afterwards so-called family of nations, or, in other words, a league of nations. and no sooner had this league of nations come into existence--and even some time before that date--than a number of schemes for the establishment of eternal peace made their appearance. the first of these schemes was that of the french lawyer _pierre dubois_, who, as early as , in his work 'de recuperatione terre sancte,' proposed an alliance between all christian powers for the purpose of the maintenance of peace and the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration for the settlement of differences between members of the alliance. another was that of _antoine marini_, the chancellor of podiebrad, king of bohemia, who adopted the scheme in . this scheme proposed the foundation of a federal state to comprise all the existing christian states and the establishment of a permanent congress to be seated at basle in switzerland, this congress to be the highest organ of the federation. a third scheme was that of _sully_, adopted by henri iv of france, which, in , proposed the division of europe into fifteen states and the linking together of these into a federation with a general council as its highest organ. and a fourth scheme was that of _emeric crucée_, who, in , proposed the establishment of a union consisting not only of the christian states but of all states of the world, with a general council seated at venice. and since that time many other schemes of similar kind have made their appearance, the enumeration and discussion of which is outside our present purpose. so much is certain that all these schemes were utopian. nevertheless, a league of nations having once come into existence, international law grew more and more, and when in hugo grotius published his immortal work on 'the law of war and peace,' the system of international law offered in his work conquered the world and became the basis of all following development. v. however, although a league of nations must be said to have been in existence for about years, because no international law would have been possible without it, this league of nations could not, and was not intended to, prevent war between its members. i say: it could not prevent war. why not? it could not prevent war on account of the conditions which prevailed within the international society from the middle ages till, say, the outbreak of the present war. these conditions are intimately connected with the growth of the several states of europe. whereas the family, the tribe, and the race are natural products, the nation as well as the state are products of historical development. all nations are blends of more or less different races, and all states were originally founded on force: strong rulers subjected neighbouring tribes and peoples to their sway and thus formed coherent nations. most of the states in europe are the product of the activity of strong dynasties which through war and conquest, and through marriage and purchase, united under one sovereign the lands which form the states and the peoples which form the nations. up to the time of the french revolution, throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, all wars were either wars of religion, or dynastic wars fought for the increase of the territory under the sway of the dynasties concerned, or so-called colonial wars fought for the acquisition of transoceanic colonies. it was not till the nineteenth century that wars for the purpose of national unity broke out, and dynastic wars began gradually to disappear. during the nineteenth century the nations, so to say, found themselves; some kind of constitutional government was everywhere introduced; and democracy became the ideal, although it was by no means everywhere realised. vi. it is for this reason that the outbreak of the present war is epoch-making, because it has become apparent that, whatever may be the war aims of the belligerents, at bottom this world war is a fight between the ideal of democracy and constitutional government on the one hand, and autocratic government and militarism on the other. everywhere the conviction has become prevalent that things cannot remain as they were before the outbreak of the present war, and therefore the demand for a league of nations, or--i had better say--for a new league of nations to take the place of that which has been in existence for about years, has arisen. now what is new in the desired new league of nations? firstly, this new league would be founded upon a solemn treaty, whereas the league of nations hitherto was only based upon custom. secondly, for the purpose of making war rarer or of abolishing it altogether, this new league of nations would enact the rule that no state is allowed to resort to arms without previously having submitted the dispute to an international court or a council of conciliation. thirdly, this new league of nations would be compelled to create some kind of organisation for itself, because otherwise it could not realise its purpose to make war rarer or abolish it altogether. vii. the demand for a new league of nations is universal, for it is made, not only everywhere in the allied countries, but in the countries of the central powers, and it will surely be realised when the war is over, at any rate to a certain extent. it is for this reason that the present world war has not only not destroyed so-called internationalism, but has done more for it than many years of peace could have done. what is internationalism? internationalism is the conviction that all the civilised states form one community throughout the world in spite of the various factors which separate the nations from one another; the conviction that the interests of all the nations and states are indissolubly interknitted, and that, therefore, the family of nations must establish international institutions for the purpose of guaranteeing a more general and a more lasting peace than existed in former times. internationalism had made great strides during the second part of the nineteenth century on account of the enormous development of international commerce and international communication favoured by railways, the steamship, the telegraph, and a great many scientific discoveries and technical inventions. but what a disturbing and destroying factor war really is, had not become fully apparent till the present war, because this is a _world_ war which interferes almost as much with the welfare of neutrals as with the welfare of belligerents. it has become apparent during the present war that the discoveries and developments of science and technology, which had done so much during the second half of the nineteenth century for the material welfare of the human race during peace, were likewise at the disposal of belligerents for an enormous, and hitherto unthought-of, destruction of life and wealth. it is for this reason that in the camp of friend and foe, among neutrals as well as among belligerents, the conviction has become universal that the conditions of international life prevailing before the outbreak of the world war must be altered; that international institutions must be established which will make the outbreak of war, if not impossible, at any rate only an exceptional possibility. the demand for a new league of nations has thus arisen and peremptorily requires fulfilment. viii. however, in considering the demand for a new league of nations, it is necessary to avoid confusing nations with states. it should always be remembered that, when we speak of a league of nations, we do not really mean a league of nations but a league of states. it is true that there are many states in existence which in the main are made up of one nation, although fractions of other nations may be comprised in them. but it is equally true that there are some states in existence which include members of several nations. take as an example switzerland which, although only a very small state, nevertheless comprises three national elements, namely german, french, and italian. another example is the british empire, which is a world empire and comprises a number of different nations. that leads me to the question: what is a nation? a nation must not be confounded with a race. a nation is a product of historical development, whereas a race is a product of natural growth. one speaks of a nation when a complex body of human beings is united by living in the same land, by the same language, the same literature, the same historical traditions, and the same general views of life. all nations are a mixture of several diverse racial elements which in the course of historical development have to a certain extent been united by force of circumstances. the swiss as a people are politically a nation, although the component parts of the population of switzerland are of different national characters and even speak different languages. historical development in general, and in many cases force in particular, have played a great part in the blending of diverse racial elements into nations; just as they have played a great part in the building up of states. the demand that every nation should have a separate state of its own--the ideal of the so-called national state--appears very late in history; it is a product of the last two centuries, and it was not till the second half of the nineteenth century that the so-called principle of nationality made its appearance and gained great influence. it may well be doubted whether each nation, be it ever so small, will succeed in establishing a separate state of its own, although where national consciousness becomes overwhelmingly strong, it will probably in every case succeed in time either in establishing a state of its own, or at any rate in gaining autonomy. be that as it may, it is a question for the future; so much is certain, what is intended now to be realised, is not a league of nations, but a league of states, although it is called a league of nations. ix. however, no league of nations is possible unless the central powers, and germany in especial, are utterly defeated during the world war, and that for two reasons. one reason is that a great alteration of the map of europe is an absolutely necessary condition for the satisfactory working of a league of nations. unless an independent poland be established; unless the problem of alsace-lorraine be solved; unless the trentino be handed over to italy; unless the yugo-slavs be united with servia; unless the czecho-slovaks be freed from the austrian yoke; and unless the problem of turkey and the turkish straits be solved, no lasting peace can be expected in europe, even if a league of nations be established. the other reason is that, unless germany be utterly defeated, the spirit of militarism, which is not compatible with a league of nations, will remain a menace to the world. what is militarism? it is that conception of the state which bases the power of the state, its influence, its progress, and its development exclusively on military force. the consequence is that war becomes part of the settled policy of a militarist state; the acquisition of further territory and population by conquest is continually before the eyes of such a government; and the condition of peace is only a shorter or longer interval between periods of war. a military state submits to international law only so long as it serves its interests, but violates international law, and particularly international law concerning war, wherever and whenever this law stands in the way of its military aims. the whole history of prussia exemplifies this. now in a league of nations peace must be the normal condition. if war occurs at all within such a league, it can only be an exceptional phase and must be only for the purpose of re-establishing peace. it is true a league of nations will not be able entirely to dispense with military force, yet such force appears only in the background as an _ultima ratio_ to be applied against such power as refuses to submit its disagreements with other members of the league either to an international court of justice or an international council of conciliation. x. be that as it may, in a sense the league of nations has already started its career, because twenty-five states are united on the one side and are fighting this war in vindication of international law. these states are--i enumerate them chronologically as they entered into the war:--russia (the bolsheviks have made peace, but in fact one may still enumerate russia as a belligerent), france, belgium, great britain, servia, montenegro, japan, san marino, portugal, italy, roumania, the united states, cuba, panama, greece, siam, liberia, china, brazil, ecuador, guatemala, nicaragua, costa rica, haiti, honduras. besides these twenty-five states which are at war with the central powers, the following four states, without having declared war, have broken off diplomatic relations with germany, namely: bolivia, san domingo, peru, uruguay. now there may be said to be about fifty civilised states in existence. of these, as i have just pointed out, twenty-five are fighting against the central powers, four have broken off relations with germany, the central powers themselves are four in number, with the consequence that thirty-three of the fifty states are implicated in the war. only the seventeen remaining states are neutral, namely: sweden, norway, denmark, holland, luxemburg, switzerland, spain, lichtenstein, and monaco in europe; mexico, salvador, colombia, venezuela, chile, argentina, and paraguay in america; and persia in asia. it may be taken for granted that all the neutral states, and all the states fighting on the side of the allies, and also the four states which, although they are not fighting on the side of the allies, have broken off relations with germany, are prepared to enter into a league of nations. but what about the central powers, and germany in especial? i shall discuss in my next lecture the question whether the central powers are to become members of the league. to-day it must suffice to say that, when once utterly defeated, they will be only too glad to be received as members. on the other hand, if they were excluded, the world would again be divided into two rival camps, just as before the war the triple alliance was faced by the entente. no disarmament would be possible, and with regard to every other matter progress would be equally impossible. therefore the central powers must become members of a league of nations for such a league to be of any great use, which postulates as a _sine qua non_ that germany must be utterly defeated in the present war. if she were victorious, or if peace were concluded with an undefeated germany, the world would not be ripe for a league of nations because militarism would not have been exterminated. xi. i have hitherto discussed the league of nations only in a general way, without mentioning that there is no unanimity concerning its aims or concerning the details of its organisation. many people think that it would be possible to do away with war for ever, and they therefore demand a world state, a federal state comprising all the single states of the world on the pattern of the united states of america. and for this reason the demand is raised not only for an international court and for an international council of conciliation, but also for an international government, an international parliament, and an international army and navy,--a so-called international police. i believe that these demands go much too far and are impossible of realisation. a federal state comprising all the single states of the whole civilised world is a utopia, and an international army and navy would be a danger to the peace of the world. why is a world state not possible, at any rate not in our time? no one has ever thought that a world state in the form of one single state with one single government would be possible. those who plead for a world state plead for it in the form of a federal state comprising all the single states of the world on the pattern of the united states of america. but even this modified ideal is not, in my opinion, realisable at present. why not? to realise this ideal there would be required a federal government, and a federal parliament; and the federal government would have to possess strong powers to enforce its demands. a powerless federal government would be worse than no government at all. but how is it possible to establish at present a powerful federal government over the whole world? how is it possible to establish a federal world parliament? constitutional government within the several states has to grapple with many difficulties, and these difficulties would be more numerous, greater, and much more complicated within a federal world state. we need democracy and constitutional government in every single state, and this can only be realised by party government and elections of parliament at short intervals. the waves of party strife rise high within the several states; no sooner is one party in, than the other party looks out for an opening into which a wedge can be pushed to turn the government out. in normal times this works on the whole quite well within the borders of the several states, because the interests concerned are not so widely opposed to one another that the several parties cannot alternatively govern. but when it comes to applying the same system of government to a federal world state, the interests at stake are too divergent. the east and the west, the south and the north, the interests of maritime states and land-locked states, the ideals and interests of industrial and agricultural states, and many other contrasts, are too great for it to be possible to govern a federal world state by the same institutions as a state of ordinary size and composition. the british world empire may be taken as an example to show that it is impossible for one single central government to govern a number of states with somewhat divergent interests. we all know that the british empire comprising the united kingdom and the so-called independent dominions, namely canada, newfoundland, australia, new zealand, and south africa, is kept together not really by the powers of the british government but by the good will of the component parts. the government of the united kingdom could not keep the empire together by force, could not compel by force one of the independent dominions to submit to a demand, in case it refused to comply. the interests of the several component parts of the british empire are so divergent that no central government could keep them together against their will. now what applies to the british empire, which is to a great extent bound together by the same language, the same literature, and the same law, would apply much more to a federal state comprising the whole of the world: such a federal state, so far as we can see, is impossible. xii. but what about an international army and navy? it is hardly worth while to say much about them. those who propose the establishment of an international army and navy presuppose that the national armies and navies would be abolished so that the world government would have the power, with the help of the international army and navy, at any moment to crush any attempt of a recalcitrant member of the federal world state to avoid its duties. this international army and navy would be the most powerful instrument of force which the world has ever seen, because every attempt to resist it would be futile. and the commander of the international army and the commander of the international navy would be men holding in their hands the greatest power that can be imagined. the old question therefore arises: _quis custodiet ipsos custodes?_ which i should like here to translate freely by: who will keep in order those who are to keep the world in order? a league of nations which can only be kept together by a powerful international army and navy, is a contradiction in itself; for the independence and equality of the member states of the league would soon disappear. it is a fact--i make this statement although i am sure it will be violently contradicted--that, just as hitherto, so within a league of nations some kind of balance of power only can guarantee the independence and equality of the smaller states. for the community of power, on which the league of nations must rest, would at once disappear if one or two members of the league became so powerful that they could disregard the combined power of the other members. every scheme of this movement must therefore see to it that no member of the league is more armed than is necessary considering the extent of its territory and other factors concerned. but be that as it may, an international army and navy is practically impossible, just as a federal world state is impossible. xiii. yet while a federal world state is impossible, a league of nations is not, provided such league gives itself a constitution, not of a state-like character, but one _sui generis_. what can be done is this: the hitherto unorganised family of nations can organise itself on simple lines so as to secure, on the one hand, the absolute independence of every state, and, on the other hand, the peaceful co-existence of all the states. it is possible, in my opinion, to establish an international court of justice before which the several states engage to appear in case a conflict arises between two or more of them which can be judicially settled, that is, can be settled by a rule of law. there is as little reason why two or more states should go to war on account of a conflict which can be settled upon the basis of law, as there is for two private individuals to resort to arms in case of a dispute between them which can be decided by a court of law. again, although there will frequently arise between states conflicts of a political character which cannot be settled on the basis of a rule of law, there is no reason why, when the states in conflict cannot settle them by diplomatic negotiation, they should resort to arms, before bringing the conflict before some council of conciliation and giving the latter an opportunity of investigating the matter and proposing a fair compromise. under modern conditions of civilisation the whole world suffers in case war breaks out between even only two states, and for this reason it is advisable that the rest of the world should unite and oppose such state as would resort to arms without having submitted its case to an international court of justice or an international council of conciliation. xiv. in my opinion the aims of a league of nations should therefore be three: the first aim should be to prevent the outbreak of war altogether on account of so-called judicial disputes, that is disputes which can be settled on the basis of a rule of law. for this reason the league should stipulate that every state must submit all judicial disputes without exception to an international court of justice and must abide by the judgment of such court. the second aim should be to prevent the sudden outbreak of war on account of a political dispute and to insist on an opportunity for mediation. for this reason the league should stipulate that every state, previous to resorting to arms over a political dispute, must submit it to an international council of conciliation and must at any rate listen to the advice of such council. the third aim should be to provide a sanction for the enforcement of the two rules just mentioned. for this reason the league should stipulate that all the member states of the league must unite their economic, military, and naval forces against such member or members as would resort to arms either on account of a judicial dispute which ought to have been settled by an international court of justice, or on account of a political dispute without previously having submitted it to an international council of conciliation and listened to the latter's advice. these should be, in my opinion, the three aims of a league of nations and the three rules necessary for the realisation of these aims. however, it is not so easy to realise them, and it is therefore necessary to face and solve four problems: there is, firstly, the problem of the organisation of the league; secondly, the problem of legislation within the league; thirdly, the problem of administration of justice within the league; and fourthly, the problem of mediation within the league--four problems which i shall discuss in the two following lectures. i have only named three aims and four problems because i have in my mind those aims which are the nearest and those problems which are the most pressing and the most urgent. the range of vision of the league of nations, when once established, will no doubt gradually become wider and wider; new aims will arise and new problems will demand solution, but all such possible future aims and future problems are outside the scope of these lectures. second lecture organisation and legislation of the league of nations synopsis i. the community of civilised states, the at present existing league of nations, is a community without any organisation, although there are plenty of legal rules for the intercourse of the several states one with another. ii. the position of the great powers within the community of states is a mere political fact not based on law. iii. the pacifistic demand for a federal world state in order to make the abolition of war a possibility. iv. every attempt at organising the desired new league of nations must start from, and keep intact, the independence and equality of the several states, with the consequence that the establishment of a central political authority above the sovereign states is an impossibility. v. the development of an organisation of the community of states began before the outbreak of the world war and is to be found in the establishment of the permanent court of arbitration at the hague by the first hague peace conference of . but more steps will be necessary to turn the hitherto unorganised community of states into an organised league of nations. vi. the organisation of the desired new league of nations should start from the beginning made by the hague peace conferences, and the league should therefore include all the independent civilised states. vii. the objection to the reception of the central powers, and of germany especially, into the league. viii. the objection to the reception of the minor transoceanic states into the league. ix. the seven principles which ought to be accepted with regard to the organisation of the new league of nations. x. the organisation of the league of nations is not an end in itself but only a means of attaining three objects, the first of which is international legislation. the meaning of the term 'international legislation' in contradistinction to municipal legislation. international legislation in the past and in the future. xi. the difficulty in the way of international legislation on account of the language question. xii. the difficulty created by the conflicting national interests of the several states. xiii. the difficulty caused by the fact that international statutes cannot be created by a majority vote of the states. the difference between universal and general international law offers a way out. xiv. the difficulty created by the fact that there are as yet no universally recognised rules concerning interpretation and construction of international statutes and ordinary conventions. the notorious article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare. the lecture i. in my first lecture on the league of nations i recommended the following three rules to be laid down by a league of nations: firstly, every state must submit all judicial disputes to an international court of justice and must abide by the judgment of such court. secondly, every state previous to resorting to arms, must submit every political and non-judicial dispute to an international council of conciliation and must at any rate listen to the advice of such council. thirdly, the member states must unite their forces against such state or states as should resort to arms without previously having submitted the matter in dispute to an international court of justice or to an international council of conciliation. and i added that these three rules cannot create a satisfactory condition of affairs unless four problems are faced and solved, namely: the organisation of the league, legislation by the league, administration of justice and mediation within the league. my lecture to-day will deal with two of these problems, namely the organisation and the legislation of the league. let us first consider the organisation of the league. hitherto the body of civilised states which form the family of nations and which, as i pointed out in my first lecture, is really a league of nations evolved by custom, has been an unorganised community. this means that, although there are plenty of legal rules for the intercourse of the several states one with another, the community of civilised states does not possess any permanently established organs or agents for the conduct of its common affairs. at present these affairs, if they are peaceably settled, are either settled by ordinary diplomatic negotiation or, if the matter is pressing and of the greatest importance, by temporarily convened international conferences or congresses. ii. it is true there are the so-called great powers which are the leaders of the family of nations, and it is therefore asserted by some authorities that the community of states has acquired a certain amount of organisation because the great powers are the legally recognised superiors of the minor states. but is this assertion correct? the great powers, are they really the legally recognised superiors of the minor states? i deny it. a great power is any large-sized state possessing a large population which gains such economic, military, and naval strength that its political influence must be reckoned with by all the other powers. at the time of the outbreak of the world war eight states had to be considered as great powers, namely great britain, austria-hungary, france, germany, italy, russia, the united states of america, and japan. but it is very probable that the end of the world war will see the number of great powers reduced to six. the collapse and break up of russia has surely for the present eliminated her from the number of great powers. and it is quite certain that austria-hungary will not emerge from the struggle as a great power, if she emerges from it as a whole at all. history teaches that the number of the great powers is by no means stable, and changes occasionally take place. look at the condition of affairs during the nineteenth century. whereas at the time of the vienna congress in eight states, namely great britain, austria, france, portugal, prussia, spain, sweden, and russia were still considered great powers, their number soon decreased to five, because portugal, spain, and sweden ceased to be great powers. on the other hand, italy joined the number of the great powers after her unification in ; the united states of america joined the great powers after the american civil war in ; and japan emerged as a great power from her war with china in . be that as it may, so much is certain, a state is a great power not by law but only by its political influence. the great powers are the leaders of the family of nations because their political influence is so great. their political and economic influence is in the long run irresistible; therefore all arrangements made by the great powers naturally in most cases gain, either at once or in time, the consent of the minor states. it may be said that the great powers exercise a kind of political hegemony within the family of nations. yet this hegemony is not based on law, it is simply a political fact, and it is certainly not a consequence of an organisation of the family of nations. iii. the demand for a proper organisation of the community of states had, up to the outbreak of the world war, been raised exclusively on the part of the so-called pacifists in order to make the abolition of war a possibility. it is a common assertion on the part of the pacifists that war cannot die out so long as there is no central political authority in existence above the several states which could compel them to bring their disputes before an international court and also compel them to carry out the judgments of such a court. for this reason many pacifists aim at such an organisation of the community of states as would bring all the civilised states of the world within the bonds of a federation. they demand a world federation of all the civilised states, or at any rate a federation of the states of europe, on the model of the united states of america. if such a federal world state were practically possible, there would be no objection to it, although international law as such would cease to exist and be replaced by the constitutional law of this federal world state. but in my first lecture i pointed out that such a federal world state is practically impossible. and it is not even desirable. the development of mankind would seem in the main to be indissolubly connected with the national development of the peoples. most peoples possessing a strong national consciousness desire an independent state in which they can live according to their own ideals. they want to be their own masters, and not to be part and parcel of a federal world state to which they would have to surrender a great part of their independence. moreover--as i likewise pointed out in my first lecture (pp. - )--it would be impossible to establish a strong government and a strong parliament in a federal world state. however this may be, it is not at all certain that war would altogether disappear in a federal world state. the history of federal states teaches that wars do occasionally break out between their member states. think of the war between the roman catholic and the protestant member states of the swiss confederation in , of the war in between the northern and the southern member states within the federation which is called the united states of america, and of the war between prussia and austria within the german confederation in . iv. but what kind of organisation of the league of nations is possible if we reject the idea of a federal state? neither i, nor anyone else who does not like to build castles in the air, can answer this question directly by making a detailed proposal. it is at present quite impossible to work out a practical scheme according to which a more detailed organisation of the league of nations could be realised. but so much is certain that every attempt at organising this league must start from, and must keep intact, the independence and the equality of all civilised states. it is for this reason that a central political authority above the sovereign states can never be thought of. every attempt to organise a league of nations on the model of a federal state is futile. if a detailed organisation of the league should ever come, it will be one _sui generis_, one absolutely of its own kind; such as has never been seen before. and it is at present quite impossible to map out a detailed plan of such an organisation although, as i shall have to show you later, the first step towards an organisation has already been made, and further steps towards the ideal can be taken. the reason that it is at present impossible is that the growth and the final shape of the organisation of the league of nations will, and must, go hand in hand with the progress of international law. but the progress of international law is conditioned by the growth, the strengthening, and the deepening of international economic and other interests, and of international morality. it is a matter of course that this progress can only be realised very slowly, for there is concerned a process of development through many generations and perhaps through centuries, a development whose end no one can foresee. it is sufficient for us to state that the development had already begun before the world war, and to try to foster it, as far as is in our power, after the conclusion of peace. v. i said that this development has begun. where is this beginning of the development to be found? it is to be found in the establishment of the permanent court of arbitration at the hague and the office therewith connected. the permanent court of arbitration is not an institution of the several states, but an institution of the community of states in contradistinction to its several members. had the international prize court agreed upon by the second hague peace conference of been established, there would have come into existence another institution of the community of states. but the establishment of international courts would not justify the assertion that thereby the community of states has turned from an unorganised community into an organised community. to reach this goal another step is required, namely an agreement amongst the powers, according to which the hague peace conferences would be made a permanent institution which periodically, within fixed intervals, assemble without being convened by one power or another. if this were done, we could say that the hitherto unorganised community of states had turned into an organised league of nations, for by such periodically assembling hague peace conferences there would be established an organ for the conduct of all such international matters as require international legislation or other international action. however that may be, the organisation created by the fact that the hague peace conferences periodically assembled, would only be an immature one; more steps would be necessary in order that the organisation of the community of states might become more perfect and more efficient. yet progress would be slow, for every attempt at a progressive step meets with opposition, and it would be only when the _international_ interests of the civilised states become victorious over their particular _national_ interests that the community of states would gradually receive a more perfect organisation. vi. there is no doubt that the experiences of mankind during the world war have been quickening development more than could have been expected in normal times. the universal demand for a new league of nations accepting the principles that every judicial dispute amongst nations must be settled by international courts and that every political dispute must, before the parties resort to arms, be brought before a council of conciliation, demonstrates clearly that the community of states must now deliberately give itself some kind of organisation, because without it the principles just mentioned cannot be realised. now a number of schemes for the organisation of a new league of nations have been made public. they all agree upon the three aims of the league and the three rules for the realisation of these aims which i mentioned in my first lecture, namely compulsory settlement of all judicial disputes by international courts of justice, compulsory mediation in cases of political disputes by an international council of conciliation, and the duty of the members of the league to turn against any one member which should resort to arms in violation of the principles laid down by the league. however, these schemes differ very much with regard to the _organisation_ of the league. i cannot now discuss the various schemes in detail. it must suffice to say that some of them embody proposals for a more or less state-like organisation and are therefore not acceptable to those who share my opinion that any state-like organisation of the league is practically impossible. but though some of the schemes, as for instance that of lord bryce and that of sir willoughby dickinson, avoid this mistake, none of them take as their starting point that which i consider to be the right one, namely the beginning made at the two hague peace conferences. _in my opinion the organisation of a new league of nations should start from the beginning made by the two hague peace conferences._ vii. however, there is much objection to this, because it would necessitate the admission into the new league of all those states which took part in the second hague peace conference, including, of course, the central powers. the objections to such a wide range of the league are two-fold. in the first instance, the admission of the central powers, and especially of germany, into the league is deprecated. by her attack on belgium at the outbreak of the war, and by her general conduct of the war, germany has deliberately taken up an attitude which proves that, when her military interests are concerned, she does not consider herself bound by any treaty, by any rule of law, or by any principle of humanity. how can we expect that she will carry out the engagements into which she might enter by becoming a member of the league of nations? my answer is that, provided she be utterly defeated and no peace of compromise be made with her, militarism in germany will be doomed, the reparation to be exacted from her for the many cruel wrongs must lead to a change of constitution and government, and this change of constitution and government will make germany a more acceptable member of a new league of nations. the utter defeat of germany is a necessary preliminary condition to the possibility of her entrance into a league of nations. those who speak of the foundation of a league of nations as a means of ending the world war by a peace of compromise with germany are mistaken. the necessary presuppositions of such a league are entirely incompatible with an unbroken prussian militarism. but while her utter defeat is the necessary preliminary condition to her entrance into a league of nations, the inclusion of germany in the league, after her utter defeat, is likewise a necessity. the reason is that, as i pointed out in my first lecture (p. ), in case the central powers were excluded from the league, they would enter into a league of their own, and the world would then be divided into two rival camps, in the same way as before the war the triple alliance was faced by the entente. _the world would be proved not ripe for a new league of nations if peace were concluded with an undefeated germany; and the league would miss its purpose if to a defeated and repenting germany entrance into it were refused._ viii. in the second instance, the entrance of the great number of minor transoceanic states into the league is deprecated because these states would claim an equal vote with the european powers and thereby obstruct progress within the league. it is asserted that some of the minor transatlantic states made the discussions at the hague conferences futile by their claim to an equal vote. now it is true that some of these states have to a certain extent impeded the work of the hague conferences, but some of the minor states of europe, and even some of the great powers, have done likewise. the community of states consisting of sovereign states does not possess any means of compelling a minority of states to fall in with the views of the majority, but i shall show you very soon, when i approach the problem of international legislation, that international legislation of a kind is possible in spite of this fact. and so much is certain that the minimum of organisation of the new league which is now necessary, cannot be considered to be endangered by the admittance of the minor transoceanic states into the league. progress will in any case be slow, and perfect unanimity among the powers will in any and every case only be possible where the _international_ interests of all the powers compel them to put aside their real or imaginary particular _national_ interests. ix. for these reasons i take it for granted that the organisation of a new league of nations should start from the beginning made by the hague peace conferences. therefore the following seven principles ought to be accepted: first principle: the league of nations is composed of all civilised states which recognise one another's external and internal independence and absolute equality before international law. second principle: the chief organ of the league is the peace conference at the hague. the peace conferences meet periodically--say every two or three years--without being convened by any special power. their task is the gradual codification of international law and the agreement upon such international conventions as are from time to time necessitated by new circumstances and conditions. third principle: a permanent council of the conference is to be created, the members of which are to be resident at the hague and are to conduct all the current business of the league of nations. this current business comprises: the preparation of the meetings of the peace conference; the conduct of communications with the several members of the league with regard to the preparation of the work of the peace conferences; and all other matters of international interest which the conference from time to time hands over to the council. fourth principle: every recognised sovereign state has a right to take part in the peace conferences. fifth principle: resolutions of the conference can come into force only in so far as they become ratified by the several states concerned. on the other hand, every state agrees once for all faithfully to carry out those resolutions which have been ratified by it. sixth principle: every state that takes part in the peace conferences is bound only by such resolutions of the conferences as it expressly agrees to and ratifies. resolutions of a majority only bind the majority. on the other hand, no state has a right to demand that only such resolutions as it agrees to shall be adopted. seventh principle: all members of the league of nations agree once for all to submit all judicial disputes to international courts which are to be set up, and to abide by their judgments. they likewise agree to submit, previous to resorting to arms, all non-judicial disputes to international councils of conciliation which are to be set up. and they all agree to unite their economic, military, and naval forces against any one or more states which resort to arms without submitting their disputes to international courts of justice or international councils of conciliation. you will have noticed that my proposals do not comprise the creation of an international government, an international executive, an international parliament, and an international army and navy which would serve as an international police force. no one can look into the future and say what it will bring, but it is certain that for the present, and for some generations to come, all attempts at creating an international government are not only futile but dangerous; because it is almost certain that a league of nations comprising an international executive, an international parliament, and an international army and navy would soon collapse. x. however this may be, and whatever may be the details of the organisation of the league, such necessary organisation is not an end in itself but a means of attaining three objects, namely: international legislation, international administration of justice, and international mediation. i shall discuss international administration of justice and international mediation in my next lecture, to-day i will only draw your attention to international legislation. in using the term 'international legislation,' it must be understood that 'legislation' is here to be understood in a figurative sense only. when we speak of legislation in everyday language, we mean that process of parliamentary activity by which municipal statutes are called into existence. municipal legislation presupposes a sovereign power, which prescribes rules of conduct to its subjects. it is obvious that within the community of states no such kind of legislation can take place. rules of conduct for the members of the league of nations can only be created by an agreement amongst those members. whereas municipal statutes contain the rules of conduct set by an authority sovereign over its subjects, international statutes--if i may be allowed to use that term--contain rules of conduct which the members of the community of states have agreed to set for themselves. international statutes are created by the so-called law-making treaties of the powers. but in one point municipal legislation and the law-making treaties of the powers resemble one another very closely:--both intend to create law, and for this reason it is permissible to use the term 'international legislation' figuratively for the conclusion of such international treaties as contain rules of international law. now it would be very misleading to believe that no international legislation has taken place in the past. the fact is that, from the vienna congress of onwards, agreements have been arrived at upon a number of rules of international law. however, such agreements have only occurred occasionally, because the community of civilised states has not hitherto possessed a permanently established organ for legislating. much of the legislation which has taken place in the past was only a by-product of congresses or conferences which had assembled for other purposes. on the other hand, when legislation on a certain subject was considered pressing, a congress or conference was convened for that very purpose. it will be only when the hague peace conferences have become permanently established that an organ of the league of nations for legislating internationally will be at hand. and a wide field is open for such legislation. the bulk of international law in its present state is--if i may say so--a book law, it is customary law which is only to be found in text-books of international law; it is, as regards many points, controversial; it has many gaps; and it is in many ways uncertain. international legislation will be able gradually to create international statutes which will turn this book law into firm, clear, and authoritative statutory law. xi. but you must not imagine that international legislation is an easy matter. it is in fact full of difficulties of all kinds. i will only mention four: there is, firstly, the language question. since it is impossible to draft international statutes in all languages, it is absolutely necessary to agree upon one language, and this language at present is, as you all know, french. yet, difficult as the language question is, it is not insurmountable. it is hardly greater than the difficulty which arises when two states, which speak different languages, have to agree upon an ordinary convention. one point, however, must be specially observed, and that is: when any question of the interpretation of an international statute occurs, it is the french text of the statute which is authoritative, and not the text of the translation into other languages. xii. another difficulty with regard to international legislation is the conflicting _national_ interests of the different states. as international statutes are only possible when the several states come to an agreement, it will often not be possible to legislate internationally on a given matter, because the interests of the different states will be so conflicting that an agreement cannot be arrived at. on the other hand, as time goes on the international interests of the several states frequently become so powerful that these governments are quite ready to brush aside their particular interests, and to agree upon a compromise which makes international legislation concerning the matter in question possible. xiii. a third difficulty with regard to international legislation is of quite a particular kind. it arises from the fact that international statutes cannot be created by a vote of the majority of states, but only by a unanimous vote of all the members of the community of civilised states. this difficulty, however, can be overcome by dropping the contention that no legislation of any kind can be proceeded with unless every member of the league of nations agrees to it. it is a well-known fact that a distinction has to be made between _universal_ international law, that is, rules to which every civilised state agrees, and _general_ international law, that is, rules to which only the greater number of states agree. now it is quite certain that no universal international law can be created by legislation to which not every member of the league of nations has agreed. nothing, however, ought to prevent those states which are ready to agree to certain new rules of international law, from legislating _for their own number_ on a certain matter. if such legislation is really of value, the time will come when the dissenting states will gradually accede. the second hague peace conference acted on this principle, for a good many of its conventions were only agreed upon by the greater number, and not by all, of the participating states. xiv. a fourth difficulty with regard to international legislation is the difficulty of the interpretation of, and the construction to be put upon, international statutes as well as ordinary international conventions. we do not as yet possess universally recognised rules of international law concerning such interpretation and construction. each nation applies to international statutes those rules of interpretation and construction which are valid for the interpretation and construction of their municipal statutes. many international disputes have been due in the past to this difficulty of interpretation and construction. a notorious example is that of the interpretation of article (h) of the hague regulations of concerning land warfare, which lays down the rule that it is forbidden 'to declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party.' germany and other continental states interpret this article to mean that the municipal law of a state is not allowed to declare that the outbreak of war suspends or avoids contracts with alien enemies, or that war prevents alien enemies from bringing an action in the courts. on the other hand, england and the united states of america interpret this article to mean merely that the _occupant of enemy territory_ is prohibited from declaring abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party. what is the cause of this divergent interpretation of an article, the literal meaning of which seems to be quite clear? the divergence is due to the different mode of interpretation of statutes resorted to by continental courts, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by british and american courts. continental courts take into consideration not only the literal meaning of a clause of a statute, but also the intention of the legislator as evidenced by--what i should like to call--the history of the clause. they look for the intention of the draftsman, they search the parliamentary proceedings concerning the clause, and they interpret and construe the clause with regard to the intention of the draftsman as well as to the proceedings in parliament. now article (h) of the hague regulations was inserted on the motion of the german delegates to the second hague peace conference, and there is no doubt that the german delegates intended by its insertion to prevent the municipal law of belligerents from possessing a rule according to which the outbreak of war suspends or avoids contracts with alien enemies, and prohibits alien enemies from bringing an action in the courts. it is for this reason that germany and other continental states interpret article (h) according to the intention of the german delegates. on the other hand, in interpreting and construing a clause of a statute, british and american courts refuse to take into consideration the intention of the draftsman, parliamentary discussions concerning the clause, and the like. they only take into consideration the literal meaning of the clause as it stands in the statute of which it is a part. now article (h) is a clause in the convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land. it is one of several paragraphs of article which comprises the prohibition of a number of acts by the armed forces of belligerents in warfare on land, such as the employment of poison or poisoned arms, and the like. the british and american delegates, believing that it only concerned an act on the part of belligerent forces occupying enemy territory, therefore consented to the insertion of article (h), and our court of appeal--in the case of porter _v._ freundenberg ( )--held that article (h) is to be interpreted in that sense.[ ] be that as it may, the difficulty of interpretation and construction of international treaties will exist so long as no international statute has been agreed upon which lays down detailed rules concerning interpretation and construction, or so long as international courts have not developed such rules in practice. but the problem of international courts is itself a very difficult one; it will be the subject of my third lecture which will deal with administration of justice and mediation within the league of nations. [ ] by a letter of february , , i drew the attention of the foreign office to the interpretation of article (h) which generally prevailed on the continent. this letter and the answer i received were privately printed, and copies were distributed amongst those members and associates of the institute of international law who attended the meeting at madrid. since french, german, and italian international law journals published translations, but the original of the correspondence was never published in this country, i think it advisable to append it to this lecture. appendix correspondence with the foreign office respecting the interpretation of article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare letter from the present writer to the foreign office. whewell house, cambridge, _ th february, _. to the under secretary of state for foreign affairs. sir,-- i venture to bring the following matter before your consideration:-- in the course of my recent studies i have been dealing with the laws and usages of war on land, and i have had to consider the interpretation of article (h) of the regulations attached to the convention of relating to the laws and customs of war on land. i find that the interpretation prevailing among all continental and some english and american authorities is contrary to the old english rule, and i would respectfully ask to be informed of the view which his majesty's government place upon the article in question. to give some idea as to how an interpretation of article (h) contrary to the old english rule prevails generally, i will quote a number of french, german, english, and american writers, the works of whom i have at hand in my library, and i will also quote the german _weissbuch_ concerning the results of the second hague conference of . bonfils, _manuel de droit international public_, th ed. by fauchille, , discusses, on page , the doctrine which denies to an enemy subject any _persona standi in judicio_, but adds:--'... article (h) décide qu'il est interdit de déclarer éteints, suspendus ou non recevables en justice, les droits et actions des nationaux de la partie adverse.' politis, professor of international law in the university of poitiers (france), in his report to the institute of international law, session of paris ( ), concerning _effets de la guerre sur les obligations internationales et les contrats privés_, page , says: 'un point hors de doute, c'est, que la guerre ne peut, ni par elle-même ni par la volonté des belligérants, affecter la validité ou l'exécution des contrats antérieurs. cette règle fait désormais partie du droit positif. l'article (h) du nouveau règlement de la haye interdit formellement aux belligérants "de déclarer éteints, suspendus ou non recevables en justice les droits et actions des nationaux de la partie adverse." 'cette formule condamne d'anciens usages conservés encore, en partie, dans certains pays. elle proscrit d'abord tous les moyens--annulation ou confiscation--par lesquels on chercherait à atteindre, dans leur existence, les droits nés avant la guerre. elle exclut, en second lieu, l'ancienne pratique qui interdisait aux particuliers ennemis l'accès des tribunaux. elle prohibe, enfin, toutes les mesures législatives ou autres tendant à entraver au cours de la guerre l'exécution ou les effets utiles des obligations privées, notamment le cours des intérêts. 'il y a là progrès incontestable. et l'on doit être reconnaissant à la délégation allemande à la e conférence de la paix de l'avoir provoqué. 'l'accueil empressé et unanime qu'a reçu cette heureuse initiative permet d'espérer que de nouveaux progrès pourront être réalisés dans cet ordre d'idées. 'on doit souhaiter que la disposition de l'article (h), étrangère à l'hypothèse de l'occupation du territoire ennemi, soit distraite du règlement de (comme les articles à l'ont été du règlement de ) pour être mieux placée dans une convention nouvelle, où d'autres textes viendraient la compléter.' ullmann, _völkerrecht_, nd ed. , p. , says:-- 'auch der rechtsverkehr wird durch den ausbruch des krieges nicht unterbrochen oder gehemmt. die nach landesrecht frueher uebliche zeitweise aufhebung der klagbarkeit vom schuldverbindlichkeiten des staates oder eines angehörigen gegen angehörige des feindes ist durch artikel (h) untersagt.' wehberg, _das beuterecht im land- und seekriege_, , pp. and says:-- 'article absatz bestimmt:--"das privateigentum darf nicht eingezogen werden." in konsequenter durchführung dieses satzes bestimmt der auf deutschen antrag hinzugefügte article (h):--"untersagt ist die aufhebung oder zeitweilige ausserkraftsetzung der rechte und forderungen von angehoerigen der gegenpartei oder der ausschliessung ihrer klagbarkeit."' whittuck, _international documents_, london , introduction p. xxvii, says--'in article (h) it is prohibited to declare abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the other belligerent which is a development of the principle that the private property of the subjects of a belligerent is not subject to confiscation. this new prohibition if accepted by this country would necessitate some changes in our municipal law.' holland, _the laws of war on land_, , says on p. that:--'article (h) seems to require the signatory powers to the convention concerned to legislate for the abolition of an enemy's disability to sustain a _persona standi in judicio_.' (see also holland, _loco citato_, p. , where he expresses his doubts concerning the interpretation of article (h).) bordwell, _the law of war between belligerents_, chicago , recognises on page the fact that according to article (h) an alien enemy must now be allowed to sue in the courts of a belligerent, and gregory, professor in the university of iowa, who reviews bordwell's work in the _american journal of international law_, volume ( ), page , takes up the same standpoint. the only author who interprets article (h) in a different way is general davis, who in his _elements of international law_, rd edition , page , note , says:-- 'it is more than probable that this humane and commendable purpose would fail of accomplishment if a military commander conceived it to be within his authority to suspend or nullify their operation, or to regard their application in certain cases as a matter falling within his administrative discretion. especially is this true where a military officer refuses to receive well grounded complaints, or declines to receive demands for redress, in respect to the acts or conduct of the troops under his command, from persons subject to the jurisdiction of the enemy who find themselves, for the time being, in the territory which he holds in military occupation. to provide against such a contingency it was deemed wise to add an appropriate declaratory clause to the prohibition of article .' it is very unfortunate that the book of general davis is not at all known on the continent, and that therefore none of the continental authors have any knowledge of the fact that a divergent interpretation from their own of article (h) is being preferred by an american author. it is likewise very unfortunate that neither the english bluebook on the second hague peace conference (see parliamentary papers, miscellaneous no. , , page ) nor the official minutes of the proceedings of the conference, edited by the dutch government, give any such information concerning the construction of article (h) as could assist a jurist in forming an opinion regarding the correct interpretation. it is, however, of importance to take notice of the fact that article (h) is an addition to article which was made on the proposition of germany, and that germany prefers an interpretation of article (h) which would seem to coincide with the interpretation preferred by all the continental writers. this becomes clearly apparent from the german _weissbuch ueber die ergebnisse der im jahre in haag abgehaltenen friedensconferenz_, which contains on page the following:-- 'der artikel hat gleichfalls auf deutschen antrag zwei wichtige zusätze erhalten. durch den ersten wird der grundsatz der unverletzlichkeit des privateigenthumes auch auf dem gebiete der forderungsrechte anerkannt. nach der gesetzgebung einzelner staaten soll nämlich der krieg die folge haben, dass die schuldverbindlichkeiten des staates oder seiner angehörigen gegen angehörige des feindes aufgehoben oder zeitweilig ausser kraft gesetzt oder wenigstens von der klagbarkeit ausgeschlossen werden. solche vorschriften werden nun durch den artikel abs. unter h für unzulässig erklärt.' however this may be, the details given above show sufficiently that a divergent interpretation of article (h) from the old english rule is prevalent on the continent, and is to some extent also accepted by english and american authorities, and it is for this reason that i would ask whether his majesty's government consider that the old english rule is no longer in force. i have, &c., (signed) l. oppenheim. letter from the foreign office to the present writer. foreign office, _march , _. sir,-- i am directed by secretary sir e. grey to thank you for your letter of february th, and for drawing his attention to the misconceptions which appear to prevail so largely among the continental writers on international law with regard to the purport and effect of article (h) of the convention of october th, , respecting the laws and customs of war on land. it seems very strange that jurists of the standing of those from whose writings you quote could have attributed to the article in question the meaning and effect they have given it if they had studied the general scheme of the instrument in which it finds a place. the provision is inserted at the end of an article dealing with the prohibited modes of warfare. it forms part of chapter i. of section ii. of the regulations annexed to the convention. the title of chapter i. is 'means of injuring the enemy, sieges and bombardment': and if the article itself is examined it will be seen to deal with such matters as employing poison or poisoned weapons, refusing quarter, use of treachery and the unnecessary destruction of private property. similarly the following articles ( to ) all deal with the restrictions which the nations felt it incumbent upon them from a sense of humanity to place upon the conduct of their armed forces in the actual prosecution of military operations. the regulation in which these articles figure is itself merely an annex to the convention which alone forms the contractual obligation between the parties, and the engagement which the parties to the convention have undertaken is (article ) to 'issue instructions to their armed land forces in conformity with the regulations respecting the law and customs of war on land.' this makes it abundantly clear that the purpose and scope of the regulations is limited to the proceedings of the armies in the field; those armies are under the orders of the commanders, and the governments are bound to issue instructions to those commanders to act in accordance with the regulations. that is all. there is nothing in the convention or in the regulations dealing with the rights or the status of the non-combatant individuals, whether of enemy nationality or domiciled in enemy territory. they are, of course, if inhabitants of the theatre of war, affected by the provisions of the regulations because they are individuals who are affected by the military operations, and in a sense a regulation which forbids a military commander from poisoning a well gives a non-combatant inhabitant a right or a quasi-right not to have his well poisoned, but his rights against his neighbours, his relations with private individuals, whether of his own or of enemy nationality, remain untouched by this series of rules for the conduct of warfare on land. turning now to the actual wording of article (h) it will be seen that it begins with the wording 'to declare.' it is particularly forbidden 'to _declare_ abolished, &c.' this wording necessarily contemplates the issue of some proclamation or notification purporting to abrogate or to change rights previously existing and which would otherwise have continued to exist, and in view of article i of the convention this hypothetical proclamation must have been one which it was assumed the commander of the army would issue; consequently, stated broadly, the effect of article (h) is that a commander in the field is forbidden to attempt to terrorise the inhabitants of the theatre of war by depriving them of existing opportunities of obtaining relief to which they are entitled in respect of private claims. sir e. grey is much obliged to you for calling his attention to the extract which you quote from the german white book. this extract may be translated as follows:--'article has also received on german proposal two weighty additions. by the first the fundamental principle of the inviolability of private property in the domain of legal claims is recognised. according to the legislation of individual states, war has the result of extinguishing or temporarily suspending, or at least of suppressing the liability of the state or its nationals to be sued by nationals of the enemy. these prescriptions have now been declared inadmissible by article (h).' the original form of the addition to article which the german delegates proposed was as follows: 'de déclarer éteintes, suspendues ou non recevables les réclamations privées de ressortissants de la partie adverse' (see procès-verbal of the nd meeting of the st sub-committee of the nd committee, th july, ). there is nothing to show that any explanation was vouchsafed to the effect that the proposed addition to the article was intended to mean more than its wording necessarily implied, though there is a statement by one of the german delegates in the procès-verbal of the st meeting of the st sub-committee of the nd committee, on july rd, which in all probability must have referred to this particular amendment, though the procès-verbal does not render it at all clear; nor is the statement itself free from ambiguity. an amendment was suggested and accepted at the second meeting to add the words 'en justice' after 'non recevables,' and in this form the sub-article was considered by an examining committee, was accepted and incorporated in article , and brought before and accepted by the conference in its th plenary sitting on the th august, . the subsequent alteration in the wording must have been made by the drafting committee, but cannot have been considered to affect the substance of the provision, as in the th plenary sitting on october th, , the reporter of the drafting committee, in dealing with the verbal amendments made in this convention, merely said, 'en ce qui concerne le règlement lui-même, je n'appellerai pas votre attention sur les différentes modifications de style sans importance que nous y avons introduites.' nor is there anything to indicate any such far-reaching interpretation as the german white book suggests in the report which accompanied the draft text of the convention when it was brought before the plenary sitting of the conference (annex a. to th plenary sitting). it merely states that the addition is regarded as embodying in very happy terms a consequence of the principles accepted in . the result appears to sir e. grey to be that neither the wording nor the context nor the circumstances attending the introduction of the provision which now figures as article (h) support the interpretation which the writers you quote place upon it and which the german white book endorses. sir e. grey notices that, in the extract you quote, monsieur politis, after placing his own interpretation upon the article, remarks that it is quite foreign to the hypothesis of the occupation of territory and ought to be removed from the regulations and turned into a convention by itself. if this interpretation were correct, this remark of monsieur politis is certainly true: but the fact that the provision appears where it does should have suggested to monsieur politis that it does not bear the interpretation he puts upon it. nor does it appear to sir e. grey that the provision conflicts with the principle of the english common law that an enemy subject is not entitled to bring an action in the courts to sustain a contract, commerce with enemy subjects being illegal. that principle operates automatically on the outbreak of war, it requires no declaration by the government, still less by a commander in the field, to bring it into operation. it is a principle which applies equally whether the war is being waged on land or sea, and which is applied in all the courts and not merely in those within the field of the operations of the military commanders. the whole question of the effect of war upon the commerce of private persons may require reconsideration in the future; the old rules may be scarcely consistent with the requirements or the conditions of modern commerce; but a modification of those rules is not one to which his majesty's government could be a party except after careful enquiry and consideration, and, when made at all, it must be done by a convention that applies to war both on land and sea. they certainly have not become parties to any such modification by agreeing to a convention which relates only to the instructions they are to give the commanders of their armed forces, and which is limited to war on land. i am, &c., (signed) f. a. campbell. third lecture administration of justice and mediation within the league of nations synopsis i. administration of justice within the league is a question of international courts, but it is incorrect to assert that international legislation necessitates the existence of international courts. ii. the permanent court of arbitration created by the first hague peace conference. iii. the difficulties connected with international administration of justice by international courts. iv. the necessity for a court of appeal above the international court of first instance. v. the difficulties connected with the setting up of international courts of justice. vi. details of a scheme which recommends itself because it distinguishes between the court as a whole and the several benches which would be called upon to decide the cases. vii. the advantages of the recommended scheme. viii. a necessary provision for so-called complex cases of dispute. ix. a necessary provision with regard to the notorious clause _rebus sic stantibus_. x. the two starting points for a satisfactory proposal concerning international mediation by international councils of conciliation. article of the hague convention concerning pacific settlement of international disputes. the permanent international commissions of the bryan peace treaties. xi. details of a scheme which recommends itself for the establishment of international councils of conciliation. xii. the question of disarmament. xiii. the assertion that states renounce their sovereignty by entering into the league. xiv. conclusion: can it be expected that, in case of a great conflict of interests, all the members of the league will faithfully carry out their engagements? the lecture i. my last lecture dealt with the organisation of a league of nations and international legislation by the league. to-day i want to draw your attention to international administration of justice and international mediation within the league. i begin with international administration of justice which, of course, is a question of international courts of justice. hitherto, although international legislation has been to some extent in existence, no international courts have been established before which states in dispute have been compelled to appear. now there is no doubt that international legislation loses in value if there are no arrangements for international administration of justice by independent and permanent international courts. yet it is incorrect to assert, although it is frequently done, that one may not speak of legislation and a law created by legislation without the existence of courts to administer such law. why is this assertion incorrect? because the function of courts is to decide _controversial_ questions of law or of fact in case the respective parties cannot agree concerning them. however, in most cases the law is not in jeopardy, and its commands are carried out by those concerned without any necessity for a court to declare the law. modern international law has been in existence for several hundred years, and its commands have in most cases been complied with in the absence of international courts. on the other hand, there is no doubt that, if controversies arise about a question of law or a question of fact, the authority of the law can be successfully vindicated only by the verdict of a court. and it is for this reason that no highly developed community can exist for long without courts of justice. ii. the community of civilised states did not, until the end of the nineteenth century, possess any permanent institution which made the administration of international justice possible. when states were in conflict and, instead of having recourse to arms, resolved to have the dispute peaceably settled by an award, in every case they agreed upon so-called arbitration, and they nominated one or more arbitrators, whom they asked to give a verdict. for this reason, it was an epoch-making step forward when the first peace conference of agreed upon the institution of a permanent court of arbitration, and a code of rules for the procedure before this court. although the term 'permanent court of arbitration,' as applied to the institution established by the first hague peace conference, is only a euphemism, since actually the court concerned is not a permanent one and the members of the court have in every case to be nominated by the parties, there is in existence, firstly, a permanent panel of persons from which the arbitrators may be selected; secondly, a permanent office at the hague; and, thirdly, a code of procedure before the court. thereby an institution has been established which is always at hand in case the parties in conflict want to make use of it; whereas in former times parties in conflict had to negotiate a long time in order to set up the machinery for arbitration. and the short time of twenty years has fully justified the expectations aroused by the institution of the permanent court of arbitration, for a good number of cases have been brought before it and settled to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. and the second hague peace conference of contemplated further steps by agreeing upon a treaty concerning the establishment of an international court of appeal in prize cases, and upon a draft treaty concerning a really permanent international court of justice side by side with the existing court of arbitration. although neither of these contemplated international courts has been established, there is no doubt that, if after the present war a league of nations becomes a reality, one or more international courts of justice will surely be established, although the existing permanent court of arbitration may remain in being. iii. but just as regards international legislation, i must warn you not to imagine that international administration of justice by international courts is an easy matter. it is in fact full of difficulties of many kinds. the peculiar character of international law; the rivalry between the different schools of international jurists, namely the naturalists, positivists, and grotians; the question of language; the peculiarities of the systems of law of the different states, of their constitutions, and many other difficulties, entail the danger that international courts may become the arena of national jealousies, of empty talk, and of political intrigues, instead of being pillars of international justice. everything depends upon what principles will guide the states in their selection of the individuals whom they appoint as members of international courts. not diplomatists, not politicians, but only men ought to be appointed who have had a training in law in general, and in international law in particular; men who are linguists, knowing, at any rate, the french language besides their own; men who possess independence of character and are free from national prejudices of every kind. there is no doubt that, under present conditions and circumstances of international life, the institution of international courts represents an unheard of experiment. there is, however, likewise no doubt that _now_ is the time for the experiment to be made, and i believe that the experiment will be successful, provided the several states are careful in the appointment of the judges. iv. and it must be emphasised that an international court of appeal above the one or several international courts is a necessity. just as municipal courts of justice, so international courts of justice are not infallible. if the states are to be compelled to have their judicial disputes settled by international administration of justice, there must be a possibility of bringing an appeal from lower international courts to a higher court. it is only in this way that in time a body of international case law can grow up, which will be equivalent in its influence upon the practice of the states to the municipal case law of the different states. v. i have hitherto considered in a general way only the difficulties of international administration of justice; i have not touched upon the particular difficulties connected with the setting up and manning of international courts. if the several states could easily agree upon, say, five qualified men as judges of a court of first instance, and upon, say, seven qualified men as judges of a court of appeal, there would be no difficulty whatever in setting up these two courts. and perhaps some generations hence the time may come when such an agreement will be possible. in our time it cannot be expected, and here therefore lies the great difficulty in the way of setting up and manning international courts of justice; because there is no doubt that each state will claim the right to appoint at least one man of its own choice to sit as judge in the international court or courts. and since there are about fifty or more civilised independent states in existence, the international court would comprise fifty or more members. now why would the several states claim a right to appoint at least one man of their own choice as judge? they would do this because they desire to have a representative of their own general legal views in the court. it is a well-known fact that not only the legal systems which prevail in the several states differ, but also that there are differences concerning the fundamental conceptions of justice, law, procedure, and evidence. each state fears that an international court will create a practice fundamentally divergent from its general legal views, unless there is at least one representative of its own general legal views sitting in the court. i think that in spite of everything the difficulty is not insurmountable provided a scheme for an international court which follows closely the model of municipal courts is not insisted upon. just as the organisation of a league of nations cannot follow the model of the organisation of a state, so the attempt to set up an international court must not aim at following closely the model of municipal courts. what is required is an institution which secures the settlement of judicial international disputes by giving judgments on the basis of law. i think this demand can be satisfied by a scheme which would meet both the claim of each state to nominate one judge and the necessity not to overcrowd the bench which decides each dispute. vi. the scheme which i should like to recommend is one which distinguishes between the court as a whole and the several benches which would be called upon to decide the several cases. it is as follows: the court as a whole to consist of as many judges as there are members of the league, each member to appoint one judge and one deputy judge who would take the place of the judge in case of illness or death or other cause of absence. the president, the vice-president, and, say, twelve or fourteen members to constitute the permanent bench of the court and therefore to be resident the whole year round at the hague. half of the members of this permanent bench of the court to be appointed by the great powers--each great power to appoint one--and the other half of the members to be appointed by the minor powers. perhaps the scandinavian powers might agree upon the nomination of one member; holland and spain and portugal upon another; belgium, switzerland, and luxemburg upon a third; the balkan states upon a fourth; argentina, brazil, and chile upon a fifth; and so on. anyhow, some arrangement would have to be made according to which the minor powers unite upon the appointment of half the number of the permanent bench. if a judicial dispute arises between two states, the case to go in the first instance before a bench comprising the two judges appointed by the two states in dispute and a president who, as each case arises, is to be selected by the permanent bench of the court from the members of this bench. this court of first instance having given its judgment, each party to have a right of appeal. the appeal to go before the permanent bench at the hague, which is to give judgment with a quorum of six judges with the addition of those judges who served as the bench of first instance. the right of appeal to exist only on questions of law and not on questions of fact. decisions of the appeal court to be binding precedents for itself and for any courts of first instance. but should the appeal court desire to go back on a former decision of law, this to be possible only at a meeting of the court comprising at least twelve members of the permanent bench. vii. the proposal which i have just sketched, and which will need to be worked out in detail if it is to be realised, offers the following advantages: every case would in the first instance be decided by a small bench which would enjoy the confidence of both parties because they would have their own judge in the court. this point is of particular importance with regard to the mode of taking evidence and making clear the facts; but is likewise of importance on account of the divergence of fundamental legal views and the like. since the court of appeal would only decide points of law, the facts as elucidated by the bench of first instance would remain settled. but the existence of the court of appeal would enable the parties to re-argue questions of law with all details. the fact that six of the bench which serves as a court of appeal are members of the permanent bench would guarantee a thorough reconsideration of the points of law concerned, and likewise the maintenance and sequence of tradition in international administration of justice. again, the fact that the court of appeal is to comprise, besides six members of the permanent bench, those three judges who sat as the bench of first instance would guarantee that the judges appointed by the states in dispute could again bring into play any particular views of law they may hold. viii. this is the outline of my scheme for the establishment and manning of the international court of justice. but before i leave the subject, i must say a few words concerning two important points which almost all other schemes for the establishment of an international court overlook. firstly, the necessity to make provision for what i should like to call complex cases of dispute; namely, cases which are justiciable but in which, besides the question of law, there is at the same time involved a vital political principle or claim. take the case of a south american state entering into an agreement with a non-american state to lease to it a coaling station: this case is justiciable, but besides the question of law there is a political claim involved in it, namely, the monroe doctrine of the united states. unless provision be made for the settlement of such complex cases, the league of nations will not be a success, for it might well happen that a case touches vital political interests in such a way as not to permit a state to have it settled by a mere juristic decision. now my proposal to meet such complex cases is that when a party objects to a settlement of a case on mere juristic principles, although the other party maintains that it is a justiciable case, the bench which is to serve as bench of first instance shall investigate the matter with regard to the question whether the case is more political than legal in nature. if the court decides the question in the negative, then the same court shall give judgment on the dispute; but, if the court decides the question in the affirmative, then the case shall be referred by the court to the international council of conciliation. whatever the decision of the bench of first instance may be, each party shall have the right of appeal to the permanent bench which serves as the court of appeal. ix. the other point which i desire to mention before i leave the subject of international administration of justice concerns the notorious principle _conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus_. you know that almost all publicists and also almost all governments assert the existence of a customary rule according to which a vital change of circumstances after ratification of a treaty may be of such a kind as to justify a party in demanding to be released either from the whole treaty or from certain obligations stipulated in it. but the meaning of the term 'vital change of circumstances' is elastic, and there is therefore great danger that the principle _conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus_ will be abused for the purpose of hiding the violation of treaties behind the shield of law. this danger will remain so long as there is no international court in existence which, on the motion of one of the contracting parties, could set aside the treaty obligation whose fulfilment has become so oppressive that in justice the obliged party might ask to be released. now, as the league of nations is to set up an international court of justice, my proposal is that the court should be declared competent to give judgment on the claim of a party to a treaty to be released from its obligations on account of vital change of circumstances. of course the case would go before that bench of the court which is to serve as the court of first instance, and an appeal would lie to the permanent bench which serves as the court of appeal. x. having given you the outlines of a scheme concerning international administration of justice, i now turn to international mediation by international councils of conciliation. for a satisfactory proposal concerning international councils of conciliation two starting points offer themselves. one starting point is the special form of mediation recommended by article of the hague convention concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes. the following is the text of this article : 'the signatory powers are agreed in recommending the application, when circumstances allow, of special mediation in the following form:-- 'in case of a serious difference endangering peace, the contending states choose respectively a power, to which they intrust the mission of entering into direct communication with the power chosen on the other side, with the object of preventing the rupture of pacific relations. 'for the period of this mandate, the term of which, in default of agreement to the contrary, cannot exceed thirty days, the states at variance cease from all direct communication on the subject of the dispute, which is regarded as referred exclusively to the mediating powers. these powers shall use their best efforts to settle the dispute. 'in case of a definite rupture of pacific relations, these powers remain jointly charged with the task of taking advantage of any opportunity to restore peace.' the second starting point is supplied by the permanent international commissions of the so-called bryan peace treaties concluded in - by the united states of america with a number of other states. these peace treaties are not in every point identical, but of interest to us here are the clauses according to which permanent international commissions are set up to serve as councils of conciliation. the following is the text of the three articles concerned of the treaty between the united states and great britain of september , : art. i. 'the high contracting parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, other than disputes the settlement of which is provided for and in fact achieved under existing agreements between the high contracting parties, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for investigation and report to a permanent international commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted.' art. ii. 'the international commission shall be composed of five members, to be appointed as follows: one member shall be chosen from each country, by the government thereof; one member shall be chosen by each government from some third country; the fifth member shall be chosen by common agreement between the two governments, it being understood that he shall not be a citizen of either country. the expenses of the commission shall be paid by the two governments in equal proportions.' 'the international commission shall be appointed within six months after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty; and vacancies shall be filled according to the manner of the original appointment.' art. iii. 'in case the high contracting parties shall have failed to adjust a dispute by diplomatic methods, they shall at once refer it to the international commission for investigation and report. the international commission may, however, spontaneously by unanimous agreement offer its services to that effect, and in such case it shall notify both governments and request their co-operation in the investigation.' keeping in view the special form of mediation recommended by article of the hague convention concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes and the stipulations of the bryan peace treaties concerning permanent international commissions, we can reach a satisfactory solution of the problem of international mediation if we take into consideration the two reasons why a league of nations must stipulate the compulsion of its members to bring non-justiciable disputes before a council of conciliation previous to resorting to hostilities. these reasons are, firstly, that war in future shall not be declared without a previous attempt to have the dispute peaceably settled, and, secondly, that war in future shall not break out like a bolt from the blue. xi. my proposal concerning international councils of conciliation is the following: every member of the league shall appoint for a term of years--say five or ten--two conciliators and two deputy conciliators from among their own subjects, and one conciliator and one deputy conciliator from among the subjects of some other state. now when a non-justiciable dispute arises between two states which has not been settled by diplomatic means, the three conciliators of each party in dispute shall meet to investigate the matter, to report thereon, and to propose, if possible, a settlement. according to this proposal there would be in existence a number of councils of conciliation equal to half the number of the members of the league. whenever a dispute arises, the permanent council of conciliation--with which i shall deal presently--shall appoint a chairman from amongst its own members. the council thus constituted shall investigate the case, report on it, send a copy to each party in dispute and to the permanent council of conciliation. the _permanent_ council of conciliation should be a _small_ council to be established by each of the great powers appointing one conciliator and one deputy conciliator for a period of--say--five or ten years. the reason why only the great powers should be represented in the permanent council of conciliation at the hague is that naturally, in case coercion is to be resorted to against a state which begins war without having previously submitted the dispute to a council of conciliation, the great powers will be chiefly concerned. this permanent council of conciliation would have to watch the political life of the members of the league and communicate with all the governments of the members in case the peace of the world were endangered by the attitude of one of the members; for instance by one or more of the members arming excessively. the council would likewise be competent to draw the attention of states involved in a dispute to the fact that they ought to bring it before either the international court of justice or their special council of conciliation. this proposal of mine concerning mediation within the league of nations is, of course, sketchy and would need working out in detail if one were thinking of preparing a full plan for its realisation. however that may be, my proposal concerning a number of councils of conciliation has the advantage that non-justiciable disputes would in each case be investigated and reported on by conciliators who have once for all been appointed by the states in dispute and who therefore possess their confidence. on the other hand, the proposed permanent council of conciliation would guarantee to the great powers that important influence which is due to them on account of the fact that they would be chiefly concerned in case economic, military, or naval measures had to be resorted to against a recalcitrant member of the league. xii. having discussed international mediation by international councils of conciliation, i must now turn to two questions which i have hitherto purposely omitted, although in the eyes of many people they stand in the forefront of interest, namely, firstly, _disarmament_ as a consequence of the peaceable settlement of disputes by an international court of justice and international councils of conciliation, and, secondly, the question of the _surrender of sovereignty_ which it is asserted is involved by the entrance of any state into the proposed league of nations. now as regards disarmament, i have deliberately abstained from mentioning it hitherto, although it is certainly a question of the greatest importance. the reason for my abstention is a very simple one. i have always maintained that disarmament can neither diminish the number of wars nor abolish war altogether, but that, if the number of wars diminishes or if war be abolished altogether, disarmament will follow. there is no doubt that when once the new league of nations is in being, war will occur much more rarely than hitherto. for this reason disarmament will _ipso facto_ follow the establishment of a league of nations, and the details of such disarmament are matters which will soon be solved when once the new league has become a reality. yet i must emphasise the fact that disarmament is not identical with the total abolition of armies and navies. the possibility must always be kept in view that one or more members of the league will be recalcitrant, and that then the other members must unite their forces against them. and there must likewise be kept in view the possibility of a war between two members of the league on account of a political dispute in which mediation by the international councils of conciliation was unsuccessful. be that as it may, it is certain that in time disarmament can take place to a very great extent, and it is quite probable that large standing armies based on conscription might everywhere be abolished and be replaced by militia. xiii. let me now turn to the question of sovereignty. is the assertion really true that states renounce their sovereignty by entering into the league? the answer depends entirely upon the conception of sovereignty with which one starts. if sovereignty were absolutely unfettered liberty of action, a loss of sovereignty would certainly be involved by membership of the league, because every member submits to the obligation never to resort to arms on account of a judicial dispute, and in case of a political dispute to resort to arms only after having given an opportunity of mediation to an international council of conciliation. but in fact sovereignty does not mean absolutely boundless liberty of action; and moreover sovereignty has at no time been a conception upon the contents of which there has been general agreement. the term 'sovereignty' was introduced into political science by bodin in his celebrated work 'de la république,' which appeared in . before that time, the word _souverain_ was used in france for any political or other authority which was not subordinate to any higher authority; for instance, the highest courts were called _cours souveraines_. now bodin gave quite a new meaning to the old term. being under the influence and in favour of the policy of centralisation initiated by louis xi of france ( - ), the founder of french absolutism, bodin defines sovereignty as the 'absolute and perpetual power within a state.' however, even bodin was far from considering sovereignty to give absolutely unfettered freedom of action, for he conceded that sovereignty was restricted by the commandments of god and by the rules of the law of nature. be that as it may, this conception of sovereignty once introduced was universally accepted; but at the same time the meaning of the term became immediately a bone of contention between the schools of publicists. and it is to be taken into consideration that the science of politics has learnt to distinguish between sovereignty of the state and sovereignty of the agents who exercise the sovereign powers of the state. according to the modern view sovereignty is a natural attribute of every independent state as a state; and neither the monarch, nor parliament, nor the people can possess any sovereignty of their own. the sovereignty of a monarch, or of a parliament, or of the whole people is not an original attribute of their own, but derives from the sovereignty of the state which is governed by them. it is outside the scope of this lecture to give you a history of the conception of sovereignty, it suffices to state the undeniable fact that from the time when the term was first introduced into political science until the present day there has never been unanimity with regard to its meaning, except that it is a synonym for independence of all earthly authority. now, do you believe that the independence of a state is really infringed because it agrees never to make war on account of a judicial dispute, and in case of a political dispute not to resort to arms before having given opportunity of mediation to international councils of conciliation? independence is not boundless liberty of a state to do what it likes, without any restriction whatever. the mere fact that there is an international law in existence restricts the unbounded liberty of action of every civilised state, because every state is prohibited from interfering with the affairs of every other state. the fact is that the independence of every state finds its limitation in the independence of every other state. and it is generally admitted that a state can through conventions--such as a treaty of alliance or of neutrality or others--enter into many obligations which more or less restrict its liberty of action. independence is a question of degree, and, therefore, it is also a question of degree whether or no the independence of a state is vitally encroached upon by a certain restriction. in my opinion the independence of a state is as little infringed by an agreement to submit all its judicial disputes to the judgment of a court and not to resort to arms for a settlement, as the liberty of a citizen is infringed because in a modern state he can no longer resort to arms on account of a dispute with a fellow citizen but must submit it to the judgment of the court. and even if it were otherwise, if the entrance of a state into the new league of nations did involve an infringement of its sovereignty and independence, humanity need not grieve over it. the prussian conception of the state as an end in itself and of the authority of the state as something above everything else and divine--a conception which found support in the philosophy of hegel and his followers--is adverse to the ideal of democracy and constitutional government. just as henri iv of france said 'la france vaut bien une messe,' we may well say 'la paix du monde vaut bien la perte de l'indépendance de l'état.' xiv. i have come to the end of this course of lectures, but before we part i should like, in conclusion, to touch upon a question which has frequently been put with regard to the proposal of a new league of nations:--can it really be expected that, in case of a great conflict of interests, all the members of the league will faithfully carry out their engagements? will the new league stand the strain of such conflicts as shake the very existence of states and nations? will the league really stand the test of history? history teaches that many a state has entered into engagements with the intention of faithfully carrying them out, but, when a grave conflict arose, matters assumed a different aspect, with the consequence that the engagements remained unfulfilled. will it be different in the future? can the powers which enter into the league of nations trust to the security which it promises? can they be prepared to disarm, although there is no guarantee that, when grave conflicts of vital interests arise, all the members of the league will faithfully stand by their engagements? these are questions which it is difficult to answer because no one can look into the future. we can only say that, if really constitutional and democratic government all the world over makes international politics honest and reliable and excludes secret treaties, all the chances are that the members of the league will see that their true interests and their lasting welfare are intimately connected with the necessity of fulfilling the obligations to which they have submitted by their entrance into the league. the upheaval created by the present world war, the many millions of lives sacrificed, and the enormous economic losses suffered during these years of war, not only by the belligerents but also by all neutrals, will be remembered for many generations to come. it would therefore seem to be certain that, while the memory of these losses in lives and wealth lasts, all the members of the league will faithfully carry out the obligations connected with the membership of the league into which they enter for the purpose of avoiding such a disaster as, like a bolt from the blue, fell upon mankind by the outbreak of the present war. on the other hand, i will not deny that no one can guarantee the future; that conflicts may arise which will shake the foundations of the league of nations; that the league may fall to pieces; and that a disaster like the present may again visit mankind. our generation can only do its best for the future, and it must be left to succeeding generations to perpetuate the work initiated by us. index administration of justice by international courts, difficulties of, ; maintenance of tradition of, ; permanent institution for the, . aims of the league of nations defined, , , - . article of the hague convention concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes, . article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, - ; controversy respecting interpretation of, ; correspondence respecting, with foreign office, - . autocratic government, . belgium, , . bodin, . bonfils on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, . bordwell on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, . british empire, , . bryan peace treaties, . bryce, lord, scheme of, . central powers, the, are they to become members of the league of nations? , ; necessity for utter defeat of, , . colonies, wars for the acquisition of, . complex cases of dispute, how to settle, . congress of vienna, , . constitutional government, , ; necessity for, . court of appeal, international, , , ; manning of, . court of arbitration, establishment of international, . court of first instance, international, ; manning of, . crucée, emeric, . davis, general, on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, . democracy, , . dickinson, scheme of sir willoughby, . disarmament, , . dubois, pierre, . dynastic wars, . engagements of the members of the league of nations, security for fulfilment of, . equality, of states, , ; of the votes at hague peace conferences, . family, the, a product of natural development, . family of nations, political hegemony of the great powers within the, . federal world state, a, - ; demanded by pacifists, ; why not possible, . foreign office, letter of, to professor oppenheim concerning article (h), - . german confederation, civil war within the, . german weissbuch on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, , , . germany, is she to become a member of the league of nations? , ; necessity for the utter defeat of, , . great powers, , ; power and influence of the, - . greece, city states of ancient, . gregory on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, . grey, earl, , , , . grotians, the school of, . grotius, hugo, . hague convention concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes, article of, . hague peace conferences, ; method of legislating by, ; the work of, obstructed by some states, ; standing council of, proposed, ; starting point of organisation of league of nations by, , ; votes of states of equal value at, . hague regulations concerning land warfare, controversy respecting interpretation of article (h) of, . henry iv of france, , . holland, professor, on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, . independence of states, what it is, , . international army and navy, why impossible, , , - , . international case law, . international council of conciliation, , , ; scheme for the establishment of, - ; starting points for, . international court of appeal, , ; a necessity, ; manning of, . international court of first instance, ; manning of proposed bench to serve as, . international court of justice, , , - ; manning of, ; proposed permanent bench of, , ; proposed special benches of, for different cases, . international courts, claims of all states in manning of, ; difficulties of manning of, ; precedents of, . international executive, why impossible, , . international government, why impossible, . international law, a book law at present, ; and league of nations interdependent, , ; complied with often without courts, ; grew by custom during middle ages, ; not in being in antiquity, ; progress of, , , ; universal and general, difference between, . international legislation, , - ; a by-product only in the past, ; difficulties of, created by conflicting interests of states, ; difficulties of, created by different methods of interpretation and construction, ; difficulties of, created by the fact that a majority vote cannot create a statute, ; difficulties of, created by the language question, ; meaning of the term, ; possible even without international courts, , ; possible only by agreement of all the states, ; wide field open for, . international statutes, cannot be created by majority vote, ; interpretation and construction of, ; what are? . internationalism, growth of, . law-making treaties, what are? . 'la france vaut bien une messe,' . league of nations, , ; aims defined, , , - ; and international law interdependent, ; career in a sense started already, , ; conception of, very old, ; demand for, universal, ; impossibility of state-like organisation of, ; no unanimity concerning its aims or organisation, ; organisation of, demanded, ; problems connected with, , ; seven principles of, which ought to be adopted, - ; so-called, but league of states is meant, ; starting point of organisation of, , , ; constitution _sui generis_ of, a necessity, , ; what is new in the now desired, ; when it would be an organised community, , . marini, antoine, . mediation, international. _see_ international council of conciliation. militarism, conception of, ; prussian, . nation, the, a product of historical development, , ; conception of, , ; not to be confounded with race, - . nations, not to be confounded with states, , . nationality, principle of, , . 'natura non facit saltus,' . naturalists, the school of, . oppenheim, letter of foreign office concerning article (h) of the hague regulations to professor, - . pacifists, . parliament, international, why impossible, , . permanent court of arbitration, international, ; establishment of, by the first peace conference, . permanent international commissions of the bryan peace treaties, . podiebrad, . police, international, , . politis on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, , . porter _v._ freundenberg, case of, . positivists, the school of, . precedents of international courts, . principle of nationality, , . prize court, international, proposed by second peace conference, . quis custodiet ipsos custodes? . race, a product of natural development, ; not to be confounded with nation, , . rebus sic stantibus, proposal for dealing with the clause, . religion, wars of, . sovereignty, conception of, ; not surrendered by entrance into the league of nations, , , . state, ideal of the national, . states of the world, the allied belligerent and the neutral, - . statutes, difference between international and municipal, . sully, . swiss confederation, civil war within the, . switzerland, . taft, ex-president, . transoceanic states, entrance into league of nations of, . tribe, the, a product of natural development, . ubi societas ibi jus, . ullmann, on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, . united states, civil war in the, . vienna congress, the, , . votes, equality of, at hague peace conferences, . wars for national unity, . wehberg on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, . whewell, dr., . whittuck on article (h) of the hague regulations concerning land warfare, . wilson, president, . world federation, a demand of pacifists, . at the ballantyne press printed by spottiswoode, ballantyne and co. ltd. colchester, london and eton, england transcriber's note: minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. variant spellings have been retained. hyphenation has been standardised. transcriber's notes: passages in italics are surrounded by _underscores_. the word "amoeba" uses oe ligature in the original on page . for consistency, a period has been added at the end of the word "editor" in some footnotes where it was missing. the following misprints have been corrected: "spendid" corrected to "splendid" (page ) "stumblingblock" corrected to "stumbling block" (page ) "can can" corrected to "can" (page ) other than corrections listed above, printer's inconsistencies in spelling, punctuation, hyphenation and ligature usage have been retained. prize orations of the intercollegiate peace association edited with an introduction by stephen f. weston, ph.d. executive secretary of the association professor of economics and sociology, antioch college yellow springs, ohio foreword by charles f. thwing boston the world peace foundation this volume is dedicated to the misses mary and helen seabury whose interest and assistance have made possible the orations of the intercollegiate peace association contents page foreword vii by charles f. thwing, president of the association the intercollegiate peace association by stephen f. weston, executive secretary of the association the conflict of war and peace by paul smith, depauw university, indiana the united states and universal peace by glenn porter wishard, northwestern university, illinois the evolution of world peace by levi t. pennington, earlham college, indiana the waste of war--the wealth of peace by arthur foraker young, western reserve university, ohio the hope of peace by stanley h. howe, albion college, michigan the roosevelt theory of war by percival v. blanshard, university of michigan national honor and vital interests by russell weisman, western reserve university, ohio the evolution of patriotism by paul b. blanshard, university of michigan certain phases of the peace movement by calvert magruder, st. john's college, maryland the assurance of peace by vernon m. welsh, knox college, illinois education for peace by francis j. lyons, university of texas national honor and peace by louis broido, university of pittsburgh, pennsylvania the new nationalism and the peace movement by ralph d. lucas, knox college, illinois man's moral nature the hope of universal peace by victor morris, university of oregon the task of the twentieth century by harold husted, ottawa university, kansas the present status of international arbitration by bryant smith, guilford college, north carolina foreword these orations are selected from hundreds of similar addresses spoken in recent years by hundreds of students in american colleges. i believe it is not too bold to say that they represent the highest level of undergraduate thinking and speaking. they are worthy interpreters of the cause of peace, but they are, as well, noble illustrations of the type of intellectual and moral culture of american students. whoever reads them will, i believe, become more optimistic, not only over the early fulfillment of the dreams of peace among nations, but also over the intellectual and ethical condition of academic life. for the simple truth is that the cause of peace makes an appeal of peculiar force to the undergraduate. it appeals to his imagination. this imagination is at once historic and prophetic. war makes an appeal to the historic imagination of the student. his study of greek and roman history has been devoted too largely to the wars that these peoples waged. marathon, salamis, carthage, are names altogether too familiar and significant. by contrast he sees what this history, which is written in blood, might have become. if the millions of men slain had been permitted to live, and if the uncounted treasure spent had been economically used, the results in the history of civilization would have been far richer and nobler. he notes, too, does this student, that if the last decades of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth had been free from wars in europe, humanity would now have attained a far higher level of physical and intellectual strength. the historic imagination of the student pictures, as his reason interprets, such conditions. his prophetic imagination likewise exercises its creative function. the student sees nations to-day dwelling in armed truces and moving to and fro as a soldiery actual or possible. he realizes that war puts up what civilization puts down, and puts down what civilization elevates. he reads the lamented robertson's great lecture on the poetry of war, but he knows also, as robertson intimates, that "peace is blessed; peace arises out of charity." the poetry of peace is more entrancing than the poetry of carnage. to this primary element in the mind of the undergraduate--the imagination--our great cause therefore makes an appeal of peculiar earnestness. to the reason of the college man, also, the cause of peace makes a peculiar appeal through its simple logic. war is most illogical. it breaks the law of the proper interpretation of causality. when two nations of adjacent territory cannot agree over a boundary line, why should settlement be made in terms of physical force? when two nations fail to see eye to eye in adjusting the questions of certain fishing rights, why should they incarnadine the seas in seeking for the truth to be applied in settlement? in civil disputes, why, asks the student, should rifles be employed to discover truth and right? war is an intellectual anachronism, a breach of logic. of course, one may reply, humanity is not logical in its reasoning any more than it is exact in its observing. of course it is not; but the college is set to cast out the rule of no-reason and to bring in the reign of reason. peace furnishes a motive and a method of such advancement. peace is logic for the individual and for the nation. the illogical character of war is also made evident by the contrast between the college man as a thinker and war itself. the college man who thinks sees truth broadly; war interprets life narrowly, at the point of the bayonet. the college man who thinks sees truth deeply; war makes its primary appeal to the superficial love of glory, of pomp, and of circumstance. the college man who thinks sees truth in its highest relations; war is hell. the college man who thinks sees truth in long ranges and in far-off horizons; war is emotional, and the warrior flings the years into the hours. the college man who thinks, thinks accurately, with logic, with reason; war does not think--it strikes. "strike," the college man may also say, "but hear!" he cries; "yes, think." if the college can make the student think, it has created the greatest force for making the world and the age a world and an age of peace. it is plain enough, too, that the economic side of war makes a tremendous appeal to the student. the cost of the battleship _indiana_ was practically $ , , ; the total value of grounds and buildings of the colleges and universities in indiana is slightly more than $ , , , and the productive funds are $ , , . the total cost of the battleship _oregon_ was more than $ , , ; the total value of grounds and buildings of the universities and colleges of oregon is less than $ , , , and the productive funds amount to hardly more than $ , , . the cost of the battleship _iowa_ was nearly $ , , , and the productive funds of all the colleges and universities of the state are only $ , , . the battleship _kentucky_ cost $ , , ; in the colleges of that state the total amount of productive funds is only $ , , , and the total value of grounds and buildings, $ , , . the battleship _alabama_ cost more than $ , , , and the entire property, real and personal, of all the universities and colleges in that state is less than $ , , . the cost of the battleship _wisconsin_ was more than $ , , ; the whole value of all grounds and buildings of the colleges and universities of the state is only slightly more than $ , , . the battleship _maine_ cost more than $ , , , and the entire value in grounds, buildings, and productive funds of the colleges and universities of that state is little more than $ , , . the value of the buildings of five hundred colleges and universities in this country was estimated in a recent year at $ , , , and the productive funds at $ , , . leaving out those now in course of construction, the total cost of the battleships and armored cruisers of the united states named after individual states is $ , , . the cost of maintaining these battleships during the fiscal year of , though many were in commission but a small part of the year, amounted to no less than $ , , . the amount which all the colleges and universities in this country received in tuition fees in was only $ , , ; and the entire income received both from fees and productive funds was only about $ , , . in other words, when one takes into account the depreciation of the battleship or armored cruiser, the entire cost of the thirty-eight battleships for a single year is greater than the administration of the entire american system of higher education. is it not painfully manifest that the cost of war constitutes a mighty argument for the economic mind of the student? moreover, i am inclined to believe that the very difficulties belonging to the triumph of our great cause constitute ground for its closer relationship to the college man. the college man wishes, as well as needs, a hard job. the easy task, the rosy opportunity, makes no appeal. he is like garibaldi's soldiers, who, when the choice was once offered them by the commander to surrender to ease and safety, chose hardship and peril. the boxer revolution in china was followed by hundreds of applications from college men and women to be sent forth to china to take the place of the martyrs. the difficulties in the progress of the great cause are of every sort and condition. industrial narrowness and commercial greed, military and political ambitions, sectional zeal, national jealousy, the sensitiveness of each nation in matters of national honor, the glamour of the good and the beautiful under the sentiment of patriotism, the historic honor attending death for one's country, the ease of creating war scares among the people, the looseness of the organization of the higher forces of the world--all these conditions and more pile up into a pelion on ossa as a part of the difficulties standing in the progress of our great movement. but such difficulties inspire rather than deter. the student says, "i will; therefore i can." he also says, "i can; therefore i will." he knows that the forces fighting for him are more than those that fight against him, strong as these are. man in his noblest relationships, the songs of the poet (the best interpreter, from homer and virgil to the "winepress" of alfred noyes), the torture, the pains, the sufferings, the woes, the vision of the prophet of a loving and perfect humanity, the reason of logic--all these and more are to him inspirations, and strengthen him in his great quest. he is a knight of the holy grail that is filled from the river of the water of life. perhaps, furthermore, the cause makes its most impressive appeal to the collegian in its internationalism, or interpatriotism. this internationalism addresses itself to his own international appreciation. the collegian is a patriot. he is a patriot not only against a foreign country but often against certain parts of his own country--loyal to the interests which he believes a section of his own nation properly represents. the german students have fought for their fatherland; they have also fought for the liberal sentiments of their own land against reactionary movements, as in . in the american civil war no brighter record is to be found than is embodied in the tablets in memorial hall, cambridge, or in memorial hall, chapel hill, university of north carolina. but the collegian possesses the international sense, and possesses it more and more deeply with each passing decade. his is the international mind, interpreting phenomena in terms of common justice. his is the international heart, feeling the universal joys and sorrows, woes and exultations. his is the international will, seeking to do good to all men. his is the international conscience, weighing right and duty in the scales of divine humanity. whatever interpretation he gives to the sayings of paul that god made all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth and has fixed the bounds of their habitation,--whether he stops with the words "the face of the earth" or whether he goes on to interpret the limitations of their residence,--it is nevertheless true that his mind, his heart, his will, and his conscience do go out toward all nations in their endeavor to realize their highest racial and interracial peace. no man is a foreigner to him. i have, i trust, said enough to intimate that these orations arise out of a natural and normal condition of the student mind and heart. they also, in subject as well as in origin, bear a special message of cheer and hopefulness to all who have a good will toward the collegian and toward the great cause for which we all are laboring. charles f. thwing _president_ western reserve university cleveland, ohio prize orations the intercollegiate peace association _origin._ in the autumn of president noah e. byers of goshen college, goshen, indiana, a mennonite college, invited to a conference representatives of all the colleges in indiana, pennsylvania, and ohio that are conducted by those religious denominations that advocate nonresistance as one of their essential religious principles. such bodies are the mennonites, the dunkards, and the quakers. in the spring of a more specific invitation was sent out, with the result that a conference was held at goshen college, june - , . this date is important, since the call of president byers for such a conference was the first active step ever taken to interest the college world, and particularly undergraduates, in the great movement for world peace founded upon the idea of human brotherhood. while the conference did not take place until a month after president gilman had suggested to the lake mohonk conference, in may, , that it should extend its peace work to the colleges and universities, yet the call for the conference was several months prior to the action of the mohonk conference. eight institutions were represented at this conference--goshen, earlham, central mennonite, ashland, wilmington, juniata, and penn colleges and friends' university. no definite plan of work had been mapped out, but a simple organization was effected, and arrangements were made for a second conference at earlham college (society of friends). professor elbert russell of earlham college was elected president, and upon him devolved most of the work of arranging for the second conference, which was held april - , . for this conference no denominational lines were drawn, it being felt that all colleges and universities should be interested in this important work. hence invitations were sent to all institutions of higher learning in both indiana and ohio. eight institutions were represented: indiana, three--earlham and goshen colleges and indiana university; ohio, five--antioch, denison, miami, wilmington, and central mennonite. this representation was small, considering the importance of the conference and the excellent program that had been arranged for by professor russell. but notwithstanding the small number of institutions represented, the conference was a marked success, made so very largely by the many excellent addresses--among others, those of edwin d. mead, benjamin f. trueblood, professor ernst richard of columbia university, and honorable william dudley foulke. on the last day of the conference the delegates from the different colleges met and perfected a permanent organization, which it was agreed should be called the intercollegiate peace association. thus, after a year of preliminary work, the intercollegiate peace association came into definite and permanent existence on april , . at this meeting dean william p. rogers of the cincinnati law school was elected president, and professor elbert russell, secretary and treasurer. the president and the secretary, president noah e. byers of goshen college, and professor stephen f. weston of antioch college constituted the executive committee. the writer has remained on the executive committee from the beginning, as either an elected or an ex-officio member. two methods of propaganda were adopted: intercollegiate oratorical contests, and public addresses on peace questions before the student body and faculties of colleges and universities. it was also agreed that the work should begin with ohio and indiana and gradually extend to other states. although no definite plan was formulated until a year later, at the meeting at cincinnati, it was understood from the outset that it should be the aim gradually to extend the field of work, so that ultimately most of the institutions of higher learning in practically all of the states should be embraced within the organization and participate in the contests. _purpose._ the purpose of the association has been quite definitely set forth in my "historical sketch"[ ] and in my report for . from these the following statement is very largely borrowed. the fundamental purpose of the intercollegiate peace association is to instill into the minds and hearts of the young men of our colleges and universities the principle that the highest ideals of justice and righteousness should govern the conduct of men in all their international affairs quite as much as in purely individual and social matters, and that, therefore, the true aim of all international dealings should be to settle differences, of whatever nature, by peaceful methods through an appeal to the noblest human instincts and the highest ideals of life, rather than by the arbitrament of the sword through an appeal to the lower passions; and, further, both on humanitarian and economic grounds, to arouse in the youth of to-day an appreciation of the importance of a peaceful settlement of international disputes, and to inculcate a spirit antagonistic to the inhuman waste of life and the reckless waste of wealth in needless warfare. [ ] printed in _antioch college bulletin_, vol. vii, no. , december, . this appeal to the idealism of youth is founded upon the psychological fact that it is the ideals of life that determine the conduct of life. it is ideals that rule the world; hence the importance of right ideals based upon a comprehensive understanding of the real nature and deepest implications of human fellowship. the alleged impracticability is not in the ideal but in the difficulty of making the ideal such a dominant part of our being that it shall consistently direct our activities under every circumstance. one of the essential conditions of human progress is the conviction that such ideals are vital to the highest attainments and that these should be the aim of all our strivings. unfortunately such a standard of life is far from being realized. policy rules largely in the world of practical life; either high ideals are considered impracticable, or there is no attempt to enforce consistency between belief and practice. mindful of the further fact that the ideals and habits of thought and action that prevail in mature life are those that are formed in youth, the intercollegiate peace association turns to the young manhood of the undergraduate for its field of operations. the aim is to give such a firm mold to the ideals of the undergraduate that they shall for all time shape his activities to the end of righteous conduct in all international dealings. in particular, the aim is to cultivate in the young men of our colleges and universities such sentiments and standards of conduct as will insure their devotion to the furtherance of international peace through arbitration and other methods of pacific settlement rather than by battleships--standards of conduct based upon the fundamental truth that conflicts between men, and therefore principles of right and justice, can be rightly settled only through the mediation of mind, and that every effort to settle them by force is not only illogical, a psychological impossibility, but is the way of the brute, not the way of man, whose nature touches the divine. all the more important must this work with the undergraduate be considered when we reflect that it is the young men in our colleges and universities to-day who will mold the public opinion and the national and international policy of the next generation; for it is such young men as these that will control the pulpit and the press, the legislation and the diplomacy of the future. it is this fact that gives such peculiar importance to the work of the intercollegiate peace association. to quote from the report of the secretary for : "other peace societies are laboring to create a public sentiment to-day in favor of international peace, through arbitration of all international differences. this is very essential. but the intercollegiate peace association is founded upon the belief that the cause of peace will not triumph in a day, and that it is therefore of the utmost importance that right ideals be rooted into the minds of those who will give expression to the public opinion of the future. in brief, it is building more for the future than for the immediate present. the millennium of peace will not come until the ideals of a christian civilization take deeper root in the minds and hearts of those who are the leaders of thought and action. one of the crying sins of to-day is that professions of righteous living in accordance with christian ethical ideals are not taken seriously. note the disgraceful policy that has been pursued with regard to turkey by the nations of europe that profess to be disciples of the prince of peace. hence it is of the utmost importance that those who are to become the future translators of ideals into action shall be imbued with right principles of life and of human relations. to this end it is sought to cultivate the right sentiment against war, and for international peace, among the undergraduates of our colleges; for what the undergraduate thinks about and reads about to-day will very largely determine his future principles and his conduct, and it is he who is destined to mold the ideals, shape the policies, and determine the actions of the people of to-morrow." _methods and results._ to carry out these purposes two things are essential: an awakened interest in the cause of peace, and some definite and effective method for molding sentiments and habits of thought that will persist with such vitality that they will give shape to future conduct and activities. to arouse an interest in the subject, on the part of both professors and students, it was believed at the outset that public addresses would be effective, and it was hoped that the association would be able to inaugurate a course of such addresses in our colleges and universities. it was, however, soon found that to finance such a course would require more money than we could hope to command for some time to come. in consequence, very little has been done along this line further than to arrange for occasional addresses and to encourage chapel talks. it is this field of work that the lake mohonk conference voted to adopt at the suggestion of dr. gilman. the conference also found it difficult to carry out the plan, and our association was invited to assume the whole of this work--a request we would gladly have accepted, but which we were compelled to decline for want of funds. it is a very important field of work and could be made very effective toward realizing the ultimate goal of the intercollegiate peace association, for its effect would undoubtedly be the enlistment of a much larger number of the students in the oratorical contests, which must be our chief reliance for getting international peace ideas to take a vital root in the undergraduate mind. if we cannot secure the necessary funds for carrying on this important work, it is hoped that some other peace society will do it for us, for such addresses could be made a most effective complement to our work. being compelled to abandon the public addresses for want of money, we have concentrated most of our efforts upon the intercollegiate oratorical contests as perhaps the most effective method for carrying out the purpose of the association. the contests are bound to arouse an interest in the subject, while the preparation of orations is sure to ingrain thoughts, sentiments, and convictions that will be indelible in the character of the young men who participate in the contests. while the contests are oratorical in their nature, their primary purpose is not the cultivation of oratory. oratory is simply used as a means to an end--the cultivation of right ideas of justice and righteousness between nations. that such a result will accrue is assured both in psychological principles and in experience. every student who produces a well-prepared oration in bound to make the thoughts and sentiments expressed a part of his being. the oration would not be effective if it were otherwise. the writer has heard scores of these orations, and he is convinced of the sincerity and earnestness of the orators. moreover, letters written to him by those who have won prizes, attesting their interest in and their devotion to the cause, by reason of their participation in the contests, give ample evidence that the contests are bearing fruit. nor can one read the orations in this volume without being convinced of their sincerity. indeed, the reason why we do not have intercollegiate debates instead of contests in oratory is because of the psychological truth, amply justified by experience, that the student who prepares for the negative side of a peace question would tend to have his thoughts permanently fixed along the lines of the advocates of great armaments. it is not that the student should not know the arguments opposing the ideas of the advocates of peace by arbitration. we would not cultivate bigotry even in a good cause. we would have him know the facts, as indeed he must before he can present any arguments for peace that would have any significance. but an acquaintance with the opposing arguments is quite a different thing, in its effect upon the thought of the student, from making that thought his own and publicly defending it. other results may be mentioned. while the cultivation of oratory is not a function of the intercollegiate peace association, it does foster oratory as a valuable if not an indispensable instrument for effecting its own end. in fact, the oratorical contests are something more than agencies for interesting undergraduates in the peace movement. the cultivation of the art of expression and of public speaking, now very generally provided for in college and university curriculums, is of especial significance to the work of this association. for it is not alone of importance that the graduate who leaves his alma mater should be indoctrinated with a message of peace for the world; that his message may be effective, he must also have attained some proficiency in the art of clear and forceful diction and in the art of delivering his message in a pleasing and convincing manner. therefore, it is not without reason that our contests are for the most part under the immediate direction of the department of english, or of whatever departments have charge of the public speaking in the various colleges and universities. a further factor in these contests is their cultural value, both moral and intellectual. they necessarily cultivate the highest ethical conceptions, historical and political knowledge, and careful and logical thinking. to quote from the secretary's report for : "the work of the intercollegiate peace association is a great force for righteousness between nation and nation, and so between man and man, and therefore may be considered as supplementary to the more strictly moral and intellectual culture in our institutions of higher learning. the ethical value is not the only value of the contests. in the preparation of orations the undergraduate necessarily informs himself of historical conditions, of the economic and social effects of war, of the legal and constitutional principles involved, and of the problems, difficulties, and principles concerned with international relations. it is this early beginning of an intelligent understanding of the problems involved, together with the right moral insight, that must count for future effectiveness in shaping international policies and practices." finally, while these contests have chiefly in mind the shaping of the public opinion of coming generations, they are by no means a negligible factor in their influence upon the public opinion of to-day. the contests--local, state, and interstate--are heard by many hundreds of people every year, and in many cases by persons who would otherwise seldom come in contact with peace sentiments. the permeating influence in college circles extends beyond those who participate in the contests. the influence of any single contest may indeed be small, but so too is the influence of any one peace conference or congress. the task of molding public opinion along the lines of any human uplift is always slow, and only gradually do the influences of this character permeate and take possession of the social mind; but every influence leaves its impression. it is only by persistent activities and cumulative effects that the social mind can be aroused to a full consciousness of any great moral issue, and still more true is this when that moral issue is of national or international importance. the many peace societies, the intercollegiate peace association among them, are just such persistent activities, which, by gradually producing cumulative effects, will ultimately reap their reward. but more perhaps than other peace societies does the intercollegiate peace association concern itself with the social mind and the social conscience of the future. _the contests._ the first oratorical contest was held at the university of cincinnati, may , . arrangements were made for the participation of only ohio and indiana colleges. state contests were not held, but fourteen orations were submitted from as many different institutions, nine from ohio and five from indiana. the writers of eight of these were selected by judges on thought and composition to take part in the speaking contest. four were from ohio and four from indiana. indiana won both the first and the second prize. the first prize was won by paul smith of depauw university with the subject, "the conflict of war and peace." the second prize went to lawrence b. smelser of earlham college, whose subject was "the solving principles of federation." the second contest was held at depauw university, may , . carrying out the plan adopted at the meeting at cincinnati, the contestants were selected by means of state contests, and an invitation was extended to the colleges and universities of michigan, illinois, and wisconsin to participate in the contest. wisconsin did not respond, but contests were held in ohio, indiana, michigan, and illinois. by special arrangement juniata college was allowed to represent pennsylvania without a state contest. glenn p. wishard of northwestern university won the first prize; subject, "the united states and universal peace." the second prize was won by h. p. lenartz of notre dame university; subject, "america and the world's peace." the third interstate contest took place at the university of chicago, may , , in connection with the second national peace congress. ohio, indiana, michigan, illinois, and wisconsin were represented, all having held state contests. levi t. pennington of earlham college won the first prize; subject, "the evolution of world peace." the second prize went to harold p. flint of illinois wesleyan university; subject, "america the exemplar of peace." the fourth annual contest was held at the university of michigan, may , . there were six contestants, pennsylvania having come regularly into the association. arthur f. young of western reserve university won the first prize; subject, "the waste of war--the wealth of peace." the second prize went to glenn n. merry of northwestern university; subject, "a nation's opportunity." the fifth annual contest was held at johns hopkins university, may , , in connection with the third national peace congress. there were seven contestants, maryland being represented for the first time. the first prize was won by stanley h. howe, albion college, michigan, and the second prize by wayne walker calhoun, illinois wesleyan university. mr. howe's subject was "the hope of peace," and mr. calhoun's, "war and the man." this contest was one of the most successful that had been held up to that time. it was greeted by one of the largest audiences that had attended any of the sessions of the peace congress, and the comparison of the orations, in both thought and delivery, with the speeches given in the congress, was very favorable to the young orators. a general enthusiasm was evoked for the contests. yet there was much fear that this contest might prove to be the last, there being no assurance ahead for adequate funds to carry on the work. it was decided, however, not to give up without further trial, a decision well justified by subsequent developments. assistance being secured from the carnegie peace fund, eleven states held contests in . in addition to the seven that participated in the contest at baltimore, four additional states were added--new york, north carolina, iowa, and nebraska. with so many states, it became necessary for the first time to divide them into groups. two groups were formed, an eastern and a western. the western group, of five states, held its contest at monmouth college, illinois, april , and the eastern group, of six states, at allegheny college, pennsylvania, may . no prizes were given at either of these contests, but an arrangement was made with the lake mohonk conference by which the ranking orator in each contest should meet and contest for first and second place at mohonk lake at the time of the lake mohonk conference. the contest at mohonk was held may , the contestants being percival v. blanshard of the university of michigan, who represented the western group, and russell weisman of western reserve university, who represented the eastern group. the title of mr. blanshard's oration was "the roosevelt theory of war," and that of mr. weisman's, "national honor and vital interests." the misses seabury gave a first prize of $ and a second prize of $ . the judges awarded the first prize to mr. blanshard and the second prize to mr. weisman. so great, however, was the interest of the guests at mohonk lake, and so nearly equal in merit were the orations, that a gentleman present gave an additional $ to mr. weisman to make the prizes equal, and mr. joshua bailey of philadelphia gave each of the contestants an additional $ . five additional states--maine, massachusetts, texas, missouri, and south dakota--participated in the contests of , making sixteen states holding contests. of these states three groups were formed, an eastern, a central, and a western. the central group held its contest at goshen college, indiana, april ; the western group at st. louis, may , as part of the program of the fourth american peace congress; and the eastern group at lafayette college, pennsylvania, may . the same arrangements were made as in the preceding year--that the contestant holding the highest rank in each group should meet in a final contest at mohonk lake. no prizes were given, except that the business men's league of st. louis gave a prize of $ for the contest at st. louis. the contest at mohonk was held may , and three prizes were given by the misses seabury--$ , $ , and $ . paul b. blanshard of the university of michigan, a twin brother of the mr. blanchard who won the first prize in , represented the central group and won the first prize with the subject, "the evolution of patriotism." calvert magruder, st. john's college, annapolis, maryland, represented the eastern group and won the second prize. his subject was "certain phases of the peace movement." vernon m. welsh, knox college, illinois, represented the western group and won the third prize. his subject was "the assurance of peace." _growth._ the growth of the intercollegiate peace association, like that of most social movements, was slow in the first few years of its existence, but with the gradual accretion of new states it has gained in momentum, and is to-day increasing with such rapidity that only the lack of financial support will prevent it from embracing in its contests within another two years practically every state in the union. starting with two states at the earlham conference in and the first contest in , it added three states in , one in , and one in , making seven states participating in the contests of . four more states were added for the contests of , and five additional ones for the contests of (nine states in two years), making sixteen states in all. since the contest in may, , eight states have been added for the contests of , while the work of organization is being carried on in several other states. by at least thirty states will be holding contests if money can be secured for properly financing them. four groups are now definitely organized: an eastern, a central, a western, and a southern. a pacific group is in process of being organized. thus, in seven years from the first contest we have become a national association, extending from the atlantic to the pacific and from the lakes to the gulf. _prizes and finances._ in order to encourage the young men to enter the contests, the plan of offering prizes was adopted at the outset. the national association made itself responsible for the state prizes, leaving the local institutions to provide for such local prizes as they could arrange for. in some places such prizes are given, being provided for in different ways, and in some places no local prizes are given. at first only $ and $ were given for the two state prizes, but after the second year it was made a definite policy of the association to make the first state prize $ and the second prize $ . with rare exceptions, in the case of the second prize, this policy is now maintained. in new york, however, there is a first prize of $ and a second prize of $ , given by mrs. elmer black. for the past two or three years the national association has made itself responsible for the first prize only, leaving the states to look after the second prize, though the secretary also looks after many of the second prizes. no prizes are regularly given in the group contests, but it is hoped that a plan may be evolved for giving one prize, as the expenses of the winning contestant are large. at the national contest at mohonk lake, prizes are given to each contestant. in these prizes will probably range from $ to $ . the prize money has come from various sources. in mr. carnegie gave $ , and in he gave $ . the misses seabury, of new bedford, massachusetts, gave $ a year from the first. they gave $ in and will give $ for prizes in . in illinois la verne w. noyes has annually given the first prize of $ and harlow n. higginbotham the second prize of $ . in michigan r. e. olds gave the first prize until , and j. h. moores the second prize until . in ohio samuel mather and j. g. schmidlapp furnish the prizes for . in new york, massachusetts, pennsylvania, and maryland the prizes are given by individuals at the instigation of peace societies. in some states the second prize is given by some individual or through a collection from a number of individuals. the balance of the prizes are paid out of the subvention of $ that has been allowed for the past three years out of the carnegie endowment fund. in the prizes amounted to $ . in they approximate $ , apart from any local prizes that may be given. the annual subvention of $ from the carnegie peace fund is wholly inadequate to meet the growing needs of this association. since this subvention was first granted, the number of states has been more than doubled, and it takes about $ a year to run the secretary's office. unless more money is secured from some source, the association will be unable to grow beyond its present limits. _officers and organization._ the organization of the intercollegiate peace association has been a gradual development, and has undergone modifications to meet the changing conditions due to the considerable enlargement of the territory embraced within its sphere of activity, chief of which has been the practical impossibility of getting representatives to a national meeting from such a large extent of territory. at first there were a president, secretary, and treasurer, and an executive committee, with the college presidents of ohio and indiana as vice presidents. at the meeting at depauw university, in , it was decided to create state committees, that should have charge of the work in their respective states. as the states grew in numbers the plan of having vice presidents was abandoned. in the chairmen of the state committees were made members of an advisory council, and in the executive committee was reorganized so that there should be one member from each group of states in addition to the president and secretary. when the organization is fully matured the elected members of the executive committee will be a self-perpetuating body, only one or two going out of office in any one year, reëlection being permitted. the executive committee will elect the president, executive secretary, and treasurer, and the president and the executive secretary will appoint the members of the advisory council, who will be ex-officio chairmen of the state committees. the officers up to date have been as follows: _presidents:_ dean william p. rogers, cincinnati law school, - ; professor george w. knight, ohio state university, - ; professor elbert russell, earlham college, - ; dean william p. rogers, - ; president charles f. thwing, western reserve university, -. _secretaries:_ professor elbert russell, - ; mr. george fulk, cerro gordo, illinois, - ; professor stephen f. weston, antioch college, -. _treasurers:_ professor elbert russell, - ; professor stephen f. weston, -. _orations._ in the seven years in which the contests have been held, about twelve hundred orations have been written, a little more than one half of these in the past two years. the number written in will not fall far short of five hundred. for some time we have desired to publish a volume of the prize orations, and within the past few years there has been considerable demand for such a volume, as many would-be contestants are anxious to see what they will have to measure up to in order to win. outsiders interested in the contests have also desired such a publication. the present collection was therefore projected, and the world peace foundation willingly undertook to issue it as one of the books in its international library. the ten orations that have been selected for this volume out of the twelve hundred have all won the first prize in interstate contests. the first five are the first prize orations in the national contests of the first five years before the group contests were organized, and were selected by a series of local, state, and interstate contests out of about five hundred and fifty orations delivered. the last five, selected by a series of contests out of about six hundred and fifty, are the first prize orations of the group contests of the past two years. they were delivered in the national contests at mohonk lake at the time of the lake mohonk conferences. the fact that many of the second prize orations, and indeed a number of the others, were given first place by some of the judges is indicative of the general high character of all the orations, so that the ten selected orations are very fairly typical of the thought and sentiment of the whole twelve hundred. it is therefore believed that the publication of these orations will be of great value not only as a stimulus to prospective contestants but as a convincing proof of the quality of the work that the undergraduate students of the country are doing in the contests. they are evidence that these contests call out a high grade of intellectual and moral culture, showing as they do keen and clear thinking and high moral ideals. there is included as an appendix to these orations the pugsley prize oration of , by bryant smith, a senior in guilford college, north carolina, a sample of the prize essays annually submitted for the pugsley prize of $ offered through the lake mohonk conference by chester dewitt pugsley of yonkers, new york. the essay is also fittingly printed in this volume because mr. smith represented the state of north carolina in the eastern group contest of the intercollegiate peace association in , while still another reason for including it is the hope that others who have taken part in the oratorical contests, and who are thereby excluded from entering those contests again, may be encouraged to try for the pugsley prize. _subjects of orations._ in view of the fact that so many orations have been written on peace subjects, it is worthy of note that the topics have seldom been duplicated, and that when the same topic has been twice used, the handling of it has been so different that little duplication has been noticeable. each oration well represents the originality and the individuality of the writer or orator. duplication is shown in the quotations, and it is therefore suggested that quotations be sparingly used. not the least interesting feature of the orations is the combination of idealism and practicality, which they reveal in the minds of the contestants. truly, these young men "have hitched their wagon to a star," the star of universal good will. to show the wide range of subjects chosen, and therefore the scope and many-sidedness of the peace question, the following list of titles already used is given here. they are also given as suggestions to future writers of orations, for there is no objection to choosing subjects previously used. even if there is some duplication of thought, it makes little difference, since the contests are seldom held twice in the same place. included in the list are some titles that show variations in the way of stating the same thing, and these variations should be suggestive to future writers of orations. partial list of subjects america the exemplar of peace america and the world's peace america's mission in the peace movement america's mission to mankind america's obligation the arbiter of the world arbitration _versus_ war the challenge of thor the conflict of war and peace a congress of nations the cost of militarism the cost of peace the crucial parallelism the dawn of peace the dawn of universal peace democracy and peace diplomacy and peace disillusionment the dominant ideal the end; and the means the evolution of a higher patriotism the evolution of justice the evolution of law the evolution of national greatness as a world peacemaker the evolution of world peace the fallacy of the economics of war the federation of the world forces of war and peace the foundations from chaos to harmony from history's pages--peace fruits of war and fruits of peace government and international peace the growing sentiment the growth of the peace movement honor satisfied the ideal of the century idealism and the peace movement immigration and peace the inefficiency of war instead of war--what? international arbitration international justice and world peace international peace international peace and the prince of peace justice and peace justice by war or peace the keynote of the twentieth century the lasting wound the law of peace the message of the andes military selection and its effect on national life modern battlefields a nation's opportunity the new anglo-saxon the new brotherhood the new corner stone the new era the new nobility the new patriotism the next step the panama canal the passing of war the pathway to peace patriotism and peace peace and armaments peace and the evolution of conscience peace and the fortification of the panama canal peace and public opinion peace inevitable peace is our passion peace on earth peace, our great ideal the philosophy of universal peace physical and psychical aspects of war a plea for international peace a plea for peace popular fallacies about war popular government and peace popular sentiment and purer citizenship: the right road to peace the power of international tolerance the prince of peace progress toward justice the proposed court of arbitral justice the rationality of peace the real power the redemption of patriotism the regaining of the world's lost legacy right or might the significance of the hague conferences the rightful ruler a simple method of forwarding universal peace the solving principles of federation sovereignty in arbitration statesmanship _versus_ battleship thor or christ ungrateful america the united states and universal peace the united states of the world universal peace and the brotherhood of man the unnecessary evil a vision of a conquest war and christianity war--the demoralizer war and its elimination war and the laboring man war and the man war for profit war--universal brotherhood--peace the warrior's protest against war the waste of war--the wealth of peace the way of peace what, from vengeance? world federation the world organization _acknowledgments._ the intercollegiate peace association is greatly indebted to many state and city peace societies for coöperation and assistance. they have materially strengthened our work and made possible the enlargement of the field of our activities. to their secretaries we are deeply indebted. the fullest coöperation of the peace societies, each assisting and supplementing the work of others wherever possible, will bring the most fruitful and the most speedy results, and the fact that we have received such coöperation indicates a full appreciation of the value of the work being done in these contests. we wish also to express our gratitude to the many individual contributors of prizes, especially to the misses seabury, for their interest, encouragement, and generosity, because without their assistance our association could not have survived. to the misses seabury we are also under obligation for lending their rights over the texts of orations for this publication. for the subvention from the carnegie endowment for international peace we thank the american peace society, through whose agency it comes to us. for the publication of this volume we are deeply grateful to the world peace foundation, without whose coöperation the book could not have been published. to edwin d. mead and denys p. myers the editor owes his sincere thanks for suggestions and corrections of the manuscript. we trust that the volume will be amply justified by the good that it will do. stephen f. weston _executive secretary_ supplement _the contests of ._ this volume was projected to be published before the lake mohonk conference in may, but it was decided to include the five orations given in the national contest of , and so make the volume complete for the year of issue. the last five orations, then, are the winning ones in the group contests of , contesting for place in the national contest at mohonk lake, may , . they are the picked orations of over four hundred and fifty prepared in one hundred and twenty colleges and universities, representing twenty-two states. the fifteen orations in the volume are the winning orations out of more than sixteen hundred and fifty written by the student body of the country in the past eight years. in six additional states took part in the contests, making twenty-two organized into five groups. the pacific coast and southern groups were added during the year to the three groups organized in . three of the groups held their contests on may --the north atlantic at the college of the city of new york, the central at western reserve university, and the western at des moines college. the southern group held its contest at vanderbilt university on may . on the pacific coast only oregon was ready, and the winner of her state contest was permitted to represent the group in the national contest. utah and california are planning to enter the contests of . virginia, west virginia, and south carolina are organizing, and a sixth group will then be formed--the south atlantic group. s. f. w. the conflict of war and peace by paul smith, depauw university, greencastle, indiana first prize oration in the national contest held at the university of cincinnati, may , the conflict of war and peace the past ages have witnessed a long conflict between two opposing principles--the principle of might and the principle of right. the first instituted the duel between equals and condemned the impotent to slavery; the second ordained the courts of civil justice and signed the emancipation proclamation. the principle of might licensed despotism and degraded the many in the service of the few; the principle of right proclaimed democracy and consecrated the few to the service of the many. thus in the realm of the individual and of the state the diviner conception has won its triumphs, and to-day force is tolerated only as it serves the cause of justice. but in the larger international sphere the advocates of might prolong the ancient cry for war; the disciples of right protest in a gentler demand for peace. the partisans of war urge four capital reasons in behalf of their principle: personal glory, moral education, class interest, and national egoism. we have as a heritage of our military past, not a sense of the grim tragedy of war, but traditions which award the highest meed of personal glory to the warrior. the roster of the world's heroes contains two classes of names--great soldiers and great altruists. poet and orator and populace unite to do honor to him who was not afraid to fight and to die for his home, his king, his liberty, his country, his convictions. bravery has ever won its laurel crown, for an instinct within us applauds physical courage and aggressiveness. and the gilded uniform and clanking sword, the drumbeat and the bugle call, the camp fire and the "far-flung battle line," stand as the most dramatic expressions of a deep sentiment, primitive and thrilling. akin to this martial hero worship is the argument that success in war gives training for the higher contests of peace. out of the war of the nation took george washington for president; out of the mexican war, zachary taylor; out of the civil war, general grant; out of the spanish war, theodore roosevelt. the badge of the grand army of the republic is a certificate of merit. the cross of the legion of honor opens the door to social and political and business prosperity. battle is regarded as a supreme test of sturdy manhood, and the harsh discipline of the camp as education for the finer arts of the council. war creates a heroism which later devotes itself to spiritual ends. moreover, say the advocates, the interests of class require force for their conservation. the hereditary nobility of europe was founded by military process for military purposes, and, with the passing of war, loses its warrant for existence. on the other hand, it is claimed that the under classes may come into the enjoyment of their inalienable rights, common to all humanity, only by means of the sword. witness the peasantry of russia! even in america so great a prophet as henry ward beecher foresaw a tragic day when the bivouac of capital would be set against the camp of labor. and lesser seers are not lacking who freely predict, even for our democratic land, a desperate rebellion of a proletariat of poverty against an aristocracy of wealth. finally, the demands of national egoism are urged in behalf of war. for example, japan needs new territory for her growing millions and must assume the conqueror's rôle. or france goes mad with the lust of empire and goes forth untamed until the day of waterloo. or great britain must have new markets; and, falsely reasoning that trade follows the flag, and the flag follows the bayonet, she seizes a realm upon which the sun may never set. or the interests of white men and yellow men, of black men or red men, clash; and then the cannon must be the final test, might must make right, and the strongest must survive. the greed of territorial aggrandizement, the spirit of national adventure, the longing for commercial supremacy, the honor of a country, the pride of racial achievement--each is urged to justify the necessity for bloodshed and carnage. such are the arguments of the advocates of war. to balance these, the advocates of peace plead four greater considerations: against personal glory, the economic cost of militarism; against the moral education of war, the higher heroism of peace; against class interests, the sanctity of human life; and against national egoism, the deeper spirit of national altruism. a single modern battleship costs more than the combined value of the property and endowment of all the colleges of a certain great state. two thirds of the money passing through the treasury of the republic goes to the support of the military system. computing two hundred dollars a year as the average loss to society occasioned by the withdrawal of each soldier and sailor from productive toil, and adding this sum to the war budgets of the nations for the past fifty years, we obtain a total of billions, beyond the reach of all imagination. the money which armies, navies, wars, and pensions have cost the world in fifty years would have installed in china a system of education equal to that of the united states; would have transformed the arid deserts of india into a modern eden by irrigation; would have laid railways from cape town to the remotest corner of africa; would have dug the panama canal; and, in addition, would have sent a translation of the bible, of shakespeare, homer, goethe, and dante to every family on the globe. in a word, the wealth spent on wars in the last half century would have transformed life for a majority of human beings. the stoppage of this waste will shorten the hours of labor, reduce pauperism, elevate the peasantry of europe, lighten taxation, and work an economic revolution. the argument for moral education mistakes national gratitude to warriors for tribute to the training of the camp. but grant that war develops the combative qualities, the argument forgets a darker moral phase. it forgets the moral wrecks which are the sad products of war; it forgets the effect of the loss of the refining influence of womanhood upon the soldier; it forgets the debasement of sinking men to the physical type of life. and the argument assumes that peace has no "equivalent for war," declared by a famous educator to be the greatest need of the age. courage and endurance are as necessary in social reforms as in carnal battle. to wrestle against principalities and powers and rulers of the world-darkness calls forth the maximum powers of manhood. wendell phillips stands in the ranks of heroes as high as philip sheridan. the moral loss from war transcends the moral gain. yet war levies toll more tragic than any toll of dollars, more appalling than any moral cost. a famous painting reveals the world's conquerors, xerxes, cæsar, alexander, napoleon, and a lesser host, mounted proudly on battle steeds, caparisoned with gorgeous trappings; but the field through which they march is paved with naked, mutilated corpses, the ghastly price of glory. the trenches at port arthur were filled level-full with the bodies of self-sacrificed martyrs, and upon this gruesome slope the final charges were made. stripped of all sentiment, war is organized and wholesale murder, a savage and awful paradox which proclaims the shallowness of civilization. said general sherman: "only those who have never heard a shot, only those who have never heard the shrieks of the wounded nor the groans of the dying, can cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation." god grant the world may soon heed the voice, sounding down from the solemnity of sinai, laying the divine command upon each man and each nation: "thou shalt not kill!" there yet remains the ethical argument for peace. will any one say that the supreme duty of altruism is binding upon men as individuals, and not binding upon the same men acting conjointly as a nation? when the people and the statesmen of one nation are able to put themselves in the places of the statesmen and of the people of another nation; when there is a common will to do international justice rather than to despise the weaker country; when not selfish interest alone, but the greatest good of the greatest number, becomes the driving impulse of humanity; when the thrill of fraternity crosses geographical lines and pauses not on the shores of the seas--then war will be impossible, the energies of the world will turn to the constructive arts, and from the midst of contentment unshadowed by hunger, from prosperity unmenaced by want, in the peaceful spirit of the christ, the world will sing: "the crest and crowning of all good, life's final star is brotherhood; for it will bring again to earth her long-lost poesy and mirth; will send new light on every face, a kingly power upon the race. and till it come, we men are slaves, and travel downward to dust of graves. come, clear the way, then, clear the way: blind creeds and kings have had their day. break the dead branches from the path: our hope is in the aftermath. our hope is in heroic men, star-led to build the world again. to this event the ages ran: make way for brotherhood--make way for man." all great reforms have begun with "star-led" men and have moved from individuals to groups and from groups to the nation. in every distinct advance of the race prophetic persons have anticipated the trend of the ages and have adopted new codes for themselves; the higher morality has spread by agitation to include a larger group, and finally it has become the policy of the nation. thus slavery went, and political equality came. and thus war must go and peace must come. first, we find protest against the killing of individuals by individuals. the duel fell into disrepute and at last was forbidden by law. the carrying of weapons became unfashionable and at length was made a crime. with the growth of the moral sense, mutual trust took the place of armed neutrality. the present situation is ready for the larger application of these principles. the argument which abolished the carrying of weapons must frown upon excessive national armaments. as the individual duel was superseded by personal arbitration, so the national duel must be superseded by national arbitration. the reason that maintains the civil court for the settlement of individuals' disputes calls for a higher court for the settlement of national disputes. not alone among men, not alone within states, but among the nations, right, not might, must rule; not force, but justice; and written as the world's supreme mandate, as the highest human law from which there may be no appeal, must be the unshaken law of national righteousness. tennyson's words were accounted a poet's fancy when he wrote: till the war drum throbs no longer, and the battle-flags are furl'd in the parliament of man, the federation of the world. yet the present year[ ] will witness the fulfillment of that prophecy. disarmament and arbitration will be considered this summer, not by agitators, not by theorists, nor yet prophetically by poets; but in june, at the invitation of our own president,[ ] an actual international conference will assemble, a parliament of the world, composed of official representatives of every nation of the globe. thus we see the foregleams of an approaching day. the time is not far distant when war will glide into the grim shadows of a scarce-remembered past, when battles will pass into the oblivion of forgotten horrors. then will society realize its dreams of a kingdom of heaven upon earth, where the barbaric lure of fighting will be lost; where no class lines may exist save those freely acknowledged by a common justice; where national egoism maintains no armies for conquest and no navies for aggrandizement; where economic resources are devoted, not to mutual physical destruction, but to splendid spiritual enlargement; where "every nation that shall lift again its hand against a brother, on its forehead will wear forevermore the curse of cain"; and where, in the realization of a vast, racial brotherhood, is fulfilled the prophetic angel's song, "peace on earth, good-will to men." ruskin, the modern bard of peace, has sung: put off, put off your mail, ye kings, and beat your brands to dust-- a surer grasp your hands must know, your hearts a better trust; nay, bend aback the lance's point, and break the helmet bar-- a noise is in the morning winds, but not the noise of war! among the grassy mountain paths the glittering troops increase-- they come, they come!--how fair their feet,--they come that publish peace. [ ] the hague conference of is referred to. [ ] by the courtesy of president roosevelt the official call for the second hague conference was issued by the emperor of russia. forty-four nations were represented.--_editor._ the united states and universal peace by glenn porter wishard, northwestern university, evanston, illinois first prize oration in the national contest held at depauw university, greencastle, indiana, may , the united states and universal peace political and religious reforms move slowly. we change our beliefs and at the same time hold fast to old customs. farsighted public opinion has declared war to be unchristian; sound statesmanship has stamped it as unjust; the march of events has, in a majority of cases, proved it to be unnecessary--and yet we continue to build mammoth engines of destruction as if war were inevitable. truly, the millennium is not at hand, nor is war a thing of the past; but whereas war was once the rule, now it is the exception. this is an age of peace; controversies once decided by force are now settled by arbitration. europe, once the scene of continuous bloodshed, has not been plundered by conquering armies for more than a generation, while the united states has enjoyed a century of peace marred by only five years of foreign war. the four notable conflicts of the last decade have been between great and small powers, and have been confined to the outposts of civilization; while during the same period more than one hundred disputes have been settled by peaceful means. the willingness to arbitrate has been manifest; the means have been provided; the permanent international court, established by the hague conference in , actually lives, and has already adjudicated four important controversies.[ ] but arbitration, you say, will never succeed because the decisions cannot be enforced. you forget that already some two hundred and fifty disputes have been settled by this method, and in not one instance has the losing power refused to abide by the decision. [ ] from october , , the date of the first decision, up to the end of , the permanent court has rendered thirteen decisions settling international differences.--_editor._ yesterday the man who advocated universal peace was called a dreamer; to-day throughout the world organized public opinion demands the abolition of war. yesterday we erected statues to those who died for their country; to-day we eulogize those who live for humanity. yesterday we bowed our heads to the god of war; to-day we lift our hands to the prince of peace. i do not mean to say that we have entered the utopian age, for the present international situation is a peculiar one, since we are at the same time blessed with peace and cursed with militarism. this is not an age of war, yet we are burdened by great and ever-increasing armaments; the mad race for naval supremacy continues, while the relative strength of the powers remains practically the same; the intense and useless rivalry of the nations goes on until, according to the great russian economist, jean de bloch, it means "slow destruction in time of peace by swift destruction in the event of war." in europe to-day millions are being robbed of the necessaries of life, millions more are suffering the pangs of abject poverty in order to support this so-called "armed peace." note the condition in our own country. last year we expended on our army, navy, and pensions sixty-seven per cent of our total receipts. think of it! in a time of profound peace more than two thirds of our entire expenditures are charged to the account of war. we do not advocate radical, utopian measures; we do not propose immediate disarmament; but we do maintain that when england, germany, france, and the united states each appropriates from thirty to forty per cent of their total expenditures in preparation for war in an age of peace, the time has come for the unprejudiced consideration of the present international situation. why do the great powers build so many battleships? president roosevelt, representative hobson, and others would have us believe that england, germany, and france are actually preparing for war, while the united states is building these engines of destruction for the purpose of securing peace. but what right have we to assume that our navy is for the purpose of preserving peace, while the navies of the european powers are for the purpose of making war? is not such an assumption an insult to our neighbors? as a matter of fact, england builds new battleships because germany does, germany increases her navy because france does, while the united states builds new dreadnoughts because other nations pursue that policy. call it by whatever honey-coated name you will, the fact, remains that it is military rivalry of the most barbarous type, a rivalry as useless as it is oppressive, a rivalry prompted by jealousy and distrust where there should be friendship and mutual confidence. there is riot one of the powers but that would welcome relief from the bondage of militarism; the demand for the limitation of armaments is almost universal. believing that to decry war and praise peace without offering some plan by which the present situation may be changed is superficial, we hasten to propose something practicable. how, then, shall we put an end to this useless rivalry of the nations? at present a general agreement of the great powers on the limitations of military establishments seems impossible. it remains for some powerful nation to prove to the world that the great armaments are not necessary to continued peace, with honor and justice. some nation must take the first step.[ ] why not the united states? the nations of europe are surrounded by powerful enemies, while the united states is three thousand miles from any conceivable foe. they are potentially weak, while our resources are unlimited. they have inherited imperialism; we have inherited democracy. their society is permeated with militarism; ours is built on peace and liberty. our strategic position is unequaled, our resources are unlimited, our foreign policy is peaceful, our patriotism is unconquerable. in view of these facts, i ask you, what nation has the greatest responsibility for peace? are not we americans the people chosen to lift the burden of militarism from off the backs of our downtrodden brother? [ ] the widely heralded proposal in for a naval holiday by all the great powers is the first move in this direction.--_editor._ now what are we doing to meet this responsibility? on the one hand, we are performing a great work for peace. many of our statesmen, business men, and laborers, united in a common cause, are exerting a tremendous influence in behalf of arbitration and disarmament. on the other hand, we are spending more on our military establishment than any other world power;[ ] we are building more battleships than any other nation;[ ] we are no longer trusting our neighbors; we are warning them to beware of our mailed fist; and we are thereby declaring to the world that we have lost our faith in the power of justice and are now trusting to the force of arms. [ ] the orator is comparing the cost of the united states army, navy, and pensions upkeep with the military establishments of other powers.--_editor._ [ ] since naval rivalry in its acute form has centered between great britain and germany, european naval building programs have exceeded those of the united states.--_editor._ and why this paradoxical situation? why do we at the same time prepare for war and work for peace? it is simply because many of our statesmen honestly believe that the best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. it is true that a certain amount of strength tends to command respect, and for that reason a navy sufficient for self-defense is warranted. such a navy we now have. why should it be enlarged? naval enthusiasts would have us prepare, not for the probable but for the possible. seize every questionable act of our neighbors, they say, magnify it a thousand times, publish it in letters of flame throughout the land, and make every american citizen believe that the great powers are prepared to destroy us at any moment. having educated the people up to a sense of threatened annihilation, they burden them with taxes, build artificial volcanoes dedicated to peace, parade them up and down the high seas, and defy the world to attack us. then, they say, we shall have peace. is this reasonable? as sure as thought leads to action, so preparation for war leads to war. this argument that the united states, since she is a peace-loving nation, should have the largest navy in the world in order to preserve peace is illogical and without foundation. by what divine right does the united states assume the rôle of preserving the world's peace at the cannon's mouth? since when has it been true that might makes right, and that peace can be secured only by acting the part of a bully? it is unjust, it is unpatriotic, it is unstatesmanlike, for men to argue that the united states should browbeat the world into submission; that she should build so many battleships that the nations of the eastern hemisphere will be afraid to oppose the ironclad dragon of the western hemisphere. peace purchased at the price of brute force is unworthy of the name. surely the united states cannot afford to be guilty of such an injustice. if we wish to be free; if we wish to remain a true republic; if we purpose to continue our mighty work for humanity, we must limit our preparations for war. the best way to preserve peace is to think peace, to believe in peace, and to work for peace. the extent to which the great powers will go in order to secure enthusiasm for their military establishments is almost beyond comprehension. each nation has its great military rendezvous, its grand naval parades, its magnificent display of gorgeous military uniforms, its wave of colors, blare of trumpets, and bursts of martial music. the united states is now sending her navy around the world--for the purpose of training the seamen?--certainly, but also that the youth of our land may be intoxicated by the apparent glory of it all, and thus enlist for service; that the american citizens may be aroused to greater enthusiasm by this magnificent display of the implements of legalized murder, and thus be willing to build more floating arsenals rather than irrigate arid lands, develop internal waterways, build hospitals, schools, and colleges. the trouble with such exhibitions is, that it displays only the bright side of militarism. if in place of the russian battleships they should display the starving masses of dejected and despised beings who pay for those battleships; if in place of the gay german uniforms they should exhibit the rags of the disheartened peasants who pay for those uniforms; if in place of the grand parade they should produce masses of wounded men and rivers of blood; if in place of the stirring martial music they should produce the writhing agonies and awful groans of dying men; if in place of sham war they should produce actual war,--their exhibitions would make militarism unbearable. again, we are told that we have suddenly become a world power, and that we must prepare to exercise a new diplomacy under new conditions. we must increase our navy, they say, to enforce this new diplomacy. we must prepare to fight in behalf of the monroe doctrine. but why, i ask, cannot this new diplomacy be enforced as american diplomacy has always been enforced? we promulgated the monroe doctrine without a navy; we have maintained it for over eighty years without the show of force. if our new diplomacy is right, it is as strong as the world's respect for righteousness; if it is wrong, a hundred battleships cannot enforce it. we have become a world power, and therefore we have a world-wide responsibility, and that responsibility is to establish justice, not force; to build colleges, not battleships; to enthrone love, not hate; to insure peace, not war. our mission is to strike the chains from the ankles of war-burdened humanity. our duty is to proclaim in the name of the most high our faith in the power of justice as opposed to the force of arms. may it be said of us that we found the world burdened with militarism, but left it blessed with peace; that we found liberty among the strong alone, but left it the birthright of the weak; that we found humanity a mass of struggling individuals, but left it a united brotherhood. may it be said of us that we found peace purchased by suffering, but left it as free as air; that we found peace bruised and stained with militarism, but left it ruling the world through love and liberty. may it be said of us that we fulfilled our mission as a world power; that we were brave enough and strong enough to lead the world into the path of universal peace. the evolution of world peace by levi t. pennington, earlham college, richmond, indiana first prize oration in the national contest held at the university of chicago, may , the evolution of world peace in the progress of the world the dream of yesterday becomes the confident hope of to-day and the realized fact of to-morrow. as old systems fail to meet new conditions and new ideals, they are discarded; and into the limbo of worse than useless things is passing the system of human sacrifice to the moloch of international warfare. for centuries world peace has been the dream of the poet, the philanthropist, the statesman, and the christian. that dream is becoming a confident hope. this generation should see it an accomplished fact. there was a time when individual prowess determined the issue of every difference. might made right, so it was thought, and the winner in any controversy was he who had the heaviest club, the strongest arm, or the thickest skull. man's interrelationships multiplied as humanity advanced; with each new relation came new causes for quarrel, and for a time advancing civilization brought but increase in murders and assassinations. we know the process by which personal combat ceased; how the duel replaced murder and ambush and assassination; how courts of law replaced the duel. the dreamer saw the day when personal combat should be no more; the man of mind refuted all the arguments in favor of the duel of men; the constructive statesman of that early day instituted courts of law and equity. men who had a difference insisted that it was their quarrel and they alone could settle it; but reason saw that two combatants inflamed by passion are least fitted of all men to see where justice lies. many held that where honor is involved, no one can adjust the difficulty but those most directly concerned; but reason saw that a man's honor cannot be vindicated by killing his enemy or being killed by him. men said, "if personal combat is abolished, courage and strength will perish from the earth." but reason saw that personal combat in a selfish cause does not bring out the highest type of courage; and that there are opportunities enough for the exercise of the highest and best moral and physical courage to keep valor alive forever. it was finally urged that there would be no power to enforce the decree if personal differences were left to the adjudication of others; but reason said, "that power will come with the need for it." and so courts of law and equity arose, based on the need of humanity; laws were passed defining rights and limiting aggression; and when one man wronged another, that wrong was settled in court by the power of the whole people and not in personal combat with the bludgeon or the knife. for similar reasons wars between states and tribes have ceased; and face to face with the inevitable logic of past progress stands the world to-day. though humanity has been slow to see it, the truth has begun to dawn in the hearts of men--that international wars are no more to be justified than civil strife, tribal warfare, or personal combat. gradually the omnipotent power of right is overcoming the inertia of humanity, and the world is moving. one by one the awful truths concerning war are forcing themselves upon the consciousness and the conscience of men. the mighty power of fact is beating down the opposition to world peace. men have begun to realize the terrible cost, the unbelievable wastefulness of actual war, and the preparation for possible war. when we read that the armed peace of europe the past thirty-seven years has cost $ , , , , nearly as much as the aggregate value of all the resources of the united states, the richest nation on earth, the figures are so appalling that mortal mind cannot conceive them, and they lose their force. when we remember that two thirds of the national revenues of the united states are spent on wars past or prospective, the matter comes closer home. when we realize that the cost of a single battleship exceeds the value of all the grounds and buildings of all the colleges and universities in illinois, the figures have more meaning to us. and when we reflect that the cost of a single shot from one of the great guns of that battleship would build a home for an american family, a comfortable home costing $ , the common man realizes that the richest nation on earth cannot afford to go to war nor prepare for war. but mere money is one of the cheapest things in all the world. the price of war never can be paid in gold. not in national treasuries can you see the payment of that price, where smug, well-groomed politicians sign bonds and bills of credit. if you would see the payment of that price of war, you must go to the place of war. with all your senses open, step upon the battlefield. smell the smoke of burning powder, the reek of charging horses, the breath of fresh, red, human blood. feel the warmth of that blood as you seek to stanch the wound in the breast of one of the world's bravest, dying for he knows not what. hear the screams of the shells, the booming roar of the cannonade, the clash of the onslaught, the shrieks of the wounded, the groans of the dying, the last gasp of him whose life has reached its end. such is the infernal music of war. see the victim of the conflict reel in the saddle and fall headlong. cast your eyes on the mangled forms of godlike men, fallen in the midst of fullest life. come in the night after the battle and look upon the ghastly faces upturned in the moonlight. gaze on the windrows of the dead, mars's awful harvest, that impoverishes all and enriches none, and you know something of the cost of war. and yet we have seen but little. could we but enter the wasted homes and see the broken hearts that war has made; could we go to the almshouses and soldiers' orphans' homes and see widows and children by the thousand suffering the doled-out charity of state or nation because war has robbed them of their rightful protectors; could we but realize the agony of the broken home, a thousandfold worse than the agony of the battlefield,--then might we know more of the real cost of war. and still our idea would be inadequate, though we realized the full measure of every groan and heartache. earth's most priceless treasures are still more intangible things, the treasures of justice and kindliness and love. in that higher realm the cost of war is most terrible and most deadly. the spirit of war in the soldier sets aside the moral law, makes human life seem valueless, human suffering a thing to be disregarded, human slaughter an honorable profession. the war spirit blinds the eye of the statesman, till wrong seems right, folly seems expediency, and the death of thousands seems preferable to the life and happiness of all under terms of peace not dictated by his own will. justice is dethroned, and revenge takes up the iron scepter and lets fly the thunderbolt. the war spirit perverts the mind of the publicist, till the achievements of honorable peace sink into insignificance, and the press clamors for the war that means money to the publisher but death to innocent thousands who can have no possible interest in the conflict. the war spirit takes possession of the pulpit, and the minister called to preach the loving message of the prince of peace stirs up the spirit of contention and animosity, of hate and murder. could we but draw aside the curtain and, back of the tinsel and gold braid, see the crime, the hate, the moral degradation that war always brings, never again would a friend of humanity ask for war. but the eyes of the world are opening to the fact that the cost of war is far too high in money and in men, in suffering and sacrifice, and in those higher values of justice and kindliness and love. and as the thought once grew that personal differences might be settled without personal combat, so men are looking toward the settlement of international difficulties without recourse to the sword. they have seen that every argument against the duel of men applies with still greater force against the duel of nations. and the world has moved farther toward world peace in the past twenty-five years than in all the centuries of history that have preceded. world peace has become not the dream of the poet but the confident hope of the world, whose realization is the task whose accomplishment is set for the men of this generation. one by one the obstacles to world peace are being broken down. commerce has destroyed much of international prejudice. community of interest has obviated many former causes of quarrel. the sophistical arguments of the friends of war are being answered by the logic of hard facts. warfare has been ameliorated by international agreement. vast reaches of territory have been neutralized. unfortified cities are no longer to be bombarded in any country. actual disarmament has taken place between the united states and canada, between chile and argentina.[ ] norway and sweden have separated peaceably. bulgaria has achieved her independence without bloodshed. the dogger bank incident, which a century earlier would have plunged england and russia into war, has been adjusted amicably. two hague conferences have advanced tremendously the progress of international amity. over eighty arbitration treaties are now in force. we already have a permanent high court of nations, to which are being referred questions that would once have resulted in war. and we are nearer than the dreamer of last century dared hope to "the parliament of man, the federation of the world." [ ] the famous "disarmament" between the argentine republic and chile was brought about by a series of four documents of may , , one of july , , and one of january , . a preliminary protocol declares the disposition of both countries "to remove all causes for trouble in their international relations." a general treaty of arbitration unlimited in scope was signed for a period of ten years. a convention bound each country to "desist from acquiring the vessels of war now building for them, and from henceforth making new acquisitions." article ii says that "the two governments bind themselves not to increase their naval armaments during a period of five years, without previous notice." as a result of arbitration resulting from this series of agreements the frontier was disarmed and remains free from military posts. new naval programs of both countries were formulated after the expiration of the period of abnegation, and dreadnoughts are now in course of construction.--_editor._ but not yet has the millennium dawned. in the face of all this progress, armies and navies are stronger and more burdensome than ever. the united states spends more on wars past and prospective than for all educational purposes, and england, france, germany, russia, groan under the burdens of the armed peace of europe. armed to the teeth, the nations of the world lie watching one another. the mind of the world is convinced that war is futile and terribly wasteful. the heart of the world is convinced that war is cruel and inexcusable. the conscience of the world has admitted that war is wrong and morally unjustifiable. and still the preparation for war goes on, and unless conditions are changed, war is inevitable. what is to be done? the world's will must be moved, and men must be led to do what they have already admitted is right and just and expedient. as we have led in other days, so must america lead to-day. as the light of republican government and complete justice to the individual first saw full dawn in the united states, so the eyes of the world are turned toward us to see the dawn of world peace, and full justice to all the nations. it is ours to lead. the example of the united states will do more than a century of argument and conference. america should begin the disarmament that will eventually mean the triumph of world peace. we have naught to fear. we are far distant from the storm centers of the world. we have no foes within that demand a large standing army, and there are no enemies without that are anxious to try conclusions with us on land or sea. then away with war talk and war scares and "jingoism." in time of peace let us prepare for peace, that all the world may enjoy peace. american disarmament will be a tremendous stride toward the accomplishment of the world's desire--the cessation of international warfare; a great world's court, to settle all international differences; an international police force, to give effect to the decrees of this court; and the end of the burdens of armies and navies under which the whole world is groaning. let heart and voice and pen, pulpit and press and platform, soldier and statesmen and private citizen, ask for peace, and not for war. this is a part of the world's larger hope. pessimists there are who say that human nature is belligerent, and that war will never be abolished. but international warfare has already seen the handwriting on the wall. mars has been weighed in the balances and found wanting. the fruitless slaughter of the millions is not to be forever nor for long. let us hasten the day when the rolling war drum will be hushed forever, the bugle note no longer call to carnage; when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." love shall take the place of hate, and justice sit on the throne instead of greed. some day in the not distant future the nations that have all these centuries bowed before the god of war shall own eternal allegiance to the prince of peace. and "of the increase of his government and of peace there shall be no end." the waste of war--the wealth of peace by arthur foraker young, western reserve university, cleveland, ohio first prize oration in the national contest held at the university of michigan, may , the waste of war--the wealth of peace in the worship of mars, herodotus tells us, the ancient scythian erected an old scimitar at the summit of a huge brush heap. to this, as a symbol of the great god of war, he offered not only the produce of the land but also human life in sacrifice. we shudder as we picture the priest standing over his victim, his hands wet with the blood of his fellow man. we cry out in horror as we think of the lives these peoples sacrificed. we call it an inhuman glorification of a pagan deity. we call it a ruthless waste of wealth and human life. these practices we pronounce to be the result of a popular delusion--a false sense of obligation to the spirit of war. yet from the time the scythian drew the blood of his victim in homage to the great war god, even down to our own day, the nations have paid homage to mars. though we boast of our progress in civilization, history reveals the fact that we, too, have been the victims of the scythian's delusion. is it not a fact that one of the most terrible customs of savage men counts among its followers to-day all the nations of the earth? the subtlest skill of the scientist, the keenest intelligence of the statesman, vast stores of the world's resources, are devoted to maintaining great armies and navies, to inventing new means of attack or defense, to enlarging and making more deadly the enginery of war. what is our boast of civilization, while we tolerate this devotion of so many men and so much of wealth to war? is this not a sacrifice essentially pagan in spirit? are we not still paying unrighteous homage to mars? why, then, we ask, do nations make provision for war the first necessity of national life? behold russia. a few years ago, in time of famine, spending millions of money for war equipment when millions of her own peasantry were slowly starving for the lack of one dollar's worth of food per month. what motive impelled russia to this heathen conduct? it was solely that germany, france, england, japan, and the united states had great armies and navies against which starving russia must be prepared to defend herself. what dire stress compels england to-day to perpetuate her program of naval supremacy when she is struggling in the throes of budget difficulties which seem all but unsolvable? what is it that compels germany and france to tax themselves until they fairly stagger under the burden of military expenditures? naught other than a suicidal lust for military power. naught other than the infatuation of the dizzy, competitive war dance of mutual destruction--each nation blindly driven by all, and all by each. we as americans profess to find in the conduct of russia, in the militarism of england and germany and france, examples of militarism run rampant. how our hearts have warmed within us when we have thought of our own republic as the happy envied nation, free from the burden of militarism! our farmer has gone singing about his work, apparently not having to carry on his back a soldier, as does the european peasant. our mechanic has freely plied his trade without thought of supporting a sailor. yet how can we say that the united states in buying battleships and erecting coast defenses, in arming her soldiers with krag-jörgensens, has not been deprived of schools, colleges, and opportunities essential to happiness and prosperity? in a decade we have spent nearly a billion dollars on our navy alone. yes, we have aped the military fashions of europe and have set a new standard of military waste. verily our national advancement waits on militarism. inland waterways should be improved; forests must be safeguarded; other natural resources of untold value should be conserved; millions of acres of desert lands should be improved; millions in swamps should be redeemed. the problem of the nation's food supply is becoming urgent; for its solution we must look more and more to scientific methods in agriculture. yet contrast the support our government gives these vital interests with war's mighty drain on our treasury. congress appropriated $ , , for all expenditures in . of this amount $ , , were appropriated for war expenditures and the glories of militarism. for this same year agriculture received for all its needs the comparatively paltry sum of $ , , . in spite of the fact that our nation is devoting two thirds of its enormous national expenditures to war, our militarists point to our vast national wealth and sneer at the niggardly mortals who object to spending it for guns. it is evident that no nation is yet beyond the infatuation for display of the splendors of war, yet in every one there are signs of a new power that is coming upon us. all are thinking less of the glories of war--of the beat of the drum, of the rhythmic tread of regiments, of glittering sabers and of monster battleships--and are thinking more and more of the glories of peace, of thriving industries, of magnificent libraries, of comfortable homes, and of more efficient schools. obviously, though we still possess a war spirit, we are seeing with a clearer vision that the waste of war is depriving us of the fullest measure of the wealth of peace. our frame of mind is much the same as that of the ragged street urchin who, having lost his day's earnings, thinks of a hundred things which he might have spent it for. the same spirit is permeating every nation. the american manufacturer, the russian peasant, the english mechanic, the german scientist, the french scholar, are all asking themselves, "why need the world continue to carry this atlantean burden of war?" already this sentiment has accomplished practically all that can be done in humanizing war. it has outlawed the dumdum bullet, it has enforced radical sanitary measures, it has neutralized the red cross and brought its ministrations to the relief of the sufferings of war. but humanized war is not the goal of this sentiment. as long as there is an increase of armaments there will be war; as long as the battle rages there will be waste and suffering. the same sentiment which has humanized war now demands war's abolition. it has already accomplished something toward this end in making the settlement of international disputes through arbitration more probable than war. what it has not accomplished is the discrediting of militarism. it has failed to stop the growth of armaments. can we expect our regiments to find contentment in the irksome routine of training camp with never a thought of charging the enemy? can we expect to man the seas with fleets of war just for gay parade and cruises around the world? can we expect that our skilled gunners will be satisfied to practice, practice always, and never long for human targets? it is against arming nations for battle and tempting them to fight that the peace sentiment is rousing itself and is being organized. it is in this labor that peace societies the world over are performing valiant service. their great mission is the creation of an intelligent public opinion, a force more potent than government itself. what, for instance, was the purpose of the founder of this intercollegiate peace association? not, i take it, to give men a chance to win petty oratorical triumphs; not, i suppose, to bring together speakers to entertain such audiences as this--or to weary them. but their object must have been to set the men of our colleges to thinking on the great question of peace. in such ways are peace societies using the platform and the press to establish a firm basis for unity and peace throughout the world. yesterday the advocate of world peace was called a dreamer; to-day rapidly organizing public opinion demands the abolition of war and recognizes the wealth and culture of peace. yesterday we erected statues to those who died for their country; to-day we cheer the gladstones, the mckinleys, the roosevelts, who live for humanity. yesterday we bowed the knee to mars; to-day we join in peans to the prince of peace. yes, the new spirit of the day is fraternal; it is undaunted; it is for mankind. even now the world's geniuses are mustering the soldier citizens of every nation for a peaceful conflict. the great battles of to-morrow are to be fought in quiet laboratories, in legislative halls, in courts of justice, and on the broad battlefields of productive labor. the final outcome is, indeed, irresistible. racial movements have mixed all peoples; the oceans have become the world's common highways; the air is filled with voices speaking from city to city and from continent to continent; an international postal system makes the world's ideas one; there is quick participation of mankind in the fruits of invention and research. we behold financial and economic enterprises world-wide in their outreach; we feel the force of social projects and social ideals that concern not one but every nation; and we are participating in missionary movements that affect not one but every race, and are changing the very face of nature itself. our world is a world unified beyond all possible conception a century ago, and the world unity is a certain stepping stone to world peace. the world never offered grander opportunity to the nations for leadership--not for leadership in military splendor, but for leadership in the sublime paths of peace. for the united states this call means not only opportunity but even obligation. already this country has performed well her duty in fostering international arbitration. she has been a party to half of the cases where disputes between nations have been referred to the hague tribunal. arbitration is performing its mission with more and more efficiency, yet each year the war budgets of the nations are increasing. the peace sentiment now demands a decrease of armaments, a conversion of the waste of war into the wealth of peace. to demonstrate that this is practicable is the immediate opportunity before us, our present obligation. what is our waste of war expressed in terms of the wealth of peace? notice! two thirds of the cost of one dreadnought, like the mammoth _florida_ launched but yesterday, would erect and furnish a veritable palace for every foreign ambassador and minister of the united states, thus solving a perplexing problem of our diplomatic service. one twenty-second of the cost of one dreadnought would support for one year the entire force of the american board of foreign missions in their work of proclaiming our gospel of peace. one half the cost of one dreadnought would erect and equip twenty-five manual-training schools, teaching the rudiments of a trade to forty thousand young people each year. the cost of two dreadnoughts would provide every state in the union with a half-million dollars with which to save the juvenile delinquents from criminal courts and schools of vice behind prison bars. the cost of one dreadnought, wisely spent each year in the fight against tuberculosis, would make the white plague in a single generation a disease as rare as smallpox is to-day. where now we are erecting battleships and forts, it is for us to build libraries and schools. where now we drain our treasuries in equipping men to fight their fellow men, it is for us to arm against the common enemy, disease. where now we pour out our wealth before the pagan mars, it is for us to devote our treasure to supporting the works of the prince of peace. such a victory for peace would make america not simply a world power: it would make her the world leader. will we stop tagging at the heels of great britain and germany and travel this broadening road in which we can be first? how humiliating to struggle along, a trailer in the military procession! how noble to set the daring example of living up to the belief in peace! will we say: "see our hands; we bear no bludgeons. search us; we carry no concealed weapons. militarism we have thrown to the scrap heap of practices discredited and vicious. we have stopped war's wanton waste of men and treasure; we rejoice in the growing wealth of peace ideals realized"? thus shall we speed the steadily growing public opinion of the world, to the bar of which must finally come every nation which does aught to break or hinder the world's peace. the hope of peace by stanley h. howe, albion college, albion, michigan first prize oration in the national contest held at johns hopkins university, may , the hope of peace the history of civilization is a record of changing ideals, and ideals are best reared in the hearts of the world's young men. inevitably, nations look toward the cradle for their future and intrust the care of their destiny to the hands of youth. "tell me what are the prevailing sentiments that occupy the minds of your young men," declared edmund burke, "and i will tell you what is to be the character of the next generation." when the blood of youth is sluggish and impure; when the young hold wealth more dear than worth, remove the check of virtue from their selfish aims, establish mammon as their god, and, ambitious to govern the world, forget how to govern themselves,--then nations choke and die. but when the blood of youth is rich and pure, pulsating through the veins of the universe with strong, resistless surge; when fathers teach anew the angel's message of good will and peace, and sons build high their goal upon a pedestal of service and of truth,--then nations breathe and live. what hope, then, asks the world, finds the doctrine of peace in the ideals and aspirations of america's youth to-day? the nation faces a charge of militarism. it is the indictment of her critics that never before in american history has the government entertained an attitude so hostile toward her neighbors and so dangerous to the interests of peace. they point to the attempt to fortify the canal and cry out that america would drain her treasury to build a monument of reproach to international integrity. they criticize the vast appropriations for the navy and declare that america is starving her poor that she may more pompously parade the seas. they protest against the "war-game" on the rio grande[ ] and even charge that in the interest of a wall street king america invites the world to arms. and these are not illusions. the lure of gold has turned the nation from her mission. the spirit of commercialism has eclipsed the sentiment of brotherhood and tempted the republic to barter her honor for the price of imperial supremacy. wherein, then, again asks the world, finds america hope for the future? and to the charges of her critics, with their dismal prophecy of a "wrong forever on the throne," this is the nation's answer and defense--that an eclipse is never permanent, that the world stays not in the valley of the shadow forever, and that the solution of the problem, the fulfillment of a national mission, and the hope of world peace find their common assurance in the changing ideals of america's aspiring young men. [ ] part of the united states army was mobilized on the frontier for maneuvers, in , owing to the mexican revolutionary disturbances.--_editor._ the young american is essentially ambitious. he is wont to seek the shortest path to leadership, and, when blocked at one highway, to turn with undiminished ardor to another. and his ideal is a mirror of the age in which he lives. in revolutionary days he covets the glory of a minuteman, and in the deeds of warren and putnam finds the consummation of his hopes. again, in the hour of civil war his eyes turn toward the battlefield--and from her boys under twenty-one the union draws eighty-five per cent of her defenders. but fortunately for america this drama of the youth's ideal has one more act. the lure of fife and drum has become a thing of the past. the glamour of military life has become a dream of yesterday. the young man is learning that the prize of battle is never equal to the price. and with the growing conviction of the folly and futility of international strife must disappear the last apology for war. nations will cease to struggle, not when they have learned that war is a tragedy but when they have discovered that it is a farce. and the youth of to-day is learning it. in the same deplorable conditions which the nation's critics have regarded as an alarming tendency toward militarism, he reads a message of the absurdity of war. militarism itself is revealing a mission. based as it is on the spirit of aggrandizement, it is teaching to youth the economic value of a human life. it is uncovering its own selfish motives and betraying its own senseless ends. it is impressing the world with the truth that battles are fought for purse string and not for principle. it is teaching to youth a new ideal; it is itself the answer to complaints of friends and calumnies of foes. it is the cloud before the dawn. it heralds the coming of the brightest epoch yet chronicled in american history. it is the realization of that glorious prophecy of john hay that the time is coming when "the clangor of arms shall cease, and we can fancy that at last our ears, no longer stunned by the din of armies, may hear the morning stars singing together and all the sons of god shouting for joy." and is this but the dream of a visionary? is it merely the fancied perception of an inexistent star? is it nothing more than a groundless hope and an alluring vagary? the answer is visible everywhere. and the hope of peace finds its safest assurance among the institutions of learning in america. james bryce has referred to the united states as the nation having the largest proportion of its young men in college. in the last month of june more than fifty thousand collegians wore the cap and gown of graduation. it is to the trust of the college-bred man that the peace movement confides its future, and modern education assumes no greater responsibility than the training of the new world-citizen. already the school has become the most potent factor in the new uplift. the youth is no longer dependent upon the newspaper for his knowledge of world-politics. an intelligent study of foreign affairs is at last regarded as of as much importance as a study of the past. to broaden the young man's vision of the world, prominent educators are even advocating traveling fellowships. in twenty-five of the larger universities of america an association of cosmopolitan clubs is establishing the groundworks for a wider international fraternity. plans are already under way to have an organized delegation of more than a hundred students of all nationalities present at the third hague conference. day by day the problem of world-unity is becoming more and more deeply embedded in the mind and thought of the rising generation. more and more is youthful patriotism becoming a realization of the truth that "above all nations is humanity." the lure of war is losing its magnetic power and the brotherhood of man becoming more and more an international reality. a sentiment for universal peace is sweeping the world, and behind the defenses of advancing civilization, armed with the strength of a lofty and unselfish purpose, stands an army of america's young men, mustered from the nation's colleges, enlisted to serve for an eternity, and invulnerable in the protection of a new and a conquering ideal. therefore the significance of the young man in the world's affairs to-day is something more than a fancy. again and again the plea for world-harmony hears a response in the changing ideals of a new generation. the growing sentiment of the educated youth of japan finds its crystallization in the efforts of count okuma toward the consummation of world-disarmament. the spirit of the youth of england finds expression in the ambitious dream of george v, whose hope it is to tie the bond of anglo-saxon unity, long since dissevered by george iii. among the young men of russia the life of the great philosopher of world-citizenship has left a lasting conviction of the senselessness of war. even in imperialistic germany the reckless building of dreadnoughts brings out a vigorous and uncompromising protest from the thinking youth of the land. in america a vision of the international parliament of man, growing large in the minds of her leading statesmen, finds expression in the continued philanthropy of a great industrial king. and, most significant of all, these are the world-wide examples that the college man enthrones in the empire of his thoughts. sixty thousand european students, bound together by the cosmopolitan ties of a peace fraternity, have ceased to glorify the triumphs of the battlefield. the commentaries of the hero-worshiper to-day do not record the names of a marlborough or a bonaparte. rather does the young man find his idols in the more humble annals of a tolstoy or a hay. and the new ideal of international peace is not merely the religion of a few enthusiasts. in an individual way these apostles of peace voice to the world the spirit of the unnumbered thousands of obscurer men whose lives and talents are directed, not to the construction of material kingdoms but to the building of a better and more world-wide brotherhood. such is the hope of peace. the nation's critics may continue their indictment, and, pointing out the crises of the hour, paint in dismal hues a picture of the problems never to be solved except by shot and shell. her skeptics, blinded by thought of the errors of the past, may prophesy the desecration of her honor and the disappointing failure of her hopes. the press may pen a graphic story of the military spirit of the age, and frowning patriarchs relate the deeds of golden days gone by. but underneath this cloud that overhangs, and almost hidden in the gloom of history's disparagement, the new world-citizen discerns the birth-light of a brighter and more steadfast star,--perceives the coming triumph of good will and peace,--and the awakened eyes of expectant america look forward with promise to the dawn of that new day when a nation shall be judged by the weight of its cross and not by the wealth of its crown. the roosevelt theory of war by percival v. blanshard, university of michigan, ann arbor first prize oration in the western group contest, , and in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , the roosevelt theory of war ex-president roosevelt has made this astounding statement, "by war alone can we acquire those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life." these words, coming from the lips of a nation's idol, have fallen like a bomb shell in the camp of the pacifists. not that mr. roosevelt's opinion was of overwhelming weight, but that he was voicing the opinion of some of the most influential thinkers of the modern world. not long before the german philosopher nietzsche had taken a like position, and he was indorsed by von moltke, the statesman; ernest renan, the historian; hegel, the philosopher; charles kingsley and canon farrar, the divines. we must have a care, we peace advocates, how we treat such men's opinions. if they are right; if, as they maintain, war develops a nation, then we are fighting against the instrument of our own salvation and smothering the only hope of the nation itself. but are they right? does war make for national greatness? before we can give a rational verdict we must answer certain other questions. what is our nation, anyway? what are the factors that make for its greatness? and how does war affect these factors? plainly our nation is not some abstraction that haunts the marble halls at washington. nor is it our vast dominion on which, like england's, the sun never sets. you will find it rather in workshop and store and factory; it is no more nor less than our men. if the capital at washington is founded on pygmy manhood, it will be blown away like thistledown before some passing wind of revolution. russia, turkey, spain, will tell you that. if our men are giants, the nation will be lasting as adamant. england and germany and america are monumental testimonies. now what are the qualities in our men that make the nation great? here a problem in analysis confronts us. let us go about it as does the student in the laboratory. he dissects a plant or mineral to find the mysteries of its nature. we are to dissect a civilization to find the factors of its strength. one little specimen will reveal the secrets of the whole species. so one sample of civilization will show the hidden springs of all. go with me to the public square of any modern city and there you will behold the qualities that build all civilization. from the hum and rattle and roar that rises from the sea of humanity come a thousand various voices, but all speak of one theme--industry. there in the center of the throng and press a slender monument rises, crowned perhaps with a figure of liberty or justice. it tells you a simple story of idealism. yonder stands a silent, vine-clad church, crowned by a mighty finger pointing heavenward and beckoning always to the higher life. what need of going farther? industry, idealism, morality--already we have found the secret of human success, the triple key to all advance, of man or group or nation. here is carlyle, with his gospel of labor, the labor that conquers all things; here is ruskin, with his exalting idealism, that gives an aim and purpose to all human toil; here is the great apostle paul himself, who transfigures that toil and exalts that purpose with his everlasting gospel of moral sublimity. here is our threefold criterion, by which every nation must stand or fall. the anglo-saxon is what he is through unceasing industry, perpetual aspiration, and moral strength. the central african is what he is through inbred sluggishness, total lack of purpose, and almost total absence of morality. these are the basic elements of national greatness. but the great question still remains, how does war affect them? concerning the effect of war on labor, we declare unhesitatingly that the two are everlasting foes, and that whenever war lays hands on labor's throat, it strangles her. this is part of the inevitable program of war, for note that it is on the laboring men that the dreadful claims of war must fall. mark its course. a bugle sounds the call to arms. from workshop, mill, and factory the laborers pour forth; out go the men into a trade where plunder and robbery are a means of livelihood; when pillage and slaughter wane, indolence becomes the order of the day; commerce degenerates into blockade-running by sea and marauding by land. how tame the life of peace to this wild life of war! and all the time the love of toil is fading from men's minds; at home the factory wheels are turning more and more feebly, and when at last the sword is laid aside, there is only "confusion worse confounded," for the channels of labor are choked with men reared in habits of indolence or trained in the school of vice. before the scar on that nation's industry can finally be healed, decades and perhaps centuries of peace must pass away. but if war is a scar on the nation's industry, it is likewise a blot on her ideals. though this element of idealism at first seems visionary and impractical, it is one of the foundation stones of progress. the fixed gulf between what man is and what he knows he might be is the decisive factor in his advance. ideals are the pulleys of the unseen, round which man throws his hopes and aims, by which he pulls himself across the chasm and into the larger life. to advance at all, man must have ideals--for himself, for his family, for his nation. but mark the effect of war on these ideals. in place of the ideal of peace--to serve men and uplift them--one is taught the ideal of war--to make himself the most widely feared of professional murderers. instead of the ideal of peace--to make his family comfortable, happy, and prosperous--comes in the war ideal, by whose terms the family head deserts his own flock to kill other family heads for the eternal glory of the stars and stripes. as for his ideal of the nation's greatness, we have ample testimony that when bullets and cannon balls cone crashing through the splendid structure of his purpose, it speedily crumbles into an ignominious desire to hide himself behind the nearest tree. no; do not say that war builds up ideals; it tears them down and tramples them in the dust; aye more, it sets back crime itself where they should rightly stand. but if war so dethrones a nation's ideals, what may it not do to a nation's morality? imagine if you can a million men, the core of the national power, turning themselves into machines to carry out blindly the schemes of leaders who may be right or wrong; schooled in the belief that manslaughter is manliness, that the rash courage of the brute is above the moral courage of a man; forgetful of the meaning of human life; thoughtless of a thing so common as death; heedless of its eternal consequences. no wonder channing cried so bitterly: "war is the concentration of all human crimes. under its standard gather violence, malignity, rage, fraud, rapacity, and lust. if it only slew men, it would do little. but it turns man into a beast of prey. here is the evil of war, that man, made to be the brother, becomes the deadly foe of his kind; that man, whose duty is to mitigate suffering, makes the infliction of suffering his study and end." no, mr. roosevelt, for once at least you are wrong! we cannot believe that war builds up a nation. rather will we believe those words of herbert spencer, more sweeping but far more true, "advance to the highest forms of man and society depends on the decline of militancy and the growth of industrialism." "but wait," you say; "all this is theory and abstraction. we want matters of fact. your case may be true as philosophy, but you have failed to ground it in example." so it is to history that our last appeal must be made, for, says bolingbroke, "history is philosophy, teaching by example." every decree of her stern tribunal is impartial and irrevocable. war the tonic or war the poison? she is the final judge. she will take you back, if you will, to her childhood days and point you out vast empires, owning the known world, babylonians, assyrians, egyptians, medes, and persians, fearful fighters all of them. but no, not quite all either. on a sandy stretch of seashore, half hidden by the unwieldy empires around it, we see a timid, peaceful little people called the hebrews; they alone, from all that mighty company, have stood the "wreckful siege" of thirty centuries. watch its sinister movement down the ages and you will see the war cloud hover over greece, and her republics melt to nothing in disunion and decay. it hovers over the huns, and they suddenly sink from sight; over islam, and its civilization crumbles faster than it grew; over spain, and all the new world treasures cannot save her from decay. finally, like the cloud no bigger than a hand, it rises from the island of corsica and moves toward central europe. all too well does europe know its meaning. from north and south, from east and west, she pours into the field the finest armies that the old world ever saw. then she pauses. europe grows tense with a nameless dread. the storm cloud blackens, hovers lower, then bursts with all its fury through the continent. for ten long years, at the command of an imperial butcher, the soil is drenched with blood, the sky grows lurid from burning paris to burning moscow, three million homes are draped in black. grand, indeed, and glorious! but europe lost more than her gorgeous standards, more than her ruined cities; she left her manhood on those bloody fields. we might extend the awful picture, but the story is the same, dread tale of death for nations as for men. is not this enough? is it not clear that this traitor to labor, this despoiler of ideals, this foe to morality, is not the benefactor but the destroyer of nations? and shall we not "here highly resolve" no longer to walk in this "valley of the shadow of death," but to hasten toward the dawning of a brighter, purer day? for in spite of pessimism, in spite of scholarship, in spite of history, the day is "coming yet, for a' that-- when man to man, the world o'er, shall brothers be for a' that." national honor and vital interests by russell weisman, western reserve university cleveland, ohio first prize oration in the eastern group contest, , and second prize in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , national honor and vital interests the day for deprecating in general terms the evils of war and of extolling the glories of peace is past. such argument is little needed. international trade requires peace. international finance dictates peace. even armies and navies are now justified primarily as agents of peace. yet so wantonly are these agents looting the world's treasuries that they are themselves forcing their own displacement by courts of arbitration. the two hundred and fifty disputes successfully arbitrated in the past century challenge with trumpet-tongued eloquence the support of all men for reason's peaceful rule. to-day no discussion is needed to show that if war is to be abolished, if navies are to dwindle and armies diminish, if there is to be a federation of the world, it must come through treaties of arbitration. in this way alone lies peace; yet in this way lies the present great barrier to further progress--the conception which many nations, especially the united states, hold of "national honor and vital interests." the reservation from arbitration of so-called matters of national honor and vital interests constitutes the weak link in every existing arbitration treaty between the great powers of the world. this reservation furnishes the big-navy men all the argument they need. it destroys the binding power of the treaties by allowing either party to any dispute to refuse arbitration. it was by this reservation that the united states senate so lately killed the british and the french treaties. and i contend here to-night that the one subject which imperatively demands discussion is national honor and vital interests. that the next important step must be the exposure of the reactionary influence of the united states in excepting these matters from arbitration. only fifteen months ago president taft made his memorable declaration that this barrier ought to be removed from the pathway of peace. he proposed that the united states negotiate new treaties to abide by the adjudication of courts in every international issue which could not be settled by negotiation, whether involving honor or territory or money. the next morning the proposal was heralded by the press throughout the world. a few days later the halls of parliament resounded with applause when great britain's secretary of state for foreign affairs announced that his government would welcome such a treaty with the united states. france soon followed. then, to the surprise of all, hesitating germany and cautious japan showed a like willingness to enter into such agreements. universal peace seemed all but realized. the cause was at once borne up on a mighty wave of public opinion. the peace societies were in a frenzy of activity. mass meetings of indorsement were held in england and america. editorials of approval appeared in all parts of the world. the movement was now irresistible. within eight months the british and the french treaties were drafted. three of the greatest nations of the world were at last to commit themselves unreservedly to the cause of international peace. even disputes involving national honor should not halt the beneficent work of high courts of law and of reason. the day when the treaties were signed, august , , was hailed as a red-letter day in the annals of the civilized world. it was proclaimed the dawn of a new and auspicious era in the affairs of men and of nations. during all the months preceding the action of the senate on these treaties the only statesman of any prominence to raise his voice in opposition was ex-president theodore roosevelt. the gist of his successive and violent attacks on the treaties is contained in this utterance, which i quote, "it would be not merely foolish but wicked for us as a nation to agree to arbitrate any dispute that affects our vital interests or our independence or our honor." in this spirit, to the surprise and disappointment of the whole nation, the senate amended the treaties out of their original intent, and placed upon them limitations that defeated their purpose. by the senate's action the united states is still committed to the pretense that there may be occasion for a just and solemn war, that vital interests and national honor may force us to fight. what, then, are the vital interests that can be conserved only by saber and bullet? nothing more, nothing less, according to various acknowledged authorities, than a state's independence and its territorial integrity. did the keen mind of our former president really foresee the seizure of some of our territory by england or france? yet he protests it that it would be "not merely foolish but wicked for us as a nation to agree to arbitrate any dispute that affects our vital interests." did senator lodge and his threescore colleagues who amended the treaties actually fear an attempt to overthrow our form of government, to destroy our political institutions, or to take away those individual rights and sacred privileges upon which our government was founded? yet to save us from such fate they refused unlimited arbitration. for the united states to except from arbitration her vital interests is obvious pretense. to add thereto her national honor is extreme hypocrisy. what is national honor? no man knows. it is one thing to-day; another, to-morrow. it may involve an indemnity claim, a boundary line, a fisheries dispute. in fact, any controversy may be declared by either party, at will, to be a question of national honor. thus in the hands of an unskilled or malicious diplomacy, any question which was originally a judicial one may become a question of national honor. what, then, will we arbitrate? every case in which a favorable award is assured us. if we want texas, we send an army after it. every case that does not rouse our anger. let the _maine_ blow up and we fight. a treaty with an elastic exception like this is a farcical sham and a delusion. it is high time the true and humiliating significance of these fearsome phrases should be as familiar to every taxpayer as is the burden of bristling camps and restless navies. read the record of great britain's first offer of unlimited arbitration in the olney-pauncefote treaty of . there, too, you will find national honor and vital interests clogging the machinery of universal peace. by these same exceptions the senate emasculated that treaty and defeated the spirit of the agreement. is it conceivable that the senate actually feared that our interests would be imperiled by that treaty? did it delve out some hidden dangers which escaped the careful scrutiny of both the english and american embassies, some peril unforeseen by the keen judicial mind of president cleveland, who characterized the defeat of the treaty as "the greatest grief" of his administration. but this is not all. the american representatives at both hague conferences were the first to place these same limitations on all arbitration proposals. look at it from what point of view you will, our government's conduct must appear humiliating. considering the fact that universal arbitration treaties have proved practical, it is well-nigh incredible. behold our bellicose sister american republics. argentina and chile, brazil and argentina, bolivia and peru, all have agreements for the arbitration of all questions whatsoever. all the central american republics are bound by treaty to decide every difference of whatever nature in the central american court of justice. denmark's three treaties with italy, portugal, and the netherlands withhold no cause, however vital, from reason's peaceful sway. norway and sweden likewise have an agreement to abide by the decision of the hague court in whatever disputes may occur. the very existence of all these treaties is significant, yet even more significant is the fact that they have been triumphantly tested. norway and sweden at one extremity of the globe and argentina and chile at the other have thus quietly settled disputes in which their honor and interests were seriously involved. do you ask further evidence of the hypocrisy with which our senate parades our national honor and our vital interests to the undoing of a grand work? search our history and you will find it in abundance. in the great case of the alabama claims, charles francis adams pronounced the construction of confederate ships in english ports to be a violation of the international law of neutrality. this certainly was a question of national honor and vital interests, yet he pleaded for arbitration. in reply lord john russell said, "that is a question of honor which we will never arbitrate, for england's honor cannot be made the subject of arbitration." the case was debated for six years. then came england's "grand old man," the mighty gladstone, with a different view. "it is to the interest," he said, "not only of england and the united states, but of the world, peaceably to settle those claims." he submitted them to a joint high commission. england lost and paid. thus the honor of both nations was successfully arbitrated. likewise the newfoundland fisheries case had been a bone of contention between great britain and america from the day our independence was recognized. as late as it threatened to become the cause of war. no question ever arose which more vitally affected the interests of america, yet the senate recently accepted a settlement by arbitration. similarly, the alaska fur seal dispute, the alaskan and the venezuelan boundary disputes, and the northeast boundary controversy all involved both the vital interests and the national honor of england and america, yet all were satisfactorily and permanently arbitrated. so excited were we over our northwest boundary that the principal issue of a political campaign was "the whole of oregon or none! fifty-four forty or fight!" yet we peaceably acquiesced in a treaty that gave us neither. yes, our honor may be arbitrated. if we are ill-prepared for war, we arbitrate. if we are sure of a favorable award, we arbitrate. but we must have a loophole, an ever-ready escape from obligation. posing as the most enlightened nation on the face of the globe, we refuse entirely to displace those medieval notions according to which personal honor found its best protection in the dueling pistol, and national honor its only vindication in slaughter and devastation. to unlimited arbitration we refuse to submit. fifteen years ago england, the mighty england, gave us her pledge that no cause should ever justify war. this pledge our senate in the name of honor refused. unlimited arbitration agreements were suggested at both hague conferences. americans promptly placed restrictions upon them in the name of honor. again has england with enthusiasm just offered us unrestricted arbitration. again she is repulsed by our senate in the name of honor. france, too, bears to our doors an unqualified pledge of arbitration. france, too, is repulsed by our senate in the name of honor. germany and japan express a desire to settle every question at the bar of justice. impelled by honor we pass their desire unheeded. our clevelands, our olneys, our edward everett hales, our carl schurzes, our john hays, have all urged unlimited arbitration. our davises and clarks and platts and quays in senate seats have undone their work in the name of honor. our charles eliots and nicholas butlers, our albert shaws and hamilton holts, now plead for universal peace through unlimited arbitration. senators bacon and lodge and heyburn and hitchcock, apparently impelled by constitutional prerogative, party prejudice, or personal animosity, now cast their votes for limitations in the name of honor. from the platform of peace conferences, from the halls of colleges, from the pulpit and the bench, from the offices of bankers and merchants and manufacturers, from the press, with scarcely a column's exception, there arises a swelling plea for treaties of arbitration that know no exceptions. in the name of honor that plea is defied. honor? no, an ocean of exception large enough to float any number of battleships for which pride and ambition may be willing to pay! honor? no, a finical and foolish reservation that at any moment may become a maelstrom of suspicion and rage and hatred and destruction and death! honor? no, a mountainous barrier to peace that must be leveled before there can be progress! honor? no, the incarnation of selfishness, the cloak of shrewd politics, the mask of false patriotism! national honor? no, national dishonor! before the nations of the world the united states stands to-day in an unenviable light. it is a false light. since the days of william penn and benjamin franklin our people have led in much of the march upward from the slough of weltering strife. many a stumbling block to progress we have removed from the rugged pathway, but for fifteen years our government has refused to touch the barrier of national honor and vital interests. england and france have now laid this duty squarely at our door. "it is a social obligation as imperative as the law of moses, as full of hope as the great physician's healing touch." let us here highly resolve that there shall be uttered a new official interpretation of national honor and vital interests, an interpretation synonymous with dignity and fidelity, sincerity, and integrity, and confidence in the vows both of men and of nations. "if we have 'faith in the right as god gives us to see the right,' we shall catch a vision of opportunity that shall fire the soul with a spirit of service which the darkness of night shall not arrest, which the course of the day shall not weary." the evolution of patriotism by paul b. blanshard, university of michigan, ann arbor first prize oration in the central group contest, , and in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , the evolution of patriotism robert southey has asked through the lips of a little child the greatest peace question that the world has known. he pictures a summer evening on the old battlefield of blenheim. on a chair before his vine-clad cottage sat old kaspar while his grandchildren, wilhelmine and peterkin, played on the lawn. suddenly peterkin from a nearby brook unearthed a skull and, running, brought it to kaspar's knee. the old man took the gruesome thing from the boy, and told him that this had been the head of a man killed in the great battle of blenheim. then little wilhelmine looked up into her grandfather's face and said: "now tell us all about the war, and what they fought each other for." here we have the central question in the problem of war. why do men fight? through the answer to that question lies the path to world-peace. few men fight to-day for glory. modern militarism has no place for lancelots and galahads. the glory of the regiment has absorbed the glory of the individual. few men fight to-day to gain great wealth. the treasures that glittered before pizarro do not tempt our soldiers. material wealth is more easily won in factory or farm or mill. few men fight to-day for religion. the conquest of religion has become a conquest of peace; the very ideal of peace is an end of religion itself. glory, wealth, religion--these are no longer the causes of war. then why do men fight? the answer is obvious. men fight to-day for patriotism. patriotism is the cause of war. the next step in our reasoning is more difficult. if patriotism is the cause of war, how shall we treat the cause to destroy the result? shall we attempt to abolish patriotism as tolstoy would have us do, or shall we try to change its nature so that war as a natural result will be impossible? to answer these questions we must study patriotism from its very beginnings. we must ask: what is patriotism? where did it come from? what place has it in our life? observe first the simplest cell of life, the amoeba. we can watch it through the microscope. it is so tiny that it keeps house in a drop of water. it has neither emotion nor consciousness, in the human sense. it lives a while, and then splits in two to form other cells that have no connection with each other. yet this infinitesimal bit of life has an instinct, the instinct to save itself. watch an amoeba as fire is brought near. it immediately moves away. its every act is regulated by this one instinct, self-preservation. now let us leave the microscope and go outdoors. over there is a bird in a tree top, feeding its young in a nest. suppose that a fire should suddenly consume the tree. would the mother bird fly away in safety? no, it would die on its nest in the effort to save its young. there is more than self-preservation here. the scientist will tell you that the instinct has expanded to include the preservation of the offspring. and now turn to primitive man. the recent excavations in sussex will give us a picture of him. he is a wild, gorilla-like figure that creeps beneath the trees. he can leap with lightning force on his prey. he drapes his body with bearskins, and eats meat from fingers that end in claws. and yet with all his savage ferocity, this is more than an animal. this is a man. in his breast there stir the instincts of a man. in his life we see the vital element of patriotism, love. his little savage family is more precious to him than all the world. he will fight and die, not only for self-preservation but for those who to him are "brother and sister and mother." this is the stamp of the human. this is the potentially divine. but as the storms of war beat about these little savage families, the sense of common danger welded them into one. out of grim necessity friendship came, and friendship gave birth to patriotism. loyalty and sacrifice were not limited to the family; men fought and died for their tribe. and now let us turn the microscope upon ourselves. we would fight for our country. we say because we love our country. we call that feeling patriotism. it is more extended than the savage love of tribe; it gives loyalty to a great government and democratic principles. we speak of that feeling as divine, but it is terribly human. its expression is the same harsh ferocity that inspired the life of the savage. to-morrow america goes to war. in great black type we read the call for men, and a sense of common danger thrills us. in the evening by a street lamp's glare we watch a passionate agitator who points to a flag that we have learned to love. the tramp, tramp of passing regiments and the sound of martial music thrill us. we lay down our tool or pen and march to the front. and then comes the first engagement. the air is blackened with rifle smoke; the roar of cannonry deafens us. dazed, we crouch behind an earthwork while the enemy creeps through the smoke. suddenly they charge. we fire, but they surge on through the smoke. they mount the earthwork. we leap together! men scream hoarsely! musket butts crash! daggers plunge into quivering flesh! divine feeling! glorious patriotism! the passing of this savage patriotism is inevitable. the whole course of nature is against it. the very history of development will tell you that. loyalty has never been an immutable thing. it has been a ceaseless and irresistible growth from the individual to the family, to the tribe, to the nation. the time for a world-patriotism has come. why should men limit their loyalty by a row of stones and trees that we call a boundary? why are men patriots, anyway, except to save their privileges and their government? the primitive patriot had no choice but to fight. he was put down in a little plot of cleared ground hemmed in by mighty forests, and made to hew out a home in a vast world of enemies. but how far we have come from him! the twentieth-century world is a little world. our earth is like an open book. we have cut through the jungle wastes of africa; we have photographed the poles. we sell and buy things from greenland and java. in such a civilization war-patriotism has no place. it is no longer the only guide to self-preservation; it has become the most terrible instrument of self-destruction. and for just this reason war-patriotism must go. it runs counter to the whole trend of nature itself. it is diametrically opposed to the mission of patriotism in the world. just as those little savage families joined hands in tribal loyalty, just as the scattered clans and tribes united under national government, so nations must clasp hands around the globe in a new spirit of "worldism" that shall make war impossible. but we cannot gain a world-spirit by a sudden destruction of our patriotism. we will never usher in tranquillity with a crash. the nihilism of tolstoy would plunge us into lawlessness and anarchy, for the chief element of patriotism we must keep. "what is that element?" you ask. it is the willingness of the individual to sacrifice his welfare for the welfare of the group. there we have the stem of the world-spirit of to-morrow. but the blossom will not burst forth in a night. it must come by an unfolding and a growth. we cannot climb to universal peace upon a golden ladder and cut the rungs beneath us. evolution builds on the past. the final spirit of "worldism" will be a broadening and a deepening and a humanizing of the spirit of sacrifice which is the noblest element in our patriotism. "but," you ask, "if the evolution of patriotism is inevitable, what have we to do with it? why should we meddle with the course of nature?" we reply that the evolution must come through you. we are not "puppets jerked by unseen wires." "consciousness," says bergson, "is essentially free." man the savage or man the philosopher--he alone can decide. let him purify patriotism with christianity and he has brotherhood; adulterate it with avarice and he has war. the evolution of patriotism is not a physical thing. listen to huxley, "social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of the ethical process." the evolution of patriotism, then, is a moral thing, and morality is man-made. we are men, but we can be supermen. we are patriots of a nation. we can be patriots of the world. the evolution of patriotism is no theorist's dream. it is a palpable fact. the patriot of one age may be the scoundrel of the next. a turn of the kaleidoscope and paul the convict trades places with nero the emperor. who was the ideal ancient patriot? the statesman, pericles? the thinker, plato? no. the most efficient murderer, a macedonian boy. "i must civilize," he says. so he starts into his neighbor's country with forty thousand fighters at his back. does persia yield its banner? no. then crush it. does thebes resist? then burn it to the ground. do the women prate of freedom? load them with slave chains. what? do they still hold out? then slaughter the swine. and as men watch him wading through seas of blood, riding roughshod over prostrate lives and dead hopes and shattered empires, the blind age cries out, "o godlike alexander!" "godlike!" oh, but there's new meaning in that word to-day. how much nobler a picture our modern patriot presents! not waving the brand of destruction, not a king of murder will you find the great patriot of to-day. his thunderbolt of conquest was a host of righteousness. his empire was built in the hearts of men. in the teeming slums of the world's greatest city he lifted the standard of the christ. haggard children stretched out hands for bread. he fed them with his last crust. thousands were dying in the city's filth. he pointed them to a more beautiful city where pain should be no more. and when the body of william booth was borne through the silent throngs of london streets, a million heads were bowed in reverence to this patriot of a purer day. in every hamlet of civilization some heart called him godlike. is not the trend of patriotism clear? are not the seeds of a new world-loyalty already in our soil? the trumpet call to war can never rouse this newer patriotism. the summons "peace on earth and good will to men"--that is the future bugle call. and for us the task is clear. to take our destiny into our own hands, to throw off the prejudices of nationalism, to turn our faces resolutely to the future and strive for that summit of brotherhood and universal peace, that "one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves." certain phases of the peace movement by calvert magruder, st. john's college, annapolis, maryland first prize oration in the eastern group contest, , and second prize in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , certain phases of the peace movement ladies and gentlemen: we are gathered here this evening in the confident expectation that a rule of reason will soon be established among the nations. it has been a hard, at times almost a discouraging, fight--for it is difficult to convince the world of its own insanity, and lovers of peace have often been tempted to cry in their despair, "how long, o lord, how long?" but there have always been men, with vision unaffected by martial glamour, who have foreseen in the logic of the world's history the inevitable end of war, and we have progressed now to a point where peace is the normal condition in international relationships. but it is an armed peace, founded on the false principle of suspicion and distrust, and we come now to consider the practical question of what the third hague conference can do to establish peace upon a firm and enduring foundation. you will remember that the first hague conference established a so-called permanent court of arbitration. it is not a definite, tangible tribunal, but merely a panel of a hundred or more men from whom the arbiters in each specific case may be selected; and therefore, though it is a great step in the right direction and though it has accomplished some good work, it has not commanded full confidence and recognition. to supplement this court the conference of proposed a new organization--a judicial court of arbitration, to be composed of seventeen judges of recognized legal authority, to sit for terms of twelve years, and to be competent to decide all cases. here, then, is the nucleus of an easily accessible supreme court of the world, whose decisions would soon build up a new system of international law. its composition, jurisdiction, and procedure are agreed upon. the vital problem, a mode of selecting the judges, remains unsettled. evidently, then, the first great duty of the next hague conference is to put into operation this court, of which all the nations recognize the need and desirability. following logically the establishment of competent machinery for arbitration comes the second great duty of that conference--the passage of a convention binding the nations to resort to this court in all cases that fail of ordinary diplomatic settlement. the judicial court of arbitration, if the nations are not bound to use it, would certainly fail of its purpose. a general treaty making arbitration obligatory is not too much to demand, for the conference of declared itself unanimous "in recognizing the principle of compulsory arbitration." separate arbitration treaties mounting into the hundreds have been negotiated between individual nations, but almost all contain that fatal reservation of questions of "honor and vital interests." honor and vital interests--could any words be more vague and indefinite? are these not the very cases which interested nations are least competent to decide? a complete answer to that silly reservation is found in our hundred years' peace with great britain. as john w. foster, that keen student of our diplomatic history, has said, "the united states can have no future dispute with england more seriously involving the territorial integrity, the honor of the nation, its vital interests, or its independence, than those questions which have already been submitted to arbitration." denmark has agreed with italy and the netherlands to arbitrate all questions that fail of diplomatic settlement, thus insuring perpetual peace between those nations. here indeed is the pathway of true national honor. coincident with the establishment of the legal machinery for arbitration and the growth thereof, we would naturally have expected a cessation in the mad race for armament-supremacy. but the very reverse has happened, and to deal firmly with this contradictory situation is the third great duty of the next hague conference. of what avail are our courts of arbitral justice when this intolerable economic waste is permitted! to limit armaments was the avowed purpose of the first hague conference, but nothing was accomplished save the adoption of a neatly worded resolution that the limitation aforesaid is "highly desirable for the enlargement of the material and moral well-being of humanity." in the subject was again under discussion, the nations exhorted to a serious examination of the question--and there the matter rested. we have reached now an insufferable stage where effective action must be taken. let us hear no more that deceptive catch phrase, "if you want peace prepare for war." when bad blood is likely to arise between individuals the very worst policy to pursue is to furnish them with weapons. and so it is with nations. consider, if you will, the neck-and-neck race between great britain and the german empire in the construction of battleships. what fool will call that preparation for war a guaranty of peace? we might be disposed to admit the sincerity of those who say we must arm and ever arm to maintain peace, except that they are too often men with professional and business interests at stake. in england there have been amazing revelations of this sinister condition--armament companies with peers, members of parliament, newspaper owners, officers of the army and navy, as stockholders; enormous appropriations forced through parliament by interested parties; periodic war scares in newspapers inspired by armament syndicates. only recently we read how the great krupp firm of germany had been exposed in its practice of bribing officials to obtain valuable military information and furnishing french newspapers with war-scare articles calculated to induce germany to increase her armament orders. in russia and france they face a similar state of affairs. here in the united states we are undoubtedly not free therefrom. and then there are the navy leagues in every country, playing upon the fears of the nations by startling tales of what the others are doing, and so on through an endless chain, manufacturing a demand for battleships in the name and under the guise of patriotism. we shrink from the contemplation of such greed and selfishness, and appeal for relief to the third hague conference. we come now to a consideration of the fourth prime duty devolving upon that conference. ocean commerce in war should be rendered inviolable. in effecting this we not only abolish a barbarous custom, but at the same time remove one of the chief causes of great navies. as long as the safety of the merchant marine is not guaranteed by international agreement, just so long will nations with commercial aspirations build enormous navies for their protection. it is true england has hitherto opposed this reform,--confident in her naval supremacy,--but she cannot again fly in the face of a general demand without too great a sacrifice of prestige. here, then, are four important problems of the peace movement, all difficult, but not impossible of solution when we remember that the conference of , in good faith, i believe, adopted the following declaration, "that, by working together during the past four months, the collected powers not only have learnt to understand one another and to draw close together, but have succeeded ... in evolving a very lofty conception of the common welfare of humanity." whether these fine words breathe sincerity or hypocrisy the next hague conference has ample opportunity to prove. and now, what shall we say of the position of america in this war against war? her boundless resources; her amalgamation of men from all parts of the world into one people; her impregnable geographical situation; her embodiment of the three cardinal principles of world-union (federation, interstate free trade, interstate courts); the genius and ideals of our government--all give america a logical leadership. she can boast of the first peace society in the world, of a glorious record of arbitration, of a long list of the wisest international statesmen, of a most advanced position at the hague upon the questions of ocean commerce, courts of justice, arbitration, limitation of armaments. but there is the darker view. the treaties negotiated by secretary knox with france and with england, agreeing to arbitrate every question that fails of diplomatic settlement--those treaties were rejected by the united states senate. there was a transcendent opportunity to lay the foundation for a speedy realization of peace universal, with france and england willing, yes, even anxious to coöperate--and america failed! mr. taft has shown that if the position of the senate is accepted as international law, then we may as well bid farewell to any hopes of leadership in the peace movement, for our nation could then enter upon no general arbitration agreements because of the prerogative of the senate in each specific case to accept or refuse arbitration. it is at this point, ladies and gentlemen, that there is work for the humblest of us to do. in the intellectual field we can aid in the creation of an intelligent, forceful public opinion that will induce the senate to recede from its fatal attitude, and that will resist a false, cheap patriotism which is relentlessly endeavoring to crush america 'neath the burden of militarism. then in the moral field we can stimulate and foster a peaceful attitude, a sentiment for peace, in the hearts of our countrymen; and until this is accomplished there can be no peace universal, for, as senator root has said, "the questions at issue between disputing nations are nothing, the spirit that deals with them is everything." and finally, in the educational field, let us take heed that the men and women of our rising generation are taught the glorious pages of our arbitration history as well as they know the battles of our country. let us take care that it is grounded into their minds and habits of thought from earliest years, that "peace hath her victories no less renowned than war." in conclusion, let us not be deceived by that vain apology for war, that it is necessary to keep alive the heroic spirit and to stimulate manly courage. despite the noble side in war, its bestial side predominates; its larger effect upon men is demoralizing. and if it be glorious to die for a cause, how much nobler to live and strive for an ideal, utilizing the talents that god gave us for its realization! the movement for peace is not one of weaklings and mollycoddles. it is championed by red-blooded men, daring to bear the ridicule of the thoughtless and to fight for the preconceptions of humanity. peace has her heroes in daily life--miners, mariners, policemen, firemen, men of every station, displaying the nobility of their souls often unheralded and unsung. the venerable william t. stead, bearing across the ocean his message of international good will, sacrificed his life on the _titanic_ that others might live. he was a hero, yes, but a hero of peace. it would be an insult to your intelligence to prove the self-evident proposition that war is uneconomic, unscientific, unchristian. the movement for its elimination, above all, is logical and practical, and should appeal to every man. is it nothing to you? yes, it is a great deal to you. merely let your imaginations picture the day when the seventy per cent of our national revenue now sacrificed on the altar of folly is diverted to the arts of peace, to the amelioration of social conditions, to advancing the happiness of our people--at peace with all other peoples in the assurance of international law and love. ladies and gentlemen, if we but do our duty, the dawn of that great day will come in our generation! the assurance of peace by vernon m. welsh, knox college, galesburg, illinois first prize oration in the western group contest, , and third prize in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , the assurance of peace the birth and rapid rise of the present movement for international peace are events of recent years. the nineteenth century found its welcome in the smoking cannon and crimsoned fields of hohenlinden. at its close the first great peace conference of the hague was in session. one hundred years ago napoleon was sweeping across europe in his terrible attempt to create an empire. to-day france, england, and america have agreed on treaties that declare for unbroken peace. touched by the wand of progress, the utopian ideal of yesterday has become the dominant political issue of to-day. it is pertinent, then, that we seek the true nature of this revolution. is it borne on the crest of a popular impulse that will recede as rapidly as it has risen, or is it a permanent movement, the product of natural forces working through ordinary channels? the nineteenth century represents a break with the past. swept into the mighty current of transition, the habits and customs of a thousand years have disappeared. with the development of natural resources, the establishment and growth of the factory system, the use of means of rapid communication, nations have entered upon a new era. commerce and industry have come to dominate thought and action and are transforming the very life of the world. defying the rigorous climate of both the poles, trade has penetrated the frozen recesses of hudson bay and made of the falkland islands a relay station in the progress of victorious industry. nor is the equatorial heat more discouraging. the thick jungles of africa have yielded their secrets, and the muddy waters of the amazon are churned by propellers a thousand miles from the sea. international trade routes traverse the seas, connecting continent with continent. in forty years this commerce has increased from two billions to thirty billions. giant corporations have ignored political boundaries, carried trade wherever profitable, and are supplying the varied demands of entire communities. tariff walls, but lately effective barriers, are crumbling before the onslaught of trade. nations are no longer independent. the wheat from canada and the dakotas feeds the mill workers of sheffield and the nobility of berlin. the failure of the georgia cotton crop halts the looms of england and raises the cost of living throughout europe. nations can no longer exist as self-sufficient economic units. never before were they so mutually interdependent. never before has the welfare and security of one state depended upon the enterprise and diligence of another. and the movement for international peace is the chance offspring of these new social forces, at once a protest and a warning against the wrecking of modern economic structures by the ruthless hand of war. commerce, the most important of these new forces, flourishes unprejudiced by armaments and military prestige. in the open competition of the world's markets stronger powers meet and suffer from the rivalry of states that have no military standing. relative to population, norway has a carrying trade three times as great as england's. with her million trained warriors germany is beaten by the merchants of holland. the flag of little denmark flies at more mastheads than does the stars and stripes. where then is the commercial advantage supposed to attend superior military strength? but it is to prevent the seizure of its commerce by others that nations must empty their treasuries to keep ironclads afloat. yet what could be gained by attempted confiscation? if germany annihilated england's navy to-morrow, how would she profit? commerce is a process of exchange, the continuance and promotion of which is dependent upon the degree of mutual profit. commercial gain is not a consequent of military success. it is since england seized the gold fields, diamond mines, and fertile plateaus of lower africa that british securities have dropped twenty points. in germany humbled and humiliated france almost beyond toleration, yet her share of the world's commerce has not been augmented thereby. so would it be with england. true, germany might commit some depredations and hinder the passage of trade, but what would be her motive? how could she gain? even if the british isles were depopulated, it is doubtful whether germany would benefit. for by what miracle would germany be able to develop the facilities, the shipyards, mills, factories, foundries, mines and machinery, to supply the trade which the foremost of commercial nations has been generations in building up? germany's banner might wave over the bank of england, her excise boats police the thames and the clyde, yet she would behold the trade of a conquered province going to foreign nations. trade does not follow the flag. undisturbed by political changes or military reverses, it flows in constantly widening channels wherever productive fields are found. and in the waging of war, do we reckon the direct cost to commerce? the commercial relations of the entire world are disturbed. prolonged conflict is accompanied by the closing of the bank and the factory, the dismantling of the shop and mill, and the lengthening of the bread line in every city and town. in what state of prosperity and happiness might not france have been had napoleon never lived? with half a century gone, our own country is still suffering from the devastation of the civil war. our commerce with south america is scarcely beyond the point it had reached before our week-end tiff with spain. yet there are those who prate of national honor and of war as insuring prosperity. from the leader of a newborn national party we hear that without a periodic war america would become effeminate and weak, her aggressive commercial life timid and corrupt, and within a few brief years the great republic would sink to a fourth-rate power. up, brave americans, and man the guns! awake, sons of freedom, and sweep the seas! fourteen years without a war; our beloved land is ruined. you men of the factory and mill, you men of property and business, you producers of the nation's wealth, forward into the carnage; burn the homes of thrift and industry, for commerce will be enriched thereby; ravage the fields and despoil the cities, for this will insure vigorous national life; impoverish happy peoples, spread famine and pestilence through fertile valleys, mark the sites of contented villages with smoldering ruins, defy your christian god, and kindle the fires of hell in human breasts; commit violence, treachery, rapine, ay, murder,--for the eternal glory of the stars and stripes. yet commerce and industry--the glittering prizes which every nation covets when it builds a dreadnought or enlarges its army--demand that the creative forces of peace supplant the destructive wastes of war. to-day the financial relationships of nations are inextricably entangled. the big banks in the capitals of the world are in communication with each other every second of the day. during the american crisis in the bank rate in england went up to seven per cent, forcing many british concerns to suspend operations. because of the balkan war the bank rate in berlin, paris, and vienna is the highest in twenty years, and european securities have depreciated over six billion dollars. foreign investments are raising insuperable barriers to war. should the french bombard hamburg to-day they would destroy the property of frenchmen. let emperor william capture london, loot the bank of england, and he will return to find german industry paralyzed, the banks closed, and a panic sweeping the land. let english regiments again move to invade the united states, english warships draw up in battle line to attack our seaports, and four billions of the earnings of the english people would bar the way. to the victor of the present the spoils of war are valueless. japan, victor over the great russian empire, staggers under a colossal debt. the italian government hears rumbles of discontent, because the cost of winning a victory has been too great. what better proof do we need that war is profitless, that it means financial suicide? it has been transformed from a gainful occupation into economic folly, and war will cease because the price is becoming prohibitive. in this movement for peace, capital's strongest ally is her most active enemy. raised to a position of independence and power by the industrial revolution, labor is wielding an effective influence. the complexity of modern business has aroused workingmen in every country to a common interest and sympathy. the international congress of trade unions, representing twenty countries and over ten million men, has declared for universal disarmament. just last month eighty-five thousand coal miners in illinois resolved that if the united states declared war on a foreign power, they would call a general strike. and why not? why should the workingmen of one country offer themselves as targets for those of another? why should the workers of germany be taxed to support a war against england, germany's best market? can the rice growers of japan profit by killing americans to whom they sell their produce? war means suffering and want, and the laborer has come to know it. he is cold to the sight of its flaunting flags and the sound of its grand, wild music, for he sees the larder bare, funds exhausted, and hunger at the door. he refuses to sacrifice his body and the welfare of his family upon the altar of mars. no longer can kings and emperors satisfy their grasping ambitions. armed by the ballot, the masses are to-day supreme. never again will the cruel hand of tyranny press to their lips the poisoned cup of death. their sway is absolute. the destinies of nations are in their keeping. the decree has gone forth that war must cease. born of these greater movements, a host of influences bring nearer the dawn of peace. the express and the wireless have supplanted the oxcart and the courier. chicago and boston are closer to-day than new york and albany a century ago. within the hour of their occurrence events that happen in paris are published in chicago and st. louis. political boundaries are fading before larger interests. every railroad train crossing the frontier, every ship plying the seas, every article of commerce, every exchange of business, every cable conveying news from distant lands--all these are potent factors in the cause of international peace. add to these the conciliating influence of foreign investments, the telephone and telegraph, travel, education, democracy, religion, and you have marshaled a host for peace whose clarion trumpets shall never sound retreat. casting aside the prejudice of ages, modern industrialism flings around the world the economic bonds against which the forces of militarism are powerless. here, then, in the world-wide operations of commerce and industry is the _assurance of peace_. the skeptic may scoff and the cynic point to mexico and the balkans, but the industrial revolution has produced a multitude of influences that are knitting the nations into an indissoluble unity. men are beginning to realize the integrity of mankind, and a world-consciousness is arising. kindness and justice--yesterday but community ideals--are extending their sway throughout the earth. even while bayonets are bared in conflict and cannon thunder against hostile camps, the magic of our civilization is weaving bonds of union that cannot be broken. peace, not war, is the true grandeur of nations; love, not hate, is the immutable law of god; and so surely as governments and kings are powerless to divide when home and factory would bind, some not too distant day will find the battle flags all furled, the sword's arbitrament abandoned, and the world at peace. education for peace by francis j. lyons, university of texas, austin, texas, representing the southern group first prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , education for peace time was when war was beneficial. historians have justified the spread of knowledge by the sword. at the world's awakening, it was well that the new thought should be diffused even at the sacrifice of human blood. it was justified because there was no other means. we have to cast our imagination back through the centuries and realize that then there were no railroads, no telegraph, no newspapers; that man was bound by narrow limits; and the elemental processes of the world were undiscovered. we do not criticize alexander for conquering the eastern perils, for he carried in his phalanxes the spirit of new-discovered thought. we do not denounce rome for piercing the unknown realms with her legions, for she was the mother of a new belief. but this was at the dawn of history, when erudition was in its struggling embryo, and the physical was the better part of man. man went forth to battle as a religion. the world grew partly wise, and man preached the gospel of brotherhood. but it did not last. the changing of the peoples smoldered the fires of rising intelligence, and the world rolled back again in darkness--a darkness long and black. centuries passed, and a new light came, slowly but courageously. man blinkingly came forth, dazed and unsteady. the light grew, and man grew with it; but rooted deep in his heart was the love of war of his ancestors. in a different spirit, it is true; but it was there, and he went forth to battle not because it was religion, but because it was brave. the world rolled on; war grew; it developed with the state; it became an art; was studied--and now our cycle turns. it faces us as a custom backed up by the centuries--deep-rooted, a consumer that yields no returns and, what with our modern appliances, a terror to the hearts of all the world. men fought in the early ages because they thought it was just; men fought in the middle ages because they considered it brave; men of our modern age will banish war because it is a fallacy. do you know that to maintain our so-called prestige we spend seventy per cent of our national income? think of it! seventy per cent to maintain our present status and to prepare for the future! think of that awful drain; think, if applied in other channels, what good could be done! we are proud of our battleship _texas_. she is a noble war dog; yet do you realize that if we had applied the money spent on her in our own state we could have had one gigantic paved highway twice the distance from el paso to galveston? we could have had two hundred high schools, representing $ , each. we could have raised our institutions of higher learning to a level with any of the east or north. fifteen millions gone for a floating war machine which in twenty years will be a piece of rusted, useless iron; fifteen millions for a sailing dragon who, each time one of her big guns speaks, wastes the equivalent of a four-year college education for some youth--$ --for a single shot. our war dogs sail the seas; our soldiers parade our forts; and we look on and raise a joyous hubbub as the nations of the world rush madly on, wasting themselves in the race for military supremacy. have you ever considered yourself transported to some celestial height, and there, from the regions of the infinite, allowed to view a battle on earth? how foolish it must seem, these pygmies coming forth to make war. see them as they charge and wound and kill! see brother slay brother! see the wounded left to die! hear the cries of distress, and picture the grief that follows all! men battling to conquer; men assuming the prerogative of a god--how foolish, yet how serious! and these artificial lines that men call boundaries, how punctiliously they are guarded! "take but a hundred feet, and we shall war with thee." how foolish this too must seem when viewed from above--that we should carry on war over even a slight infraction on any imaginary, mathematical line. we cherish the thought that the youth of our land are being taught self-restraint. it is ever impressed upon them that there are courts of justice for the settlement of controversies. law and order have become stock phrases, dinned into their ears at every turn. the man who would settle his difficulty by trying the physical metal of his adversary is of the past. by the new order he is taboo as a savage. individual self-restraint rings out in our vocabulary as nationally descriptive. the babe at the mother's knee learns first the virtue of it; the child at school is tutored to it soundly; the man in life is lectured with it regularly. brotherhood! love! self-restraint! but what of the self-restraint of the nation? in the teaching of the individual, is it not odd and inconsistent that we forget the teaching of the unit? we paint the inner rooms of our national character with colors bright and pleasing, but the exterior, though weathering the heavier storms, is forgotten. if the child be taught that individuals should arbitrate their differences, can he not learn that the individual nations are subject to the same rule? if arbitration is best for each man, surely it must be best for all. if the child be taught that self-restraint is the boasted characteristic of the model american, should he not learn that the model american nation should be self-restraining? let us learn this lesson, and surely we will never war. herein shall we find the solution of this great problem. we can preach about peace and write pretty orations, but if we are to impress it upon the hearts of the world, we must teach it, and in a systematic manner. it is not to be learned in a day. it is the labor of a generation and more. it must be a fully developed characteristic. man is learning self-development; now we must turn to the bigger ideals--national restraint, national development, international brotherhood. do you say this is idealism--visionary? on the contrary, it is thoroughly practicable. the only way to attain world-peace is for the individual citizen to think peace, to teach peace, and to act in accordance with such thoughts and teachings. just as public opinion causes war, so only through cultivated public opinion can we hope for peace. i do not say to sink our battleships and turn free our army. i do not argue that we should quit guarding ourselves and throw ourselves open to the world; but what i seek is that we should turn our faces with bright hope to the future, eager to assist in the abolition of all that tends to war, eager to assist in the only proper way--the enlightenment of the world-nations. the call comes naturally to america, the land of new belief; america, the new world of opportunity, as emerson calls it; the land cut off from the conventional past; a land that has taken world-leadership in the march of a single century. to america, where problems are studied and fallacies dethroned, the birthplace and the abiding home of democracy; to america, the christian, the civilized! what will the answer be? already we can hear the faint responses, as yet vague and indistinct, the drowned murmurings of the wiser tongues. these must grow into a national anthem whose echo will challenge the powers of the world and startle them into the consciousness of the new brotherhood. we will answer: "yes, we have learned the lessons of the centuries--that war is a fallacy, and armed peace its ill-sprung child; that man is no longer savage; that with enlightened mind he has controlled his warring instinct; that human love is a mightier power than war; and that we are one in the brotherhood of the master. "let us stand before the nations, clad in simple honesty, panoplied in elemental justice; let us appeal to the common conscience of the world; let us say to the war-made powers, there is a way out, and we will lead. we will help you police the sea; we will give our constabulary to a quota of peace, but we are through. no great standing army, no more leviathan battleships. we trust to what we boast of as the highest attainment of the age, the innate justice of civilized humanity." to such a national summons, how will texas respond? facing the mexican boundary for eight hundred miles, texas is to-day peculiarly the guardian of our nation. the situation calls not for agitation and jingoism, bit for rare patience, sanity, and self-control. through troubled waters our chosen captain is guiding the ship of state. it is no time for mutiny, but rather a time for obedience. in this critical hour let every loyal citizen say with a contemporary poet: in this grave hour--god help keep the president! to him all lincoln's tenderness be lent, the grave, sweet nature of the man that saw most power in peace and let no claptrap awe his high-poised duty from its primal plan of rule supreme for the whole good of man. in this grave hour--lord, give him all the light, and us the faith that peace is more than might, that settled nations have high uses still to curb the hasty, regulate the ill, and without bloodshed from the darkest hour make manifest high reason's nobler power. national honor and peace by louis broido, university of pittsburgh, pennsylvania, representing the north atlantic group second prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , national honor and peace since the dawn of history the teachers, thinkers, and prophets of mankind have prayed and labored for the abolition of war. in the process of the centuries, their hope has become the aspiration of the mass of men. growing slowly, as do all movements for righteousness, the cause of peace first claimed the attention of the world in the year , when nicholas of russia called the nations together to discuss ways and means for the arbitration of international differences and for the abolition of war. from that day on, the movement for peace has progressed by leaps and bounds, and to-day it has reached the highest point of its development. already nations have signed treaties to arbitrate many of their differences. holland, denmark, argentina, and chile have agreed to arbitrate every dispute. but these nations are not potent enough in world affairs for their action to have an international influence. it remains for the great powers like england, france, germany, and the united states to agree to submit every difficulty to arbitration, and thus take the step that will result in the practical abolition of war. if one would find the reasons that thus far have kept the great powers from agreeing to submit _all_ differences to arbitration, his search need not be long nor difficult. the peace conference of reports that the objections to international arbitration have dwindled to four. of these objections the one commonly considered of most weight is this: "we will not submit to arbitration questions involving our national honor." even so recently as the spring of , our own senate refused to give its assent to president taft's proposed treaties with france and england to arbitrate all differences, and refused on the ground that "we cannot agree to arbitrate questions involving our national honor." this is the statement that you and i as workers for peace are constantly called upon to refute. let us, therefore, consider what honor is. for centuries honor was maintained and justice determined among men by a strong arm and a skillfully used weapon. it mattered not that often the guilty won and the dishonorable succeeded. death was the arbiter, honor was appeased, and men were satisfied. but with the growth of civilization there slowly came to man the consciousness that honor can be maintained only by use of reason and justice administered only in the light of truth. then private settlement of quarrels practically ceased; trial by combat was abolished; and men learned that real honor lies in the graceful and manly acceptance of decisions rendered by impartial judges. as men have risen to higher ideals of honor in their relations with one another, so nations have risen to a higher standard in international affairs. centuries ago tyrants ruled and waged war on any pretext; now before rulers rush to arms, they stop to count the cost. nations once thought it honorable to use poisoned bullets and similar means of destruction; a growing humanitarianism has compelled them to abandon such practices. at one time captives were killed outright; there was a higher conception of honor when they were forced into slavery; now the quickening sense of universal sympathy compels belligerent nations to treat prisoners of war humanely and to exchange them at the close of the conflict. at one time neutrals were not protected; now their rights are generally recognized. a few hundred years ago arbitration was almost unknown; in the last century more than six hundred cases were settled by peaceful means. during the last quarter of a century we have caught a glimpse of a new national honor. it is the belief that battle and bloodshed, except for the immediate defense of hearth and home, is a blot on the 'scutcheon of any nation. it is the creed of modern men who rise in their majesty and say: "we will not stain our country's honor with the bloodshed of war. god-given life is too dear. the forces of vice, evil, and disease are challenging us to marshal our strength and give them battle. there is too much good waiting to be done, too much suffering waiting to be appeased, for us to waste the life-blood of our fathers and sons on the field of useless battle. here do we stand. we believe we are right. with faith in our belief we throw ourselves upon the altar of truth. let heaven-born justice decide." here is honor unsmirched, untainted! here is pride unhumbled! here is patriotism that is all-embracing, that makes us so zealous for real honor that we turn from the horrors of war to combat the evils that lie at our very doors. we know that faith in such national honor will abolish war. we know, too, that men will have war only so long as they want war. if this be true, then, just as soon as you and i, in whose hands the final decision for or against war must ever rest, express through the force of an irresistible public opinion the doctrine that our conception of national honor demands the arbitration of every dispute, just so soon will our legislators free themselves from financial dictators and liberate the country from the dominance of a false conception of national honor. do you say this ideal is impractical? history proves that questions of the utmost importance can be peacefully settled without the loss of honor. the casa blanca dispute between france and germany, the venezuela question, the north atlantic fisheries case, the alabama claims--these are proof indisputable that questions of honor may be successfully arbitrated. "does not this magnificent achievement," says carl schurz of the alabama settlement, "form one of the most glorious pages of the common history of england and america? truly, the two great nations that accomplished this need not be afraid of unadjustable questions of honor in the future." in the face of such splendid examples, how meaningless is the doctrine of the enemies of peace, "we will not arbitrate questions of national honor. we will decide for ourselves what is right and for that right we will stand, even if this course plunges us into the maelstrom of war. we will not allow our country to be dishonored by any other." well has andrew carnegie expressed the modern view: "our country cannot be dishonored by any other country, or by all the powers combined. it is impossible. all honor wounds are self-inflicted. we alone can dishonor ourselves or our country. one sure way of doing so is to insist upon the unlawful and unjust demand that we sit as judges in our own case, instead of agreeing to abide by the decision of a court or a tribunal. we are told that this is the stand of a weakling, that progress demands the fighting spirit. we, too, demand the fighting spirit; but we condemn the military spirit. we are told that strong men fight for honor. we answer with mrs. mead: 'justice and honor are larger words than peace, and if fighting would enable us to get justice and maintain honor, i would fight! but it is not that way!'" for it is impossible to maintain honor by recourse to arms; right may fall before might, and, viewed in the light of its awful cost, even victory is defeat. in the words of nicholas murray butler: "to argue that a nation's honor must be defended by the blood of its citizens, if need be, is quite meaningless, for any nation, though profoundly right in its contention, might be defeated at the hands of a superior force exerted in behalf of an unjust and unrighteous cause. what becomes of national honor then?" too long have we been fighting windmills; we must struggle with ourselves; we must conquer the passions that have blinded our reason. we have been enrolled in the army of thoughtlessness; the time has come to enroll in the army of god. we have followed a false ideal of honor; we must disillusion ourselves and the world. if men declare that the preservation of courage and manliness demand that we fight, let us lead them to the fight, not against each other, but against all that is unrighteous and undesirable in our national life. men still cling to an ancient conception of national honor; let us convince them that there is a newer and higher conception. men still declare that peace is the dream of the poet and prophet; let us prove by historical example that questions, even of national honor, can be happily settled by arbitration. if men despair, let us remind them that to-day, as never before, the mass of men are slowly and surely working out god's plan for this great cause. the day of triumph is not far distant. already the moving finger of time paints on the wide horizon, in the roseate tints of the dawn, the picture of peace--peace, the victory of victories, beside which marathon and gettysburg pale into insignificance; victory without the strains of martial music, unaccompanied by the sob of widowed and orphaned; victory on god's battlefield in humanity's war on war. the new nationalism and the peace movement by ralph d. lucas, knox college, galesburg, illinois, representing the central group third prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , the new nationalism and the peace movement nationalism is a precious product of the centuries. the world has paid a tremendous price to widen the political unit until its boundaries include continents. it has been an equally difficult task to weld the spirit of diverse peoples into a homogeneous whole. and the story of this development constitutes a heritage not soon to be given up. the tales of victory and defeat are held even more dear to a united people than life itself. rightly will any nation jealously defy him who dares advance to plunder its possessions. and it is well that men do not wish to surrender it upon slight provocation. that has been a good diplomacy that sought to protect the nation by war. by the extension of political unity peoples gain moral and physical strength. thrift becomes more common and moral courage greater when a people strike forward with common aims. and in proportion as the nation as a whole enjoys these advantages and opportunities, the individual widens his horizon in peaceful association with fellow men and receives a benefit beyond computation. but, good as nationalism has been in the past, a gradual change seems to be overtaking the world's politics. national diplomacy hesitates where a century ago it was firm. forces which once drove the nations apart seem now to be drawing them together. the discord of disputes seems to be disappearing in the harmony of coöperation. it is no longer possible to determine easily what a nation's interests really are. and it is of the forces that are bringing about this change in the policies of nations, of this new nationalism and its bearing upon the peace movement, that i wish to speak. within the last two centuries economic forces have worked a mighty revolution. continents have been converted into communities. the prosperity of our eastern industries controls the activities of the west, and a disturbance from any section throws a tremor over all. tribal barter has developed into a world-wide commerce until the most distant nation may easily acquire the products of another. steel rails weave a web of commercialism among the peoples, and the cable welds them in a mighty network which, responsive to every flash of news, brings all the nations into a mutuality of interests. so interdependent are the nations and so vital are their relations that a single fluctuation in the most distant market finds a response in our own. a slight disorder in wall street strains the whole financial world. and thus through intercourse in commerce, industry, the press, christian missions, and scholastic research a system has been developed that holds no place for the selfish policy of exploiting backward peoples. we no longer consider the advance of alien peoples in wealth and prosperity as a menace to our own. there is being developed a strong international public opinion which realizes that anything that destroys the well-being of one member is the concern of all. in the light of these facts, future world-politics can have no place for the settlement of disputes by force. a declaration of war by one of the large powers to-day would be more terrible than it has ever been in the past. the man of business, of education, of philanthropy, of civic advancement cannot reasonably advocate a policy that would ruin business, stagnate education, increase poverty, and turn progress over to the ravages of manslaughter. industry cannot continue when the shoulder that should turn the wheels of industry grows weary beneath the weight of the musket. education cannot proceed when libraries and lecture halls are deserted for the camp and fortress. a tolstoy with all his power of vivid presentation does not overdraw the picture. the moral fiber and physical strength of a people must forever afterward bear their scars. a struggling people can never rid themselves of the evil effects of the conflict, although they may rejoice in the valor of their heroes. nations cannot afford to become the theaters of carnage and bloodshed and the rendezvous of commercial and moral pirates and civic grafters. why, then, do nations throw away their strength in the building and equipping of armies and navies? the advocates of militarism tell us that we need a navy to protect our commerce. possibly it is true that under the present system of international law this is somewhat excusable; for although private property on land is exempt from confiscation and the old forms of privateering have long ago been abolished by an agreement of the powers, yet the policy does not apply to maritime warfare. enemy's goods in enemy's ships are still subject to seizure. but while this argument does hold for the present, the condition could easily be remedied. because a man with foreign capital operates ships instead of factories, why is there any special reason for exposing his property to depredation? in the light of common sense such a policy seems absurd. and it should be one of the first aims of our diplomats to eliminate all possibility of this licensed robbery, for as long as it exists there will always be the cry for extravagant expenditure in order to preserve international peace. but even if we should not need a navy to protect our commerce, again the opponents of the policy of settling international disputes by arbitration say that we need armies and navies to preserve our honor. they tell us that there are certain questions which cannot be submitted to any tribunal; that a nation must reserve the right to submit only those questions it sees fit. surrender this right, and prestige and self-respect are gone and we become a nation of "mollycoddles" whose patriotism has no virile qualities. it is true that the independence and security of each nation is essential to international life. it is self-governing nations, not subjugated ones, that make possible a strong international life. but the converse is equally true. an international life made up of independent, coöperating, and mutually helpful nations is the best security by which national life can be guaranteed. those who say that questions of national honor cannot be submitted to a tribunal have a wrong conception of the essence of national life. love of country means more than a mere willingness to serve as a target for the enemy's guns. we would not deduct one iota from the respect and honor due those who have served the nation on the field of battle. but what a service they might have rendered if they had been spared that life to live serving their fellow men and contributing to the vigor of the race! none of us will give up his firm resolve to defend his own country with all his strength. but theirs is a cheap patriotism which depends for its expression upon the thrilling note of fife and drum. the great test of patriotism is the everyday purpose to deal justly with one's neighbor. let him who would be a patriot and serve the nation put his life into the work close at hand, and, with a civic temper and moral courage that can grip the scourge, rid our social life of its damning influences. this is the spirit of true national honor. this it is that makes of a nation a real nation. the call to arms is but another signal of the defeat of the underlying principles of civilization. only slowly will any large number of the people accept these new conceptions. but there are already hopeful signs. the growing sentiment is rapidly crystallizing. the developing code of international equity as expressed by the establishment of such an institution as the hague court is a step in the right direction. the peaceful settlement of the venezuelan boundary dispute was an honor to the nations involved. and the work of the international commission of inquiry in the dogger bank episode between russia and england is significant of the trend. again, a modern innovation was wrought when the international conference in settled the conflicting interests of germany, france, and spain in morocco. within the last century the powers ratified over two hundred treaties, each providing for the peaceful settlement by tribunals of specified international disputes. it is true that most peace treaties have dealt almost exclusively with legal questions. the nations have hesitated to submit all international differences to a court of arbitration. but the spirit for arbitral settlement is widening. and this spirit is not for a mere avoidance of war, but seeks the substitution of a better method than war for determining justice between nations. each nation has its own individual problems to deal with, and in this respect all cannot proceed according to set rules. the movement does not mean the extinction and obliteration of nationality and national rights. the individual has not been minimized because he consents to submit his differences with his fellow men to a court for settlement. and this must be the ultimate attitude of nations whose honor we have a right to guard jealously. what, then, shall be our program? whatever attitude is to be adopted, most people agree that the day of universal peace is far in the future. the balkans and mexico remind us of the difficulty lying before the coming generations. but the numerous peace societies whose purpose it is to circulate authentic documents, that the great mass of citizens may be brought into sympathetic touch through accurate information, are doing much for the cause. the erection of the hague court gives something lasting and tangible to work from. and, above all, the nations will rise to higher standards principally by adopting the ideals of the individual. as man has risen above his barbaric ideals, so will the nations throw their military expenditures into the coffers of public welfare as they come more and more to judge their successes, not by victories in war but by achievements in education, commerce, industry, and artizanship. and, proceeding with such aims, the established international court must be the medium through which all differences will be settled. we shall discover that our internal policy of dealing with the individual can be more easily applied to international relations than was at first supposed. and having reached this point in the evolution of international peace, there must be added to the international court a world-wide police force. as the system develops and our prejudices are abandoned, a method of policing must stand as an enforcer of international law. until then there is little hope that military expenditures will radically diminish, for we cannot reasonably abolish our present methods unless we have something secure to substitute. perhaps such a system will not abolish the utter possibility of war. only the future can tell us what heights of success the policy will reach. there are those of us who have high hopes because we believe in the good sense of the american people and of our great contemporaries. by the past we are made confident of the future. but if the goal is to be reached, it is for us as individual citizens to contribute our influence toward developing the attitude of peace among our fellow men. for our international welfare and for the honor of the newest of great nations, may we in this issue throw our influence, as a united people, on the side of a higher international morality! may the united peoples of the world abolish the prejudices of misconceptions and, drawn together by common interests, resolve that the priceless heritage of centuries shall not be imperiled by war! and thus over a warring humanity the breaking day of peace shall be hastened, at whose high noon there shall be heard not the clashing of arms but the increasing hum of prosperity under the sway of the new and better national life. man's moral nature the hope of universal peace by victor morris, university of oregon, eugene, oregon representing the pacific coast group fourth prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , man's moral nature the hope of universal peace two thousand years ago the coming of a prince of peace, the prince of peace, inaugurated the fulfillment of the prophetic promise that "peace shall cover the earth," and that "man shall learn war no more forever." from the time of jesus until now men have passively accepted the idea, but have failed to do their part in its fulfillment. to-day there are few indeed but believe that it would be desirable to abolish war. many also feel in a way that war is brutal. but here our feelings on this great question largely end. we are not aroused to talk, and work, and fight against war as inhuman, as economic folly, as unreason, and especially as an immorality and a sin. now we are not here to harangue about the physical sufferings wrought through war, but we are here to inquire and find out what we can do about it. how are we going to attack the war problem in order to bring about action, instead of simply talk and discussion? in considering this war problem it is well to bear in mind the fact that war is a resultant of a deeper cause, the war spirit. the war spirit is the spirit of him who first made war in heaven; the war spirit--ambitious, aggressive, covetous and revengeful, rampant through the centuries, never conquered by force, in war subdued only by exhaustion. this war spirit still exists to scourge the nations with war, to stagger with its problem of war the brains of statesmen believing in peace. how are we to attack this stupendous problem? what appeal can we make to the nations that will be strong enough to do away with the war spirit? in order to overthrow this mighty evil, certainly every possible force must be enlisted. the thought which i wish to bring to you is this: while such appeals as those to economy and to reason are of value, they are not in themselves strong enough to cause the nations to abolish war; and hence, in view of the real inner nature of the war spirit, man's moral nature, working through a developed conscience upon war, is the only force strong enough to effect universal peace. against war peace-advocates appeal with force from a business standpoint, on grounds of economy and financial expediency. the vast system of international trade and commerce calls for world peace. the prosperity of world-industries and business requires good will and brotherhood between the nations. so heavy, also, have the burdens of war and militarism become that three fourths of our own expenditures go for war purposes, past and present, and in great britain two thirds are so spent.[ ] every german citizen, it is said, carries a soldier on his back. by the testimony of financiers and ministers of state themselves, nothing but financial ruin and bankruptcy await the nations if the present military tragedy continues. but has this obvious condition of affairs affected the race for armaments? not unless it has accelerated it. to every appeal to economy the reply is that the outlay is necessary if we are to exist at all. but even suppose that for a season the economic motive should lead us to abolish war, as soon as financial advantage was apparent to a nation through war it is evident that all restraints would be removed and war ensue again. the same motive used to abolish war would bring war once more. again, when we remember that it is the deeper cause, the war spirit, that we must quench, we can understand why this appeal is often made to those who bear not. so far as the great mass of men is concerned, purely economic considerations cannot change the spirit and impulses of the soul. history reveals no great uplifting of humanity or change in ideals as having arisen through purely economic or financial considerations. [ ] the percentages as a matter of fact are not so large, but the argument is not impaired by the fact.--_editor._ the peace plea has also been based on grounds of reason. clearly has it been pointed out that reason demands that no person shall sit in judgment on his own case, yet this we do in a resort to arms. war is not arbitrament by reason, but arbitrament by the sword. every plain argument of reason condemns war and militarism. the arguments of reason have, indeed, been strong, and have attracted much attention, resulting in the settlement of many disputes by arbitration. but as concerns the final wiping out of war and the surrendering of heavy armaments, reason alone cannot present a permanent powerful appeal, for it is easy in times of stress to plead that reason and justice demand the war. never was there a fight but the contending parties claimed they were justified. but the chief fact that seems to put reason in the category of impotent appeals is the fact that it is an appeal to the mind, while the war spirit can only be removed by an appeal to the heart, wherein it resides. we may reason with nations all we please, but when the war fury arises, then all the reasoning proves to have been in vain, the appeal to the mind turns out to be too feeble. appeals to economy and reason, then, are appeals we must make, but they are too weak in themselves to make a permanent impression against the war spirit. we must then look for some additional, some more compelling, force. let us examine the real inner nature of war, for this ought surely to throw some light upon our problem. war is not economy; it is not reason. is war, then, morality? is it virtue? it would hardly seem necessary for us to answer this question, for modern civilized nations long ago recognized blood feuds with their kindred as contrary to real morality, as nothing but murder; but they seem unable to recognize that war is just the same--nothing but legalized, organized murder. from the use of violence in settling our international disputes arise all the deadly passions of the soul, such as treachery, insolence, revenge, and a murderous spirit, with the accompanying fruits of robbery, misery, and blood. surely, o nations! nothing which bears such fruits can be anything but corrupt, for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. look also at its relationship to civilization and citizenship, and its effects upon theme. "war and civilization," said one of the great english ministers, "are contradictory terms, even as christ and mars." particularly damaging is the effect of war upon citizens. for does it not blunt the sensibilities, harden the heart, inflame the mind with passions, and deaden the consciences of men? said the same great english preacher, "the sword that smites the enemy abroad, also lays bare the primeval savage within the citizen at home." and again, "war is not so horrible in that it drains the dearest veins of the foe, but in that it drains our own hearts of the yet more precious elements of pity, mercy, generosity, which are the lifeblood of the soul." what now must be our conclusion about war? had we ten thousand voices, surely every one would be in honor bound to declare war an immorality. every incident of war declares it such. every result of battle hands down the same decree. in the words of a famous russian battle painter, we too may define war as "the antithesis of all morality." this clear idea of the real inner nature of war ought surely to enable us to find our ground of attack. since war is sin and war is crime, the conclusion which we draw is, that if it is possible ever to abolish war, man's conscience, his sense of right and wrong, is the only force powerful enough to accomplish the result. the great searchlight of morality must be turned on war--a searchlight which is always bright and strong and which never has failed to reveal the truth. to turn this on full and strong means to awaken the consciences of men. it must be an individual proposition--not simply the developed consciences of a few leaders who may be submerged by the war spirit of the masses, but there must be developed consciences of all the people individually. all our arbitration treaties and the actual settlement of disputes by arbitration are of great value and should be pressed as far as possible; but are these sufficient forces to develop the consciences of men against war as an immorality and a sin? what are the forces that have always come to our support against an immorality and a sin? how about our churches? have they been doing their duty? have they made it clear that war is sin and war is crime? has not the church been too easy? has its voice sounded clear and strong on this world-evil? surely a duty rests upon the ministry to be insistent in its characterization of war. what peace-advocates must do is to urge this upon the church and bring it to a realization of its duty. church members know the character of war and simply need to have the matter brought home to their hearts. what about our schools,--not simply the colleges and universities, but all the schools,--which offer fertile ground to sow the seeds of peace? thus far in the history of our schools too much emphasis has been laid upon military history, etc. dates and events of national wars have been thoroughly drilled into students, and the glory and blaze of war brought out. we have actually made it a glory and a virtue. one of the most encouraging signs of the times, however, is the fact that many of our text-books are dropping out the prolonged study of wars and centering more on the peaceful pursuits of the nation and the commercial relations with foreign powers. how about direct peace teaching in the lower schools? how much of it do we include in the work? none at all. many are the speakers who address the schools on war reminiscences, but few indeed are the appeals made for peace. not until this movement is strongly emphasized in our schools from the very beginning can we hope completely to drive out the war spirit; for time is required to develop in the individual conscience a full realization of the real nature of war, and such development should begin with the plastic period of youth. with church and school lined up on the side of peace, the home teaching will soon fall in line; and church, school, and home combined can develop so strong a conviction concerning war, can make so forceful an appeal to man's moral nature, that the war spirit will take its leave and be gone forever. we always look to history for a confirmation of our beliefs, and let us glance now to the records of the past and learn her teachings. first of all, look at the duel as the mode of settling a personal difficulty if peaceful settlement appeared impossible. first, it was heartily accepted as a gentlemanly, honorable, and brave mode of settlement. then, tolerated and simply suffered to exist. finally, condemned by conscience as an immorality and a sin, it was banished from civilized nations. look also at slavery. at first heartily accepted as a divine arrangement. then tolerated by the world as undesirable, yet not necessarily wrong. next its overthrowal attempted on grounds of pity and of reason; until finally, recognized as an immorality and a sin, it too was blotted from the pages of civilization. no great uplift of humanity, no great movement in civilization, but has found its path to success in the developed moral sense of man. no great change in civilized institutions but has found itself produced by the dynamic, moving forces of morality. war must be abolished. only the great powers of morality are vital enough, are dynamic and powerful enough, to carry out our peace program. these forces lie dormant, and simply need stimulation and development. recognizing the impotency of appeals to economy and to reason, what are we going to do? in the name of humanity let us impeach war and the war spirit. it is a traitor to every ideal of civilization and of justice. it is the instrument of hatred and of pride, the agent of jealousy and of avarice. in the name of the dead and dying, in the name of justice, which it dethrones, in the name of those whose loved ones it demands, we impeach war as a traitor, guilty of all high crimes and misdemeanors. what else shall we do? stir up from its greatest depths the heart of man. educate his conscience till he is unwilling to suffer war to exist. begin early in church, school, and home to instil in the minds of young and old continually the true conception of war, that it is an immorality, contrary to every principle of christianity and to every teaching of our christ. let us bring into the conflict against war the great, dynamic, motive force--the moral nature of man. and when we shall have thus developed the consciences of men, there will henceforth be laid up for us a crown of victory, as there will then be a fuller realization that in man's moral nature is the hope of universal peace. the task of the twentieth century by harold husted, ottawa university, ottawa, kansas, representing the western group fifth prize oration in the national contest held at mohonk lake, may , the task of the twentieth century age by age, civilization advances. each successive era has contributed that invention or accomplished that achievement which has placed another round in the great ladder of civilization. the development of many small states into powerful nations, and many wonderful improvements in other fields, such as steam navigation, the railroad, the telegraph, and wireless communication, crown the last as the greatest of centuries in the history of the human family. it is difficult to understand why the human mind, whence these mighty inspirations originated, has been incapable of realizing that there still remains the most degrading, the most deteriorating, the foulest blot that ever disgraced this world--the killing of civilized men, by men, as a permissible mode of settling international disputes. this world can never attain its highest standard of civilization until this one disgraceful blemish, called war, is obliterated. it is the collective task of the people living in this twentieth century to bring into reality the millennium of tennyson, till the war drum throbs no longer, and the battle-flags are furl'd in the parliament of man, the federation of the world. the beginning of this social task, then, is the enlightenment of the peoples as to the immorality, waste, and ineffectiveness of war. god commanded, "thou shalt not kill." who shall presume to declare that this precept was directed not to nations but to individuals only? that one man shall not kill, but nations may? we are horrified at the report of a single murder, yet, if viewed from the light of truth, what is war but wholesale murder? what tongue, what pen, can describe the bloody havoc of the battle of gettysburg, where, between the rise and set of a single sun, fifty thousand of our fellow men sank to earth, dead or wounded? what sentiment in human hearts which needs to be perpetuated sent rank after rank, column after column, of blue soldiers against the impregnable stone wall of fredericksburg? and who will place the blame for the carnage of cold harbor elsewhere than upon the folly of misguided patriotism and cruel, selfish interests that made the bloody battle possible? every soldier is connected, as all of us, by dear ties of kindred, love, and friendship. perhaps there is an aged mother, who fondly hoped to lean her bending form on his more youthful arm; perhaps a young wife, whose life is entwined inseparably with his; perchance a sister, a brother. but as he falls on the field of battle, must not all these suffer? his aged mother surely falls with him. his young wife is suddenly widowed, his children orphaned. that husband's helping hand is forever stayed. a parent's voice is stilled, and the children's plaintive cries for their loving father fall on unheeding ears. tell me, friends, you who know the bitterness of parting with dear ones whom you watched tenderly through the last hopeful moments, can you measure your anguish? yet, what a contrast! your dear ones departed soothed by kindness and love, while the dying soldier gasped out his life on the battlefield alone. and what a waste is war! we are just beginning to realize the tremendous cost, the incalculable wastefulness, not only of actual war but of the preparation for future possible wars. for the current fiscal year ending june , , the united states has appropriated in round numbers $ , , , in preparation for future wars and because of wars fought in the past. sixty-seven cents out of every dollar expended by our national government goes to feed the present-day mania for war, present and past, leaving only thirty-three cents out of each dollar for the combined expense of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of our national government. when we realize that the cost of a single battleship exceeds the total value of all the grounds and buildings of all the colleges and universities in the state of kansas, the figures indicating this expense have more meaning to us. and when we reflect that the cost of a single shot from one of the great guns of that battleship is $ , enough to send a young man through college, the common man realizes that the united states cannot afford to go to war or even prepare for war. and all this suffering and cost are to no purpose. war is utterly ineffectual to secure or advance its professed object. the wretchedness it involves contributes to no beneficial result, helps to establish no right, and, therefore, in no respect promotes harmony between the contending nations. when the saviour was born, angels from heaven sang to the children of the human family this benediction: glory to god in the highest, peace on earth, good will toward men. and at last, in the beginning of this twentieth century, nations seem to be visibly approaching that unity so long hoped and prayed for; and that nation which shall precede all others in the abolition of war will be crowned by history with everlasting honor. the risk will be very little, the gain incalculable. we are coming to believe that the most significant fact about man and his civilization is their improvability. individual inventive genius has added improvement after improvement until it would seem that man's mastery over nature is to be well-nigh complete as these ideas and inventions are socialized and extended to benefit all. we are now entering the era of social achievement when mankind unitedly undertakes by organization and coöperation mightier tasks than ever accomplished before. many dreadful diseases are disappearing before preventive medicine, and sanitary science is eliminating many plagues; pestilence is coming to be a thing of the past. human welfare is now the concern of coöperative mankind, and social science will condemn and banish war or fail to establish itself as an applied science. it _can_ be done! it _ought_ to be done! it _will_ be done! and although this consummation seems to many far away, it may be accomplished by very simple methods. it only waits the time of concerted action on the part of the leading nations when the principles of arbitration can be invoked more fully, and a world-court established with plenary powers for settling all disputes between the nations. international legislation has occurred repeatedly, though no world-court has as yet been established. in the case of the universal postal union we have what is tantamount to world-legislation, in that all civilized nations have entered into a formal agreement regarding the delivery of mail. another instance of practical world-legislation is that of the international bureau of weights and measures. many other examples might be given in which several nations are parties to an agreement regarding some important measure, such as the respect paid to the flag of truce, the regulations concerning commerce on the high seas, and the etiquette of diplomacy. paramount in world-importance has been the agreement of the leading nations of the world in the establishment of the hague conferences for the amelioration of war. since a conference of nations can meet and decide on the mitigation of the horrors of war, it is certainly conceivable that a tribunal of nations can prevent war. such a tribunal would in no respect differ from the supreme court of the united states in its fundamental foundations. as our supreme court is final in settling all disputes in this country, so the international court would be final in adjusting all controversies between the nations. and such a court is clearly the next decisive step in the promotion of this great task of securing world-peace. if nations can agree to establish war as their arbiter of peace, why can they not establish a more peaceful substitute? it is possible, for there is nothing in the nature of strife that cannot be settled, no quarrel that cannot be judged, no difficulty that cannot be satisfactorily adjusted. with the establishment of a true world-court, there would rise on the vision of the nations for the first time the prospect of justice for the united whole of mankind. justice to the smaller countries would be secured; encroachments by the strong upon the weak would be prevented; the moral standard of politics would be uplifted; and though every step would be exposed to the selfishness, corruption, and love of despotism that are prevalent in all men, yet is it not reasonable to suppose that, as progress is now being made in the various nations for overcoming these evils, so it would be made in this united whole, to the unspeakable benefit of mankind? this country has been foremost in the promotion of this great movement to organize the world. it is especially fitting that the united states should take the lead. the greatest nation having a government of the people and by the people, with the longest experience and the greatest success, is best fitted to lead others. we have the form of national government which foreshadows the form of world-government. theoretically, our states are sovereign; all rights which are not formally surrendered by accepting the constitution of the united states are reserved to them. in a like manner, referring to the establishment of a world-court, the nations individually will be expected to surrender to the nations collectively only such jurisdiction as pertains to the settling of their controversies. a world-court would appeal to the strongest, the purest, and the deepest thinkers of every race. it would cover a new field, appealing to reason and altruism and justice. it would by its very effect upon individuals tend to develop the qualities it demands, and would prove a mighty influence for uplifting the intellectual and moral standards not only of men but nations. it would by its very international nature annihilate all national antipathies and promote an era of universal good will and genuine understanding. to send a husband or father, glorious in the perfection of physical manhood, out on the field of carnage to be slain in an effort to settle international difficulty or to uphold fancied national honor, is unquestionable barbarism. it is far more humane to terminate disputed questions by arbitration than by the keen-edged sword. international peace compacts can hold mankind together by unbreakable yet unburdensome bonds and greatly promote prosperity and social progress. the wanton woe and waste that inevitably follow in the train of war will soon be things of the past. the twentieth century, already so full of radiant promise, so enlivened by a new social conscience, will devote its collective energies to the abolition of war and the substitution of its successor--a world-court, based on the facts of humane solidarity and the principles of international peace. the present status of international arbitration by bryant smith, guilford college, north carolina, a senior in guilford college prize-winning essay in the pugsley contest, - the pugsley prize-essay contests in mr. chester dewitt pugsley, then an undergraduate student in harvard university, gave $ as a prize to be offered by the lake mohonk conference for the best essay on "international arbitration" by an undergraduate student of an american college. the prize was won by l. b. bobbitt of baltimore, a sophomore in johns hopkins university. the following year ( - ) a similar prize, of $ , was won by george knowles gardner of worcester, massachusetts, a harvard sophomore. a like prize of $ in - was won by harry posner of west point, mississippi, a senior in the mississippi agricultural and mechanical college. the prize of - , of which john k. starkweather of denver, colorado, a junior in brown university, was the winner, was the first offered to men students only (other similar prizes having been offered to women students) in the united states and canada. in the fifth pugsley contest ( - ) the prize was awarded to bryant smith of guilford college, north carolina, a senior in guilford college at the same place, whose essay follows. the judges were chancellor elmer ellsworth brown of new york university, rollo ogden, editor of the new york _evening post_, and lieutenant general nelson a. miles, u.s.a., retired. each winner is invited to the lake mohonk conference next following, where he publicly receives the prize from its donor, mr. pugsley. the present status of international arbitration the first concerted effort looking toward an eventual world-wide peace was the hague conference of , where representatives of twenty-six nations assembled in response to a rescript from the czar of russia, whose avowed purpose, as set forth in the rescript, was to discuss ways and, if possible, devise means, to arrest the alarming increase in expenditures for armaments which threatened to bankrupt the national governments. unable to accomplish anything definite in this respect because of the vigorous opposition headed by germany, the delegates turned their attention toward giving official recognition and concrete form to ideas which had already obtained in the settlement of international disputes, and toward the formation of a court before which the nations might have their differences adjudicated. the principles embodied in good offices and mediation and commissions of inquiry have given gratifying evidence of their efficiency, each in its respective capacity. the original achievement of the conference, however, was the permanent court of arbitration. the composition of this court was to include not more than four persons from each of the signatory powers; from which panel, in case of an appeal to arbitration, each party was to select two judges, who, in turn, should elect their own umpire unless otherwise provided by the disputants. that it would be subject to criticism might have been expected. that twenty-six nations could unanimously agree upon any court whatever was the real occasion for surprise. the four cases arbitrated during the eight years intervening between this and the second hague conference served to bring out its defects, chief of which were its decentralized and intangible nature. nominally a court, in reality it was but a panel scattered all over the world from which a court could, with great difficulty and expense, be selected. nominally permanent, in reality it had to be re-created for each case to be judged. the second hague conference, working on a basis of this short experience, undertook to remedy these inherent defects in the arbitral machinery by leaving the permanent court just as it was, and by creating besides an international court of prize to serve a special function indicated by its name, and a court of judicial arbitration to supplement the work of, if not eventually to supplant, the former court. to insure greater impartiality and also to encourage the weaker powers the expenses of the new court, instead of falling upon the litigants in each case, were to be prorated among the ratifying powers. to insure greater tangibility and permanency the new court was to be composed of only seventeen members, each to serve a term of twelve years at a salary of $ per annum, with an additional $ for each day of actual service. furthermore, the court was to meet once a year and to elect each year a delegation of three of its members to sit at the hague for settling minor cases arising in the interval between regular sessions, having the power also to call extra sessions of the entire court whenever occasion should demand. to insure a more judicial personnel the convention specifies that members shall be qualified to hold high legal posts in their respective countries. the method by which members of the court were to be appointed--the one point upon which the delegates were unable to agree--was deferred for subsequent determination. this, in addition to the one hundred and fifty-odd treaties privately entered into by two or more nations, many of which contain pledges to submit certain classes of disputes to the permanent court, is, in brief, what has been accomplished by way of constructive political organization by the modern peace movement. how much does this signify? in view of the present attitude of the social mind, what are we to infer from this as bearing upon the ultimate outcome of international arbitration? it shall be the purpose of this paper to answer that question. in an address before the mohonk conference of dr. cyrus northrup, ex-president of the university of minnesota, said: "what is really wanted is not continued talking in favor of peace with the idea of converting the people; for the people are already converted! they are ready for peace and arbitration!" in the october number of the _review of reviews_ for , privy councillor karl von stengel, one of the german delegation to the first hague conference, is quoted as follows: "it must be stated emphatically that in its ultimate aims the peace movement is not only ... utopian, but ... dangerous...." these quotations are given as typical of the attitude manifested by the two extremes, the injudiciously optimistic and the ultraconservative, toward every social reform. all true progress pursues a course intermediate to these two. the idea entertained by so many enthusiastic peace advocates, that the world is ready for peace if we but had institutional facilities adequate to carry out the will of the people, is erroneous. in all democratic states political institutions are but a concrete expression of the social mind, the media created by the people, through which society executes its will. "with a given phase of human character ... there must go an adapted class of institutions."[ ] therefore, i submit that if the people were ready for peace they could easily provide the means necessary for its accomplishment. [ ] herbert spencer, "the study of sociology." the first gentleman quoted above drew his conclusion from the indications that of the two million inhabitants of his state, one million nine hundred thousand would favor arbitration as shown by the enthusiasm manifested at a meeting of the state peace society a few weeks before. similar conditions in other parts of the country, he thought, would corroborate the application of his assertion to the entire country. such a conclusion is fallacious in that it fails to consider three essential facts about the people of the united states which largely determine the attitude of any people toward war. first, they have no grievance. second, no appeal is being made to their patriotic bias. third, their emotions and passions are quiescent. the first of these needs only brief mention. no people in this enlightened age wishes to fight as a matter of course, regardless of any reasonable pretext. if nations never had any personal interests involved, there would, of course, be no more war. in this respect the people of the united states are not ahead of the other parts of the civilized world. disinterested parties have been in favor of peace for two thousand years. the other two facts deserve more extended consideration. the disposition in individuals to pluck motes out of their neighbors' eyes and leave beams in their own, in the nation becomes what herbert spencer calls the bias of patriotism. according to him patriotism is but an extended self-interest. we love our country because our own interests and our country's interests are one. unable to view international affairs apart from national interests, we are handicapped in making those balanced judgments necessary to judicial arbitration. an act reprehensible under the union jack becomes patriotic under the stars and stripes. at both hague conferences all the powers were seemingly in favor of curtailing expenditures for armaments. the unprecedented increase in expenditures which followed bespeaks their sincerity, or, rather, bespeaks each nation's mistrust of the sincerity of others. a number of years ago the farmers' alliance, organized in some of the southern tobacco states, voted to reduce the acreage of tobacco for a given year in order to raise the price. so many members tried to profit by this opportunity to realize a high price for a big crop that there was a greater acreage planted that year than ever before. can we expect better of groups than of the individuals of which the groups are composed? most nations question the justice of russia's policy leading up to the war with japan, england's course in south africa, and america's attitude toward the philippines; yet the body of citizens of each of these three countries, while concurring in the general opinion concerning the other two, justifies its own government's actions with patriotic pride. the chief respect in which this bias interferes with the progress of international arbitration is in restricting the scope of general arbitration treaties, the average formula of such treaties excluding all questions which involve "national honor and vital interests." a greatly modified survival of the spirit which in primitive peoples regarded the tribe over the mountain or across the stream as a fit object of hatred and fear, the objection to a judicial settlement of such questions assumes that a nation's honor and vital interests are goods peculiar in that they may be inconsistent with justice. the attitude of the united states toward the recently proposed treaty between england and america may be taken as typical of the attitude which prevails on this subject generally. the formulators of the treaty took an advanced step in that, instead of reserving questions of national honor and vital interests, they provided for the arbitration of all differences which are "justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of principles of law or equity," thereby recognizing the judicial nature of arbitration. the action of the senate, however, which sustained the opinion of the majority report of the senate committee on foreign relations, objecting to the last clause of article iii of the treaty,[ ] would indicate that the significance of a general arbitration treaty attaches not so much to the definition of its scope as to who shall determine what cases conform to the definition. it would seem that the nature of the reservation is relatively unimportant so long as its interpretation devolves upon the parties at variance. the majority report, objecting to the delegation to the joint high commission of the power to determine the arbitrability of cases in terms of the treaty, contains this statement[ ] in which the minority report likewise concurs: "every one agrees that there are certain questions which no nation ... will ever submit to the decision of any one else." as cases of this nature it enumerates territorial integrity, admission of immigrants, and our monroe doctrine. the significance of this insistence upon a means of evasion is evident. there is not yet enough international confidence. the powers are not yet ready to submit to unlimited arbitration. [ ] the clause, referring to the commission of inquiry, reads: "it is further agreed, however, that in cases in which the parties disagree as to whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under article i of this treaty, that question shall be submitted to the joint high commission of inquiry; and if all or all but one of the members of the commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of article i, it shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this treaty."--_editor._ [ ] see senate document , d cong., st sess., - .--_editor._ the other enemy to rational judgment--and rational judgment must be the only basis of arbitration--is the danger of emotionalism. the average man is yet largely irrational. when cool and self-possessed, and when his prejudices and traditions do not interfere, he can pass rational judgment upon questions in which his own interests are not concerned; but when his passions are aroused he dispenses with any effort to reason and acts in obedience to blind impulse. he knows that it is expensive to fight, that it is dangerous, and that it is wrong; but when he is provoked, he fights. the characteristics of the average man are the characteristics of society. we have not yet outgrown the mob. interwoven with this impulsive temperament and associated with some of the most cherished affections of the human heart is the spirit of war, developed by thousands of generations of ancestral conflict and passed on to us as a heritage to be rooted out of our nature before we shall realize in its fullness the ideal for which we strive. mortal conflict sanctified by religion, devastation idealized by literature, pillage justified by patriotism, fellow-destruction ennobled by self-sacrifice--these form a complex of contradictory emotions from which men are as yet unable to unravel the one essential characteristic of war; namely, the attempt to dispense justice in a trial by battle, and make it stand out in its revealed inconsistency, dissociated from its traditional concomitants of which it is neither part nor parcel. the romance of knighthood and chivalry still appeals to the human heart, notwithstanding the fact that war, love, and religion, the knight's creed, are an inconsistent combination. most men can be made to see this in their minds, but cannot be made to feel it in their souls. many old civil war veterans, who would not consent for their sons to volunteer in the spanish-american war, would have gone themselves had they been able. some did go. to men so disposed it is useless to talk of the horrors of war. give us a just grievance; let some competent enthusiast inflame this passion with a war cry like "remember the maine," "fifty-four forty or fight," "liberty or death," and, reënforced by the animal inherent in man, it will arouse popular demonstrations devoid of all reason, creating a force that cannot be controlled by a cold, calculating intellect. can you listen to a bugle call on a clear, still night without a quickening of the pulse as there flashes through your soul a suggestion of all past history with its marshaling hosts and heroic deeds? can you see a military parade without a suggestion of "dixie" and the star spangled banner, or feeling your bosom swell with patriotic pride? this association may be, and doubtless is, a delusion, but it is a delusion developed and fortified by thousands of years of custom and precedent and it would be contrary to the history of human progress if man should become disillusionized in one generation. it may take centuries. if we are to have international arbitration in the near future, we must have it in spite of this spirit of war rather than by destroying the spirit. in fact, the only practical way to destroy it is to let it, like vestigial organs of which biologists tell us, degenerate from disuse. this inherited emotional tendency remains as a threat with which we, as exponents of arbitration, must reckon before we are justified in saying that the world is ready for peace. because of these two social characteristics--the patriotic bias which perverts judgment, and uncontrolled passions which submerge reason--the educational propagandists still have a task to perform. let us now examine the stand-pat idea that unlimited arbitration is but a dream as expressed in the quotation from privy councillor stengel. this is farther from the truth than the other extreme just discussed. he who will, with an unprejudiced mind, examine cross sections of history at widely separated stages, cannot fail to see that along with the growing tendency of reason to predominate over passion, superstition, and custom there has been a parallel tendency to restrict militarism as a social activity. from a war conceived as religion to war as patriotism, then war as commercialism and the tool of ambition, man is now coming to the more rational conception of war as the despoiler of nations. david speaks of the "season of the year" when nations went forth to battle. fifteen hundred years later governments pretended at least to justify their military operations on rational grounds. to-day war is the last resort, and even its most ardent defenders do not attempt to justify it except in disputes which involve national honor and vital interests. in view of the foregoing facts it is evident that the modern peace movement has by no means the whole of the task to perform. rather, we can almost justify ourselves in the assumption that war is not long to remain one of our social inconsistencies and that it is now making its last, and, therefore, most determined, stand on questions of national honor and vital interests. among the numerous forces contributing to this evolution of international peace, the chief agencies have been, and still are, moral and industrial. these same forces are working to-day with cumulative effect. warfare is becoming more and more inconsistent with the ethical spirit of the times. men may talk of the expenses, horrors, and devastations of war as paramount causes for the tendency to substitute arbitration; but antedating all other causes, underlying and strengthening all others, is the slowly changing social conscience which, as each generation passes, appreciates more fully warfare's inconsistency with justice and antagonism to right. this same cause found civilized society taking keen delight in the heathen barbarity of a gladiatorial combat, and has transformed and lifted it up to where it is horrified at a bull-baiting or a prize fight. it found human beings with absolute power of life and death over other human beings and has evolved the view that all men are created free and equal. it found individuals settling questions of honor by a resort to arms, and has substituted therefor a judge, counsel, and a jury. these three institutions--gladiatorial combats, slavery, and dueling--were no more regarded in their day as only temporary phenomena of social evolution than is war so regarded by military sympathizers of to-day; yet these have one by one been eliminated, and war is fast becoming as much out of harmony with the ethical spirit of this age as was each of the above out of harmony with the spirit of the age which dispensed with it, and the effort to demonstrate that war is just as dispensable is meeting with success. the teachings of christ, who two thousand years ago announced the doctrine of human brotherhood and surrendered his life to make this doctrine effective, have slowly but surely wrought their leavening influence upon the source of all war; namely, the hearts of men. warfare has for centuries been gradually yielding to this deepening consciousness and that it must eventually, if not soon, take its place beside the long-discarded gladiatorial profession, the outlawed slave trade, and the discountenanced custom of the duelist must be evident to any one who takes more than a superficial view of the great determining forces which shape human progress. besides moral forces, industrial forces were mentioned as a factor tending to the adoption of arbitration. during recent times, under the impetus caused by the relatively modern innovations of steam, electricity, and the press, this class of causes has been unusually effective. industry has overstepped international boundary lines. through the division of labor we are passing from the independence of nations to the interdependence of nations. international banking, transportation, and commerce, by establishing communities of interest in all parts of the world, are binding the peoples of the earth into one great industrial organization. as striking evidence of this development, more than one hundred and fifty international associations[ ] and more than thirty-five international unions of states have been formed. the modern intricate system of communication is a veritable nervous system which, in the event of any local paralysis or upheaval, informs the entire industrial organism. the figure is no longer "the shot heard, round the world," but becomes "the pulse-beat felt, round the world." if spencer's definition of patriotism--that is, coextensive with personal interests--is correct, the bias of patriotism cannot retard the progress of arbitration much longer, for patriotism will be a world-wide feeling, since personal interests are no longer restricted to nationality. [ ] "annuaire de la vie internationale," - , reports on .--_editor._ no, herr stengel, each passing year finds the causes which make for war weakened and the causes which make for arbitration proportionately reënforced. the skeptics are the dreamers and the peace workers are the practical men of affairs. from the foregoing synopsis of the technical accomplishments of the modern peace movement to date, and from the effort to interpret their significance in the light of fundamental social characteristics and the present social attitude, i trust three things have become evident: _first._ the movement for international peace through arbitration, far from being a mere bubble on the surface of society to be burst by the first war cloud which appears on the horizon, is a movement, centuries old, coincident with social evolution, deep-rooted in the very nature of a developing world-wide civilization. _second._ international peace through arbitration is not to be a ready-made affair, coming in on the crest of some wave of popular enthusiasm as was expected by many in . _third._ being an outgrowth of the natural laws of human development, a result so much deeper and more fundamental than political laws can produce, international peace through arbitration may be furthered, but cannot be accomplished, by legislation; may be delayed, but cannot be prevented, by the neglect to legislate. to undertake to hasten arbitration by forcing legislative proceedings beyond what the people will indorse, would be as futile as to turn up the hands of the clock to hasten the passage of time. to those who can appreciate these facts there is no occasion for discouragement in the suspicious attitude manifested by the powers toward any definite step in the direction of unrestricted arbitration, apparently so inconsistent with their general pacific professions. "rapid growth and quickly accomplished reforms are necessarily unsound, incomplete, and disappointing."[ ] [ ] f. h. giddings, "the elements of sociology." with the truth of these deductions granted, it would seem safe to assume that the institutions for the settlement of international difficulties will develop in much the same way as have the institutions for the settlement of difficulties between individuals. it should be profitable, therefore, to compare the present growth of arbitration with the evolution and decay of the various modes of trial as the idea of judicial settlement diffused itself through the mind of the english people causing established forms to give way to something better. dispensing with the blood feud, which hardly deserves the name of trial, the oldest form of such institution was trial by ordeal which, according to thayer in his "evidence at the common law," seems to have been "indigenous with the human creature in the earliest stages of his development." this form gradually fell into disuse before the more rational form of compurgation introduced into teutonic courts in the fifth century. in it was formally abolished. compurgation was abolished in as its inferiority to trial by witnesses became fully recognized. in the latter form, instituted early in the ninth century, when the witnesses disagreed the judicial talent of the day conceived of no other method of decision than to fight it out. thus we have trial by witnesses and trial by battle developing concurrently, although they were recognized as distinct forms. after two centuries of effort to abolish it, trial by battle was made illegal in , the last case recorded as being so decided occurring in . out of the trial by witnesses has evolved our modern trial by jury, at first limited to certain unimportant cases, then having its sphere extended as its superiority became more evident, until finally it superseded all other forms and to-day is the accepted mode of settling even questions of honor. the growth and extension of international arbitration has not been dissimilar to this. six cases were arbitrated in the eighteenth century, four hundred and seventy-one in the nineteenth, while more than one hundred and fifty cases have been arbitrated during the first thirteen years of the twentieth century. between the first and second hague conferences only four uses were submitted to the permanent court of arbitration. since the second conference, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory disposition of the venezuelan affair, eight cases have been tried, a ninth is pending, a tenth will soon be docketed if the united states is not to act the hypocrite in her international relations by refusing to submit to england's request to arbitrate the question as to whether or no we exempt our coastwise vessels from toll duty through the panama canal. defects have been detected in the permanent court of arbitration and we are well on the way toward a better court. representatives of only twenty-six nations took part in the deliberations of the first hague conference; representatives of forty-four nations took part in the deliberations of the second hague conference. wars of aggression and conquest, though not formally outlawed, are effectively so, and arbitration for the recovery of contract debts is now practically obligatory. as time passes and its feasibility gains credence, arbitration, like the jury trial, will extend its sphere of usefulness until it too settles questions of honor. nor need we imply from this analogy that it will take such an age to accomplish this result. because of the increased mobility of society, resulting from the greater like-mindedness and consciousness of kind incident to our modern communities of interests and systems of communication, and from our greater susceptibility to rational rather than traditional appeals, a reform can be wrought more easily and the people can adjust themselves to the change far more readily than several centuries ago. bearing in mind, then, our attempted analysis of counter social forces at work, our deductions from this analysis and the foregoing analogy the significance of which grows out of the truth of these deductions, let us conclude with a suggestion as to what the next hague conference should attempt. it should, of course, like the former conferences, extract as many teeth as possible from war. as to improving our arbitration facilities, its first task evidently should be to determine some method whereby members of the judicial arbitration court shall be apportioned and selected. if, as has been suggested, it is decided to use the same scheme of apportionment as that for the international court of prize, the provision that each party to a case shall have a representative on the bench should be changed so as to provide that neither party shall have a representative on the bench. if this court is not to be a misnomer like the permanent court of arbitration, its rulings must be in accord with the principles of jurisprudence rather than with the spirit of compromise such a provision would tend to produce. with this accomplished and the judicial court of arbitration put in practical working order "of free and easy access" to the powers, it may be doubted whether anything further can be done. if the powers can be made to agree to submit to the court all cases growing out of the disputed interpretation of treaties, a great advance will have been made, but it is doubtful whether the present state of public opinion would indorse such a progressive step. these international legislators can do no more than provide channels through which the spirit of international peace can exercise itself as it expands, and the judicial court of arbitration, at the optional use of the nations, conforms admirably to this requirement. the delegates should, therefore, avoid the universal tendency of such bodies to legislate too much. none of these hague conferences can alone accomplish the ultimate purpose of the so-called dreamers, but each conference may be a landmark on the upward journey toward that consummation, anticipated by utopians from the earliest times, foretold by prophets from micah and isaiah to robert burns and tennyson, labored for by practical statesmen from hugo grotius to william h. taft, when each man shall be a native of his state and a citizen of the world. authorities for acts and conventions of hague conferences: "texts of the peace conferences" by james brown scott. for data concerning proposed treaty with england: text of treaty and majority and minority reports of senate committee on foreign relations. for statistics of arbitration treaties: "revised list of arbitration treaties," compiled by denys p. myers. for development of trial by jury: "evidence at the common law" by thayer. proofreading team. this file was produced from images generously made available by the bibliothèque nationale de france (bnf/gallica) at http://gallica.bnf.fr letters upon war and neutrality ( - ) letters to "the times" upon war and neutrality ( - ) with some commentary by sir thomas erskine holland k.c., d.c.l., f.b.a. fellow of all souls college sometime chichele professor of international law membre (prÉsident ) de l'institut de droit international etc., etc. third edition longmans, green, and co. paternoster row, london fourth avenue & th street, new york bombay, calcutta, and madras preface to the first edition for a good many years past i have been allowed to comment, in letters to _the times_, upon points of international law, as they have been raised by the events of the day. these letters have been fortunate enough to attract some attention, both at home and abroad, and requests have frequently reached me that they should be rendered more easily accessible than they can be in the files of the newspaper in which they originally appeared. i have, accordingly, thought that it might be worth while to select, from a greater number, such of my letters as bear upon those questions of war and neutrality of which so much has been heard in recent years, and to group them for republication, with some elucidatory matter (more especially with reference to changes introduced by the geneva convention of , the hague conventions of , and the declaration of london of the present year) under the topics to which they respectively relate. the present volume has been put together in accordance with this plan; and my best thanks are due to the proprietors of the times for permitting the reissue of the letters in a collected form. cross-references and a full index will, i hope, to some extent remove the difficulties which might otherwise be caused by the fragmentary character, and the chances of repetition, inseparable from such a work. t. e. h. eggishorn, switzerland, _september_ , . * * * * * preface to the second edition i have again to thank _the times_ for permission to print in this new edition letters which have appeared in its columns during the past four years. they will be found to deal largely with still unsettled questions suggested by the work of the second peace conference, by the declaration of london, and by the, unfortunately conceived, naval prize bill of . i have no reason to complain of the reception which has so far been accorded to the views which i have thought it my duty to put forward. t. e. h. oxford, _january_ , . * * * * * preface to the third edition this, doubtless final, edition of my letters upon war and neutrality contains, by renewed kind permission of _the times_, the whole series of such letters, covering a period of no less than forty years. to the letters which have already appeared in former editions, i have now added those contained in the "supplement" of (for some time out of print) to my second edition; as also others of still more recent date. all these have been grouped, as were their predecessors, under the various topics which they were intended to illustrate. the explanatory commentaries have been carefully brought up to date, and a perhaps superfluously full index should facilitate reference for those interested in matters of the kind. such persons may not be sorry to have their attention recalled to many questions which have demanded practical treatment of late years, more especially during the years of the great war. not a few of these questions are sure again to come to the front, so soon as the rehabilitation of international law, rendered necessary by the conduct of that war, shall be seriously taken in hand. t. e. h. oxford, _april_ , . contents chapter i measures short of war for the settlement of international controversies section _friendly measures_ the petition to the president of the united states ( ) commissions of enquiry and the hague convention ( ) the league of nations ( ) " " " " ( " ) " " " " ( ) section _pacific reprisals_ the blockade of the menam ( ) pacific blockade ( ) the venezuelan controversy ( ) the venezuela protocol ( ) war and reprisals ( ) chapter ii steps towards a written law of war count von moltke on the laws of warfare ( ) professor bluntschli's reply to count von moltke ( ) the united states naval war code ( ) a naval war code ( ) chapter iii terminology international terminology ( ) chapter iv conventions and legislation government bills and international conventions ( ) the present bill in parliament ( ) the foreign enlistment bill ( ) chapter v the commencement of war section _declaration of war_ the sinking of the _kowshing_ ( ) section _the immediate effects of the outbreak of war_ foreign soldiers in england ( ) the naval prize bill: civil disabilities of enemy subjects ( ) enemy ships in port ( ) chapter vi the conduct of warfare section _on the open sea_ the freedom of the seas? ( ) section _in other waters_ the suez canal ( ) " " " ( " ) " " " ( " ) " " " ( " ) the closing of the dardanelles ( ) " " " " " ( " ) section _in a special danger zone?_ the german threat ( ) section _aerial warfare_ the debate on aeronautics ( ) the aerial navigation act ( ) sovereignty over the air ( ) attack from the air: the enforcement of international law ( ) " " " " the rules of international law ( ) section _submarines_ germany and the hague ( ) the "pirates" (march , ) submarine crews (march , ) mr. wilson's note (may , ) section _lawful belligerents_ guerilla warfare ( ) the russian use of chinese clothing ( ) the rights of armed civilians ( ) civilians in warfare: the right to take up arms ( ) civilians and a raid ( ) miss cavell's case ( ) section _privateering and the declaration of paris_ our mercantile marine in war time ( ) " " " " " " ( " ) our mercantile marine in war ( ) the declaration of paris ( ) " " " " ( ) " " " " ( ) " " " " ( ) section _assassination_ the natal proclamation ( ) section _the choice of means of injuring_ bullets in savage warfare ( ) gases ( ) section _the geneva convention_ wounded horses in war ( ) section _enemy property in occupied territory_ international "usufruct" ( ) requisitions in warfare ( ) section _enemy property at sea_ private property at sea ( ) section _martial law_ the executions at pretoria ( ) the petition of right ( ) the petition of right ( ) martial law in natal ( ) section _the naval bombardment of open coast towns_ naval atrocities ( ) the naval manoeuvres ( ) " " " ( " ) naval bombardments of unfortified places ( ) section _belligerent reprisals_ reprisals ( ) " ( " ) section _peace_ undesirable peace talk ( ) chapter vii the rights and duties of neutrals section _the criterion of neutral conduct_ professor de martens on the situation ( ) neutrals and the laws of war ( ) section _the duties of neutral states, and the liabilities of neutral individuals, distinguished_ contraband of war ( ) coal for the russian fleet ( ) german war material for turkey ( ) section _neutrality proclamations_ the british proclamation of neutrality ( ) " " " " ( " ) " " " " ( ) the proclamation of neutrality ( ) section _neutral hospitality_ belligerent fleets in neutral waters ( ) the _appam_ ( ) section _carriage of contraband_ _absolute and conditional contraband_ contraband of war ( ) is coal contraband of war? ( ) cotton as contraband of war ( ) " " " " ( ) japanese prize law ( ) " " " ( ) _continuous voyages_ prize law ( ) the _allanton_ ( ) _unqualified captors_ the _allanton_ ( ) section _methods of warfare as affecting neutrals_ _mines_ mines in the open sea ( ) territorial waters ( ) _cable-cutting_ submarine cables ( ) " " in time of war ( ) " " " " " " ( " ) section _destruction of neutral prizes_ russian prize law ( ) " " " ( " ) " " " ( " ) the sinking of neutral prizes ( ) section _an international prize court_ an international prize court ( ) a new prize law ( ) " " " " ( " ) " " " " ( " ) section _the naval prize bill_ the naval prize bill ( ) " " " " ( ) naval prize money ( ) section _the declaration of london_ the declaration of london ( ) " " " " ( ) " " " " ( ) " " " " ( " ) " " " " ( " ) " " " " ( ) " " " " ( ) germany wrong again ( ) index chapter i measures short of war for the settlement of international controversies section _friendly measures_ of the letters which follow, the first was suggested by a petition presented in october, , to the president of the united states, asking him to use his good offices to terminate the war in south africa; the second by discussions as to the advisability of employing, for the first time, an international commission of enquiry, for the purpose of ascertaining the facts of the lamentable attack perpetrated by the russian fleet upon british fishing vessels off the dogger bank, on october , . the commission sat from january to february , , and its report was the means of terminating a period of great tension in the relations of the two powers concerned (see _parl. paper_, russia, , no. ): this letter deals also with arbitration, under the hague convention of . it may be worth while here to point out that besides direct negotiation between the powers concerned, four friendly methods for the settlement of questions at issue between them are now recognised, _viz_ ( ) good offices and mediation of third powers; ( ) "special mediation"; ( ) "international commissions of enquiry"; ( ) arbitration. all four were recommended by the hague convention of "for the peaceful settlement of international disputes" (by which, indeed, ( ) and ( ) were first suggested), as also by the amended re-issue of that convention in . it must be noticed that resort to any of these methods is entirely discretionary, so far as any rule of international law is concerned; all efforts to render it universally and unconditionally obligatory having, perhaps fortunately, hitherto failed. it remains to be seen how far the settlement of international controversies has been facilitated by the establishment of a "league of nations" (to which reference is made in the concluding letters of this chapter), and, in particular, by the plan for the establishment of a "permanent court of international justice," formulated by the league, in pursuance of art. of the treaty of versailles, and submitted to its members in december, . the petition to the president of the united states sir,--it seems that a respectably, though perhaps thoughtlessly signed petition was on thursday presented to president mckinley, urging him to offer his good offices to bring to an end the war now being waged in south africa. from the _new york world_ cablegram, it would appear that the president was requested to take this step "in accordance with art. of the protocol of the peace conference at the hague." the reference intended is doubtless to the _convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux_, prepared at the conference [of ], art. of which is to the following effect:-- "les puissances signataires jugent utile qu'une ou plusieurs puissances étrangères au conflit offrent de leur propre initiative, en tant que les circonstances s'y prêtent, leurs bons offices ou leur médiation aux États en conflit. "le droit d'offrir les bons offices ou la médiation appartient aux puissances étrangères au conflit, même pendant le cours des hostilités. "l'exercice de ce droit ne peut jamais être considéré par l'une ou l'autre des parties en litige comme un acte peu amical." several remarks are suggested by the presentation of this petition:-- ( ) one might suppose from the glib reference here and elsewhere made to the hague convention, that this convention is already in force, whereas it is [ ], in the case of most, if not all, of the powers represented at the conference, a mere unratified draft, under the consideration of the respective governments. ( ) the article, if it were in force, would impose no duty of offering good offices, but amounts merely to the expression of opinion that an offer of good offices is a useful and unobjectionable proceeding, in suitable cases (_en tant que les circonstances s'y prêtent_). it cannot for a moment be supposed that the president would consider that an opportunity of the kind contemplated was offered by the war in south africa. ( ) one would like to know at what date, if at all, the prime minister of the british colony of the cape was pleased, as is alleged, to follow the lead of the presidents of the two boer republics in bestowing his grateful approval upon the petition in question. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, october ( ). _par._ ( ).--the convention of was ratified by great britain, on september , ; and between that year and practically all civilised powers ratified or acceded to it. it is now, for almost all powers, superseded by the hague convention, no. i. of , which, reproduces art. of the older convention, inserting, however, after the word "utile," the words "et désirable." _ib._ ( ).--on march , , the two boer republics proposed that peace should be made on terms which included the recognition of their independence. great britain having, on march , declared such recognition to be inadmissible, the european powers which were requested to use their good offices to bring this about declined so to intervene. the president of the united states, however, in a note delivered in london on march , went so far as to "express an earnest hope that a way to bring about peace might be found," and to say that he would aid "in any friendly manner to bring about so happy a result." lord salisbury, on the following day, while thanking the united states government, replied that "h.m. government does not propose to accept the intervention of any power in the south african war." similar replies to similar offers had been made both by france and prussia in , and by the united states in . commissions of enquiry and the hague convention sir,--it is just now [ ] especially desirable that the purport of those provisions of the hague convention "for the peaceful settlement of international controversies" which deal with "international commissions of enquiry" should be clearly understood. it is probably also desirable that a more correct idea should be formed of the effect of that convention, as a whole, than seems to be generally prevalent. you may, therefore, perhaps, allow me to say a few words upon each of these topics. art. of the convention contains an expression of opinion to the effect that recourse to an international commission of enquiry into disputed questions of fact would be useful. this recommendation is, however, restricted to "controversies in which neither honour nor essential interests are involved," and is further limited by the phrase "so far as circumstances permit." two points are here deserving of notice. in the first place, neither "the honour and vital interests clause," as seems to be supposed by your correspondent mr. schidrowitz, nor the clause as to circumstances permitting, is in any way modified by the article which follows. art. does not enlarge the scope of art. , but merely indicates the procedure to be followed by powers desirous of acting under it. in the second place, it is wholly unimportant whether or no the scope of art. is enlarged by art. . the entire liberty of the powers to make any arrangement which may seem good to them for clearing up their differences is neither given, nor impaired, by the articles in question, to which the good sense of the conference declined to attach any such obligatory force as had been proposed by russia. it may well be that disputant powers may at any time choose to agree to employ the machinery suggested by those articles, or something resembling it, in cases of a far more serious kind than those to which alone the convention ventured to make its recommendation applicable; and this is the course which seems to have been followed by the powers interested with reference to the recent lamentable occurrence in the north sea. as to the convention as a whole, it is important to bear in mind that, differing in this respect from the two other conventions concluded at the hague, it is of a non-obligatory character, except in so far as it provides for the establishment of a permanent tribunal at the hague, to which, however, no power is bound to resort. it resembles not so much a treaty as a collection of "pious wishes" (_voeux_), such as those which were also adopted at the hague. the operative phrases of most usual occurrence in the convention are, accordingly, such as "jugent utile"; "sont d'accord pour recommander"; "est reconnu comme le moyen le plus efficace"; "se réservent de conclure des accords nouveaux, en vue d'étendre l'arbitrage obligatoire à tous les cas qu'elles jugeront possible de lui soumettre." it is a matter for rejoicing that, in accordance with the suggestion contained in the phrase last quoted, so many treaties, of which that between great britain and portugal is the most recent, have been entered into for referring to the hague tribunal "differences of a juridical nature, or such as relate to the interpretation of treaties; on condition that they do not involve either the vital interests or the independence or honour of the two contracting states." such treaties, conforming as they all do to one carefully defined type, may be productive of much good. they testify to, and may promote, a very widely spread _entente cordiale_, they enhance the prestige of the tribunal of the hague, and they assure the reference to that tribunal of certain classes of questions which might otherwise give rise to international complications. beyond this it would surely be unwise to proceed. it is beginning to be realised that what are called "general" treaties of arbitration, by which states would bind themselves beforehand to submit to external decision questions which might involve high political issues, will not be made between powers of the first importance; also, that such treaties, if made, would be more likely to lead to fresh misunderstandings than to secure the peaceful settlement of disputed questions. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). _pars._ - .--the topic of "commissions of enquiry," which occupied arts. - of the convention of "for the peaceful settlement of international disputes," is more fully dealt with in arts. - of the convention as amended in . _par._ .--the amended convention, as a whole, is still, like its predecessor, purely facultative. the russian proposal to make resort to arbitration universally obligatory in a list of specified cases, unless when the "vital interests or national honour" of states might be involved, though negatived in , was renewed in , in different forms, by several powers, which eventually concurred in supporting the anglo-portuguese-american proposal, according to which, differences of a juridical character, and especially those relating to the interpretation of treaties, are to be submitted to arbitration, unless they affect the vital interests, independence, or honour, of the states concerned, or the interests of third states; while all differences as to the interpretation of treaties relating to a scheduled list of topics, or as to the amount of damages payable, where liability to some extent is undisputed, are to be so submitted without any such reservation. this proposal was accepted by thirty-two powers, but as nine powers opposed it, and three abstained from voting, it failed to become a convention. the delegates to the conference of went, however, so far as to include in their "final act" a statement to the effect that they were unanimous: ( ) "in recognising the principle of obligatory arbitration"; ( ) "in declaring that certain differences, and, in particular, such as relate to the interpretation and application of the provisions of international conventions, are suitable for being submitted to obligatory arbitration, without any reservations." _par._ .--the convention between france and great britain, concluded on october , , for five years, and renewed in , and again in , for a like period, by which the parties agree to submit to the hague tribunal any differences which may arise between them, on condition "that they do not involve either the vital interests, or the independence, or honour of the two contracting states, and that they do not affect the interests of a third power," has served as a model or "common form," for a very large number of conventions to the same effect, entered into between one state and another. the convention of april , , between great britain and the united states is substantially of this type. but see now the three letters which follow. the league of nations sir,--the league is unquestionably "a brave design." sympathy with its objects and some hope that they may be realised have induced myself, as, doubtless many others, to abstain from criticising the way in which the topic has been handled by the representatives of the victorious powers. recent discussions seem, however, to render such reticence no longer desirable. it begins to be recognised that, as some of us have all along held to be the case, a serious mistake was made by the paris delegates when they combined in one and the same document provisions needed for putting an end to an existing state of war with other provisions aiming at the creation in the future of a new supernational society. two matters so wholly incongruous in character should surely have been dealt with separately. whether it is now too late to attempt a remedy for the consequences of this unfortunate combination is a question which can be answered only by the diplomatists whose business it is to be intimately in touch with the susceptibilities of the various nations concerned. in the meantime, however, on the assumption that this state of things is productive of regrettable results, i may perhaps venture to indicate, recommending their adoption, the steps which appear to be required for the reformation of the treaty as drafted. my suggestions would run as follows:-- ( ) subtract from the treaty of versailles, parts i. and xiii., the former constituting a league of nations, the latter, in pursuance of a recital that universal peace "can be established only if it is based upon social justice," wholly occupied with a sufficiently ambitious scheme for the regulation by the league of all questions relating to "labour" which may arise within its jurisdiction. ( ) let part i., with part xiii. annexed, constitute a new and independent treaty; to be, as such, submitted to the powers for further consideration. (the opportunity might be taken of ridding it of all references to a system of "mandates," which might very probably lead to jealousies and misunderstandings.) ( ) parts ii. to xii., xiv., and xv. would then constitute the real treaty of peace, in which it would, however, be necessary in the numerous articles attributing functions, for the most part of a temporary character, the "league of nations," to substitute for any mention of the league words descriptive of some other authority, yet to be created, such as, for instance, "a commission to be constituted by the principal allied and associated powers." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). sir,--let me assure lord robert cecil that i am perfectly serious in giving expression to a long-felt wish that the treaty of peace could be relieved of articles relating exclusively to an as yet to be created league of nations, and in proceeding to indicate the steps that must be taken if this reform is to be effected. it can hardly be necessary also to assure lord robert that i am fully aware of the formidable, though perhaps not insuperable, difficulties which would beset any efforts to carry out my suggestions. he may have inferred so much from my letter of the th, in which, treating the question whether it is now too late to attempt a remedy for the existing state of things as beyond the competence of an outsider, i describe it as one which can be answered "only by the diplomatists whose business it is to be intimately in touch with the susceptibilities of the various nations concerned." on a point of detail, i am surprised that lord robert is unwilling that the contents of part xiii. should be removed to their natural context, on the ground that the labour organisation might be annoyed if this were done. i am, however, confident that the organisation is too intelligent not to see that it would lose nothing if the articles in which it is interested were made an integral part of a convention constituting a league of nations; the league being already solely charged with giving effect to the articles in question. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). sir,--professor alison phillips is not quite accurate in attributing to me a belief that the task of amending the treaty of versailles is "not beyond the powers of competent diplomatists." no such belief is expressed in my letter of december , in which i was careful to admit that the question, "whether it is now too late to attempt" the reform which appears to me to be desirable is one "which can be answered only by the diplomatists." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, january ( ). * * * * * section _pacific reprisals_ the four letters next following were suggested by the ambiguous character of the blockades instituted by france against siam in , by the great powers against crete in , and by great britain, germany, and italy, against venezuela in . the object, in each case, was to explain the true nature of the species of reprisals known as "pacific blockade," and to point out the difference between the consequences of such a measure and those which result from a "belligerent blockade." a fifth letter, written with reference to the action of the netherlands against venezuela in , emphasises the desirability of more clearly distinguishing between war and reprisals. on the various applications of a blockade in time of peace, see the author's _studies in international law_, pp. - . the blockade of the menam sir,--upon many questions of fact and of policy involved in the quarrel between france and siam it may be premature as yet to expect explicit information from the french government; but there should not be a moment's doubt as to the meaning of the blockade which has probably by this time been established. is france at war with siam? this may well be the case, according to modern practice, without any formal declaration of war; and it is, for international purposes, immaterial whether the french cabinet, if it has commenced a war without the sanction of the chambers, has or has not thereby violated the french constitution. if there is a war, and if the blockade, being effective, has been duly notified to the neutral powers, the vessels of those powers are, of course, liable to be visited, and, if found to be engaged in breach of the blockade, to be dealt with by the french prize courts. or is france still at peace with siam, and merely putting upon her that form of pressure which is known as "pacific blockade"? in this case, since there is no belligerency there is no neutrality, and the ships of states other than that to which the pressure is being applied are not liable to be interfered with. the particular mode of applying pressure without going to war known as "pacific blockade" dates, as is well known, only from . it has indeed been enforced, by england as well as by france, upon several occasions, against the vessels of third powers; but this practice has always been protested against, especially by french jurists, as an unwarrantable interference with the rights of such powers, and was acknowledged by lord palmerston to be illegal. the british government distinctly warned the french in that their blockade of formosa could be recognised as affecting british vessels only if it constituted an act of war against china; and when the great powers in proclaimed a pacific blockade of the coasts of greece they carefully limited its operation to ships under the greek flag. the subject has been exhaustively considered by the institut de droit international, which, at its meeting at heidelberg in , arrived at certain conclusions which may be taken to express the view of learned europe. they are as follows:-- "l'établissement d'un blocus en dehors de l'état de guerre ne doit être considere comme permis par le droit des gens que sous les conditions suivantes:-- " . les navires de pavillon étranger peuvent entrer librement malgré le blocus. " . le blocus pacifique doit être déclaré et notifié officiellement, et maintenu par une force suffisante. "les navires de la puissance bloquée qui ne respectent pas un pareil blocus peuvent être séquestrés. le blocus ayant cessé, ils doivent être restitués avec leur cargaisons à leurs propriétaires, mais sans dédommagement à aucun titre." if the french wish to reap the full advantages of a blockade of the siamese coast they must be prepared, by becoming belligerent, to face the disadvantages which may result from the performance by this country of her duties as a neutral. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. athenæum club, july ( ). pacific blockade sir,--the letter signed "m." in your issue of this morning contains, i think, some statements which ought not to pass uncorrected. a "blockade" is, of course, the denial by a naval squadron of access for vessels to a defined portion of the coasts of a given nation. a "pacific blockade" is one of the various methods--generically described as "reprisals," such as "embargo," or seizure of ships on the high seas--by which, without resort to war, pressure, topographically or otherwise limited in extent, may be put upon an offending state. the need for pressure of any kind is, of course, regrettable, the only question being whether such limited pressure be not more humane to the nation which experiences it, and less distasteful to the nation which exercises it, than is the letting loose of the limitless calamities of war. the opinion of statesmen and jurists upon this point has undergone a change, and this because the practice known as "pacific blockade" has itself changed. the practice, which is comparatively modern, dating only from , was at first directed against ships under all flags, and ships arrested for breach of a pacific blockade were at one time confiscated, as they would have been in time of war. it has been purged of these defects as the result of discussions, diplomatic and scientific. as now understood, the blockade is enforced only against vessels belonging to the "quasi-enemy," and even such vessels, when arrested, are not confiscated, but merely detained till the blockade is raised. international law does not stand still; and having some acquaintance with continental opinion on the topic under consideration, i read with amazement "m.'s" assertion that "the majority in number," "the most weighty in authority" of the writers on international law "have never failed to protest against such practices as indefensible in principle." the fact is that the objections made by, e.g. lord palmerston in , and by several writers of textbooks, to pacific blockade, had reference to the abuses connected with the earlier stages of its development. as directed only against the ships of the "quasi-enemy," it has received the substantially unanimous approbation of the institut de droit international at heidelberg in , after a very interesting debate, in which the advocates of the practice were led by m. perels, of the prussian admiralty, and its detractors by professor geffken. it is true that in an early edition of his work upon international law my lamented friend, mr. hall, did use the words attributed to him by "m.": "it is difficult to see how a pacific blockade is justifiable." but many things, notably lord granville's correspondence with france in and the blockade of the greek coast in , have occurred since those words were written. if "m." will turn to a later edition of the work in question he will see that mr. hall had completely altered his opinion on the subject, or rather that, having disapproved of the practice as unreformed, he blesses it altogether in its later development. with reference to the utility of the practice, i should like to call the attention of "m." to a passage in the latest edition of hall's book which is perhaps not irrelevant to current politics:-- "the circumstances of the greek blockade of show that occasions may occur in which pacific blockade has an efficacy which no other measure would possess. the irresponsible recklessness of greece was endangering the peace of the world; advice and threats had been proved to be useless; it was not till the material evidence of the blockade was afforded that the greek imagination could be impressed with the belief that the majority of the great powers of europe were in earnest in their determination that war should be avoided." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ). the venezuelan controversy sir,--apart from the practical difficulty, so ably described by sir robert giffen in your issue of this morning, of obtaining compensation in money from a state which seems to be at once bankrupt and in the throes of revolution, not a few questions of law and policy, as to which misunderstanding is more than probable, are raised from day to day by the action of the joint squadrons in venezuelan waters. it may therefore be worth while to attempt to disentangle the more important of these questions from the rest, and to indicate in each case the principles involved. . are we at war with venezuela? till reading the reports of what passed last night in the house of commons, i should have replied to this question unhesitatingly in the negative. most people whose attention has been directed to such matters must have supposed that we were engaged in the execution of "reprisals," the nature and legitimacy of which have long been recognised by international law. they consist, of course, in the exertion of pressure, short of war; over which they possess the following advantages: they are strictly limited in scope; they cease, when their object has been attained, without the formalities of a treaty of peace; and, no condition of "belligerency" existing between the powers immediately concerned, third powers are not called upon to undertake the onerous obligations of "neutrality." the objection sometimes made to reprisals, that they are applicable only to the weaker powers, since a strong power would at once treat them as acts of war, is indeed the strongest recommendation of this mode of obtaining redress. to localise hostile pressure as far as possible, and to give to it such a character as shall restrict its incidence to the peccant state, is surely in the interest of the general good. that the steps taken are such as would probably, between states not unequally matched, cause an outbreak of war cannot render them inequitable in cases where so incalculable an evil is unlikely to follow upon their employment. . the justification of a resort either to reprisals or to war, in any given case, depends, of course, upon the nature of the acts complained of, and upon the validity of the excuses put forward either for the acts themselves, or for failure to give satisfaction for them. the british claims against venezuela seem to fall into three classes. it will hardly be disputed that acts of violence towards british subjects or vessels, committed under state authority, call for redress. losses by british subjects in the course of civil wars would come next, and would need more careful scrutiny (on this point the debates and votes of the institut de droit international, at its meeting at neuchâtel in , may be consulted with advantage). last of all would come the claims of unpaid bondholders, as to which mr. balfour would seem to endorse, in principle, the statement made in by lord salisbury who, while observing that "it would be an extreme assertion to say that this country ought never to interfere on the part of bondholders who have been wronged," went on to say that "it would be hardly fair if any body of capitalists should have it in their power to pledge the people of this country to exertions of such an extensive character.... they would be getting the benefit of an english guarantee without paying the price of it." . reprisals may be exercised in many ways; from such a high-handed act as the occupation of the principalities by russia in , to such a mere seizure of two or three merchant vessels as occurred in the course of our controversy with brazil in . in modern practice, these measures imply a temporary sequestration, as opposed to confiscation or destruction, of the property taken. in the belief that reprisals only were being resorted to against venezuela one was therefore glad to hear that the sinking of gunboats by the germans had been explained as rendered necessary by their unseaworthiness. . pacific reprisals should also, according to the tendency of modern opinion and practice, be so applied as not to interfere with the interests of third powers and their subjects. this point has been especially discussed with reference to that species of reprisal known as a "pacific blockade," of which some mention has been made in the present controversy. the legitimacy of this operation, though dating only from , if properly applied, is open to no question. its earlier applications were, no doubt, unduly harsh, not only towards the peccant state, but also towards third states, the ships of which were even confiscated for attempting to break a blockade of this nature. two views on this subject are now entertained--viz. ( ) that the ships of third powers breaking a pacific blockade may be turned back with any needful exertion of force, and, if need be, temporarily detained; ( ) that they may not be interfered with. the former view is apparently that of the german government. it was certainly maintained by m. perels, then as now the adviser to the german admiralty, during the discussion of the subject by the institut de droit international at heidelberg in . the latter view is that which was adopted by the institut on that occasion. it was maintained by great britain, with reference to the french blockade of formosa in ; was acted on by the allied powers in the blockade of the coast of greece, instituted in ; and is apparently put forward by the united states at the present moment. . if, however, we are at war with venezuela (as will, no doubt, be the case if we proclaim a belligerent blockade of the coast, and may at any moment occur, should venezuela choose to treat our acts, even if intended only by way of reprisals, as acts of war), the situation is changed in two respects: ( ) the hostilities which may be carried on by the allies are no longer localised, or otherwise limited, except by the dictates of humanity; ( ) third states become _ipso facto_ "neutrals," and, as such, subject to obligations to which up to that moment they had not been liable. whatever may have previously been the case, it is thenceforth certain that their merchant vessels must respect the (now belligerent) blockade, and are liable to visit, search, seizure, and confiscation if they attempt to break it. . if hostile pressure, whether by way of reprisals or of war, is exercised by the combined forces of allies, the terms on which this is to be done must obviously be arranged by previous agreement. more especially would this be requisite where, as in the case of great britain and germany, different views are entertained with reference to the acts which are permissible under a "pacific blockade." . when, besides the power, or powers, putting pressure upon a given state, with a view to obtaining compensation for injuries received from it, other powers, though taking no part in what is going on, give notice that they also have claims against the same offender; delicate questions may obviously arise between the creditors who have and those who have not taken active steps to make their claims effective. in the present instance, france is said to assert that she has acquired a sort of prior mortgage on the assets of venezuela; and the united states, spain, and belgium declare themselves entitled to the benefit of the "most-favoured-nation clause" when those assets are made available for creditors. what principles are applicable to the solution of the novel questions suggested by these competing claims? . it is satisfactory to know, on the highest authority, that the "monroe doctrine" is not intended to shield american states against the consequences of their wrongdoing; since the cordial approval of the doctrine which has just been expressed by our own government can only be supposed to extend to it so far as it is reasonably defined and applied. great britain, for one, has no desire for an acre of new territory on the american continent. the united states, on the other hand, will doubtless readily recognise that, if international wrongs are to be redressed upon that continent, aggrieved european powers may occasionally be obliged to resort to stronger measures than a mere embargo on shipping, or the blockade (whether "pacific" or "belligerent") of a line of coast. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). the venezuela protocol sir,--the close (for the present, at any rate) of the venezuelan incident will be received with general satisfaction. one of the articles of the so-called "protocol" of february seems, however, to point a moral which one may hope will not be lost sight of in the future--viz. the desirability of keeping unblurred the line of demarcation between such unfriendly pressure as constitutes "reprisals" and actual war. after all that has occurred--statements in parliament, action of the governor of trinidad in bringing into operation the dormant powers of the supreme court of the island as a prize court, &c.--one would have supposed that there could be no doubt, though no declaration had been issued, that we were at war with venezuela. our government has, therefore, been well advised in providing for the renewal of any treaty with that power which may have been abrogated by the war; but it is curious to find that the article ( ) of the protocol which effects this desirable result begins by a recital to the effect that "it may be contended that the establishment of a blockade of the venezuelan ports by the british naval forces has _ipso facto_ created a state of war between great britain and venezuela." it is surely desirable that henceforth great britain should know, and that other nations should at least have the means of knowing, for certain, whether she is at war or at peace. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). war and reprisals sir,--professor westlake's interesting letter as to the measures recently taken by the netherlands government in venezuelan waters opportunely recalls attention to a topic upon which i addressed you when, six years ago, our own government was similarly engaged in putting pressure upon venezuela--viz. the desirability of drawing a clear line between war and reprisals. perhaps i may now be allowed to return, very briefly, to this topic, with special reference to professor westlake's remarks. in any discussion of the questions involved, we ought, i think, clearly to realise that the hague convention, no. iii. of , has no application to any measures not amounting to war. the "hostilities" mentioned in art. of the convention are, it will be observed, exclusively such as must not commence without either a "declaration of war," or "an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war"; and art. requires that the "state of war" thus created shall be notified to "neutral powers." there are, of course, no powers answering to this description till war has actually broken out. neutrality presupposes belligerency. any other interpretation of the convention would, indeed, render "pacific blockades" henceforth impossible. in the next place, we must at once recognise that the application of the term "reprisals," whatever may have been its etymological history, must no longer be restricted to seizure of property. it has now come to cover, and it is the only term which does cover generically, an indeterminate list of unfriendly acts, such as embargo, pacific blockade, seizure of custom-houses, and even occupation of territory, to which resort is had in order to obtain redress from an offending state without going to war with it. the pressure thus exercised, unlike the unlimited _licentia laedendi_ resulting from a state of war, is localised and graduated. it abrogates no treaties, and terminates without a treaty of peace. it affects only indirectly, if at all, the rights of states which take no part in the quarrel. the questions which remain for consideration would seem to be the following:-- . would it be feasible to draw up a definite list of the measures which may legitimately be taken with a view to exercising pressure short of war?--i think not. states differ so widely in offensive power and vulnerability that it would be hardly advisable thus to fetter the liberty of action of a state which considers itself to have been injured. . ought it to be made obligatory that acts of reprisal should be preceded, or accompanied, by a notification to the state against which they are exercised that they are reprisals and not operations of war?--this would seem to be highly desirable; unless indeed it can be assumed that, in pursuance of the hague convention of , no war will henceforth be commenced without declaration. . ought a statement to the like effect to be made to nations not concerned in the quarrel?--this would, doubtless, be convenient, unless the non-receipt by them of any notification of a "state of war," in pursuance of the convention, could be supposed to render such a statement superfluous. on the ambiguous character sometimes attaching to reprisals as now practised, i may perhaps refer to an article in the _law quarterly review_ for , entitled "war sub modo." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). the operations against venezuela which were closed by the protocol of february , , had given rise to the enunciation of the so-called "drago doctrine," in a despatch, addressed on december of the preceding year, by the argentine minister for foreign affairs to the government of the united states, which asserts that "public indebtedness cannot justify armed intervention by a european power, much less material occupation by it of territory belonging to any american nation." the reply of the united states declined to carry the "monroe doctrine" to this length, citing the passage in president roosevelt's message in which he says: "we do not guarantee any state against punishment, if it misconducts itself, provided such punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-american power." it is, however, now provided by the hague convention, no. ii. of , ratified by great britain on november , , that "the contracting powers have agreed not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contractual debts, claimed from the government of a country by the government of another country, as being due to its subjects. this stipulation shall have no application when the debtor state declines, or leaves unanswered, an offer of arbitration, or, having accepted it, renders impossible the conclusion of the terms of reference (_compromis_), or, after the arbitration, fails to comply with the arbitral decision." chapter ii steps towards a written law of war a large body of written international law, with reference to the conduct of warfare, has been, in the course of the last half-century, and, more especially, in quite recent years, called into existence by means of general conventions, or declarations, of which mention must frequently be made in the following pages. such are:-- (i.) with reference to war, whether on land or at sea: the declaration of st. petersburg, of , as to explosive bullets; the three hague declarations of (of which the first was repeated in ), as to projectiles from balloons, projectiles spreading dangerous gases, and expanding bullets; the hague convention, no. iii. of as to declaration of war; all ratified by great britain, except the declaration of st. petersburg, which was thought to need no ratification. (ii.) with reference only to war on land: the geneva convention of (superseding that of ) as to the sick and wounded, which was generally ratified, though by great britain only in (it was extended to maritime warfare by conventions iii. of and x. of , both ratified by great britain, _cf. infra_, ch. vi. section ); the hague conventions of , no. iv. (superseding the convention of ) as to the conduct of warfare, and no. v. as to neutrals, of which only the former has as yet been ratified by great britain. (iii.) with reference only to war at sea: the declaration of paris, of , supposed apparently to need no ratification (to which the united states is now the only important power which has not become a party), as to privateering, combination of enemy and neutral property and blockades; the hague conventions of , no. vi. as to enemy merchant vessels at outbreak, no. vii. as to conversion of merchantmen into warships, no. viii. as to mines, no. ix. as to naval bombardments, no. x. as to the sick and wounded, no. xi. as to captures, no. xii. as to an international prize court, supplemented by the convention of , no. xiii. as to neutrals. it must be observed that, of these conventions, great britain has ratified only vi., vii., viii., ix., and x., the three last subject to reservations. the declaration of london of , purporting to codify the laws of naval warfare as to blockade, contraband, hostile assistance, destruction of prizes, change of flag, enemy character, convoy, resistance and compensation, and so to facilitate the working of the proposed international prize court, if, and when, this court should come into existence, has failed to obtain ratification, as will be hereafter explained. concurrently with the efforts which have thus been made to ascertain the laws of war by general diplomatic agreement, the way for such agreement has been prepared by the labours of the institut de droit international, and by the issue by several governments of instructions addressed to their respective armies and navies. the _manuel des lois de la guerre sur terre_, published by the institut in , is the subject of the two letters which immediately follow. their insertion here, although the part in them of the present writer is but small, may be justified by the fact that they set out a correspondence which is at once interesting (especially from its bearing upon the war of ) and not readily elsewhere accessible. the remaining letters in this chapter relate to the _naval war code_, issued by the government of the united states in , but withdrawn in , though still expressing the views of that government, for reasons specified in a note to the british _chargé d'affaires_ at washington and printed in _parl. papers, miscell._ no. ( ), p. . the united states, it will be remembered, were also the first power to attempt a codification of the laws of war on land, in their _instructions for the government of armies of the united states_, issued in , and reissued in . some information as to this and similar bodies of national instructions may be found in the present writer's _studies in international law_, , p. . _cf._ his _manual of naval prize law_, issued by authority of the admiralty in , his _handbook of the laws and customs of war on land_, issued by authority to the british army in , and his _the laws of war on land (written and unwritten)_, . the institut de droit international, which has been engaged for some years upon the law of war at sea, by devoting the whole of its session at oxford, in , to the discussion of the subject, produced a _manuel des lois de la guerre sur mer_, framed in accordance with the now-accepted view which sanctions the capture of enemy private property at sea. it is to be followed by a manual framed in accordance with the contrary view. _cf._ the letters upon the _declaration of london_, in ch. vii. section , _infra_. count von moltke on the laws of warfare sir,--you may perhaps think that the accompanying letter, recently addressed by count von moltke to professor bluntschli, is of sufficient general interest to be inserted in _the times_. it was written with reference to the manual of the laws of war which was adopted by the institut de droit international at its recent session at oxford. the german text of the letter will appear in a few days at berlin. my translation is made from the proof-sheets of the february number of the _revue de droit international_, which will contain also professor bluntschli's reply. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, january ( ). "berlin, dec. , . "you have been so good as to forward to me the manual published by the institut de droit international, and you hope for my approval of it. in the first place i fully appreciate the philanthropic effort to soften the evils which result from war. perpetual peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. war is an element in the order of the world ordained by god. in it the noblest virtues of mankind are developed; courage and the abnegation of self, faithfulness to duty, and the spirit of sacrifice: the soldier gives his life. without war the world would stagnate, and lose itself in materialism. "i agree entirely with the proposition contained in the introduction that a gradual softening of manners ought to be reflected also in the mode of making war. but i go further, and think the softening of manners can alone bring about this result, which cannot be attained by a codification of the law of war. every law presupposes an authority to superintend and direct its execution, and international conventions are supported by no such authority. what neutral states would ever take up arms for the sole reason that, two powers being at war, the 'laws of war' had been violated by one or both of the belligerents? for offences of that sort there is no earthly judge. success can come only from the religious moral education of individuals and from the feeling of honour and sense of justice of commanders who enforce the law and conform to it so far as the exceptional circumstances of war permit. "this being so, it is necessary to recognise also that increased humanity in the mode of making war has in reality followed upon the gradual softening of manners. only compare the horrors of the thirty years' war with the struggles of modern times. "a great step has been made in our own day by the establishment of compulsory military service, which introduces the educated classes into armies. the brutal and violent element is, of course, still there, but it is no longer alone, as once it was. again, governments have two powerful means of preventing the worst kind of excesses--strict discipline maintained in time of peace, so that the soldier has become habituated to it, and care on the part of the department which provides for the subsistence of troops in the field. if that care fails, discipline can only be imperfectly maintained. it is impossible for the soldier who endures sufferings, hardships, fatigues, who meets danger, to take only 'in proportion to the resources of the country.' he must take whatever is needful for his existence. we cannot ask him for what is superhuman. "the greatest kindness in war is to bring it to a speedy conclusion. it should be allowable with that view to employ all methods save those which are absolutely objectionable ('dazu müssen alle nicht geradezu verwerfliche mittel freistehen'). i can by no means profess agreement with the declaration of st. petersburg when it asserts that 'the weakening of the military forces of the enemy' is the only lawful procedure in war. no, you must attack all the resources of the enemy's government: its finances, its railways, its stores, and even its prestige. thus energetically, and yet with a moderation previously unknown, was the late war against france conducted. the issue of the campaign was decided in two months, and the fighting did not become embittered till a revolutionary government, unfortunately for the country, prolonged the war for four more months. "i am glad to see that the manual, in clear and precise articles, pays more attention to the necessities of war than has been paid by previous attempts. but for governments to recognise these rules will not be enough to insure that they shall be observed. it has long been a universally recognised custom of warfare that a flag of truce must not be fired on, and yet we have seen that rule violated on several occasions during the late war. "never will an article learnt by rote persuade soldiers to see a regular enemy (sections - ) in the unorganised population which takes up arms 'spontaneously' (so of its own motion) and puts them in danger of their life at every moment of day and night. certain requirements of the manual might be impossible of realisation; for instance, the identification of the slain after a great battle. other requirements would be open to criticism did not the intercalation of such words as 'if circumstances permit,' 'if possible,' 'if it can be done,' 'if necessary,' give them an elasticity but for which the bonds they impose must be broken by inexorable reality. "i am of opinion that in war, where everything must be individual, the only articles which will prove efficacious are those which are addressed specifically to commanders. such are the rules of the manual relating to the wounded, the sick, the surgeons, and medical appliances. the general recognition of these principles, and of those also which relate to prisoners, would mark a distinct step of progress towards the goal pursued with so honourable a persistency by the institut de droit international. "count von moltke, field-marshal-general." professor bluntschli's reply to count von moltke sir,--in accordance with a wish expressed in several quarters, i send you, on the chance of your being able to make room for it, a translation of professor bluntschli's reply to the letter from count von moltke which appeared in _the times_ of the st inst. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). "christmas, . "i am very grateful for your excellency's detailed and kind statement of opinion as to the manual of the laws of war. this statement invites serious reflections. i see in it a testimony of the highest value, of historical importance; and i shall communicate it forthwith to the members of the institut de droit international. "for the present i do not think i can better prove my gratitude to your excellency than by sketching the reasons which have guided our members, and so indicating the nature of the different views which prevail upon the subject. "it is needless to say that the same facts present themselves in a different light and give a different impression as they are looked at from the military or the legal point of view. the difference is diminished, but not removed, when an illustrious general from his elevated position takes also into consideration the great moral and political duties of states, and when, on the other hand, the representatives of science of international law set themselves to bring legal principles into relation with military necessities. "for the man of arms the interest of the safety and success of the army will always take precedence of that of the inoffensive population, while the jurist, convinced that law is the safeguard of all, and especially for the weak against the strong, will ever feel it a duty to secure for private individuals in districts occupied by an enemy the indispensable protection of law. there may be members of the institut who do not give up the hope that some day, thanks to the progress of civilisation, humanity will succeed in substituting an organised international justice for the wars which now-a-days take place between sovereign states. but the body of the institut, as a whole, well knows that that hope has no chance of being realised in our time, and limits its action in this matter to two principal objects, the attainment of which is possible:-- " . to open and facilitate the settlement of trifling disputes between nations by judicial methods, war being unquestionably a method out of all proportion in such cases. " . to aid in elucidating and strengthening legal order even in time of war. "i acknowledge unreservedly that the customs of warfare have improved since the establishment of standing armies, a circumstance which has rendered possible a stricter discipline, and has necessitated a greater care for the provisionment of troops. i also acknowledge unreservedly that the chief credit for this improvement is due to military commanders. brutal and barbarous pillage was prohibited by generals before jurists were convinced of its illegality. if in our own day a law recognised by the civilised world forbids, in a general way, the soldier to make booty in warfare on land, we have here a great advance in civilisation, and the jurists have had their share in bringing it about. since compulsory service has turned standing armies into national armies, war has also become national. laws of war are consequently more than ever important and necessary, since, in the differences of culture and opinion which prevail between individuals and classes, law is almost the only moral power the force of which is acknowledged by all, and which binds all together under common rules. this pleasing and cheering circumstance is one which constantly meets us in the institut de droit international. we see a general legal persuasion ever in process of more and more distinct formation uniting all civilised peoples. men of nations readily disunited and opposed--germans and french, english and russians, spaniards and dutchmen, italians and austrians--are, as a rule, all of one mind as to the principles of international law. "this is what makes it possible to proclaim an international law of war, approved by the legal conscience of all civilised peoples; and when a principle is thus generally accepted, it exerts an authority over minds and manners which curbs sensual appetites and triumphs over barbarism. we are well aware of the imperfect means of causing its decrees to be respected and carried out which are at the disposal of the law of nations. we know also that war, which moves nations so deeply, rouses to exceptional activity the good qualities as well as the evil instincts of human nature. it is for this very reason that the jurist is impelled to present the legal principles, of the need for which he is convinced, in a clear and precise form, to the feeling of justice of the masses, and to the legal conscience of those who guide them. he is persuaded that his declaration will find a hearing in the conscience of those whom it principally concerns, and a powerful echo in the public opinion of all countries. "the duty of seeing that international law is obeyed, and of punishing violations of it, belongs, in the first instance, to states, each within the limits of its own supremacy. the administration of the law of war ought therefore to be intrusted primarily to the state which wields the public power in the place where an offence is committed. no state will lightly, and without unpleasantness and danger, expose itself to a just charge of having neglected its international duties; it will not do so even when it knows that it runs no risk of war on the part of neutral states. every state, even the most powerful, will gain sensibly in honour with god and man if it is found to be faithful and sincere in respect and obedience to the law of nations. "should we be deceiving ourselves if we admitted that a belief in the law of nations, as in a sacred and necessary authority, ought to facilitate the enforcement of discipline in the army and help to prevent many faults and many harmful excesses? i, for my part, am convinced that the error, which has been handed down to us from antiquity, according to which all law is suspended during war, and everything is allowable against the enemy nation--that this abominable error can but increase the unavoidable sufferings and evils of war without necessity, and without utility from the point of view of that energetic way of making war which i also think is the right way. "with reference to several rules being stated with the qualifications 'if possible,' 'according to circumstances,' we look on this as a safety-valve, intended to preserve the inflexible rule of law from giving way when men's minds are overheated in a struggle against all sorts of dangers, and so to insure the application of the rules in many other instances. sad experience teaches us that in every war there are numerous violations of law which must unavoidably remain unpunished, but this will not cause the jurist to abandon the authoritative principle which has been violated. quite the reverse. if, for instance, a flag of truce has been fired upon, in contravention of the law of nations, the jurist will uphold and proclaim more strongly than ever the rule that a flag of truce is inviolable. "i trust that your excellency will receive indulgently this sincere statement of my views, and will regard it as an expression of my gratitude, as well as of my high personal esteem and of my respectful consideration. "dr. bluntschli, privy councillor, professor." the united states naval war code.[ ] sir,--the "naval war code" of the united states, upon which an interesting article appeared in _the times_ of friday last, in so well deserving of attention in this country that i may perhaps be allowed to supplement the remarks of your correspondent from the results of a somewhat minute examination of the code made shortly after its publication. one notes, in the first place, that the government of the united states does not shirk responsibility. it puts the code into the hands of its officers "for the government of all persons attached to the naval service," and is doubtless prepared to stand by the rules contained in it, as being in accordance with international law. these rules deal boldly with even so disagreeable a topic as "reprisals" (art. ), upon which the brussels, and after it the hague, conference preferred to keep silence; and they take a definite line on many questions upon which there are wide differences of opinion. on most debatable points, the rules are in accordance with the views of this country--e.g. as to the right of search (art. ), as to the two-fold list of contraband (arts. - ), as to the moment at which the liability of a blockade-runner commences (art. ), and as to the capture of private property (art. ), although the prohibition of such capture has long been favoured by the executive of the united states, and was advocated by the american delegates at the hague conference. so also arts. - , by apparently taking for granted the correctness of the rulings of the supreme court in the civil war cases of the _springbok_ and the _peterhoff_ with reference to what may be described as "continuous carriage," are in harmony with the views which lord salisbury recently had occasion to express as to the trade of the _bundesrath_ and other german vessels with lorenzo marques. it must be observed, on the other hand, that art. flatly contradicts the british rule as to convoy; while art. sets out the hague declaration as to projectiles dropped from balloons, to which this country is not a party. art. departs from received views by prohibiting altogether the use of false colours, and art. (doubtless in pursuance of the recent decision of the supreme court in the _paquete habana_), by affirming the absolute immunity of coast fishing vessels, as such, from capture. on novel questions the code is equally ready with a solution. it speaks with no uncertain voice on the treatment of mail steamers and mail-bags (art. ). on cable-cutting it adopts in art. , as your correspondent points out, the views which i ventured to maintain in your columns when the question was raised during the war of .[ ] i may also, by the way, claim the support of the code for the view taken by me, in a, correspondence also carried on in your columns during the naval manoeuvres of , of the bombardment of open coast towns.[ ] art. sets out substantially the rules upon this subject for which i secured the _imprimatur_ of the institut de droit international in . secondly, the code is so well brought up to date as to incorporate (arts. - ) the substance of the hague convention, ratified only in september last, for applying to maritime warfare the principles of the convention of geneva. art. of the hague convention has been reproduced in the code, in forgetfulness perhaps of the fact that that article has not been ratified. thirdly, the code contains, very properly, some general provisions applicable equally to warfare upon land (arts. , , , , ). fourthly, it is clearly expressed; and it is brief, consisting of only articles, occupying pages. fifthly, it deals with two very distinct topics--viz. the mode of conducting hostilities against the forces of the enemy, and the principles applicable to the making prize of merchant vessels, which as often as not may be the property of neutrals. these topics are by no means kept apart as they might be, articles on prize occurring unexpectedly in the section avowedly devoted to hostilities. it is worth considering whether something resembling the united states code would not be found useful in the british navy. our code might be better arranged than its predecessor, and would differ from it on certain questions, but should resemble it in clearness of expression, in brevity, and, above all things, in frank acceptance of responsibility. what naval men most want is definite guidance, in categorical language, upon those points of maritime international law upon which our government has made up its own mind. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, april ( ). notes - : withdrawn in . - : _infra_, ch. vii. section . - : _infra_, ch. vi. section . a naval war code sir,--it is now nearly a year ago since i ventured to suggest in your columns (for april , ) that something resembling the united states "naval war code," dealing with "the laws and usages of war at sea," would be found useful in the british navy. the matter is, however, not quite so simple as might be inferred from some of the allusions to it which occurred during last night's debate upon the navy estimates. upon several disputable and delicate questions the government of the united states has not hesitated to express definite views; and they are not always views which the government of our own country would be prepared to endorse. for some remarks upon these questions in detail, and upon the code generally, i must refer to my former letter, but may perhaps be allowed to quote its concluding words, which were to the following effect:-- "our code might be better arranged than its predecessor, and would differ from it on certain questions, but should resemble it in clearness of expression, in brevity, and, above all things, in frank acceptance of responsibility. what naval men most want is definite guidance, in categorical language, upon those points of maritime international law upon which our government has made up its own mind." before issuing such a code our authorities would have to decide--first, what are the classes of topics as to which it is desirable to give definite instructions to naval officers; and, secondly, with reference to topics, to be included in the instructions, as to which there exist international differences of view, what is, in each case, the view by which the british government is prepared to stand. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ). chapter iii terminology international terminology sir,--demands for the punishment of the ex-kaiser have produced many "curiosities of literature," sometimes even over the signatures of men deservedly respected as authorities upon subjects which they have made their own; but _ne sutor supra crepidam_. a.b.,[ ] for instance, wrote of the kaiser as guilty of "an indictable offence." x.y.[ ] naturally protests against this misuse of terminology, which is, indeed, far more specifically erroneous than was the popular application, which you allowed me to criticise, of the terms "murder" and "piracy" to certain detestable acts perpetrated under government authority.[ ] he goes on to give an elaborate, though perhaps hardly necessary, explanation that breaches of that generally accepted body of rules to be followed by states _inter se_, which is known as "international law," can be enforced, in the last resort, only by hostile state action--a fact which he seems to suppose may entitle him to qualify the rules as "a mockery." x.y.[ ] then proceeds to give an account of the so-called "private international law" which surely needs revision for the benefit of any "man in the street" who may care to hear about it. x.y.[ ] defines it as "that part of the law of each separate country, as administered in its own courts, which deals with international matters," and he enumerates as such matters "prize, contraband, blockade, the rights of ambassadors." in fact none of these matters are within the scope of "private international law," but are governed by "(public) international law," non-compliance with which by the courts or subjects of any state is ground of complaint for the government of any other state thereby wrongfully affected. the so-called "private international law," better described as "the conflict of laws," deals, in reality, with the rules which the courts of each country apply, apart from any international obligation, to the solution of questions, usually between private litigants, in which doubt may arise as to the national law by which a given transaction ought to be governed--e.g. with reference to a contract made in france, but to be performed in england. there is here a "conflict," or "collision," of laws, and it is decided in accordance with rules adopted in the country in which the litigation occurs. these rules have no "international" validity, and the term is applied to them, merely in a popular way, to indicate that a court may have in some cases to apply the law of a country other than that in which it is sitting. the unfortunate opposition of "public" to "private" international law has to answer for much confusion of thought. "international law," properly so called, has, of course, no need to be described as "public" to distinguish it from rules for solving the "conflicts" of private laws, which are "international" rules only in the sense that laws are sometimes applied in countries other than those in which they are primarily binding. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). notes - : writer's names are omitted as immaterial. - : _infra_, p. . a full discussion of the topics dealt with in the last paragraph of this letter may be found in my _elements of jurisprudence_, edit. xii., pp. - . a translation, by professor nys, of the chapter in which those pages occur, as it stood in edit. i., appeared in the _revue de droit international_, t. xii., pp. , &c. chapter iv conventions and legislation not a few international conventions necessitate, before they can be ratified, in order that their provisions may be carried into effect, a certain amount of municipal legislation. the letters which follow are concerned with some measures introduced into the british parliament for this purpose, relating respectively to naval prize, to the geneva convention of , and to conventions signed at the hague peace conference of . it is with criticisms of bills dealing with the last-mentioned topic that this chapter is mainly occupied. government bills and international conventions sir,--you have already allowed me to point out how singularly ill-adapted is the resuscitated "naval prize consolidation bill"[ ] to inform parliament upon the highly technical points as to which a vote in favour of the bill might be supposed to imply approval of the government policy. two other bills have now been presented to the house of commons in such a shape as to raise a doubt whether the wish of the government, or of the draftsman, has been that the topics to which they relate shall be discussed _en pleine connaissance de cause_. the "geneva convention bill"[ ] is intended to facilitate the withdrawal of reservations subject to which the convention was ratified by great britain. these reservations, upon which i insisted at geneva, somewhat to the surprise of my french and russian colleagues, relate to arts. , , and of the convention, one of the effects of which would have been to impose upon our government an obligation to carry through, within five years, an act of parliament, making the employment of the geneva emblem or name, except for military purposes, a criminal offence. any one who knows something of the difficulties which beset legislation in this country, especially where commercial interests are involved, will see that the performance of such an undertaking might well have proved to be impossible. though myself strongly in favour of placing, at the proper time and in an appropriate manner, legislative restrictions upon the general use of the emblem and name, i can hardly think the bill now before parliament to be well adapted for its purpose. the "memorandum" prefixed to it ought surely to have stated, in plain language, the effect of the articles in question and the reasons which prevented them from being ratified together with the rest of the convention. instead of this, only one of those articles is cited, and few members of parliament will be aware that an omitted paragraph of that article requires that the use of the emblem or name should be penalised by british law at the latest five years and six months from the date of the british ratification, which was deposited on april , --_i.e._, not later than october , . this requirement is not satisfied by the bill, which, even if passed in the present session, would preserve intact till the rights of proprietors of trade-marks, while somewhat harshly rendering forthwith illegal the user of the emblem or name by all other persons. on the drafting of the "second peace conference conventions bill," i will only remark that neither in the preamble nor elsewhere is any information vouchsafed as to the conventions, out of thirteen drafted at the hague, which are within the purview of the bill. the reader is left to puzzle out for himself, supposing him to have the necessary materials at hand, that certain clauses of the bill relate respectively to certain articles which must be looked for in the conventions numbered i., v., x., xii., and xiii. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. the athenæum, july ( ). notes - : this bill, originally introduced in the house of commons on june , to enable the government to ratify hague convention no xii. of and the declaration of london of , was passed by that house on december , , but rejected on the th of the same month, by to votes, in the house of lords. cf. _infra_, pp. - . - : cf. _infra_, p. . the bill became an act, & geo. , c. . questions were put and objections raised, in the sense of my criticisms upon the drafting of the "second peace conference (conventions) bill" of , upon several occasions in the house of commons, especially in august of that year, and on december the bill was finally withdrawn. on the re-introduction of the bill in , see the following letter. the present bill in parliament sir,--in reintroducing their bill "to make such amendments in the law as are necessary in order to enable certain conventions to be carried into effect," the government has justified the criticisms which i addressed to you upon the way in which this measure was first presented to parliament. i pointed out that neither in the preamble nor elsewhere was any information vouchsafed as to which of "the various conventions drawn up at the second peace conference" were within the purview of the bill. still less was any clue given to those articles, out of nearly contained in the conventions in question, which are relevant to the proposed legislation. members of parliament sufficiently inquisitive not to be inclined to take the measure on trust, were left to puzzle out all this for themselves, but proved so restive under the treatment that the bill, which was introduced in june, , had to be withdrawn in the following december. as now resuscitated, the bill is accompanied by a memorandum containing information which will enable the reader, even though no specialist, supposing him to have the necessary documents at hand, though probably only after several hours of labour, to ascertain what would be the result of passing it. is it too much to hope that similar aids to the understanding of complicated legislative proposals will be systematically provided in the future? i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, april , . this bill was introduced into the house of commons on april , , with a memorandum proposed in compliance with the criticisms, which had led to the withdrawal of its predecessor of . _cf. supra_, p. . it also was withdrawn, after sustaining much renewed criticism, on july , . the foreign enlistment bill sir,--it is doubtless the case, as stated in your leading article of to-day, that the foreign enlistment bill has not received the attention which it deserves. it may perhaps be worth while to mention, as affording some explanation of this neglect, the fact that the memorandum prefixed to the bill vaguely describes its main object as being to bring our law into conformity with "the hague conventions" at large. an ordinary member of parliament would surely be grateful to be referred specifically to convention no. xiii., arts. , , and . he might well shrink from the labour of exploring the hundreds of articles contained in "the hague conventions" in order to ascertain which of the articles suggest some modification of the english statute. i would also venture to suggest that, in article ( ) (b) of the bill the words "or allows to depart," carried over from the old act, should be omitted, as of doubtful interpretation. would it not also be desirable to take this opportunity of severing the enlistment articles of the overgrown principal act from those forbidding the despatch of ships fitted for hostilities and restricting the hospitality which may be extended to belligerent war ships? upon quite a different subject, i should like to answer the question propounded in your article, as to the weight now to be given to the declaration of london, by saying that no weight should be given to it, except as between powers who may have ratified it or may have agreed to be temporarily bound by its provisions. one has of late been surprised to read of vessels carrying contraband being allowed to continue their voyage after surrendering the contraband goods, in accordance with a new rule suggested by the declaration, whereas, under still existing international law, the duty of a captor is to bring in the vessel together with her cargo, in order that the rightfulness of the seizure may be investigated by a prize court. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). the bill of "to amend the foreign enlistment act, ," passed the house of lords with little comment, but was withdrawn, after much adverse criticism, in the house of commons on february , . chapter v the commencement of war section _declaration of war_ the following letter bears upon the question, much discussed in recent years, of the lawfulness of hostilities commenced without anything amounting to a declaration of war. although several modern wars, e.g. the franco-prussian of , and the russo-turkish of , were preceded by declaration, it was hardly possible, in view of the practice of the last two centuries, to maintain, that this was required by international law, and it has never been alleged that any definite interval need intervene between a declaration and the first act of hostilities. on the destruction of the _kowshing_, the present writer may further refer to his _studies in international law_, , p. , and to professor takahashi's _international law during the chino-japanese war_, , pp. , . but see now the note at the end of the "letter" which follows. the sinking of the _kowshing_ sir,--the words of soberness and truth were spoken with reference to the sinking of the _kowshing_ in the letter from professor westlake which you printed on friday last. ignorance dies hard, or, after the appearance of that letter and of your remarks upon it, one might have expected that leading articles would be less lavishly garnished with such phrases as "act of piracy," "war without declaration," "insult to the british flag," "condign punishment of the japanese commander." but these flowers of speech continue to blossom; and, now that the facts of the case seem to be established beyond reasonable doubt by the telegrams of this morning, i should be glad to be allowed to state shortly what i believe will be the verdict of international law upon what has occurred. if the visiting, and eventual sinking, of the _kowshing_ occurred in time of peace, or in time of war before she had notice that war had broken out, a gross outrage has taken place. but the facts are otherwise. in the first place, a state of war existed. it is trite knowledge, and has been over and over affirmed by courts, both english and american, that a war may legally commence with a hostile act on one side, not preceded by declaration. how frequently this has occurred in practice may be seen from a glance at an historical statement prepared for the war office by colonel maurice _à propos_ of the objections to a channel tunnel. whether or no hostilities had previously occurred upon the mainland, i hold that the acts of the japanese commander in boarding the _kowshing_ and threatening her with violence in case of disobedience to his orders were acts of war. in the second place, the _kowshing_ had notice of the existence of a war, at any rate from the moment when she received the orders of the japanese commander. the _kowshing_, therefore, before the first torpedo was fired, was, and knew that she was, a neutral ship engaged in the transport service of a belligerent. (her flying the british flag, whether as a _ruse de guerre_ or otherwise, is wholly immaterial.) her liabilities, as such ship, were twofold:-- . regarded as an isolated vessel, she was liable to be stopped, visited, and taken in for adjudication by a japanese prize court. if, as was the fact, it was practically impossible for a japanese prize crew to be placed on board of her, the japanese commander was within his rights, in using any amount of force necessary to compel her to obey his orders. . as one of a fleet of transports and men-of-war engaged in carrying reinforcements to the chinese troops on the mainland, the _kowshing_ was clearly part of a hostile expedition, or one which might be treated as hostile, which the japanese were entitled, by the use of all needful force, to prevent from reaching its destination. the force employed seems not to have been in excess of what might lawfully be used, either for the arrest of an enemy's neutral transport or for barring the progress of a hostile expedition. the rescued officers also having been set at liberty in due course, i am unable to see that any violation of the rights of neutrals has occurred. no apology is due to our government, nor have the owners of the _kowshing_, or the relatives of any of her european officers who may have been lost, any claim for compensation. i have said nothing about the violation by the japanese of the usages of civilised warfare (not of the geneva convention, which has no bearing upon the question), which would be involved by their having fired upon the chinese troops in the water; not only because the evidence upon this point is as yet insufficient, but also because the grievance, if established, would affect only the rights of the belligerents _inter se_; not the rights of neutrals, with which alone this letter is concerned. i have also confined my observations to the legal aspects of the question, leaving to others to test the conduct of the japanese commander by the rules of chivalrous dealing or of humanity. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. athenæum club, august ( ) the controversy caused by the sinking of the _kowshing_ in was revived by the manner of the japanese attack upon port arthur, in (see professor takahashi's _international law applied to the russo-japanese war_, , p. ), and led to a careful study of the subject by a committee of the institut de droit international, resulting in the adoption by the institut, at its ghent meeting in , of the following resolutions:-- ( ) "it is in conformity with the requirements of international law, to the loyalty which the nations owe to one another in their, mutual relations, as well as to the general interests of all states, that hostilities ought not to commence without previous and unequivocal warning. ( ) "this warning may be given either in the shape of a declaration of war pure and simple, or in the shape of an ultimatum duly notified to the adversary by the state which wishes to begin the war. ( ) "hostilities must not commence until after the expiration of a delay which would suffice to prevent the rule as to a previous and unequivocal warning from being thought to be evaded." see the _annuaire de l'institut_, t, xxi. p. . in accordance with the principles underlying the first and second of these resolutions, the hague convention, no. iii. of (ratified generally by great britain on november , ), has now laid down as a principle of international law, binding upon the contracting powers, that-- ( ) "hostilities between them ought not to commence without a warning previously given and unequivocal, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war, or of an ultimatum, with a conditional declaration of war." and the convention goes on to provide that-- ( ) "the state of war ought to be notified without delay to neutral powers, and shall be of no effect with reference to them, until after a notification, which may be made even telegraphically. nevertheless, neutral powers may not plead absence of notification, if it has been shown beyond question that they were in fact cognisant of the state of war." any reference to the need of an interval between declaration and the first act of hostility (such as is contained in the third of the resolutions of the institut) was deliberately omitted from the convention, although a declaration immediately followed by an attack would obviously be of little service to the party attacked. (see the present writer's _laws of war on land (written and unwritten)_, , p. .) * * * * * section _the immediate effects of the outbreak of war_ _enemy residents_ before any actual hostilities have taken place, each belligerent acquires, _ipso facto_, certain new rights over persons and property belonging to the other, which happen to be at the time within its power, e.g. the right, much softened in modern practice, and specifically dealt with in the hague convention, no. vi. of , of capturing enemy merchant vessels so situated. the following letter deals with the permissible treatment of enemy persons so situated; and was suggested by a question asked in the house of commons on february , , by mr. arnold-forster: viz. "what would be the _status_ of officers and men of the regular army of a hostile belligerent power, found within the limits of the united kingdom after an act or declaration of war; and would such persons be liable to be treated as prisoners of war, or would they be despatched under the protection of the government to join the forces of the enemy?" the general effect of the attorney-general's reply may be gathered from the quotations from it made in the letter. the topic was again touched upon on march , in a question put by captain faber, to which mr. haldane replied. foreign soldiers in england sir,--the question raised last night by mr. arnold-forster is one which calls for more careful consideration than it appears yet to have received. international law has in modern times spoken with no very certain voice as to the permissible treatment of alien enemies found within the territory of a belligerent at the outbreak of war. there is, however, little doubt that such persons, although now more usually allowed to remain, during good behaviour, may be expelled, and, if necessary, wholesale, as were germans from france in . but may such persons be, for good reasons, arrested, or otherwise prevented from leaving the country, as germans were prevented from leaving france in the earlier days of the franco-prussian war? grotius speaks with approval of such a step being taken, "ad minuendas hostium vires." bynkershoek, more than a century later, recognises the right of thus acting, "though it is rarely exercised." so the supreme court of the united states in _brown v. united states_ ( ). so chancellor kent ( ), and mr. manning ( ) is explicit that the arrest in question is lawful, and that "the individuals are prisoners of war." vattel, is it true ( ), ventures to lay down that-- "le souverain qui déclare la guerre ne peut retenir les sujets de ennemi qui se trouvent dans ses états au moment de la déclaration ... en leur permettant d'entrer dans ses terres et d'y séjourner, il leur a promis tacitement toute liberté et toute sûreté pour le retour." and he has been followed by some recent writers. there is, however, i venture to hold, no ground for asserting that this indulgent system is imposed by international law. i am glad, therefore, to find the attorney-general laying down that-- "for strictly military reasons, any nation is entitled to detain and to intern soldiers found upon the territory at the outbreak of war." and i should be surprised if, under all circumstances, as the learned attorney-general seems to think probable-- "england would follow, whatever the strict law may be, the humane and chivalrous practice of modern times, and would give to any subjects of a hostile power who might be found here engaging in civilian pursuits a reasonable time within which to leave for their own country, even although they were under the obligation of entering for service under the enemy's flag." the doctrine of vattel has, in fact, become less plausible than it was before universal liability to military service had become the rule in most continental countries. the peaceably engaged foreign resident is now in all probability a trained soldier, and liable to be recalled to the flag of a possible enemy. there may, of course, be considerable practical difficulties in the way of ascertaining the nationality of any given foreigner, and whether he has completed, or evaded, the military training required by the laws of his country. it may also be a question of high policy whether resident enemies would not be a greater danger to this country if they were compelled to remain here, than if they were allowed, or compelled, to depart, possibly to return as invaders. i am only concerned to maintain that, as far as international law is concerned, england has a free hand either to expel resident enemies or to prevent them from leaving the country, as may seem most conducive to her own safety. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). _civil disabilities of alien enemies_ the naval prize bill civil disabilities of enemy subjects sir,--the naval prize bill has sins enough of its own to answer for. the question dealt with under that heading in mr. arthur cohen's letter of this morning has, however, nothing to do with naval matters, but arises under the hague convention of as to warfare on land, which was ratified by our government two years ago; unfortunately without any reserve as to the extraordinary provision contained in art. (_h_) of that convention. i lose not a moment in asking to be allowed to state that my view of the question is, and always has been, the reverse of that attributed to me by my friend mr. cohen. no less than three views are entertained as to the meaning of art. (_h_). ( ) continental writers, e.g., mm. fauchille, kohler, and ullmann, with the german whitebook, assert, in the most unqualified manner, that great britain and the united states have under this clause abandoned their long-established doctrine as to the suspension of the private rights and remedies of enemy subjects; ( ) our own government, in a non-confidential reply to an inquiry from professor oppenheim, asserts categorically, as does general davis in the united states, that the clause relates only to the action of a commander in a territory of which he is in occupation; while ( ) most english and american writers look upon the meaning of the clause as doubtful. if mr. cohen will look at p. of my _laws of war on land_, , he will find that i carry this sceptical attitude so far as to include the clause in question in brackets as "apocryphal," with the comment that "it can hardly, till its policy has been seriously discussed, be treated as a rule of international law." i have accordingly maintained, in correspondence with my continental colleagues, that the clause should be treated as "non avenue," as "un non sens," on the ground that, while, torn from their context, its words would seem ("ont faux air") to bear the continental interpretation, its position as part of a "règlement," in conformity with which the powers are to "issue instructions to their armed land forces," conclusively negatives this interpretation. i will not to-day trouble you in detail with the very curious history of the clause; which, as originally proposed by germany, merely prohibited (a commander?) from announcing that the private claims ("réclamations") of enemy subjects would be unenforceable. it is astonishing that no objection was raised by the british or by the american delegates to the subsequent transformation of this innocent clause into something very different, first by the insertion of the words "en justice," and later by the substitution of "droits et actions" for "réclamations." the quiescence of the delegates is the more surprising, as, at the first meeting of the sub-committee, general de gundel, in the plainest language, foreshadowed what was aimed at by the clause. art. (_h_) is, i submit, incapable of rational interpretation and should be so treated by the powers. if interpreted at all, its sense must be taken to be that which is now, somewhat tardily, put upon it by our own government. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). i may perhaps refer here to my _laws of war on land_ ( ), p. , where i describe as "apocryphal" art. (_h_) of the hague convention no. iv. of ; and to my paper upon that article in the _law quarterly review_ for , pp. - , reproduced in the _revue de droit international_, the _revue générale de droit international public_, and the _zeitschrift für völkerrecht und bundesstaatsrecht_, for the same year. the view there maintained was affirmed by the court of appeal in _porter_ v. _freudenberg_, [ ] k.b. , _at_ p. . _enemy ships in port_ enemy ships in port sir,--the action taken by the united states in seizing german merchant ships lying in their ports will raise several questions of interest. it is, however, important at once to realise that, apart from anything which may be contained in old treaties with prussia, their hands are entirely free in the matter. the indulgences so often granted: to such ships during the last years, notably by themselves in the spanish war of , under endlessly varying conditions, have been admittedly acts of grace, required by no established rule of international law. the united states are also unaffected by the hague convention no. vi, to which they are not a party. it is therefore superfluous to inquire what construction they would have been bound to put upon the ambiguous language of section of the convention, which proclaims that "when a merchant ship of one of the belligerent powers is, at the commencement of hostilities, in an enemy port, _it is desirable_ that it should be allowed to depart freely," &c. it might perhaps be argued that our own prize court might well have refrained from treating this section as if it were obligatory, and have founded its decisions rather upon international law, as supplemented by a non-obligatory custom. be this as it may, it would seem that the policy of the united states has to some extent felt the influence of convention vi. in announcing that seizure will, provisionally, only amount to requisitioning. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, april ( ). chapter vi the conduct of warfare the three following sections relate to the waters in which hostile operations may take place. section probably calls for no explanatory remark. with reference to section , dealing with certain spaces of water more or less closed to belligerent action, it may be desirable to state that the letters as to the suez canal were written to obviate some misconceptions as to the purport of the convention of october , , and to maintain that it was not, at the time of writing, operative, so far as great britain was concerned. this state of things was, however, altered by the anglo-french convention of april , , which, concerned principally with the settlement of the egyptian and newfoundland questions, provides, in art. , that "in order to assure the free passage of the suez canal, the government of his britannic majesty declares that it adheres to the stipulations of the treaty concluded on the th october ; and to their becoming operative. the free passage of the canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last phrase of paragraph , and that of paragraph of the th article of this treaty, will remain suspended." the last phrase of paragraph of art. relates to annual meetings of the agents of the signatory powers. paragraph of this article relates to the presidency of a special commissioner of the ottoman government over those meetings. on the whole question see _parl. papers, egypt_, no. ( ), _commercial_, no. ( ), and the present writer's _studies in international law_, pp. - . note must, of course, now be taken of the constitutional changes resulting from the war of . the provisions of the treaty of , with reference to the free navigation of the suez canal, have, of course, acquired a new importance from their adoption into the hay-pauncefote treaty of november , , as to the panama canal, and from the divergent views taken of their interpretation, as so adopted. section _on the open sea_ "the freedom of the seas"? sir,--your remarks upon "the wide and ambiguous suggestions" contained in the pope's peace note are especially apposite to his desire for "the freedom of the seas." it is regrettable that his holiness does not explain the meaning which he attaches to this phrase, in itself unmeaning, so dear to the germans. he is doubtless well aware that the sea is already free enough, except to pirates, in time of peace, and must be presumed to refer to time of war, and specifically to propose the prohibition of any such interference with neutral shipping as is now legalised by the rules relating to visit and search, contraband and blockade. if this be indeed the pope's meaning, his aspirations are now less likely than ever to be realised. it is curious to reflect that the proposal actually made by our own government at the hague conference of , apparently under the impression that great britain would be always neutral, for protecting the carriage of contraband was most fortunately defeated by the opposition of the other great naval powers, of which germany was one. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, august ( ). * * * * * section _in other waters_ the suez canal sir,--your correspondent "m.b." has done good service by calling attention to the misleading nature of the often-repeated statement that the suez canal has been "neutralised" by the convention of . perhaps you will allow me more explicitly to show why, and how far, this statement is misleading. in the first place, this convention is inoperative. it is so in consequence of the following reservation made by lord salisbury in the course of the negotiations which resulted in the signature of the convention:-- "les délégués de la grande-bretagne ... pensent qu'il est de leur devoir de formuler une réserve générale quant à l'application de ces dispositions en tant qu'elles ne seraient pas compatibles avec l'état transitoire et exceptionnel où se trouve actuellement l'egypte, et qu'elles pourraient entraver la liberté d'action de leur gouvernement pendant la période de l'occupation de l'egypte par les forces de sa majesté britannique." being thus unaffected by the treaty, the canal retains those characteristics which it possesses, under the common law of nations, as a narrow strait, wholly within the territory of one power and connecting two open seas. the fact that the strait is artificial may, i think, be dismissed from consideration, for reasons stated by me in the _fortnightly review_ for july, . the characteristics of such a strait are unfortunately by no means well ascertained, but may perhaps be summarised as follows. in time of peace, the territorial power is bound by modern usage to allow "innocent passage," under reasonable conditions as to tolls and the like, not only to the merchant vessels, but also, probably, to the ships of war, of all nations. in time of war, the territorial power, if belligerent, may of course carry on, and is exposed to, hostilities in the strait as elsewhere, and the entrances to the strait are liable to a blockade. should the territorial power be neutral, the strait would be closed to hostilities, though it would probably be open to the "innocent passage" of belligerent ships of war. it may be worth while to enquire how far this state of things would be affected by the convention of , were it to come into operation. the _status_ of the canal in time of peace would be substantially untouched, save by the prohibition to the territorial power to fortify its banks. even with reference to time of war, several of the articles of the convention merely reaffirm well-understood rules applicable to all neutral waters--e.g. that no hostilities may take place therein. the innovations proposed by the convention are mainly contained, as "m.b." points out, in the first article, which deals with the position of the canal when the territorial power is belligerent. in such a case, subject to certain exceptions, with a view to the defence of the country, the ships of that power are neither to attack nor to be attacked in the canal, or within three miles of its ports of access, nor are the entrances of the canal to be blockaded. this is "neutralisation" only in a limited and vague sense of the term, the employment of which was indeed carefully avoided not only in the convention itself but also in the diplomatic discussions which preceded it. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. brighton, october ( ). the suez canal sir,--your correspondent "m.b.," if he will allow me to say so, supports this morning a good case by a bad argument, which ought hardly to pass without remark. it is impossible to accept his suggestion that the article which he quotes from the treaty of paris can be taken as containing "an international official definition of neutralisation as applied to waters." the article in question, after declaring the black sea to be "neutralisée," no doubt goes on to explain the sense in which this phrase is to be understood, by laying down that the waters and ports of that sea are perpetually closed to the ships of war of all nations. it is, however, well known that such a state of things as is described in the latter part of the article is so far from being involved in the definition of "neutralisation" as not even to be an ordinary accompaniment of that process. belgium is unquestionably "neutralised," but no one supposes that the appearance in its waters and ports of ships of war is therefore prohibited. the fact is that the term "neutralisée" was employed in the treaty of paris as a euphemism, intended to make less unpalatable to russia a restriction upon her sovereign rights which she took the earliest opportunity of repudiating. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. brighton, october ( ). the suez canal sir,--will you allow me to reply in the fewest possible words to the questions very courteously addressed to me by mr. gibson bowles in his letter which appeared in _the times_ of yesterday? . it is certainly my opinion, for what it is worth, that the full operation of the convention of is suspended by the reserves first made on behalf of this country during the sittings of the conference of . these reserves were texually repeated by lord salisbury in his despatch of october , , enclosing the draft convention which, three days later, was signed at paris by the representatives of france and great britain, the two powers which, with the assent of the rest, had been carrying on the resumed negotiations with reference to the canal. lord salisbury's language was also carefully brought to the notice of each of the other powers concerned; in the course of the somewhat protracted discussions which preceded the final signature of the same convention at constantinople on october , . . all the signatories of the convention having thus become parties to it after express notice of "the conditions under which her majesty's government have expressed their willingness to agree to it," must, it can hardly be doubted, share the view that the convention is operative only _sub modo_. . supposing the convention to have become operative, and supposing the territorial power to be neutral in a war between states which we may call a and b, the convention would certainly entitle a to claim unmolested passage for its ships of war on their way to attack the forces of b in the eastern seas. . the language of the convention, being as it, is the expression of a compromise involving much re-drafting, is by no means always as clear as it might be. but when mr. gibson bowles is again within reach of blue-books he will probably agree with me that the treaty need not, as he suggests, be "read as obliging the territorial power, even when itself a belligerent, to allow its enemy to use the canal freely for the passage of that enemy's men-of-war." the wide language of art. (which is substantially in accordance with mr. gibson bowles's reminiscence of it) must be read in connection with art. , and without forgetting that, in discussing the effect of an attack upon the canal by one of the parties to the convention, lord salisbury wrote in , "on the whole it appears to be the sounder view that, in such a case, the treaty, being broken by one of its signatories, would lose its force in all respects." your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, october ( ). the closing of the dardanelles sir,--now that the pressure upon your space due to the clash of opposing views of domestic politics is likely to be for the moment relaxed, you may, perhaps, not think it inopportune that attention should be recalled to a question of permanent international interest raised by the recent action of the turkish government in closing the dardanelles to even commercial traffic. i cordially agree, as would, i suppose, most people, with your leading article of some weeks since in deprecating any crude application to the case of the dardanelles and bosporus of _dicta_ with reference to freedom of passage through straits connecting two open seas. it would, indeed, be straining what may be taken to be a general principle of international law to say that turkey is by it prohibited from protecting her threatened capital by temporarily closing the straits. a good deal of vague reference has, however, been made in the discussions which have taken place upon the subject to "treaties" under which it seems to be thought that trading ships enjoy, in all circumstances, rights of free navigation through the straits in question which they would not have possessed otherwise. i should like, therefore, with your permission, to state what seem to be the relevant treaty provisions upon the subject, whether between the powers constituting the european concert collectively, or between russia and turkey as individual powers. as to what may be described as the "european" treaties, it is necessary, once for all, to put aside as irrelevant art. of the treaty of paris of and its annexed convention; art. of the treaty of london of ; and the confirmatory art. of the treaty of berlin of . these articles have exclusive reference to the "ancient rule of the ottoman empire," under which, so long as the porte is at peace, no foreign ships of war are to be admitted into the straits. there are, however, two articles, still in force, of these "european" treaties which may seem to bear upon the present inquiry. by art. of the treaty of paris:-- "free from any impediment, the commerce in the ports and waters of the black sea shall be subject only to regulations of health, customs, and police, framed in a spirit favourable to the development of commercial transactions." and by art. of the treaty of london:-- "the black sea remains open, as heretofore, to the mercantile marine of all nations." it is submitted that these provisions relate solely to commerce carried on by vessels already within the black sea, and contain no covenant for an unrestricted right of access to that sea. as between russia and turkey individually, treaties which are still in force purport, no doubt, to give to the former a stronger claim to free passage through the straits for her mercantile marine than that which can be supposed to be enjoyed by other powers. by art. , for instance, of the treaty of adrianople of , the porte recognises and declares the passage of the "canal de constantinople," and of the strait of the dardanelles, to be entirely free and open to russian merchant vessels; and goes on to extend the same privilege to the merchant vessels of all powers at peace with turkey. art. of the treaty of san stefano is still more explicit, providing that "the bosporus and dardanelles shall remain open in time of war as in time of peace to the merchant vessels of neutral states arriving from or bound to russian ports." the rest of the article contains a promise by the porte never henceforth to establish a "fictitious blockade, at variance with the spirit of the declaration of paris"; meaning thereby such a blockade of ports on the black sea as had been enforced by turkish ships of war stationed at the entrance to the bosporus. it may well be doubted whether these articles, containing concessions extorted from turkey at the end of wars in which she had been defeated, ought not, like so many other provisions of the treaty of san stefano, to have been abrogated by the treaty of berlin. they are of such a character that, in the struggle for existence, turkey can hardly be blamed for disregarding them. as was said long ago, "ius commerciorum aequum est, at hoc acquius, tuendae salutis." the imperious necessities of self-preservation were recognised both by lord morley and by lord lansdowne in the debate which took place on may , although lord lansdowne intimated that "the real question, which will have to be considered sooner or later, is the extent to which a belligerent power, controlling narrow waters which form a great trade avenue for the commerce of the world, is justified in entirely closing such an avenue in order to facilitate the hostile operations in which the power finds itself involved." it is, i think, clear that the solution of a question at once so novel and so delicate must be undertaken, not by any one power, but by the concert of europe, or of the civilised world, which must devise some guarantee for the safety of any littoral power which would be called upon in the general interest to restrict its measures of self-defence. in the meantime, we may surely say that the case is provided for neither by established international law nor by "european" treaties; and, further, that the treaties between russia and turkey, which do provide for it, are not such as it is desirable to perpetuate. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). the closing of the dardanelles sir,--i am reminded by mr. lucien wolf's courteous letter that i ought probably to have mentioned, in alluding to the treaty of san stefano, that it is doubtful whether art. of that treaty is in force. it was certainly left untouched by the treaty of berlin, but the language of the relevant article ( ) of the definitive treaty of peace of is somewhat obscure, nor is much light to be gained upon the point from the protocol of the th _séance_ of the congress of berlin, at which art. came up for discussion. the earlier treaties, however, which were revived beyond question by art. of the treaty of , grant to russian merchant vessels full rights of passage between the black sea and the Ægean, exercisable, for all that appears, in time of war as well as of peace, although these treaties contain no express words to that effect. such rights, i would again urge, if enjoyed by one power, should be enjoyed by all; upon terms to be settled, not by any pair of powers but by the powers collectively. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, june ( ). * * * * * section _in a special danger zone?_ the german threat sir,--it may perhaps be desirable, for the benefit of the general reader, to distinguish clearly between the two topics dealt with in the recent announcement of german naval policy. . we find in it what may, at first sight, suggest the establishment of a gigantic "paper blockade," such as was proclaimed in the berlin decree of , stating that "les îles britanniques sont déclarées en état de blocus." but in the new decree the term "blockade" does not occur, nor is there any indication of an intention to comply with the prescriptions of the declaration of paris of as to the mode in which such an operation must be conducted. what we really find in the announcement is the specification of certain large spaces of water, including the whole of the british channel, within which german ships will endeavour to perpetrate the atrocities about to be mentioned. . these promised, and already perpetrated, atrocities consist in the destruction of merchant shipping without any of those decent preliminary steps, for the protection of human life and neutral property, which are insisted on by long established rules of international law. under these rules, the exercise of violence against a merchant vessel is permissible, in the first instance, only in case of her attempting by resistance or flight to frustrate the right of visit which belongs to every belligerent cruiser. should she obey the cruiser's summons to stop, and allow its officers to come on board, they will satisfy themselves, by examination of her papers, and, if necessary, by further search, of the nationality of ship and cargo, of the destination of each, and of the character of the latter. they will then decide whether or no they should make prize of the ship, and in some cases may feel justified in sending a prize to the bottom, instead of taking her into port. before doing so it is their bounden duty to preserve the ship papers, and, what is far more important, to provide for the safety of all on board. this procedure seems to have been followed, more or less, by the submarines which sank the _durward_ in the north sea, and several small vessels near the mersey, but is obviously possible to such craft only under very exceptional circumstances. it was scandalously not followed in the cases of the _tokomaru_, the _ikaria_, and the hospital ship (!) _asturias_, against which a submarine fired torpedoes, off havre, without warning or inquiry, and, of course, regardless of the fate of those on board. the threat that similar methods of attack will be systematically employed, on a large scale, on and after the th inst., naturally excites as much indignation among neutrals as among the allies of the entente. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). * * * * * section _aerial warfare_ it may be desirable to supplement what is said in the following letters by mentioning that the declaration of (to remain in force for five years) was largely ratified, though not by great britain; that of (to remain in force till the termination of the third peace conference) was ratified by great britain and by most of the other great powers in , not, however, by germany or austria; that aerial navigation is regulated by the acts, i & geo. , c. , and & geo. , c. ; and that an agreement upon the subject was entered into between france and germany, on july , , by exchange of notes, "en attendant la conclusion d'une convention sur cette matière entre un plus grand nombre d'états" (the international conference held at paris in had failed to agree upon the terms of such a convention); and that art. of the hague convention of , no. iv., was ratified by great britain, and generally. the debate on aeronautics sir,--it is not to be wondered at that the chairman of committees declined to allow yesterday's debate on aviation to diverge into an enquiry whether the powers could be induced to prohibit, or limit, the dropping of high explosives from aerial machines in war time. the question is, however, one of great interest, and it may be desirable, with a view to future discussions, to state precisely, since little seems to be generally known upon the subject, what has already been attempted in this direction. in the _règlement_ annexed to the hague convention of , as to the "laws and customs of war on land," art. , which specifically prohibits certain "means of injuring the enemy," makes no mention of aerial methods; but art. , which prohibits "the bombardment of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings, which are not defended," was strengthened, when the _règlement_ was reissued in as an annexe to the, as yet not generally ratified, hague convention no. iv. of that year, by the insertion, after the word "bombardment," of the words "by any means whatever," with the expressed intention of including in the prohibition the throwing of projectiles from balloons. the hague convention no. ix. of , also not yet generally ratified, purports to close a long controversy, in accordance with the view which you allowed me to advocate, with reference to the naval manoeuvres of , by prohibiting the "naval bombardment of ports, towns, villages, habitations, or buildings, which are not defended." the words "by any means whatever" have not been here inserted, one would incline to think by inadvertence, having regard to what passed in committee, and to the recital of the convention, which sets out the propriety of extending to naval bombardments the principles of the _règlement_ (cited, perhaps again by inadvertence, as that of ) as to the laws and customs of war on land. but the topic was first squarely dealt with by the first of the three hague declarations of , by which the powers agreed to prohibit, for five years, "the throwing of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other analogous new methods." the declaration was signed and ratified by almost all the powers concerned; not, however, by great britain. at the hague conference of , when the belgian delegates proposed that this declaration, which had expired by efflux of time, should be renewed, some curious changes of opinion were found to have occurred. twenty-nine powers, of which great britain was one, voted for renewal, but eight powers, including germany, spain, france, and russia, were opposed to it, while seven powers, one of which was japan, abstained from voting. the japanese delegation had previously intimated that, "in view of the absence of unanimity on the part of the great military powers, there seemed to be no great use in binding their country as against certain powers, while, as against the rest, it would still be necessary to study and bring to perfection this mode of making war." although the declaration, as renewed, was allowed to figure in the "acte final" of the conference of , the dissent from it of several powers of the first importance must render its ratification by the others highly improbable; nor would it seem worth while to renew, for some time to come, a proposal which, only two years ago, was so ill received. i may perhaps add, with reference to what was said by one of yesterday's speakers, that any provision on the topic under discussion would be quite out of place in the geneva convention, which deals, not with permissible means of inflicting injury, but exclusively with the treatment of those who are suffering from injuries inflicted. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, august ( ). the aerial navigation act practical difficulties sir,--the haste with which colonel seely's bill, authorising resort to extreme measures for the prevention of aerial trespass under suspicious circumstances, has been passed through all its stages, was amply justified by the urgent need for such legislation, which russia seems to have been the first to recognise. the task of those responsible for framing regulations for the working of the new act will be no easy one. they will be brought face to face with practical difficulties, such as led to the adjournment of the paris conference of . in the meantime, it may interest your readers to have some clue to what has taken place, with reference to the more theoretical aspects of the questions involved, in so competent and representative a body as the institut de droit international. the institut has had the topic under consideration ever since , more especially at its sessions for the years , , , and . in the volumes of its "annuaire" for those years will be found not only the text of the resolutions adopted on each occasion, together with a summary account of the debates which preceded their adoption, but also, fully set out, the material which had been previously circulated for the information of members, in the shape of reports and counter-reports from inter-sessional committees, draft resolutions, and such critical observations upon these documents as had been received by the secretary. the special committee upon the subject, of which m. fauchille is _rapporteur_, is still sitting, and the topic will doubtless be further debated at the session of the institut, which will this year be held at oxford. no success has attended efforts to pass resolutions in favour of any interference with the employment of _aéronefs_ in time of war, such as was proposed by the (now discredited) hague declaration, prohibiting the throwing of projectiles and explosives from airships. with reference to the use of these machines in time of peace, the debates have all along revealed a fundamental divergence of opinion between the majority of the institut and a minority, comprising those english members who have made known their views. both parties are agreed that aerial navigation must submit to some restrictions, but the majority, starting from the roman law dictum, "naturali iure omnium communia sunt _aer_, aqua profluens, et mare," would always presume in favour of freedom of passage. the minority, on the other hand, citing sometimes the old english saying, "cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum," hold that the presumption must be in favour of sovereignty and ownership as applicable to superimposed air space. it is hardly necessary to observe that neither of the maxims just mentioned was formulated with reference to problems which have only presented themselves within the last few years. the romans, in the passage quoted, were thinking not of aerial space, but of the element which fills it. the old english lawyers were preoccupied with questions as to projecting roofs and overhanging boughs of trees. the problems now raised are admittedly incapable of solution _a priori_, but the difference between the two schools of thinkers is instructive, as bearing upon the extent to which those who belong to one or the other school would incline towards measures of precaution against abuses of the novel art. this difference was well summed up at one of our meetings by professor westlake as follows: "conservation et passage, comment combiner ces deux droits? lequel des deux est la règle? lequel l'exception? pour le rapporteur (m. fauchille) c'est le droit de passage qui prime. pour moi c'est le droit de conservation." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). sovereignty over the air sir,--mr. arthur cohen has done good service by explaining that great britain has practically asserted the right of a state to absolute control of the airspace vertically above its territory. i may, however, perhaps be permitted to remark that he seems to have been misinformed when he states that the institute of international law has arrived at no decision upon the subject. the facts are as follows: the problems presented by the new art of aerostation have been under the consideration of the institute since , producing a large literature of reports, counter-reports, observations, and draft rules, to debates upon which no fewer than four sittings were devoted at the madrid meeting in . wide differences of opinion then disclosed themselves as to territorial rights over the air, the radical opposition being between those members who, with m. fauchille, the reporter of the committee, would presume in favour of freedom of aerial navigation, subject, as they would admit, to some measures of territorial precaution, and those who, like the present writer ("il se proclame opposé au principe de la liberté de la navigation aérienne, et s'en tiendrait[a] plutôt au principe _cuius est solum, huius est usque ad coelum_, en y apportant au besoin quelques restrictions," "annuaire," p. ), would subject all aerial access to the discretion of the territorial power. the discussion took place upon certain _bases_, and no. of these was ultimately adopted, though only by against votes, to the following effect: "la circulation aérienne internationale est libre, sauf le droit pour les états sous-jacents de prendre certaines mesures à déterminer, en vue de leur sécurité et de celle des personnes et des biens de leur territoire." the institut then proceeded to deal with _bases_ relating to a time of war, but was unable to make much progress with them in the time available. the debate upon the "régime juridique des aérostats" was not resumed at christiania in , nor is it likely to be at oxford "in the autumn of the present year," as mr. cohen has been led to suppose. other arrangements were found to be necessary, at a meeting which took place a week ago between myself and the other members of our _bureau_. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). attack from the air the enforcement of international law sir,--in his interesting and important address at the royal united service institution, colonel jackson inquired: "can any student of international law tell us definitely that such a thing as aerial attack on london is outside the rules; and, further, that there exists an authority by which the rules can be enforced?" as one of the students to whom the colonel appeals i should be glad to be allowed to reply to the first of his questions. the "geneva convention" mentioned in the address has, of course, no bearing upon aerial dangers. the answer to the question is contained in the, now generally ratified, hague convention no. iv. of . art. of the regulations annexed to this convention runs as follows: "it is forbidden to attack or to bombard _by any means whatever (par quelque moyen que ce soit)_ towns, villages, habitations, or buildings which are not defended." it clearly appears from the "actes de la conférence," e.g. _t._ i., pp. , , that the words which i have italicised were inserted in the article, deliberately and after considerable discussion, in order to render illegal any attack from the air upon undefended localities; among which i conceive that london would unquestionably be included. i cannot venture to ask the hospitality of your columns for an adequate discussion of the gallant officer's second question, as to the binding force attributable to international law. upon this i may, however, perhaps venture to refer him to some brief remarks, addressed to you a good many years ago, and now to be found at pp. and of the new edition of my "letters to _the times_ upon war and neutrality ( - )." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, april ( ). attack from the air the rules of international law sir,--in reply to colonel jackson's inquiry as to any rule of international law bearing upon aerial attack upon london, i referred him to the, now generally accepted, prohibition of the "bombardment, _by any means whatever_, of towns, &c., which are not defended." this rule has been growing into its present form ever since the brussels conference of . the words italicised were added to it in , to show that it applies to the action of _aéronefs_ as well as to that of land batteries. it clearly prohibits any wanton bombardment, undertaken with no distinctly military object in view, and the prohibition is much more sweeping, for reasons not far to seek, than that imposed by convention no. ix. of upon the treatment of coast towns by hostile fleets. so far good; but further questions arise, as to which no diplomatically authoritative answers are as yet available; and i, for one, am not wise above that which is written. one asks, for instance, what places are _prima facie_ "undefended." can a "great centre of population" claim this character, although it contains barracks, stores, and bodies of troops? for the affirmative i can vouch only the authority of the institut de droit international, which in , in the course of the discussion of a draft prepared by general den beer pourtugael and myself, adopted a statement to that effect. a different view seems to be taken in the german _kriegsbrauch_, p. . one also asks: under what circumstances does a place, _prima facie_, "undefended," cease to possess that character? doubtless so soon as access to it is forcibly denied to the land forces of the enemy; hardly, to borrow an illustration from colonel jackson's letter of thursday last, should the place merely decline to submit to the dictation of two men in an aeroplane. i read with great pleasure the colonel's warning, addressed to the united service institution, and am as little desirous as he is that london should rely for protection upon the hague article, ambiguous as i have confessed it to be; trusting, indeed, that our capital may be enabled so to act at once in case of danger as wholly to forfeit such claim as it may in ordinary times possess to be considered an "undefended" town. let the principle involved in art. be carried into much further detail, should that be found feasible, but, in the meantime, let us not for a moment relax our preparation of vertical firing guns and defensive aeroplanes. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). the war of has definitely established the employment of aircraft for hostile purposes, and, as evidenced by the reception given by belligerents to neutral protests, the sovereignty of a state over its superincumbent air-spaces. on the bombardment of undefended places, _cf. supra_, pp. , , , ; _infra_, pp. , , - . on the authority of international law, _supra_, pp. , , ; _infra_, pp. , , , , . * * * * * section _submarines_ germany and the hague sir,--one excuse for german atrocities put forward, as you report, in the _kolnische zeitung_, ought probably not to pass unnoticed, denying, as it does, any binding authority to the restrictions imposed upon the conduct of warfare, on land or at sea, by the hague conventions of . it is true that each of these conventions contains an article to the effect that its provisions "are applicable only between the contracting powers, and only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention." it is also true that three of the belligerents in the world-war now raging--namely, serbia, montenegro, and, recently, turkey--although they have (through their delegates) signed these conventions, have not yet ratified them. therefore, urges the _zeitung_, the conventions are, for present purposes, waste paper. the argument is as technically correct as its application would be unreasonable; and i should like to recall the fact that, in the important prize case of the _möwe_, sir samuel evans, in a considered judgment, pointed out the undesirability of refusing application to the maritime conventions because they had not been ratified by montenegro, which has no navy, or by serbia, which has no seaboard; and accordingly, even after turkey, which also has not ratified, had become a belligerent, declined to deprive a german shipowner of an indulgence to which he was entitled under the sixth hague convention. admiral von tirpitz was perhaps not serious when he intimated to the representative of the united press of america that german submarines might be instructed to torpedo all trading vessels of the allies which approach the british coasts. the first duty of a ship of war which proposes to sink an enemy vessel is admittedly, before so doing, to provide for the safety of all its occupants, which (except in certain rare eventualities) can only be secured by their being taken on board of the warship. a submarine has obviously no space to spare for such an addition to its own staff. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). the charitable view taken in the last paragraph has, of course, not been justified. for the _möwe_, see lloyd, . on the restrictive article in the hague convention, _cf. passim_. "the pirates" sir,--would it not be desirable, in discussing the execrable tactics of the german submarines, to abandon the employment of the terms "piracy" and "murder," unless with a distinct understanding that they are used merely as terms of abuse? a ship is regarded by international law as "piratical" only if, upon the high seas, she either attacks other vessels, without being commissioned by any state so to do (_nullius principis auctoritate_, as bynkershoek puts it), or wrongfully displaces the authority of her own commander. the essence of the offence is absence of authority, although certain countries, for their own purposes, have, by treaty or legislation, given a wider meaning to the term, e.g., by applying it to the slave-trade. "murder" is such slaying as is forbidden by the national law of the country which takes cognizance of it. in ordering the conduct of which we complain, germany commits an atrocious crime against humanity and public law; but those who, being duly commissioned, carry out her orders, are neither pirates nor murderers. the question of the treatment appropriate to such persons, when they fall into our hands, is a new one, needing careful consideration. in any case, it is not for us to rival the barbarism of their government by allowing them to drown. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ) submarine crews sir,--my letter in _the times_ of march with reference to the conduct of certain of the german submarines has been followed by a good many other letters upon the same subject. some of your correspondents have travelled far from the question at issue into the general question of permissible reprisals, into which i have no intention of following them. but others, by exhibiting what i may venture to describe as an _ignoratio elenchi_, have made it desirable to recall attention to the specific purport of my former letter. it was to the effect--( ) that the acts of those who, in pursuance of a government commission, sink merchant vessels without warning are not "piracy," the essence of that offence at international law being that it is committed under no recognised authority; and that neither is it "murder" under english law; ( ) that the question of the treatment appropriate to the perpetrators of such acts, even under the orders of their government, is a new one, needing careful consideration. i was, of course, far from stating, as a general rule, that government authority exempts all who act under it from penal consequences. the long-established treatment of spies is sufficient proof to the contrary. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ). mr. wilson's note sir,--i may perhaps be permitted to endorse every word of the high praise bestowed in your leading article of this morning upon the note addressed to germany by the government of the united states. the frequent mentions which it contains of "american ships," "american citizens," and the like, were, no doubt, natural and necessary, as establishing the _locus standi_ of that government in the controversy which it is carrying on. but we find also in the note matters of even more transcendent interest, relating to the hitherto universally accepted doctrines of international law, applicable to the treatment of enemy as well as of neutral vessels. it may suffice to cite the paragraph which assumes as indisputable "the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of unarmed merchantmen," as also "the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality, or is in fact carrying contraband under a neutral flag." [i assume that the word "unarmed" here does not exclude the case of a vessel carrying arms solely for defence.] the note also recognises, what you some time ago allowed me to point out, "the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which modern opinion regards as imperative." adding:-- "it is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her, and if they cannot put a prize crew on board, they cannot sink her without leaving her crew and all on board her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats." nothing could be more satisfactory than the views thus authoritatively put forth, first as to the applicable law, and secondly as to the means by which its prescriptions can be carried out. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. brighton, may ( ). _cf. supra_, p. . * * * * * section _lawful belligerents_ guerilla warfare sir,--when mr. balfour last night quoted certain articles of the "instructions for the government of armies of the united states in the field" with reference to guerilla warfare, some observations were made, and questions put, upon which you will perhaps allow me to say a word or two. . mr. healy seemed to think that something turned upon the date (may, ) at which these articles were promulgated. in point of fact they were a mere reissue of articles drawn by the well-known jurist francis lieber, and, after revision by a military board, issued in april, by president lincoln. . to mr. morley's enquiry, "have we no rules of our own?" the answer must be in the negative. the traditional policy of our war office has been to "trust to the good sense of the british officer." this policy, though surprisingly justified by results, is so opposed to modern practice and opinion that, as far back as - , i endeavoured, without success, to induce the office to issue to the army some authoritative, though simple, body of instructions such as have been issued on the continent of europe and in america. the war office was, however, content to include in its "manual of military law," published in , a chapter which is avowedly unauthoritative, and expressly stated to contain only "the opinions of the compiler, as drawn from the authorities cited." . the answer to sir william harcourt's unanswered question, "were there no rules settled at the hague?" must be as follows. the hague convention of , upon "the laws and customs of warfare," ratified by this country on september last, binds the contracting parties to give to their respective armies instructions in conformity with the _règlement_ annexed to the convention. this _règlement_, which is substantially a reproduction of the unratified _projet_ of the brussels conference of , does deal, in arts. - , with guerilla warfare. it is no doubt highly desirable that, as soon as may be, the drafting of rules in accordance with the _règlement_ should be seriously taken in hand, our government having now abandoned its _non possumus_ attitude in the matter. it will, however, be found to be the case, as was pointed out by mr. balfour, that the sharp distinction between combatants and non-combatants contemplated by the ordinary laws of war is inapplicable (without the exercise of undue severity) to operations such as those now being carried out in south africa. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). "lieber's instructions," issued in and reissued in , will doubtless be superseded, or modified, in consequence of the united states having, on april , , ratified the convention of , and on march , , that of , as to the laws and customs of war on land. the answer to mr. morley's enquiry in would not now be in the negative. the present writer's representations resulted in mr. brodrick, when secretary for war, commissioning him to prepare a handbook of the _laws and customs of war on land_, which was issued to the army by authority in . on the instructions issued by other national governments, see the author's _laws of war on land_, , pp. - . the answer, given in the letter, to sir william harcourt's question must now be supplemented by a reference to the handbook above mentioned as having contained rules founded upon the _règlement_ annexed to the convention of , and by a statement that that convention, with its _règlement_, is now superseded by conventions no. iv. (with its _règlement_) and no. v. of , of which account has been taken in a new handbook upon _land warfare_, issued by the war office in . as to what is required from a lawful belligerent, see arts. and of the _règlement_ of , practically repeated in that of . the substance of art. is set out in the letter which follows. art. grants some indulgence to "the population of a territory which has not been occupied who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops, without having had time to organise themselves in accordance with art. ." _cf. infra_, pp. , . the russian use of chinese clothing sir,--if russian troops have actually attacked while disguised in chinese costume, they have certainly violated the laws of war. it may, however, be worth while, to point out that the case is not covered, as might be inferred from the telegram forwarded to you from tokio on wednesday last, by the text of art. (_f_) of the _règlement_ annexed to the hague convention "on the laws and customs of war on land." this article merely prohibits "making improper use of the flag of truce, of the national flag or the military distinguishing marks and the uniform of the enemy, as well as of the distinguishing signs of the geneva convention." art. of the _règlement_ is more nearly in point, insisting, as it does, that even bodies not belonging to the regular army, which, it is assumed, would be in uniform (except in the case of a hasty rising to resist invasion), shall, in order to be treated as "lawful belligerents," satisfy the following requirements, viz.:-- "( ) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; "( ) that of having a distinctive mark, recognisable at a distance; "( ) that of carrying their arms openly; and "( ) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." the fact that, in special circumstances, as in the boer war, marks in the nature of uniform have not been insisted upon, has, of course, no bearing upon the complaint now made by the japanese government. all signatories of the hague convention are bound to issue to their troops instructions in conformity with the _règlement_ annexed to it. the only countries which, so far as i am aware, have as yet fulfilled their obligations in this respect are italy, which has circulated the french text of the _règlement_ without comment; russia, which has prepared a little pamphlet of sixteen pages for the use of its armies in the far east; and great britain, which has issued a handbook, containing explanatory and supplementary matter, besides the text of the relevant diplomatic acts. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, october ( ). the rights of armed civilians sir,--it is interesting to be reminded by sir edward ridley of the view taken by sir walter scott of the right and duty of civilians to defend themselves against an invading enemy. international law is, however, made neither by the ruling of an "impartial historian," on the one hand, nor by the _ipse dixit_ of an emperor, on the other. in point of fact, the question raised by sir edward is not an open one, and, even in our own favoured country, it is most desirable that every one should know exactly how matters stand. the universally accepted rules as to the persons who alone can claim to act with impunity as belligerents are set forth in that well-known "scrap of paper" the hague convention no. iv. of ; to the effect that members of "an army" (in which term militia and bodies of volunteers are included) must ( ) be responsibly commanded, ( ) bear distinctive marks, visible at a distance, ( ) carry their arms openly, and ( ) conform to the laws of war. by way of concession, inhabitants of a district not yet "occupied" who spontaneously rise to resist invasion, without having had time to become organised, will be privileged if they conform to requirements ( ) and ( ). these rules are practically a republication of those of the hague convention of , which again were founded upon the recommendations of the brussels conference of , although, at the conference, baron lambermont regretted that "si les citoyens doivent être conduits au supplice pour avoir tenté de défendre leur pays, au péril de leur vie, ils trouvent inscrit, sur le poteau au pied duquel ils seront fusillés, l'article d'un traité signé par leur propre gouvernement qui d'avance les condamnait à mort." _an englishman's home_ was a play accurately representing the accepted practice, shocking as it must be. i remember the strength of an epithet which was launched from the gallery at the german officer on his ordering the shooting of the offending householder. it may be hardly necessary to add that nothing in international usage justifies execution of innocent wives and children. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, september ( ). this letter was, it seems, perverted in the _kreuz zeitung_. civilians in warfare the right to take up arms sir,--i have read with some surprise so much of sir ronald ross's letter of to-day as states that "the issue still remains dark" as to the right of civilians to bear arms in case of invasion. it has long been settled that non-molestation of civilians by an invader is only possible upon the understanding that they abstain from acts of violence against him. modern written international law has defined, with increasing liberality, by the draft declaration of and the conventions of and , the persons who will be treated as lawful belligerents. art. of the hague regulations of recognises as such, not only the regular army, but also militia and volunteers. art. grants indulgence to a _levée en masse_ of "la population" (officially mistranslated "the inhabitants") of a territory not yet occupied. art. , also cited by sir ronald, has no bearing upon the question. the rules are, i submit, as clear as they could well be made, and are decisive against the legality of resistance by individual civilians, the sad, but inevitable consequence of which was, as i pointed out in _the times_ of september last, truthfully represented on the stage in _an englishman's home_. in the same letter i wrote that "even in our own favoured country it is most desirable that every one should know exactly how matters stand." there are, however, obvious objections, possibly not insuperable, to this result being brought about, as is proposed by sir ronald ross, by government action. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, october ( ). civilians and a raid sir,--it is satisfactory to learn, from mr. mckenna's answer to a question last night, that the duty of the civilian population, at any rate in certain counties, is engaging the attention of government. i confess, however, to having read with surprise mr. tennant's announcement that "it was provided by the hague convention that the wearing of a brassard ensured that the wearer would be regarded as a belligerent." it ought surely to be now generally known that, among the four conditions imposed by the convention upon militia and bodies of volunteers, in order to their being treated as belligerents, the third is "that they shall bear a distinctive mark, fixed and recognisable at a distance." whether an enemy would accept the mere wearing of a brassard as fulfilling this condition is perhaps an open question upon which some light may be thrown by the controversies of with reference to _francs-tireurs_. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). miss cavell's case sir,--the world-wide abhorrence of the execution of miss cavell, aggravated as it was by the indecent and stealthy haste with which it was carried out, is in no need of enhancement by questionable arguments, such as, i venture to say, are those addressed to you by sir james swettenham. it is, of course, the case that germany is in belgium only as the result of her deliberate violation of solemnly contracted treaties, but she is in military "occupation" of the territory. from such "occupation" it cannot be disputed that there flow certain rights of self-defence. no one, for instance, would have complained of her stern repression of civilian attacks upon her troops, so long as it was confined to actual offenders. the passages quoted by sir james from hague convention v., and from the _kriegsbrauch_, relate entirely to the rights and duties of governments, and have no bearing upon the tragical abuse of jurisdiction which is occupying the minds of all of us. may i take this opportunity of calling attention to the fresh evidence afforded by the new order in council of our good fortune in not being bound by the declaration of london, which erroneously professed to "correspond in substance with the generally recognised principles of international law"? is it too late, even now, to announce, by a comprehensive order in council, any relaxations which we and our allies think proper to make of well-established rules of prize law, without any reference to the more and more discredited provisions of the declaration, the partial and provisional adoption of which seems, at the outbreak of the war, to have been thought likely to save trouble? your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, october ( ). * * * * * section _privateering_ the three letters which immediately follow were written to point out that neither belligerent in the war of was under any obligation not to employ privateers. within, however, a few days after the date of the second of these letters, both the united states and spain, though both still to be reckoned among the few powers which had not acceded to the declaration of paris, announced their intention to conduct the war in accordance with the rules laid down by the declaration. art. of the spanish royal decree of april was to the effect that "notwithstanding that spain is not bound by the declaration signed in paris on april , , as she expressly stated her wish not to adhere to it, my government, guided by the principles of international law, intends to observe, and hereby orders that the following regulations for maritime law be observed," viz. arts. , , and of the declaration, after setting out which, the decree proceeds to state that the government, while maintaining "their right to issue letters of marque, ... will organise, for the present, a service of auxiliary cruisers ... subject to the statutes and jurisdiction of the navy." the proclamation of the president of the united states of april recited the desirability of the war being "conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations, and sanctioned by their recent practice," and that it "has already been announced that the policy of the government will not be to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the declaration of paris," and goes on to adopt rules , , and of the declaration. ten years afterwards, viz. on january , , spain signified "her entire and definitive adhesion to the four clauses contained in the declaration," undertaking scrupulously to conduct herself accordingly. mexico followed suit on february , . the united states are therefore now the only important power which has not formally bound itself not to employ privateers. it seems unlikely that privateers, in the old sense of the term, will be much heard of in the future, though many questions may arise as to "volunteer navies" and subsidised liners, such as those touched upon in the last section, with reference to captures made by the _malacca_; possibly also as to ships "converted" on the high seas. our mercantile marine in war time sir,--there can be no doubt that serious loss would be occasioned to british commerce by a war between the united states and spain in which either of those powers should exercise its right of employing privateers or of confiscating enemy goods in neutral bottoms. before, however, adopting the measures recommended, with a view to the prevention of this loss, by sir george baden-powell in your issue of this morning, it would be desirable to enquire how far they would be in accordance with international law, and what would be the net amount of the relief which they would afford. it is hardly necessary to say that non-compliance with the provisions of the declaration of paris by a non-signatory carries with it none of the consequences of a breach of the law of nations. the framers of that somewhat hastily conceived attempt to engraft a paper amendment upon the slowly matured product of oecumenical opinion, far from professing to make general law, expressly state that the declaration "shall not be binding except upon those powers who have acceded, or shall accede, to it." as regards spain and the united states the declaration is _res inter alios acta_. it follows that, in recommending that any action taken by privateers against british vessels should be treated as an act of piracy, sir george baden-powell is advocating an inadmissible atrocity, which derives no countenance from the view theoretically maintained by the united states, at the outset of the civil war, of the illegality of commissions granted by the southern confederation. his recommendation that our ports should be "closed" to privateers is not very intelligible. privateers would, of course, be placed under the restrictions which were imposed in , in accordance with lord granville's instructions, even on the men-of-war of belligerents. they would be forbidden to bring in prizes, to stay more than twenty-four hours, to leave within twenty-four hours of the start of a ship of the other belligerent, to take more coal than enough to carry them to the nearest home port, and to take any further supply of coal within three months. we might, no doubt, carry discouragement of privateers by so much further as to make refusal of coal absolute in their case, but hardly so far as to deny entry to them under stress of weather. the difficulties in the way of accepting sir g. baden-powell's other suggestion are of a different order. although we could not complain of the confiscation by either of the supposed belligerents of enemy property found in british vessels, as being a violation of international duty, we might, at our own proper peril, announce that we should treat such confiscation as "an act of war." international law has long abandoned the attempt to define a "just cause of war." that must be left to the appreciation of the nations concerned. so to announce would be, in effect, to say: "although by acting as you propose you would violate no rule, yet the consequences would be so injurious to me that i should throw my sword into the opposite scale." we should be acting in the spirit of the "armed neutralities" of and . the expediency of so doing depends, first, upon the extent to which the success of our action would obviate the mischief against which it would be directed; and, secondly, upon the likelihood that the benefit which could be obtained only by imposing a new rule of international law _in invitos_ would counterbalance the odium incurred by its imposition. on the former question it may be worth while to remind the mercantile community that, even under the declaration of paris, neutral trade must inevitably be put to much inconvenience. any merchant vessel may be stopped with a view to the verification of her national character, of which the flag is no conclusive evidence. she is further liable to be visited and searched on suspicion of being engaged in the carriage of contraband, or of enemy military persons, or of despatches, or in running a blockade. should the commander of the visiting cruiser "have probable cause" for suspecting any of these things, though the vessel is in fact innocent of them, he is justified in putting a prize crew on board and sending her into port, with a view to the institution of proceedings against her in a prize court. a non-signatory of the declaration of paris may investigate and penalise, in addition to the above-mentioned list of offences, the carriage of enemy goods. this is, no doubt, by far the most important branch of the trade which is carried on for belligerents by neutrals, but it must not be forgotten that even were this branch of trade universally indulged, in accordance with the declaration of paris neutral commerce would still remain liable to infinite annoyance from visit and search, with its possible sequel in a prize court. the question of the balance between benefit to be gained and odium to be incurred by insisting upon freedom to carry the goods of belligerents i leave to the politicians. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. the athenæum, april ( ). our mercantile marine in war time sir,--to-day's debate should throw some light upon the views of the government, both as to existing rules of international law and as to the policy demanded by the interests of british trade. it is, however, possible that the government may decline to anticipate the terms of the declaration of neutrality which they may too probably find themselves obliged to issue in the course of the next few days, and it is not unlikely that the law officers may decline to advise shipowners upon questions to which authoritative replies can be given only with reference to concrete cases by a prize court. you may perhaps, therefore, allow me in the meantime to supplement my former letter by a few remarks, partly suggested by what has since been written upon the subject. it is really too clear for argument that privateers are not, and cannot be treated as, pirates. sir george baden-powell still fails to see that the declaration of paris was not a piece of legislation, but a contract, producing no effect upon the rights and duties of nations which were not parties to it. we did not thereby, as he supposes, "decline to recognise private vessels of war as competent to use force on neutral merchantmen." we merely bound ourselves not to use such vessels for such a purpose. sir george is still unable to discover for privateers any other category than the "_status_ of pirate." he admits that it would not be necessary for their benefit to resort to "the universal use of the fore-yard-arm." let me assure him that the bearer of a united states private commission of war would run no risk even of being hanged at newgate. president lincoln, it is true, at the outset of the civil war, threatened to treat as pirates vessels operating under the "pretended authority" of the rebel states; but he was speedily instructed by his own law courts--e.g. in the _savannah_ and in the _golden rocket_ (insurance) cases--that even such vessels were not pirates _iure gentium_. it is also tolerably self-evident that we cannot absolutely "close" our ports to any class of vessels. there is no inconsistency here between my friend sir sherston baker and myself. we can discourage access, and of course, by refusal of coal, render egress impossible for privateers. mr. coltman would apparently be inclined to carry this policy so far that he would disarm and intern even belligerent ships of war which should visit our ports: a somewhat hazardous innovation, one would think. it is quite possible that the question of privateering may not become a practical one during the approaching war. both parties may expressly renounce the practice, or they may follow the example of prussia in , and russia at a later date, in commissioning fast liners under the command of naval officers--a practice, by the by, which is not, as sir george seems to think, "right in the teeth of the declaration of paris." see lord granville's despatch in . on sir george's proposals with reference to the carriage of enemy goods, little more need be said, except to deprecate arguments founded upon the metaphorical statement that "a vessel is part of the territory covered by her flag," a statement which lord stowell found it necessary to meet by the assertion that a ship is a "mere movable." there can be no possible doubt of the right, under international law, of spain and the united states to visit and search neutral ships carrying enemy's goods, and to confiscate such goods when found. they may also visit and search on many other grounds, and the question (one of policy) is whether, rather than permit this addition to the list, we choose to take a step which would practically make us belligerent. this question also, it may be hoped, will not press for solution. in any case, let me express my cordial concurrence with your hope that, when hostilities are over, some really universal and lasting agreement may be arrived at with reference to the matters dealt with, as i venture to think prematurely, by the declaration of paris. a reform of maritime law to which the united states are not a party is of little worth. that search for contraband of war can ever be suppressed i do not believe, and fear that it may be many years before divergent national interests can be so far reconciled as to secure an agreement as to the list of contraband articles. in the meantime this country is unfortunately a party to that astonishing piece of draftsmanship, the "three rules" of the treaty of washington, to which less reference than might have been expected has been made in recent discussions. the ambiguities of this document, which have prevented it from ever being, as was intended, brought to the notice of the other powers, with a view to their acceptance of it, are such that, its redrafting, or, better still, its cancellation, should be the first care of both contracting parties when the wished for congress shall take place. may i add that no serious student of international law is likely either to overrate the authority which it most beneficially exercises, or to conceive of it as an unalterable body of theory. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. brighton, april ( ). our mercantile marine in war sir,--let me assure sir george baden-powell that if, as he seems to think, i have been unsuccessful in grasping the meaning of his very interesting letters, it has not been from neglect to study them with the attention which is due to anything which he may write. how privateering, previously innocent, can have become piratical, _i.e._ an offence, everywhere justiciable, against the law of nations, if the declaration of paris was not in the nature of a piece of legislation, i confess myself unable to understand; but have no wish to repeat the remarks which you have already allowed me to make upon the subject. i shall, however, be glad at once to remove the impression suggested by sir george's letter of this morning, that art. of the spanish decree of april has any bearing upon the legitimacy of privateering generally. the article in question (following, by the by, the very questionable precedent of a notification issued by admiral baudin, during the war between france and mexico in ) merely threatens with punishment neutrals who may accept letters of marque from a belligerent government. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, april ( ). the declaration of paris sir,--there is really no question at issue between your two correspondents mr. gibson bowles and "anglo-saxon" as to the attitude of the united states towards the declaration of paris. mr. bowles rightly maintains that the united states has not acceded to the declaration as a whole, or to its second article, which exempts from capture enemy property in neutral ships. he means, of course, that neither the whole nor any part of that declaration has been ratified by the president with the advice and consent of the senate. the whole contains, indeed, an article on privateering, to which, as it stands, the united states have always objected, and no part of the declaration can be accepted separately. "anglo-saxon," on the other hand, is equally justified in asserting that the "officially-recorded policy" of the states, _i.e._ of the executive, is in accordance with art. of the declaration. this policy has been consistently followed for more than half a century. its strongest expression is perhaps to be found in the president's proclamation of april , , in which, after reciting that it being desirable that the war with spain "should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice, it has already been announced that the policy of the government will not be to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules for the declaration of paris," he goes on to "declare and proclaim" the three other articles of the declaration. the rule of art. , as to exemption of enemy goods in neutral ships, was embodied in art. of the naval war code of (withdrawn in , for reasons not affecting the article in question), and reappears in art. , amended only by the addition of a few words relating to "hostile assistance" in the draft code which the united states delegates to the conferences of and were instructed to bring forward "with the suggested changes, and such further changes as may be made necessary by other agreements reached at the conference, as a tentative formulation of the rules which should be considered." (my quotation is from the instructions as originally issued in english.) such changes as have been made in the code are due to discussions which have taken place between high naval and legal authorities at the naval war college. i do not know whether the annual reports of these discussions, with which i am kindly supplied, are generally accessible, but would refer, especially with reference to the declaration of paris, to the volumes for and . it can hardly be necessary to add that no acts of the executive, such as the proclamation of , the order putting in force the code of , or the instructions to delegates in and , amount to anything like a ratification of the declaration in the manner prescribed by the constitution of the united states. i have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, january ( ). the declaration of paris sir,--mr. gibson bowles resuscitates this morning his crusade against the declaration of . it is really superfluous to argue in support of rules which have met with general acceptance for nearly sixty years past, to all of which spain and mexico, who were not originally parties to the declaration, announced their formal adhesion in , while the united states, which for well-known reasons declined to accede to the declaration, described, in , all the articles except that dealing with privateering as "recognised rules of international law." it may, however, be worth while to point out why it was that no provision was made for the ratification of the declaration of , or for that of relating to the use of explosive bullets. at those dates, when the first steps were being taken towards the general adoption of written rules for the conduct of warfare, it was, curiously enough, supposed that agreement upon such rules might be sufficiently recorded without the solemnity of a treaty. this was, in my opinion, a mistake, which has been avoided in more recent times, in which the written law of war has been developed with such marvellous rapidity. not only have codes of such rules been promulgated in regular "conventions," made in , , and , but the so-called "declarations," dealing with the same topic, of , , and have been as fully equipped as were those conventions with provisions for ratification. the distinction between a "convention" and a "declaration" is therefore now one without a difference, and should no longer be drawn. nothing in the nature of rules for the conduct of warfare can prevent their expression in conventions, and the reason which seems to have promoted the misdescription of the work of the london conference of - as a "declaration"--viz. an imaginary difference between rules for the application of accepted principles and wholly new rules--is founded in error. much of the contents of the hague "conventions" is as old as the hills while much of the "declaration" of london is revolutionary. this by the way. it is not very clear whether mr. gibson bowles, in exhorting us to denounce the declaration, relies upon its original lack of ratification, or upon some alleged "privateering" on the part of the germans. nothing of the kind has been reported. the commissioning of warships on the high seas is a different thing, which may possibly be regarded as an offence of a graver nature. great britain is not going to imitate the cynical contempt for treaties, evidenced by the action of germany in belgium and luxemburg, in disregard not only of the well-known treaties of and , but of a quite recent solemn undertaking, to which i have not noticed any reference. art. of the hague convention no. v. of , ratified by her in , is to the following effect:-- "belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral power troops or convoys, whether of munitions or of supplies." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, august ( ). the true ground for objecting to the legality of the purchase by turkey of the german warships which have been forced to take refuge in her waters is no doubt that stated by sir william scott in the _minerva_, c. rob. at p. --viz. that it would enable the belligerent to whom the ships belong "so far to rescue himself from the disadvantage into which he has fallen as to have the value at least restored to him by a neutral purchaser." the point is not touched upon in the (draft) declaration of london. even supposing the purchase to be unobjectionable, the duty of turkey to remove all belligerents from the ships would be unquestionable. _cf._ on the declaration of paris, _passim_, see index; on the misuse of declarations, _infra_, p. ; on privateering, _supra_, pp. - . the declaration of paris sir,--the resuscitation, a few days ago, in the house of commons of an old controversy reminds one of the mistaken procedure which made such a controversy possible. it can hardly now be doubted that the rules set forth in the declaration of paris of , except possibly the prohibition of privateering, have by general acceptance during sixty years, strengthened by express accessions on the part of so many governments, become a portion of international law, and are thus binding upon great britain, notwithstanding her omission to ratify the declaration. this omission is now seen to have been a mistake. so also was the description of the document as a "declaration." both mistakes were repeated in with reference to the "declaration" of st. petersburg (as to explosive bullets). in those early attempts at legislation for the conduct of warfare it seems to have been thought sufficient that the conclusions arrived at by authorised delegates should be announced without being embodied in a treaty. surely, however, what purported to be international agreements upon vastly important topics ought to have been accompanied by all the formalities required for "conventions," and should have been so entitled. in later times this has become the general rule for the increasingly numerous agreements which bear upon the conduct of hostilities. thus we have the hague "conventions" of and , and the geneva "convention" of , all duly equipped with provisions for ratification. such provisions are also inserted in certain other recent agreements dealing with aerial bombardments, gases, and expanding bullets, which it has nevertheless pleased their contrivers to misdescribe as "declarations." equally so misdescribed was the deceased declaration of london, with a view, apparently, to suggesting, as was far from being the case, that it was a mere orderly statement of universally accepted principles, creating no new obligations. is it not to be desired that all future attempts for the international regulation of warfare should not only be specifically made subject to ratification, but should also, in accordance with fact, be described as "conventions"? i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, august ( ). the declaration of paris sir,--if mr. gibson bowles, whose courteous letter i have just been reading, will look again at my letter of the th, i think he will see that i there carefully distinguished between the declaration of paris, which, as is notorious, must be accepted as a whole or not at all, and the rules set forth in it, "except, possibly, the prohibition of privateering," which i thought, for the reasons which i stated, might be taken to have become a portion of international law. i must be excused from following mr. bowles into a discussion of the bearing of those rules upon the order in council of march , --a large and delicate topic, which must be studied in elaborate dispatches exchanged between this country and the united states. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, august ( ). * * * * * section _assassination_ the natal proclamation sir,--it was reported a few days ago that the natal government had offered a reward for bambaata, dead or alive. i have waited for a statement that no offer of the kind had been made, or that it had been made by some over-zealous official, whose act had been disavowed. no such statement has appeared. on the contrary, we read that "the price placed upon the rebel's head has excited native cupidity." it may therefore be desirable to point out that what is alleged to have been done is opposed to the customs of warfare, whether against foreign enemies or rebels. by art. (_b_) of the hague regulations, "it is especially prohibited to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army": words which, one cannot doubt, would include not only assassination of individuals, but also, by implication, any offer for an individual "dead or alive." the regulations are, of course, technically binding only between signatories of the convention to which they are appended; but art. (_b_) is merely an express enactment of a well-established rule of the law of nations. a recent instance of its application occurred, before the date of the hague convention, during operations in the neighbourhood of suakin. an offer by the british admiral of a reward for osman digna, dead or alive, was, if i mistake not, promptly cancelled and disavowed by the home government. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. brighton, april ( ). * * * * * section _the choice of means of injuring_ bullets in savage warfare sir,--the somaliland debate was sufficient evidence that the hague convention "respecting the laws and customs of war on land" is far more talked about than read. colonel cobbe had, it appears, complained of the defective stopping power, as against the foes whom he was encountering, of the lee-metford bullet. it is the old story that wounds inflicted by this bullet cannot be relied on to check the onrush of a hardy and fanatical savage, though they may ultimately result in his death. whereupon arises, on the one hand, the demand for a more effective projectile, and, on the other hand, the cry that the proposed substitute is condemned by "the universal consent of christendom"; or, in particular, "by the convention of the hague," which, as was correctly stated by mr. lee, prohibits only the use of arms which cause superfluous injury. you print to-day two letters enforcing the view of the inefficiency against savages of the ordinary service bullet. perhaps you will find space for a few words upon the question whether the employment for this purpose of a severer form of projectile, such as the dum dum bullet, would be a contravention of the "laws of war." the law of the subject, as embodied in general international national agreements, is to be found in four paragraphs; to which, be it observed, nothing is added by the unwritten, or customary, law of nations. of these paragraphs, which i shall set out textually, three affirm general principles, while the fourth contains a specific prohibition. the general provisions are as follows:-- "the progress of civilisation should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war. the only legitimate object which states should set before themselves during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men. this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which would uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable. the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity." (st. petersburg declaration, . preamble.) "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." (hague _règlement_, art. .) "besides the prohibitions provided by special conventions [the declaration of st. petersburg alone answers to this description] it is in particular prohibited (_e_) to employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury." (_ib._ art. .) the only special prohibition is that contained in the declaration of st. petersburg, by which the contracting parties-- "engage mutually to renounce, in case of war among themselves, the employment by their military or naval forces of any projectile of a weight below grammes which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances." no one, so far as i am aware, has any wish to employ a bullet weighing less than oz. which is either explosive or charged as above. so far, therefore, as the generally accepted laws of warfare are concerned, the only question as to the employment of dum dum or other expanding bullets is whether they "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable"; in other words, whether they are "of a nature to cause superfluous injury." it is, however, probable that people who glibly talk of such bullets being "prohibited by the hague convention" are hazily reminiscent, not of the _règlement_ appended to that convention, but of a certain "declaration," signed by the delegates of many of the powers represented at the hague in , to the effect that-- "the contracting powers renounce the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard casing, which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions." to this declaration neither great britain nor the united states are parties, and it is waste-paper, except for powers on whose behalf it has not only been signed, but has also been subsequently ratified. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. athenæum club, may ( ). the declaration last mentioned (no. of the first peace conference) is now something more than waste paper, having been generally ratified. great britain, on august , , at the fourth plenary sitting of the second peace conference, announced her adhesion to it, as also to the, also generally ratified, declaration no. of , which forbids the employment of projectiles constructed solely for the diffusion suffocating or harmful gases. the provisions of arts. and (_e_) of the _règlement_ annexed to the hague convention of "concerning the laws and customs of war on land," as quoted in the letter, have been textually reproduced in arts. and (_e_) of the _règlement_ annexed to the hague convention, no. iv. of , on the same subject, ratified by great britain on november , . the written agreements as to the choice of weapons may be taken therefore to start from the general principles laid down in the preamble to the declaration of st. petersburg (though held by some powers to err in the direction of liberality), and in arts. and (_e_) of the hague _règlements_. the specially prohibited means of destruction are, by the declaration of st. petersburg, explosive bullets; by the hague _règlements_, art. (_a_) poison or poisoned arms; by the hague declarations of , nos. and , "projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or harmful gases," and "bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard casing, which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions." as to declaration no. , _cf. supra_, p. . it must be remarked that the declarations of st. petersburg and of the hague, unlike the hague règlements, apply to war at sea, as well as on land. _cf. supra_, p. , and see the author's _the laws of war on land (written and unwritten)_, , pp. - . gases sir,--the weightily signed medical protest which you publish this morning will be widely welcomed. the german employment of poisonous gases for military purposes, which the allies were obliged, reluctantly, though necessarily, to reciprocate, was, of course, prohibited by international acts to which germany is a party. not only does the declaration of specifically render unlawful "the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or harmful gases," but the hague conventions of and both forbid, in general terms, the employment of "(_a_) poison or poisoned arms," "(_c_) arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous suffering." the united states, like the rest of the world, are a party to the two conventions, and would doubtless, after the experiences of recent years, no longer hesitate, as hitherto, to adhere to the declaration of ; in accordance with admiral mahan's view at that date, to the effect that "the effect of gas shells has yet to be ascertained," and, in particular, "whether they would be more, or less, merciful than missiles now available." the prohibition ought, no doubt, to be renewed and, if possible, strengthened; but this is surely not, as your correspondents suggest, work for the peace congress. the rules for naval warfare set out in the declaration of paris of form no part of the treaty of paris of that year. i venture to make a similar remark with reference to any discussion by the peace congress of "the freedom of the seas," a topic unfortunately included by president wilson among his " points." the peace delegates will be concerned with questions of regroupings of territory, penalties, and reparation. the rehabilitation and revision of international law is a different business, and should be reserved for a subsequent conference. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). * * * * * section _the geneva convention_ as far back as the year , the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals exerted itself to induce both sides in the great war then commencing to make some special provision for relieving, or terminating, the sufferings of horses wounded in battle. in it made the same suggestion to the british war office, but the reply of the secretary of state was to the effect that "he is informed that soldiers always shoot badly wounded horses after, or during, a battle, whenever they are given time to do so, _i.e._ whenever the operation does not involve risk to human life. he fears that no more than this can be done unless and until some international convention extends to those who care for wounded animals the same protection for which the geneva convention provides in the case of men; and he would suggest that you should turn your efforts in that direction." thereupon, mr. lawrence pike, on november , addressed to _the times_ the letter which called forth the letter which follows. wounded horses in war sir,--everyone must sympathise with the anxiety felt by mr. l.w. pike to diminish the sufferings of horses upon the field of battle. how far any systematic alleviation of such sufferings may be compatible with the exigencies of warfare must be left to the decision of military experts. in the meantime it may be as well to assure mr. pike that the geneva convention of has nothing to do with the question, relating, as it does, exclusively to the relief of human suffering. this is equally the case with the second geneva convention, which mr. pike is right in supposing never to have been ratified. he is also right in supposing that "the terms of the convention are capable of amendment from time to time," but wrong in supposing that they can be amended "by the setting up of precedents." the convention can be amended only by a new convention. it is not the case that art. of the convention, which merely confides to commanders-in-chief, under the instructions of their respective governments, "les détails d'exécution de la présente convention," gives them any authority to extend its scope beyond what is expressly stated to be its object--viz. "l'amélioration du sort des militaires blessés dans les armées en campagne." while, however, the geneva convention, does not contemplate the relief of animal suffering, it certainly cannot be "set up as a bar" to the provision of such relief. commanders who may see their way to neutralising persons engaged in the succour or slaughter of wounded horses would be quite within their powers in entering into temporary agreements for that purpose. i may add that the "convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land," prepared by the recent conference at the hague, and signed on behalf of most governments, including our own, though not yet ratified, contains a chapter "des malades et des blessés," which merely states that the obligations of belligerents on this point are governed by the convention of geneva of , with such modifications as may be made in it. among the aspirations (_voeux_) recorded in the "acte final" of the conference, is one to the effect that steps may be taken for the assembling of a special conference, having for its object the revision of the geneva convention. should such a conference be assembled mr. pike will have an opportunity of addressing it upon the painfully interesting subject which he has brought forward in your columns. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). the "second geneva convention," above mentioned, was the "projet d'articles additionnels," signed on october , , but never ratified. art. of the _règlement_ annexed to the hague convention of as to the "laws and customs of war on land," stating that "the obligations of belligerents, with reference to the care of the sick and wounded, are governed by the convention of geneva of august , , subject to alterations which may be made in it," is now represented by art. of the hague _règlement_ of , which mentions "the convention of geneva," without mention of any date, or of possible alterations. the convention intended in this later _règlement_ is, of course, that of , for the numerous powers which have already ratified it, since for them it has superseded that of . the british ratification, of april , , was subject to a reservation, the necessity for which was intended to be removed by & geo. , c. , as to which, see _supra_, p, . the later is somewhat wider in scope than the earlier convention, its recital referring to "the sick," as well as to the wounded, and its first article naming not only "les militaires," but also "les autres personnes officiellement attachées aux armées." with a view to the expected meeting of the conference by which the convention was signed in , mr. pike and his friends again, in , pressed upon the british government their desire that the new convention should extend protection to persons engaged in relieving the sufferings of wounded horses. the british delegates to the conference, however, who had already been appointed, and were holding meetings in preparation for it, were not prepared to advise the insertion of provisions for this purpose in the revised convention of geneva. "the principles of the geneva convention" of were applied to naval warfare by the hague convention no. iii. of , and those of the geneva convention of by the hague convention no. x. of respectively. both were ratified by great britain. cf. _supra_, chapters ii. and iv. * * * * * section _enemy property in occupied territory_ by art. of the hague _règlement_ of , which reproduces art. of the brussels _projet_, and is repeated as art. of the _règlement_ of : "the occupying state shall regard itself as being only administrator and usufructuary of the public buildings, immoveable property, forests and agricultural undertakings belonging to the hostile state and situated in the hostile country. it must protect the substance of these properties and administer them according to the rules of usufruct." the following letter touches incidentally upon the description of the rights of an invader over certain kinds of state property in the occupied territory as being those of a "usufructuary." international "usufruct" sir,--the terminology of the law of nations has been enriched by a new phrase. we are all getting accustomed to "spheres of influence." we have been meditating for some time past upon the interpretation to be put upon "a lease of sovereign rights." but what is an international "usufruct"? the word has, of course, a perfectly ascertained sense in roman law and its derivatives; but it has been hitherto employed, during, perhaps two thousand years, always as a term of private law--_i.e._ as descriptive of a right enjoyed by one private individual or corporation over the property of another. it is the "ius utendi fruendi, salva rerum substantia." the usufructuary of land not merely has the use of it, but may cut its forests and work its mines, so long as he does not destroy the character of the place as he received it. his interest terminates with his life, though it might also be granted to him for a shorter period. if the grantee be a corporation, in order to protect the outstanding right of the owner an artificial limit is imposed upon the tenure--e.g. in roman law years, by the french code years. for details it may suffice to refer to the institutes of justinian, ii. ; the digest, vii. ; the code civil, sects. - ; the new german civil code, sects. - . it remains to be seen how the conception of "usufruct" is to be imported into the relations of sovereign states, and, more especially, what are to be the relations of the usufructuary to states other than the state under which he holds. it is, of course, quite possible to adapt the terms of roman private law to international use. "dominium," "possessio," "occupatio," have long been so adapted, but it has yet to be proved that "usufructus" is equally malleable. i can recall no other use of the term in international discussions than the somewhat rhetorical statement that an invader should consider himself as merely the "usufructuary" of the resources of the country which he is invading; which is no more than to say that he should use them "en bon père de famille." it will be a very different matter to put a strict legal construction upon the grant of the "usufruct" of port arthur. by way of homage to the conception of such a grant, as presumably creating at the outside a life-interest, russia seems to have taken it, in the first instance, only for twenty-five years. one may, however, be pardoned for sharing, with reference to this transaction, the scruples which were felt at rome as to allowing the grant of a usufruct to a corporation--"periculum enim esse videbatur, ne perpetuus fieret." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ). p.s.--it would seem from m. lehr's _Éléments du droit civil russe_ that "usufruct" is almost unknown to the law of russia, though a restricted form of it figures in the code of the baltic provinces. it is certain that, apart from general conventions, international law imposes no liability on an invader to pay for requisitioned property or services, or to honour any receipts which he may have given for them. the hague convention of made no change in this respect. arts. and of the _règlement_ annexed to the convention direct, it is true, that receipts should be given for contributions ("un reçu sera délivré aux contribuables") also for requisitions in kind, if not paid for ("elles seront constatées par des reçus"), but these receipts were to be merely evidence that money or goods have been taken, and it was left an open question, by whom, if at all, compensation was to be made or the losses thus established. the _règlement_ of is more liberal than that of with reference to requisitioned property (though not with reference to contributions). by the new art. , "supplies furnished in kind shall be paid for, so far as possible, on the spot. if not, they shall be vouched for (_constatées_) by receipts, and payment of the sums due shall be made as soon as may be." the hague convention mentioned in the following letter is, of course, that of . requisitions in warfare sir,--a few words of explanation may not be out of place with reference to a topic touched upon last night in the house of commons--viz. the liability of the british government to pay for stock requisitioned during the late war from private enemy owners. it should be clearly understood that no such liability is imposed by international law. the commander of invading forces may, for valid reasons of his own, pay cash for any property which he takes, and, if he does not do so, is nowadays expected to give receipts for it. these receipts are, however, not in the nature of evidence of a contract to pay for the goods. they are intended merely to _constater_ the fact that the goods have been requisitioned, with a view to any indemnity which may eventually be granted to the sufferers by their own government. what steps should be taken by a government towards indemnifying enemies who have subsequently become its subjects, as is now happily the case in south africa, is a question not of international law, but of grace and favour. an article in the current number of the _review of reviews_, to which my attention has just been called, contains some extraordinary statements upon the topic under discussion. the uninformed public is assured that "we owe the boers payment in full for all the devastation which we have inflicted upon their private property ... it is our plain legal obligation, from the point of view of international law, to pay it to the last farthing." then the hague convention is invoked as permitting interference with private property "only on condition that it is paid for in cash by the conqueror, and, if that is not possible at the moment, he must in every case give a receipt, which he must discharge at the conclusion of hostilities." there is no such provision as to honouring receipts in this much-misquoted convention. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, july ( ). * * * * * section _enemy property at sea_ private property at sea sir,--the letter which you print this morning from mr. charles stewart can hardly be taken as a serious contribution to the discussion of a question which has occupied for many years the attention of politicians, international lawyers, shipowners, traders, and naval experts. mr. stewart actually thinks that lord sydenham's argument to the effect that "the fear of the severe economic strain which must result from the stoppage of a great commerce is a factor which makes for peace" may be fairly paraphrased as advice to "retain the practice because it is so barbarous that it will sicken the enemy of warfare." he goes on to say that this argument "would apply equally to the poisoning of wells and to the use of explosive bullets." it may be worth while to contrast with the attitude of a writer who seems unable to distinguish between economic pressure and physical cruelty that taken up by a competent body, the large majority of the members of which belong to nations which, for various reasons, incline to the abolition of the usage in question. the institut de droit international, encouraged by the weight attached to its _manual of the law of war on land_ by the first and second peace conferences, has been, for some time past, working upon a _manual of the laws of war at sea_. at its christiania meeting in the institut, while maintaining the previously expressed opinion of a majority of its members in favour of a change in the law, recognised that such a change has not yet come to pass, and that, till it occurs, regulations for the exercise of capture are indispensable, and directed the committee charged with the topic to draft rules presupposing the right of capture, and other rules to be applied should the right be hereafter surrendered (_annuaire_, t. xxv., p. ). the committee accordingly prepared a draft, framed in accordance with the existing practice, to the discussion of which the institut devoted the whole of its recent session at oxford, eventually giving its _imprimatur_ to a manual of the law of maritime warfare, as between the belligerents, in articles. as opportunity serves, the committee will prepare a second draft, proceeding upon the hypothesis that the right of capturing private property at sea has been surrendered, which, in its turn, will be debated, word for word, by the institut de droit international. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). * * * * * section _martial law_ the first of the letters which follow has reference to the case of two boer prisoners who, having taken the oath of neutrality on the british occupation of pretoria, attempted to escape from the town. both were armed, and one of them fired upon and wounded a sentinel who called upon them to stop. they were tried by court-martial, condemned to death, and shot on june , . the hague convention quoted in the letter is that of , but the same art. figures in the convention of . the second and third of these letters relate to a question of english public law, growing out of the exercise of martial law in british territory in time of war. one marais, accused of having contravened the martial law regulations of may , , was imprisoned in cape colony by military authority, and the supreme court at the cape held that it had no authority to order his release. the privy council refused an application for leave to appeal against this decision, saying that "no doubt has ever existed that, when war actually prevails, the ordinary courts have no jurisdiction over the action of the military authorities"; adding that "the framers of the petition of right knew well what they meant when they made a condition of peace the ground of the illegality of unconstitutional procedure" (_ex parte_ d.f. marais, [ ] a.c. ). thereupon arose a discussion as to the extent of the prohibition of the exercise of martial law contained in the petition of right; and mr. edward jenks, in letters to _the times_ of december , , and january , , maintained that the prohibition in question was not confined to time of peace. the last letter deals with the true character of a proclamation of martial law, and was suggested by the refusal of the privy council, on april , , to grant leave to appeal from sentences passed in natal by court-martial, in respect of acts committed on february , , whereby retrospective effect had, it was alleged, been given to a proclamation not issued till the day after the acts were committed, _see_ mcomini mzinelwe and wanda _v._ h.e. the governor and the a.g. for the colony of natal, _times law reports_, . the executions at pretoria sir,--no doubt is possible that by international law, as probably by every system of national law, all necessary means, including shooting, may be employed to prevent the escape of a prisoner of war. the question raised by the recent occurrence at pretoria is, however, a different one--viz. what are the circumstances in connection with an attempt to escape which justify execution after trial by court-martial of the persons concerned in it? this question may well be dealt with a part from the facts, as to which we are as yet imperfectly informed, which have called for mr. winston churchill's letter. with the arguments of that letter i in the main agree, but should not attach so much importance as mr. churchill appears to do to a chapter of the british _manual of military law_, which, though included in a government publication, cannot be taken as official, since it is expressly stated "to have no official authority" and to "express only the opinions of the compiler, as drawn from the authorities cited." i propose, without comment, to call attention to what may be found upon this subject in conventional international law, in one or two representative national codes, and in the considered judgment of the leading contemporary international lawyers. i. the hague "convention on the laws and customs of war on land" (ratified by twenty powers) lays down:-- "article .--prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army of the state into whose hands they have fallen. any act of insubordination warrants the adoption as regards them of such measures of severity as may be necessary. escaped prisoners, recaptured before they have succeeded in rejoining their army, or before quitting the territory occupied by the army that captured them, are liable to disciplinary punishment. prisoners who after succeeding in escaping are again taken prisoners are not liable to any punishment for their previous flight." the hague conference, in adopting this article, adopted also, as an "authentic interpretation" of it, a statement that the indulgence granted to escapes does not apply to such as are accompanied by "special circumstances," of which the instances given are "complot, rébellion, émeute." "article .--any prisoner of war who is liberated on parole and recaptured bearing arms against the government to which he had pledged his honour, or against the allies of that government, forfeits his right to be treated as a prisoner of war, and can be put on his trial." ii. the united states instructions:-- "article .--a prisoner of war may be shot or otherwise killed in his flight; but neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted on him simply for his attempt.... if, however, a conspiracy is discovered, the purpose of which is a united or general escape, the conspirators may be rigorously punished even with death, &c." "article .--if prisoners of war, having given no pledge nor made any promise on their honour, forcibly or otherwise, escape, and are captured again in battle, having rejoined their own army, they shall not be punished for their escape." "article .--breaking the parole is punished with death when the person breaking the parole is captured again." _cf._ the french _code de justice militaire_, art. , and other continental codes to the same effect. iii. the _manuel des lois de la guerre sur terre_ of the institute of international law lays down:-- "article .--si le fugitif ressaisi[b] ou capturé de nouveau avait donne sa parole de ne pas s'évader, il peut être privé des droits de prisonnier de guerre." "article .--tout prisonnier libéré sur parole et repris portant les armes contre le gouvernement auquel il l'avait donnée, peut être privé des droits de prisonnier de guerre, à moins que, postérieurement à sa liberation, il n'ait été compris dans un cartel d'échange sans conditions." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, june ( ). the petition of right sir,--this is, i think, not a convenient time, nor perhaps are your columns the place, for an exhaustive discussion of the interpretation and application of the petition of right. it may, however, be just worth while to make the following remarks, for the comfort of any who may have been disquieted by the letter addressed to you by my friend mr. jenks:-- . although, as is common knowledge, the words "in time of peace," so familiar in the mutiny acts from the reign of queen anne onwards, do not occur in the petition, they do occur, over and over again, in the arguments used in the house of commons by "the framers of the petition of right," to employ the phraseology of the judgment recently delivered in the privy council by the lord chancellor. . the prohibition contained in the petition, so far from being "absolute and unqualified," is perfectly specific. it refers expressly to "commissions of like nature" with certain commissions lately issued:-- "by which certain persons have been assigned and appointed commissioners, with power and authority to proceed within the land, according to the justice of martial law, against such soldiers or mariners, or other dissolute persons joining with them, as should commit any murder, robbery, felony, mutiny, or other outrage or misdemeanour whatsoever, and by such summary course and order as is agreeable to martial law, and is used in armies in time of war, &c." the text of these commissions, the revocation of which is demanded by the petition, is still extant. . the petition neither affirms nor denies the legality of martial law in time of war; although its advocates were agreed that at such a time martial law would be applicable to soldiers. . a war carried on at a distance from the english shore as was the war with france in , did not produce such a state of things as was described by the advocates of the petition as "a time of war." "we have now no army in the field, and it is no time of war," said mason in the course of the debates. "if the chancery and courts of westminster be shut up, it is time of war, but if the courts be open, it is otherwise; yet, if war be in any part of the kingdom, that the sheriff cannot execute the king's writ, there is _tempus belli_," said rolls. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). the petition of right sir,--in a letter which you allowed me to address to you a few days ago, i dealt with two perfectly distinct topics. in the first place i pointed out that the words occurring in a recent judgment of the privy council, which were cited by mr. jenks as a clear example of an assumption "that the petition of right, in prohibiting the exercise of martial law, restricted its prohibition to time of peace," imply, as i read them, no assumption as to the meaning of that document, but merely contain an accurate statement of fact as to the line of argument followed by the supporters of the petition in the house of commons. can mr. jenks really suppose that in making this remark i was "appealing from the 'text of the petition' to the debates in parliament"? i then proceeded to deal very shortly with the petition itself, showing that while it neither condemns nor approves of the application of martial law in time of war (see lord blackburn's observations in r. _v._ eyre), the prohibition contained in its martial law clauses, so far from being "absolute and unqualified," relates exclusively to "commissions of like nature" with certain commissions which had been lately issued (at a time which admittedly, for the purposes of this discussion, was not "a time of war"), the text of which is still preserved, and the character of which is set forth in the petition itself, as having authorised proceedings within the land, "according to the justice of martial law, against such soldiers or mariners," as also against "such other dissolute persons joining with them," &c. the description of these commissions, be it observed, is not merely introduced into the petition by way of recital, but is incorporated by express reference into the enacting clause. thus much and no more i thought it desirable to say upon these two topics by way of dissent from a letter of mr. jenks upon the subject. in a second letter mr. jenks rides off into fresh country. i do not propose to follow him into the history of the conferences which took place in may, , after the framing of the petition of right, except to remark that what passed at these conferences is irrelevant to the interpretation to be placed upon the petition, and, if relevant, would be opposed to mr. jenks's contention. it is well known that the lords pressed the commons to introduce various amendments into the petition and to add to it the famous reservation of the "sovereign power" of the king. one of the proposed amendments referred, as mr. jenks says, to martial law, forbidding its application to "any but soldiers and mariners," or "in time of peace, or when your majesty's army is not on foot." the commons' objection to this seems to have been that it was both unnecessary and obscurely expressed. "their complaint is against commissions in time of peace." "it may be a time of peace, and yet his majesty's army may be on foot, and that martial law was not lawful here in england in time of peace, when the chancery and other courts do sit." "they feared that this addition might extend martial law to the trained bands, for the uncertainty thereof." the objections of the commons were, however, directed not so much to the amendments in detail as to any tampering with the text of the petition. "they would not alter any part of the petition" (nor did they, except by expunging two words alleged to be needlessly offensive), still less would they consent to add to it the reservation as to the "sovereign power" of the king. the story of these abortive conferences, however interesting historically, appears to me to have no bearing upon the legality of martial law, and i have no intention of returning to the subject. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, january ( ). martial law in natal sir,--it seems that in the application made yesterday to the judicial committee of the privy council, on behalf of natal natives under sentence of death, much stress was laid upon the argument that a proclamation of martial law cannot have a retrospective application. you will, perhaps, therefore allow me to remind your readers that, so far from the date of the proclamation having any bearing upon the merits of this painful case, the issue of any proclamation of martial law, in a self-governing british colony, neither increases nor diminishes the powers of the military or other authorities to take such steps as they may think proper for the safety of the country. if those steps were properly taken they are covered by the common law; if they have exceeded the necessities of the case they can be covered only by an act of indemnity. the proclamation is issued merely, from abundant caution, as a useful warning to those whom it may concern. this view, i venture to think, cannot now be seriously controverted; and i am glad to find, on turning to mr. clode's _military and martial law_ that the passage cited in support of mr. jellicoe's contention as to a proclamation having no retroactive application is merely to the effect that this is so, if certain statements, made many years ago in a debate upon the subject, are correct. as to their correctness, or otherwise, mr. clode expresses no opinion. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. * * * * * section _the naval bombardment of open coast towns_ the four letters which first follow were suggested by the british naval manoeuvres of , during which operations were supposed to be carried on, by the squadron playing the part of a hostile fleet, which i ventured to assert to be in contravention of international law. many letters were written by naval men in a contrary sense, and the report of a committee of admirals appointed to consider, among other questions, "the feasibility and expediency of cruisers making raids on an enemy's coasts and unprotected towns for the purpose of levying contributions," was to the effect that "there can be no doubt about the feasibility of such operations by a maritime enemy possessed of sufficient power; and as to the expediency, there can be as little doubt but that any power at war with great britain will adopt every possible means of weakening her enemy; and we know of no means more efficacious for making an enemy feel the pinch of war than by thus destroying his property and touching his pocket." (_parl. paper_, [c. ], pp. , .) the supposed hostile squadron had, it seems, received express instructions "to attack any port in great britain." (see more fully in the writer's _studies in international law_, , p. .) the fifth letter was suggested by a russian protest against alleged japanese action in . the subsequent history of this controversy, some account of which will be found at the end of this section, has, it is submitted, established the correctness of the views maintained in it. naval atrocities sir,--i trust we may soon learn on authority whether or no the enemies of this country are conducting naval hostilities in accordance with the rules of civilised warfare. i read with indignation that the _spider_ has destroyed greenock; that she announced her intention of "blowing down" ardrossan; that she has been "shelling the fine marine residences and watering-places in the vale of clyde." can this be true, and was there really any ground for expecting that "a bombardment of the outside coast of the isle of wight" would take place last night? your obedient servant, t. e. holland. athenæum club, august ( ). the naval manoeuvres sir,--in a letter which i addressed to you on the th inst. i ventured to point out the discrepancy between the proceedings of certain vessels belonging to admiral tryon's fleet and the rules of civilised warfare. your correspondent on board her majesty's ship _ajax_ yesterday told us something of the opinion of the fleet as to the bombardment and ransoming of defenceless seaboard towns, going on to predict that, in a war in which england should be engaged, privateers would again be as plentiful as in the days of paul jones, and assuring us that in such a war "not the slightest respect would be paid to old-fashioned treaties, protocols, or other diplomatic documents." captain james appears, from his letter which you print to-day, to be of the same opinion as the fleet, with reference both to bombardments and to privateers; telling us also in plain language that "the talk about international law is all nonsense." two questions are thus raised which seem worthy of serious consideration. first, what are the rules of international law with reference to the bombardment of open towns from the sea (i leave out of consideration the better understood topic of privateering)? secondly, are future wars likely to be conducted without regard to international law? . i need hardly say that i do not, as captain james supposes, contend "that unfortified towns will never be bombarded or ransomed." international law has never prohibited, though it has attempted to restrict, the bombardment of such towns. even in our government defended the destruction of dieppe, havre, and calais only as a measure of retaliation, and in subsequent naval wars operations of this kind have been more and more carefully limited, till in the crimean war our cruisers were careful to abstain from doing further damage than was involved in the confiscation or destruction of stores of arms and provisions. the principles involved were carefully considered by the military delegates of all the states of europe at the brussels conference of , and their conclusions, which apply, i conceive, _mutatis mutandis_, to operations conducted by naval forces against places on land, are as follows:-- "article .--fortified places are alone liable to be besieged. towns, agglomerations of houses, or villages which are open or undefended cannot be attacked or bombarded." "article .--but if a town, &c., be defended, the commander of the attacking forces should, before commencing a bombardment, and except in the case of surprise, do all in his power to warn the authorities." "article .--as private property should be respected, the enemy will demand from parishes or the inhabitants only such payments and services as are connected with the necessities of war generally acknowledged, in proportion to the resources of the country." "article .--the enemy in levying contributions, whether as equivalents for taxes or for payments which should be made in kind, or as fines, will proceed, as far as possible, according to the rules of the distribution and assessment of the taxes in force in the occupied territory. contributions can be imposed only on the order and on the responsibility of the general in chief." "article .--requisitions shall be made only by the authority of the commandant of the locality occupied." these conclusions are substantially followed in the chapter on the "customs of war" contained in the _manual of military law_ issued for the use of officers by the british war office. the bombardment of an unfortified town would, i conceive, be lawful--( ) as a punishment for disloyal conduct; ( ) in extreme cases, as retaliation for disloyal conduct elsewhere; ( ) for the purpose of quelling armed resistance (not as a punishment for resistance when quelled); ( ) in case of refusal of reasonable supplies requisitioned, or of a reasonable money contribution in lieu of supplies. it would, i conceive, be unlawful--( ) for the purpose of enforcing a fancy contribution or ransom, such as we were told was exacted from liverpool; ( ) by way of wanton injury to private property, such as was supposed to have been caused in the clyde and at folkestone, and _a fortiori_ such as would have resulted from the anticipated shelling during the night-time of the south coast of the isle of wight. . is it the case that international law is "all nonsense," and that "when we are at war with an enemy he will do his best to injure us: he will do so in what way he thinks proper, all treaties and all so-called international law notwithstanding"? are we, with admiral aube, to speak of "cette monstrueuse association de mots: les droits de la guerre"? if so, _cadit quæstio_, and a vast amount of labour has been wasted during the last three centuries. i can only say that such a view of the future is not in accordance with the teachings of the past. the body of accepted usage, supplemented by special conventions, which is known as international law, has, as a matter of fact, exercised, even in time of war, a re staining influence on national conduct. this assertion might be illustrated from the discussions which have arisen during recent wars with reference to the geneva conventions to the treatment of the wounded and the st. petersburg declaration against the use of explosive bullets. the binding obligation of these instruments, which would doubtless be classed by your correspondent with the fleet among "old-fashioned treaties, protocols, and other diplomatic documents," has never been doubted, while each party has eagerly endeavoured to disprove alleged infractions of them. the naval manoeuvres have doubtless taught many lessons of practical seamanship. they will have done good service of another sort if they have brought to the attention of responsible statesmen such questions as those with which i have attempted to deal. it is essential that the country should know the precise extent of the risks to which our seaboard towns will be exposed in time of war, and it is desirable that our naval forces should be warned against any course of action, in their conduct of mimic warfare, which could be cited against us, in case we should ever have to complain of similar action on the part of a real enemy. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, august ( ). the naval manoeuvres sir,--in my first letter i called attention to certain operations of the _spider_ and her consorts which seemed to be inspired by no principle beyond that of doing unlimited mischief to the enemy's seaboard. in a second letter i endeavoured to distinguish between the mischief which would and that which would not be regarded as permissible in civilised warfare. the correspondence which has subsequently appeared in your columns has made sufficiently clear the opposition between the view which seems to find favour just now in naval circles and the principles of international law, as i have attempted to define them. the question between my critics and myself is, in effect, whether the mediæval or the modern view as to the treatment of private property is to prevail. according to the former, all such property is liable to be seized or destroyed, in default of a "brandschatz," or ransom. according to the latter, it is inviolable, subject only to certain well-defined exceptions, among which reasonable requisitions of supplies would be recognised, while demands of money contributions, as such, would not be recognised. the evidence in favour of the modern view being what i have stated it to be is, indeed, overwhelming; but i should like to call special attention to the _manuel de droit international à l'usage des officiers de l'armée de terre_, issued by the french government, as going even further than the brussels conference in the restrictions which it imposes upon the levying of requisitions and contributions. the duke of wellington, who used to be thought an authority in these matters, wrote in , with reference to a pamphlet in which the prince de joinville had advocated depredations on the english coasts:-- "what but the inordinate desire of popularity could have induced a man in his station to write and publish an invitation and provocation to war, to be carried on in a manner such as has been disclaimed by the civilised portions of mankind?" the naval historian, mr. younge, in commenting on the burning of paita, in chili, as far back as , for non-compliance with a demand for a money contribution (ultimately reduced to a requisition of provisions for the ships), speaks of it as "worthy only of the most lawless pirate or buccaneer, ... as a singular proof of how completely the principles of civilised warfare were conceived to be confined to europe." such exceptional acts as the burning of paita, or the bombardment of valparaiso, mentioned by mr. herries, will, of course, occur from time to time. my position is that they are so far stigmatised as barbarous by public opinion that their perpetration in civilised warfare may be regarded as improbable; in other words, that they are forbidden by international law. it is a further question whether the rules of international law on this point are to be changed or disregarded in future. do we expect, and are we desirous, that future wars shall be conducted in accordance with buccaneering precedent, or with what has hitherto been the general practice of the nineteenth century? your naval correspondents incline to revert to buccaneering and thus to the introduction into naval coast operations of a rigour long unknown to the operations of military forces on land; but they do so with a difference. lord charles beresford (writing early in the controversy) asserts the permissibility of ransoming and destroying, without any qualifying expressions; while admiral de horsey would apparently only ask "rich" towns for contributions, insisting also that a contribution must be "reasonable," and expressly repudiating any claim to do "wanton injury to property of poor communities, and still less to individuals." in the light of these concessions, i venture to claim admiral de horsey's concurrence in my condemnation of most of the doings mentioned in my first letter, although on the whole he ranges himself on the side of the advocates of what i maintain to be a change in the existing law of war. whether or no the existing law needs revision is a question for politicians and for military and naval experts. it is within my province only to express a hope that the contradiction between existing law and new military necessities (if, indeed, such contradiction exists) will not be solved by a repudiation of all law as "nonsense"; and, further, that, if a change of law is to be effected, it will be done with due deliberation and under a sense of responsibility. it should be remembered that operations conducted with the apparent approval of the highest naval authorities, and letters in _the times_ from distinguished admirals, are in truth the stuff that public opinion, and in particular that department of public opinion known as "international law," is made of. the ignorance, by the by, which certain of my critics have displayed of the nature and claims of international law is not a little surprising. some seem to identify it with treaties; others with "vattel." several, having become aware that it is not law of the kind which is enforced by a policeman or a county court bailiff, have hastened, much exhilarated, to give the world the benefit of their discovery. most of them are under the impression that it has been concocted by "bookworms," "jurists," "professors," or other "theorists," instead of, as is the fact, mainly by statesmen, diplomatists, prize courts, generals and admirals. this is, however, a wide field, into which i must not stray. i have even avoided the pleasant by-paths of disquisition on contraband, privateering, and the declaration of paris generally, into which some of your correspondents have courteously invited me. i fear we are as yet far from having disposed of the comparatively simple question as to the operations which may be properly undertaken by a naval squadron against an undefended seaboard. i am, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. llanfairfechan, august ( ). naval bombardments of unfortified places sir,--the protest reported to have been lodged by the russian government against the bombardment by the japanese fleet of a quarantine station on the island of san-shan-tao, apart from questions of fact, as to which we have as yet no reliable information, recalls attention to a question of international law of no slight importance--viz. under what, if any, circumstances it is permissible for a naval force to bombard an "open" coast town. in the first place, it may be hardly necessary to point out the irrelevancy of the reference, alleged to have been made in the russian note, to "article of the hague convention." the convention and the _règlement_ annexed to it are, of course, exclusively applicable to "la guerre sur terre." not only, however, would any mention of a naval bombardment have been out of place in that _règlement_, but a proposal to bring such action within the scope of its th article, which prohibits "the attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings which are not defended," was expressly negatived by the conference of the hague. it became abundantly clear, during the discussion of this proposal, that the only chance of an agreement being arrived at was that any allusion to maritime warfare should be carefully avoided. it was further ultimately admitted, even by the advocates of the proposal, that the considerations applicable to bombardments by an army and by a naval force respectively are not identical. it was, for instance, urged that an army has means other than those which may alone be available to a fleet for obtaining from an open town absolutely needful supplies. the hague conference, therefore, left the matter where it found it, recording, however, among its "pious wishes" (_voeux_) one to the effect "that the proposal to regulate the question of the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval force should be referred for examination to a future conference." the topic is not a new one. you, sir, allowed me to raise it in your columns with reference to the naval manoeuvres of , when a controversy ensued which disclosed the existence of a considerable amount of naval opinion in favour of practices which i ventured to think in contravention of international law. it was also thoroughly debated in at the venice meeting of the institut de droit international upon a report drafted by myself, as chairman of a committee appointed a year previously. this report lays down that the restrictions placed by international law upon bombardments on land apply also to those effected from the sea, except that such operations are lawful for a naval force when undertaken with a view to ( ) obtaining supplies of which it is in need; ( ) destroying munitions of war or warships which may be in a port; ( ) punishing, by way of reprisal, violations by the enemy of the laws of war. bombardments for the purpose of exacting a ransom or of putting pressure upon the hostile power by injury to peaceful individuals or their property were to be unlawful. the views of the committee were, in substance, adopted by the institut, with the omission only of the paragraph allowing bombardment by way of reprisals. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, april ( ). the "hague conference" and "hague convention" to which reference was made in the last of these letters were, of course, those of . for the action taken by the institut de droit international in and , on the initiative of the present writer, see the _annuaire de l'institut_, t. xiv p. , t. xv. pp. - , , ; and his _studies in international law_, pp. - . see also, at p. of the same work, an opinion given by him to the chevalier tindal as to the liability of the hague to be bombarded. the later growth of opinion has been in accordance with the views maintained by the writer of these letters, and with the _rapport_ drafted by him for the institut. the hague conference of , though unable to discuss the subject, had registered a _væu_ "that the proposal to regulate the question of the bombardment of ports, towns and villages by a naval force may be referred for examination to a future conference." see _parl. paper, miscell._ no. ( ), pp. , , , , , . at the conference of a convention, no. ix., was accordingly signed and generally ratified, notably by germany and great britain, art. of which prohibits "the bombardment by naval forces of ports towns, villages, houses, or buildings which are not defended," germany, france, great britain and japan dissenting from the second paragraph of this article, which explains that a place is not to be considered to be defended merely because it is protected by submarine contact-mines. bombardment is, however, permitted, by art. , of places which are, in fact, military or naval bases, and, by arts. and , of places which refuse to comply with reasonable requisitions for food needed by the fleet, though not for refusal of money contributions. the _acte final_ of the conference further registers a _væu_ that "the powers should, in all cases, apply, as far as possible, to war at sea the principles of the convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land." (_parl. paper, miscell._ no. ( ), p. .) this convention, no. iv. of , in art. of the _règlement_ annexed to it, lays down that "the attack or bombardment, by whatsoever means, of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings which are not defended is prohibited." the british government had, in , so far departed from the admiralty views of as to instruct their delegates to the conference of that year to the effect that "the government consider that the objection, on humanitarian grounds, to the bombardment of unfortified towns is too strong to justify a resort to that measure, even though it may be permissible under the abstract doctrines of international law [?]. they wish it, however, to be clearly understood that any general prohibition of such practice must not be held to apply to such operations as the bombardment of towns or places used as bases or storehouses of naval or military equipment or supply, or ports containing fighting ships, and that the landing of troops, or anything partaking of the character of a military or naval operation, is also not covered." it is hardly necessary to chronicle the indignation aroused by the raids upon undefended coast towns carried out by german cruisers during the war of , in violation of modern international law and notwithstanding the german ratification of convention no. ix. of . * * * * * section _belligerent reprisals_ reprisals sir,--the controversy as to the legitimacy of the recent attack on freiburg tends to stray into irrelevancies. if the attack was made upon barracks or troop trains no one would surely criticise what is of everyday occurrence, although not unlikely to cause incidentally death or injury to innocent persons. there seems, however, to be no reason for supposing that such military objects were in view, or that our aeroplanes were instructed to confine their activity, as far as possible, to the attainment of such objects. we must assume, for any useful discussion of the question raised, that the operation was deliberately intended to result in injury to the property and persons of civilian inhabitants, not, of course, by way of vengeance, but by way of reprisal--_i.e._ with the practical object of inducing the enemy to abstain in the future from his habitually practised illegal barbarities. such reprisals, as is to-day so well explained by your correspondent "jurist," are no violations of international law. objections might, of course, be made to them as unlikely to produce their hoped-for effect, or as repugnant to our feelings of humanity or honour. they are not illegal. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). reprisals sir,--if my friend sir edward clarke will glance again at my letter of monday, he will, i think, cease to be surprised that it contains no answer to his censure from an ethical standpoint of our treatment of freiburg. my object was merely to indicate the desirability of keeping the question whether acts of the kind are in violation of international law (which i answered in the negative) distinct from questions, which i catalogued, as to their practical inutility, with which some of your correspondents have occupied themselves, or their repugnancy to feelings of honour and humanity with which sir edward has dealt exclusively. any discussion of political expediency or of high morals would have been beside my purpose. it is curious that sir herbert stephen should to-day speak of my letter of the th as a defence of the aerial bombardment of freiburg. it neither attacked nor defended the bombardment, but, solely in the interests of clear thinking, indicated the desirability of keeping distinct the three points of view from which the topic may be regarded, viz.: ( ) of international law; ( ) of practical utility; ( ) of morality and honour. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). * * * * * section _peace_ undesirable peace talk sir,--there has been more than enough of premature discussion by groups of well-meaning amateurs, not unfrequently wirepulled by influences hostile to this country, with reference to the terms of the treaty of peace by which the world-war now raging will be brought to a close. movements of the kind have culminated in the action of a body rejoicing in the somewhat cumbrous title of the "international central organisation for a durable peace," which is inviting members of about fifty societies, of very varying degrees of competence, to a cosmopolitan meeting, to be held at berne in december next. lest the unwary should be beguiled into having anything to do with the plausible offer made to them that they should, there and then, assist in compiling "a scientific dossier, containing material that will be of vast importance to the diplomats who may be chosen to participate in the peace congress itself," it may be worth while to call attention to the composition of the executive committee by which the invitations are issued, and to its "minimum programme." of the members of this committee (of thirteen), on which great britain is represented only by mr. lowes dickenson (mistakenly described as a cambridge professor), and america only by mrs. andrews, of boston, the best known are professors lammasch, of vienna, and schücking, of marburg. the "minimum programme" demands, _inter alia_, "equal rights for all nations in the colonies, &c.," of the powers; submission of all disputes to "pacific procedure," joint action by the powers against any one of them resorting to military measures, rather than to such procedure; and that "the right of prize shall be abolished, and the freedom of the seas shall be guaranteed." the _provenance_ of this "minimum programme" is sufficiently obvious. what is likely to be the character of such a "maximum programme" as will doubtless be aimed at by the proposed gathering? i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, october ( ). chapter vii the rights and duties of neutrals section _the criterion of neutral conduct_ the main object of the first of the following letters was to assert, as against any possible misunderstanding of phraseology attributed to a great international lawyer (since lost to science and to his friends by his sudden death on june , ), the authority by which alone neutral rights and duties are defined. the letter also touches upon the limit of time which a neutral power is bound to place upon the stay in its ports of belligerent ships of war; a topic more fully discussed in section . professor de martens on the situation sir,--the name of my distinguished friend, m. de martens, carries so much weight that i hope you will allow me at once to say that i am convinced that to-day's telegraphic report of some communication made by him to the st. petersburg newspapers fails to convey an accurate account of the views which he has thus expressed. on matters of fact it would appear that he is no better informed than are most of us in this country; and under matters of fact may be included the breaches of neutrality which he is represented as counter-charging against the japanese. it is exclusively with the views on questions of law which are attributed to professor de martens that i am now concerned. he is unquestionably right in saying, as i pointed out in a recent letter, that the hard-and-fast rule, fixing hours as the limit, under ordinary circumstances, of the stay of a belligerent warship in neutral waters, is not yet universally accepted as a rule of international law; and, in particular, is not adopted by france. but what of the further _dictum_ attributed to professor de martens, to the effect that "each country is its own judge as regards the discharge of its duties as a neutral"? this statement would be a superfluous truism if it meant merely that each country, when neutral, must, in the first instance, decide for itself what courses of action are demanded from it under the circumstances. the words may, however, be read as meaning that the decision of the neutral country, as to the propriety of its conduct, is final, and not to be questioned by other powers. an assertion to this effect would obviously be the negation of the whole system of international law, of which professor de martens is so great a master, resting, as that system does, not on individual caprice, but upon the agreement of nations in restraint of the caprice of any one of them. the last word, with reference to the propriety of the conduct of any given state, rests, of course, not with that state; but with its neighbours. "securus indicat orbis terrarum." any power which fails in the discharge, to the best of its ability, of a generally recognised duty, is likely to find that self-satisfaction is no safeguard against unpleasant consequences. professor de martens would, i am certain, endorse this statement. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). neutrals and the laws of war sir,--the interesting address by sir edward carson reported in your issue of yesterday will remind many of us of our regret that president wilson, in notes complaining of injuries sustained by american citizens, dwelt so slightly upon the violations of international law by which those injuries were brought about. sir edward seems, however, to have made use of certain expressions which might be taken to imply a view of neutral responsibility which can hardly be accepted. the united states were warned in the address that they will not "by a mere note maintain the obligations which are put upon them, as parties to international law, which are to prevent breaches of civilisation and to mitigate the horrors of war." neutrals were spoken of as "the executives of international law," and as alone standing "behind the conventions" (for humanising warfare). "abolish," we were told, "the power of neutrals, and you have abolished international law itself." is this so? the contract into which a state enters with other states, by adopting the customary laws of war and by ratifying express conventions dealing with the same subject, obliges it, while remaining neutral, to submit to certain inconveniences resulting from the war, and, when belligerent, to abstain from certain modes of carrying on hostilities. it is assuredly no term of the contract that the state in question shall sit in judgment upon its co-contractors and forcibly intervene in _rebus inter alios actis_. its hands are absolutely free. it may remain a quiescent spectator of evil, or, if strong enough and indignant with the wrongdoing, may endeavour to abate the mischief by remonstrance, and, in the last resort, by taking sides against the offender. let us hope that at the present crisis the united states may see their way to choosing the better part. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). * * * * * section _the duties of neutral states, and the liabilities of neutral individuals, distinguished_ the duties of neutral states have been classified by the present writer under the heads, of "abstention," "prevention," and "acquiescence." (_transactions of the british academy_, vol. ii, p. ; reproduced in the _revue de droit international_, the _revista de derecho international_, and the _marine rundschau_.) in the three letters which follow, an attempt is made to point out the confusion which has resulted from failure to distinguish between the two last-mentioned heads of neutral duty; on the one hand, namely, the cases in which a neutral government is bound itself to come forward and take steps to prevent certain classes of action on the part of belligerents, or of its own subjects, e.g. the overstay in its ports of belligerent fleets, or the export from its shores of ships of war for belligerent use; and, on the other hand, the cases in which the neutral government is bound only to passively acquiesce in interference by belligerents with the commerce of such of its subjects as may choose, at their own risk and peril, to engage in carriage of contraband, breach of blockade, and the like. i. a neutral state is bound to prevent its territory from becoming, in any way, a "base of operations" for either belligerent. of the various obligations thus arising, the following letters deal with the duty of the state ( ) to prevent the departure from its ports of vessels carrying coal intended to supply directly the needs of a belligerent fleet; and ( ) to prevent the reception accorded in its ports to belligerent warships from being such as will unduly facilitate their subsequent operations. it is pointed out that the rule adopted by the united states and this country, as well as by some others, when neutral, by which the stay of belligerent warships is limited to twenty-four hours, has not been adopted by the nations of the european continent. the attempt made at the hague conference of to secure the general acceptance of this rule was unsuccessful; and convention no. xiii. of that year, not yet ratified by great britain, which deals with this subject, merely lays down, in art. , that "_in the absence of special provisions to the contrary in the legislation of a neutral power_, belligerent warships are not permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said power for more than twenty-four hours, except in the cases covered by this convention." art. obliges the contracting powers to "communicate to each other in due course all laws, proclamations, and other enactments, regulating in their respective countries the _status_ of belligerent warships in their ports laid waters." ii. a neutral state is not bound to prevent such assistance being rendered by its subjects to either belligerent as is involved in, e.g. blockade-running or carriage of contraband; but merely to acquiesce in the loss and inconvenience which may in consequence be inflicted by the belligerents upon persons so acting. in order to explain this statement, it became necessary to say much as to the true character of "carriage of contraband" (although this topic is more specifically dealt with in the letters contained in section ), and to point out that such carriage is neither a breach of international law nor forbidden by the law of england. for the same reason, it seemed desirable to criticise some of the clauses now usually inserted in british proclamations of neutrality. the view here maintained commended itself to the institut de droit international, at its cambridge and venice sessions, , , as against the efforts of mm kleen and brusa to impose on states a duty of preventing carriage of contraband by its subjects (_annuaire_, t. xiv. p. , t. xv. p. ). it has now received formal expression in the hague convention no. x. of , art. of which lays down that "a neutral power is _not_ bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet." contraband of war sir,--as a good deal of discussion is evidently about to take place as to the articles which may be properly treated as contraband of war, and, in particular, as to coal being properly so treated, i venture to think that it may be desirable to reduce this topic (a sufficiently large one) to its true dimensions by distinguishing it from other topics with which it is too liable to be confused. articles are "contraband of war" which a belligerent is justified in intercepting while in course of carriage to his enemy, although such carriage is being effected by a neutral vessel. whether any given article should be treated as contraband is, in the first instance, entirely a question for the belligerent government and its prize court. a neutral government has no right to complain, of hardships which may thus be incurred by vessels sailing under its flag, but is bound to acquiesce in the views maintained by the belligerent government and its courts, unless these views involve, in the language employed by lord granville in , "a flagrant violation of international law." this is the beginning and end of the doctrine of contraband. a neutral government has none other than this passive duty of acquiescence. its neutrality would not be compromised by the shipment from its shores, and the carriage by its merchantmen, of any quantity of cannon, rifles, and gunpowder. widely different from the above are the following three topics, into the consideration of which discussions upon contraband occasionally diverge:-- . the international duty of the neutral government not to allow its territory to become a base of belligerent operations: e.g. by the organisation on its shores of an expedition, such as that which in sailed from plymouth in the interest of dona maria; by the despatch from its harbours for belligerent use of anything so closely resembling an expedition as a fully equipped ship of war (as was argued in the case of the _alabama_); by the use of its ports by belligerent ships of war for the reception of munitions of war, or, except under strict limitations, for the renewal of their stock of coal; or by such an employment of its colliers as was alleged during the franco-prussian war to have implicated british merchantmen in the hostile operations of the french fleet in the north sea. the use of the term "contraband" with reference to the failure of a neutral state to prevent occurrences of this kind is purely misleading. . the powers conferred upon a government by legislation of restraining its subjects from intermeddling in a war in which the government takes no part. of such legislation our foreign enlistment act is a striking example. the large powers conferred by it have no commensurable relation to the duties which attach to the position of neutrality. its effect is to enable the government to prohibit and punish, from abundant caution, many acts on the part of its subjects for which it would incur no international liability. it does empower the government to prevent the use of its territory as a base: e.g. by aid directly rendered thence to a belligerent fleet; but it, of course, gives no right of interference with the export or carriage of articles which may be treated as contraband. . the powers conferred upon a government by such legislation as section of the customs consolidation act; , now reproduced in a later enactment, of forbidding at any time, by order in council, the export of articles useful in war. the power thus given has no relation to international duty, and is mainly intended to be exercised, in the way of self-protection, when great britain is, or is likely to be, engaged in war. the object of the enactment is to enable the government to retain in the country articles of which we may ourselves be in need, or to prevent them from reaching the hands of our enemies. the articles enumerated--e.g. arms, ammunition, marine engines, &c.--are, neither in the act of nor in the order in council of the following year, described as "contraband of war." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ). coal for the russian fleet sir,--the use of coal for belligerent purposes is, of course, of comparatively modern date, and it is hardly surprising to find that the mercantile community, as would appear from your marine insurance article of this morning, does not clearly distinguish between the different classes of questions to which such use may give rise. there is indeed a widely prevalent confusion, even in quarters which ought to be better informed, between two topics which it is essential to keep separate--viz. the shipment of contraband, and the use of neutral territory as a base for belligerent operations. a neutral government (our own at the present moment) occupies a very different position with reference to these two classes of acts. with reference to the former, its international duty (as also its national policy) is merely one of acquiescence. it is bound to stand aside, and make no claim to protect from the recognised consequences of their acts such of its subjects as are engaged in carriage of contraband. so far as the neutral government is concerned, its subjects may carry even cannon and gunpowder to a belligerent port, while the belligerent, on the other hand, who is injured by the trade may take all necessary stops to suppress it. such is the compromise which long experience has shown to be both reasonable and expedient between the, in themselves irreconcilable, claims of neutral and belligerent states. so far, it has remained unshaken by the arguments of theorists, such as the swedish diplomatist m. kleen, who would impose upon neutral governments the duty of preventing the export of contraband by their subjects. a british trader may, therefore, at his own proper risk, despatch as many thousand tons of coal as he chooses, just as he may despatch any quantity of rifles or bayonets, to vladivostok or to nagasaki. it by no means follows that british shipowners may charter their vessels "for such purposes as following the russian fleet with coal supplies." lord lansdowne's recent letter to messrs. woods, tylor, and brown is explicit to the effect that such conduct is "not permissible." lord lansdowne naturally confined himself to answering the question which had been addressed by those gentlemen to the foreign office; but the reason for his answer is not far to seek. the unlawfulness of chartering british vessels for the purpose above mentioned is wholly unconnected with the doctrine of contraband, but is a consequence of the international duty, which if incumbent on every neutral state, of seeing that its territory is not made a base of belligerent operations. the question was thoroughly threshed out as long ago as , when mr. gladstone said in the house of commons that the government had adopted the opinion of the law officers: "that if colliers are chartered for the purpose of attending the fleet of a belligerent and supplying it with coal, to enable it to pursue its hostile operations, such colliers would, to all practical purposes, become store-ships to the fleet, and would be liable, if within reach, to the operation of the english law under the (old) foreign enlistment act." british colliers attendant on a russian fleet would be so undeniably aiding and abetting the operations of that fleet as to give just cause of complaint against us to the government of japan. the british shipper of coal to a belligerent fleet at sea, besides thus laying his government open to a charge of neglect of an international duty, lays himself open to criminal proceedings under the foreign enlistment act of . by section ( ) and ( ) of that act "any person within h.m. dominions" who (subject to certain exceptions) equips or despatches any ship, with intent, or knowledge, that the same will be employed in the military or naval service of a foreign state, at war with any friendly state, is liable to fine or imprisonment, and to the forfeiture of the ship. by section , "naval service" covers "user as a store-ship," and "equipping" covers furnishing a ship with "stores or any other thing which is used in or about a ship for the purpose of adapting her for naval service." our government has, therefore, ample powers for restraining, in this respect, the use of its territory as a base. it has no power, had it the wish (except for its own protection, under a different statute), to restrain the export of contraband of war. it would tend to clearness of thought if the term "contraband" were never employed in discussions with reference to prohibition of the supply of coal to a belligerent fleet at sea. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). german war material for turkey sir,--the _cologne gazette_ rightly treats as incredible the rumour, mentioned by your sofia correspondent, that a trainload of munitions of war had been despatched by the german government for the use of turkey, while admitting that such a consignment may very likely have been forwarded from private german workshops. it has long been settled international law that a neutral government, while, on the one hand, it is precluded from itself supplying munitions to a belligerent, is, on the other hand, not bound to prevent private individuals from so acting. the latter half of this rule has now received written expression in art. of the hague convention no. v. of , which deals with "neutral powers and persons in war on land." the only fault to be found with the paragraph in the _cologne gazette_ quoted by your berlin correspondent, supposing it to be correctly transcribed, would be that it seems to imply that the above-mentioned art. legitimatises the supply of war material to belligerents by "neutral states." it is, however, obvious from the rest of the paragraph that the _gazette_ is not really under that impression. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). * * * * * section _neutrality proclamations_ the criticisms directed against the proclamation of , in the first two letters which follow, have produced some improvement in proclamations of later date. see the last two letters of this section. see also appendix a in f.e. smith and n.w. sibley's _international law in the russo-chinese war_ ( ), devoted to a consideration of those criticisms. the british proclamation of neutrality sir,--you were good enough to insert in your issue of november some observations which i had addressed to you upon the essential difference between carriage of contraband, which takes place at the risk of the neutral shipowner, and use of neutral territory as a base for belligerent operations, an act which may implicate the neutral power internationally, while also rendering the shipper liable to penal proceedings on the part of his own government. i am gratified, to find that the views thus expressed by me are in exact accordance with those set forth by lord lansdowne in his reply of november to the chamber of shipping of the united kingdom. perhaps you will allow me to say something further upon the same subject, suggested by several letters which appear in your paper of this morning. i am especially desirous of emphasising the proposition that carriage of contraband is no offence, either against international law or against the law of england. . the rule of international law upon the subject may, i think, be expressed as follows: "a belligerent is entitled to capture a neutral ship engaged in carrying contraband of war to his enemy, to confiscate the contraband cargo, and, in some cases, to confiscate the ship also, without thereby giving to, the power to whose subjects the property in question belongs any ground for complaint." or, to vary the phrase, "a neutral power is bound to acquiesce in losses inflicted by a belligerent upon such of its subjects as are engaged in adding to the military resources of the enemy of that belligerent." this is the rule to which the nations have consented, as a compromise between the right of the neutral state that its subjects should carry on their trade without interruption, and the right of the belligerent state to prevent that trade from bringing an accession of strength to his enemy. international law here, as always, deals with relations between states, and has nothing to do with the contraband trader, except in so far as it deprives him of the protection of his government. if authority were needed for what is here advanced, it might be found in mr. justice story's judgment in the _santissima trinidad_, in president pierce's message of , and in the statement by the french government in , with reference to the case of the _fram_, that "the neutral state is not required to prevent the sending of arms and ammunition by its subjects." . neither is carriage of contraband any offence against the law of england; as may be learnt, by any one who is in doubt as to the statement, from the lucid language of lord westbury in _ex parte chavasse_ ( l.j., bkry., ). and this brings me to the gist of this letter. i have long thought that the form of the proclamation of neutrality now in use in this country much needs reconsideration and redrafting. the clauses of the proclamation which are set out by mr. gibson bowles in your issue of this morning rightly announce that every person engaging in breach of blockade or carriage of contraband "will be justly liable to hostile capture and to the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that behalf, and will in no wise obtain protection from us against such capture or such penalties." so far, so good. but the proclamation also speaks of such acts as those just mentioned as being done "in contempt of this our royal proclamation, in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral power in a war between other powers, or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf." it proceeds to say that all persons "who may misconduct themselves in the premises ... will incur our high displeasure for such misconduct." i venture to submit that all these last-quoted phrases are of the nature of misleading rhetoric, and should be eliminated from a statement the effective purport of which is to warn british subjects of the treatment to which certain courses of conduct will expose them at the hands of belligerents, and to inform them that the british government will not protect them against such treatment. the reason why our government will abstain from interference is, not that such courses of action are offences either against international or english law, but that it has no right to so interfere; having become a party to a rule of international law, under which a neutral government waives the right, which it would otherwise possess, to protect the trade of its subjects from molestation. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). the british proclamation of neutrality sir,--enquiries which have reached me with reference to the observations which i recently addressed to you upon the british proclamation of neutrality induce me to think that some account of the development of the text of the proclamation now in use may be of interest to your readers. the proclamations with which i am acquainted conform to one or other of two main types, each of which has its history. . the earlier proclamations merely call attention to the english law against enlistments, &c., for foreign service; and command obedience to the law, upon pain of the penalties thereby inflicted, "and of his majesty's high displeasure." in the proclamation of , the tacit reference is doubtless to certain acts of george ii, which, having been passed for a very different purpose, and having proved inadequate in their new application, were repealed by the foreign enlistment act of . this is the act to which reference is made in the proclamations of and ; in the former of which we first get a recital of neutrality; while in the latter the clause enjoining all subjects strictly to observe the duties of neutrality and to respect the exercise of belligerent rights first makes its appearance. . the proclamation of is of a very different character, bearing traces of the influence of the ideas which had inspired the action of president washington in . while carrying on the old, it presents several new features. british subjects are enjoined to abstain from violating, not only "the laws and statutes of the realm," but also (for the first time) "the law of nations." they are also (for the first time) warned that, if any of them "shall presume, in contempt of this our royal proclamation, and of our high displeasure, to do any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral sovereign, ... or in violation of the law of nations, ... as, more especially," by breach of blockade, or carriage of contraband, &c., they will "rightfully incur, and be justly liable to, hostile capture, and to the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that behalf"; and notice is (for the first time) given that those "who may misconduct themselves in the premises will do so at their peril, and of their own wrong; and that they will in no wise obtain any protection from us against such capture, or such penalties as aforesaid, but will, on the contrary, incur our high displeasure by such misconduct." the proclamations of and february and march complicate matters, by making the warning clause as to blockade and contraband apply also to the statutory offences of enlistment, &c.; but the proclamation of june, , gets rid of this complication by returning to the formula of , which has been also followed in , , , and in the present year. the formula as it now stands, after the process of growth already described, may be said to consist of seven parts--viz. ( ) a recital of neutrality; ( ) a command to subjects to observe a strict neutrality, and to abstain from contravention of the laws of the realm or the law of nations in relation thereto; ( ) a recital of the foreign enlistment act of ; ( ) a command that the statute be obeyed, upon pain of the penalties thereby imposed, "and of our high displeasure"; ( ) a warning to observe the duties of neutrality, and to respect the exercise of belligerent rights; ( ) a further warning to those who, in contempt of the proclamation "and of our high displeasure," may do any acts "in derogation of neutral duty, or in violation of the law of nations," especially by breach of blockade, carriage of contraband, &c., that they will be liable to capture "and to the penalties denounced by the law of nations"; ( ) a notification that persons so misconducting themselves "will in no wise obtain any protection from us," but will, "on the contrary, incur our high displeasure by such misconduct." the question which i have ventured to raise is whether the _textus receptus_, built up, as it has been, by successive accretions, is sufficiently in accordance with the facts to which it purports to call the attention of british subjects to be properly submitted to his majesty for signature. i would suggest for consideration: . whether the phrases commanding obedience, on pain of his majesty's "high displeasure," and the term "misconduct," should not be used only with reference to offences recognised as such by the law of england. . whether such condensed, and therefore incorrect, though very commonly employed, expressions as imply that breach of blockade and carriage of contraband are "in violation of the law of nations," and are liable to "the penalties denounced by the law of nations," should not be replaced by expressions more scientifically correct. the law of nations neither prohibits the acts in question nor prescribes penalties to be incurred by the doers of them. what it really does is to define the measures to which a belligerent may resort for the suppression of such acts, without laying himself open to remonstrance from the neutral government to which the traders implicated owe allegiance. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). the british proclamation of neutrality sir,--i am glad that mr. gibson bowles has called attention to certain respects in which the proclamation of neutrality issued by our government on the rd of the present month differs from that issued on february , . in two letters addressed to you with reference to the proclamation of that year, i ventured to point out what appeared to me to be its defects, alike from a scientific and from a practical point of view. the present proclamation has slightly minimised these defects, but, as a whole, remains open to the objections which i then raised. i have no wish to repeat in detail the contents of my letters of , especially as they may be now found in my _letters upon war and neutrality_, published in , pp. and , but am unwilling not to take this opportunity once more to urge the desirability of redrafting the document in question. the proclamation just issued still answers to my description of that of , as consisting of seven parts--viz.: ( ) a recital of neutrality; ( ) a command to subjects to observe a strict neutrality, and to abstain from contravention of the laws of the realm or the law of nations in relation thereto; ( ) a recital of the foreign enlistment act, ; ( ) a command that the statute be obeyed, upon pain of the penalties thereby imposed, and of "our high displeasure"; ( ) a warning to observe the duties of neutrality and to respect the exercise of belligerent rights; ( ) a further warning that any persons presuming, in contempt of the proclamation, to do acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral power, or of the law of nations, will incur the penalties denounced by such law; ( ) a notice that persons so misconducting themselves will obtain no protection from their sovereign. with the phraseology of no. , reciting british neutrality, and nos. - , dealing with the duties of british subjects under the foreign enlistment act of , and constituting the bulk of the proclamation, little serious fault can be found. it is well that such persons should be warned of the penalties which they may incur, including the royal displeasure. the remaining two clauses relate, however, to matters of a totally different character from those previously mentioned, and care should therefore have been taken, but has not been taken, to make this perfectly clear. i would further remark upon these clauses: ( ) that i agree with mr. bowles in regretting the omission here of the specific mention made in of "breach of blockade," "carriage of contraband," &c., as specimens of the acts undoubtedly contemplated in these two clauses; ( ) that it is a mistake to describe acts of this kind as being in derogation of "the duty of subjects of a neutral power," or "in violation of the law of nations," or as "liable to the penalties denounced by such law." carriage of contraband, and acts of the same class, are notoriously not condemned by english law, neither are they, in any proper sense, breaches of the law of nations, which, speaking scientifically, never deals with individuals, as such, but only with the rights and duties of states _inter se_. what the law of nations really does is, as i said in , "to define the measures to which a belligerent may resort for the suppression of such acts, without laying himself open to remonstrance from the neutral government to which the traders implicated owe allegiance"; ( ) that on the other hand, i am glad to find that, in accordance with my suggestion, while it continues very properly to be stated that persons doing the acts under discussion "will in no wise obtain any protection from us against such capture, &c.," the further statement that such persons "will, on the contrary, incur our high displeasure by such misconduct," has now been with equal propriety omitted. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. the athenæum, october ( ). the proclamation of neutrality sir,--may i be allowed to point out that two questions arise upon the recent british proclamation of neutrality which were not, as they should have been, in the house of commons last night, kept entirely distinct? the government has surely done right in now omitting, as i suggested in , with reference to certain classes of acts which are prohibited neither by english nor by international law, a phrase announcing that the doers of them would incur the king's "high displeasure"; while retaining the warning that doers of such acts must be prepared for consequences from which their own government will not attempt to shield them. on the other hand, our government has surely erred in not specifying, as in previous proclamations, the sort of acts to which this warning relates--viz., to acts such as carriage of contraband, enemy service, and breach of blockade, which differ wholly in character from those violations of the foreign enlistment act against which the bulk of the proclamation is directed. as the proclamation now stands, no clear transition is marked between breaches of english law and the unspecified acts which, though perfectly legal, will forfeit for the doers of them any claim to british protection from the consequences involved. traders are left to find out as best they may the meaning of the general words "any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral power." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, october ( ). * * * * * section _neutral hospitality_ the hague convention of , no. xiii., not yet ratified by great britain, suggests in art. , with reference to the question here raised, that "à défaut d'autres dispositions spéciales de la législation de la puissance neutre, il est interdit aux navires de guerre des belligérants de demeurer dans les ports et rades ou dans les eaux territoriales de la dite puissance pendant plus de heures sauf dans les cas prévues par la présente convention." belligerent fleets in neutral waters sir,--a novel question as to belligerent responsibilities would be suggested for solution if, as seems to be reported in paris, admiral rozhdestvensky over-stayed his welcome in the waters of madagascar, although ordered to leave them by his own government in compliance with "pressing representations" on the part of the government of france. a much larger question is, however, involved in the discussion which has arisen as to the alleged neglect by france to prevent the use of her cochin-chinese waters by the russians as a base of operations against japan. we are as yet in the dark as to what is actually occurring in those waters, and are, perhaps, for that very reason in a better position for endeavouring to ascertain what are the obligations imposed on a neutral in such a case by international law. it is admitted on all hands that a neutral power is bound not to permit the "asylum" which she may grant to ships of war to be so abused as to render her waters a "base of operations" for the belligerent to which those ships belong. beyond this, international law speaks at present with an uncertain voice, leaving to each power to resort to such measures in detail as may be necessary to ensure the due performance of a duty which, as expressed in general terms, is universally recognised. the rule enforced since by great britain for this purpose limits the stay of a belligerent warship, under ordinary circumstances, to a period of twenty-four hours; and the same provision will be found in the neutrality proclamations issued last year by, e.g. the united states, egypt, china, denmark, sweden and norway. so by japan and russia in . this rule, convenient and reasonable as it is, is not yet a rule of international law; as lord percy has had occasion to point out, in replying to a question addressed to him in the house of commons. the proclamations of most of the continental powers do not commit their respective governments to any period of time, and the material clauses of the french circular, to which most attention will be directed at the present time, merely provide as follows:-- "( ) en aucun cas, un belligérant ne peut faire usage d'un port français, ou appartenant à un État protégé, dans un but de guerre, &c. ( ) la durée du séjour dans nos ports de belligérants, non accompagnés d'une prise, n'a été limitée par aucune disposition spéciale; mais pour être autorisés à y séjourner, ils sont tenus de se conformer aux conditions ordinaires de la neutralité, qui peuvent se résumer ainsi qu'il suit:--(_a_) ... (_b_) les dits navires ne peuvent, _à l'aide de ressources puisées à terre_, augmenter leur matériel de guerre, renforcer leurs équipages, ni faire des enrôlements volontaires, même parmi leurs nationaux. (_c_) ils doivent s'abstenir de toute enquête sur les forces, l'emplacement ou les ressources de leurs ennemis, ne pas appareiller brusquement pour poursuivre ceux qui leur seraient signalés; en un mot, s'abstenir de faire du lieu de leur résidence la base d'une opération quelconque contre l'ennemi. ( ) il ne peut être fourni à un belligérant que les vivres, denrées, et moyens de réparations nécessaires à la subsistence de son équipage ou à la sécurité de sa navigation." under the twenty-four hours rule, the duty of the neutral government is clear. under the french rules, all must evidently turn upon the wisdom and _bonne volonté_ of the officials on the spot, and of the home government, so far as it is in touch with them. we have no reason to suppose that the qualities in question will not characterise the conduct of the french at the present moment. there can, however, be no doubt that a better definition of the mode in which a neutral power should prevent abusive use of the asylum afforded by its ports and waters is urgently required. the point is one which must prominently engage the attention of the special conference upon the rights and duties of neutrals, for which a wish was expressed by the hague conference of , and, more recently, by president roosevelt. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, april ( ). the appam sir,--it is satisfactory to learn that the united states neutrality board has decided adversely to the contention that the _appam_ is a german ship of war. her treatment as a prize would then, _prima facie_, seem to be governed by art. of the hague convention, no. xiii., which provides for her being released, together with her officers and crew, while the prize crew is to be interned. this convention has been duly ratified both by germany and by the united states. its non-ratification by great britain is, i conceive, irrelevant. but germany contends that the situation is governed by art. , the text of which has been several times set out in your columns, of the old convention of . this may startle those who are acquainted with what occurred at the hague in , and i have seen no reference to what must be the gist of the german argument on the point. they no doubt argue that the old convention remains unrepealed by no. xiii. of the hague, because the latter convention is of no effect, in pursuance of its common form art. , to the effect that:--"the provisions of the present convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention" (which is by no means the case). your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). certain reservations on ratification do not affect arts. or . the state department ruled that the case did not fall within the protecting clauses of the treaty of , which granted asylum only to ships of war accompanying prizes, whereas the _appam_ was herself a prize. proceedings by the owners in the local federal court for possession of the ship resulted in a decision in their favour, against which the germans are appealing in the supreme court. they do not seem to have raised the objection, mentioned in the letter, as to the applicability of convention viii. * * * * * section _carriage of contraband. (absolute and conditional contraband: continuous voyages: unqualified captors: the declaration of london)_ the letters included in the preceding sections and touched incidentally upon carriage of contraband, in relation to other departments of the law affecting neutrals. the eight letters which follow, suggested respectively by the spanish-american, the boer, and the russo-japanese wars, deal exclusively with this topic, which seems likely to be henceforth governed no longer only by customary and judge-made law, but largely also by written rules, such as those suggested by the unratified declaration of london of . (_absolute and conditional contraband_) the divergence which has so long existed between anglo-american and continental views upon contraband was very noticeable at the commencement of the war of , which gave occasion to the letter which immediately follows. while the spanish decree of april set out only one list of contraband goods, the united states instructions of june recognised two lists--viz. of "absolute" and of "conditional" contraband, including under the latter head "coal when destined for a naval station, a port of call, or a ship or ships of the enemy; materials for the construction of railways or telegraphs, and money, when such materials or money are destined for an enemy's forces, provisions, when destined for an enemy's ship or ships, for a place besieged." an answer was thus supplied to the question suggested in this letter, as to articles _ancipitis usus_. contraband of war sir,--i fear that the mercantile community will hardly profit so much as the managers of the atlas steamship company seem to expect by the information contained in their letter which you print this morning. it was, indeed, unlikely that the courteous reply of the assistant secretary of state at washington to the enquiry addressed to him by the new york agents of the company would contain a declaration of the policy of the united states with reference to contraband of war. the threefold classification of "merchandise" (not of "contraband") quoted in the reply occurs, in the judgment of the supreme court in the well-known case of the _peterhoff_ ( wallace, ), but it is substantially that of grotius, and has long been accepted in this country and in the united states, while the continent is, generally speaking, inclined to deny the existence of "contraband by accident," and to recognise only such a restricted list of contraband as was contained in the spanish decree of april last. the questions upon which shippers are really desirous of information (which they are, however, perhaps not likely to obtain, otherwise than from decisions of prize courts) are of a less elementary character. they would like to know what articles _ancipitis usus_ ("used for purposes of war or peace according to circumstances") will be treated by the united states as contraband, and with what penalty the carriage of such articles will be visited--_i.e._ whether by confiscation or merely by pre-emption. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). the four letters which next follow also relate to the two classes of contraband goods, with especial reference to the character attributed to foodstuffs, coal and cotton. on foodstuffs, see the _report of the royal commission on the supply of food, &c., in time of war_, . _cf._ also _infra._, pp. , , . they were placed by the unratified declaration of london, art. , in the class of conditional contraband; as is also coal. by art. of the declaration, raw cotton was enumerated among the articles which cannot be declared contraband of war. the suggestion in the letter of february , , that certain words quoted from the japanese instructions had been mistransmitted or misquoted was borne out by the regulations governing captures at sea, issued on march , , art. of which announces that certain goods are contraband "in case they are destined to the enemy's army or navy, or in case they are destined to the enemy's territory, and from the landing place it can be inferred that they are intended for military purposes." the letters of march and , , will sufficiently explain themselves. the accuracy of the statements contained in them was vouched for by baron suyematsu, in a letter which appeared in _the times_ for march , to the effect that: "in japan the matters relating to the organisation and procedure of the prize court, and the matters relating to prize, contraband goods, &c., are regulated by two separate sets of laws.... the so-called prize court law of august , , and amendment dated march , , which your correspondent refers to, are the provisions relating to the former matters. the rules regulating the latter matters--viz. prize, contraband goods, &c., are not comprised in them. the rules which relate to the latter matters, as existing at present, are consolidated and comprised in an enactment which was issued on march , .... under the circumstances i can only repeat what professor holland says ... in other words, i fully concur with the views taken by the professor." the distinction between articles which are "absolutely contraband," those which are "conditionally contraband," and those which are incapable of being declared contraband was expressly adopted in arts. , , and of the unratified declaration of london of , as to which, see the comment at the end of this section, as also the whole of section . is coal contraband of war? sir,--this question has now been answered, in unmistakable terms, on behalf of this country by lord lansdowne in his reply, which you printed yesterday, to messrs. powley, thomas, and co., and on behalf of japan by the proclamation which appears in _the times_ of to-day. both of these documents set forth the old british doctrine, now fully adopted in the united states, and beginning to win its way on the continent of europe, that, besides articles which are absolutely contraband, other articles _ancipitis usus_, and amongst them coal, may become so under certain conditions. "when destined," says lord lansdowne, "for warlike as opposed to industrial use." "when destined," says japan, "for the enemy's army or navy, or in such cases where, _being goods arriving, at enemy's territory_, there is reason to believe that they are intended for use of enemy's army or navy." i may say that the words which i have italicised must, i think, have been mistranslated or mistransmitted. their intention is, doubtless, substantially that which was more clearly expressed in the japanese proclamation of by the words: "either the enemy's fleet at sea or a hostile port used exclusively or mainly for naval or military equipment." a phrase in your issue of to-day with reference to the cardiff coal trade suggests that it may be worth while to touch upon the existence of a widely-spread confusion between the grounds on which export of coal may be prohibited by a neutral country and those which justify its confiscation, although on board a neutral ship, by a belligerent. a neutral state restrains, under certain circumstances, the export of coal, not because coal is contraband, but because such export is converting the neutral territory into a base of belligerent operations. the question of contraband or no contraband only arises between the neutral carrier and the belligerent when the latter claims to be entitled to interfere with the trade of the former. since the rules applicable to the carriage of coal are, i venture to think, equally applicable, to the carriage of foodstuffs, i may perhaps be allowed to add a few words with reference to the letter addressed to you a day or two ago by sir henry bliss. i share his desire for some explanation of the telegram which reached you on the th of this month from british columbia. one would like to know: ( ) what is "the government," if any, which has instructed the empress line not to forward foodstuffs to japan; ( ) whether the refusal relates to foodstuffs generally, or only to those with a destination for warlike use; ( ) what is meant by the statement that "the steamers of the empress line belong to the naval reserve"? i presume the meaning to be that the line is subsidised with a view to the employment of the ships of the company as british cruisers when great britain is at war. the bearing of this fact upon the employment of the ships when great britain is at peace is far from apparent. it is, of course, possible that the government contract with the company may have been so drawn, _ex abundanti cautela_, as greatly to restrict what would otherwise have been the legitimate trade of the company. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). cotton as contraband of war sir,--the text of the decision of the court of appeal at st. petersburg in the case of the _calchas_ has at length reached this country, and we are thus informed, upon the highest authority, though, perhaps, not in the clearest language, of the meaning which is now to be placed upon the russian notification that cotton is contraband of war. this notification, promulgated on april , , was received with general amazement, not diminished by an official gloss to the effect that it "applied only to raw cotton suitable for the manufacture of explosives, and not to yarn or tissues." it must be remembered that at the date mentioned, and for some months afterwards, russia stoutly maintained that all the articles enumerated in her list of contraband of february , , and in the additions to that list, were "absolutely" such; _i.e._ were confiscable if in course of carriage to any enemy's port, irrespectively of the character of that port, or of the use to which the articles would probably be put. it was only after much correspondence, and the receipt of strong protests from great britain and the united states, that russia consented to recognise the well-known distinction between "absolute" and "conditional" contraband; the latter class consisting of articles useful in peace as well as for war, the character of which must, therefore, depend upon whether they are, in point of fact, destined for warlike or for peaceful uses. this concession was made about the middle of september last, and it was then agreed that provisions should be placed in the secondary category (as was duly explained in the petersburg judgment in the case of the _arabia_ on december ) together with some other articles, among which it seemed that raw cotton was not included. the final decision in the _calchas_ case marks a welcome change of policy. cotton has now followed foodstuffs into the category of "conditional" contraband, and effect has so far been given to the representations on the subject made by mr. hay in circular despatches of june and august , , and by sir charles hardinge, in a note presented to count lamsdorff on october of the same year. the question had become a practical one in the case of the _calchas_. on july this vessel, laden with, _inter alia_, nine tons of raw cotton for yokohama and kobe, was seized by a russian cruiser and carried into vladivostok, where, on september , the cotton, together with other portions of her cargo, was condemned as absolutely contraband. the reasons for repudiating this decision, and the notification to which it gave effect, were not far to seek, and it may still be worth while to insist upon them. as against russia, it is well to recall that, from the days of the armed neutralities onwards, her traditional policy has been to favour a very restricted list of contraband; that when in , as again in and , she included in it materials "servant de faire sauter les obstacles," the examples given of such materials were things so immediately fitted for warlike use as "les mines, les torpilles, la dynamite," &c.; and that what is said as to "conditional contraband" by her trusted adviser, professor de martens, in his _droit international_, t. iii ( ), pp. - , can scarcely be reconciled with her recent action. but a still stronger argument against the inclusion of cotton in the list of "absolute" contraband is that this is wholly without precedent. it has, indeed, been alleged that cotton was declared to be "contraband" by the united states in their civil war. the federal proclamations will, however, be searched in vain for anything of the kind. the mistake is due to an occasional loose employment of the term, as descriptive of articles found by an invader in an enemy's territory, which, although the property of private, and even neutral, individuals, happen to be so useful for the purposes of the war as to be justly confiscated. that this was so will appear from an attentive reading of the case of _mrs. alexander's cotton_, in ( wallace, ), and of the arguments in the claim made by messrs. maza and larrache against the united states in (foreign relations of u.s., ). a similarly loose use of the term was its application by general b.f. butler to runaway slaves who had been employed on military works--an application of which he confessed himself "never very proud as a lawyer," though "as an executive officer, much comforted with it." the phrase caught the popular fancy, came to be applied to slaves generally, and was immortalised in a song, long a favourite among negro children, the refrain of which was "i'se a happy little contraband." the decision of the court of st. petersburg in the case of the _calchas_, so far as it recognises the existence of a conditional class of contraband, and that raw cotton, as _res ancipitis usus_, must be treated in accordance with the rules applicable to goods belonging to that class, has laid down an unimpeachable proposition of law. whether the view taken by the court of the facts of the case, so far as they relate to the cotton cargo, is equally satisfactory, is a different and less important question, upon which i refrain from troubling you upon the present occasion. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. p.s.--it may be worth while to add, for the benefit of those only who care to be provided with a clue (not to be found in the judgment) through the somewhat labyrinthine details of the question under discussion, a summary of its history. the russian rules as to contraband are contained in several documents--viz. the "regulations as to naval prize" of , arts. - ; the "admiralty instructions" of , arts. , , and the appended "special declaration" as to the articles considered to be contraband (partly modelled on the list of ); the "imperial order" of february , , rule (this order keeps alive the rules of and , except in so far as they are varied by it); the "order" of march , , defining "food" and bringing machinery of certain kinds into the list of contraband; the "order," of april , , bringing "raw cotton" into the list; and, lastly, the "instructions" of september and october , , recognising, in effect, a class of "conditional" contraband, placing foodstuffs in this class, as also, ultimately, other objects "capable of warlike use and not specified in sections - of rule ." t. e. h. temple, july ( ). cotton as contraband sir,--your correspondent "judex" will rejoice, as i do, that cotton has now been declared to be "absolute contraband." may i, however, suggest that the topic should be discussed without any reference to the fortunately unratified declaration of london, that premature attempt to codify the law of maritime warfare, claiming, misleadingly, that its rules "correspond in substance with the generally recognised principles of international law"? it is surely regrettable that, by the order in council of august , , our government adopted the provisions of the declaration "during the present hostilities," and "subject to various additions and modifications," the list of which has since been considerably extended. this half-hearted course of action painfully recalls certain vicious methods of legislation by reference, and was additionally uncalled for, since, as has been shown by recent events, about two-thirds of the rules laid down by the declaration are inapplicable to modern warfare. the straightforward announcement made by the united states in their note of january is surely far preferable. it states in plain terms that, "as the declaration of london is not in force, the rules of international law only apply. as to articles to be regarded as contraband there is no general agreement between nations." in point of fact, the hard-and-fast categories of neutral imports, suggested by the threefold grotian division, as set forth in the declaration, are unlikely ever to be generally accepted. even grotius is careful to limit his proposals, and bynkershoek, in commenting upon them, points out that the test of contraband of the most noxious kind must be the, possibly exceptional, importance of objects for hostile use; their being of use also for non-hostile purposes being immaterial ("nec interesse an et extra bellum usum praebeant"). the application of these remarks to the case of cotton is sufficiently obvious. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, august ( ). japanese prize law sir,--i hope you will allow me space for a few words with reference to some statements occurring to-day in your marine insurance news which i venture to think are of a misleading character. your correspondent observes that-- "although the japanese are signatories to the treaty of paris, it should not be forgotten that they haw a prize court law of their own (august , ), and are more likely to follow its provisions, in dealing with the various captured steamers, than the general principles of the treaty of paris." upon this paragraph let me remark:-- . the action of the japanese is in full accordance with the letter and spirit of all four articles of the declaration of paris. ("the treaty of paris" has, of course, no bearing upon prize law.) . "the general principles" of that declaration is a phrase which conveys to me, i confess, no meaning. . the japanese have, of course, a prize law of their own, borrowed, for the most part, from our own admiralty manual of prize law. neither the british nor the japanese instructions are in conflict with, or indeed stand in any relation to, the declaration of paris. . the existing prize law of japan was promulgated on march , , not on august , . your correspondent goes on to say that the japanese definition of contraband "is almost as sweeping as was the russian definition, to which the british government took active objection last summer." so far is this from being the case that the japanese list is practically the same as our own, both systems recognising the distinction between "absolute" and "conditional" contraband, which, till the other day, was ignored by russia. the japanese rules as to the cases in which ships carrying contraband may be confiscated are quite reasonable and in accordance with british views. the third ground for confiscation mentioned by your correspondent does not occur in the instructions of . ships violating a blockade are, of course, confiscable; but the japanese do not, as your correspondent seems to have been informed, make the existence of a blockade conditional upon its having been "notified to the consuls of all states in the blockaded port." commanders are, no doubt, instructed to notify the fact, "as far as possible, to the competent authorities and the consuls of the neutral powers within the circumference of the blockade"; but that is a very different thing. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. the athenæum, march ( ). japanese prize law sir,--let me assure your correspondent upon marine insurance that i have been familiar, ever since its promulgation, with the japanese prize law of , quoted by him as authority for statements made in your issue of march , the misleading character of which i felt bound to point out in a letter of the same date. all the topics mentioned by him on that occasion, and to-day, are, however, regulated, not by that law, but by notifications and instructions issued from time to time during . i make it my business not only to be authoritatively informed on such matters, but also to see that my information is up to date. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ). _(continuous voyages)_ the opinion expressed in the letter which immediately follows, that the american decisions, applying to carriage of contraband the doctrine of "continuous voyages," seem to be "demanded by the conditions of modern commerce, and might well be followed by a british prize court," was referred to by lord salisbury in a despatch of january , , to be communicated to count von bülow, with reference to the seizure of _bundesrath_. _parl. papers_, africa, no. ( ), p. . the distinction, drawn in the same letter, between "carriage of contraband" and "enemy service," which has sometimes been lost sight of, was established in the case of _yangtsze insurance association_ v. _indemnity mutual marine company_, [ ] k.b. , in which it was held by bigham, j., that the transport of military officers of a belligerent state, as passengers in a neutral ship, is not a breach or a warranty against contraband of war in a policy of marine insurance. the carriage of enemy despatches will no longer be generally treated as "enemy service" since the hague convention, no. xi. of , ratified by most of the powers, including great britain, on november , , by art. provides that, except in the case of breach of blockade, "the postal correspondence of neutrals or _belligerents_, whether of _an official_ or a private character, found on board a _neutral_ or enemy ship on the high seas is inviolable." the case of the _allanton_, which gave occasion for the letter of july , , was as follows. this british ship left cardiff on february of that year, with a cargo of coal to be delivered either at hong-kong or sasebo. on arrival at hong-kong, she found orders to deliver at sasebo, and, having made delivery accordingly, was chartered by a japanese company at another japanese port, to carry coal to a british firm at singapore. on her way thither, she was captured by a russian squadron and taken in to vladivostok, where on june she was condemned by the prize court for carriage of contraband. the court held, ignoring the rule that a vessel ceases to be _in dilecto_ when she has "deposited" her contraband (since affirmed by art. of the declaration of london of ), that she was liable in respect of her voyage to sasebo; as also in respect of the voyage on which she was captured, on the ground that her real destination was at that time the japanese fleet, or some japanese port. this decision was reversed, as to both ship and cargo, by the court of appeal at st. petersburg, on october of the same year. the doctrine of "continuous voyages" was by the declaration of london, art. , recognised in the case of "absolute," but by art. was stated to be inapplicable to the case of "conditional" contraband. prize law sir,--questions of maritime international law which are likely to give rise not only to forensic argument in the prize courts which we have established at durban and at the cape, but also to diplomatic communications between great britain and neutral governments, should obviously be handled just now with a large measure of reserve. lord rosebery has, however, in your columns called upon our government to define its policy with reference to foodstuffs as contraband of war, while several other correspondents have touched upon, cognate topics. you may perhaps therefore be disposed to allow one who is responsible for the _admiralty manual of the law of prize_, to which reference has been made by your correspondent "s.," to make a few statements as to points upon which it may be desirable for the general reader to be in possession of information accurate, one may venture to hope, as far as it goes. of the four inconveniences to which neutral trading vessels are liable in time of war, "blockade" may be left out of present consideration. you can only blockade the ports of your enemy, and the south african republics have no port of their own. the three other inconveniences must, however, all be endured--viz. prohibition to carry "contraband," prohibition to engage in "enemy service," and liability to be "visited and searched" anywhere except within three miles of a neutral coast, in order that it may be ascertained whether they are disregarding either of these prohibitions, as to the meaning of which some explanation may not be superfluous. . "carriage of contraband" implies ( ) that the goods carried are fit for hostile use; ( ) that they are on their way to a hostile destination. each of these requirements has given rise to wide divergence of views and to a considerable literature. as to ( ), while continental opinion and practice favour a hard-and-fast list of contraband articles, comprising only such as are already suited, or can readily be adapted, for use in operations of war, english and american opinion and practice favour a longer list, and one capable of being from time to time extended to meet the special exigencies of the war. in such a list may figure even provisions, "under circumstances arising out of the particular situation of the war," especially if "going with a highly probable destination to military use"--lord stowell in the _jonge margaretha_ ( rob. ); _cf._ story, j., in the _commercen_ ( wheat. ), the date and purport of which are, by the by, incorrectly given by "s." it would be in accordance with our own previous practice and with lord granville's despatches during the war between france and china in , if we treated flour as contraband only when ear-marked as destined for the use of enemy fleets, armies, or fortresses. even in such cases our practice has been not to confiscate the cargo, but merely to exercise over it a right of "pre-emption," so as to deprive the enemy of its use without doing more injury than can be helped to neutral trade--as is explained by lord stowell in the _haabet_ ( rob. ). as to ( ), the rule was expressed by lord stowell to be that "goods going to a neutral port cannot come under the description of contraband, all goods going there being equally lawful"--_imina_ ( rob. ); but innovations were made upon this rule during the american civil war which seem to be demanded by the conditions of modern commerce, and might well be followed by a british prize court. it was held that contraband goods, although _bona fide_ on their way to a neutral port, might be condemned, if intended afterwards to reach the enemy by another ship or even by means of land carriage--_bermuda_ ( wallace); _peterhoff_ ( wallace). a consignment to lorenzo marques, connected as is the town by only forty miles of railway with the transvaal frontier, would seem to be well within the principles of the civil war cases as to "continuous voyages." . the carriage by a neutral ship of enemy troops, or of even a few military officers, as also of enemy despatches, is an "enemy service" of so important a kind as to involve the confiscation of the vessel concerned, a penalty which, under ordinary circumstances, is not imposed upon carriage of "contraband" property so called. see lord stowell's luminous judgments in _orozembo_ ( rob. ) and _atalanta_ (_ib._ ). the alleged offence of the ship _bundesrath_ would seem to be of this description. the questions, both of "contraband" and of "enemy service," with which our prize courts must before long have to deal, will be such as to demand from the judges a competent knowledge of the law of prize, scrupulous fairness towards neutral claimants, and prompt penetration of the protean disguises which illicit trade so readily assumes in time of war. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, january ( ). the _allanton_ _(continuous voyage)_ sir,--i venture to think that the letter which you print this morning from my friend dr. baty, with reference to the steamship _allanton_, calls for a word of warning; unless, indeed, it is to be taken as merely expressing the private opinion of the writer as to what would be a desirable rule of law. it would be disastrous if shipowners and insurers were to assume, that a neutral vessel, if destined for a neutral port, is necessarily safe from capture. words at any rate capable of this construction may, no doubt, be quoted from one of lord stowell's judgments, now more than a century old; but many things have happened, notably the invention of railways, since the days of that great judge. the united states cases, decided in the sixties (as dr. baty thinks, "on a demonstrably false analogy"), in which certain ships were held to be engaged in the carriage of contraband, although their destination was a neutral port, were substantially approved of by great britain. their principle wast adopted by italy, in the _doelwijk_, in , and was supported by great britain in the correspondence upon this subject which took place with germany in . it was endorsed, after prolonged discussion, by the institut de droit international in . i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, july ( ). _(unqualified captors)_ among the objections raised by the british government to the capture by the russian ship _peterburg_ in the red sea, on july , , of the p. and o. ss. _malacca_, for carriage of contraband were ( ) that the so-called contraband consisted of government ammunition for the use of the british fleet in chinese waters; and ( ) what was more serious, that the capturing vessel, which belonged to the russian volunteer fleet, after issuing from the black sea under the commercial flag had subsequently, and without touching at any russian port, brought up guns from her hold, and had proceeded to exercise belligerent rights under the russian naval flag. in consequence of the protest of the british government, and to close the incident, the _malacca_ was released at algiers, after a purely formal examination, on july , and russia agreed to instruct the officers of her volunteer fleet not to make any similar captures. the question of the legitimacy of the transformation on the high seas into a ship-of-war of a vessel which has previously been sailing under the commercial flag was much discussed at the hague conference of , but without result. opinions were so much divided upon the point, that no mention of it is made in convention no. vii. of that year, ratified by great britain on november , , "as to the transformation of merchant vessels into ships-of-war." at the session of the institut de droit international held at oxford in , this question was discussed, and rules relating to it will be found in section of the _manuel des lois de la guerre maritime_, the drafting of which occupied the whole of the session. the _allanton_ _(unqualified captors)_ sir,--the indignation caused by the treatment of the _allanton_ is natural, and will almost certainly prove to be well founded; but mr. rae, in the letter which you print this morning, overstates a good case. he asks that, "whatever steps are taken for the release of the _malacca_, equally strong steps should be taken for the release of the _allanton_"; and he can see no difference between the cases of the two ships, except that the former is owned by a powerful company in the habit of carrying british mails, while the latter is his private property. one would have supposed it to be notorious that the facts which distinguish the one case from the other are, first, that the capture of the _malacca_ was effected by a vessel not entitled to exercise belligerent rights; and, secondly, that great britain is prepared to claim the incriminated cargo as belonging to the british government. capture by an unqualified cruiser is so sufficient a ground for a claim of restoration and compensation that, except perhaps as facilitating the retreat of russia from a false position, it would seem, to say the least, superfluous to pray in aid any other reason for the cancellation of an act unlawful _ab initio._ i have not noticed any statement as to the actual constitution of the prize court concerned in the condemnation of the _allanton._ under rule of the russian naval regulations of , a "port prize court" must, for a decree of confiscation, consist of six members, of whom three must be officials of the ministries of marine, justice, and foreign affairs respectively. an "admirals' prize court," for the same purpose, need consist of only four members, all of whom are naval officers. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, july ( ). _(note upon the declaration of london)_ the british delegates to the hague conference of were instructed that h.m. government "are ready and willing for their part, in lieu of endeavouring to frame new and more satisfactory rules for the prevention of contraband trade in the future, to abandon the principle of contraband of war altogether, thus allowing the oversea trade in neutral vessels between belligerents on the one hand and neutrals on the other, to continue during war without any restriction," except with reference to blockades. this proposal, fortunately, was not accepted by the conference, which was unable even to agree upon lists of contraband articles, and recommended that the question should be further considered by the governments concerned, _parl. paper, miscell._ no. ( ), p. . this task was accordingly among those undertaken at the conference of maritime powers held in london in - , which resulted in a declaration, arts. - of which constituted a fairly complete code of the law of contraband. reference has already been made, in comments upon letters comprised in previous sections, to this declaration, the demerits and history of which are more fully dealt with in section , _infra_, pp. - . * * * * * section _methods of warfare as affecting neutrals_ _(mines)_ on the views expressed in the first of the two letters which follow, as also in the writer's british academy paper on _neutral duties_, as translated in the _marine rundschau_, see professor von martitz of berlin, in the _transactions_ of the international law association, . the institut de droit international has for some years past had under its consideration questions relating to mines, and has arrived at conclusions which will be found in its _annuaire_, t. xxi. p. , t. xxii. p. , t xxiii. p. , t. xxiv. pp. , . the topic has also been dealt with in the hague convention, no. viii. of , ratified with a reservation, by great britain on november , . by art. it is forbidden "( ) to lay unanchored automatic-contact mines, unless they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after he who has laid them has lost control over them; ( ) to lay anchored automatic-contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings; ( ) to employ torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark." by art. , (which is, however, not accepted by france or germany) it is forbidden "to lay automatic-contact mines off the coast and ports of an enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation." mines in the open sea sir,--the question raised in your columns by admiral do horsey with reference to facts as to which we are as yet imperfectly informed, well illustrates the perpetually recurring conflict between belligerent and neutral interests. they are, of course, irreconcilable, and the rights of the respective parties can be defined only by way of compromise. it is beyond doubt that the theoretically absolute right of neutral ships, whether public or private, to pursue their ordinary routes over the high sea in time of war, is limited by the right of the belligerents to fight on those seas a naval battle, the scene of which can be approached by such ships only at their proper risk and peril. in such a case the neutral has ample warning of the danger to which he would be exposed did he not alter his intended course. it would, however, be an entirely different affair if he should find himself implicated in belligerent war risks, of the existence of which it was impossible for him to be informed, while pursuing his lawful business in waters over which no nation pretends to exercise jurisdiction. it is certain that no international usage sanctions the employment by one belligerent against the other of mines, or other secret contrivances, which would, without notice, render dangerous the navigation of the high seas. no belligerent has ever asserted a right to do anything of the kind; and it may be in the recollection of your readers that strong disapproval was expressed of a design, erroneously attributed to the united states a few years since, of effecting the blockade of certain cuban ports by torpedoes, instead of by a cruising squadron. these, it was pointed out, would superadd to the risk of capture and confiscation, to which a blockade-runner is admittedly liable, the novel penalty of total destruction of the ship and all on board. it may be worth while to add, as bearing upon the question under discussion, that there is a tendency in expert opinion towards allowing the line between "territorial waters" and the "high seas" to be drawn at a considerably greater distance than the old measurement of three miles from the shore. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). territorial waters sir,--most authorities would, i think, agree with admiral de horsey that the line between "territorial waters" and "the high sea" is drawn by international law, if drawn by it anywhere, at a distance of three miles from low-water mark. in the first place, the ridiculously wide claims made, on behalf of certain states, by mediæval jurists were cut down by grotius to so much water as can be controlled from the land. the grotian formula was then worked out by bynkershoek with reference to the range of cannon; and, finally, this somewhat variable test was before the end of the eighteenth century, as we may see from the judgments of lord stowell, superseded by the hard-and-fast rule of the three-mile limit, which has since received ample recognition in treaties, legislation, and judicial decisions. the subordinate question, also touched upon by the admiral, of the character to be attributed to bays, the entrance to which exceeds six miles in breadth, presents more difficulty than that relating to strictly coastal waters. i will only say that the privy council, in _the direct u.s. cable co._ v. _anglo-american telegraph co._ (l.r. app. ca. ), carefully avoided giving an opinion as to the international law applicable to such bays, but decided the case before them, which had arisen with reference to the bay of conception, in newfoundland, on the narrow ground that, as a british court, they were bound by certain assertions of jurisdiction made in british acts of parliament. the three-mile distance has, no doubt, become inadequate in consequence of the increased range of modern cannon, but no other can be substituted for it without express agreement of the powers. one can hardly admit the view which has been maintained, e.g. by professor de martens, that the distance shifts automatically in accordance with improvements in artillery. the whole matter might well be included among the questions relating to the rights and duties of neutrals, for the consideration of which by a conference, to be called at an early date, a wish was recorded by the hague conference, of . in the meantime it may be worth while to call attention to the view of the subject taken by a specially qualified and representative body of international experts. the institut de droit international, after discussions and enquiries which had lasted for several years, adopted, at their paris meeting in , the following resolutions, as a statement of what, in the opinion of the institut, would be reasonable rules with reference to territorial waters (i cite only those bearing upon the extent of such waters):-- "art. .--la mer territoriale s'étend à six milles marins ( au degré de latitude) de la laisse de basse marée sur tout l'étendue des côtes. art. .--pour les baies, la mer territoriale suit les sinuosités de la côte, sauf qu'elle mesurée à partir d'une ligne droite tirée en travers de la baie, dans la partie la plus rapprochée de l'ouverture vers la mer, où l'écart entre les deux côtes de la baie est de douze milles marins de largeur, à moins qu'un usage continu et séculaire n'ait consacré une largeur plus grande. art. .--en cas de guerre, l'état riverain neutre a le droit de fixer, par la déclaration de neutralité, ou par notification spéciale, sa zone neutre au dela de six milles, jusqu'à portée du canon des côtes. art. .--tous les navires sans distinction ont le droit de passage inoffensif par la mer territoriale, sauf le droit des belligérants de règlementer et, dans un but de défense, de barrer le passage dans la dite mer pour tout navire, et sauf le droit de neutres de règlementer le passage dans la dite mer pour les navires de guerre de toutes nationalités." (_annuaire de l'institut_, t. xiii. p. ). i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, june ( ). a french decree, of october , , accordingly extends, when france is neutral, her territorial waters to a distance of six miles ( kilom.) from low-water mark. _(cable-cutting)_ with the letters which follow, compare the article by the present writer on "les cables sous-marins en temps de guerre," in the _journal de droit international privé_, , p. . the topic of cable-cutting, as to which the institut de droit international arrived in at the conclusions set out in the first of these letters, was again taken into consideration by the institut in : see the _annuaire_ for that year, pp. - . the hague convention; no. iv. of , provides, in art. , that "submarine cables connecting occupied territory with a neutral territory shall not be destroyed or seized, unless in case of absolute necessity. they must be restored, and compensation must be arranged for them at the peace." convention no. v., by art. , forbids belligerents ( ) to install on neutral territory a radio-telegraphic station, or any other apparatus, for communicating with their land or sea forces; ( ) to employ such apparatus, established by them there before the war, for purely military purposes. by art. , a neutral power is bound to permit nothing of the sort. submarine cables sir,--the possibility of giving some legal protection to submarine cables has been carefully considered by the institut de droit international. a committee was appointed in to consider the subject, and the presentation of its report to the meeting at brussels in was followed by an interesting discussion (see the _annuaire de l'institut_, - , pp. - ). the conclusions ultimately adopted by the institut were as follows:-- " . it would be very useful if the various states would come to an understanding to declare that destruction of, or injury to, submarine cables in the high seas is an offence under the law of nations, and to fix precisely the wrongful character of the acts, and the appropriate penalties. with reference to the last-mentioned point, the degree of uniformity attainable must depend on the amount of difference between systems of criminal legislation. the right of arresting offenders, or those presumed to be such, might be given to the public vessels of all nations, under conditions regulated by treaties, but the right to try them should be reserved to the national courts of the vessel arrested. " . a submarine-telegraph cable uniting two neutral territories is inviolable. it is desirable that, when telegraphic communication must be interrupted in consequence of war, a belligerent should confine himself to such measures as are absolutely necessary to prevent the cable from being used, and that such measures should be discontinued, or that any damage caused by them, should be repaired as soon as the cessation of hostilities may permit." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). submarine cables in time of war sir,--i venture to think that the question which has been raised as to the legitimacy of cable-cutting is not so insoluble as most of the allusions to it might lead one to suppose. it is true that no light is thrown upon it by the convention of , which relates exclusively to time of peace, and was indeed signed by lord lyons, on behalf of great britain, only with an express reservation to that effect. nor are we helped by the case to which attention was called in your columns some time since by messrs. eyre and spottiswoode. their allusion was doubtless to the _international_ (l.r. a. and e. ), which is irrelevant to the present enquiry. the question is a new one, but, though covered by no precedent, i cannot doubt that it is covered by certain well-established principles of international law, which, it is hardly necessary to remark, is no cut-and-dried system but a body of rules founded upon, and moving with, the public opinion of nations. that branch of international law which deals with the relations of neutrals and belligerents is, of course, a compromise between what grotius calls the "belli rigor" and the "commerciorum libertas." the terms of the compromise, originally suggested partly by equity, partly by national interest, have been varied and re-defined, from time to time, with reference to the same considerations. it is perhaps reasonable that, in settling these terms, preponderant weight should have been given to the requirements of belligerents, engaged possibly in a life-and-death struggle. "ius commerciorum æquum est," says gentili; "at hoc æquius, tuendæ salutis." there is accordingly no doubt that in land warfare a belligerent may not only interrupt communications by road, railway, post, or telegraph without giving any ground of complaint to neutrals who may be thereby inconvenienced, but may also lay hands on such neutral property--shipping, railway carriages, or telegraphic plant--as may be essential to the conduct of his operations, making use of and even destroying it, subject only to a duty to compensate the owners. this he does in pursuance of the well-known "droit d'angarie," an extreme application of which occurred in , when certain british colliers were sunk in the seine by the prussians in order to prevent the passage of french gunboats up the river. count bismarck undertook that the owners of the ships should be indemnified, and lord granville did not press for anything further. such action, if it took place outside of belligerent territory, would not be tolerated for a moment. the application of these principles to the case of submarine cables would appear to be, to a certain point at any rate, perfectly clear. telegraphic communication with the outside world may well be as important to a state engaged in warfare as similar means of communication between one point and another within its own territory. just as an invader would without scruple interrupt messages, and even destroy telegraphic plant, on land, so may he thus act within the enemy's territorial waters, or, perhaps, even so far from shore as he could reasonably place a blockading squadron. it may be objected that a belligerent has no right to prevent the access of neutral ships to unblockaded portions of the enemy's coast on the ground that by carrying diplomatic agents or despatches they are keeping up the communications of his enemy with neutral governments. but this indulgence rests on the presumption that such official communications are "innocent," a presumption obviously inapplicable to telegraphic messages indiscriminately received in the course of business. it would seem, therefore, to be as reasonable as it is in accordance with analogy, that a belligerent should be allowed, within the territorial waters of his enemy, to cut a cable, even though it may be neutral property, of which the _terminus ad quem_ is enemy territory, subject only to a liability to indemnify the neutral owners. the cutting, elsewhere than in the enemy's waters, of a cable connecting enemy with neutral territory receives no countenance from international law. still less permissible would be the cutting of a cable connecting two neutral ports, although messages may pass through it which, by previous and subsequent stages of transmission, may be useful to the enemy. your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). submarine cables in time of war sir,--will you allow me to refer in a few words to the interesting letters upon the subject of submarine cables which have been addressed to you by mr. parsoné and mr. charles bright? in asserting that "the question as to the legitimacy of cable-cutting is covered by no precedent," i had no intention of denying that belligerent interference with cables had ever occurred. international precedents are made by diplomatic action (or deliberate inaction) with reference to facts, not by those facts themselves. to the best of my belief no case of cable-cutting has ever been made matter of diplomatic representation, and i understand mr. parsoné to admit that no claim in respect of damage to cables was presented to the mixed commission appointed under the convention of between great britain and chile. in the course of his able address upon "belligerents and neutrals," reported in your issue of this morning, i observe that mr. macdonell suggests that the institut de droit international might usefully study the question of cables in time of war. it may, therefore, be well to state that this service hat already been rendered. the institut, at its paris meeting in , appointed a committee, of which m. renault was chairman, to consider the whole subject of the protection of cables, both in peace and in war; and at its brussels meeting, in , carefully discussed the exhaustive report of its committee and voted certain "conclusions," notably the following:-- "le câble télégraphique sous-marin qui unit deux territoires neutres est inviolable. "il est à désirer, quand les communications télégraphiques doivent cesser par suite de l'état de guerre, que l'on se borne aux mesures strictement nécessaires pour empêcher l'usage du cable, et qu'il soit mis fin à ces mesures, ou que l'on en répare les consequences, aussitôt que le permettra la cessation des hostilités." it was in no small measure due to the initiative of the institut that diplomatic conferences were held at paris, which in produced a draft convention for the protection of cables, not restricted in its operation to time of peace; and in the actual convention, which is so restricted. it may not be generally known that in , before the difficulties of the subject were thoroughly appreciated, a convention was signed, though it never became operative, by which brazil, hayti, italy, and portugal undertook to recognise the "neutrality" in time of war of a cable to be laid by one balestrini. so, in , the united states were desirous of concluding a general convention which should assimilate the destruction of cables in the high seas to piracy, and should continue to be in force in time of war. the brussels conference of avoided any mention of "câbles sous-marins." the moral of all that has been written upon this subject is obviously that drawn by mr. charles bright--viz. "the urgent necessity of a system of cables connecting the british empire by direct and independent means--_i.e._ without touching on foreign soil." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, june ( ). * * * * * section _destruction of neutral prizes_ a british ship, the _knight commander_, bound from new york to yokohama and kobe, was stopped on july , , by a russian cruiser, and as her cargo consisted largely of railway material, was considered to be engaged in carriage of contraband. her crew and papers were taken on board the cruiser, and she was sent to the bottom by fire from its guns. the reasons officially given for this proceeding were that: "the proximity of the enemy's port, the lack of coal on board the vessel to enable her to be taken into a russian port, and the impossibility of supplying her with coal from one of the russian cruisers, owing to the high seas running at the time, obliged the commander of the russian cruiser to sink her." the russian regulations as to naval prize, art. , allowed a commander "in exceptional cases, when the preservation of a captured vessel appears impossible on account of her bad condition or entire worthlessness, the danger of her recapture by the enemy, or the great distance or blockade of ports, or else on account of danger threatening the ship which has made the capture, or the success of her operations," to burn or sink the prize. the japanese regulations, art. , were to the same effect in cases where the prize ( ) cannot be navigated owing to her being unseaworthy, or to dangerous seas; ( ) is likely to be recaptured by the enemy; ( ) cannot be navigated without depriving the ship-of-war of officers and men required for her own safety. the case of the _knight commander_ was the subject of comment, on the th of the same month, in both houses of parliament. in the house of lords, lord lansdowne spoke of what had occurred as "a very serious breach of international law," "an outrage," against which it had been considered "a duty to lodge a strong protest." in the house of commons, mr. balfour described it as "entirely contrary to the accepted practice of civilised nations." similar language was used in parliament on august , when mr. gibson bowles alluded to my letter of the th, in a way which gave occasion for that of the th. the _knight commander_ was condemned by the prize court at vladivostok on august , , and the sentence was confirmed on december , , by the court of appeal at st. petersburg, which found it "impossible to agree that the destruction of a neutral vessel is contrary to the principles of international law." the russian government remained firm on the point, and in declined to submit the case to arbitration. the institut de droit international in its _code des prises maritimes_, voted in , art. (not, be it observed, professing to state the law as it is, but as it should be), had taken a view in accordance with that maintained by the british government (_annuaire_ for , t. ix. p. ; _cf. ib._ pp. , ). (the _manuel des lois de la guerre maritime_, voted at oxford in , dealing exclusively with "les rapports entre les belligérants," does not deal with the topic in question.) it was, however, the opinion of the present writer, as will appear from the following letters, that no rule of international law, by which the sinking of even neutral prizes was absolutely prohibited, could be shown to exist. he had previously touched upon this question in his evidence before the royal commission on the supply of food, &c., in time of war, on november, , , and returned to it later in his paper upon "the duties of neutrals," read to the british academy on april , , _transactions_, ii. p. . it was reproduced in french, german, belgian, and spanish periodicals, and was cited in the judgment of the st. petersburg court of appeal in the case of the _knight commander._ the subsequent history of the question, and, in particular, of the rules suggested in arts. - of the unratified declaration of london, may be claimed in favour of the correctness of the opinion maintained in the letters. russian prize law sir,--the neutral powers have serious ground of complaint as to the mode in which russia is conducting operations at sea. it may, however, be doubted whether public opinion is sufficiently well informed to be capable of estimating the comparative gravity of the acts which are just now attracting attention. putting aside for the moment questions arising out of the straits convention of , as belonging to a somewhat different order of ideas, we may take it that the topics most needing careful consideration relate to removal of contraband from the ship that is carrying it without taking her in for adjudication; interference with mail steamers and their mail bags; perversely wrong decisions of prize courts; confiscation of ships as well as of their contraband cargo; destruction of prizes at sea; the list of contraband. of these topics, the two last mentioned are probably the most important, and on each of these i will ask you to allow me to say a few words. . there is no doubt that by the russian regulations of , art. ; and instructions of , art. , officers are empowered to destroy their prizes at sea, no distinction being drawn between neutral and enemy property, under such exceptional circumstances as the bad condition or small value of the prize, risk of recapture, distance from a russian port, danger to the imperial cruiser or to the success of her operations. the instructions of , it may be added, explain that an officer "incurs no responsibility whatever" for so acting if the captured vessel is really liable to confiscation and the special circumstances imperatively demand her destruction. it is fair to say that not dissimilar, though less stringent, instructions were issued by france in and by the united states in ; also that, although the french instructions expressly contemplate "l'établissement des indemnités à attribuer aux neutres," a french prize court in refused compensation to neutral owners for the loss of their property on board of enemy ships burnt at sea. the question, however, remains whether such regulations are in accordance with the rules of international law. the statement of these rules by lord stowell, who speaks of them as "clear in principle and established in practice," may, i think, be summarised as follows: an enemy's ship, after her crew has been placed in safety, may be destroyed. where there is any ground for believing that the ship, or any part of her cargo, is neutral property, such action is justifiable only in cases of "the gravest importance to the captor's own state," after securing the ship's papers and subject to the right of neutral owners to receive fall compensation (_actaeon_, dods. ; _felicity, ib._ ; substantially followed by dr. lushington in the _leucade_, spinks, ). it is not the case, as is alleged by the _novoe vremya_, that any british regulations "contain the same provisions as the russian" on this subject. on the contrary, the admiralty manual of allows destruction of enemy vessels only; and goes so far in the direction of liberality as to order the release, without ransom, of a neutral prize which either from its condition, or from lack of a prize crew, cannot be sent in for adjudication. the japanese instructions of permit the destruction of only enemy vessels; and art. of the carefully debated "code des prises" of the institut de droit international is to the same effect. it may be worth while to add that the eminent russian jurist, m. de martens, in his book on international law, published some twenty years ago, in mentioning that the distance of her ports from the scenes of naval operations often obliges russia to sink her prizes, so that "ce qui les lois maritimes de tous les états considèrent comme un moyen auquel il n'y a lieu de recourir qu'à la dernière extrémité, se transformera nécessairement pour nous en règle normale," foresaw that "cette mesure d'un caractère général soulévera indubitablement contre notre pays un mécontentement universel." . a far more important question is, i venture to think, raised by the russian list of contraband, sweeping, as it does, into the category of "absolutely contraband" articles things such as provisions and coal, to which a contraband character, in any sense of the term, has usually been denied on the continent, while great britain and the united states have admitted them into the category of "conditional" contraband, only when shown to be suitable and destined for the armed forces of the enemy, or for the relief of a place besieged. still more unwarrantable is the russian claim to interfere with the trade in raw cotton. her prohibition of this trade is wholly unprecedented, for the treatment of cotton during the american civil war will be found on examination to have no bearing on the question under consideration. i touch to-day upon this large subject only to express a hope that our government, in concert, if possible, with other neutral governments, has communicated to that of russia, with reference to its list of prohibited articles, a protest in language as unmistakable as that employed by our foreign office in ; "i regret to have to inform you, m. l'ambassadeur," wrote lord granville, "that her majesty's government feel compelled to take exception to the proposed measure, as they cannot admit that, consistently with the law and practice of nations, and with the rights of neutrals, provisions in general can be treated as contraband of war." a timely warning that a claim is inadmissible is surely preferable to waiting till bad feeling has been aroused by the concrete application of an objectionable doctrine. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, august i ( ). russian prize law sir,--from this hilltop i observe that, in the debate of thursday last, mr. gibson bowles, alluding to a letter of mine which appeared in your issue of august , complained that i "had not given the proper reference" to lord stowell's judgments. mr. bowles seems to be unaware that in referring to a decided case the page mentioned is, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, invariably that on which the report of the case commences. i may perhaps also be allowed to say that he, in my opinion, misapprehends the effect of the passage quoted by him from the _felicity_, which decides only that, whatever may be the justification for the destruction of a neutral prize, the neutral owner is entitled, as against the captor, to full compensation for the loss thereby sustained. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. eggishorn, valais, suisse, august ( ). russian prize law sir,--mr. gibson bowles has, i find, addressed to you a letter in which he attempts to controvert two statements of mine by the simple expedient of omitting essential portions of each of them. . mr. bowles having revealed himself as unaware that the mode in which i had cited a group of cases upon destruction of prizes was the correct mode, i thought it well to provide him with the rudimentary information that, "in referring to a decided case, the page, mentioned is, _in the absence of any indication to the contrary_, invariably that on which the report of the case commences." he replies that he has found appended to a citation of a passage in a judgment the page in which this passage occurs. may i refer him, for an explanation of this phenomenon, to the words (now italicised) omitted in his quotation of my statement? it is, of course, common enough, when the reference is obviously not to the case as a whole but to an extract from it, thus to give a clue to the extract, the formula then employed being frequently "_at_ page so-and-so." . i had summarised the effect, as i conceive it, of the group of cases above mentioned in the following terms: "such action is justifiable only in cases of the gravest importance to the captor's own state, _after securing the ship's papers, and subject to the right of the neutral owners to receive full compensation_." here, again, while purporting to quote me, mr. bowles omits the all-important words now italicised. i am, however, maltreated in good company. mr. bowles represents lord stowell as holding that destruction of neutral property cannot be justified, even in cases of the gravest importance to the captor's own state. what lord stowell actually says, in the very passage quoted by mr. bowles, is that "to the neutral can only be justified, under any such circumstances, by a full restitution in value." i would, suggest that mr. bowles should find an opportunity for reading _in extenso_ the reports of the _actaeon_ ( dods. ), and the _felicity_ (_ib._ ), as also for re-reading the passage which occurs at p. of the latter case, before venturing further into the somewhat intricate technicalities of prize law. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. eggishorn, suisse, august ( ). the sinking of neutral prizes sir,--in your st. petersburg correspondence of yesterday i see that some reference is made to what i have had occasion to say from time to time upon the vexed question of the sinking of neutral vessels, and your correspondent thinks it "would be decidedly interesting" to know whether i have really changed my opinion on the subject. perhaps, therefore, i may be allowed to state that my opinion on the subject has suffered no change, and may be summarised as follows:-- . there is no established rule of international law which absolutely forbids, under any circumstances, the sinking of a neutral prize. a _consensus gentium_ to this effect will hardly be alleged by those who are aware that such sinking is permitted by the most recent prize regulations of france, russia, japan, and the united states. . it is much to be desired that the practice should be, by future international agreement, absolutely forbidden--- that the lenity of british practice in this respect should become internationally obligatory. . in the meantime, to adopt the language of the french instructions, "on ne doit user de ce droit de destruction qu'avec plus la grande réserve"; and it may well be that any given set of instructions (e.g. the russian) leaves on this point so large a discretion to commanders of cruisers as to constitute an intolerable grievance. . in any case, the owner of neutral property, not proved to be good prize, is entitled to the fullest compensation for his loss. in the language of lord stowell:-- "the destruction of the property may have been a meritorious act towards his own government; but still the person to whom the property belongs must not be a sufferer ... if the captor has by the act of destruction conferred a benefit upon the public, he must look to his own government for his indemnity." it may be worth while to add that the published statements on the subject for which i am responsible are contained in the _admiralty manual of prize law_ of (where section sets out the lenient british instructions to commanders, without any implication that instructions of a severer kind would have been inconsistent with international law); in letters which appeared in your columns on august , , and , ; and in a paper on "neutral duties in a maritime war, as illustrated by recent events," read before the british academy in april last, a french translation of which is in circulation on the continent. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. temple, june ( ). the russian circular of april , , inviting the powers to a second peace conference, included amongst the topics for discussion: "destruction par force majeure des bâtiments de commerce neutres arrêtés comme prises," and the british delegates were instructed to urge the acceptance of what their government had maintained to be the existing rule on the subject. the conference of declined, however, to define existing law, holding that its business was solely to consider what should be the law in future. after long discussions, in the course of which frequent reference was made to views expressed by the present writer (see _actes et documents_, t. iii. pp. - , , , , , ), the conference failed to arrive at any conclusion as to the desirability of prohibiting the destruction of neutral prizes, and confined itself to the expression of a wish (_voeu_) that this, and other unsettled points in the law of naval warfare, should be dealt with by a subsequent conference. this question was, accordingly, one of those submitted to a conference of ten maritime powers, which was convoked by great britain in , for reasons upon which something will be said in the next section. the question of sinking was fully debated in this conference, with the assistance of memoranda, in which the several powers represented explained their divergent views upon it, and of reports prepared by committees specially appointed for the purpose. it soon became apparent that the british proposal for an absolute prohibition of the destruction of neutral prizes had no chance of being accepted; while, on the other hand, it was generally agreed that the practice is permissible only in exceptional cases. (see _parl. paper, miscell._ no. ( ), pp. - , - , , , , , , , - , , .) arts. - of the declaration, signed by the delegates to the conference on february , , but not ratified by great britain, related to this question. after laying down, in art. , the general principle that "a neutral prize cannot be destroyed by the captor, but should be taken into such port as is proper for the legal decision of the rightfulness of the capture" the declaration proceeded, in art. , to qualify this principle by providing that "exceptionally, a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent warship, which would be liable to confiscation, may be destroyed, if obedience to art. might compromise the safety of the warship, or the success of the operations in which she is actually engaged." * * * * * section _an international prize court_ the forecast, incidentally attempted in the following letters, of the general results likely to be arrived at by the second peace conference, has been justified by the event. as much may be claimed for the views maintained upon the topic with which these letters were more specifically concerned. instead of letting loose the judges of the proposed international prize court to "make law," in accordance with what might happen to be their notions of "the general principles of justice and equity," a serious attempt has been made to supply them with a code of the law which they would be expected to administer. some account will be given at the end of this section of the movement towards the establishment of an international court of appeal in oases of prize. an international prize court sir--the idea suggested by the question addressed on february to the government by mr. a. herbert--viz. that the appeal in prize cases should lie, not to a court belonging to the belligerent from whose court of first instance the appeal is brought, but to an international tribunal, has a plausible appearance of fairness, but involves many preliminary questions which must not be lost sight of. prize courts are, at present, courts of enquiry, to which a belligerent government entrusts the duty of ascertaining whether the captures made by its officers have been properly made, according to the views of international law entertained by that government. there exists, no doubt, among continental jurists, a considerable body of opinion in favour of giving to courts of appeal, at any rate, in prize cases a wholly different character. this opinion found its expression in arts. - of the _code des prises maritimes_, finally adopted at its heidelberg meeting, in , by the institut de droit international. art. runs as follows:-- "au début de chaque guerre, chacune des parties belligérantes constitue un tribunal international d'appel en matière de prises maritimes. chacun de ces tribunaux est composé de cinq membres, designés comme suit: l'état belligérant nommera lui-même le président et un des membres. il désignera en outre trois états neutres, qui choisiront chacun un des trois autres membres." in the abstract, and supposing that a tribunal perfectly satisfactory both to belligerents and neutrals could be constituted, whether antecedently or _ad hoc_, there might be much to be said for the proposal; subject, however, to one condition--viz. that an agreement had been previously arrived at as to the law which the court is to apply. at the present time there exists, on many vital questions of prize law, no such agreement. it will be sufficient to mention those relating to the list of contraband, the distinction between "absolute" and "conditional" contraband, the doctrine of "continuous voyages," the right of sinking a neutral prize, the moment from which a vessel becomes liable for breach of blockade. just as the _alabama_ arbitration would have been impossible had not an agreement been arrived at upon the principles in accordance with which neutral duties as to the exit of ships of war were to be construed, so, also, before an international court can be empowered to decide questions of prize, whether in the first instance or on appeal, it is indispensable that the law to be applied on the points above mentioned, and many others, should have been clearly defined and accepted, if not generally, at least by all parties concerned. the moral which i would venture to draw is, therefore, that although questions of fact, arising out of capture of a prize, might sometimes be submitted to a tribunal of arbitration, no case, involving rules of law as to which nations take different views, could possibly be so submitted. one is glad, therefore, to notice that the prime minister's reply to mr. a. herbert was of the most guarded character. the settlement of the law of prize must necessarily precede any general resort to an international prize court; and if the coming hague conference does no more than settle some of the most pressing of these questions, it will have done much to promote the cause of peace. i am, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). a new prize law sir,--the leading articles which you have recently published upon the doings of the peace conference, as also the weighty letter addressed to you by my eminent colleague, professor westlake, will have been welcomed by many of your readers who are anxious that the vital importance of some of the questions under discussion at the hague should not be lost sight of. the conference may now be congratulated upon having already given a _quietus_ to several proposals for which, whether or not they may be rightly described as utopian, the time is admittedly not yet ripe. such has been the fate of the suggestions for the limitation of armaments, and the exemption from capture of private property at sea. such also, there is every reason to hope, is the destiny which awaits the still more objectionable proposals for rendering obligatory the resort to arbitration, which by the convention of was wisely left optional. should the labours of the delegates succeed in placing some restrictions upon the employment of submarine mines, the bombardment of open coast towns, and the conversion of merchant vessels into ships of war; in making some slight improvements in each of the three conventions of ; and in solving some of the more pressing questions as to the rights and duties of neutrals, especially with reference to the reception in their ports of belligerent warships, it will have more than justified the hopes for its success which have been entertained by persons conversant with the difficulty and complexity of the problems involved. but what shall we say of certain proposals for revolutionising the law of prize, which still remain for consideration, notably for the establishment of an international court of appeal, and for the abolition of contraband? it can hardly be supposed that either suggestion will win its way to acceptance. . the british scheme for an international court of appeal in prize cases is, indeed, far preferable to the german; but the objections to anything of the kind would seem to be, for the present, insuperable, were it only for the reason which you allowed me to point out, some months ago, _à propos_ of a question put in the house of commons by mr. arnold herbert. as long as nations hold widely different views on many points of prize law, it cannot be expected that they should agree beforehand that, when belligerent, they will leave it to a board of arbitrators to say which of several competing rules shall be applied to any given case of capture, or to evolve out of their inner consciousness a new rule, hitherto unknown to any national prize court. it would seem that the german advocates of the innovation claim in its favour the authority of the institut de droit international. permit me, therefore, as one who has taken part in all the discussions of the institut upon the subject, to state that when it was first handled, at zurich, in , the difficulties in the way of an international court were insisted on by such men as asser, bernard, bluntschli, bulmerincq, and neumann, and the vote of a majority in its favour was coupled with one which demanded the acceptance by treaty of a universally applicable system of prize law. the drafting of such a system was accordingly the main object of the _code des prises maritimes_, which, after occupying several sessions of the institut, was finally adopted by it, at heidelberg, in . only ten of the sections of this code deal with an international court of appeal. a complete body of law, by which states have agreed to be bound, must, one would think, necessarily precede the establishment of a mixed court by which that law is to be interpreted. . while the several delegations are vying with one another in devising new definitions of contraband, there would seem to be little likelihood that the british proposal for its total abandonment will be seriously entertained. such a step could be justified, if at all, from the point of view of national interest, only on the ground that it might possibly throw increased difficulties in the way of an enemy desirous, even by straining the existing law, of interfering with the supply of foodstuffs to the british islands. i propose, for the present, only to call attention to the concluding paragraph of the british notice of motion on this point, which would seem to imply much more than the abandonment of contraband. the words in question, if indeed they are authentically reported, are as follows: "le droit de visite ne serait exercé que pour constater le caractère neutre du bâtiment de commerce." does this mean that the visiting officer, as soon as he has ascertained from the ship's papers that she is neutral property, is to make his bow and return to the cruiser whence he came? if so, what has become of our existing right to detain any vessel which has sailed for a blockaded port, or is carrying, as a commercial venture, or even ignorantly, hostile troops or despatches? no such definition as is proposed of an "auxiliary ship-of-war" would safeguard the right in question, since a ship, to come within that definition, must, it appears, be under the orders of a belligerent fleet. i would venture to suggest that the motto of a reformer of prize law should be _festina lente._ the existing system is the fruit of practical experience extending over several centuries, and, though it may need, here and there, some readjustment to new conditions, brought about by the substitution of steam for sails, is not one which can safely be pulled to pieces in a couple of months. let us leave something for future hague conferences. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, july ( ). a new prize law sir,--in a letter under the above heading, for which you were so good as to find room in july last, i returned to the thesis which i had ventured to maintain some months previously, _à propos_ of a question put in the house of commons. my contention was that the establishment of an international prize court, assuming it to be under any circumstances desirable, should follow, not precede, a general international agreement as to the law which the court is to administer. it would appear, from such imperfect information as intermittently reaches swiss mountain hotels, that a conviction of the truth of this proposition is at length making way among the delegates to the hague conference and among observers of its doings. in a recent number of the _courrier de la conférence_, a publication which cannot be accused of lukewarmness in the advocacy of proposals for the peaceful settlement of international differences, i find an article entitled "pas de code naval, pas de cour des prises," to the effect that "l'acceptation de la cour des prises est strictement conditionnelle à la rédaction du code, qu'elle aura à interpréter." its decisions must otherwise be founded upon the opinions of its judges, "the majority of whom will belong to a school which has never accepted what great britain looks upon as the fundamental principles of naval warfare." one learns also from other sources, that efforts are being made to arrive, by a series of compromises, at some common understanding upon the points as to which the differences of view between the powers are most pronounced. it may, however, be safely predicted that many years must elapse before any such result will be achieved. in the meantime, a very different solution of the difficulty has commended itself to the partisans of the proposed court. m. renault, the accomplished reporter of the committee which deals in the first instance with the subject, after stating that "sur beaucoup de points le droit de la guerre maritime est encore incertain, et chaque État le formule au gré de ses idées et de ses intérêts," lays down that, in accordance with strict juridical reasoning, when international law is silent an international court should apply the law of the captor. he is, nevertheless, prepared to recommend, as the spokesman of the committee, that in such cases the judges should decide "d'après les principes[c] généraux de la justice et de l'équité"--a process which i had, less complimentarily, described as "evolving new rules out of their inner consciousness." the court, in pursuance of this confessedly "hardie solution," would be called upon to "faire le droit." one may be permitted to hope that this proposal will not be accepted. the beneficent action of english judges in developing the common law of england may possibly be cited in its favour; but the analogy is delusive. the courts of a given country in evolving new rules of law are almost certain to do so in accordance with the views of public policy generally entertained in that country. should they act otherwise their error can be promptly corrected by the national legislature. far different would be the effect of the decision of an international court, in which, though it might run directly counter to british theory and practice, great britain would have bound herself beforehand to acquiesce. the only quasi-legislative body by which the _ratio decidendi_ of such a decision could be disallowed would be an international gathering in which british views might find scanty support. the development of a system of national law by national judges offers no analogy to the working of an international court, empowered, at its free will and pleasure, to disregard the views of a sovereign power as to the proper rule to be applied in cases as to which international law gives no guidance. in such cases the ultimate adjustment of differences of view is the appropriate work, not of a law court, but of diplomacy. it is hardly necessary to combat the notion that there already exists, _in nubibus_, a complete system of prize law, which is in some mysterious way accessible to judges, and reveals to them the rule applicable to each new case as it arises. this notion, so far as it is prevalent, seems to have arisen from a mistaken reading of certain _dicta_ of lord stowell, in which that great judge, in his finest eighteenth-century manner, insists that the law which it was his duty to administer "has no locality" and "belongs to other nations as well as our own." he was, of course, thinking of the rules of prize law upon which the nations are agreed, not of the numerous questions upon which no agreement exists, and was dealing with the difficult position of a judge who has to choose (as in the recent _moray firth_ case) between obedience to such rules and obedience to the legislative, or quasi-legislative, acts of his own government. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. eggishorn, suisse, september ( ). a new prize law sir,--the speech of the prime minister at the guildhall contains a paragraph which will be read with a sense of relief by those who, like myself, have all along viewed with surprise and apprehension the hague proposals for an international prize court. sir h. campbell-bannerman admits that "it is desirable, and it may be essential, that, before legislation can be undertaken to make such a court effective, the leading maritime nations should come to an agreement as to the rules regarding some of the more important subjects of warfare which are to be administered by the court"; and his subsequent eulogy of the court presupposes that it is provided with "a body of rules which has received the sanction of the great maritime powers." what is said as to the necessary postponement of any legislation in the sense of the hague convention must, of course, apply _a fortiori_ to the ratification of the convention. we have here, for the first time, an authoritative repudiation of the notion that fifteen gentlemen of mixed nationality composing an international prize court, are to be let loose to "make law," in accordance with what may happen to be their conceptions of "justice and equity." it seems at last to be recognised that such a court cannot be set to work unless, and until, the great maritime powers shall have come to an agreement upon the rules of law which the court is to administer. i may add that it is surely too much to expect that the rules in question will be discussed by the powers, to use sir h. campbell-bannerman's phrase, "without any political _arrière pensêe._" compromise between opposing political interests must ever remain one of the most important factors in the development of the law of nations. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, november ( ). although the establishment of an international prize court of appeal was not one of the topics included in the programme of the russian invitation; to a second peace conference, no objection was made to its being taken into consideration, when proposals to that effect were made by the british and american delegates to the conference. the idea seems first to have been suggested by hübner, who proposed to confer jurisdiction in cases of neutral prize on courts composed of ministers or consuls, accredited by neutrals to the belligerents, together with commissioners appointed by the sovereign of the captors or of the country to which the prize has been brought, as also, perhaps, "des personnes pleines de probité et de connaissances dans tout ce qui concerne les loix des nations et les traités des puissances modernes." the court is to decide in accordance with treaties, "ou, à leur défaut, la loi universelle des nations." _de la saisie des bâtiments neutres_ ( ), ii. pp. - . the institut de droit international, after discussions extending over several years, accepted the principle of an international court of appeal, though only in combination with a complete scheme of prize law, in its _code des prises maritimes_, completed in , section . at the conference of , the work of several committees, and a masterly report by professor renault, _parl. papers_, no. iv. ( ), p. , resulted in the hague convention, no. xii. of that year, providing for the establishment of a mixed court of appeal from national prize courts. according to art. of this convention, in default of any relevant treaty between the governments of the litigant parties, and of generally recognised rules of international law bearing upon the question at issue, the court is to decide "in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity." it seems, however, to have been soon perceived that the proposal to institute a court, unprovided with any fixed system of law by which to decide the cases which might be brought before it, could not well be entertained, and the final act of the conference accordingly expresses a wish that "the preparation of a _règlement_, relative to the laws and customs of maritime war, may be mentioned in the programme of the next conference." thereupon, without waiting for the meeting of a third hague conference, the british government on february , , addressed a circular to the great maritime powers, which, after alluding to the impression gained "that the establishment of the international prize court would not meet with general acceptance so long as vagueness and uncertainty exist as to the principles which the court, in dealing with appeals brought before it, would apply to questions of far-reaching importance, affecting naval policy and practice," went on to propose that another conference should meet in london, in the autumn of the same year, "with the object of arriving at an agreement as to what are the generally recognised principles of international law within the meaning of paragraph of article of the convention, as to those matters wherein the practice of nations has varied, and of then formulating the rules which, in the absence of special treaty provisions applicable to a particular case, the court should observe in dealing with appeals brought before it for decision.... it would be difficult, if not impossible, for h.m. government to carry the legislation necessary to give effect to the convention, unless they could assure both houses of the british parliament that some more definite understanding had been reached as to the rules by which the new tribunal should be governed." in response to this invitation, delegates from ten principal maritime states assembled at the foreign office on december , , and after discussing the topics to which their attention was directed, viz.: ( ) contraband; ( ) blockade; ( ) continuous voyage; ( ) destruction of neutral prizes; ( ) unneutral service; ( ) conversion of merchant vessels into warships on the high seas; ( ) transfer to a neutral flag; ( ) nationality or domicil, as the test of enemy property; signed on february , , the declaration of london. the convention no. xii. of and the declaration of london of have alike failed to obtain ratification. _cf._ now the two immediately following sections, and . an ultimate court of appeal in cases of prize seems now likely to be provided by the "permanent court of international justice," proposed by the league of nations in pursuance of art. of the treaty of versailles. see also art. of the treaty. _cf. supra_, p. . * * * * * section _the naval prize bill_ the first two letters in this section contain the criticisms of the bill to which allusion is made in the first lines of a letter of later date, q.v. _supra_, p. . on the rejection of the bill, see _ib._, note . the naval prize bill sir--a paternal interest in the naval prize bill may perhaps be thought a sufficient excuse for the few remarks which i am about to make upon it. the bill owes its existence to a suggestion made by me, just ten years ago, while engaged in bringing up to date for the admiralty my _manual of naval prise law_ of . it was drafted by me, after prolonged communications with judges, law officers, and the government departments concerned, so as not only to reproduce the provisions of several "cross and cuffing" statutes dealing with the subject, but also to exhibit them in a more logical order than is always to be met with in acts of parliament. the bill was thought of sufficient importance to be mentioned on two occasions in the king's speech, and has been several times passed, after careful consideration, by the house of lords; but pressure of other business has hitherto impeded its passage through the house of commons. it has now been reintroduced, this time in the lower house, with an imposing backing of government support; primarily, no doubt, with a view to facilitating the ratification of the hague convention for the establishment of an international prize court of appeal. for this purpose, several pieces of new cloth have been sewn into the old garment, and i may perhaps be allowed to call attention to three or four points in which, on a first reading, the new clauses strike one as needing reconsideration. tactical reasons have, no doubt, operated to induce the government to include in the consolidation bill the provisions for which statutory authority must be obtained before it will be possible to ratify the convention; instead of first introducing a bill having this sole object in view, and afterwards, should this be passed, inserting the new law in a reintroduced consolidation bill. the course adopted necessitates an otherwise unnecessary preamble, and the qualification of the new part iii. by the words "in the event of an international prize court being established" (clause ). the reference, by the by, in this clause to "the said convention" is somewhat awkward, no mention of any convention having occurred previously, except in the preamble of the bill. is not also the statutory approval given by this clause, not only to the convention of but also to "any convention amending the same," somewhat startling, as tending to exclude parliamentary criticism of such an amending convention before its ratification? by clause , the members of the judicial committee who are to be nominated to act as the british court of appeal in cases of prize are to be described by the novel title of "the supreme prize court." is not the use made of the term "supreme" in the judicature acts, as covering both the high court and the court of appeal, already sufficiently unsatisfactory? but the question which, of all others _saute aux yeux_, in reading the new part iii., is whether the convention is to be approved as it stands, irrespectively of a general acceptance of the new code of prize law contained in the declaration of london of . the objections to art. of the contention, providing that, in the absence of rules of international law generally recognised (and on many points of prize law there are no such rules), the court is to decide in accordance with (what it may be pleased to consider) "the general principles of law and equity," are well known. the purpose of the declaration of london (itself the subject of much difference of opinion) was to curtail this licence of decision, by providing the court with so much ascertained prize law as to render action under the too-elastic phrase above quoted almost inconceivable. is it too much of a counsel of perfection to suggest that the debatable questions arising under the convention of and the declaration of should first be threshed out in discussions on a bill dealing with those questions only; and that the decision, if any, thus arrived at should be subsequently inserted, freed from hypothesis, in the consolidation bill which has so long awaited the leisure of the house of commons? i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, july ( ). the naval prize bill sir,--the government has so far yielded to the representations of the opposition as to have refrained from forcing on friday night a division upon the naval prize bill. is it too much to hope that the government may even now withdraw altogether a measure so ill adapted to place fairly before parliament the question of the desirability of ratifying two documents held by a large body of competent opinion to be certain, if ratified, seriously to endanger the vital interests of the country? the bill, as i have already pointed out, as originally drawn, was a careful consolidation of the law and procedure governing british courts of prize. into this has now been incongruously thrust a set of clauses intended to give effect to a novel and highly controversial proposal for the creation of an international prize court. about the declaration of london, alleged to contain a body of law which would adequately equip such a court for the performance of its duties, not a word is said in the bill; yet, should approval of the bill be snatched by a purely party majority, the intention of the government is to proceed straightway to the ratification both of the prize court convention and the declaration. whether they intend also to endeavour to obtain the ratification, as an auxiliary convention, of the lengthy covering commentary upon the declaration, supplied by the committee by which the declaration was drafted, does not yet appear. of such a step i have already written that it "would be calamitous should a practice be introduced of attempting to cure the imperfect expression of a treaty by tacking on to it an equally authoritative reasoned commentary. the result would be _obscurum per obscurius_, a remedy worse than the disease." the alternatives before parliament on monday next will be either, by reading the naval prize bill a second time, to bring about, in the teeth of protests from those best qualified to express an independent opinion upon the subject, the immediate ratification of the convention and the declaration, or to ask that before, this momentous step is taken the infinitely complex and delicate questions involved should be examined and passed upon by a commission of representative experts. which shall it be? your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, july i ( ). _cf._ a letter of july , , _supra_, p. . naval prize money sir,--the existing enactments as to prize bounty are, it seems, unsuitable to present conditions of naval warfare, and are accordingly to be varied by a bill shortly to be introduced. may i venture to recommend that the bill should contain merely the half-dozen clauses needed for this purpose, leaving untouched for subsequent uncontroversial passage, the naval prize consolidation with amendments bill? this bill, suggested and drafted by myself, in the spacious times of peace, in consultation with the admiralty and other government departments, as also with the judge of the admiralty division and the law officers (including the present lord chancellor), was twice mentioned in the king's speech, and several times, after careful consideration, passed by the house of lords, but still awaits the leisure of the lower house. it deserved a better fate than to have been used, in , as a corpus vile for facilitating the ratification of the convention for an international prize court and of the declaration of london; receiving, most fortunately, as so perverted, its _coup de grâce_ from the lords. it should be passed as an artistic whole, apart from any contentious matter, account having, of course, been taken of recent legislation by which it may have been, here and there, affected. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, may ( ). * * * * * section the declaration of london for incidental mentions of the declaration in earlier sections see _supra_, pp. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . see also my paper upon _proposed changes in the law of naval prize_, read to the british academy on may , , _transactions_, vol. v., of which a translation appeared in the _revue de droit international_, n.s., t. xiii, pp. - . the declaration of london sir,--the questions put last night by mr. m'arthur need, perhaps, more fully considered answers than they received from mr. mckinnon wood. with reference to the first answer, it may be worth while to point out that, in art. of the declaration, the powers undertake not only, as in the passage quoted, "to give the necessary instructions to their authorities and armed forces," but also "to take the measures which may be proper for guaranteeing the application of the rules contained in the declaration by their courts, and, in particular, by their courts of prize." the "authentic commentary" upon the article in m. renault's "report" explains that the measures in question "may vary in different countries, and may or may not require the intervention of the legislature." the second answer lays down broadly that "the decisions of the british prize courts are founded on international law, and not on municipal enactments." our prize courts have, no doubt, on most points, decided in accordance with international law, in the sense of the principles generally followed by civilised nations; but, on not a few points, in accordance with the british view of what is, or ought to be, international law, in opposition to views persistently maintained by other countries--e.g. with reference to the moment from which a blockade-runner becomes liable to capture. the fact is that, whatever grandiloquent language may have been judicially employed by lord stowell in a contrary sense, it will now hardly be denied that a prize court sits by national, not international, authority, and is bound to take the view of international law which, if any, is prescribed to it by the constitutionally expressed will of its own government. the declaration of london is in many ways a great achievement; but one is glad to learn from mr. mckinnon wood's third answer that opportunity will be given for discussing all important points in connexion with its rules. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ). the declaration of london sir,--both the prize court convention of and its complement, the london declaration of , stand greatly in need of full and well-informed discussion before receiving the parliamentary approval which ought to be a condition precedent to the ratification of either of them. it is well, therefore, that many chambers of commerce have called the attention of government to the detriment to british interest which may in their opinion result from these agreements if ratified, although the representations thus made exhibit, in some cases, so little technical knowledge as to have been readily disposed of by the foreign secretary. for the same reason, i welcome the letter from mr. gibson bowles, which appeared in _the times_ of yesterday, although it contains some statements the inaccuracy of which it may be desirable at once to point out. . the declaration of paris is neither implicitly nor explicitly adopted by the declaration of london, "as a part of the common law of nations which can no longer be disputed." the later makes no mention of the earlier one, and m. benault's _rapport_ (as to the interpretative authority of which opinions may well differ) applies the words quoted, not to the paris declaration as a whole, but to one only of its articles. mr. bowles's statement that "the declaration of london, if adopted, would reaffirm, and its ratification would in effect, for the first time ratify, the declaration of paris" cannot be supported. . mr. bowles asserts it to be "an unquestioned doctrine of the law of nations that war abrogates and annuls treaty obligations between belligerents." one would have supposed it to be common knowledge that large classes of treaties are wholly unaffected by war. such are, for instance, what are called conventions _transitoires_, because their effect is produced once for all, as in the case of cessions of territory; and, notably, treaties entered into for the regulation of the conduct of war, such as the geneva convention, many of the hague conventions of , and the declaration of paris itself, which mr. bowles appears to think would _ipso facto_ cease to be obligatory between its signatories on their becoming belligerent. it is a pleasure to be able to agree with mr. bowles in his wish that the naval prize bill, if reintroduced, should be rejected, though i would rather say "withdrawn." you have already allowed me (on july ) to point out that if the convention and declaration are to be effectively discussed in parliament they should be disentangled from that bill, into which the convention, and, by implication, the declaration, have been incongruously thrust. this practically non-contentious consolidation bill, after several times securing the approval of the house of lords, has hitherto for several years awaited the leisure of the house of commons, but was suddenly reintroduced last session, apparently as an unobtrusive vehicle for the new and highly debatable matter contained in the two above-mentioned documents. may i now repeat my suggestion that "the debatable questions arising under the convention of and the declaration of should first be threshed out in discussions on a bill dealing with these questions only; and that the decision, if any, thus arrived at should be subsequently inserted, freed from hypothesis, in the consolidation bill"? i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). the declaration of london sir,--i have read professor westlake's letters upon the declaration of london with the attention due to anything written by my very learned friend, but, although myself opposed to the ratification alike of the prize court convention and of its complement, the declaration, do not at present wish to enter upon the demerits of either instrument. there is, however, a preliminary question upon which, with your permission, i should like to say a few words. my friend justly observes that in dealing with the declaration "the first necessity is to know what it is that we have before us"; and he devotes his letter of january to maintaining that the declaration must be read as interpreted by the explanations of it given to the full conference by the drafting committee, of which m. renault was president. professor westlake supports his opinion by a quotation from the reply of the foreign office in november last to the edinburgh chamber of commerce (_miscell._ , no. , p. ). i may mention that a similar reply had been given, a year previously, by mr. mckinnon wood to a question in the house of commons. the source of these replies is doubtless to be found in a paragraph of the report, addressed on march , , to sir edward grey, of the british delegates to the london conference, which runs as follows:-- "it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the principles and practice of continental jurisprudence, such a report is considered an authoritative statement of the meaning and intention of the instrument which it explains, and that consequently foreign governments and courts, and no doubt also the international prize court, will construe and interpret the provisions of the declaration by the light of the commentary given in the report." (_miscell._ , no. , p. .) it is desirable to know upon what authority this statement rests. i am aware of none. the nearest approach to an assertion of anything like it occurred at the hague conference of , when the "approval" accorded to "the work of the second committee, as embodied in the articles voted and in the interpretative report which accompanies them" was alleged by m. de martens to amount to an acceptance of the report "comme un commentaire interprétatif authentique des articles votés." (_miscell._ , no. , p. .) the drafting report presented to the geneva conference of is merely said to have been "adopted" (actes, p. ); and m. renault's report to the conference of london was similarly merely "accepted," although he presented it as containing "un commentaire précis, dégagé de tout controverse, qui, devenu commentaire officiel par l'approbation de la conférence, soit de nature à guider les autorités diverses, administratives, militaires, judiciaires, qui pourront avoir à l'appliquer." (_miscell._ , no. , p. .) it would seem that in each of these cases the adoption of the report, and even a suggestion or two for a change in its phraseology, amounted to nothing more than an expression of opinion on the part of the delegates to the conference that the report contained explanations which had satisfied themselves, and might satisfy their governments, that the convention which they were about to forward to those governments might safely be accepted. so far as governments are concerned, the adoption of a report by their delegates is _res inter alios acta_. an "authentic interpretation" of a contract can be given only by the parties to it, who, in the case of a treaty, are the states concerned. if these states desire to give to the report of a drafting committee the force of an authentic interpretation of their contract, they can surely do so only by something amounting to a supplementary convention. writers upon international law naturally throw but little light upon questions to which the somewhat novel practice of argumentative drafting reports has given rise; but i may cite professor ullmann, of vienna, as saying:-- "eine authentische interpretation kann nur die durch kontrahenten selbst, in einem gemeinschaftlichen, ihren willen ausser zweifel setzenden acte (einem nachtrags-oder erlauterungsvertrage), erfolgen" (volkerrecht, p. ); and professor fiore, of naples, to the effect that what is called "authentic interpretation" is not "interpretazione propriamente detta, ma una dichiarazione di quello che fu gia concordato, o un nuovo trattato" (diritto internazionale, ss. , ); and that "il trattato non può essere interpretato che dalle stesse parti (_i.e._ stati) contrahenti; e per la validità dell' atto è indispensabile che la relativa convenzione di interpretazione abbia gli stessi requisiti ... di ogni altra convenzione tra stato e stato" (il dir. int. codif., § ). i would submit that such a report as that which accompanies the declaration of london has no claim to the sort of interpretative authority which has been attributed to it; nor is it desirable that the requisite steps should be taken for giving it that authority. it would be calamitous should a practice be introduced of attempting to cure the imperfect expression of a treaty by tacking on to it an equally authoritative reasoned commentary, likely, as in the present case, to be enormously longer than the test to which it relates. it is a wholly different question whether governments or courts would be inclined to take notice of such a report, among other facts antecedent to a convention, or declaration, which they might be called upon to construe. a british court would not, i conceive, be so inclined. on the probable inclinations of continental courts, and of an international prize court, should one be instituted, further expert information would seem to be called for. the fact is that the vitally important questions of theory and practice raised by the convention and the declaration need calmer and better instructed discussion than they have yet received. ought they not to be referred to a royal commission, on which should be placed representatives of the navy and merchant service, of the corn trade, and of the colonies, together with international lawyers, in touch with the views of their continental colleagues? i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). the declaration of london sir,--professor westlake, replying in _the times_ of to-day to the arguments by which i had endeavoured to show that the report made to the conference of london has no pretensions to be treated as an authentic interpretation of the declaration prepared by the conference, still maintains that "the essential question will be, what the agreement was that the conference arrived at." i had maintained, on the contrary, that the essential question will be, what is the agreement entered into by the powers, as evidenced by their ratifications? anything outside of the ratified agreement being _res inter alios acta_. i should not be justified in asking you to allow me to repeat the contents of my letter of monday last in support of this view. the pleadings are, i think, exhausted. "therefore let a jury come." i should like, however, to point out that i did not, as my friend seems to think, attribute the acceptance of the report to the delegates "singly." it was, no doubt accepted by all present without protest. my colleague will, i am sure, pardon me if i add that i cannot concur in his exegesis of my citations from ullmann and fiore. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, february ( ). the declaration of london sir,--it is satisfactory that so high an authority as mr. arthur cohen distinctly accedes to the view that the declaration of london ought not to be ratified as it stands. i should, however, be sorry were his suggestion accepted that the declaration and the argumentative report which accompanies it might be ratified together. the result would be _obscurum per obscurius_, a remedy worse than the disease. i shall ask leave to add that, if mr. cohen will take the trouble to look again at my letters of february and , he will cease to suppose it possible that in writing "the pleadings are, i think, exhausted, &c.," i meant to convey that no further discussion of the merits or demerits of the declaration was required. on the contrary i expressly limited myself to a consideration of the preliminary question, whether interpretative authority would rightly be attributed to the report in question, stating that, while opposed to the ratification alike of the prize court convention and of the declaration, i did not, for the present, wish to enter upon the demerits of either instrument; and ended my first letter by suggesting the reference to a royal commission of "the vitally important questions of theory and practice raised by the convention and the declaration," as needing "calmer and better instructed discussion than they have yet received." i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, march ( ). the declaration of london sir,--after tuesday's debate in the house of lords it may be hoped that not even "the man in the street" will suppose the declaration of london to be anything more than an objectionable draft, by which no country has consented to be bound. every day of the war makes more apparent our debt to the house of lords for having, four years ago, prevented the british government from ratifying either the international prize court convention or this declaration, which, while misleadingly professing that its provisions "correspond in substance with the generally recognised principles of international law," contains, interspersed with truisms familiar to all concerned with such matters, a good many undesirable novelties. this being so, it was surely unfortunate that our government, with a view apparently to saving time and trouble, decided, in the early days of the war, to adopt the declaration _en bloc_ as a statement of prize law "during the present hostilities," subject, however, to "certain additions and modifications"; to which it, of course, retained the power of making additions. this power has been so freely exercised, and large portions of the declaration, not thereby affected, have proved to be so inapplicable to modern conditions, as disclosed by the war, that the document, so far from providing reliable guidance, is now a mere source of hopeless confusion. to put an end to this confusion, i venture to suggest that, in concert with our allies, the declaration should be finally consigned to oblivion. either let its place be taken by some clear and simple statement of unquestioned prize law, for the use of commanders and officials (something like a confidential document in the drafting of which i had a hand some years ago, but, of course, brought up to date), or let established principles take care of themselves, certain doubtful points only being dealt with, from time to time, by orders in council. while heartily concurring in lord portsmouth's description of the unratified "declaration" as "rubbish," i regret that he seems to relegate to the same category even those generally ratified "hague conventions" which, as far as they go, mark a real advance upon previously accepted rules. still less acceptable is his advice to "sweep away juridical niceties" in the conduct of hostilities. did he intend thus to describe the whole fabric of the rules by which international law has endeavoured, with considerable success, to restrain barbarity in warfare? i must mention that this letter was written before seeing this morning the letter of mr. gibson bowles, my worthy ally in attacks upon the declaration. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, december ( ). the declaration of london sir,--you have allowed me, in a good many letters, to criticise the declaration of london, both in its original inception and in its subsequent applications. thanks to the house of lords, the declaration, which erroneously professed to "correspond in substance with the generally recognised principles of international law," has remained unratified, and therefore diplomatically of no effect. its admirers have, however, too long preserved it, perhaps _sub spe rati_, in a state of suspended animation, using it by way of, as they supposed, a convenient handbook of maritime law for the purposes of the present war, though subject to such variations as might from time to time be found convenient by the allies. the mistake thus made soon became apparent. the elaborate classification of contraband had to be at once thrown overboard, and most of the remaining provisions of the declaration proved to be inapplicable to modern warfare. in december last i accordingly wrote as follows:-- "to put an end to this confusion, i venture to suggest that, in concert with our allies, the declaration should be finally consigned to oblivion. either let its place be taken by some clear and simple statement of unquestioned prize law, for the use of commanders and officials, ... or established principles take care of themselves, certain doubtful points only being dealt with from time to time by orders in council." i need hardly say that to anyone holding the views thus expressed, yesterday's order in council must be most satisfactory; getting rid, as it does for good and all, of the unfortunate declaration, leaving the application of established principles to those acquainted with them and promulgating authoritative guidance on specific novel questions. i may perhaps add a word or two on the undesirability of describing as "declarations" documents which, being equipped with provisions for ratification, although they may profess to set out old law, differ in no respect from other conventions. also, as to the need for greater caution on the part of our representatives than has been shown by their acceptance of various craftily suggested anti-british suggestions, such as were several embodied in the declaration in question, and notably that of the notorious cl. (_h_) of the hague convention iv., the interpretation of which has exercised the ingenuity of the foreign office and, more recently, of the court of appeal. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. brighton, july ( ). on july , , an order in council was made, revoking all orders by which the provisions of the declaration had been adopted, or modified, for the duration of the war; stating the intention of the allies to exercise their belligerent rights at sea in strict accordance with the law of nations; but dealing specifically with certain doubtful points. the order was accompanied by a memorandum, drawn up by the british and french governments, explaining how their expectation that in the declaration they would find "a suitable digest of principles and compendium of working rules" had not been realised. see also lord robert cecil in the house of commons on august , with reference to the zamora case, [ ] ch. c. . on misuses of the term "declaration" _cf. supra_, pp. , , . germany wrong again sir,--the new german note handed on thursday last to the representatives of the neutral powers supports its allegation that the four allied powers "have trampled upon right and torn up the treaties on which it was based" by the following statement:-- "already in the first weeks of the war england had renounced the declaration of london, the contents of which her own delegates had recognised as binding in international law." it is surely notorious that the delegates of a power, by agreeing to the draft of a treaty, give to it no international validity, which results only when the treaty has been ratified by their government. the declaration of london has, most fortunately, never been ratified by the government of great britain. i am, sir, your obedient servant, t. e. holland. oxford, january ( ). index absolute contraband. _see_ contraband abstention, acquiescence, state duty of, , , , _actæon_, the, , acts of parliament, , admiralty manual of prize law, , , aerial warfare, air, opposite views as to rights over, , aircraft in war, _alabama_, the, , _alexander, mrs., the cotton of_, alien enemies, civil disabilities of, , , _allanton_, the, , , , _ancipitis usus_, articles, _angarie, droit d'_, _appam_, the, _arabia_, the, arbitration, - , treaties, general, , treaties, limited, _ib._ cases fit for, the hague tribunal of, armaments, limitation of, armed civilians, neutralities, the, army, duties of, article (h), , , , restricting application, aspirations, assassination, _asturias_, the, asylum to belligerent warships, , _atalanta_, the, aube, admiral, authentic interpretation, , , , , baden-powell, sir g., , , baker, sir sherston, balfour, mr. a.j., , , , , balloons, projectiles from, , base of operations, neutral duty as to, , , , baty, dr. t., bays, , belligerents, lawful, , , , , , beresford, lord charles, _bermuda_, the, bills criticised, - , , birkenhead, lord, bismarck, prince, bliss, sir h., blockade, belligerent, , , fictitious, , pacific, - , bluntschli's reply to von moltke, bombardment, of open coast towns, , from the air, , bondholders, foreign, vindication of rights of, bowles, mr. gibson, , , , , , , , , , brandschatz, brassard, effect of a, bright, sir charles, , british academy, author's paper at, british manual of military law, handbooks on war on land, , brodrick, mr., _brown_ v. _united states_, brusa, prof., brussels conference, the, of , , , , , bullets, expanding, , , explosive, , , in savage warfare, _bundesrath_, the, , , butler, general b.f., bynkershoek, , , , cable-cutting, , - cables, submarine, campbell-bannerman, sir h., captors, unqualified, , , , carson, sir edward, cavell, miss, case of, _calchas_, the, , , cecil, lord robert, , channel tunnel, _chavasse, ex parte_, civilians armed, position of, , , churchill, mr. winston, claims, competitive, clarke, sir edward, clode, mr., closed localities, clothing, use of enemy, coal, conditional contraband, for belligerent fleet, , coast fishing vessels, codification of laws of war, , cohen, mr. arthur, , coltman, mr., commencement of war, _commercen_, the, commissioning on the high seas, commissions of enquiry, compromise, the, between belligerent and neutral rights, , , , conditional contraband. _see_ contraband conduct of warfare between belligerents, conflict of laws, , continuous voyages, , , , "contraband, a happy little," contraband of war, what it is, , , , absolute and conditional, , , , , british proposal to abolish doctrine of, , , coal, how far, , , , cotton, how far, , , food-stuffs, how far, , japanese rules as to, , , misuse of the term, no neutral duty to prohibit export of, , russian rules as to, , the declaration of london as to, the two constituents of, contractual debts, contributions, , conventions. _see_ geneva, hague, &c. and legislation, "transitoires," conversion. _see_ transformation convoy, cotton, as contraband, , , court of international justice, a permanent, , criticism of bills, - , customs consolidation act, , danger zone, a, dardanelles, closing of, , , , , "declaration," misuse of the term, , , declaration, the, of london, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , - provisional adoption of, as modified, , rejection of, , declaration, the, of paris, , , , , , , , , , , , accession to, of spain and mexico, , , , , , declaration, the, of st. petersburg, , , , , , von moltke upon, declaration of war, , , declarations, mistaken view as to their not needing ratification, , the three, of the hague in . _see_ hague de horsey, admiral, , de joinville, prince, de martens, prof., , , , deposit of delict, despatches, enemy, , , destination, , , destruction of neutral prizes, , - dickenson, mr. lowes, _direct u.s. cable co._ v. _anglo-american tel. co._, disguise, , distinctive marks, , _doelwijk_, the, drago doctrine, the, _droit d'angarie_, the, dum-dum bullet. _see_ bullets _durward_, the, embargo, enemy, who is an ?, [e] disabilities of, , , goods in neutral bottoms, in occupied territory, merchant vessels at outbreak, , property on land, property at sea, , , resident at outbreak, service, , , "englishman's home, an," the play, enquiry, international commissions of, , , , evans, sir samuel, false colours, , , fauchille, m., , , _felicity_, the, , , , , , fiore, prof., fishing vessels, flag of truce, food-stuffs, , how far contraband, , , food, royal commission on, , , foreign enlistment acts, the, , , , , , foreign enlistment bills, new, foreign soldiers, forster, arnold-, mr., _fox_, the, , _fram_, the, _francs-tireurs_, "freedom of the seas," , french government manual for land warfare, friendly methods of settlement, gases, harmful, whether employment of, legitimate, , , geffken, prof., general principles of justice and equity, the, , , , geneva convention bill, geneva conventions, the, , , , , application of, to maritime warfare, , gentili, a., germany. _cf._ hague conventions proclamation by, of a danger zone, wrong as to declaration of london, giffen, sir r., gladstone, mr., _goeben_ and _breslau_, the, _golden rocket_, the, good offices, , , government authority, as a protection, government bills and international conventions, - , , , granville, lord, , , , , greek coast, blockade of, guerilla warfare, gundel, general de, grotius, , , , , , _haabet_, the, hague conventions, the, of , , , , , , , , , , , , , , of , , applicable only between contracting powers, no. i., , , no. ii., , no. iii., , , no. iv., , , , , , , , , , , , , , no. v., , , , , , , no. vi., , , no. vii., , no. viii., , , no. ix., , , no. x., , , no. xi., , no. xii., , , , , , , no. xiii., , , , hague declarations, the, , , , , , , hague _règlements_, the, as to war on land, , , , , , hague tribunal, the, reference to, not obligatory, haldane, mr. r.b., hall, mr. w.e., on pacific blockade, harcourt, sir w., hardinge, sir c., herbert, mr. arnold, , holland, sir t.e., references to writings of, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , honour and vital interests clause, the, , , horses, wounded, , horsey, adml., , , hostile assistance, , , , hübner, _ikaria_, the, _imina_, the, immediate effects of outbreak of war, the, institut de droit international, the, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , its _manuel des lois de la guerre maritime_, its _manuel des lois de la guerre sur terre_, , , , , instructions, national, on laws of war on land, , on laws of war at sea: british, , french, japanese, , , , , , , russian, , , , , , united states, _international_, the, international court of appeal, an, international justice, a permanent court of, international law, the nature and authority of, , , , , , , , , , , international prize court, proposal for an, , - jackson, colonel, , james, captain, jenks, mr., , , _jonge margaretha_, the, just cause of war, "justice and equity, general principles of," , , , kent, chancellor, kleen, mr., , _knight-commander_, the, , kohler, mr., _kowshing_, the case of the, , "kriegsbrauch," the, , lambermont, baron, lammasch, prof., lansdowne, marquess of, , , , , , lawful belligerents, , league of nations, the, , , , , lehr, prof., _leucade_, the, lincoln, president, lieber's instructions, , localities closed to hostilities, london, conference of, , , london, declaration of, , , , , , , , , , - lyons, lord, macdonell, prof., mckenna, mr., mahan, admiral, mail steamers and bags, _malacca_, the case of the, , , mandates, manning, mr., manual of military law, the british, manuals of warfare on land, at sea, manuel des lois de la guerre maritime, the, of institut, manual des lois de la guerre sur terre, , , _marais, ex parte_, martens, de, prof., martial law, - maurice, colonel, _mcomini and others_ v. _governor &c. of natal_, means of injuring, measures short of war, - mediation. _see_ good offices menam, blockade of the, mercantile marine in war, , , merchant ships, visit of, militia, _minerva_, the, mines, moltke, von, on conduct of war, monroe doctrine, the, , _moray firth_, the, morley, lord, , "most favoured nation" clause, _möwe_, the, "murder," , , , mutiny acts, the, national instructions, , naval bombardments of open coast towns, , , naval manoeuvres of , the, , naval war code, a british, , , naval warfare, naval prize (consolidation) bill, the, , - , object of, , rejection of, naval prize money, neutral conduct, the criterion of, neutral duties, as classified by the author, neutral hospitality, neutral states and individuals, their liabilities distinguished, - neutral territory, passage through, neutral trade, the four inconveniences, to, neutralisation, the term, , neutrality, correlative to belligerency, , , british proclamations of, , - neutrals, methods of warfare affecting, - non-combatants, , _novoe vremya_, the, occupied territory, right of the invader in, , not yet occupied, oppenheim, prof., _orozembo_, the, "ottoman empire, ancient rule of the," pacific blockade, palmerston, lord, panama canal, the, _paquete habana_, the, paris. _see_ declaration of paris, treaty of, , , , , , , "pas de code naval, pas de cour des prises," passage, , peace talk, peaceful settlement of disputes, the conventions for, of , , , of , , are non-obligatory, perels, prof., permanent court of international justice, a, _peterburg_, the, _peterhoff_, the, , , petition of right, the, , , pike, mr., , "piracy," , , poison, pope's note, the, port, enemy ships in, _porter_ v. _freudenberg_, portsmouth, lord, pourtugael, den beer, prof., pre-emption, prevention, state duties of, , prisoners of war, , , liabilities of, private international law, privateers, , restrictions on, commissioned liners are not, private property at sea, prize court, the russian, an international court of appeal, , - a settled prize law, must precede, , , , , , a supreme, prize law consolidation bill, , , "probable cause," proclamations of neutrality, the british, criticised, - "professors," projectiles, from balloons, , , for diffusion of gases, , , "quasi-enemy," radiotelegraphic stations, rae, mr., ratification, receipts, _règlements_, the hague. _see_ hague renault, prof., , , , , , report of the force of (_see_ authentic interpretation) reprisals, advantages of, , how differing from war, , , , opposite views as to, species of, , , united states, instructions as to, belligerent, , requisitions, , restrictive clause, the, , retaliation, reward for, dead or alive, _r._ v. _eyre_, ridley, sir e., roman law terminology, roosevelt, pres., rosebery, lord, ross, sir r., russian prize law, , , salisbury, lord, , , , , _santissima trinidad_, the, savage warfare, _savannah_, the, scott, sir walter, , scott, sir william, search. _see_ visit and search second peace conference conventions bill, , , seely, col., ship, a "mere moveable," shucking, prof., siam, sinking. _see_ destruction smith (lord birkenhead) and sibley, on international law in the russo-japanese war, _spider_, the, , spies, _springbok_, the, stephen, sir herbert, stewart, mr. c., story, j., stowell, lord, , , , , , , , , , straits, , submarine cables, , , , submarines, suez canal, the, , , , superfluous injury, , suyematsu, baron, swettenham, sir james, sydenham, lord, takahashi, prof., terminology, territorial waters, , , tindal, le chevalier, tirpitz, admiral von, _tocumaro_, the, [d] torpedoes, transformation into ships of war, treaties, who are the parties to, , effect of war on, , treaty, the hay-pauncefote, twenty-three (h) clause, the, , twenty-four hours rule, the, , , ullmann, prof., , , unarmed merchantmen, , undefended towns, , , uniform, united states instructions for war on land, , , naval war code, , , , naval war college, ratification of conventions, views of, compared with british, , unqualified captors, , unratified conventions, effect of, usufruct, vattel, , venezuela, , visit and search, , , , , "violations of law of nations," term misapplied, , voeux, , , , , , , volunteers, war. _see_ reprisals declaration of, , legitimate object of, , _sub modo_, , written law of, washington, the three rules of, wellington, duke of, westbury, lord, westlake, prof., , , , , , wilson, pres., , , wolf, mr., wood, mackinnon, mr., , , wounded and sick. _see_ geneva conventions horses, , _yangtsze insurance association_ v. _indemnity mutual marine company_, younge, mr., _zamora_, the, zone, a danger, printed by spottiswoode, ballantyne & co. ltd. colchester, london & eton, england by the same author an essay on composition deeds under and vict. c. . london, sweet, , mo. s. a plan for the formal amendment of the law of england. london, butterworths, , vo. s. essays upon the form of the law. london, butterworths, , vo. s. d. the institutes of justinian, edited as a recension of the institutes of gaius. oxford, clarendon press, , second edit. , mo. s. select titles from the digest of justinian, edited, with c.l. shadwell. oxford, clarendon press, - , vo. s. albericus gentilis, an inaugural lecture delivered at all souls college, november , . london, macmillan, , vo. s. d. albericus gentilis, tradotto da aurelio saffi. roma, loescher, . the brussels conference of , and other diplomatic attempts to mitigate the rigour of warfare. oxford and london, james parker, , vo. s. d. the treaty relations of russia and turkey, to , with an appendix of treaties. london, macmillan, , mo. s. alberici gentilis de iure belli libri tres, edited. oxford, clarendon press, , to. s. the elements of jurisprudence. oxford, clarendon press, , vo, twelfth edit. , vo. s. the european concert in the eastern question: a collection of treaties and other public acts, edited, with introductions and notes. oxford, clarendon press, , vo. s. d. a manual of naval prize law. issued by authority of the lords commissioners of the admiralty. london, eyre & spottiswoode, , vo. studies in international law. oxford, clarendon press, , vo. s. d. the laws and customs of war on land, &c. (issued by the war office to the british army). london, harrison & sons, , mo. d. neutral duties in a maritime war, as illustrated by recent events (_from the proceedings of the british academy_). london, h. frowde, , vo. s. the law of war on land (written and unwritten). oxford, clarendon press, , vo. s. net. a valedictory retrospect ( - ), being a lecture delivered at all souls college, june , . oxford, at the clarendon press, . s. proposed changes in naval prize law (_from the proceedings of the british academy_). london, h. frowde, , vo. s. r. zouchaei iuris et iudicii fecialis, sive iuris inter gentes explicatio, edited in vols., with biographical and bibliographical introduction, for the carnegie institution of washington, at the oxford university press, , to. $ . iohannis db lignano db iure belli, edited from the fourteenth-century ms., with biographical and bibliographical introduction, for the carnegie institution of washington, at the oxford university press, , to. £ s. d. [transcriber's note: the spelling and usage of non-english words and characters is occasionally inconsistent throughout the work. this etext preserves the usage in each instance as it appears in the printed book, except in cases of probable error as noted below.] [note a: printed _s'entiendrait_ in original.] [note b: printed _ressasi_ in original.] [note c: printed _principles_ in original.] [note d: spelled _tokomaru_ where it appears in the text.] [note e: misprinted in original--intended page unknown.] the laws of war, affecting commerce and shipping by h. byerley thomson, esq., b.a. barrister-at-law, of jesus college, cambridge, and the inner temple a new edition, enlarged, with an introduction and index preface to the second edition. the success which attended the publication of the first edition of this treatise, on "the laws of war, affecting commerce and shipping," has confirmed the author's opinion of the utility of such a work; and its hearty acceptance by the mercantile world has induced him to add largely and materially to this edition. the general plan of the former work has not been departed from in the first portion of the present; and although a great number of fresh and popular topics have been here touched upon, the author has endeavoured to preserve (as far as was consistent with accuracy), that concise and popular character which he believes in no small degree contributed to the favourable reception of the first edition. an introduction has also been added, discussing the origin of the laws of war generally, and the utility of the work has been enhanced by an index for facilitating reference. in a second part, which will shortly appear, the author proposes to treat of the laws of war relating to the army, navy, and the militia, as well as the administration of the bodies governing those various sections of the war force of the country. h.b.t. , serjeant's inn, temple, april , . contents. introduction chapter i. commencement of war. section i. the immediate effects of war section ii. on enemies and hostile property chapter ii. section i. actual war. its effects section ii. prizes and privateers section iii. licences section iv. ransom, recaptures, and salvage chapter iii. section i. neutrality section ii. contraband of war section iii. blockades. right of search. convoys section iv. armed neutralities appendix to part i. note a. the law of reprisals note b. war bill act note c. rule of note d. articles that have been declared contraband at various times note e. the late declarations introduction to part i. it would be superfluous to trouble my readers, in a concise practical treatise, with any theoretical discussion on the origin of the law of nations, had not questions of late been often asked, respecting the means of accommodating rules decided nearly half-a-century ago, to those larger views of international duty and universal humanity, that have been the natural result of a long peace, and general progress. to commence with the question, who is the international legislator? it must be observed, that there is no general body that can legislate on this subject; no parliament of nations that can discuss and alter the law already defined. the maritime tribunals of maritime states always have been, and still are, almost the sole interpreters and mouthpieces of the international law. attempts that have been made by our own parliaments, by individual sovereigns, and even by congressional assemblies of the ministers of european powers, to create new universal laws, have been declared by these courts to be invalid, and of no authority. and though it is distinctly laid down, that the law of nations forms a part of the common law of england, yet it is not subject to change by act of parliament, as other portions of the common law are; except so far as parliament can change the form, constitution, and persons of the courts that declare the law. lord stowell says "no british act of parliament, nor any commission founded upon it, can affect the rights or interests of foreigners, unless they are founded upon principles, and impose regulations, that are consistent with the law of nations." and in another place-- "much stress has been laid upon the solemn declaration of the eminent persons (the ministers of the european powers), assembled in congress (at vienna). great as the reverence due to such authorities may be, they cannot, i think, be admitted to have the force of over-ruling the established course of the general law of nations." it is to the maritime courts, then, of this and other countries, that the hopes of civilization must look for improvement and advance in the canons of international intercourse during the unhappy time of war. the manner, and the feeling in which they are to pronounce those canons cannot be more finely enunciated than in the words of lord stowell himself. "i consider myself as stationed here, not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the _law of nations_ holds out, without distinction, to independent states, some happening to be neutral, and some belligerent. "the seat of judicial authority is indeed locally _here_ in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; _but the law itself has no locality_. it is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question, if sitting at stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of great britain, which he would not allow to sweden in the same circumstances; and to impose no duties on sweden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to _great britain_, in the same character. if, therefore, i mistake the law in this matter, i mistake that which i consider, and which i mean should be considered, as universal law upon the question." when an admiralty judge investigates the law in this impartial spirit, he occupies the grand position of being in some respects the director of the deeds of nations; but with equal certainty does the taint of an unjust bias poison all his authority; his judgments are powerful then only for evil; they bind no one beyond the country in which he sits, and may become the motive and origin of reprisal and attack upon his native land. as the authority of the international judge depends on his integrity, so also does the universal law arise from, and remain supported by, the true principles of right and justice; in other words, by the fundamental distinction between right and wrong. a statute, a despotic prerogative, and an established principle of common law, rest upon different sanctions. they may be the causes of the greatest injustice, may sow the seeds of national ruin, and yet may even require revolutions for their reformation; but any one of the laws of nations preserves its vitality, only with the essential truth of its principles; a change in the feeling of mankind on the great question of real justice, destroys it, and it simply remains an historical record of departed opinion, or a point from which to date an advance or retreat in the career of the human mind. it is for this reason that international law has been so differently defined by writers at various periods. the law of nations is _founded_, i have said, on the general principles of right and justice, on the broad fundamental distinctions between right and wrong, or as montesquieu defines it, "on the principle that nations ought in time of peace to do each as much good, and in time of war as little harm as possible." these are the principles from which any rule must be shown to spring, before it can be said to be a rule for international guidance. but what are the principles of right and wrong? these are not left to the individual reason of the interpreter of the law for the time being, but are to be decided by the _public opinion of the civilized world_, as it stands at the time when the case arises. it may immediately be asked--how is that public opinion to be ascertained? the answer is--by ascertaining the _differences_ in opinion between the present and the past. for this purpose it must be observed, that the views of a past age are easily ascertainable, in matters of law, from theoretical writings, history, and judicial decisions; and these views may be reduced to definition. modern universal intelligence will either agree or disagree in these views. in the mass of instances it will agree, as progress on such points is at all times slow; and not only will the points of _disagreement_ be few, but they will be salient, striking, and generally of popular notoriety. present, universal, or international opinion, has therefore two portions. . that in which it accords with the views of a past generation, that has become historical. . that in which it differs from, or contradicts those views. in the first instance, then, we are to ascertain what _were_ the principles of right and justice, from any materials handed down to us; and if those principles agree with, or support the practical rules recorded by the same, or similar sources of information, such are to be accepted as belonging to the code of the laws of nations, as far as those principles are uncontradicted by modern opinion. in the second instance, those differences which may either overrule, add to, or complete the public opinion of a past age, are to be ascertained, (by those in whose hands such decisions rest,) by looking to the _wish_ of nations on these points; and this wish may be exhibited in various ways; either by a universal abandonment of a given law, in its non-execution by any nation whatever, for a length of time; by numerous treaties, to obtain by convention an improvement not yet declared by international tribunals; or by extending to the relations and duties of nations, the improvements in the general principles of right and justice, that are at the time being applied to the concerns of private individuals. the judges of such matters are not to ignore what is going on around them; all necessary knowledge is to be brought into court to discover what is the universal feeling of nations in respect of right and wrong, at the time they decide, and if they see a departure from the past sense of right and wrong, to make the modern, and not the ancient, the fountain of modern law; thence deducing the modern rules. because a precept cannot be found to be settled by the consent or practice of nations at one time, it is not to be concluded that it cannot be incorporated into the public code of nations, at some subsequent period. nor is it to be admitted, that no precept belongs to the law of nations which is not _universally_ recognised as such, by all civilized communities, or even by those constituting what may be called the christian states of europe. some doctrines, which we, as well as the united states, admit to belong to the law of nations, are comparatively of recent origin and application, and even at this period have received no public or general sanction in other nations; and yet, inasmuch as they are founded on a just view of the duties and rights of nations, according to a modern universal sense of what is just, they are enforced here as ascertained laws.[ ] by a similar train of reasoning, not only may the international tribunals of england enunciate new rules of law, as universal law, if founded and fairly deduced from ascertained modern, public, and international opinion; but they may refuse to alter settled rules, however much opposed by other nations, provided those rules are still deducible from that origin. generally, every doctrine fairly deduced, by correct reasoning, from the rights and duties of nations, and the nature of moral obligation, may be said to exist in the law of nations. those rights, duties, and that moral obligation, are to be ascertained from the enunciation of them in past times, unless they have been relaxed, waived, or altered by universal modern opinion. we may regard, then, the law of nations to be a system of political ethics; not reduced to a written code, but to be sought for, (not founded,) in the elementary writings of publicists, judicial precedents, and general usage and practice; but _continually_ open to change and improvement; as the views of men in general, change or improve, with regard to the questions--what is right? what is just? now to apply the above to one example. undoubtedly up to the present time the system of granting letters of marque to the adventurers of a power friendly to the enemy, has received the sanction of the world. these buccaneering adventurers have, under the laws of war, when taken, claimed and been allowed the rights of prisoners of war; have exercised all the privileges of regular privateers, and cast little or no responsibility on the countries they issued from, who still claimed to be entitled to the full position of neutral powers. yet these unprincipled men differed from pirates in one respect only--that their infamous warfare was waged on one unhappy nation alone, instead of against the power of mankind. uninfluenced by national feelings, their sole object was the plunder of the honest trader, and the means to that end--murder. are there any modern principles of right and justice by which such persons are still to claim consideration? that there were such principles formerly, when the whole system of war was barbaric and unmerciful, cannot be doubted, unless such enemies were to be condemned when others equally bad were to be excused; but those reasons have now disappeared. universal opinion is against these principles; numerous treaties have condemned the practice; the municipal laws of several states have made it punishable in their own subjects; america has even attempted, in two cases, to bring it in as piracy; and the highest authorities have pronounced it a crime. are not then the foundations of the laws that governed this case changed? it may be going too far to declare it piracy by the law of nations, but is it asking too much, in calling upon our maritime tribunals to proclaim the practice contrary to the law of nations; to deprive these privateers of the protection of neutrality, when in their native waters, and to subject the nation that permits them to fit out in, or issue from their ports, to the danger of reprisals, from the offended belligerents. this i suggest as an example of the application of the principles of right and wrong, as at present understood, to the investigation of the continued soundness of an accepted precept of law. in the judgments of lord stowell there are many such examples; and _guided_ as he was by precedent and authority, he could not be said to have been _led_ by anything but the principles of universal justice. at no time does he appear for a moment to have hesitated in putting aside precedent, when the true doctrine was unsatisfied. mr. justice story acted on the same plan. the granting of salvage for the recapture of neutral property--the denial of the right of the danish government to confiscate private debts--the declaration of mr. justice story, that the slave trade was against the law of nations--are a few amongst many remarkable examples of the fundamental principle being allowed to alter and overrule the authoritative precept. the laws of war. part i. the laws of war affecting commerce and shipping. chapter i. commencement of war. section i. _the immediate effects of war_. for some months the state of war that has been impending between russia, and the allied powers,--england, france, and turkey,--has now become actual; and though there have been many acts of preparation and precaution on the part of england and france, we have not been, up to the present crisis, engaged in what is termed by international writers, public and solemn war; such a position of affairs has at last arrived. [sidenote: solemn war.] the war then, that england has entered into, is of the most public and solemn kind. public war is divided into perfect and imperfect. the former is more usually called solemn. grotius defines public or solemn war to be such public war as is declared or proclaimed. imperfect wars between nations, that is such wars as nations carry on one against the other, without declaring or proclaiming them, though they are public wars, are seldom called wars at all; they are more usually known by the name of reprisals, or acts of hostility. it has often been important to determine, on the re-settlement of peace, what time war commenced, and when reprisals ceased.[ ] according to the law of nations, two things are required for a solemn war; first, it must be a public war; that is, the contending parties must be two nations, or two parties of allied nations, contending by force under the direction of a supreme executive; and secondly, it must be proclaimed, notified, or declared. and probably it must be general in its character, and not simply local or defensive. presuming that the coming contest will be of the widest character, i shall proceed to examine its legal effects on commerce, on that supposition.[ ] [sidenote: declaration of war] declarations have existed from the most ancient times, having been borrowed by modern nations from the manners and customs of the romans. but in present times, (although they may be very properly put forward,) they are not necessary to a state of actual war, or as it is technically termed, to legalize hostilities. a declaration of war is not a matter of international right.[ ] acts of hostilities, without such an instrument, cannot be denounced as irregular or piratical, unless committed in manifest bad faith. but though war may lawfully commence without an actual declaration, yet a declaration is of sufficient force to create a state of war, without any mutual attack. it is not a mere challenge from one country to another, to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other. it proves the existence of actual hostilities on one side at least, and puts the other party also in a state of war, though, he may, perhaps, think proper to act on the defensive only.[ ] [sidenote: war, how commenced.] war now generally commences by actual hostilities, by the recal or dismissal of an ambassador or minister, or by a manifesto published by one belligerent power to its own subjects. manifestoes are issued to fix the date of the commencement of hostilities; for as a state of war has many various effects on commercial transactions, such as the confiscation of certain property, and the dissolution of certain contracts, it is very necessary that such a date should be accurately known. when a manifesto or declaration is issued, it is said to legalize hostilities, that is to say,--to make all acts done, and all breaches committed, under pressure of war, good and lawful acts and breaches. i have given this explanation, because it is a popular notion that a declaration always precedes war; but in reality, in modern times, few wars are solemnly declared;--they begin most often with general hostilities; thus the first dutch war began upon general letters of marque, and the war with spain, that commenced by the attempted invasion of the armada in , was not declared or proclaimed between the two crowns.[ ] [sidenote: contents of declaration.] the manifesto not only announces the commencement contents of and existence of hostilities, but also states the reasons of, and attempts the justification of the war; and it is necessary for the instruction and direction of the subjects of the belligerent state, with respect to their intercourse with the foe; it also apprizes neutral nations of the fact, and enables them to conform their conduct to the rights belonging to the new state of things.[ ] without such an official act, it might be difficult to distinguish, in a treaty of peace, those acts which are to be accounted lawful effects of war, from those which either nation may consider as naked wrongs, and for which they may, under certain circumstances, claim reparation. when war is duly declared, it is not merely a war between one government and another, but between nation and nation, between every individual of the one state with each and every individual of the other. the subjects of one country are all, and every one of them, the foes of every subject of the other, and from this principle flow many important consequences.[ ] [sidenote: property of subjects of belligerent states in the enemy's country.] on the commencement of hostilities a natural expectation will arise that the property, (if not the persons) of the belligerent state, found in the enemy's territory, will become liable to seizure and confiscation, especially as no declaration or notice of war is now necessary to legalize hostilities. according to strict authority, the persons and property of subjects of the enemy found in the belligerent state are liable to detention and confiscation; but even on this point diversity of opinion has arisen among institutional writers; and modern usage seems to exempt the persons and property of the enemy found in either territory at the outbreak of the war, from its operations. without entering on the long arguments that have been produced on this subject, and which it is not the intention of this treatise to reproduce, the rule may be stated very nearly as follows.[ ] that though, on principle, the property of the enemy is liable to seizure and confiscation, yet it is now an established international usage that such property found within the territory of the belligerent state, or debts due to its subjects by the government or individuals, _at the commencement_ of hostilities, are not liable to be seized and confiscated as prize of war. this rule is often enforced by treaty, but unless thus enforced it cannot be considered as an inflexible, though established, rule. this rule is a guide which the sovran of the belligerent state follows or abandons at will, and although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded. it is not an immutable rule, but depends on considerations which continually vary.[ ] [sidenote: rule with respect to immoveable property.] the rule is different with respect to immoveable things, such as landed estates. he who declares war does not confiscate the immoveable estate possessed in his country by the enemy, but the income may be sequestrated, to prevent its being remitted to the enemy.[ ] [sidenote: public funds.] public funds, or in other words, debts due from the sovran of the hostile state to private persons, are always held protected from confiscation, and there is only one instance in modern times where this rule has been broken. it is a matter of public faith; and even during war, no enquiry ought to be made whether any part of the public debt is due to the subjects of the enemy.[ ] [sidenote: rule of reciprocity.] all these rules are, however, subject to the rule of reciprocity. this is thus laid down by sir william scott, in the case of the santa cruz, "that at the commencement of a war, it is the constant practice of this country to condemn property seized before the war, if the enemy condemns, and to restore if the enemy restores. it is a principle sanctioned by that great foundation of the law of england, _magna charta_ itself, which prescribes, that at the commencement of a war the enemy's merchants shall be kept and treated as our own merchants are treated in their country."[ ] [sidenote: droits of admiralty.] [ ]in england, at present, however, these liberal principles are modified by rights of admiralty, the foregoing rules being applied rather to property _upon the land_ than _within the territory_; for although, when captures are made in ports, havens, or rivers, within the body of the country of the realm, the admiralty is in reality excluded, yet prize courts have uniformly, without objection, tried all such captures in ports and havens within the realm; as in the case of ships not knowing hostilities, coming in by mistake, before the declaration of war or hostilities; all the ships of the enemy are detained in our ports, to be confiscated as the property of the enemy, if no reciprocal agreement is made.[ ] [sidenote: hostile embargo.] this species of reprisal is termed a hostile embargo. it cannot well be distinguished from the practice of seizing property found within the territory upon the declaration of war. it is undoubtedly against the spirit of modern liberality, and has been but too justly reprobated as destroying that protection to property which the rule of faith and justice gives it, when brought into the country in the course of trade, and in the confidence of peace. it is not, however, as wheaton states, peculiar to england, but common to modern europe, except that england does not, in practice, appear to be influenced by the corresponding conduct of the enemy in that respect.[ ] [sidenote: debts due to and from an enemy.] but with relation to debts due to an enemy, previous to hostilities, english law follows a wiser principle. on the outbreak of war between denmark and this country in , the danish government, as a measure of retaliation for the seizure of their ships in our ports, issued an ordinance sequestrating all debts due from danish to british subjects, causing them to be paid into the danish royal treasury. the court of king's bench decided that this was not a legal defence to a suit in england for the debt, and that the ordinance was not conformable to the law to nations.[ ] it was observed by the court, that the right of confiscating debts (contended for on the authority of vattel,)[ ] was not recognised by grotius,[ ] and was impugned by puffendorf and others; and that no instance had occurred of the exercise of the right, (except the ordinance in question,) for upwards of a century. this is undoubtedly the law in england, although it may be doubted if this rule still holds so strongly in the united states. [sidenote: interruption of intercourse; trading with the enemy unlawful.] one of the most immediate consequences of the outbreak of hostilities is the complete interruption of commercial intercourse between the subjects of the countries at war, even to the extent of holding it unlawful, after war has begun, except under special licence of the government, to send a vessel to the enemy's country to bring home, with _their permission_, one's own property, when war has broken out. there cannot exist at the same time a war for arms and a peace for commerce; from the very nature of war all commercial intercourse ceases between enemies. this interdiction of intercourse is the result of the mere operation of war; for declarations of war generally enjoin on every subject the duty of attack on the subjects of the hostile state, of seizing their goods, and doing them every harm in their power.[ ] from the very nature of war itself, all commercial intercourse ceases between enemies. the utility, however, of merchants, and the mutual wants of nations, have almost got the better of the law of war as to commerce. hence, commerce is alternately permitted and forbidden in time of war, as princes think it most for the interest of their subjects. a commercial nation is anxious to trade, and accommodate the laws of war to the greater or lesser want that it may have for the goods of the other. thus sometimes a mutual commerce is permitted generally; sometimes as to certain merchandizes only, while others are prohibited; and sometimes it is prohibited altogether. in this manner there is partly peace and partly war, between subjects of both countries.[ ] in the case of the hoop,[ ] sir wm. scott says, "by the law and constitution of great britain, the sovereign alone has the power of declaring war and peace. he alone, therefore, who has the power of entirely removing the state of war, has the power of removing it in part, by permitting, when he sees proper, that commercial intercourse, which is a partial suspension of the war. there may be occasions on which such an intercourse may be highly expedient; but it is not for individuals to determine on the expediency of such occasions, on their own notions of commerce only, and possibly on grounds of private advantage not very reconcilable with the general interests of the state. it is for the state alone, on more enlarged views of policy, and of all circumstances that may be connected with such an intercourse, to determine when it shall be permitted, and under what regulations. no principle ought to be held more sacred than that this intercourse cannot subsist on any other footing than that of the direct permission of the state. who can be insensible to the consequences that might follow, if every person in time of war had a right to carry on a commercial intercourse with the enemy; and under colour of that, had the means of carrying on any other species of intercourse he might think fit? the inconvenience to the public might be extreme; and where is the inconvenience on the other side, that the merchants should be compelled, in such a situation of the two countries, to carry on his trade between them, (if necessary,) under the eye and control of the government charged with the care of public safety?" [sidenote: alien enemy cannot sue in this country.] sir william then goes on to say, "another principle of law, of a less politic nature, but equally general in its reception and direct in its application, forbids this sort of communication as fundamentally inconsistent with the relation at the time existing between the two countries, and that is the total inability to sustain any contract by an appeal to the tribunals of the one country, on the part of the subjects of the other. in the law of almost every country, the character of an alien enemy carries with it a disability to sue, or to sustain, in the language of the civilians, a _persona standi in judicio_. the peculiar law of our own country applies this principle with great rigour--the same principle is received in our courts of the law of nations; they are so far _british_ courts, that no man can sue therein who is a subject of the enemy, unless under particular circumstances that _pro hac vice_ discharge him from the character of an enemy, such as his coming under a flag of truce, a cartel, or a pass, or some other act of public authority that puts him in the queen's peace _pro hac vice_. but otherwise he is totally _ex lex_! even in the case of ransom bills which were contracts, but contracts arising out of _the laws of war_, and tolerated as such, the enemy was not permitted to sue _in his own person_, for the payment of the ransom bill; the payment was enforced by an action brought by the imprisoned hostage in the courts of his own country, for the recovery of his freedom. a state in which contracts cannot be enforced is not a state of legal commerce." [sidenote: no trade permitted except under royal licence.] "upon these and similar grounds, it has been the established rule of this court, confirmed by the judgment of the supreme court, that a trading with the enemy, except under a royal licence, subjects the property to confiscation. "where the government has authorised, under sanction of an act of parliament, a _homeward trade_ from the enemy's possessions, but has not specifically protected an _outward_ _trade_ to the same, though intimately connected with that homeward trade, and almost necessary to its existence, the rule has been enforced, where strong claim not merely of convenience, but almost of necessity, excused it on behalf of the individual. "it has been enforced, where cargoes have been laden before the war, but where the parties have not used all possible diligence to countermand the voyage after the first notice of hostilities.[ ] "in the last war between england and america, a case occurred in which an american citizen had purchased a quantity of goods within the british territory, a long time previous to the war, and had deposited them upon an island near the frontier; upon the breaking out of hostilities, his agents had hired a vessel to proceed to the spot, to bring away the goods; on her return she was captured, and with the cargo, condemned as prize of war."[ ] so also, where goods were purchased, some time before the war, by the agent of an american citizen in great britain, but not shipped until nearly a year after the declaration of hostilities, they were pronounced liable to confiscation.[ ] where property is to be withdrawn from the country of the enemy, it is the more satisfactory and guarded proceeding on the part of the _british_ merchant to apply to his own government for the special importation of the article; it is indeed the only safe way in which parties can proceed.[ ] [sidenote: subjects of an ally may not trade with the enemy.] during a conjoint war no subject of an ally can trade with the common enemy without liability to forfeiture in the prize courts of the ally, of all his property engaged in such trade. as the former rule can be relaxed only by permission of the sovran power of the state, so this can be relaxed only by the permission of the allied nations, according to their mutual consent.[ ] [sidenote: contracts void.] on similar principles, all contracts made with the enemy _during war_ are utterly _void_. this applies to insurances on the enemy's property and trade; to the drawing and negociation of bills of exchange, whether the subject of this country or of the alien enemy be the acceptor; to the sending of money or bills to the enemy's country; to commercial partnerships. all endeavours to trade by third persons are equally illegal.[ ] thus also all contracts made in contemplation of war, and which never could have existed at all, but as an insurance against the pressure of war, and with a view to evade the rights that arise out of war, and in fraud of the belligerent, are illegal, even though made by neutrals.[ ] [sidenote: insurances.] the municipal or common law of every state declares all insurances to be void, by which ships or merchandize of the enemy are sought to be protected. also all insurances by or on behalf of _alien_ enemies are wholly illegal and void, although effected before the breaking out of hostilities; but if both the policy had been effected and the loss accrued before the war, the remedy is only suspended during the war. the general principle is that the contract of assurance is vacated and annulled _ab initio_; wherever an insurance is made on a voyage expressly prohibited by the common, statute, or maritime law of the country; the policy is of no effect.[ ] thus, if a ship, though neutral, be insured on a voyage prohibited by an embargo laid on in time of war, by the prince of the country in whose ports the ships happen to be, such an insurance is void.[ ] similarly, all insurances to protect the interests of british subjects trading without licence with the enemy are absolutely void.[ ] so also, if a licence is not strictly pursued, so that the voyage becomes illegal, the insurance is void.[ ] i have said that all insurances will be void which are designed to protect voyages or trading to hostile ports. but, for this purpose, it must be clearly made out, not only that the port into which the ship sails is hostile, but also, that she was bound with a distinct hostile destination at the time of loss. thus a policy to "ports in the baltic," is legal, as some may be hostile, and some not, and it is not certain that she was sailing to a hostile port. the general principle by which the validity of a policy is to be tested, is by the voyage, that it is a voyage prohibited by law, on some ground of public policy. the will, therefore, of the parties is of no account, as the prohibition is for public, and not private benefit. so that if the underwriter is told that the voyage is illicit he is not more bound than if he were not told so.[ ] it is insurances upon voyages generally prohibited by law, such as to an enemy's garrison, or upon a voyage directly contrary to an express act of parliament, or to royal proclamation in time of war, that are absolutely void and null;--therefore, on neutral vessels, or the vessels of british subjects possessing neutral rights and sailing from neutral ports to enemies ports are not void.[ ] similarly, with respect to insurances on neutral vessels carrying _contraband goods_, for it is not the voyage, but the cargo, that is illegal in that case.[ ] insurances are good on neutral vessels engaged in the colonial trade of the enemy, and which was closed to the neutral in time of peace,[ ] it must be observed, that if a voyage is illegal, and voids the policy for that voyage, it does not follow that it voids the voyage in the opposite direction, and even the goods purchased by the proceeds of a former illegal voyage, may be the subject of insurance.[ ] [sidenote: bills of exchange drawn during war.] it has been stated above that all bills drawn or negociated with the enemy, whether a british subject or the alien enemy be the acceptor, are null and void; during the last war, however, attempts were often made to draw and negociate bills that should pass muster in our courts of law, as for example:-- an alien enemy, during war, drew upon a british subject resident in england, and who had funds of the alien in his hands; the drawer then indorsed the bill to an english-born subject, resident in the hostile country; such a bill cannot be enforced even after the restoration of peace, for otherwise it would enable alien enemies to take the benefit of all their property in this country, by allowing them to pay debts out of such funds, by the instrumentality of bills.[ ] the principle seems to be,--that it is not every bill that bears the name of an alien enemy upon it that is void, but such bills only that are instrumental in assisting in communication with an alien enemy;--and a liberal application of this principle has been made use of to open a way for english prisoners to make use of their property at home for their support in the country of their captivity. thus, where one of two englishmen, detained in france on the breaking out of hostilities, drew in favour of the other, upon a subject here, it was held that he might legally draw such a bill for his _subsistence_, and that he might indorse it to an alien enemy, an inhabitant of the hostile country; for he could not avail himself of the bill except by negociation; and to whom could he negociate it, except to the inhabitants of the country in which he resided?[ ] bills, like other contracts, are only void by the policy of war; but the law still recognizes some extent of obligation between the parties, so that bills void in their concoction (as instruments of trade with the enemy,) are not so far void that they may not constitute the basis of a promise by which a party may bind himself on the return of peace.[ ] [sidenote: contracts made before the war.] on the very important question of the effect of a declaration on contracts with the subjects or the enemy, _entered into previous to the war_, the rule is, that if the performance of the contract be rendered unlawful by the government of the country, the contract is dissolved on both sides.[ ] thus the contract of affreightment is dissolved when the voyage becomes unlawful, by the commencement of war, or the interdiction of commerce;[ ] and this whether the interdiction is complete as to the ship, or partial as to the receiving of goods. similarly, if the voyage be broken up by capture on the passage, so as to cause a _complete defeat_ of the undertaking, the contract is dissolved, notwithstanding a recapture.[ ] a blockade of the port of destination, that renders the delivery of the cargo impossible, and obliges the ship to return to its port of destination, dissolves the contract.[ ] a temporary interruption of the voyage does not put an end to the agreement. embargoes, hostile blockades, and investments of the port of departure are held to be temporary impediments only.[ ] but in the case of an embargo imposed by the government of the country, of which the merchant is a subject, in the nature of reprisals and partial hostility, against the enemy to which the ship belongs, the merchant may put an end to the contract, if the object of the voyage is likely to be defeated thereby; as if, for example, the cargo were of a perishable nature.[ ] [sidenote: partnerships.] a public war operates as a positive dissolution of partnerships between subjects of the contending nations. every partnership is dissolved by the extinction of the business for which it was formed.[ ] by a declaration of war, the respective subjects of each country become positive enemies to each other. they can carry on no commercial or other intercourse with each other; they can make no valid contracts with each other; they can institute no suits in the courts of either country; they can, properly speaking, hold no communication of an amicable nature, with each other; and their property is mutually liable to capture and confiscation by the subjects of the other country. the whole objects and ends of the partnership, the application of the joint funds, skill, labour, and enterprize of all the partners of the common business, can no longer be attained.[ ] thus a partnership between alien friends, is at once defeated when they become alien enemies. this dissolution, however, only has respect to the future. the parties remain bound for all antecedent engagements. the partnership may be said to continue as to everything that is past, and until all pre-existing matters are wound up and settled. with regard to things past, the partnership continues, and must always continue. no notice is necessary to the world to complete the dissolution of the association. notice is requisite when a partnership is dissolved by the act of the parties, but it is not necessary when the dissolution takes place by the act of law. all mankind are bound to take notice of the war, and its consequences. besides, any special notice would be useless unless joint, and as the partners could hold no lawful intercourse, a lawful joint notice is impossible. it must not be supposed that peace will have any healing effect, to restore the parties to their rights; the co-partnership being once dissolved by the war, it was extinguished for ever, except as to matters existing prior to the war.[ ] with regard to the effect of war upon partnerships, where the partners are severally subjects of the belligerent powers. according to mr. justice story, "this point does not seem to have been discussed in our courts of justice until a recent period; yet it would seem to be a necessary result of principles of public law, well established and defined. by a declaration of war, the respective subjects of each country become positive enemies of each other. they can carry on no commercial or other intercourse with each other; they can make no valid contracts with each other; they can institute no suits in the courts of either country; they can, properly speaking, hold no communication of an amicable nature with each other; and their property is mutually liable to capture and confiscation, by the subjects of either country. now, it is obvious from these considerations, that the whole ends and objects of the partnership, the application of the joint funds, skill, labours, and enterprize, of all the partners in the common business thereof, can no longer be attained. the conclusion therefore, would seem to be absolutely that this mutual supervening capacity, must, upon the very principles applied to all analagous cases, amount to a positive dissolution of the partnership."[ ] the law of nations has not even stopped at the points already stated; it proceeds further. the question of enemy or no enemy, depends not upon the natural allegiance of the partners, but upon their domicile. [sidenote: partnerships.] if a partnership is established, and as it were domiciled, in a neutral country, and all the partners reside there, it is treated as a neutral establishment, and is entitled to protection accordingly. but if one or more of the partners is domiciled in an enemy's country, he or they are treated personally as enemies, and his share of the partnership property is liable to capture and condemnation accordingly, even though the partnership establishment is in the neutral country. the inference from these considerations is, that in all these cases there is an utter incompatibility from operation of law between the partners, as to their respective rights, duties, and obligations, both public and private; and therefore, that a dissolution must necessarily result therefrom, independent of the will or acts of the parties.[ ] and, as a general rule, therefore, it may be laid down, that if the performance of a covenant be rendered unlawful by the government of this country entering into war, the contract will be dissolved on both sides, and the offending party, as he has been compelled to abandon his contract, will be excused from the payment of damages for its non-performance; but it is otherwise, if the non-performance is prevented only by the prohibition of a foreign country.[ ] in such cases, the remedy only is suspended; and other cases may occur on these principles, where, from other circumstances, the remedy only is suspended until the termination of the war; as for example, in most cases of executed contracts. [sidenote: trading with the enemy punishable.] trading with the enemy, was at an early period an indictable offence in the english court of admiralty.[ ] and in the time of king william, it was held to be a misdemeanor at common law, to carry corn to an enemy.[ ] the law, as i have faintly sketched it out, is founded to some extent on american authorities, where the question has been as fully discussed as in the reports of this country; but there can be little doubt that the law is the same in this country: although a doubt was once thrown on it, by the strong political opinion of lord mansfield, as to the policy of allowing trade with an enemy, or assuring an enemy's property. the lustre of his talents, and his ascendancy in the court of king's bench, were calculated to continue the delusion. during his time, the question as to the _legality_ of such insurances was never mooted; for he frowned on every attempt to set up such a defence, as dishonest and against good faith.[ ] the strict rule of interdicted intercourse has been carried so far in the british admiralty, as to prohibit supplies to a british colony during its partial subjection to the enemy, and when the colony was in want of provisions.[ ] [sidenote: cartel ships] the same interdiction to trade applies to cartel ships, or ships of truce, that is, to ships sent to recover prisoners of war; and there is but one exception to this rigorous rule of international law;--the case of ransom bills, which are contracts of necessity, founded on a state of war. section ii. _on enemies and hostile property_. during a peace of thirty-nine years, there has naturally arisen a vast inter-immigration throughout europe; many complicated commercial and family relations have sprung up between nations of different countries; many englishmen are permanently settled in various parts of europe; and england, in return, is crowded with foreigners, who look upon this country as their present and future home. what is the position of these persons at the commencement of war? who, in fact, are our enemies? and the previous section, in which the effect of war on commercial relations has been sketched out, must have made it quite evident that it has become important accurately to determine what relations and circumstances impress a hostile character upon persons and property. according to chancellor kent, "the modern international law of the commercial world is replete with refined and complicated distinctions on this point." * * * * * [sidenote: alien enemies] a man is said to be permanently an alien enemy, when he owes a permanent allegiance to the adverse belligerent, and his hostility is commensurate in point of time with his country's quarrel. but he who does not owe a permanent allegiance to the enemy, is an enemy only during the existence and continuance of certain circumstances.[ ] the character of enemy arises from the party being in what the law looks upon as a state of allegiance to the state at war with us; if the allegiance is permanent (as in the case of a natural-born subject of the hostile sovran), the character is permanent. but with respect to the man who is an alien enemy from what he does under a local or temporary allegiance to a power at war with us--when the allegiance ends, the character of alien enemy ceases to exist.[ ] of course all persons owing a natural allegiance to the enemy are our enemies; but on the same broad principles of natural justice that impress a temporary character upon our friends and fellow countrymen, under special circumstances individuals from amongst our natural enemies become our friends and fellow subjects. * * * * * [sidenote: prisoners of war.] the first among these are prisoners of war. a prisoner of war is _not_ adhering to the king's enemies, for he is here under the protection from the king. if he conspires against the king's life it is high treason; if he is killed (malice aforethought), it is murder. he is not, therefore, in a state of actual hostility. at one time it was ruled, that a prisoner of war could not contract; but that case was thought hard. officers on their parole must subsist like other men of their own rank; but if they could not contract they must starve; for they could gain no credit if deprived of the power of sueing for their own debts. a prisoner in confinement is protected as to his person, and if on parole he has protection in his credit also.[ ] he is allowed to support himself, and add to his personal comfort, by applying himself in his trade or business, and may maintain an action on his contract for his wages; nor can he be compelled, when sueing for money necessary for his support, to give security for costs like any other foreigner temporarily resident in this country.[ ] * * * * * [sidenote: married foreigners.] a wife generally follows the country and allegiance of her husband; but where she is in this country of necessity, or is here owing allegiance by her birth, and her husband is an alien enemy and under an absolute disability to come and live here, the law steps in to her aid, and gives her the privileges of an unmarried woman, so that she may sue and be sued, and make contracts for and against herself, for her maintenance. "her case," says chief justice holt, "does not differ from that of those ladies who were allowed to sue and be sued upon the adjuration or banishments of their lords, as if they had been sole."[ ] foreign ladies, who have married englishmen, are, by their marriage, naturalized, and have all the rights, privileges, and duties, of natural-born subjects, and cease to be enemies.[ ] * * * * * [sidenote: enemies by hostility.] a hostile character may be acquired by alien friends, by acts of actual hostility, and by alien friends and our fellow-subjects also, by what are termed personal and commercial domicile. of course a british subject in actual hostility to his native country is more than enemy, he is a traitor, and has no belligerent rights; but an alien friend, that is a neutral engaging in war against this country, under the commission of a foreign prince, and in the ranks of a hostile army, or on board a legally commissioned enemy's vessel, is an enemy, and has all the rights of a prisoner of war, if taken. * * * * * [sidenote: mariners.] a mariner, by a general rule, takes the character of the country in whose service he is employed, and even fugitive visits to the place of his birth will not entitle him to retain the benefit of a neutral character, in opposition to a regular course of employment in the enemy's country and trade; nor does the fact of his wife and family residing in his own country enable him to retain his native character.[ ] * * * * * [sidenote: domicile, test of nationality.] with the exception of these special cases, in a state of war, domicile is the test of nationality. according to grotius, "by the law of nations all the subjects of the offending state, who are such from a _permanent_ cause, whether natives _or emigrants from another country_, are liable to reprisals; but not so those who are only travelling or sojourning for a little." and he even holds that the right of killing and doing bodily harm to enemies extends "not only to those who bear arms, or are subjects of the author of the war, but to _all_ those who are found in the enemy's territory;" meaning all those found domiciled or adhering to the enemy. if, then, a native of england resides in a belligerent country, his property is liable to capture as enemy's property; and if he resides in a neutral country, he enjoys all the privileges, and is subject to all the inconveniences of the neutral trade.[ ] he takes all the advantages and disadvantages of the country of his adoption; with the limitation, that he must do nothing inconsistent with his native allegiance;[ ] as, for example, if he emigrate to a neutral country _during the time of war_, he will not be permitted to acquire the character of a neutral merchant, and trade with the enemy in that character, it being his duty to injure the enemy to the full extent of his power.[ ] * * * * * [sidenote: test of domicile.] in determining the important question of domicile, the _animus manendi_, or disposition to remain or settle in the land of the domicile, is the question to be determined. if a man goes into a foreign country upon a visit, to travel for health, to settle a particular business, or for similar purposes, the residence naturally attendant on these circumstances is not generally regarded as a permanent residence. but though a special purpose, such as the above, does not fix a domicile, yet these circumstances are not to be taken without respect to the _time_ they _may probably_ or _actually do_ occupy. a general residence may grow upon a special purpose. it is difficult to fix the amount of time necessary to create a domicile, and it probably must be determined from each particular case. thus, if a man remained in a hostile state after the outbreak, employed on some great work, which would occupy him many years, or beyond the probable termination of the war, or were unable to leave that particular climate on account of health, or were under any disability to return to his native country, the amount of time he had resided there would become an element of the question; against such a residence, the plea of an original special purpose, could not be averred; but it must be inferred, in such a case, that other purposes forced themselves upon him, mixed themselves with his original design, and impressed upon him the character of the country where he resided. but, as an exception, a residence involuntary or constrained, however long, does not change the original character of the party, and give him a new and hostile one. domicile is fixed by a disclosed intention of permanent residence; if the emigrant employs his person, his life, his industry, for the benefit of the state under whose protection he lives; and if, war breaking out, he continues to reside there, pays his proportion of taxes, imposts, and revenues, equally with the natural-born subjects, no doubt he may be said to be domiciled in that country. when these circumstances are ascertained, time ceases to be an element in the question, and the _animus manendi_, once ascertained, the recency of the establishment, though it may have been for a day only, is immaterial. the intention is the real subject of enquiry; and the residence, once the domicile, is not changed by periodical absence, or even by occasional visits to the native country, if the intention of foreign domicile remains. the native character, however, easily reverts; more so in the case of a native subject, than of one who is originally of another country. the moment an emigrant turns his back on his adopted country, with the intention of returning to (not simply visiting) his native country, he is in the act of resuming his original character, and must be again considered as a citizen of his native land;[ ] even if he is forcibly detained in the country he is parting from, as was the case with british subjects on the breaking out of the war of .[ ] but it is advisable for persons so situated, on their intended removal, to make application to government for a special pass, rather than to trust valuable property to the effect of a mere intention to remove, dubious as that intention may frequently appear, under the circumstances that prevent that act from being carried into execution. but, as we have before observed, general principles on this subject are scarcely sufficient; the right of domicile must depend on each individual case. if no express declaration has been made, and the secret intention has yet to be discovered, it can be evidenced by the acts of the party. in the first instance, these acts are removal to a foreign country, settlement there, and engagement in the trade of the country: and if a state of war brings his national character into question, it lies on him to explain the circumstances of his residence. * * * * * [sidenote: domicile in eastern countries.] a singular exception exists in reference to the rule of domicile. in the western parts of europe, alien merchants mix in the society of the natives; but in the east, from almost the oldest times, an immixable character has been kept up; foreigners continue strangers and sojourners, as all their fathers were. merchants residing in these countries are hence still considered british subjects. * * * * * [sidenote: hostile character acquired by trade.] again, a national character may be acquire by trade, or, as it is called, by _commercial domicile_. in general, the national character of a person, as neutral or enemy, is determined by that of his domicile; but the property of a person may acquire a hostile character independently of his personal national character derived from personal domicile. a person carrying on trade habitually in the country of the enemy, though not personally resident there, should have time given him to withdraw from that commerce; it would press too heavily on neutrals to say, that immediately on the first breaking out of a war, their goods should become subject to confiscation. but if a person enters into a house of trade in the enemy's country, in time of war, or continued that connexion during the war, he cannot protect himself by mere residence in a neutral country. "it is a _doctrine_ supported by strong principles and equity," says sir william scott, "_that there is a traffic which stamps a national character_ on the individual, independent of _that character_ which _mere personal residence_ may give him."[ ] the principle does not go to the extent of saying that a man, having a house of trade in the enemy's country, as well as in a neutral country, should be considered in his whole concerns as an enemy's merchant, as well in those which respected solely his neutral house, as in those which belong to his belligerent domicile.[ ] his lawful trade is exonerated from the operation of his unlawful trade, in all cases, and under all phases. all trade that does not originate from the belligerent country is protected, but not so, if it can be traced so to arise in not too remote a degree. the same protection however is not extended to the case of a merchant residing in the hostile country, and having a share of a house of trade in an enemy's country. residence in a neutral country will not protect his share in a house established in the enemy's country, though residence in the enemy's country will condemn his share in a house established in a neutral country.[ ] [sidenote: rule of .] the next mode in which a hostile character may be given to those not naturally bearing it, is by dealing in those branches of commerce which are confined in the time of peace to the subjects of the enemy: _i.e._ the ships and cargoes of a neutral engaged in the colonial or coasting trade of the enemy (not open to foreigners in time of peace), are liable to the penal consequences of confiscation. this point; was first mooted in the war of , and is called the rule of .[ ] * * * * * [sidenote: national character of ships.] when there is nothing particular or special in the conduct of the vessel itself, the national character is determined by the residence of the owner; but there may be circumstances arising from that conduct which will lead to a contrary conclusion. it is a known and established rule with respect to a vessel, that if she is navigating under the pass of a foreign country, she is considered as bearing the national character of the nation under whose pass she sails; she makes a part of its navigation, and is in every respect liable to be considered as a vessel of that country. in like manner, and on similar principles, if a vessel, purchased in the enemy's country, is by constant and habitual occupation continually employed in the trade of that country, commencing with the war, continuing during the war, and evidently on account of the war, that vessel is deemed a ship of the country from which she is so navigating, in the same manner as if she evidently belonged to the inhabitants of it.[ ] further, when parties agree to take the pass and flag of another country, they are not permitted, in case any inconvenience should afterwards arise, to aver against the flag and pass to which they have attached themselves, and to claim the benefit of their real character. they are likewise subject to this further inconvenience, that their own real character may be pleaded against them by others. such is the state of double disadvantage to which persons expose themselves by assuming the flag and pass of a foreign state.[ ] * * * * * [sidebar: distinction as to cargoes] a distinction is made in england between the ship and the cargo. some countries have gone so far as to make the flag and pass conclusive on the cargo also; but in england it is held that goods have no dependence upon the authority of the state, and may be differently considered. if the cargo is laden in time of peace, though documented as foreign property, in the same manner as the ship, the sailing under a foreign flag and pass has not been held conclusive as to the cargo.[ ] * * * * * [sidebar: hostile property cannot be transferred _in transitu_.] property which has a hostile character at the commencement of a voyage, cannot change that character by assignment while it is _in transitu_, so as to protect it from capture.[ ] in the ordinary course of things, in the time of peace, such a transfer _in transitu_ can certainly be made. when war intervenes, another rule is set up by the courts of admiralty, which interferes with the ordinary practice. in a state of war, _existing_ or _imminent_, it is held that the property shall be deemed to continue as it was at the time of shipment, till actual delivery; this arises out of a state of war, which gives a belligerent a right to stop the goods of his enemy. if such a rule did not exist, all goods shipped in an enemy's country would be protected by transfers, which it would be impossible to detect.[ ] chapter ii. section i. _actual war_.--_its effects_. [sidenote: objects of war.] vattel tells us "the end of a just war is to _avenge or prevent injury_; that is to say, to obtain justice by force, when not obtainable by any other method; to compel an unjust adversary to repair an injury already done, or to give us securities against any wrong with which we are threatened by him. as soon therefore as we have declared war, we have a right to do against the enemy whatever we find necessary for the attainment of that end, for the purpose of bringing him to reason, and obtaining justice and security from him. "the lawfulness of the end does not give us any thing further than barely the means necessary for the attainment of that end. whatever we do beyond that, is reprobated by the law of nature--is faulty and condemnable at the tribunal of conscience. hence it is that the right to such acts varies according to circumstance. what is just and perfectly innocent in one situation is not always so on other occasions. right goes hand in hand with necessity and the exigency of the case, but never exceeds them." such are some of the arguments that vattel puts forth with all the strength of reason and eloquence, against all unnecessary cruelty, and all mean and perfidious warfare. there was no limit to the career of violence and destruction, justified by some of the earlier writers; they considered a state of war as a dissolution of all moral ties, and a licence for every disorder and fierceness: even such authors as bynkershoek and wolff, who lived in the most learned and not the least civilized nations of europe, and were the contemporaries of that galaxy of talent that adorned the commencement of the eighteenth century, held that every thing done against an enemy was lawful. he might be destroyed, though unarmed, harmless, defenceless; fraud, even poison, might be used against him. a foe was a criminal and an outlaw, who had forfeited his rights, and whose life, liberty, and property, lay at the mercy of the victor. but such was not the public opinion or practice of enlightened europe at the time they wrote. grotius had long before, even in opposition to his own authorities, but influenced by religion and humanity, mentioned that many things were not fit and commendable, though they might be strictly lawful. he held that the law of nations prohibited the use of poisoned arms, the employment of assassins, violence to women or the dead, or making slaves of prisoners. montesquieu followed in the same humane spirit. he writes, that the civilians said, "that the law of nations, to prevent prisoners being put to death, has allowed them to be made slaves.... the reasons of the civilians are all false. it is false, that killing in war is lawful, unless in case of absolute necessity; but when a man has made another his slave, he cannot be said to be under a necessity of taking away his life, since he actually did not take it away. war gives no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing any further harm, by securing their persons. all nations concur in detesting the murdering of prisoners in cold blood."[ ] thus, it is now the established law of nations, that necessity is the measure of violence in war, and humanity, its tempering spirit; or, as it has been otherwise enunciated, the rights of war are to be measured by the objects of the war. although we have a right to kill our enemies in war; it is only when we find gentler methods insufficient to conquer their resistance and bring them to terms, that we have a right to put them to death.[ ] under the name of enemies are comprehended not only the first author of the war, but also those who join him and support his cause. [sidenote: cartel] out of these enlightened views of war has sprung the system of cartels for the exchange of prisoners. these exchanges are generally regulated by special convention between the hostile states. prisoners are sometimes permitted to return home, upon condition not to serve again during the war, or until duly exchanged. officers are frequently released upon their parole, on the same condition; and to carry more effectually into operation the arrangements necessary for these purposes, commissaries are permitted to reside in the respective hostile states. subject to the principle of non-resistance, there are several classes of persons that are generally considered exempt from the operations of war, beyond the effects of unavoidable accident. "all the members of the enemy's state," says wheaton, "may lawfully be treated as enemies, in a public war; but it does not follow that all are to be treated alike; though we may lawfully destroy some of them, it does not follow that we may lawfully destroy all; for the general rule derived from the natural law is still the same, that no force against an enemy is lawful, unless it is necessary to accomplish the purposes of war. the custom of civilised nations founded on this principle, has therefore exempted the persons of the sovran and his family, the members of the civil government, women and children, cultivators of the earth, artizans, labourers, merchants, men of science and letters, and generally all other public or private persons engaged in the ordinary civil pursuits of life, from the direct effect of military operations, unless actually taken in arms, or guilty of some misconduct in violation of the usages of war, by which they forfeit their immunity."[ ] the same principle of moderation towards that which is non-resisting limits and restrains the operations of war against the territory and other property of the enemy. there is a marked difference in the rights of war carried on by land and at sea, in modification of the general right to seize on _all_ the enemy's property, and to appropriate that property to the captors. [sidenote: objects of a maritime war.] the object of a maritime war is the destruction of the enemy's commerce and navigation, in order to weaken and destroy the foundations of his naval power. the capture or destruction of _private_ property is necessary to that end, and is allowed in maritime wars, by the practice and law of nations. [sidenote: private property on land.] but _private property on land_ is exempt from confiscation, with the exception of such as may become booty in special cases, when taken from enemies in the field or in besieged towns, and of military contributions levied upon the inhabitants of the hostile territory. this exemption extends even to an absolute and unqualified conquest of an enemy's country. in ancient times, both real and personal property of the vanquished passed to the victors; but the last example of confiscation and partition among the conquerors in europe, was that of england, by william of normandy. unless in special cases, private property on land is not touched, without making compensation; though contributions are sometimes levied in lieu of a necessary confiscation, or for the expenses of maintaining and affording protection. in other respects private rights are unaffected by war. [sidenote: government property.] the property, however, belonging to the government of the vanquished nation, passes to the victorious state, which also takes the place of the former sovereign, in respect to the eminent domain.[ ] [sidenote: limitations of the right of making war.] the right of making war, as we have shown in the first chapter of this book, solely belongs to the sovran power. subjects cannot, therefore, of themselves, take any step in the affair; nor are they allowed to commit any act of hostility without orders from their sovran. the sovran's order which commands acts of hostility, is either general or particular. the declaration of war, which enjoins the subjects to attack the enemy's subjects, implies a general order. generals, officers, soldiers, privateersmen, and partisans, being all. commissioned by the sovran, make war by virtue of a particular order. in declarations of war, the ancient form is still retained,[ ] by which subjects in general are ordered, not only to break off all intercourse with, but also to _attack_ the foe. custom interprets this general order. it authorises, indeed, and even obliges every subject, of whatever rank, to secure the persons and things belonging to the enemy, when they fall into his hands; but it does not invite the subject to undertake any offensive expedition without a commission or particular order.[ ] section ii. _prizes and privateers_. [sidenote: privateer commissions.] during the lawless confusion of the feudal ages, the right of making reprisals was claimed and exercised, with out a public commission. it was not until the fifteenth century that commissions were held necessary, and were issued to private subjects in time of war, and that subjects were forbidden to fit out vessels to cruise against enemies without licence. there were ordinances in germany, france, spain, and england, to that effect.[ ] [sidenote: non-commissioned captors.] hostilities, without a commission, are contrary to usage, and exceedingly irregular and dangerous, but they are not considered as acts of piracy during the time of war. noncommissioned vessels of a belligerent nation may at all times capture hostile ships, without being deemed, by the law of nations, pirates. but they have no interest in the prizes they take, and the property so seized is condemned to the government as _droits of the admiralty_. the reward of this class of captors is left to the liberality of the admiralty, and is often referred to the admiralty court. [sidenote: right of capture.] the fruits of any forcible detention or occupancy, prior to hostilities, are vested in the crown; similarly, _british_ property taken in course of trade forbidden by the laws of his country, is condemned to the crown, and not to the individual captor.[ ] to prevent the custom house or excise vessels, that may be commissioned with letters of marque, turning their attention from the smugglers to the more attractive adventure of privateering, all interest in their prizes is reserved to the crown,[ ] [sidenote: grants to the admiralty.] though all rights of prize belong originally to the crown, yet it has been thought expedient to grant a portion of those rights to maintain the dignity of the lord high admiral. this grant, (whatever it conveys,) carries with it a total and perpetual alienation of the rights of the crown, and nothing short of an act of parliament can restore them; whereas the grant to private captors is nothing more than the mere temporary transfer of a beneficial interest. the rights of the admiral, as distinguished from those of the crown, are these; that when vessels come in, not under any motive arising out of the occasions of war, but from distress of weather, or want of provisions, or from ignorance of war, and are seized in port, they belong to the lord high admiral; but where the hand of violence has been exercised upon them, where the impression arises from acts connected with war, from revolt of their own crews, or from being forced or driven in by the queen's ships, they belong to the crown. this includes ships and goods already come into the ports, creeks, or roadsteads, of all the queen's dominions.[ ] [sidenote: acquisition of captures.] persons fitting out private vessels under a commission to cruise against the enemy, acquire the property of whatever captures they may make, as a compensation for their disbursements, and for the risks they run; but they acquire it by grant from the sovran who issues out the commission to them. the sovran allows them either the whole, or a part of the capture; this entirely depends on the nature of the contract he has made with them.[ ] this grant of prize is, in terms, a grant of the property of the queen's enemies, but it is not restricted to the property of the nations with whom we are at war. it is held in construction and practice to embrace all property liable to be condemned as prize, and which is not particularly reserved to the crown, or the admiralty.[ ] it depends, also, on the municipal regulations of each particular power: and as a necessary precaution against abuse, the owners of privateers are required by the ordinances of commercial states to give adequate security that they will conduct the cruize according to the laws and usages of war, and the instructions of the government; and that they will respect the rights of neutrals, and bring their prizes in for adjudication. [sidenote: commissions of privateers.] the commissions of privateers do not extend to the capture of private property upon land; that is a right which is not even granted to queen's ships. the words of the rd section of the prize act extend only to capture by any of her majesty's ships, "of any fortress upon the land, or any arms, ammunition, stores of war, goods, merchandize, and treasure, belonging to the state, or to any public trading company, of the enemies of the crown of great britain, upon the land." thus the interests of the queen's cruizers are expressly limited with respect to the property in which the captors can acquire any interest of their own, the state still reserving to itself all private property, in order that no temptation may be held out for unauthorized expeditions against the subjects of the enemy on land. with regard to private vessels of war, the lords of the admiralty are empowered by the th section, to issue letters of marque, to the _commanders_ of any such ships or vessels, "for the attacking and taking any place or fortress upon the land, or any ship or vessel, arms, ammunition, stores of war, goods, or merchandize, belonging or possessed by any of her majesty's enemies in any sea, creek, river, or haven." it was the purpose of the persons who brought in this bill, that privateers should not be allowed to make depredations upon the coasts of the enemy for the purpose of plundering individuals, and for that reason they were restricted to fortified places and fortresses, and to property water-borne.[ ] as privateers sometimes sail in company with queen's vessels, and also in small squadrons, for the purpose of mutual assistance, the rights of the privateers vary. when a privateer is sailing under the convoy of a queen's ship, she takes no share in any prize taken by the ship, or even by herself, unless she has received orders from the convoying royal ship to give chase, or has acted hostilely against the enemy, actually aiding and assisting in the capture.[ ] when privateers have sailed in company, it has often happened that not every vessel has been actually engaged in the capture of the prize, though they may have been rendering valuable assistance in a variety of forms, such as watching in the offing, guarding an open outlet of escape to the intended prize. in the disputes arising from these joint captures, sir william scott was the first to establish a settled intelligible system, on principles that might become in future easily applicable to the various cases that might arise. [sidenote: constructive captors.] he says "the act of parliament (meaning the prize act), and the proclamation, give the benefit of prize to the takers, by which term, are naturally to be understood those who _actually take possession_, or those affording an actual contribution of endeavour to that event; either of these persons are naturally included under the name of takers, but the courts of law have gone further, and have extended the term 'takers' to those who, not having contributed actual service, are supposed to have rendered a constructive assistance, either by conveying encouragement to the captor, or intimidation to the enemy. * * * it has been contended that where ships are associated in a _common enterprize_, that circumstance is sufficient to entitle them to share equally and alike in the prizes that are made; but many cases might be stated when ships so associated would _not_ share. i must ever hold that the principle of mere common enterprise is not sufficient--it is not sufficiently specific--it must be more limited. what is the real and true criterion? she being in sight, or seeing the enemy's fleet accidentally, a day or two before, will not be sufficient; it must be at the commencement of the engagement, either in the act of chasing, or in preparations for chase, or afterwards during its continuance. if a ship was detached in sight of the enemy, and under preparation for chase, i should have no hesitation in saying that she ought to share; but if she was sent away after the enemy had been descried, but before any preparations for chase, or any hostile movements had taken place, i think it would be otherwise; there must be _some actual contribution of endeavour as well as a general intention_."[ ] [sidenote: efforts to suppress privateering.] powerful efforts have been made by humane and enlightened individuals to suppress privateering, as inconsistent with the liberal spirit of the age. in the language of chancellor kent, "the object is not honour, or chivalric fame, but plunder and profit. the discipline of the crews is not apt to be of the highest order, and privateers are often guilty of enormous excesses, and become the scourge of neutral commerce." they are sometimes manned and officered by foreigners, having no permanent connection with the country, or interest in the cause. this was a complaint made by the united states in , in relation to irregularities and atrocities committed by private armed vessels, sailing under the flag of buenos ayres. under the best regulations the business tends strongly to blunt the sense of private right, and to nourish a lawless and fierce spirit of rapacity. its abolition has generally been attempted by treaty. in the treaty of prussia and the united states, in , stipulations against private armed vessels were included. in , a similar agreement was made between sweden and holland, but the agreement was not performed. france, soon after the breaking out of the war with austria, in , passed a decree for the total suppression of privateering, but that was a transitory act, and was soon swept away in the tempest of the revolution. [sidenote: piratical privateering.] on these considerations naturally follows that of the classes of privateers that can be considered pirates. a privateer differs from a pirate, in that--first, the former is provided with a commission, or with letters of marque from a sovran, of which the pirate is destitute. secondly, the privateer supposes a state of war (or at least that of reprisals); the pirate plunders in the midst of peace, as well as in war. thirdly, the privateer is obliged to observe the rules and instructions that have been given him, and to attack by virtue of them only the enemy's ships, or those neutral vessels which carry on an illicit commerce; the pirate plunders indiscriminately the ships of all nations, without observing even the laws of war. but in this last point privateers may become pirates when they transgress the limits prescribed to them; and this is one of the reasons why we often see the former confounded with the latter.[ ] under these general definitions, we see that it is quite open to any citizen of the world to become a privateer under a foreign sovran; and martens goes on to say, that "there is nothing that prevents the granting of letters of marque, even to the subjects of neutral or allied powers who are able to solicit them; but since it is contrary to neutrality to suffer subjects to contribute by this means to the reinforcement of one of the belligerent powers, and to the annoyance of the other, states generally prohibit their subjects from taking letters of marque from a power, without the permission of their sovereigns, and many treaties oblige them also to prohibit their subjects from doing it, as well as to forbid every species of armaments on the enemy's account, in their ports. however, the enemy is not justified in _punishing them as pirates_, when they have letters patent from one of the powers with whom it is at war, although their ship may be confiscated."[ ] the laws of the united states have made ample provision on this subject, and they may be considered as an expression of the general wish of civilized nations; and they prescribed specific punishment for acts which were before unlawful. american citizens are prohibited from being concerned, beyond the limits of the united states, in fitting out or otherwise assisting any private vessel of war, to cruize against the subjects of friendly powers.[ ] in the various treaties between the powers of europe, in the two last centuries, and in the several treaties between the united states and france, holland, sweden, prussia, great britain, spain, colombia, chili, &c., it is declared, that no subject or citizen of either nation shall accept a commission or letter of marque, to assist an enemy in hostilities against the other, under penalty of being treated as an enemy.[ ] the title to property taken in war may, upon general title to principles, be considered as immediately divested from the original owner, and transferred to the captor. as to personal property, the title is considered as lost to the former proprietor, as soon as the enemy has acquired a firm possession, which, as a general rule, is considered as taking place after the lapse of twenty-four hours.[ ] ships and goods captured _at sea_, are excepted from the operation of this rule. the right to all captures rests primarily in the sovran, and no individual can have any interest in a prize, whether made by a crown or private armed vessel, but what he receives under the grant of the state. when a prize is taken at sea, it must be brought with due care into some port, for adjudication by a competent court. the condemnation must be pronounced by a prize court of the government of the captor, sitting either in the country of the captor, or of his ally. the prize court of an ally cannot condemn.[ ] [sidenote: proceedings preliminary to condemnation.] the proceedings preliminary to condemnation may be roughly described as follows:-- the _captor_, immediately on bringing his prize into port, sends up and delivers upon oath to the registry of the court of admiralty, all papers found on board the prize. the preparatory examinations of the captain and some of the crew of the _captured ship_ are then taken, upon a set of standing interrogatories, before the commissioners of the port to which the prize is brought. these also are forwarded to the registry of the court of admiralty. a written _notice_, called a _monition_, is extracted by the captor from the registry, and served upon the royal exchange, notifying the capture, and calling upon all persons interested, to appear and show cause why the ship and goods should not be condemned. at the expiration of twenty days, the monition is returned into the registry, with a certificate of its service; and if any claim has been given, the cause is then ready for hearing, upon evidence arising out of the ship's papers and preparatory examinations. the _neutral master or proprietor of the cargo_ takes measures as follows:--upon being brought into port, the master usually makes a protest, which he forwards to london as instructions, (or with such further directions as he thinks proper) either to the correspondent of his owners, or to the consul of his nation, in order to claim the ship or such parts of the cargo as belong to his owners, or with which he was particularly entrusted; or the master himself goes to london to take the necessary steps, as soon as he has undergone his examination. the master, correspondent, or consul, applies to a proctor, who prepares a claim supported by the affidavit of the claimant, stating briefly to whom, as he believes, the ship and goods claimed belong; and that no enemy has any right or interest therein; security must be given to the amount of sixty pounds, to answer costs, if the case should appear so grossly fraudulent on the part of the claimant as to subject him to be condemned therein. if the captor has neglected in the mean time to take the usual steps, (but which seldom happens, as he is strictly enjoined both by his instructions and by the prize act to proceed immediately to adjudication,) a process issues against him, on the application of the claimant's proctor, to bring in the ship's papers and preparatory examinations, and to proceed in the usual way. as soon as the claim is given, copies of the ship's papers and examinations are procured from the registry, and upon the return of the monition the cause may be heard. it however seldom happens, owing to the great pressure of business, (especially at the commencement of war), that causes can possibly be prepared for hearing immediately on the expiration of the time for the return of the monition; in that case, each cause must necessarily take its regular turn. correspondent measures must be taken, by the neutral master, if carried within the jurisdiction of a vice-admiralty court, by giving a claim, supported by his affidavit, and offering a security for costs, if the claim should be pronounced grossly fraudulent. if the claimant be dissatisfied with the sentence, his proctor enters an appeal in the registry of the court, where the sentence was given, or before a notary public (which regularly should be entered within fourteen days after the sentence); and he afterwards applies at the registry of the lords of appeal in prize causes, which is held at the same place as the registry of the high court of admiralty, for an instrument called an inhibition, and which should be taken out within three months, if the sentence be in the high court of admiralty; and within nine months, if in a vice-admiralty court; but may be taken out at later periods if a reasonable cause can be alleged for the delay which has intervened. this instrument directs the judge, whose sentence is appealed from, to proceed no further in the cause; it directs the registrar to transmit a copy of all proceedings of the inferior courts; and it directs the party who has obtained the sentence to appear before the superior tribunal to answer to the appeal. on applying for the inhibition, security is given on the part of the appellant to the amount of two hundred pounds, to answer costs, in case it should appear to the court of appeal that the appeal is vexatious. the inhibition is to be served upon the judge, the registrar, and the adverse party, and his proctor, by shewing the instrument under seal, and delivering a note of its contents. if the party cannot be found, and his proctor will not accept the service, the instrument is to be served, _viis et modis_; that is, by affixing it to the door of the last place of residence, or by hanging it on the pillars of the royal exchange. that part of the process above described, which is to be executed abroad, may be performed by any person to whom it is committed, and the formal part at home is executed by the officer of the court. a certificate of the service is endorsed on the back of the instrument, sworn before the surrogate of the superior court, or before a notary public, if the service is abroad. if the cause be adjudged in the vice-admiralty court, it is usual, on entering the appeal there, to procure a copy of the proceedings, which the appellant sends over to his correspondent in, england, who carries it to a proctor, and the same steps are taken to procure and send the inhibition as when the cause has been adjudged in the high court of admiralty. but if a copy of the proceedings cannot be procured in due time, an inhibition can be obtained, by sending over a copy of the instrument of appeal, or by writing to the correspondent an account only of the time and substance of the sentence. upon an appeal, fresh evidence may be introduced, if, upon hearing, the lords of appeal should be of an opinion that the cause is of such doubt, or that further proof ought to have been ordered by the court below. further proof usually consists of affidavits made by the asserted proprietors of the goods, in which they are sometimes joined with their clerks, and others acquainted with the real transactions, and with the real property of the goods claimed. in corroboration of these affidavits, may be annexed the original correspondence, duplicates of bills of lading, invoices, extracts from books, &c. these papers must be proved by affidavits of persons who can speak of their authenticity; and if copies or extracts, they should be collected and certified by public notaries. the affidavits are sworn before magistrates, or others competent to administer oaths in the country where they are made, and authenticated by a certificate from the british consul. the degree of proof required depends upon the degree of suspicion or doubt that belongs to the case. in case of heavy suspicion and great importance, the court may order what is called "plea and proof," that is, instead of admitting affidavits and documents introduced by the claimant only, each party is at liberty to allege, in regular pleadings, such circumstance as may tend to acquit or condemn the capture, and to examine witnesses in support of the allegation, to whom the opposite party may administer interrogatories. the depositions of the witnesses are taken in writing. if the witnesses are to be examined abroad, a commission issues for that purpose; but in no case is it necessary for them to come to england. these solemn proceedings are seldom resorted to. standing commissions may be sent to any neutral country for the general purpose of receiving examinations of witnesses, in all cases where the court may find it necessary, for the purposes of justice, to decree an enquiry to be conducted in that manner.[ ] [sidenote: prize jurisdiction.] the jurisdiction over prizes is exercised by the judge of the admiralty, exclusively of every other judicature of the kind, except in cases of appeal. this jurisdiction in matter of prize, (whether it is coeval with the court of admiralty, or, which is much more probable, of a later institution, beyond the time of memory,) though exercised by the same person, is quite distinct in its nature. the judge of the admiralty is appointed by a commission under the great seal, which enumerates particularly, as well as generally, every object of his jurisdiction, but not a word of prize. to constitute that authority, in every war, a commission under the great seal issues to the lord high admiral to will and require the court of admiralty, and the lieutenant and judge of the said court, his surrogate or surrogates, and they are thereby authorised and required to proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and reprisals, of all ships and goods that are or shall be taken, and to hear and determine according to the courts of admiralty and the law of nations. a warrant issues to the judge accordingly. the court of admiralty is called the instance court; the other the prize court. the manner of proceeding is totally different. the whole system of litigation and jurisprudence in the prize court is peculiar to itself. [sidenote: common law courts not always excluded] a thing being done on the high seas does not exclude the jurisdiction of the courts of common law. for seizure, stopping, or taking a ship upon the high seas, but _not as prize_, an action will lie; but for taking as _prize_, no action will lie. the nature of the question, not the locality, excludes. the end of a prize court is to suspend the property till condemnation, to punish every sort of misbehaviour in the captors; to restore instantly (full sail) if upon the most summary examination there does not appear a sufficient ground; to condemn finally, if the goods really are prize, against everybody; giving every body a fair opportunity of being heard. a captor may, and must force everybody interested to defend; and every person interested may force him to proceed to condemn without delay.[ ] [sidenote: prize courts.] before the sixth of the reign of queen anne there were no laws made on this subject. previous to that time all prizes taken in war were of right vested in the crown, and questions concerning the property of such prizes were not the subject of discussion in courts of law. but in order to do justice to claimants, from the first year after the restoration of charles the second, special commissions were issued to enable the courts of admiralty to condemn such captures as appeared to be lawful prizes; to give relief where there was no colour for taking; and generally to make satisfaction to parties injured. by the act of the car. ii. c. , (now repealed) indeed, some regulations were made concerning the treatment of ships taken, but no provisions enacted respecting any security to be given on delivery; the sole interest in the thing condemned being in the crown; it was in public custody, and the disposition of it a mere matter of prerogative; no such provisions therefore were necessary. but in the sixth year of queen anne, it was thought proper, for the encouragement of seamen, to vest in them the prizes they should take; and for that purpose the statutes, anne, c. and c. , were passed. the first of these acts only relates to proceedings in the courts of admiralty in england, but contains no particular directions to them; the practice of those courts being already settled.[ ] there is a long series of statutes, which follows the above, on the subject of the prize courts. the following may be taken as a general description of their operation. the judge should proceed, according to their form, to sentence with all possible expedition. if on the preparatory examination there arises a doubt in the breast of the judge, whether the capture is prize or not, and further proof appears to be necessary, the ship and cargo is appraised by persons named on the part of the captor, and is delivered up to the claimants, on their giving good and sufficient security to pay to the captor the full value, according to the appraisement, if the ship is adjudged lawful prize by the judge; by this the claimant is entitled to the immediate possession of the subject in dispute, which the captor cannot obtain but on the refusal of the claimant to give security for the appraised value. after a sentence of condemnation, the captor has a right to the possession; the execution of the sentence is not suspended by an appeal, but the party appellant gives good and sufficient security to restore the cargo, or its full value, in case the sentence is reversed.[ ] [sidenote: where prize courts can be held.] having explained shortly the operation of the prize courts, it must be observed, that the prize court of an ally cannot condemn. prize or no prize is a question belonging exclusively to the courts of the country of the captor. the reason is, that the sovran has a right and is bound to inspect the conduct of the captors, for he is answerable to other states for the acts of the captor. the prize court of the captor may sit in the country of a co-belligerent or an ally, because there is a common interest between such on the subject, and both governments may be presumed to authorize any measures conducing to give effect to their arms, and to consider each others ports as mutually subservient.[ ] it is not lawful for such a court to act in a neutral territory; and it was at one time even doubted, where property had been carried into, and was lying in a neutral port, whether the validity of the capture could be determined even by a court of prize established in the captor's country; because it was thought that the possession in reach of the court was essential to the exercise of a jurisdiction in a proceeding _in rem_. the principle was admitted by sir wm. scott to be correct, in the case of the henrick and the maria;[ ] but he considered that the english admiralty had gone too far in supporting condemnations in england, of prizes abroad in neutral ports, to permit him to recall the vicious practice of the court to acknowledged principle. [sidenote: judgments of prize courts conclusive.] the jurisdiction of the court of the capturing nation is conclusive upon the question of property in the captured thing. its sentence settles all further dispute between claimants; and if that sentence is manifestly unjust, or against the law of nations, the state is alone responsible, and not the captors. an unjust sentence is a good ground for issuing commissions of reprisals. numerous treaties between the different powers of europe, regulating the subject of reprisals, declare that they shall not be granted, unless in case of the _denial of justice_. "an unjust sentence," says wheaton, "must certainly be considered as a denial of justice, unless the mere privilege of being heard before condemnation is all that is included in the idea of justice."[ ] thus the sentence of a prize court, it is plain, is sufficient to confirm the captor's title to captures at sea; but a different rule applies to real property or immoveables. immoveable possessions, lands, towns, provinces, &c., become the property of the enemy who makes himself master of them; but it is only by the treaty of peace, or the entire subjugation and extinction of the state to which those towns and provinces belonged, that the acquisition is completed, and the property becomes stable and perfect. thus, a third party cannot safely purchase conquered land till the sovran from whom it has been taken has renounced it by a treaty of peace, or has irretrievably lost his sovereignty.[ ] until such confirmation, it continues liable to be divested by the _jus postliminii_. the purchaser of any portion takes it, at the peril of being evicted by the original sovran owner, when he is restored to his dominions.[ ] i now pass on to the more commercial question of passports, safe-conducts, and licences to trade. section iii. _licences_. [sidenote: passports and safe conducts] passports, and safe-conducts, are a kind of privilege, insuring safety to persons in passing and repassing, or to certain things during their conveyance from one place to another. all safe-conducts, like every other act of supreme command, emanate from the sovran authority, but are constantly delegated to inferior officers, either by an express commission, or by a natural consequence of the nature of their functions. the person named in the passport cannot transfer his privilege to another. they generally promise security wherever the grantor has authority and command, and are interpreted by the same rules of liberality and good faith, with other acts of the sovran power.[ ] [sidenote: licences to trade with the enemy] a licence granted by a state to its own subjects, or to those or the enemy, is a dispensation on its own side of the laws of war, as far as its terms can be fairly construed. the adverse party may justly consider such licence as a ground of capture and confiscation _per se_; but the prize courts of the state, under whose authority they are issued, are bound to consider them as lawful relaxations of the ordinary state of war. in the country which grants them, licences to carry on a pacific commerce are rigidly interpreted, as being exceptions to a general rule; though they are not to be construed with pedantic accuracy, nor will every small deviation be held to vitiate the fair effect of them.[ ] during the later period of the last century, and the earlier portion of this, licences were considered as privileges granted to individuals for their own benefit, and in which the nation at large was but little, or remotely, interested. they were therefore held liable to the same strict construction with other similar grants. yet this rule was never held in a narrow captious manner; and if the apparent intention of government was complied with, and there was no suspicion of fraud, a sufficient liberality was allowed in the construction. when the extraordinary mode of warfare established by the emperor napoleon, (by an attempt at a general embargo) was carried on, new expedients were required to counteract its evils, and licences to a great extent were granted to relieve the stagnant trade of the country; and this measure, so highly beneficial, and even necessary, was facilitated by the adoption of a still more liberal mode of construction, and which, no doubt, will again guide these cases.[ ] [sidenote: duties of merchants using licences] in trading under a licence, the merchant ought to follow the terms or it as strictly as possible; but if he is acting _bonâ fides_, some breaches of it will be permitted. being high acts of sovranty, they are necessarily the creatures of that act of power, and must not be carried further than the intention of the great authority that grants them may be supposed to extend; not that they are to be construed with pedantic accuracy, nor that any small deviation should be held to vitiate the fair effect of them. an excess in the _quantity_ of goods permitted might not he considered noxious to any extent. a variation in the quality or substance of the goods might be more significant, because a liberty assumed of trading in one species of goods, under a license to trade in another, might lead to very dangerous abuses. the license must be looked to for the enumeration of goods that are to be protected by it.[ ] the principles on which courts act in treating licences is thus succinctly laid down by sir william scott.-- "i need not repeat what i have so often stated, the anxious wish of this court to relieve, as much as possible, the difficulties under which the commerce of the world now labours (november ,) and to apply the most favourable consideration to the construction of license cases. at the same time it is to be remembered, that the court possesses the mere power of interpretation; that it must confine itself to a reasonable explanation of the terms made use of, and cannot alter or dispense with conditions considered as essential by the government granting the license. if the court assumes the power of extension by favourable interpretation, it does so only where there is a total absence of _bad faith_, and where unavoidable obstacles have been thrown in the way of an exact compliance with the terms prescribed. where there has been a want of good faith, or a departure from the terms, beyond the necessity thus imposed, the court has not felt itself called upon to mitigate the penalties incurred by such a deviation."[ ] [sidenote: the vessel.] it is not an essential deviation from the licence, if ships of other countries than those designated in the license are employed; provided those other countries have the same political bearing towards this kingdom as those mentioned in the licence. but it is not a matter of indifference to substitute a ship belonging to a country at war, for a neutral or native ship, at the will and pleasure of the holder of the licence.[ ] where an enemy's ship was represented to be neutral, and under that disguise obtained a licence and was navigated, the ship and freight were condemned; and the cargo would have been involved in the same fate had it been shown that the owner of the cargo was privy to the fraud.[ ] a licence to trade in neutral bottoms does not extend to british ships.[ ] [sidenote: the cargo.] the exportation of the produce and manufactures of this country is undoubtedly of great importance; but in time of war, it may be a matter of serious injury to the kingdom, if the commerce of the enemy is to be carried on in security under the abuse of british licences. the courts of admiralty and prize, therefore, as far as lie in their power, guard against the fraudulent application of licences. the following are a few practical rules for the guidance of merchants:-- . where the goods are enumerated in the licence, the best endeavour ought to be made to follow that enumeration. it is _not_ a fatal departure from the licence to take on board non-enumerated articles, if done so by mistake, or inadvertence; but an essential and fraudulent departure from the conditions of the licence is a total defeasance of it.[ ] . when a licence is granted to _one_ person, it cannot be made to extend to the protection of all other persons who may be permitted by that person to take advantage of it.[ ] . where a and b have obtained a licence to import, _as for themselves, or their agents, or the bearers of their bill of lading_, the only persons entitled to act under that licence, are a and b, as _importers_, or their agents, or persons holding their bills of lading, and claiming under bills of lading, which a and b, _after having conducted the importation from the enemy on their own account_, have transferred to them.[ ] . under a licence to _import_, the british merchant must not also be the _exporter_. he is not permitted under such a licence to go to the enemy's country, and there act as an enemy's merchant, carrying on the export trade of that country.[ ] . sometimes, in describing the property in licences, the privilege is extended to all property of a certain class, "to whomsoever the property may appear to belong." in such cases no enquiry is ever made as to the proprietary interest in the property; but if the words are not introduced into the licence, it does not protect enemy's property.[ ] [sidenote: the voyage.] in the voyage, also, the merchant must follow the licence. it is vitiated by changing the place of shipment. thus, where a licence was to bring away a cargo from bordeaux, and the party thought proper to change the licence, and accommodate it to another port in france, it was held by the english admiralty that the licence was vitiated, and the vessel and cargo were condemned.[ ] enemies trading to the ports of this country must strictly comply with the conditions under which that permission is granted. no voluntary deviation from the _course_ pointed out can on any account be tolerated; except under the pressure of irresistible necessity. the character of enemy revives, when such a trader so deviates from his appointed course, even if there is no _malâ fides_, and he runs all the perils of an enemy on an english coast.[ ] it is a violation of a licence to touch at an intermediate port under a licence for a direct voyage to this country, the presumption being that at the intermediate port the vessel might receive another destination, or might actually deliver her cargo in that port.[ ] [sidenote: time.] of course when the period for which a licence has been granted has expired, it no longer has any operation; yet in cases in which parties have used due diligence, but have been prevented by accident from carrying their intentions into effect within the time, it has been holden that, though their licences have expired, they are entitled to protection.[ ] a licence cannot be _ante dated_, and if granted subsequent to capture it is no protection against condemnation. it is in its very nature prospective, pointing to something which has not yet been done, and cannot be done at all without such permission. where the act has already been done, and requires to be upheld, it must be by an express confirmation of the act itself, as by an indemnity granted to the party; but a licence necessarily looks to that which remains to be done, and can extend its influence only to future operations.[ ] note.--it has been before pointed out, that the queen has, by her prerogative, the power of granting licences. but the navigation laws could not, of course, be dispensed with by the royal prerogative. various acts, therefore, were passed to alter or qualify them, according to the new condition of things which was produced in time of war. these acts expired with the several wars that suggested them; but the almost total repeal of the celebrated navigation laws will render the re-enactment of similar war measures almost unnecessary. section iv. _ransom, recaptures, and salvage_. [sidenote: ransom.] sometimes circumstances will not permit property captured at sea to be sent into port; and the captor, in such cases, may either destroy it, or permit the original owner to redeem it. it was formerly the general custom to redeem property from the hands of the enemy by ransom, and the contract is undoubtedly valid, when municipal regulations do not intervene. it is now but little known in the commercial law of england, for several statutes in the reign of george the third absolutely prohibited british subjects the privilege of ransom of property captured at sea, unless in a case of extreme necessity--to be judged of by the court of admiralty.[ ] these contracts are generally drawn up at sea, and by virtue of them, the captain of the captor engages for the release and safe conduct of the taken ship, in consideration of a sum of money, which the master of the captured vessel, on behalf of himself and the owners of his ship and cargo, engages to pay, and for the payment of which he delivers a hostage as security. the contract is drawn up in two parts, of which the captor has one, which is called the ransom bill; the master of the captured vessel has the other, which operates as his safe conduct. by the french law this safe conduct only protects the vessel to its own port, or its port of destination, if nearer that. in other countries the pass allows the ship to continue its voyage; but operates only to protect the vessel in the course prescribed, and within the time limited by the contract. it protects only against capture, unless by agreement it provides also against _total loss_ by perils of the seas. during war, and while the character of alien enemy continues, no suit will lie in the british courts by the enemy, in proper person, on a ransom bill, notwithstanding it is a contract arising out of the law of war. the remedy to enforce payment of the ransom bill for the benefit of the enemy captor, is by an action by the imprisoned hostage, in the courts of his own country, for the recovery of his freedom. the hostage consists generally of one or two principal officers of the captured prize, more generally one only. as the ransom is in the nature of a pledge, the ransom cannot exceed the value of the ship, so that the master cannot bind his owner for a larger value; and on the same principle, the captor is bound to take the vessel or its value if abandoned by the owner, or what it sells for if the owner is insolvent. he is also bound to maintain the hostage, and that is an item in the ransom bill. in estimating the ransom and expenses of the hostage as a damage or loss, they are regarded in the nature of general average, and the several persons interested in the ship, freight, and cargo, must all contribute towards them.[ ] [sidenote: recaptures.] although in strictness _every_ prize legally made, may be adjudged to the captor, yet there are cases where he ought to restore, wholly, or in part, that which he may legally have taken from the enemy. this is the case of recaptures. according to the universal law of nations, the question whether the recapture ought to be restored to the first proprietor, seems to depend essentially on another, namely, whether the captor has become full proprietor of the prize, _to the total extinction_ of the rights of the first proprietor. if we admit that he may have become so, there would be no further perfect and external obligation on the _recaptor_ to restore property which has become that of the enemy; and on which the first proprietor has lost all claim. there may be a thousand reasons of equity why he should not enrich himself by the spoil of his fellow citizens or friends; but then, that restitution would not be according to the strict rule of natural law; if indeed all claim had so passed away. the captor has, without doubt, a right to take away the enemy's goods. he may, without troubling himself with the proprietor's rights, detain them, with intent to appropriate to himself, in the same manner, in every respect, as he may seize _res nullius_ in the time of peace; but it does not follow from thence that the effect of these two actions is the same, when applied to objects of so different a condition, or that the right of war alone, without cession or renunciation, is a title sufficient for a full property. by the laws of war the right and power _of possession_ is in the captor; the _right of property_ remains in the proprietor. this right of war, which is personal in the captor, not being capable of cession, cannot bind a third person, who acquires the prize by recapture during war; and nothing prohibits the original proprietor from prosecuting his rights against him; accordingly, without making any distinction between conquest, booty, or prize; the goods taken by the enemy, however legal that capture might be, however certain the possession of them might be, do not become his full property till the moment of peace; and that during the whole course of the war it may be claimed by the first proprietor from the hands of every third possessor. from this it follows that every recapture, made at any period of the war whatever, whether the capture may have been legal, or whether it may have been illegal; whether the recapture be made by a sovran, or by a privateer; ought to be restored to the original owner on a just repayment of the costs and damages of every recaptor, unless the illegality of the recapture precludes the recaptor from the privilege of demanding the indemnification.[ ] [sidenote: salvage.] the costs and damages paid to the recaptor are termed salvage. it was the ancient law of this country, that a possession of twenty-four hours was a sufficient conversion of the property, and unless it was reclaimed before _sundown_, the owner was divested of his property. thus there was a complete obliteration of the rights of former owners. this was the ancient law of england, and was in accordance with the ancient law of europe. this rule has been receded from in this country, since the increase of her commerce. during the time of the usurpation, when england was becoming commercial, an alteration was effected by the ordinance of , which directed a restitution, upon salvage, to british subjects; and the same indulgent rule was continued afterwards, when this country became still more commercial. this country, as a commercial country, has thus departed from the old law, and has made a new and peculiar law for itself, in favour of merchant property recaptured, introducing a policy not then introduced by other countries, and differing from its own ancient practice. [sidenote: recaptures converted into ships of war are not restored.] there is one exception to this law. the prize act provides that if a recaptured ship, originally taken by her majesty's enemies, shall appear to have been by them "_set forth as a ship or vessel of war_," the said ship or vessel shall not be restored to the former owners or proprietors; but shall, in all cases, whether retaken by any of her majesty's ships, or by any privateer, be adjudged lawful prize for the benefit of the captors. when the former character of the vessel has been once obliterated by her conversion into a ship of war, the title of the former owner, and his claim to restitution, are extinguished, and cannot be revived by any subsequent variation of the character of the vessel. _setting forth_ does not necessarily mean sending out of port with a regular commission. it is sufficient if she has been used as part of the _national_ force of the enemy, by those in _competent_ authority.[ ] [sidenote: capture a material question in cases of recapture.] as it has been stated above, in cases of recapture, the material question is, whether there was such a capture made by the enemy, as to found a case of re-capture. this is settled by the question whether the enemy have an effectual possession; by this is not meant the _complete_ and firm possession obtained by condemnation in a court of prize, but that effectual possession, that if not interrupted by recapture, would have enabled the captor to exercise rights of war over her. for this purpose it is not necessary that the possession should be _long_ maintained. the following are some examples of such effectual possession. an english merchantman, separated from her convoy during a storm, was brought to by an enemy's lugger, which came up and told the master to stay by her till the storm was abated, when they would send a man on board; a british frigate coming up afterwards chased the lugger and took her, thus releasing the merchantman; the frigate was held entitled to salvage.[ ] but when a small english vessel, armed with two swivels, forced a privateer row-boat from dunkirk to strike, but was not able to board her, because the english vessel has only three men, and no arms but the swivels,--the frenchman being filled with a well armed crew; and subsequently, the row-boat was forced to put into the port of ostend, then the port of an ally; this might not be a capture under the act, so much as it was under the general maritime law. a vessel brought out of port, and which was in the power, though not in the actual occupation of the enemy, was thus rescued from considerable peril, was held to be recaptured.[ ] similarly, with a vessel abandoned by the enemy, having possession of her, through the terror of an approaching force.[ ] there is no claim to salvage where the property rescued was not in the possession of the enemy, or so nearly as to be certainly and inevitably under his grasp. [sidenote: recapture of property of allies.] england restores the recaptured property of her allies, on the payment of salvage; but if instances can be given of british property retaken by them, and condemned as prize, the court of admiralty will determine their cases according to their own rule.[ ] [sidenote: recapture of neutral property.] it is not the practice of modern nations to grant salvage on the recapture of neutral vessels; and upon this plain principle, that the liberation of a clear neutral from the hand of the enemy, is no essential service to him; for the enemy would be compelled by the tribunals of his own country, after he had carried the neutral into port, to release him with costs and damages, for the injurious seizure and detention. this proceeds on the supposition, that those tribunals would duly respect the law of nations; a presumption which, in the wars of civilized states, each belligerent is bound to entertain in their respective dealings with neutrals. but in the wild hostilities declared and practised by france in the revolutionary war, there was a constant struggle between the governing powers of france and the maritime courts, which should most outrage the rights of neutral property; the liberation of neutral property out of their hands then came to be deemed, not only by lord stowell, but by the neutrals themselves, a substantial benefit; and salvage for such service was not only awarded, but thankfully paid.[ ] [sidenote: jus postliminii.] the rule by which things taken by the enemy are restored to their former owner, upon coming again under the power of the nation to which they formerly belonged, is termed _jus postliminii_, or the right of postliminy. real property, which is easily identified, is more completely within the right of postliminy than moveable property, which is more transitory in its nature, and less easily recognized. during war, the right of postliminy can only be claimed in the tribunals of the belligerent powers, and not in the courts of neutrals; for by a general law of nations, neutrals have no right to enquire into any captures, except such as are an infringement of their own neutrality.[ ] [sidenote: costs and damages to owners for invalid seizures.] it often happens that captains of ships of war and privateers make seizures of native or neutral vessels, under the impression that such vessels are occupied in illicit trade or other condemnatory acts. this may arise from error, and in such cases the vessel is restored to the owner by the prize court; but still there may be circumstances justifying the seizure, though not condemnation; and if condemnation is not granted, the owner sets up a claim for any damage that may have occurred to his vessel. and the rule is, that where the capture is not justifiable, a captor is answerable for every damage.[ ] but if a seizure is justifiable, all that the law requires is that the captor shall be held responsible for _due diligence_; it is not enough that the captor should use as much caution as he would in his own affairs, the law requires that there should be no _deficiency of due diligence_.[ ] when property is confided by an owner to another person, the care that the owner would take of his own property may be a reasonable criterion of the care that he may expect his agent to take. but in the case of capture, there is no confidence reposed, nor any voluntary election of the person in whose care the property is left. it is a compulsory act of justifiable force, but still of such force as removes from the owner any responsibility for the imprudent conduct of the prize-master. hence, where the prize-master refused to take a pilot, and the ship and cargo were lost, restitution in value was decreed. chapter iii. section i. _neutrality_. [sidenote: rights of neutral nations.] it now only remains for me to place before the reader the rights and obligations of neutral nations, as they influence commerce. neutral nations are those who, in time of war, take no part in the contest, but remain common friends to both parties, without favouring the arms of the one to the prejudice of the other.[ ] neutrality consists in-- st, giving no assistance when there is no obligation to give it; nor voluntarily to furnish troops, arms, ammunition, or anything of direct use in war. ndly, in whatever does not relate to war, a neutral and impartial nation must not refuse to one of the parties (on account of his present quarrel) what she grants to the other.[ ] [sidenote: qualified neutrality.] these rules do not apply to engagements by treaty, to which the neutral may be bound previous to war; as for example, an engagement to furnish one of the belligerent parties with a _limited_ succour in money, troops, ships, or munitions of war, or to open his ports to the armed vessels of his ally with his prizes.[ ] neutrality, again, may be qualified by treaties (antecedent to war), to admit vessels of war, with their prizes, of one of the belligerent parties, into the neutral's ports, to the complete or limited exclusion of the other. [sidenote: neutral territory protected.] the rights of war can be exercised only within the territory of the belligerent powers, upon the high seas, or in a territory belonging to no one. to make use of neutral territory for the _proximate_ purposes of war cannot be allowed, although it is to be understood that the prohibition does not extend to remote objects and uses, such as procuring provisions, and other innocent articles.[ ] the sanctity of a claim of territory is very high. when the fact is established, it overrules every other consideration; the property taken must be restored, notwithstanding that it belongs to the enemy; and if the captors should have erred wilfully, and not merely through ignorance, he would be subject to further punishment. it is however, a point on which foreign states are very likely to be misinformed and abused, by the interested representations of those who are anxious to catch at their protection. the claim of territory is, therefore, to be taken according to the letter of the law, and to be made out by clear and unimpeached evidence. the right of seizing the property of the enemy is a right which extends, generally speaking, _universally_, wherever that property is found. the protection of neutral territory is an exception only to the rule; it is not therefore to be considered disrespectful to any government that the fact, on which such claims are founded, should be accurately examined.[ ] the neutral territory is supposed to extend three english miles from the shore.[ ] [sidenote: property of belligerents in neutral territory.] but the general inviolability of neutral character goes further than merely the protection of neutral property. it protects the property of belligerents within the neutral territory. thus, if the enemy be attacked, or any capture made under neutral protection, the neutral is bound to redress the injury, and effect restitution. as for example, in , the english ship grange was captured in delaware bay, by a french frigate, and upon due complaint, the american government caused the british ship to be promptly restored. similarly, in the case of the anna, restoration was made of property captured by a british cruizer near the mouth of the mississippi, and within the jurisdiction of the united states.[ ] an armed ship has no right to lie in a neutral harbour, in order to make it an habitual _station_ for her captures, as that would be a continuous direct infringement on neutral trade with the enemy; but if she is accidentally in a neutral port, and sees an enemy coming, she may go out and fight, or take her, beyond the range of neutral ground.[ ] nor ought captors to station themselves at the mouth of a neutral river for exercising the rights of war from that river, much less in the very river itself.[ ] the doctrine is carried to the extent that no use of a neutral territory for the purposes of war is to be permitted; this does not include _remote_ uses, such as procuring provisions and refreshments, and acts of that nature, which the law of nations universally tolerates; but that no _proximate_ acts of war, in any manner, are to be allowed to originate on neutral grounds;--thus a ship has no right to station herself in neutral waters, and then to send out her boats on hostile enterprises beyond the boundary. this is a _direct hostile use_ of the neutral territory, and many instances have occurred in which such an irregular use of neutral territory has been warmly resented. nor can the neutral, in true consistency with his neutrality, permit such a course of war.[ ] [sidenote: vessels chased into a neutral port.] bynkershoek has maintained the anomalous principle, that vessels may be chased into a neutral territory, and there captured; but there is in reality no exception to the rule, that every voluntary entrance into a neutral territory, with hostile purposes, is absolutely unlawful. but this restoration takes place only on the application of the neutral government whose territory has been thus violated, the neutrality alone being the ground of the invalidity of the capture.[ ] [sidenote: consent of neutral state necessary.] though a belligerent vessel may not enter within neutral jurisdiction for hostile purposes, she may, consistently with a state of neutrality (unless prohibited by the neutral power), bring her prize into the neutral port and sell it there. [sidenote: freedom of neutral commerce.] a neutral has a right to pursue his accustomed commerce, and he may become the carrier of the enemy's goods, without being subject to confiscation of the ship, or of the neutral articles on board; though not without the risk of having the voyage interrupted by the seizure of the hostile property. if we find an enemy's effects on board a neutral ship, we seize them by right of war; but we are naturally bound to pay the freight to the master of the vessel, who is not to suffer by such seizure.[ ] the effects of neutrals found in an enemy's ship, are to be restored to the owners, against whom there is no right of confiscation,--but without allowance for detainder, decay, &c. neutrals voluntarily expose themselves to these accidents by embarking their goods in a hostile ship.[ ] we have before mentioned that neutral ships do not afford protection to an enemy's property. it may be seized if found on board of a neutral vessel, _beyond the limits of the neutral jurisdiction_. this is a clear and well-settled principle of the law of nations. when an enemy's ship, containing free goods, is taken, if the captor carries the goods to the port of destination, he is entitled to the freight. he stands in the place of the _owner of the ship_, and performs (by completing) the specific contract between the owner and charterer. but he _is not_ entitled, if he does _not_ proceed and perform the original voyage.[ ] the specific contract is performed in the one case, and not in the other. but freight will be allowed to the captor, even though he does not carry the goods to the port of destination, if he carries them to his own country, and to the ports to which they would have been consigned, if not prevented by the regulations of the country of embarkation.[ ] under certain circumstances the _captor_ is considered entitled to freight, even though the goods are carried to his own country, and restored. if the captor does anything to injure the property, or is guilty of misconduct, he may remain answerable for the effect of such misconduct or injury, in the way of set-off against him.[ ] no right of _visitation_ and search, of capture, nor any other kind of belligerent right, can be exercised on board a _public neutral_ vessel on the high seas. but _private_ vessels form no part of neutral territory, and when within the limits of another state, are not exempt from local jurisdiction.[ ] the right to take enemy's property on board a neutral ship has been much contested by particular nations, whose interests it strongly opposed. this rule has been steadily maintained in great britain, though in france and other countries it has been fluctuating. for the first time, england has voluntarily abandoned this right in the present war. if a neutral vessel, having enemy's goods on board, is taken, and there is nothing unfair in the conduct of the neutral master, he will even be entitled to his reasonable demurrage. the captor pays the whole freight, because he represents the enemy, by possessing himself of the enemy's goods by right of war; and although the whole freight has not been earned by the completion of the voyage, yet as the captor, by his act of seizure, has prevented its completion, his seizure operates to the same effect as an actual delivery of the goods to the consignee, and subjects him to the payment of the full freight.[ ] in such case, however, the neutral master must have acted _bonâ fide_, and with strictly neutral conduct. [sidenote: this rule changed by convention.] this rule is often changed by convention; and it is generally stipulated that "_free ships shall make free goods_." the converse, though also sometimes the subject of treaty, does not of necessity hold, _enemy's ships do not make enemy's goods_. goods of neutrals, found on enemy's ships, are bound to be restored.[ ] a neutral subject is at liberty to put his goods on board a merchant vessel, though belonging to a belligerent, subject nevertheless to the rights of the enemy who may capture the vessel; who has no right, according to modern practice, to condemn the neutral property. neither will the goods of the neutral be subject to condemnation, although a rescue should be attempted by the crew of the captured vessel, for that is an event which the merchant could not have foreseen.[ ] [sidenote: neutral goods on _armed_ hostile vessels.] in america, neutral goods laden on an _armed_[ ] belligerent vessel are still protected, but in england it is different. "if the neutral," says sir wm. scott, "puts his goods on board a ship of force, which will be defended by force, he betrays an intention to resist visitation and search, and so far adheres to the belligerent, and withdraws himself from his protection of neutrality."[ ] [sidenote: the sale and purchase of vessels by neutrals.] the purchase of ships from the enemy, is a liberty that has not been denied to neutral merchants, though by the regulation of france, it is entirely forbidden. the rule that this country has been content to apply is, that property so transferred, must be _bonâ fide_ and absolutely transferred; there must be a sale divesting the enemy of all further interest in it; and that any thing tending to continue his interest, vitiates a contract of this description altogether.[ ] russia is reported to have several vessels of war in different parts of the world; some of these vessels have been sold, and others are said to be in the process of sale. i shall cite what sir wm. scott says, on a case nearly similar. "there have been many cases of enemy _merchant vessels_ driven into ports out of which they could not escape, and there sold, in which after much discussion, and some hesitation of opinion, the validity of the purchase has been sustained. but whether the purchase of a vessel, _built for war_, and employed as such, and rendered incapable of acting as a ship of war, by the arms of the other belligerent, and driven into a neutral port for shelter; whether the purchase of such a ship can be allowed, which shall enable the enemy so far to rescue himself from the disadvantage into which he has fallen, as to have the value restored to him by a neutral purchaser, is a question on which i shall wait for the authority of a superior court, before i admit the validity of such a transfer."[ ] it has been said that the sale must be absolute and unconditional; so that a sale under a condition to re-convey at the end of the war, is invalid.[ ] similarly, where the seller is bound by his own government under a penalty not to sell, except upon a condition of restitution at the end of the war, and the purchaser undertook to exonerate the seller, the sale was held invalid.[ ] section ii. _contraband of war_. [sidenote: contraband of war.] the general freedom of neutral commerce is subject to certain restrictions with respect to neutral commerce. among these is the trade with the enemy in certain articles, called _contraband of war_. these are generally warlike stores, and articles which are directly auxiliary to warlike purposes. writers on this subject have made distinctions between those things useful only for the purposes of war, those which are not so, and those which are susceptible of indiscriminate use in war and peace. all seem to agree in excluding the first class from neutral trade; and, in general, admitting the second. the chief difference is about the third class. the last kind of articles--for example, money, provisions, ships, and naval stores, according to grotius, are sometimes lawful articles of neutral trade, and sometimes not; and the question depends upon circumstances. this is perhaps the truest ground of decision, as we shall see in subsequent illustrations.[ ] thus, these articles become contraband, _ipso facto_, if carried to a besieged town, camp, or port. so in a _naval_ war, ships and materials for ships, are contraband, although timber and cordage may be used for other purposes, besides fitting out ships of war; and so horses and saddles are not of necessity warlike stores, except when comparing the quality, manufacture, or quantity attempted to be imported into the hostile state, with the circumstances and condition of the war, it appears (if not to be impossible) to be in the highest degree unlikely, that they should be designed for any other purposes besides the purposes of war.[ ] [sidenote: provisions, when contraband.] common provisions are not contraband in general prize law, except in the single case of being sent to a beseiged or blockaded place.[ ] it is a modern practice, in order to remove all possible doubt as to what goods are contraband, for nations at war to enumerate them particularly in treaties or compacts with neutral states; and such treaties leave the neutral, with which they are made, at liberty to supply the enemy with all goods that are not enumerated in them. these treaties do not operate as a law; but like other treaties, are binding only between the nations that are parties to them.[ ] [sidenote: lord stowell's opinion on contraband of war.] the opinions of our great english authority, lord stowell, on this subject, are contained in two judgments, of which the following is the substance:-- "in , many unwarrantable rules were laid down by public authority respecting contraband. it was expressly asserted by a person of great knowledge and experience in the english admiralty, that by its practice _corn, wine, and oil_, were liable to be deemed contraband. in much later times, many sorts of provisions, such as butter, salted fish, and rice, have been condemned as contraband. the modern established rule was, that generally they are not contraband, but may become so under circumstances arising out of the peculiar situation of the war, or the condition of the parties engaged in it; among the causes which tend to prevent provisions from being treated as contraband, one is that they are of the growth of the country which exports them. "another circumstance, to which some indulgence, by the practice of nations, is shown, is where the articles are in their native and unmanufactured state. thus, iron is treated with indulgence, though anchors and other instruments fabricated out of it, are directly contraband. hemp is more favourably considered than cordage; and wheat is not considered so noxious a commodity as any of the final preparations of it for human use. but the most important destination is, whether the articles are destined for the ordinary uses of life, or for military uses. the nature and quality of the port to which the articles are going, is a test of the matter of fact on which the distinction is to be applied. if the port is a general commercial port, it shall be understood that the articles were going for civil use, although occasionally a frigate or other ship of war may be constructed in that port. on the contrary, if the great predominant character of a port is that of a port of naval equipment, it shall be contended that the articles were going for military use, although, merchant ships resort to the same place, and although it is possible that the articles might have been applied to civil consumption; for it being impossible to ascertain the final application of an article, _ancipitis usus_, it is not an injurious rule which deduces both ways the final use from immediate destination; and the presumption of a hostile use, founded on its destination to a military port, is very much inflamed, if at the time when the articles were going, a considerable armament was notoriously preparing, to which a supply of those articles would be eminently useful."[ ] in a later case he seems to have modified his opinion with respect to undoubted naval stores, either so by nature, or intended as such for the occasion. he says-- "the character of the port is immaterial, since naval stores, if they are to be considered as contraband, are so without reference to the nature of the port, and equally, whether bound to a mercantile port only, or to a port of military equipment. the consequences of the supply may be nearly the same in either case. if sent to a mercantile port, they may be applied to immediate use in the equipment of privateers, or they may be conveyed from the mercantile to the naval port, and there become subservient to every purpose to which they could have been applied if going directly to a port of naval equipment."[ ] [sidenote: controversy between england and america on contraband provisions.] the doctrine of the english admiralty court, as to provisions becoming contraband, was adopted by the government in the instructions given to their cruisers, on the th june, , directing them to stop all vessels laden wholly, or in part, with corn, flour, or meal, bound for france, and to send them into a british port to be purchased by government; or to be released on condition that the master should. give security to dispose of his cargo in the ports of some country in amity with his britannic majesty. this was resisted by the neutral powers, sweden, denmark, and especially the united states. this order was justified upon the ground, that by the modern law of nations, all provisions are to be considered as contraband, and as such liable to confiscation, wherever depriving an enemy of these supplies is one of the means intended to be employed for reducing him to terms. the actual situation of france, (it was said,) was notoriously such, as to lead to the employing this mode of distressing her by the joint operations of the various powers engaged in the war; and the reasonings of the text writers applying to all cases of this sort were more applicable to the present case, in which the distress resulted from the unusual mode of war adopted by the enemy himself, in having armed almost the whole laboring class of the french nation, for the purpose of commencing and supporting hostilities against almost all european governments; but this reasoning was most of all applicable to a trade, which was in a great measure carried on by the then actual rulers of france, and was no longer to be regarded as a mercantile speculation of individuals, but as an immediate operation of the very persons who had declared war, and were then carrying it on against great britain. this reasoning was resisted by the neutral powers--sweden, denmark, and especially the united states. the american government insisted, that when two nations go to war, other nations who choose to remain at peace, retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures, and ordinary vocations; to carry the produce of their industry for exchange to all countries, belligerent or neutral, (as usual;) to go and come freely without injury or molestation; in short, that the war, (amongst other) should be for neutral purposes, as if it did not exist; the only exceptions being trade in implements of war, or to a place blockaded by its enemy. that there were sufficient treaties to decide what were implements of war. corn, flour, and meal, were not of the class of contraband. the result of this controversy was a treaty with the united states in . it confined contraband to military and naval stores; and with respect to provisions not generally contraband, it was agreed, "that whenever such articles became contraband by the law of nations, and should for that reason be seized, the same should not be confiscated, but the owners thereof should be speedily and completely indemnified; and the captors, or in their default, the government under whose authority they act, should pay to the masters or owners of such vessels the full value of all such articles, with a reasonable mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight, and also the demurrage incident to such detention." the instructions of june, , had been revoked previously to the signature of this treaty; but before its ratification, the british government issued, in april, , an order in council, instructing its cruizers to stop and detain all vessels laden wholly, or in part, with corn, flour, meal, and other provisions, and bound to any port in france, and to send them to such ports as might be most convenient, in order that such corn, &c., might be purchased on behalf of government. this last order was subsequently revoked, and the question of its legality became the subject of discussion in a mixed commission, constituted under the treaty, to decide upon the claims of american citizens, by reason of irregular or illegal seizures of their vessels and cargoes, under the authority of the british government. a full indemnification was allowed by the commissioners, under the th article of the treaty of , to the owners of vessels and cargoes seized under the orders in council, as well for the loss of a market as for the other consequences of their detention. it was, however, urged on the part of the united states, that the th article of the treaty of , manifestly intended to leave the question where it was before, namely, that when _the law of nations_, existing at the time the case arises, pronounces the articles contraband, they may for that reason be seized; when otherwise, not so. each party was thus left free to decide what was contraband in its own courts of the law of nations, leaving any false appeal to that law to the usual remedy of reprisals and war.[ ] since the ratification of this treaty, we have a decision of lord stowell, in , on this very subject, in the case of the haabet, which, however, arose on a question of insurance. "the right of taking possession of provisions is no peculiar claim of this country; it belongs generally to belligerent nations: the ancient practice of europe, or at least of several maritime states of europe, was to confiscate them entirely. a century has now elapsed since this claim has been asserted by some of them. a more mitigated practice has prevailed in later times, of holding such cargoes subject only to a right of pre-emption; that is, to a right of purchase, upon a reasonable compensation, to the individual whose property is thus diverted. this claim on the part of the belligerent cannot go beyond cargoes avowedly bound to the enemy's ports, or suspected on just grounds to have a concealed destination of that kind. the neutral can only expect a reasonable compensation. he cannot look to the price he would obtain in the enemy's port. an enemy, distressed by famine, may be driven by his necessities to pay a famine price; but it does not follow that the belligerent, in the exercise of his rights of war, is to pay the price of distress."[ ] "it is a mitigated exercise of war, on which any purchase is made; and no rule has established that such a purchase shall be regulated exactly on the same terms of profit which would have followed the adventure, if no such exercise of war had intervened; it is a _reasonable_ indemnification, and a _fair profit_, that is due, reference being had to the price originally paid by the exporter, and the expenses he has incurred." [sidenote: neutral vessels transporting enemy's forces.] transporting the _enemy's forces_, subjects a neutral vessel to confiscation, if captured by the opposite belligerent. sir wm. scott says, in the leading case on this subject-- "that a vessel hired, by the enemy, for the conveyance of military persons is to be considered _as a transport_, subject to condemnation, has been in a recent case, held by this court, and on other occasions.[ ] what is the number of military persons that shall constitute such a case it may be difficult to define. in the former cases there were many, in the present they are fewer in number; number alone is an insignificant circumstance in the considerations on which the principles of law on this subject are built; since fewer persons of high quality and character may be of more importance than a much greater number of persons of lower condition. to send out _one veteran general_ of france to take command of the forces at batavia might be a much more noxious act than the conveyance of a whole regiment. the consequences of such assistance are greater, and therefore it is what the belligerent has a stronger right to prevent and punish. in this instance the military persons are three,[ ] and there are besides two other persons who were going to be employed in civil capacities in the government of batavia. *** it appears to me, _on principle_, to be but reasonable that, whenever it is of sufficient importance to the enemy that such persons should be sent out on the public service, and at the public expense, it should afford equal ground of forfeiture against the vessel that may be let out for a purpose so intimately connected with hostile operations.[ ] the fact of the vessel having been pressed into the enemy's service does not exempt her. the master cannot aver that he was an involuntary agent."[ ] [sidenote: neutral ships carrying enemy's despatches.] carrying the _despatches of the enemy_ is also a ground of condemnation. "in the transmission of despatches may be conveyed the entire plan of a campaign, that may defeat all the plans of the other belligerent, in the world. it is a service, therefore, which, in whatever degree it exists, can only be considered in one character--as an act of the most hostile nature. the offence of _fraudulently_ carrying despatches in the service of the enemy being greater than other contraband, some other penalty has to be affixed. the confiscation of the noxious article would be ridiculous when applied to _despatches_. there would be _no_ freight dependent on their transportation. the _vehicle_ (_i.e._ the ship) in which they are carried must, therefore, be forfeited."[ ] [sidenote: ambassadors excepted.] the despatches of an ambassador or other public minister of the enemy, resident in a neutral country, are an exception to this rule, being the despatches of persons who are in a peculiar manner the favourite object of the law of nations, residing in the neutral country for the purpose of preserving peace and the relations of amity between that state and their own government. the ambassador of the enemy may be stopped on his passage, but when he has arrived in the neutral country, he becomes a sort of _middleman_, and is entitled to peculiar privileges.[ ] [sidenote: penalty for contraband trade.] under the present law of nations, a contraband cargo cannot affect the ship; the carrying of contraband articles is attended only with loss of freight and expenses, except where the ship belongs to the owner of the contraband cargo, or where the simple misconduct of carrying a contraband cargo has been connected with some malignant and aggravating circumstances.[ ] [sidenote: additional penalties.] the aggravation of fraud justifies additional penalties; thus, the carriage of contraband with a false destination, will work a condemnation of the ship as well as the cargo; the false destination being intended to defeat the right of pre-emption.[ ] generally, _false_ papers will extend the taint of contraband to the vessel. it is also an established rule, that the transfer of contraband by a neutral, from one port of a country to another, where it is required for the purposes of war, is subject to be treated in the same manner as an original importation into the country itself.[ ] [sidenote: return voyage free.] generally, the proceeds of the return voyage cannot be taken. from the moment of quitting port on a hostile destination, indeed, the offence is complete, and it is not necessary to wait till the goods are actually endeavouring to enter the enemy's port; but beyond that, if the goods are not taken _in delicto_, and in actual prosecution of such a voyage, the penalty is not now generally held to attach.[ ] section iii. _blockades. right of search. convoys_. [sidenote: blockades.] we now pass on to the subject of blockade, which is the next exception to the general freedom of neutral commerce in time of war. a blockade is a high act of sovran authority; it cannot be assumed or exercised by a commander, without special authority, provided his government is sufficiently near at hand to superintend and direct the course of operations; but a commander on a distant station is supposed to carry with him such a portion of the sovran authority as may enable him to act with energy against the commerce of the enemy, as against the enemy himself.[ ] again, referring to sir wm. scott's celebrated judgments, we find him saying, "that to constitute a violation of a state of blockade, three things must be proved: first, the existence of the blockade; secondly, the knowledge of it, in the party supposed to have offended; and thirdly, some act of violation, either by going in, or coming out with a cargo, laden after the commencement of the blockade." [sidenote: first rule of blockade.] i. there is no rule of law more established than this; that the breach of a blockade subjects the property so employed to confiscation. every man knows it; the subjects of all states know it. a lawful maritime blockade requires the actual presence of a sufficient force stationed at the entrance of the port, sufficiently near to prevent communication. the blockade is to be considered legally existing, although the winds may occasionally blow off the blockading squadron. it is an accidental change which must take place in every blockade; but the blockade is not therefore suspended. this axiom is laid down in all books of authority; and the law considers an attempt to take advantage of such an accidental removal as an attempt to break the blockade, and a mere fraud.[ ] when a blockading squadron is driven off by a superior force, the blockade is effectually raised, and it must be renewed by fresh notification, before foreign nations can be affected by an obligation to observe it as a blockade. the mere appearance of another squadron will not renew it, but it must be restored by the measures required for the original imposition of a blockade.[ ] [sidenote: second rule of blockade.] it is necessary that the evidence of a blockade should be clear and decisive. a blockade may exist without a public declaration; although a declaration, unsupported by fact, will not be sufficient to establish it. in the war of , the west india islands were declared under blockade by admiral jervis; but the lords of the supreme court held, that as the fact did not support the declaration, a blockade could not be deemed legally to exist. but the fact, on the contrary, duly notified on the spot, is of itself sufficient; for public notifications between governments are meant for the information of individuals; but if the individual is _personally_ informed, that purpose is better obtained than by a public declaration.[ ] where the vessel sails from a country lying near enough to the blockaded port to have constant information of the blockade, no notice is necessary of its continuance or relaxation; but when the country is at a distance beyond constant information, they may lawfully send their vessels on conjecture that the blockade is broken up, after it has existed a long time.[ ] and this is important, as it must be remembered that even the _intention_ to evade blockade is a fraudulent breach of it, and sailing towards the port is an _overt_ act of that intent.[ ] there are two kinds of blockade. . simple blockade, _i.e._ blockade in fact; and nd., blockade in fact, accompanied by a notification. the first expires by the breaking up _intentionally_ of the blockading squadron. the second, _prima facie_, does not expire until the repeal of the notification, but it is the duty of the belligerent country directly the blockade ceases, _de facto_, to revoke its proclamation. and it would appear that a notified blockade would only expire, in fact, after some unnecessary and long neglect to publish this revocation; otherwise neutral nations are bound until such publication.[ ] it has from time to time been stipulated, in treaties between belligerent and neutral countries, (as in the case of the treaty between great britain and the united states, of ,) that vessels of the neutral country should not be considered as having notice of a blockade, until they have been duly and respectfully warned off; and it would only be on a second attempt to enter port that they would be liable to be seized. under such a treaty a neutral vessel might lawfully sail for a blockaded port, knowing it to be blockaded.[ ] [sidenote: third rule of blockade.] an act of violation is essential to a breach of blockade; such as, either going in or coming out of the port with a cargo, laden after the commencement of the blockade: or being found so near to the blockaded port as to show, beyond a doubt, that the vessel was endeavouring to run into it: or where the intention is expressly avowed by the papers found on board.[ ] the time of shipment is very material; for although it may be hard to refuse a neutral, liberty to retire with a cargo already laden, and by that act already become neutral property,--yet, after the commencement of a blockade, a neutral cannot be allowed to interpose in any way to assist the exportation of the property of the enemy. after the commencement of a blockade, a neutral is no longer at liberty to make any purchase in that port.[ ] a _maritime_ blockade is not in law violated by bringing or sending goods to the port through the internal canal navigation or land carriage of the country; and thus such goods are not liable to confiscation on ground of the blockade. [sidenote: right of search.] on the great question of the right of search, the international law has been summed up by lord stowell, in the case of the _maria_, where the exercise of the right was attempted to be resisted, by the interposition of a convoy of swedish ships of war.[ ] first, the right of visiting and searching merchant ships on the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the destinations, is the incontestible right of the lawfully commissioned cruizers of a belligerent nation. secondly, that the authority of the sovran of the neutral country, being interposed in any manner of mere force, cannot legally vary the rights of a lawfully commissioned belligerent cruizer. it cannot be maintained, that if a swedish commissioned cruizer, during the wars of his own country, has a right, by the laws of nations, to visit and examine neutral ships, the king of england, (being neutral to sweden,) is authorized by law to obstruct the exercise of that right with respect to the merchants' ships of his country. thirdly, that the penalty for the violent contravention of this right, is the confiscation of the property withheld from visitation and search. the judgment of condemnation, pronounced in this case, was followed by the treaty of armed neutrality entered into by the baltic powers to resist the right of search, in , which league was dissolved by the death of the emperor paul, and the points in controversy between those powers and great britain were finally adjusted by the convention of th of june, .[ ] [sidenote: convoys.] it now remains to say a few words on the subject of convoy. convoy is a ship or ships of war appointed by the government, or by the commander-in-chief on a particular station, for the guard of merchant vessels bound to their destination. a warranty that the vessel shall sail with convoy, is very common in policies of insurance, and if not complied with, the insurance becomes absolutely void. this warranty to sail with convoy, does not mean that the vessel shall depart with convoy immediately from the lading port, but only from the place of rendezvous appointed for vessels bound from that port, and must be strictly and impartially maintained by force, to the uniform universal exclusion of all vessels not privileged by law.[ ] from many ports, and among others from the port of london, no convoy ever sails. it has therefore been held sufficient for a vessel bound from london to sail with convoy from the _downs_, and even from _spithead_, when there was no convoy appointed from the _downs_. neither does it require the vessel to sail with convoy bound to the precise place of her destination; but if the vessel sail with the only convoy appointed for vessels going to her place of destination, it is sufficient. it sometimes happens that the force first appointed, is to accompany the ships only for a part of their voyage, and to be succeeded by another; at other times a small force is detached from the main body to bring up to a particular point; if a vessel sail under the protection of a vessel thus appointed or detached, the warranty is satisfied. but this warranty requires not only that the vessel shall sail under the protection of the convoy, but also that she shall continue during its course under the same protection, unless prevented from so doing by tempest or other unavoidable accident, in which case, the master and owners will be excused, if the master does all that is in his power to keep with the convoy. the merchantman must, before sailing, obtain or endeavour to obtain, the sailing orders issued by the convoying squadron. the value of a convoy appointed by government arises in a great degree from its taking the ships under control, as well as under protection; but this control cannot be exercised except by means of sailing orders. otherwise, the master could not learn the rendezvous in case of dispersion by a storm, or obey signals in case of attack. the obligation to sail with convoy does not depend merely on special agreement; but, by act of parliament, a merchant cannot sail without a convoy, on a _foreign_ voyage, unless previously licensed to do so.[ ] section iv. [sidenote: _armed neutralities_.] it is not improbable the course of events in the present war may make it not uninteresting to my readers to have some short account of the origin and meaning of _armed neutralities_, especially as the principles on which they were founded may again be open to discussion. the right to take enemy's property on board neutral vessels has, in the present war, been waived by the queen, in a declaration, dated buckingham palace, march th . this is however tempered by a reservation of the right to search for contraband. up to the present time the right to take enemy's goods on board a neutral vessel has in this country been steadily maintained; though in france it has been fluctuating; the interests of another commercial power became the origin of the extraordinary confederacies termed _armed neutralities_. at an early period it was an object of interest with holland, a great commercial and navigating country, whose permanent policy was essentially pacific, to obtain a relaxation of the severe rules which had previously been observed in maritime warfare. the states general of the united provinces having complained of the provisions in the french ordinance of , a treaty of commerce was concluded between france and the republic in , by which the law, as far as respected the capture and confiscation of neutral vessels for carrying enemy's property, was suspended; but it was found impossible to obtain, at that time, any relaxation as to the liability to capture of enemy's property in neutral vessels. this latter concession, however, the united provinces obtained from france by the treaty of alliance of , and the commercial treaty signed at the same time with the peace, at nimiguen, in ; confirmed by the treaty of ryswick, in . the maxim that _free ships_ make _free goods_ was coupled in these treaties with its correlative maxim, _enemy's ships_ make _enemy's goods_. the same concession was obtained by holland from england in and , as the price of an alliance between the two countries against the ambitious designs of louis xiv. in the subsequent war of , a controversy arose between england and holland, in which it was said, on the one hand, that england had violated the rights of neutral commerce; and on the other, that holland had not fulfilled the guarantees under which those privileges had been granted. afterwards, when the american revolution gave rise to a war between france and great britain, the latter power, instead of following the example of her enemy, (who had issued an ordinance prohibiting the seizure of neutral vessels, even when bound to or from enemy ports, unless carrying contraband,) issued an order in council, (march, ,) suspending the special stipulations respecting commerce and navigation contained in the treaty of . this was the crisis of many complaints made by the neutral powers against great britain; and, in , the empress of russia proclaimed the principles of the baltic code of neutrality, and declared she would maintain them by _force of arms_. this system of armed neutrality contained the following principles. . that commerce with the ports and roads of the enemy is free to neutral powers. . that the ship covers the cargo. . that those merchandizes only be considered as contraband, which are declared to be such by treaties with the belligerent powers, or with one of them. . that no place shall be considered as blockaded, till it is surrounded in such a manner by hostile ships that no person can enter it without manifest danger. . that these principles shall serve as a basis for decisions concerning the legality of prizes. the principal powers of europe, as sweden, denmark, prussia, germany, holland, france, spain, portugal, naples, and also the united states, acceded to the russian principles of neutrality. the court of london answered this declaration by appealing to "the principles generally acknowledged as the law of nations, being the only law between powers where no treaties subsist;" and to "the tenor of its different engagements with other powers, where those engagements had altered the primitive law by neutral stipulations, according to the will and convenience of the contracting parties." england, being thus opposed to all the maritime world, was at this time obliged to smother her resentment; only simply expostulating with russia. but the want of the consent of a power of such decided maritime superiority as that of great britain, was an insuperable obstacle to the success of the baltic conventional law of neutrality; and it was abandoned in by the naval powers of europe, as not sanctioned by the existing law of nations, in every case in which the doctrines of that code did not rest upon positive compact. during the protracted wars of the french revolution, all the belligerent powers began by discarding in practice, not only the principles of the armed neutrality, but even the generally received maxims of international law by which neutral commerce in time of war had been previously regulated. france, on her part, revived the severity of her ancient prize code; decreeing not only the capture and condemnation of the goods of her enemies found on board neutral vessels, but even of the vessels themselves laden with goods of british growth, produce, and manufacture. in , principally in consequence of the doctrines of the british admiralty courts with regard to the right of search, great efforts were made by the baltic powers to recall and enforce the doctrines of the armed neutrality of . this attempt is generally known as the armed neutrality of , and was met, promptly overpowered, and the confederacy finally dissolved, by the naval power of england. russia gave up the point, and by her convention with england of the th of june, , expressly agreed, that enemy's property was not to be protected on board of neutral ships.[ ] this settlement was ended by the death of the emperor paul. appendix to part i. note a.--_the law of reprisals_.[ ] reprisals by commission, or letters of marque and reprisal, granted to one or more injured persons, in the name and authority of the sovereign, constitutes a case of "partial, or special reprisals," and is considered to be compatible with a state of peace, and was formerly permitted by the law of nations; though it may be doubted if such a rule would hold good now.[ ] general reprisals upon the persons and property of the subjects of another nation are equivalent to open war. it is often the first step which is taken at the commencement of a public war, and may be considered as amounting to a declaration of hostilities, unless satisfaction is made by the offending state. a stoppage or seizure (in other words, an embargo), must not be confounded with complete reprisals. when ships are seized for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction for a particular injury, or security against a possible event, that seizure is only an embargo. the vessels are preserved as long as there is any hope of obtaining satisfaction or justice. as soon as that hope disappears, they are confiscated, and the reprisals are accomplished. in fact, that which was _embargo_ becomes reprisals by the _act of confiscation_.[ ] in the words of lord stowell: "upon property so detained the declaration of war is said to have a retroactive effect, and to render it liable to be considered as the property of enemies taken in time of war. the property is seized provisionally--an act hostile enough in the mere execution, but equivocal as to its effects, and liable to be varied by subsequent events, and by the conduct of the government, the property of whose subjects is so detained. where the first seizure is equivocal, if the matter in dispute terminates in reconciliation, the seizure is converted into a mere civil embargo. this would be the retroactive effect of that course of circumstances. on the contrary, if the transactions end in hostility, the retroactive effect is directly the other way. it impresses a hostile character upon the original seizure. it is declared to be embargo; it is no longer an equivocal act, subject to two interpretations; there is a declaration of the _animus_ by which it was done, that it was done _hostili animo_, and is to be considered a hostile measure _ab initio_. the property taken is liable to be used as the property of persons, trespassers _ab initio_, and guilty of injuries which they have refused to redeem by any amicable alteration of their measures. this is the necessary course, if no particular compact intervenes for the restitution of such property taken before a formal declaration of hostilities."[ ] the modern rule seems to be, that tangible property, belonging to an enemy, ought _not_ to be _immediately confiscated_. it may be considered as the opinion of all who have written on the _jus belli_, that war gives the _right_ to confiscate, but does not of itself confiscate the property of an enemy. chancellor kent expressly terms this species of hostility--_a reprisal_.[ ] and lord mansfield says, that though foreign ports or harbours are not the high sea any more than the shore, yet numberless captures made there have been condemned as prize,[ ] _i.e._ can be the subject _of reprisal_. note b.--_war bill act_. during the last war, the war bill act, geo. . c. , was passed as a measure of retaliation. it was passed in order to prevent the effect intended to be produced by an order of the french government, compelling all merchants, bankers, and others, possessed of money, funded property, and effects, in different parts europe, to declare all such property, that it might be taken by violence, and applied to the purposes of the war then carried on by the government of france against the greater part of europe. the principal sections relating to bills, prohibited any british subject, from and after march , , from wilfully and knowingly in any manner paying or satisfying any bill of exchange, note, draught, obligation, or order for money, in part or in whole, which, since january , , had been or at any time during the said war should be drawn, accepted, or indorsed, or in any manner sent from any part of the dominions of france, &c.; every person so offending to forfeit _double_ the value, and the payment not to be effectual against any person who might otherwise have demanded the same; but the demands of all persons to remain, notwithstanding such payment, and notwithstanding such bills shall have been delivered up. note c.--_rule of_ . during the war of , the french government, finding the trade with their colonies cut off by the maritime superiority of great britain, relaxed the monopoly of that trade, and allowed the dutch, then neutral, to carry on the commerce between the mother country and her colonies, under special licences or passes, granted for this particular purpose, excluding at the same time, all other neutrals from the same trade. many of their vessels were captured by the british cruizers. the policy under which they were captured is called the "rule of ;" and as, in the present war, its justice and propriety has already begun to be doubted, it may not be uninteresting to read the reasons upon which it was founded. . they were considered as part of the french navigation, having adopted this otherwise exclusive commerce, and acting in the character of french enemy in identifying themselves with that interest, in direct opposition to the belligerent interests and purposes of great britain. . inasmuch as they were only carriers for the french, they were to be regarded as french transports, carrying national assistance to the enemy, and therefore to be condemned on the same principle as vessels carrying troops or despatches. . that the property they carried being from one part of the french empire to the other, was so completely identified with french interests as to take a hostile character. . when war comes it is necessary to shut some of the avenues of commerce, otherwise the belligerent rights could not be protected. . that the neutral ought not to have _through_ and by means of the war, which is not his affair, that he has not in time of peace; and by natural justice he is only entitled to his accustomed trade. that any inconveniences he may suffer are quite balanced by the enlargement of his commerce; the trade of the belligerents is usually interrupted to a great degree, and falls into the lap of the neutral.[ ] . that it is a direct assistance to the enemy, and an injury to the belligerent interests of the other country, to carry on for the enemy the commerce that she has lost by the pressure of the war,--rendering the efforts of the successful power nugatory. note d.--_articles that have been declared contraband at various times._ gunpowder, arms, military equipments, and other things peculiarly adapted to military purposes. sail cloths, masts, anchors, pitch, tar, and hemp, universally contraband, even when destined to ports not of military equipment. cheeses, fit for naval use; such as dutch cheeses, when exclusively used in french ships of war. rosin, tallow, and ship biscuits, if destined to ports of military or naval equipment. similarly, of wines. and ship timber, when so destined. ships of war, or ships adapted for such service, going to a port of the enemy for sale. copper in sheets, certified by government dockyard officers as fit for the sheathing of ships. brimstone, destined to a port of warlike equipment. note e.--_the late declarations_. the first manifesto or declaration of war issued by the queen, so far follows the ancient form, that it gives a justification of the war, but differs from it in the omission of a general command to all her subjects to commit hostilities on the enemy. by this command (in the ancient form), the subjects were in general ordered, not only to break off all intercourse with the enemy, but also to _attack_ him. custom interpreted this general order. it authorized, and even obliged every subject, of whatever rank, to secure the person and things belonging to the enemy when they fell into his hands; but it did not invite the subjects to undertake any offensive expedition without a commission or particular order. the present manifesto simply proclaims that the queen of england has taken up arms against russia, that is, has declared "a state of war." the omission of an injunction to break off intercourse, and to exercise hostility, does not relieve the subject from his duty in that respect; for war may commence without any manifesto, and any official recognition of the "state of war" casts upon the subject his full duties under that condition of things. the ancient form has been judiciously allowed to drop, leading, as it might have done, to misconception on the part of her majesty's lieges. the second manifesto has reference to regulations with respect to neutral commerce, and speaks for itself. the third is as follows, and the references to the text will be sufficient to explain it. declaration. her majesty, the queen of the united kingdom of great britain and ireland, having been compelled to take up arms in support of an ally, is desirous of rendering the war as little onerous as possible to the powers with whom she remains at peace. to preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruction, her majesty is willing, for the present, to waive a part of the belligerent rights appertaining to her by the law of nations. it is impossible for her majesty to forego the exercise of her right of seizing articles contraband of war,[ ] and of preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's dispatches,[ ] and she must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the enemy's forts, harbours, or coasts.[ ] but her majesty will waive the right of seizing enemy's property laden on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of war.[ ] it is not her majesty's intention to claim the confiscation of neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemy's ships,[ ] and her majesty further declares, that being anxious to lessen as much as possible the evils of war, and to restrict its operations to the regularly organized forces of the country, it is not her present intention to issue letters of marque for the commissioning of privateers. westminster, march , . the fourth declaration. at the court at buckingham palace, the th day of march, , present, the queen's most excellent majesty in council. her majesty having determined to afford active assistance to her ally, his highness the sultan of the ottoman empire, for the protection of his dominions against the encroachments and unprovoked aggression of his imperial majesty, the emperor of all the russias, her majesty, therefore, is pleased, by and with the advice of her privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals[ ] be granted against the ships, vessels, and goods of the emperor of all the russias, and of his subjects or others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories, or dominions, _so that her majesty's fleets and ships_ shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods, belonging to the emperor of all the russias, or his subjects, or others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories, or dominions, and bring the same to judgment in such courts of admiralty within her majesty's dominions, possessions, or colonies, as shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance thereof. and to that end her majesty's advocate-general, with the advocate of her majesty in her office of admiralty, are forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to her majesty at this board, authorizing the commissioners for executing the office of lord high admiral to will and require the high court of admiralty of england, and the lieutenant and judge of the said court, his surrogate or surrogates, as also the several courts of admiralty within her majesty's dominions, which shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance of, and judicially proceed upon, all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and reprisals of all ships, vessels, and goods, that are or shall be taken, and to hear and determine the same; and, according to the courts of admiralty and the law of nations, to adjudge and condemn all such ships, vessels, and goods, as shall belong to the emperor of all the russias or his subjects, or to any others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories, or dominions: and they are likewise to prepare and lay before her majesty, at this board, a draft of such instructions as may be proper to be sent to the said several courts of admiralty in her majesty's dominions, possessions, and colonies, for their guidance herein. from the court at buckingham palace, this twenty-ninth day of march, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four. index. admiralty. droits of admiralty, ambassadors, armed neutrality, affreightment, bills of exchange. drawn during war, blockades, by whom proclaimed, violation of, first rule of, second rule, third rule, simple blockade, blockade in fact, blockade with notification, maritime blockade not violated by land carriage, contracts. with enemy, void, made before the war, cartel, principles of cartel, cargoes. distinguished from ships, condemnation. preliminary proceedings, captors. answerable for damages, when entitled to freight, convoys, contraband of war, provisions, when contraband, lord stowell's opinion, neutral ships transporting enemy's forces, neutral ships carrying enemy's despatches, penalty for contraband trade, further penalties, return voyage free, articles of contraband, declaration of war, contents, the late declarations, when retroactive, debts. due to or from an enemy, domicile. test of nationality, test of domicile, in eastern countries, embargo. hostile, civil and hostile, enemy. alien enemy cannot sue in this country, who is enemy?, natural enemies, funds. public, foreigners. married in this country, free goods. in enemy's ships, free goods, free ships, _see_ rule of . freight. captor entitled to, when he takes goods to port of destination, when captor pays freight, hostile character. acquired by trade, hostile property. cannot be transferred _in transitu_, insurances, licences. to trade with enemy, duties of merchants using licences, what vessels may be employed under them, the cargo allowed, rules with respect thereto, the voyages permitted, the time of the licence, note, mariners. their position in time of war, neutrality. rights of neutral nations, qualified neutrality, neutral territory protected, property of belligerents in neutral territory, vessels chased into neutral ports, violation of neutrality, armed, neutral commerce. freedom of, neutral ships. enemy's property in, public neutral ships, private neutral ships, transporting enemy's forces, neutral property. _see_ property. partnerships. dissolved by war, in neutral countries, prisoners of war, privateers, acquisition of captures by, commissions of, efforts to suppress privateering, piratical privateers, prizes. jurisdiction over prizes, common law courts not always excluded, prize courts, where held, their judgments conclusive, postliminy. right of, jus postliminii, passports, property. of subjects of belligerent states in enemy's country, immoveable property, rule in respect of, private, on land, government property, captured property, title to, enemy's, in neutral ships, neutral, in enemy's ships, neutral, on _armed_ hostile ships, hostile cannot be transferred _in transitu_, reciprocity. rule of, rule of , note, ransoms, recaptures, of the property of allies, of neutral property, reprisals, ships. national character of, sale and purchase of, by neutrals, not restored on recapture, if set forth as ships of war, safe-conducts, salvage in war, search, right of, trade. with the enemy unlawful, not permitted with enemy, except under royal licence, subjects of an ally cannot trade with enemy, trading with the enemy punishable, hostile character acquired by trade, _see also_ licences, contraband, &c. war. solemn, how commenced, objects of, maritime, objects of, limitations of the right of making war, postscript. since the completion of the second edition of this work, two very important orders in council, (dated april th, ,) have been published. before proceeding to explain the intended effect of these orders, it will be well to state that the consent of _both_ the allies of england in this war is necessary to give full validity to the orders. it is a very old principle that, during a _conjoint_ war, no subject of an ally can trade with the common enemy without liability to forfeiture, in the prize courts of the ally, of all his property engaged in such trade. this rule can be relaxed only by the permission of the allied nations, according to their mutual consent.[ ] lord stowell lays down the principle in much broader terms, thus-- "it has happened, since the world has grown more commercial, that a practice has crept in of admitting particular relaxations; and if _one_ state only is at war, no injury is committed to any other state. it is of no importance to other nations how much a _single_ belligerent chooses to weaken and dilute his _own_ rights; but it is otherwise when allied nations are pursuing a common cause against a common enemy. between them it must be taken as an implied, if not an express contract, that one state shall not do anything to defeat the general object. if one state admits its subjects to carry on an uninterrupted trade with the enemy, the consequence may be that it will supply aid and _comfort_ to the enemy; especially if it is an enemy very materially depending on the resources of foreign commerce, which may be injurious to the prosecution of the common cause, _and the interests of its ally_. it should seem that it is not enough, therefore, to say that one state has allowed this practice to its own subjects; it should appear to be at least desirable, that it could be shown that the practice is of such a nature that it can in no way interfere with the common operations, or that it has the allowance of the confederate state."[ ] trade with the enemy has always been held to be a direct interference with the common operations of the war, and indirect trade has been regarded with as much jealousy as direct trade. if lord stowell is to be trusted, this country cannot in any way waive its belligerent rights, without the consent of its ally; so that it is quite in the option of france at any time to withdraw its assent, or to modify it in terms, and thus bind english merchants to the terms of their assent. the _intended_ effect of these orders is well described in the _times_, of april st, . "the order in council of the th april, , recites, in the first instance, her majesty's declaration made on the opening of the war; but it then goes on to enact not only that enemies' property laden on board neutral vessels shall not be seized, but that all neutral and friendly ships shall be permitted to import into her majesty's dominions, all goods and merchandizes whatsoever, and to export everything in like manner, except to blockaded ports, and except those articles which require a special permission as being contraband of war. but this liberty of trade is not confined to neutrals. it is further ordered, that, with the above exceptions only, british subjects shall have free leave to. trade 'with all ports and places wherever situate,' save only that british ships are not permitted to enter the ports of the enemy. the effect of this order is, therefore, to leave the trade of this country with neutrals, and even the indirect trade with russia, in the same state it was in during peace, as far as the law of our courts maritime is concerned; and the doctrine of illegal trading with the enemy is at an end.[ ] the restrictions henceforth to be imposed are solely those arising out of direct naval and military operations, such as blockade, and those which the enemy may think fit to lay upon british and french property. as far as we are concerned, except that british ships are not to enter russian ports--which it is obvious that they could not do without incurring the risk of a forfeiture of their property and the imprisonment of their crews--the trade may be lawfully carried on in any manner which the ingenuity and enterprise of our merchants can devise. in order to facilitate the removal of british property from the ports of the baltic and the white sea, which were frozen up at the date of the order of the th of march, further leave has been given to russian vessels to come out of those ports, if not under blockade, until the th of may; as, in fact, it is only by taking up russian ships that british property in those ports is likely to be removed, as neutrals will not enter them from fear of the blockade. "it is not easy to convey to the mind of the mercantile classes of the present generation, who have had no practical experience of the state of war, the extent of the change which is thus effected in their favour. the vigilance of our cruisers and the acuteness of our lawyers were incessantly employed in all former contests in tracking out the faintest scent of enemy's property on board every vessel met on the seas. the character of enemy's property was regarded as an infection, and reprobated with all the terms originally reserved for guilty practices. the mercantile ingenuity of the country, pressed by the increased demand and exorbitant prices of prohibited articles, was strained to evade by every species of fraud these prohibitions, and a warfare was carried on within our own courts of justice between the pitiless exactions of the laws of war and the irresistible impulse of the laws of trade. to allay, in some degree, the inconveniences of this system, and to provide by legal means some of those commodities which it was for the public interest to purchase, the english and french governments were driven, even during the height of the continental system, to the granting of licences. but here again fresh abuses of every kind arose. these licences were an authorized mode of evading that very prohibition which the belligerents conceived it to be for their interest to maintain. they conferred a monopoly on the holder of the licence, which enabled him to sell his cargo of french wines or french silks at a prohibition price; and the law books of the time are still full of the endless litigation and fraud to which these practices gave rise. "from all these evils we trust that the order in council of the th april has permanently relieved us, and the change it is calculated to bring about in the state of war is not of inferior importance to that which marked the transition from protection to free trade in the state of peace. the system of licences is at an end, for all the liberty of trade with the enemy which it is in the power of the government to confer at all, is thus conferred at once, and indiscriminately upon all; and, unless the russian government find means to maintain a prohibitive system on their frontiers, we hope that the supply of raw material from that country will not be reduced to scarcity." in addition, however, to this very lucid explanation, it may be added, that it might become necessary to grant licences to trade directly (with the consent of our allies) to the russian ports. that on the part of british vessels, the "entering or communicating with any port or place in the possession or occupation of the enemy, will place the english vessel in the position of an illegal trader, and that the vessel will then be liable to the same penalties as if this order had not been published." with respect to contraband, it will have to be remembered that contraband _to_ russia will not be contraband to england, unless it is despatches, treasonable letters, enemy's forces, secret agents or spies. neutral property on board an enemy's vessel is not generally liable to seizure, unless on an "armed vessel of force;" but even this, by the order, seems to be protected. by the same order, british property on russian vessels is _not_ protected. it is quite in the option of neutrals, or british vessels, to break any russian blockade. the renunciations in these orders are a waiver only of certain parts of the queen's belligerent rights, and in no way diminish the state of war between england and russia. notwithstanding these orders, russo-english partnerships are dissolved, contracts with the enemy invalid, and even though a free trade is permitted, an englishman cannot draw a good bill on a russian, and _vice-versâ_. all attempts to communicate with the enemy are still illegal. the queen has not altered her belligerent rights, she merely declares that she will not put them into motion; but that does not alter, nor can she of her own authority alter, any part of the international law, which also is a part of our common law. these, orders, therefore, give no power to the enemy to sue or reside here, or to make a valid indorsement to any british subject. insurances will become legal on cargoes that by these orders may be imported. (from the _gazette_ of tuesday.) at the court of windsor, the th day of april, , present the queen's most excellent majesty in council. whereas her majesty was graciously pleased, on the th day of march last, to issue her royal declaration on the following terms-- "her majesty the queen of the united kingdom of great britain and ireland, having been compelled to take up arms in support of an ally, is desirous of rendering the war as little onerous as possible to the powers with whom she remains at peace. "to preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruction, her majesty is willing, for the present, to waive a part of the belligerent rites appertaining to her by the law of nations. "it is impossible for her majesty to forego the exercise of her right of seizing articles contraband of war, and of preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches, and she must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the enemy's forts, harbours, or coasts. "but her majesty will waive the right of seizing enemy's property laden on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of war.[ ] "it is not her majesty's intention to claim the confiscation of neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemy's ships;[ ] and her majesty further declares that, being anxious to lessen as much as possible the evils of war, and to restrict its operations to the regularly organized forces of the country, it is not her present intention to issue letters of marque for the commissioning of privateers." _now it is this day ordered_, by and with the advice of her privy council, that all vessels under a neutral or friendly flag, being neutral or friendly property, shall be permitted to import into any port or place in her majesty's dominions all goods and merchandize whatsoever, to whomsoever the same may belong,[ ] and to export from any port or place in her majesty's dominions to any port not blockaded, any cargo or goods, not being contraband of war, or not requiring a special permission, to _whomsoever the same may belong_. and her majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice of her privy council, to order, and it is hereby further ordered, that, save and except only as aforesaid, _all the subjects of her majesty_, and the subjects or citizens of any neutral or friendly state, shall and may, during and notwithstanding the present hostilities with russia, _freely trade_[ ] with all ports and places wheresoever situate, which shall not be in a state of blockade, save and except that no british vessel shall, under any circumstances whatsoever, either under or by virtue of this order, or otherwise, be permitted or empowered to enter or communicate with any port or place which shall belong to or be in the possession or occupation of her majesty's enemies. and the right hon. the lords commissioners of her majesty's treasury, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, the lord warden of the cinque ports, and her majesty's principal secretary of state for war and the colonies, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.--c.c. greville. at the court at windsor, the th day of april, , present the queen's most excellent majesty in council. whereas, by an order of her majesty in council, of the th of march last, it was, among other things, ordered, "that any russian merchant vessel which, prior to the date of this order, shall have sailed from any foreign port, bound for any port or place in her majesty's, dominions, shall be permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without molestation; and that any such vessel, if met at sea by any of her majesty's ships, shall be permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded." and whereas her majesty, by and with the advice of her said council, is now pleased to alter and extend such part of the said order, it is hereby ordered, by and with such advice as aforesaid, as follows--that is to say, that any russian merchant vessel which, prior to the th day of may, , shall have sailed from any port of russia situated either in or upon the shores or coasts of the baltic sea or of the white sea, bound for any port or place in her majesty's dominions, shall be permitted to enter such last-mentioned port or place and to discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without molestation; and that any such vessel, if met, at sea by any of her majesty's ships, shall be permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded. and her majesty is pleased, by and with the advice aforesaid, further to order, and it is hereby further ordered, that in all other respects her majesty's aforesaid order in council, of the th day of march last, shall be and remain in full force, effect, and operation. and the right hon. the lords commissioners of her majesty's treasury, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the lord warden of the cinque ports, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.--c.c. greville. h.b.t. , serjeant's inn, _ nd april, _. notes [ : see justice story's judgment in the case of the la jeune eugenie. life, vol. i. .] [ : the law of reprisals; _vide_ note (a.)] [ : rutherford's institutes, vol. ii. p. .] [ : wheaton, p. ; kent, p. .] [ : per sir w. scott--case of the eliza ann, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : wildman's international law, vol. ii. p. .] [ : kent, p. ; vattel, book , chap. iv. sec. .] [ : kent, p. .] [ : wheaton, p. ; kent, p. ; rutherford's institutes, book , chap. , sec. .] [ : wheaton, p. - ; kent's com. p. - ; brown _v._ united states, cranch, ; see also , .] [ : idem.] [ : grot, book , chap. , sec. .] [ : rob. adm. rep. .] [ : wheaton, p. .] [ : lindo v. rodney, doug. ; the boedes lust, rob. rep. .] [ : per lord mansfield, lindo _v._ rodney.] [ : wolff _v._ oxholm, m. and s. .] [ : grot. book , chap. , sec. ; book , chap. , sec. .] [ : whewell, grot. vol. , p. , sec. ; p. , sec. ( ).] [ : kent's com. p. .] [ : bynkersheok, quæst. sur. pub. lib. i. cap. ; wheaton, p. .] [ : robinson's adm. rep. p. .] [ : the hoop.] [ : the rapid, cranche's rep. p. .] [ : the st. lawrence, cranche's rep. p. .] [ : the juffrow catharina, rob. .] [ : wheaton, p. .] [ : kent's com. p. .] [ : the rendsborg, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : park, p. .] [ : toulmin _v._ anderson, taunt. .] [ : potter _v._ bell, t. rep. ; the hoop, _supra._] [ : vandyck _v._ whitmore, east, .] [ : park, .] [ : park on insurance; arnold on insurance; gist _v_. mason, i t. r. .] [ : idem.] [ : the immanuel, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : park, ; sewell _v_. royal exchange assurance co. taunt. ; wilson _v_. marryat, t. rep. .] [ : willison _v_. patterson, taunt. ; _vide_ note on the war bill act, at the end of this part.] [ : per gibbs, c.j. antoine _v._ morshead, taunt. . according to mr. serjeant byles, a bill drawn by a british prisoner in favour of an alien enemy cannot be enforced by the payee. he cites no case in support of this assertion; but on the principle of the last case cited, if it were drawn for _subsistence and not for trade_, there seems to be no reason why it should not be legal.] [ : duhamel _v._ pickering, starkie, .] [ : barker _v._ hodgson, m. & s. .] [ : liddard _v._ lopes, east. ; abbot, on shipping, .] [ : kent's com. ; the hiram, rob. adm. .] [ : kent's com., .] [ : hadley _v._ clarke, t.r. ; kent's com. .] [ : abbot, on shipping, .] [ : pothier, trait du cout. de joc. no. .] [ : story, on partnership, pp. , .] [ : griswold _v._ waddington, johns. rep. u.s.] [ : story, on partnership, .] [ : story, on partnership, ; griswold _v._ waddington, johns, ; johns, .] [ : platt, on covenants, ; doe _d._ lord anglesea _v._ ch. wardens of rugely, q.b. , and cases there cited.] [ : cosmopolite, rob. , , in note.] [ : term. r. gist. _v._ mason.] [ : per buller, j. bell _v._ gilson, bos. _v._. pull.] [ : case of bella guidita, cited rob. adm. rep. .] [ : kent, p. ] [ : kent, p. ] [ : per eyre, c.j. sparenburgh _v._ bannatyne, b. & p. .] [ : sparenburgh _v._ bannatyne, b. & p. .] [ : maria _v_. hall, b.&p. .] [ : derry _v_. duchess of mazarin, taunt. .] [ : & vic. c. , sec. ; mrs. manning's case, d.c.c. .] [ : the vriendchap, rob. ; the embden, rob. ; the endraught, rob. .] [ : kent's com. vol. i. .] [ : case of the emmanuel, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : case of dos hermanos, wheaton, .] [ : wheaton, ; rob. adm, rep. iii. ; the harmony, the indian chief, rob. .] [ : the ocean, rob. p. .] [ : the vigilantia, rob. adm. rep. p. .] [ : the susa, rob. adm. rep. vol. ii. p. .] [ : wheaton, vol. ii. p. , citing cranch's rep. vol viii. p. .] [ : kent's com. , citing berens _v_. rucker, i w. bl. ; and _vide infra_ chap. iii. under title "rule of ."] [ : the vigilantia, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : the success, i dodson's adm. rep. .] [ : i kent's com., p. .] [ : i kent's com. p. .] [ : vrow margaretha, i rob. adm. rep. .] [ : esprit des loix, book , c. .] [ : vattel, idem.] [ : wheaton, vol. , p. .] [ : wheaton, vol. , p. ; kent, vol. , p. .] [ : not so, however, in the late declaration, march , ; _sed vide_ app.] [ : vattel, book , chap. .] [ : kent, vol. i, sec. , p. .] [ : rob. adm. rep. p. (n).] [ : prize acts, geo. iii. c. .] [ : order of council, ; the maria francaise, rob. adm. rep. ; rebekah, rob. .] [ : vattel, book , chap. , sec. .] [ : the elsebe, rob. .] [ : the thorshaven, edw. rep. ; goo. iii. c. .] [ : geo. iii. c. , sec. .] [ : the vryheid, rob. .] [ : martens, on privateering, p. .] [ : but see the introduction.] [ : act of congress, april , , chap. .] [ : kent, vol. i, p. .] [ : wheaton, vol. , p. - .] [ : kent, sec. , p. ; rutherford's institutes, book , chap. .] [ : this description of the preliminary proceedings in prize is taken from the second volume of wildman's institutes of international law, p. ; cited "by that author from a letter from sir w. scott and dr. nicholl to mr. jay, the american minister."] [ : lindo _v._ rodney, doug. , note.] [ : brymer _v._ atkins, i. h. black.] [ : brymer _v._ atkins, i. h. black, p. .] [ : floy owen, i rob. adm. rep. ; oddy _v_. bovill, east. .] [ : rob. rep. .] [ : wheaton, vol. , p. .] [ : vattel, book , chap. , sec. .] [ : wheaton, vol. , p. .] [ : vattel, book , chap. , sec. - .] [ : page , ante.] [ : the cosmopolite, bob. kep. .] [ : the abigail, stewart's adm. rep. p. .] [ : shroeder _v_. vaux, east. rep. ; camp. n.p. rep. p. ; the cosmopolite, rob. .] [ : the dauk vaarhirt, dod. adm. rep. .] [ : the dauk vaarhirt, dod. adm. rep. .] [ : idem.] [ : the jonge arend, rob. .] [ : the henrietta, dod. adm. rep. .] [ : the jonge johannes, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : idem.] [ : the jonge klassina, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : the cousinne marianne, edw. .] [ : the twee gebroeders, edw. adm. rep. .] [ : the manly, i dod. .] [ : europa, edw. .] [ : golden hoop, nov. , , edw. rep.] [ : the st. ivan, edw. .] [ : kent, . the statutes are, geo. , c. ; geo. , c. , sections , ; geo. , c. , sections , , , and .] [ : there are a few other general points with respect to ransoms, which will be found _infra_ under recaptures. valin is the principal authority, and his law will be found well summed up in the nd volume of wildman's institutes of international law. there are few cases on the subject; the chief are, ricard _v._ bellenham, burr, ; yates _v._ hall, t.r. , ; authon _v._ fisher, corner _v._ blackburn, doug.] [ : martens on privateers and recaptures.] [ : the ceylon, i dod. ; l'actif, edw. , _vide etiam_; the nostra signora, bob. ; the georgiana, i dod. ; the horatio, rob. .] [ : the edward and mary, rob. .] [ : the pensamento felix, edw. .] [ : the charlotte caroline, dod. .] [ : santa cruz, rob. .] [ : the war onskan, rob. .] [ : kent, com. .] [ : the william, rob. .] [ : idem.] [ : vattel, book iii. c. .] [ : idem.] [ : wheaton, chap. iii. sec. i. p. .] [ : wheaton, vol. ii. ; kent's com. vol. i. p. .] [ : vrow anna catharina, rob. .] [ : idem.] [ : kent's com. p. ; the anna, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : vrow anna catharina, rob. .] [ : the anna, rob. c.] [ : the twee gebroeders, rob. a. r. .] [ : the etrusco, rob. adm. rep.] [ : kent com. p. ; vattel, book in, chap, vii, sec. . see also, the immanuel, rob. adm. rep. , and the notes on the declarations, in appendix.] [ : vattel, book in, chap. vii, sec. .] [ : the fortuna, rob. rep. p. .] [ : the diana, rob. rep. .] [ : the fortuna.] [ : _vide_ vattel.] [ : kent's com. ; the copenhagen, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : _vide post_. section iv, and notes on the declarations. appendix.] [ : the fancy, dod. adm. rep. .] [ : the nereid, cranch rep. .] [ : the fancy, dodson's adm. rep. .] [ : the sachs gesawhistern, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : the minerva, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : the noydt gedart. rob. , (n.)] [ : rob. .] [ : see in the appendix a table of articles of commerce that have been declared contraband.] [ : grotius, book in. chap. i. sec. v.; rutherfurd's instit. book ii. chap. ix. sec. xix.] [ : the commercen, wheaton's rep. .] [ : the commereen, wheaton's rep. .] [ : the jonge margaretha, rob. adm..rep. vol. i. p. .] [ : the charlotte, rob. adm. rep. vol. v. p. .] [ : wheaton, , .] [ : the haabet, rob. adm. rep. .] [ : the carolina, rob. adm. rep. vol. iv. p. .] [ : they were officers of distinction.] [ : the orozembo, rob. adm. rep. p. .] [ : idem.] [ : the atalanta, rob. adm. rep. vol. vi. p. .] [ : the caroline. rob. adm. rep. vol. vi. p. .] [ : the ringende jacob, rob. adm. rep. vol. i. p. .] [ : the franklin, rob. vol. iii, p. .] [ : the rolla, rob. .] [ : the edward, rob. adm. rep. vol. iv. p. .] [ : the tonina, rob. adm. rep. vol. iii. p. .] [ : the betsy, the columbia, rob. adm. rep. pp. and .] [ : the hoffnung, rob. ; see also the triheton, rob. .] [ : the mercurius, rob. adm. rep. p. .] [ : wheaton, p. , citing rob. adm. rep.] [ : rob. adm. rep. vol. i. p. .] [ : neptunus, rob. adm. rep. vol. i. p. ; neptunus, hempel. rob. adm. rep. vol. ii. p. .] [ : wheaton, p. .] [ : wheaton, pp. , .] [ : the betsey, rob. adm. rep. p. .] [ : rob. adm. rep. p. .] [ : see section iv. on armed neutralities.] [ : rob. adm. rep. p. .] [ : geo. iii. c. lvii. sec. ; abbot, on shipping, pp. -- .] [ : this account of armed neutralities has been extracted principally from kent's commentaries, vol. i. pp. - ; wheaton on international law, vol. ii. pp. - ; martens on privateers, pp. - . there are also most excellent accounts of these celebrated confederacies to be found in the annual register, in volumes , ( ,) and , ( ,) in the portion called the historical chronicle.] [ : this note was originally intended to form part of the text, but was accidentally omitted.] [ : le louis.] [ : vattel, book ii. chap, xviii. sec. .] [ : the boedes lust, rob. adm. rep. p. .] [ : kent's com. p. .] [ : lind. _v._ rodney, dougl. rep. p. . a.] [ : lord stowell argues the principles at length in the immanuel, rob. adm. rep. , .] [ : _vide_ section ii. chap. iii. contraband of war.] [ : _vide_ p. .] [ : see section ii. chap. ii. blockades.] [ : this is the doctrine _free ships free goods_, for the first time voluntarily adopted by this country, pp. , .] [ : according to vattel, this belligerent right has no existence, and need not therefore be waived, as it could not legally be exercised; but see p. .] [ : this grant of general reprisals, though apparently limited in its address, (as to action in the war) to her majesty's fleets and ships, does not exclude non-commissioned captors from taking russian ships, or goods when called upon _by necessity_ to do so. for example, any of our armed merchantmen, who in the present war will not be allowed letters of marque, would be quite justified when beating off the enemy, in also making a capture if possible, and although her prize would become a _droit of admiralty_, the captor would be entitled to apply to the court for some compensation. the second part of this declaration is intended to proclaim the preliminary step to establishing the court of prize. the declarations with respect to the embargo laid upon russian goods and ships in our ports require no comment.] [ : see pages and .] [ : the neptunus, robinson's adm. rep. p. ; also the nayade, rob. p. .] [ : vide post.] [ : see page .] [ : see page .] [ : this allows free commerce in neutral bottoms to our ports, from russia. it is difficult to see what is meant by "friendly flags." it cannot mean "a flag of the allies," for that would be giving our allies more than we take ourselves. it is, perhaps, intended to include powers that may not be friendly to russia, but in that position to ourselves, without being allied to us.] [ : free trade by british vessels in enemy's property to ports not hostile.] terrorists and freedom fighters st edition sam vaknin, ph.d. editing and design: lidija rangelovska lidija rangelovska a narcissus publications imprint, skopje first published by central europe review not for sale! non-commercial edition. (c) copyright lidija rangelovska. all rights reserved. this book, or any part thereof, may not be used or reproduced in any manner without written permission from: lidija rangelovska - write to: palma@unet.com.mk or to vaknin@link.com.mk visit the author archive of dr. sam vaknin in "central europe review": http://www.ce- review.org/authorarchives/vaknin_archive/vaknin_main.html isbn: - - - http://samvak.tripod.com/guide.html http://economics.cjb.net http://samvak.tripod.com/after.html created by:	lidija rangelovska republic of macedonia c o n t e n t s i.	terrorists and freedom fighters ii.	macedonia to the macedonians iii.	the black hand iv.	the insurgents and the swastika v.	kla - the army of liberation vi.	appendix: pathological narcissism, group behaviour and terrorism vii.	appendix: the crescent and the cross viii.	the author ix.	about "after the rain" terrorists and freedom fighters "'unbounded' morality ultimately becomes counterproductive even in terms of the same moral principles being sought. the law of diminishing returns applies to morality." thomas sowell there's a story about robespierre that has the preeminent rabble- rouser of the french revolution leaping up from his chair as soon as he saw a mob assembling outside. "i must see which way the crowd is headed," he is reputed to have said: "for i am their leader." http://www.salon.com/tech/books/ / / /new_optimism/ people who exercise violence in the pursuit of what they hold to be just causes are alternately known as "terrorists" or "freedom fighters". they all share a few common characteristics: .	a hard core of idealists adopt a cause (in most cases, the freedom of a group of people). they base their claims on history - real or hastily concocted, on a common heritage, on a language shared by the members of the group and, most important, on hate and contempt directed at an "enemy". the latter is, almost invariably, the physical or cultural occupier of space the idealists claim as their own. .	the loyalties and alliances of these people shift effortlessly as ever escalating means justify an ever shrinking cause. the initial burst of grandiosity inherent in every such undertaking gives way to cynical and bitter pragmatism as both enemy and people tire of the conflict. .	an inevitable result of the realpolitik of terrorism is the collaboration with the less savoury elements of society. relegated to the fringes by the inexorable march of common sense, the freedom fighters naturally gravitate towards like minded non-conformists and outcasts. the organization is criminalized. drug dealing, bank robbing and other manner of organized and contumacious criminality become integral extensions of the struggle. a criminal corporatism emerges, structured but volatile and given to internecine donnybrooks. .	very often an un-holy co-dependence develops between the organization and its prey. it is the interest of the freedom fighters to have a contemptible and tyrannical regime as their opponent. if not prone to suppression and convulsive massacres by nature - acts of terror will deliberately provoke even the most benign rule to abhorrent ebullition. .	the terrorist organization will tend to emulate the very characteristics of its enemy it fulminates against the most. thus, all such groups are rebarbatively authoritarian, execrably violent, devoid of human empathy or emotions, suppressive, ostentatious, trenchant and often murderous. .	it is often the freedom fighters who compromise their freedom and the freedom of their people in the most egregious manner. this is usually done either by collaborating with the derided enemy against another, competing set of freedom fighters - or by inviting a foreign power to arbiter. thus, they often catalyse the replacement of one regime of oppressive horror with another, more terrible and entrenched. .	most freedom fighters are assimilated and digested by the very establishment they fought against or as the founders of new, privileged nomenklaturas. it is then that their true nature is exposed, mired in gulosity and superciliousness as they become. inveterate violators of basic human rights, they often transform into the very demons they helped to exorcise. most freedom fighters are disgruntled members of the middle classes or the intelligentsia. they bring to their affairs the merciless ruthlessness of sheltered lives. mistaking compassion for weakness, they show none as they unscrupulously pursue their self- aggrandizement, the ego trip of sending others to their death. they are the stuff martyrs are made of. borne on the crests of circumstantial waves, they lever their unbalanced personalities and project them to great effect. they are the footnotes of history that assume the role of text. and they rarely enjoy the unmitigated support of the very people they proffer to liberate. even the most harangued and subjugated people find it hard to follow or accept the vicissitudinal behaviour of their self-appointed liberators, their shifting friendships and enmities and their pasilaly of violence. in this series of articles, i will attempt to study four such groups which operated in the tortured region of the balkans. i will start with the imro (vmro) in macedonia and bulgaria, proceed to serbia and its union with death ("union or death", aka the black hand), study the ustasha in detail and end with the current mutation of balkan spasms, the kla (uck). return macedonia to the macedonians "two hundred and forty five bands were in the mountains. serbian and bulgarian comitadjis, greek andartes, albanians and vlachs... all waging a terrorist war" leon sciaky in "farewell to salonica: portrait of an era" "(goce delcev died) cloak flung over his left shoulder, his white fez, wrapped in a bluish scarf, pulled down and his gun slung across his left elbow" mihail chakov, who was nearby delcev at the moment of his death, quoted in "balkan ghosts" by robert d. kaplan "i will try and tell this story coldly, calmly, dispassionately ... one must tone the horrors down, for in their nakedness, they are unprintable..." a.g. hales reporting about the illinden uprising in the london "daily news" of october , "the internal macedonian revolutionary organization directs its eyes neither to the west, nor to the east,nor to anywhere else; it relies primarily on its own powers, does not turn into anybody's weapon, and will not allow anybody to use its name and prestige for personal and other purposes. it has demonstrated till now and will prove in the future that it establishes its activities on the interests and works for the ideals of struggling macedonia and the bulgarian race." todor alexandrov, the leader of the imro from to the treaty of berlin killed peter lazov. a turkish soldier first gouged his eyes out, some say with a spoon, others insist it was a knife. as the scream-imbued blood trickled down his face, the turk cut both his ears and the entirety of his nose with his sword. thus maimed and in debilitating agony, he was left to die for a few days. when he failed to do so, the turks disembowelled him to death and decapitated the writhing rump. the ottomans granted independence to bulgaria in the treaty of san stefano unwillingly, following a terminal defeat at the hands of a wrathful russian army. the newly re-invented nation incorporated a huge swathe of macedonia, not including thessaloniki and the chalcidice peninsula. another treaty followed, in berlin, restoring the "balance" by returning macedonia to turkish rule. turkey obligingly accepted a "one country, two systems" approach by agreeing to a christian administration of the region and by permitting education in foreign languages, by foreign powers in foreign-run and owned schools. then they set about a typical infandous ottoman orgy of shredded entrails, gang raped corpses of young girls and maiming and decapitation. the horrors this time transcended anything before. in ohrid, they buried people in pigsty mud for "not paying taxes". joined by turks who escaped the advancing russian armies in north bulgaria and by bosnian moslems, who fled the pincer movement of the forces of austro-hungary, they embarked on the faithful recreation of a bosch-like hell. feeble attempts at resistance (really, self defence) - such as the one organized by natanail, the bishop of ohrid - ended in the ever escalating ferocity of the occupiers. a collaboration emerged between the church and the less than holy members of society. natanail himself provided "chetis" (guerilla bands) with weapons and supplies. in october , an uprising took place in kresna. it was duly suppressed by the turks, though with some difficulty. it was not the first one, having been preceded by the razlovci uprising in . but it was more well organized and explicit in its goals. but no one - with the exception of the turks - was content with the situation and even they were paranoid and anxious. the flip-flop policies of the great powers turned macedonia into the focus of shattered national aspirations grounded in some historical precedent of at least three nations: the greeks, the bulgarians, and the serbs. each invoked ethnicity and history and all conjured up the apparition of the defunct treaty of san stefano. serbia colluded with the habsburgs: bosnia to the latter in return for a free hand in macedonia to the former. the wily austro-hungarians regarded the serbs as cannon fodder in the attrition war against the russians and the turks. in , bulgaria was at last united - north and formerly turk-occupied south - under the kremlin's pressure. the turks switched sides and allied with the serbs against the spectre of a great bulgaria. again, the battleground was macedonia and its bulgarian-leaning (and to many, pure bulgarian) inhabitants. further confusion awaited. in , following the crete uprising against the ottoman rule and in favour of greek enosis (unification), turkey (to prevent bulgaria from joining its greek enemy) encouraged king ferdinand to help the serbs fight the greeks. thus, the balkanian kaleidoscope of loyalties, alliances and everlasting friendship was tilted more savagely than ever before by the paranoia and the whims of nationalism gone berserk. in this world of self reflecting looking glasses, in this bedlam of geopolitics, in this seamless and fluid universe, devoid of any certainty but the certainty of void, an anomie inside an abnormality - a macedonian self identity, tentative and merely cultural at first, began to emerge. voivode gorgija pulevski published a poem "macedonian fairy" in . the young macedonian literary society was established in and started publishing "loza", its journal a year thereafter. krste misirkov, dimitrija cupovski, the vardar society and the macedonian club in belgrade founded the macedonian scholarly-literary society in (in russia). their "macedonian national program" demanded a recognition of a macedonian nation with its own language and culture. they stopped short of insisting on an independent state, settling instead for an autonomy and an independent church. misirkov went on to publish his seminal work, "on macedonian matters" in in sofia. it was a scathing critique of the numbing and off-handed mind games macedonia was subjected to by the big powers. misirkov believed in culture as an identity preserving force. and the purveyors and conveyors of culture were the teachers. "so the teacher in yugoslavia is often a hero and fanatic as well as a servant of the mind; but as they walked along the belgrade streets it could easily be seen that none of them had quite enough to eat or warm enough clothing or handsome lodgings or all the books they needed" - wrote dame rebecca west in her eternal "black lamb and grey falcon" in . goce delcev (gotse deltchev) was a teacher. he was born in in kukush (the bulgarian name of the town), north of thessaloniki (salonica, solun, saloniki). there is no doubt about his cultural background (as opposed to his convictions later in life) - it was bulgarian to the core. he studied at a bulgarian gymnasium in saloniki. he furthered his education at a military academy in sofia. he was a schoolteacher and a guerilla fighter and in both capacities he operated in the areas that are today north-central greece, southwestern bulgaria and the republic of macedonia. he felt equally comfortable in all three regions. he was shot to death by the turks in banitsa, then a bulgarian village, today, a greek one. it was in a spring day in may . the death of this sad but steely eyed, heavily moustached youth was sufficient to ignite the illinden uprising three months later. it erupted on the feast of saint illiya (sveti ilija). peasants sold their sacrificial bulls - the fruits of months of labour - and bought guns with the proceeds. it started rather innocuously in the hotbed of ethnic unrest, western macedonia - telegraph wires were cut, some tax registers incinerated. the imro collaborated in this with the pro-bulgarian organization vzhovits. in krusevo (krushevo) a republic was proclaimed, replete with "rules of the macedonian uprising committee" (aka the "constitution of the uprising"). this document dealt with the liberation of macedonia and the establishment of a macedonian state. a special chapter was dedicated to foreign affairs and neighbourly relationships. it was all heart- achingly naive and it lasted bloody days. crushed by trained soldiers and horse bound artillery, the outnumbered rebels surrendered. forty of them kissed each other goodbye and blew their brains out. the usual raping and blood thick massacres ensued. according to turkish records, these ill-planned and irresponsible moments of glory and freedom cost the lives of , civilians, "terrorists". the rape of , women was not documented. in northwestern macedonia, an adolescent girl was raped by soldiers and murdered afterwards. in another village, they cut a girl's arm to secure her bracelets. the more one is exposed to these atrocities, the more one is prone to subscribe to the view that the ottoman empire - its halting and half hearted efforts at reform notwithstanding - was the single most important agent of retardation and putrid stagnation in its colonies, a stifling influence of traumatic proportions, the cause of mass mental sickness amongst its subjects. as is usually the case in the bloodied geopolitical sandbox known as the balkans, an international peacekeeping force intervened. yet it was - again, habitually - too late, too little. what made delcev, rather his death, the trigger of such an outpouring of emotions was the imro (vmro in macedonian and in bulgarian). the illinden uprising was the funeral of a man who was a hope. it was the ululating grieving of a collective deprived of vengeance or recourse. it was a spasmodic breath taken in the most suffocating of environments. this is not to say that imro was monolithic or that delcev was an apostle (as some of his hagiographers would have him). it was not and he was far from it. but he and his two comrades, jane (yane) sandanski and damyan (dame) gruev had a vision. they had a dream. the imro is the story of a dream turned nightmare, of the absolute corruption of absolute power and of the dangers of inviting the fox to fight the wolf. the original "macedonian revolutionary organization" (mro) was established in sofia. the distinction between being a macedonian and being a macedonian-bulgarian was not sharp, to use a polite understatement. the bulgarians "proper" regarded the macedonians as second class, primitive and uncultured bulgarian relatives who inhabit a part of bulgaria to the east. the macedonians themselves were divided. some wished to be incorporated in bulgaria, the civilized and advanced society and culture. others wanted an independent state - though they, too, believed that the salvation of such an entity - both demographic and financial - lies abroad, with the diaspora and benevolent foreign powers. a third group (and delcev was, for a time, among them) wanted a federation of all states balkan with an equal standing for a macedonian polity (autonomy). the original mro opted for the bulgarian option and restricted its aims to the liberation and immediate annexation of what they solemnly considered to be a turkish-occupied bulgarian territory. to distinguish themselves from this mro, the founders of the macedonian version - all members of the intelligentsia - added the word "internal" to their name. thus, they became, in november , imro. a measure of the disputatiousness of all matters balkanian can be found in the widely and wildly differing versions about the circumstances of the establishment of imro. some say it was established in thessaloniki (this is the official version, thus supporting its "macedonian"-ness). others - like robert kaplan - say it was in stip (shtip) and the encyclopaedia britannica claims it was in ... resen (resana). let it be clear: this author harbours no sympathy towards the ottoman empire. the imro was fighting for lofty ideals (balkanian federation) and worthy goals (liberation from asphyxiating turkish rule). but to many outside observers (with the exception of journalists like john sonixen or john smith), the imro was indistinguishable in its methods of operation from the general landscape of mayhem, crime, disintegration of the social fabric, collapse of authority, social anomie, terror and banditry. from steven sowards' "twenty five lectures on modern balkan history, the balkans in an age of nationalism", available here: http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect .htm "meanwhile, the tanzimat reforms remained unfulfilled under abdul hamid's reactionary regime. how effective had all these reforms been by the turn of the century? how bad was life for christian peasants in the balkans? in a book called 'macedonia: its races and their future', h. n. brailsford, an english relief worker, describes lawless conditions in macedonia, the central balkan district between greece, serbia, albania and bulgaria. in the areas brailsford knew, the authorities had little power. he writes: 'an albanian went by night into a bulgarian village and fired into the house of a man whom he regarded as an enemy. ... the prefect...endeavored to arrest the murderer, but [his albanian] village took up his cause, and the gendarmes returned empty-handed. the prefect ... marched upon the offending village at the head of three hundred regular troops. ... the village did not resist, but it still refused to give evidence against the guilty man. the prefect returned to ochrida with forty or fifty prisoners, kept them in gaol for three or four days, and then released them all. ... to punish a simple outbreak of private passion in which no political element was involved [the prefect] had to mobilize the whole armed force of his district, and even then he failed.' robbers and brigands operated with impunity: 'riding one day upon the high-road ..., i came upon a brigand seated on a boulder ... in the middle of the road, smoking his cigarette, with his rifle across his knees, and calmly levying tribute from all the passers-by." extortionists, not police, were in control: "a wise village ... [has] its own resident brigands. ... they are known as rural guards. they are necessary because the christian population is absolutely unarmed and defenceless. to a certain extent they guarantee the village against robbers from outside, and in return they carry on a licensed and modified robbery of their own.' self-defense by orthodox peasants was dangerous: 'the government makes its presence felt ... when a 'flying column' saunters out to hunt an elusive rebel band, or ... to punish some flagrant act of defiance ... the village may have ... resented the violence of the tax-collector ... [or] harboured an armed band of insurgents ... or ... killed a neighbouring civilian turk who had assaulted some girl of the place ... at the very least all the men who can be caught will be mercilessly beaten, at the worst the village will be burned and some of its inhabitants massacred.' it was not surprising that peasants hated their rulers. 'one enters some hovel ... something ... stirs or groans in the gloomiest corner on the floor beneath a filthy blanket. is it fever, one asks, or smallpox? ... the answer comes ..., 'he is ill with fear.' ... looking back ... , a procession of ruined minds comes before the memory--an old priest lying beside a burning house speechless with terror ... a woman who had barked like a dog since the day her village was burned; a maiden who became an imbecile because her mother buried her in a hole under the floor to save her from the soldiers ... children who flee in terror at the sight of a stranger, crying 'turks! turks!' these are the human wreckage of the hurricane which usurps the functions of a government.' four things are worth noting in brailsford's account as we consider the prospects for a reform solution to balkan problems. first, revolutionary politics was not the foremost issue for the christian population: nationalism addressed the immediate problems in their daily lives only indirectly, by promising a potential better state. second, loyalties were still local and based on the family and the village, not on abstract national allegiances. if criminal abuses ended, the ottoman state might yet have invented an ottoman "nationalism" to compete with serbian, greek, romanian, or bulgarian nationalism. third, villagers did not cry out for new government departments or services, but only for relief from corruption and crime. the creation of new national institutions was not necessary, only the reform of existing institutions. fourth, and on the other hand, mistrust and violence between the two sides was habitual. so many decades of reform had failed by this time. the situation was so hopeless and extreme that few people on either side can have thought of reform as a realistic option." during the s, imro's main sources of income were voluntary (and later, less voluntary) taxation of the rural population, bank robberies, train robberies (which won handsome world media coverage) and kidnapping for ransom (like the kidnapping of the american protestant missionary ellen stone - quite a mysterious affair). the imro developed along predictable lines into an authoritarian and secretive organization - a necessity if it were to fight the turks effectively. it had its own tribunals which exercised - often fatal - authority over civilians who were deemed collaborators with the turkish enemy. it must be emphasized that this was not unusual or unique at that time. this was the modus operandi of all military- organized ideological and political groups. and, taking everything into account, the imro was fighting a just war against an abhorrent enemy. moreover, to some extent, its war was effective and resulted in reforms imposed on the sublime port (the turkish authorities) by the great powers of the day. we mentioned the peacekeeping force which replaced the local gendarmerie. but reforms were also enacted in education, religious rights and tolerance, construction, farm policy and other areas. the intractable and resource-consuming macedonian question led directly to the reform of turkey itself by the macedonia-born officer ataturk. and it facilitated the disintegration of the ottoman empire - thus, ironically, leading to the independence of almost everyone except its originators. the radicalization of imro and its transformation into the infamous organization it has come to be known as, started after the second balkan war ( ) and, more so, after the first world war ( ). it was then that disillusionment with big power politics replaced the naive trust in the inevitable triumph of a just claim. the macedonians were never worse off politically, having contributed no less - if not more - than any other nation to the re-distribution of the ottoman empire. the cynicism, the hypocrisy, the off-handedness, the ignorance, the vile interests, the ulterior motives - all conspired to transform the imro from a goal-orientated association to a power hungry mostrosity. in bulgaria, serbia, and greece - former bitter foes - formed the balkan league to confront an even more bitter foe, the ottoman empire on the thin pretext of an albanian uprising. the brotherhood strained in the treaty of london (may ) promptly deteriorated into internecine warfare over the spoils of a successful campaign - namely, over macedonia. serbs, greeks, montenegrins and romanians subdued bulgaria sufficiently to force it to sign a treaty in august in bucharest. "aegean macedonia" went to greece and "vardar macedonia" (today's republic of macedonia) went to serbia. the smaller "pirin macedonia" remained bulgarian. the bulgarian gamble in world war i went well for a while, as it occupied all three parts of macedonia. but the ensuing defeat and dismemberment of its allies, led to a re-definition of even "pirin macedonia" so as to minimize bulgaria's share. vardar macedonia became part of a new kingdom of the serbs, croats, and slovenes (later renamed yugoslavia). these political lego games led to enormous population shifts - the politically correct term for refugees brutally deprived of their land and livelihood. all of them were enshrined in solemn treaties. the treaty of lausanne ( ) led to the expulsion of , turks from aegean macedonia. , greek refugees from turkey replaced them. each of the actual occupiers and each of the potential ones opened its own schools to indoctrinate the future generations of the populace. conflicts erupted over ecclesiastical matters, the construction of railways and railway stations. guerilla fighters soon realized that being pawns on this mad hatter's chessboard could be a profitable vocation. the transformation from freedom fighters to mercenaries with no agenda was swift. and pecuniary considerations bred even more terror and terrorists where there were none before. in the meantime, greece enacted a land reform legislation in "aegean macedonia" - in effect, the confiscation of arable land by thousands of greek settlers, refugees from turkey. much of the land thus "re- distributed" was owned by turkish absentees, now refugees themselves. but a lot of land was simply impounded from its rightful, very much present and very macedonian owners. the serb authorities coerced the population to speak the serb language, changed macedonian names to serb ones in brutally carried campaigns and imposed a corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy upon the suffering multitudes. imro never gave up its proclaimed goal to liberate both occupied parts of macedonia - the aegean and the vardar ones. but, as time passed and as the nature of its organization and operation evolved, the perfunctoriness of its proclamations became more and more evident. the old idealists - the intellectuals and ideologues, the goce delcev types - were removed, died in battle, or left this mutation of their dream. the imro insignia - skull and crossbones - linked it firmly to the italian balckshirts and the nazi brown ones. the imro has developed into a fascist organization. it traded opium. it hired out the services of its skilled assassins (for dollars a contract). it recruited members among the macedonian population in the slums of sofia. finally, they openly collaborated with the fascists of mussolini (who also supported them financially), with the ustashe (similarly supported by italy) and with the nazis (under ivan mihailov, who became the nominal quisling ruler of vardar macedonia). it was an imro man ("vlado the chauffeur") who murdered king alexander of yugoslavia in . all this period, the imro continued to pursue its original agenda. imro terrorists murdered staff and pupils in yugoslav schools in vardar macedonia. in between - , it killed , people. tourists of the period describe the yugoslav-bulgarian frontier as the most fortified in europe with "entanglements, block houses, redoubts and searchlight posts". throughout the twenties and the thirties, the imro maintained a presence in europe, publishing propaganda incessantly and explaining its position eloquently (though not very convincingly). it was not very well liked by both bulgarians and macedonians who got increasingly agitated and exhausted by the extortion of ever increasing taxes and by the seemingly endless violence. but the imro was now a force to reckon with: organized, disciplined, lethal. its influence grew by the day and more than one contemporary describes it as a "state within a state". in bulgaria it collaborated with todor alexandrov in the overthrow and murder of the prime minister, alexandur stamboliyski (june ) and in the appointment of a right wing government headed by alexandur tsankov. stamboliyski tried to appease yugoslavia and, in the process, sacrifice inconvenient elements, such as the imro, as expediently as he could. he made too many powerful enemies too fast: the army (by cutting their inflated budget), the nationalists (by officially abandoning the goal of military expansion), the professional officers (by making them redundant), the great powers (by making them redundant as well) and the opposition (by winning the elections handsomely despite all the above). by signing the treaty of nis (allowing serb forces the right of hot pursuit within bulgarian territory), he in effect sealed his own death warrant. the imro teamed up with the military league (an organization of disgruntled officers, both active duty and reserve) and with the tacit blessing of tsar boris and the forming national alliance (later renamed the democratic alliance), they did away with the hated man. following the murder, the imro was given full control of the region of petric (petrich). it used it as a launching pad of its hit and run attacks against yugoslavia with the full - though clandestine - support of the bulgarian ministry of war and fascist italy. from pirin, they attacked greece as well. these were exactly the kind of international tensions the murdered prime minister was keen to terminate and the imro no less keen to foster. in the meanwhile, alexandrov came to an end typical of many a bulgarian politician and was assassinated only a year after the coup d'etat. the decade that followed did not smile upon the imro. it fragmented and its shreds fought each other in the streets of sofia, chicago- style. by , the imro was a full-fledged extortionist mafia organization. they ran protection rackets ("protecting" small shop- owners against other gangs and "insuring" them against their own violence). hotels in sofia always had free rooms for the imro. the tobacco industry paid the imro more than a million british pounds of that time in six years of "taxation". robberies and assassinations were daily occurrences. so were street shoot-outs and outright confiscation of goods. the imro had no support left anywhere. in , it was disbanded (together with other parties) by colonel kimron georgiev, the new prime minister of bulgaria and a senior figure in the zveno association of disgruntled citizenry. his rule was brief (ended the next year) but the imro never recovered. it brought its own demise upon itself. colonel velcev (velchev), the perpetrator of the coup, was swept to power on the promise to end all terrorist activities - a promise which he kept. the modern republic of macedonia is today ruled by a party called vmro-dpmne. it is one of a few political parties to carry this name and the biggest and weightiest amongst them by far. it is founded on the vision and ideals of goce delcev and has distanced itself from the "terrorist-imro". the picture of delcev adorns every office in both macedonia and bulgaria and he is the closest to a saint a secular regime can have. in , the greeks transferred his bones to bulgaria. stalin, in a last effort to placate tito, ordered bulgaria to transfer them to macedonia. even in his death he knew no peace. now he is buried in his final resting place, in the tranquil inner yard of the church of sveti spas (saint saviour). a marble slab bearing a simple inscription with his name under a tree, in a macedonia which now belongs to the macedonians. return the black hand "i live and shall die for federalism; it is the sole salvation for the monarchy, if anything can save it." archduke franz ferdinand of austria the imro was a populist organization established by intellectuals (as such groups often do) but staffed by peasant, lumpenproletariat and dwellers of the slums formed by macedonian refugees all over the balkans and especially in sofia. its members swore allegiance on a bible and a gun - two universally potent symbols. the nationalist- terrorist movement which bore the improbable by-name of "the black hand" was no such thing. it was elitist - only members of the officer corps and government officials could join. but the two shared an ethos and methods of operation. the imro sought to liberate the parts of macedonia which were under greek and serb control - and the black hand (official name: "union or death") sought to do the same for serbs under ottoman or habsburg rule. the black hand was the precursor of the great serbia dream. but whereas the imro - at least until - did not enjoy the support of the state and its mechanisms, the black hand was, for a long time, the long arm of the serb government and the serb state. to the generation of post-yugoslavia it is a familiar story. in human affairs, the dream of a greater serbia is no less a recurrent nightmare than the numerable german reichs and serbia erupted upon the world stage no less frequently and regularly than its northern equivalent. serbia, montenegro and russia fought a war against turkey in an effort to capitalize on a serb peasants' revolt in bosnia in . the latter were mightily and rather inhumanly oppressed by the local moslem nobility (enmity has long roots in the balkans). it was a holy war for the protection of holy (orthodox) mother church. it was this conflict that led to the turkish capitulation embedded in the san stefano treaty of . it was not the first time that balkan borders were re-drawn but, with the creation of bulgaria, extending all the way to lake ohrid, a few taboos were broken. a new state was created, russia was introduced as a major player and the sick man of europe (the ottoman empire) was in death throes. it also generated a new problem, the macedonian one. the treaty of berlin sought to restore the balance but to no avail. the inexorable germination of the nationalistic ideal has commenced. when the treaty placed bosnia-herzegovina under austro-hungarian administration and allowed habsburg garrisons to camp inside serbia (effectively severing it from montenegro) - the seeds of discontent blossomed into the evil flowers of violence. no one cared what the local populace had to say. the austrian brought roads and railways and modern mining and forestry and industry to this hitherto european backwater. reversing the ottoman infliction was no mean feat. yet, the austrians chose to rule by division, to motivate through hate and to buy the love of their subjects rather than to earn it. they befriended the moslem landlords and pitted the serbs against each across a denominational divide. this volatile state of affairs was only aggravated by the abolition in of the military frontier, which brought hundreds of thousands of serbs into the remit of an increasingly and virulently nationalistic croatia. the hungarians used this to their advantage by fanning croat-serb hostility. after all, they had a historical account to settle with the serbs who quashed an hungarian rebellion not years before (in - ) and were awarded with the half autonomous duchy of vojvodina, an integral part of the kingdom of hungary. the ausgleich of (which divided the loot between austria and hungary) deprived vojvodina of its autonomy. the magyars rushed back in with german and austrian settlers and immediately embarked upon a massive campaign of forced assimilation. thus, as vojvodina prospered with roads and railways and large commercial farms ("the breadbasket of the empire") - it became more hate-riven and explosive. in the balkans, affluence and commerce seem only to encourage envy and belligerence and neighbourly relations are no barrier to mutual slaughter. a self-appointed "guardian of all serbs", the serbian state willingly engaged in agitation and confronted both other ethnicities and the dual monarchy in its quest to safeguard the well-being, welfare, prosperity and equal treatment of the serbs, all noble goals, no doubt. yet instability is contagious, a lesson not learn by serb politicians. even as the bosnian uprising was in progress, king milan stuck an austrian knife unto its back. he agreed to not foment rebellion in bosnia-herzegovina, in return for a free hand in macedonia and some export concessions for some agricultural produce. in , he acted upon his grandiosity to disastrous outcome. four years later, he abdicated in disgrace. not till was order restored in the person of king alexander whose most important act was marrying his concubine, draga masin in . they were both massacred in june by disgruntled officers in their own palace and that was the end of one dynasty (the obrenovic's) and the beginning of another (the karadjordjevic's). a young officer, a member of the general staff of the army, by the name of dragutin dimitrijevic ("apis" - the "holy bull" was his endearing nickname, or, perhaps, the bee, from the latin root, as petrovic, the attache to the serbia legation in london has it in "black hand over europe" by heneri pozzi) planned it all in . remember this name, his role in our history has only just begun. as is usually the case, the honeymoon looked both passionate and auspicious. the new king was of the reforming kind and keen on economic progress and wealth formation. regretfully, his implementation fell short of his intentions. serbian agriculture lagged behind its more commercialized and industrialized competitors, the population grew relentlessly and rural debts buried the semi-feudal rustic peasantry under its increasing burden. it is against this background of mounting and mercurial discontent that the "black hand" was formed. attesting to the spreading of the rot throughout the karadjordjevicean state, was its cancerous metastasis through all levels of the army and the government. apis the regicide was appointed chief of intelligence of the general staff, no less. he later confessed to planning the murders of king nicholas of montenegro, king constantine of greece, the german kaiser and king ferdinand of bulgaria. how much of it was balkan delusions and how much reality is still open to debate - but the man relished death and firmly believed in its transforming and catalysing powers. the black hand became a state within a state (a feat later emulated by the imro). those bureaucrats and politicians not already members of the shady outfit, obeyed its express or perceived wishes out of terror, more imagined than exercised. the army was entirely in thrall. the accelerated advance of dimitrijevic through the ranks serves proof of the growing influence of his cankerous outfit. he became professor of tactics at the military academy where he taught subversion and terror more than military strategy. by , he was chief of intelligence, as we mentioned and by he was attained the rank of colonel at the age of . though formally established only in - the black hand cast its shadow long before. it engaged mostly in propaganda and in the seeding of armed bands in macedonia prior to the two balkan wars. its biggest achievement was probably the inception of numerous revolutionary cells among the serbs of bosnia. the longer and more thorough the meddling, the more the languid relationship between austria and serbia deteriorated. the former imposed tariffs on the exports of the latter in an aptly named "pig war". as serb subversion intensified in bosnia, austria annexed it and herzegovina outright discarding the pretence of autonomy it has maintained. stymied in one border - the serbs reverted to another. the illinden uprising ignited slav imagination. serbia has long hungered after its slice of a dismembered macedonia and thrace in a banquet attended by both bulgaria and greece. but the fresh atrocities - not devoid of religious and ethnic dimensions - endowed the whole endeavour with an aura of a holy war. this delirium was further stoked by the apparent disintegration of the ottoman empire following the revolution of the young turks in . yet, in its drang nach suden, serbia found itself once more entangled with the austrians who had their own designs on macedonia and novi pazar. the risk of losing kosovo and metohija was very real and the conflict assumed the robes of a crusade, both cultural and religious. to the serbs the very maintenance of their self-identity and civilization was at stake. this was the background to the onslaught of the balkan wars. serbia collaborated with the more potent of its potential enemies (greece, bulgaria) in the balkan league. to cleanse the balkans of all turks was the explicit goals of hush-hush treaties and clandestine encounters. the hidden agenda bespoke of austria. the initial triumphs against the turkish army (reversing a trend three centuries old) lent an air of inevitable invincibility and divine justice to the whole endeavour. it is interesting to mention that it was little montenegro which was the first to declare war in almost all balkan conflicts. whether as serbian proxies or because of the contentious nature of the montenegrins remains unclear. whatever the case may be, a second war among the winners of the first left serbia with its agenda fulfilled and with its territory almost doubled. it gained part of the sandzak, all kosovo and metohija and the bulk of macedonia. its tax paying population increased by half as much in less than two years. had it not been for austria's minacious insistence, albania would have never been born on serb occupied territory. the creation of this (artificial, so the serbs felt) albanian state deprived serbia - alone among the victors - from access to the sea. it had another cause for paranoid delusions and deepening sense of victimization at the hands of vast conspiracies. relegated to the geopolitical sidelines, denuded of their conquests, coerced by a big power, the serbs felt humiliated, stabbed in the back, discriminated against, inferior and wrathful. frustration breeds aggression we are taught and this true lesson was never more oft-repeated than in the balkans. the raging rivalry between an eastward-bound austria and a defiant serbia was bound to boil over. the black hand was there to provoke the parties into a final test of strengths and willpower. dame rebecca west voices her doubts regarding the true intent of the black handers in their involvement (which she does not dispute) in the events that followed. based on all manner of circumstantial evidence and the testimonies of mysterious friends of furtive conspirators she reaches the conclusion that they did not believe in the conspiracy to which they lent their support. the black hand went along with the planning and execution of the assassination of archduke, heir to the throne franz (francis) ferdinand in , disbelieving all the way both the skills and the commitment of the youthful would be assassins. perhaps so. yet there can be little doubt and, indeed, there is no dispute that the black hand was introduced to a cabal of plotters called "mlada bosna" (young bosnia), headed by one illich and that this introduction was effected by the year old influential bosnian revolutionary gacinovic (gachinovich) who lived in lausanne in switzerland. the black hander ciganovic (tsiganovitch) made contact with one gavrilo princip and chabrinovich and together with another bosnian, tankosic (tankosich). the latter - a self proclaimed sharpshooter - immediately set about testing the sniping skills of his co-schemers in a secluded wood. with the mild exception of princip, they were no good. despite this disheartening display of incompetence (princip claimed at his trial to have aimed at a general sitting next to the archduke), the black hand equipped them with bombs (of the wrong kind, points west correctly), pistols and suicidal prussic acid (which didn't work). they were smuggled to sarajevo by two collaborating border guards. as opposed to rumours, gavrilo princip was not a member of the black hand, nor was the black hand involved in his training. moreover, the connection between mlada bosna and crna ruka (black hand) was made only a short time before the eventful june , . it was a challenge and on serbia's national day at that. the austrians were elated having been handed the excuse to educate serbia and cut it to size. they issued an ultimatum and the rest is the history of the first truly global conflict, the first world war. in , in a surprising turn of events, alexander, the commander in chief of the expatriate serbian army in collusion with the serb premier, nikola pasic, arrested apis and of his collaborators, thus shattering the black hand irreversibly. it is always surprising how really brittle and vulnerable these apparently invincible organizations of terror are. the imro, after having terrorized bulgaria for decades and decimated its political elite, was reduced to rubble, bloodlessly, in a matter of a few weeks in . the same happened with the omnipotent and all-pervasive black hand. it vanished in a whimper. in may , dragutin dimitrijevic (apis) was executed together with or of his black hand colleagues. finally it was death, not union that caught up with them. the trial was closed to the public, opaque and hurried. the king apparently believed - or claimed he did - that the prisoners conspired on his life. west testifies in her great opus "black lamb grey falcon" that transcripts of the trial were banned and that it was forbidden to mention the mere historic fact either in speech or in print. the members of the black hand lived secretly and dies mysteriously and meaninglessly. but the black hand - like the imro - was a child of the times. the balkans was perceived to be the gate to the crumbling ottoman empire, the coveted prizes were not dirt poor macedonia or albania. it was the stepping stone and the springboard that they represented to much vaster territories, to the riches of the orient, to the exotic realms of asia. all big powers and would be big powers engaged in the pugilistics of self-positioning. the demise of the ottomans was imminent and this imminence exerted subtle but verifiable pressure on all the participant in this grubby grabbing game. additionally, in this fin de siecle, all involved felt doomed. the rumblings of counter-revolutionary russia, the drang nach osten of austria - all were attempts at self re-definition and self- preservation. perhaps this explains the outlandish and disproportionate reaction of austria to the needling of bosnian terrorism. assertive minorities constituted a direct threat to the very cohesion of empire. and serbia blocked the hitherto unhindered path to eastern territories - depriving austria of lebensraum and raison d'etre. faced with a limiting event horizon, austria imploded like a black hole, unto itself. the driving force behind it all was really austria and its growing existential angst. it struck a modus vivendi of mutual paralysis in the balkan with russia as early as . it lasted ten years in which only austria and russia stood still but history defied them both. to its horror, austria discovered that in its pursuit of glorious and condescending isolation, it was left only with germany as an ally, the very germany whose weltpolitik put it on a clear collusion course with the moribund sublime port. russia, on the other hand, teamed up with a rising power, with britain, at least implicitly. the abrupt and involuntary departure of the pliable and easily corruptible obrenovic's in serbia bode ill to the checks and balances austria so cultivated in its relationship with the recalcitrant serbs. karageorgevic was much less enamoured with austrian shenanigans. the final nail in the ever more crowded coffin of austrian foreign policy was hammered in in when the young turks effectively re-opened the question of the administration of bosnia-herzegovina by austria. these territories were always under turkish sovereignty, the austrians "discovered" to growing alarm. one solution was to annex the administered units, as austria's minister of foreign affairs suggested. he further offered a trade-off: recognition of russia's rights of passage through the dardanelles. the russians accepted only to be abandoned by the austrians in the crucial vote. austria annexed bosnia-herzegovina unilaterally - but russia was still prevented from crossing into the warm waters, its ambition and obsession. russia learned a lesson: always back your client (serbia), never back down. elsewhere, tensions between the big powers were growing and eroded their capability to institute a system of efficacious self- regulation. armed conflict erupted between germany and france in morocco more than once. britain and germany were engaged in a naval arms race which depleted the coffers and the social cohesion of both. italy declared war on turkey in and even invaded the dardanelles. serbia and bulgaria struck a bargain to expel the ottomans from europe (see above, the balkan wars). thus, with the field narrowing and getting more crowded, an austrian-serb armageddon was all but inevitable. the irony of it all is that austria presented the only viable solution to the problem of multi-ethnicity and muti-culturalism. the history of the balkans in the th century can be effectively summed up in terms of the contest between the serb and hungarian model of co-existence and its austrian anathema. the serbs and hungarians aspired to ethnically and culturally homogenous states and were willing to apply violence towards the achievement of this goal either by forced assimilation of minorities or by their expulsion or worse. the austrians proposed federalism. they envisaged a federation of politically, culturally and religiously autonomous entities. this peaceful vision constituted a direct threat on the likes of the black hand. peaceful, content citizens do not good rebels make. the encyclopaedia britannica says: "such is the logic of terrorism: its greatest enemies are the peacemakers". the black hand did not operate in empty space and was not alone. in serbia formed "the national defence". its main function was to agitate against the austrians and to conduct propaganda for the serb cause. there were other organizations but all of them were contemptuously labelled "intellectual" by apis, who craved violence. ironically, one of the original band of conspirators against king alexander in - was petar zivkovic (zhivkovitch). but he soon separated himself from the black hand and joined the white hand, another group of officers, more moderate, though no less authoritarian. another king alexander (who was also murdered but in ), king of the serbs, croats and slovenes (later renamed "yugoslavia"), appointed him commander of the palace guards in and prime minister eight years thereafter. zivkovic lost no time in disbanding all political parties and (elected) municipalities. he embarked upon an endless string of show trials of opponents of his dictatorship, communists and anti- monarchists. he introduced a one-party, government-controlled electoral system. thus, in an ironic twist of history, the black hand came to its own, after all. one of its former members a prime minister, a dictator, under a king installed by its slaughterous coup. black hand or white hand - the means disputed, the ends were always in consensus. a great serbia for the great serbian people. return the insurgents and the swastika "even going back ten years it was easy to see something gripping yugoslavia by the throat. but in the years since then the grip has been tightened, and tightened in my opinion by the dictatorship established by king alexander karageorgevitch. this dictatorship, however much it may claim a temporary success, must inevitably have the effect of poisoning all the yugoslav organism. whether the poisoning is incurable or not is the question for which i have sought an answer during two months in yugoslavia, bulgaria and central europe." "black hand over europe" by henri pozzi, the sin yugoslavia was born in sin and in sin it perished. the king of serbs, croats and slovenes, alexander i, a freshly self-proclaimed dictator, declared it on october . it was a union of east and west, the orthodox and the catholic, ottoman residues with austro- hungarian structures, the heart and the mind. inevitably, it stood no chance. the croats and the slovenes - formerly fiery proponents of a yugo (southern) slav federation - were mortified to find themselves in a serb-dominated "third world", byzantine polity. this was especially galling to the croats who fiercely denied both their geography and their race to cling to the delusion of being a part of "europe" rather than the "balkans". to this very day, they hold all things eastern (serbs, the orthodox version of christianity, belgrade, the ottoman empire, macedonia) with unmitigated contempt dipped in an all-pervasive feeling of superiority. this is a well known defence mechanism in nations peripheral. many a suburban folk wish to belong to the city with such heat and conviction, with such ridiculous emulation, that they end up being caricatures of the original. and what original! the bloated, bureaucracy-saddled, autocratic and sadistic habsburg empire. hitler's germany. mussolini's italy. unable to ignore the common ethnic roots of both serbs and croats - one tribe, one language - the croats chose to believe in a vast conspiracy imposed upon the serbs by corrupt and manipulative rulers. the gullible and self-delusional cardinal stepinac of zagreb wrote just before the second world war erupted, in a curious reversal of pan-serbist beliefs: "if there were more freedom... serbia would be catholic in twenty years. the most ideal thing would be for the serbs to return to the faith of their fathers. that is, to bow the head before christ's representative, the holy father. then we could at last breathe in this part of europe, for byzantium has played a frightful role ... in connection with the turks." the same turks that almost conquered croatia and, met by fierce and brave resistance of the latter, were confined to bosnia for years. the croats came to regard themselves as the last line of defence against an encroaching east - against the manifestations and transmutations of byzantium, of the turks, of a vile mix of orthodoxy and islam (though they collaborated with their moslem minority during the ustashe regime). besieged by this siege mentality, the back to the literal wall, desperate and phobic, the croats developed the paranoia typical of all small nations encircled by hostility and impending doom. it was impossible to reconcile their centrifugal tendency in favour of a weak central state in a federation of strong local entities - with the serb propensity to create a centralist and bureaucratic court. when the croat delegates of the peasant party withdrew from the fragmented constituent assembly in - serbia and the moslem members voted for the vidovdan constitution (june ) which was modelled on the pre-war serbian one. while a minority with limited popular appeal, the ustashe did not materialize ex nihilo. they were the logical and inescapable conclusion of a long and convoluted historical process. they were both its culmination and its mutation. and once formed, they were never exorcised by the croats, as the germans exorcised their nazi demon. in this, again, the croats, chose the path of unrepentant austria. croat fascism was not an isolated phenomenon. fascism (and, less so, nazism) were viable ideological alternatives in the s and s. variants of fascist ideology sprang all over the world, from iraq and egypt to norway and britain. even the jews in palestine had their own fascists (the stern group). and while croat fascism (such as it was, "tainted" by catholic religiosity and pagan nationalism) lasted four tumultuous years - it persisted for a quarter of a century in romania ("infected" by orthodox clericalism and peasant lores). while both branches of fascism - the croat and the romanian - shared a virulent type of anti-semitism and the constipated morality of the ascetic and the fanatic - codreanu's was more ambitious, aiming at a wholesale reform of romanian life and a re- definition of romanianism. the iron guard and the legion (of the archangel michael, no less) were, therefore and in their deranged way, a force for reform founded on blood-thirsty romanticism and masochistic sacrifices for the common good. moreover, the legion was crushed in by a military dictatorship which had nothing to do with fascism. it actually persecuted the fascists who found refuge in hitler's germany. fascism in hungary developed similarly. it was based on reactionary ideologies pre-dating fascism by centuries. miklos horty, the austro-hungarian admiral was consumed by grandiose fantasies of an hungarian empire. he had very little in common with the fascists of the "white terror" of in budapest (an anti-communist bloodshed). he did his best to tame the hungarian fascist government of gyula gombos ( ). the untimely death of the latter brought about the meteoric rise of ferenc szalasi and his brand of blood-pure racism. but all these sub-species of fascism, the romanian, the slovakian (tiso) and the hungarian (as opposed to the italian and the bulgarian) were atavistic, pagan, primal and romanticist - as was the croat. these were natural - though nefarious - reactions to dislocation, globalization, economic crisis and cultural pluralism. a set of compensatory mechanisms and reactions to impossible, humiliating and degrading circumstances of wrathful helplessness and frustration. "native fascism" attributed a divine mission or divine plan to the political unit of the nation, a part of a grand design. the leader was the embodiment, the conveyor, the conduit, the exclusive interpreter and the manifestation of this design (the fuhrerprinzip). proof of the existence of such a transcendental plan was the glorious past of the nation, its qualities and conduct (hence the tedious moralizing and historical nitpicking). the definition of the nation relied heavily of the existence of a demonized and dehumanized enemy (marxists, jews, serbs, gypsies, homosexuals, hungarians in romania, etc.). means justified the end and the end was stability and eternity ("the thousand years reich"). thus, as opposed to the original blueprint, these mutants of fascism were inert and aspired to a state of rest, to an equilibrium after a spurt of cleansing and restoration of the rightful balance. when serb domination (serb ubiquitous military, serbs in all senior government positions even in croatia) mushroomed into the "kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes", it was only natural for dissenting and dissident croats to turn to their "roots". unable to differentiate themselves from the hated serbs racially - they appealed to religious heterogeneity. immediately after the political hybrid was formed, the croats expressed their discontent by handing election victories to the "croatian peasant party" headed by radic. the latter was a dour and devout anti-yugoslav. he openly agitated for an independent - rustic and pastoral - croatia. but radic was a pragmatist. he learned his lesson when - having boycotted the constituent assembly in belgrade - he facilitated the imposition of a pro-serb, pro-central government constitution. radic moderated his demands, if not his rhetoric. the goal was now a federated yugoslavia with croat autonomy within it. there is poetic justice in that his death - at the hand of a montenegrin deputy on the floor of the skupstina in - brought about the dictatorship that was to give rise to macek and the sporazum (croat autonomy). the irony is that a peasant-favouring land reform was being seriously implemented when a deadlock between peasant parties led to king alexander's fateful decision to abolish the parliamentary system. king alexander i was a good and worthy man forced by circumstances into the role of an abhorrent tyrant. he was a great believer in the power of symbols and education. he changed the name of his loose confederacy into a stricter "yugoslavia". in an attempt to defuse internal divisions, he appealed to natural features (like rivers and mountains) as internal borders. croatia vanished as a political entity, replaced by naturally-bounded districts and provinces. the majority of croats still believed in a federal solution, albeit less serb-biased. they believed in reform from the inside. the ustashe and pavelic were always a minority, the bolsheviks of croatia. but king alexander's authoritarian rule was hard to ignore: the torture of political opponents and their execution, the closure of patriotic sports societies, the flagrant interference in the work of the ostensibly independent judiciary, the censorship. there was bad blood growing between the king and more of his subjects by the day. the croats were not the only "minority" to be thus maltreated. the serbs maintained an armed presence in macedonia, kosovo, the sandzak and even in slovenia. they deported thousands of "turks" (actually, all manner of muslims) under the guise of a "re-patriation" scheme. they confiscated land from religious institutions, from the deportees, from big landowners, from the magyars in vojvodina and "re-distributed" it to the serbs. ethnic homogenization (later to become known as "ethnic cleansing") was common practise in that era. the turks, the bulgars, the germans, the greeks were all busily purifying the ethnic composition of their lands. but it made the king and the serbs no friends. the serbs seemed to have been bent on isolating themselves from within and on transforming their yugo slav brethren into sworn adversaries. this was true in the economic sphere as well as in the political realm. serbia declared a "danubian orientation" (in lieu of the "adriatic orientation") which benefited the economies of central and northern serbia at the expense of croatia and slovenia. while serbia was being industrialized and its agriculture reformed, croatia and slovenia did not share in the spoils of war, the reparations that yugoslavia received from the central powers. yugoslavia was protectionist which went against the interest of its trading compatriots. when war reparations ceased ( ) and germany's economy evaporated, yugoslavia was hurled into the economic crisis the world has been experiencing since . the nazi induced recovery of germany drew in yugoslavia and its firms. it was granted favourable export conditions by hitler's germany and many of its companies participated in cartels established by german corporate giants. king alexander i must have known he would be assassinated. someone tried to kill him as he was taking the oath to uphold the constitution on june , . for long years he had to endure a kaleidoscope of governments, a revolving door of ministers, violence in the assembly and ever-escalating croat demands for autonomy. after the hideous slaughter on the floor of parliament, all its remaining croat members withdrew. they refused to go back and parliament had to be dissolved. alexander went further, taking advantage of the constitutional crisis. he abolished the constitution of , outlawed all ethnically, religiously or nationally based political parties (which basically meant most political parties, especially the croat ones), re-organized the state administration, standardized the legal system, school syllabi and curricula and the national holidays. he was moulding a nation single handedly, carving it from the slab of mutual hatred and animosity. the croats regarded all this as yet another serb ploy, proof of serb power-madness and insatiable desire to dominate. in an effort to placate the bulk of his constituency, the peasantry, king alexander established rural credit unions and provided credit lines to small farmers and rural processing plants. to no avail. the insecurity of this hastily foisted regime was felt, its hesitation, the cruelty that is the outcome of fear. the scavengers were gathering. it was this basic shakiness that led the king to look for sustenance from neighbours. in rapid succession, he made his state a friend of bulgaria, czechoslovakia and romania (the last two in the frame of the little entente). another entente followed (the balkan one) with greece, turkey and romania. the king was frantically seeking to neutralize his enemies from without while ignoring the dangers from within. his death lurked in zagreb but he was travelling to marseilles to meet it. a vicious secret police, a burgeoning military, a new constitution to legalize his sanguinous regime conspired with a global economic crisis to make him a hated figure, even by serb democrats. days before his death, he earnestly considered to return to a parliamentary form of government. but it was too late and too little for those who sought his end. the ustasha movement ("insurgence" or "insurrection", officially the "croatian ustasha movement") was a product of the personal rebellion of ante pavelic and like-minded others. born in bosnia, he was a member of the croat minority there, in a serb-infused environment. he practised as a lawyer in zagreb and there joined the nationalist croatian party of rights. he progressed rapidly and by (at the age of ), he was alderman of zagreb city and county. he was a member of the skupstina when anti-croat sentiment peaked with the triple murder of the croat deputies. when alexander the king dissolved parliament and assumed dictatorial powers, he moved (or fled) to italy, there to establish a croat nationalist movement, the ustasha. their motto was "za dom spremny" ("ready for home" or "ready for the fatherland"). italy the fascist was a natural choice - both because of its ideological affinity and because it opposed yugoslavia's gradual drift towards germany. italy was worried about an ultimate anschluss ("unification or incorporation") between the reich and austria - which will have brought hitler's germany to austria's doorstep. thus, the ustasha established training centres (more like refugee camps, as they included the family members of the would be "warriors") in italy and hungary (later to be expelled from the latter as a result of yugoslav pressure). having mainly engaged in the dissemination of printed propaganda, they failed at provoking a peasant rebellion in north dalmatia (promised to italy by the ustasha). but they did better at assassinating their arch-foe, king alexander in (having failed earlier, in ). in this the ustasha was reputed to have collaborated with the fascist imro (internal macedonian revolutionary organization) under ivan mihailov in bulgaria. by joining forces with the imro, the ustasha has transformed itself into a link in the chain of terrorist organizations that engulfed the world in blood and flames prior to the onslaught of the greatest terrorist of all, of hitler. while some versions of the unholy alliance between the bulgarian- macedonian outfit and the croats are unsubstantiated (to put it gently), it is clear that some assistance was provided by both lower italian ranks and the imro. the actual murderer of the king was mihailov's macedonian chauffeur, vlado georgiev-kerin. the ustasha was also known for blowing trains and for attempting to do so on more than one occasion both in croatia and in slovenia. king alexander seemed to have ordered the systematic annihilation of the ustasha just before his own untimely ustasha-assisted annihilation. lt. colonel stevo duitch "committed suicide" in karlsbad and there were attempts - some successful, some less - on pavelic in munich, percevic in vienna, servaci (servatsi) in fiume and percec in budapest. it was made abundantly clear to the ustasha that it was an all-out war with no prisoners taken. the king had to go. it was a strange movement, the ustashe. claiming the continuous "rights of state" of the great croatian kingdom under peter kresimir and zvonimir in the th century - they nonetheless gave up slovenia and bosnia-herzegovina to italy and, later, accepted a german occupation of eastern croatia. composed of frugal ascetics and avaricious operators, merciless romanticists and hard nosed pragmatists, murderous sadists and refined intellectuals, nationalist croats and serb-haters who had no coherent national agenda bar the mass slaughter of the serbs. thus, it was a social movement of the dispossessed, a cesspool of discontent and rage, of aggression too long suppressed but never sublimated, of justified social and political grievances irradiated by racism, national chauvinism, militarism and sadism. a grassroots reaction turned cancerous, led by a second hand, third rate hitler-clone. a terrorist organization displaying the trappings of a state in the making. this is not to say that it lacked popular support. tensions ran so high between serbs and croats that daily brawls broke in pubs and restaurants, trains and public places between serb soldiers and croat citizens in croatia. the ustashe fed on real friction, were charged by escalating tensions, mushroomed on growing violence. prince paul, who acted as regent for years old peter ii, permitted the operation of political parties but did not reinstate parliament. all this time, a yugoslav opposition of democratic forces included croat as well as serb intellectuals and wannabe politicians. vladko macek himself - later, the epitome of croat separatism and the most successful promoter of this cause - was a member. in the elections, his party - the peasant party - won an astounding % of the votes in croatia. the regent, now much humbled by years of strife and paralysis - bowed to popular opinion so eloquently and convincingly expressed. he backed negotiations with macek which led to a declaration of croat independence in everything but name. the sporazum of august , a few days before the outbreak of world war ii, granted croatia self-government except in matters of national defence and foreign affairs. the serbs were now disgruntled. the serb democrats felt abandoned and betrayed by macek and his faustian deal with the dictatorship. all other serbs felt humiliated by what they regarded as a capitulation to irredentism, bound to have a disintegrative domino effect on the rest of serbia's possessions. it is a surrealistic thing, to read the transcripts of these vehement and sincere arguments just four days before the world as all the conversants knew it, came to a shrieking end. when german planes were pulverizing warsaw, yugoslavia declared its mock-neutrality. everybody knew that paul was pro-german. even king alexander before him signed a few secret pacts with the rising, ignore at your peril, central european force. the austrian national socialists who were implicated in the murder of the austrian prime minister, dolfus, in july , escaped to yugoslavia and resided openly (though disarmed by the yugoslav police) in army barracks in varadzin. in , a fascist movement was established in serbia ("zbor"). fascism and nazism were not without their attractions to serbs and croats alike. this is the great theatre of the absurd called the balkans. pavelic and the ustasha were actually closer in geopolitical orientation to the yugoslav monarchy (until paul was deposed by the yugoslav army) - than to mussolini's fascist italy. they were worried by the latter's tendency to block german designs on austria. in a region known for its indefinite historical memory and lack of statute of limitations, they recalled how the italians treated montenegrin refugees in (returning them to yugoslavia in cattle cars). they wondered if the precedent might be repeated, this time with croat passengers. the italians did, after all, arrest "longin" (kvaternik), jelic and others in torino following the assassination of the king. in the paranoid twilight zone of european big power sponsored terrorism, these half hearted actions and dim memories were enough to cast a pall of suspicion and of guilt over the italian regime. mussolini called pavelic his "balkan pawn" but in that he was mistaken. there are good reasons to believe that he was shocked by the murder of king alexander. in any event, the free movement of pavelic and the ustasha was afterwards severely restricted. on march , the crown council of yugoslavia decided to accede to the tripartite pact of the axis, though in a watered down form. yugoslavia maintained the prerogative to refuse the right of passage in its territory to foreign powers. yet, no one believed this would be the case if confronted with such a predicament. this decision - to give up yugoslavia's main asset and only protection - its neutrality - was taken under pressure from the croats in power at the time. the pact was already joined by romania, bulgaria and hungary. two days after the yugoslav prime minister (dragisa cvetkovic) and his foreign minister signed the pact in vienna - they were deposed together with the regent paul. the precocious peter was made king of yugoslavia by the rebellious officers, headed by general dusan simovic. the generals now in charge reverted to yugoslavia's neutrality and refused to join the british-greek naval treaty, for example. but what appeared to be spontaneous demonstrations in favour of the conspirators and against the tripartite pact erupted all over serbia. it was a challenge to germany which it could not ignore. the supreme command of the wehrmact (okw) issued "undertaking " (against yugoslavia) and "case marita" (against greece). the yugoslavs mobilized (albeit with a surprising procrastination), the germans invaded (on april , ) and, within days it was all over. the croats did their best to assist the new forces of occupation, disrupting and sabotaging the best they could army operations as well as civilian defence. it was clear that many of them (though by no means the majority) regarded the serbs as the real occupiers and the germans as long awaited liberators. on april , , six days into the invasion, the germans declared the independent state of croatia (ndh, after the initials of its name in croatian - nezavisna drzava hrvatska). vladimir mecak, leader of the peasant party and deputy prime minister of yugoslavia called on the people to collaborate with the new government. overnight, a fringe terrorist organization, (erroneously) considered to be more a puppet of italy that a true expression of croat nationalism, found itself at the helm of government in circumstances complicated by internecine rivalries, inter-ethnic tensions, an history of hate and mutual resentment, a paranoia stoked by sporadic violence. the serbs were evidently a fifth column and so were the jews. indeed, croatia's serbs wasted no time in joining resistance movements against the nazis and the ndh. anyhow, the vacuum created by macek's surprising passivity and by the church's abstention - was filled by the ustashe. the new state included a part of dalmatia (the rest went to italy), the region of srem and the entirety of bosnia herzegovina. it was the closest croatia ever got to re- creating great croatia of a millennium ago. fearful of croat encroachment, the slovenes hurried to discuss the declaration of their own state modelled after the ndh - only to discover that their country was split between italy and germany. in zagreb, the enthusiasm was great. the nor so returning ustashe were greeted back even by their political rivals. people thronged the streets, throwing flowers and rice at the advancing former terrorist and german convoys. the ndh existed for four years. it had governments - only of which were headed by ante pavelic. as opposed to popular opinion, the ustashe were not a puppet regime, far from it. both the italians and the germans express their continued frustration at being unable to control and manipulate the ustashe. despite their military presence and economic support - both axis powers lacked real leverage over the ever more frantic activities of the ustashe. even when it was clear that the croat ndh - in its genocidal activities - is alienating the serbs and adding to the ranks of resistance movements throughout yugoslavia, there was precious little the germans or italians could do. they held polite and less polite talks with the top echelons of their own creation but like the fabled dr. frankenstein found that the ndh had a life very much of its own and an agenda it pursued with vigour and conviction. it is impossible - nor is it desirable - to avoid the issue of the mass killings of serbs, jews and gypsies. some croats claim that "only" - , were killed in jasenovac and other camps. the very use of the word "only" in this context ought to send a frisson of repulsion down the spines of civilized men. the serbs, jewish scholars and many international scholars claim the number was between - , people. the reason for the disparity in numbers is that - despite their "german" pretensions, the croats acted like the least of the barbarous balkanians in their mass slaughters. this was no industrial affairs, replete with bureaucracy and statistics. the massacres were atavistic, primitive, the call of blood and guts and scattered brains. it was an orgy, not an operation. there is nothing much to tell about the ndh. the regime was busy enacting laws against deadly sins and minor vices (such as pornography). the collaboration with the catholic church proceeded smoothly. laws were passed against the jews. the ndh army fought the partisans and the allied forces. when it tried to surrender to the british army in - it refused to accept their capitulation and turned them over to the partisans. in a series of death marches army soldiers and civilian collaborators with the ustashe were deliberately exterminated. the balkans knows no mercy. victims become butchers and butchers victims in nauseating turns. by , the ndh lost half its territory either to the germans or to the partisans. the rump state survived somehow, its leaders deserting in droves. pavelic himself escaped to austria, from there to italy and argentina. he survived an attempt on his life in and then fled to paraguay and spain where he died in . the dead "after all, if the croat state wishes to be strong, a nationally intolerant policy must be pursued for fifty years, because too much tolerance on such issues can only do harm." adolf hitler to ante pavelic in their meeting, june , "for the rest - serbs, jews and gypsies - we have three million bullets. we shall kill one third of all serbs. we shall deport another third, and the rest of them will be forced to become roman catholic." mile budak, minister of education of croatia, july , "there are limits even to love... (it is) stupid and unworthy of christ's disciples to think that the struggle against evil could be waged in a noble way and with gloves on." archbishop of sarajevo, ivan saric, "croats no longer think that german troops are present merely to provide peace and security, but that they are here to support the ustasha regime [...] the ustashas promote the impression that they act not only in agreement with german instances, but actually on their orders. [...] there is here today a deep mistrust of germany, because it is supporting a regime that has no moral or political right to exist, which is regarded as the greatest calamity that could have happened to the croat people. that regime is based entirely on the recognition by the axis powers, it has no popular roots, and depends on the bayonets of robbers who do more evil in a day than the serbian regime had done in twenty years." captain haffner to general edmund glaise von horstenau, plenipotentiary of the wehrmacht in zagreb, croatia, "our troops have to be mute witnesses of such events; it does not reflect well on their otherwise high reputation... i am frequently told that german occupation troops would finally have to intervene against ustasha crimes. this may happen eventually. right now, with the available forces, i could not ask for such action ad hoc intervention in individual cases could make the german army look responsible for countless crimes which it could not prevent in the past." general edmund glaise von horstenau to the okw, july , "the horrors that the ustashi have committed over the serbian small girls is beyond all words. there are hundreds of photographs confirming these deeds because those of them who have survived the torture: bayonet stabs, pulling of tongues and teeth, nails and breast tips - all this after they were raped. survivors were taken in by our officers and transported to italian hospitals where these documents and facts were gathered." commander of the italian sassari division in croatia, "increased activity of the bands is chiefly due to atrocities carried out by ustasha units in croatia against the orthodox population. the ustashas committed their deeds in a bestial manner not only against males of conscript age, but especially against helpless old people, women and children. the number of the orthodox that the croats have massacred and sadistically tortured to death is about three hundred thousand." report to reichsfuhrer ss heinrich himmler from the geheime staatspolizei - gestapo - dated february , "from the founding [of the ndh] until now the persecution of serbs has not stopped, and even cautious estimates indicate that at least several hundred thousand people have been killed. the irresponsible elements have committed such atrocities that could be expected only from a rabid bolshevik horde." german foreign ministry plenipotentiary representative in belgrade felix benzler to joachim von ribbentrop, minister of foreign affairs of the reich " (in croatia under the ustasha) ...over half a million [serbs] were murdered, about a quarter of a million were expelled from the country, and another quarter of a million were forced to convert to catholicism." encyclopaedia of the holocaust (all quotes from "the real genocide in yugoslavia: independent croatia of revisited" by: srdja trifkovic, published in: www.rockfordinstitute.org and in: www.antiwar.com ) return kla - the army of liberation "(there is a growing tendency among foreign observers) to identify the criminal with the honest, the vandal with the civilized, the mafiosi with the nation.'' former albanian president sali berisha "they were terrorists in and now, because of politics, they're freedom fighters" jerry seper, quoting an anonymous "top drug official" who refers to a state department report, in the article "kla finances war with heroin sales", washington times, may , "the albanian villages are much better, much richer than the serbian ones. the serbs, even the rich ones, don't build fine houses in villages where there are albanians. if a serb has a two-story house he refrains from painting it so that it shan't look better than the albanian houses." leon trotsky, war correspondent for "pravda", reporting from the balkan wars, - "when spring comes, we will manure the plains of kosovo with the bones of serbs, for we, albanians, have suffered too much to forget." isa boletini, leaving the ambassadors conference in london, "instead of using their authority and impartiality to restrain terrorist gangs of albanian extremists, we face the situation in which the terrorism is taking place under their auspices, and even being financed by united nations means" milosevic, march "getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation." ernest renan, french historian "we spent the 's worrying about a greater serbia. that's finished. we are going to spend time well into the next century worrying about a greater albania." christopher hill, ambassador to macedonia, "there is no excuse for that, even if the serbs in kosovo are very angry. i accept responsibility. one of the most important tasks of a democracy is to protect its minorities." milosevic to ambassador hill who reported to him about atrocities in kosovo "i am like a candle. i am melting away slowly, but i light the way for others." adem demaci, political representative of the kla before the founding fathers of the kla were ibrahim rugova, the pacifist president of the self-proclaimed "kosovo republic", established in - and slobodan milosevic, his belligerent yugoslav counterpart. the abysmal failure of the gandhiesque policies of the former to shelter his people from the recrudescently violent actions of the latter - revived the fledging kla outfit. contrary to typically shallow information in the media, the kla has been known to have operated in kosovo as early as the attack on policemen in glogovac in may . its epiphany, in the form of magnificently uniformed fighters, occurred only on november , (in the funeral of a teacher, a victim of serb zealousness) - but it existed long before. perhaps as long as the people's movement of kosovo, founded in . the historical and cultural roots of the conflict in kosovo were described elsewhere ("the bad blood of kosovo"). reading that article is essential as this one assumes prior acquaintance with it. kosovo is a land of great mineral wealth and commensurate agricultural poverty. it has always languished with decrepit infrastructure and irrelevant industry. kosovo's mineral riches were looted by yugoslavia for decades and both macedonia and kosovo were the poor relatives in the yugoslav federation. in kosovo, more than % of all those over years of age were illiterate (in ) and its per capita income was less than % of the national average. infant mortality was times that in slovenia. kosovo was an african enclave in an otherwise europe-aspiring country. caught in the pernicious spiral of declining commodity prices, kosovo relied on transfers from yugoslavia and from abroad for more than % of its income. inevitably, unemployment tripled from % in to % in . as a result, the federal government had to quell -months long, paralysing riots in . riots were nothing new to kosovo - the demonstrations of were arguably worse (and led to constitutional changes granting autonomy to kosovo in ). but this time, the authorities, reacted with tanks in scenes reminiscent of china's tiananmen square years later. the hotbed of hotheads was, as usual, the university in pristina. students there were more concerned with pedestrian issues such the quality of their food and the lack of facilities than with any eternal revolutionary or national truths. these mundane protests were hijacked by comrades with higher class consciousness and loftier motives of self- determination. such hijacking, though, would have petered out had the cesspool of rage and indignation not been festering so ebulliently. serb insensitivity backed by indiscriminate brutality led to escalation. as the years passed, calls for the restoration of the constitution (under which kosovo was granted political, financial, legal and cultural autonomy and institutions) - merged into a sonorous agenda of "great albania" and a "kosovo republic". the kosovar crowd was never above beatings, looting and burning. the hate was strong. yugoslavia's ruling party - the league of communists - was in the throes of its own transformation. with tito's demise and the implosion of the soviet bloc, the communists lacked both compass and leader. his natural successors were purged by tito in the s and s. the party wasn't sure whether to turn to gorbachev's east or to america's west. the communists panicked and embarked on a rampage of imprisonment, unjust dismissals of albanians (mainly of teachers, journalists, policemen and judges) and the occasional torture or murder. serb intellectuals regarded this as no more than the rectification of tito's anti-serb policies. serbia was the only republic within the federation, who was dismembered into autonomous regions (kosovo and vojvodina). "getting back at tito" was a strong motive, commensurate with serb "the world is against us" paranoia and siege mentality. milosevic, visibly ill at ease, surfed this tide of religion-tinged nationalism straight into kosovo, the historical heartland of serb-ism. oppression breeds resistance and serb oppression served only to streamline the stochastic nationalist movement into a compartmentalized, though factious, underground organization with roots wherever albanians resided: germany, switzerland, the usa, canada and australia. the ideology was an improbable mix of stalinism (enver hoxha-inspired), maoism and albanian chauvinism. this was before albania opened up to reveal its decrepitude and desolation to its kosovar visitors. all delusions of an albania- backed armed rebellion evaporated in the languor of albania proper. thus, the activities of the nationalists were more innocuous than their concocted doctrines. they defaced government buildings, shattered gravestones in serb cemeteries and overturned heroic monuments. the distribution of subversive (and fairly bromide) "literature" was rarely accompanied by acts of terror, either in kosovo or in europe. nationalism is refuge from uncertainty. as the old yugoslavia was crumbling, each of its constituents developed its own brand of escapism, replete with revenant nationalist leaders, mostly fictional "history", a newly discovered language and a pledge to fate to reconstitute a lost empire at its apex. thus, kosovar nationalism was qualitatively the kin and kith of the serb or croat sub-species. paradoxically, though rather predictably, they fed on each other. milosevic was as much a creation of kosovar nationalism as thaci was the outcome of milosevic's policies. the kla's stalinist-maoist inspiration was in emulation of the paranoid and omphaloskeptic regime in albania - but it owed its existence to belgrade's intransigence. the love-hate relationship between the kosovars and the albanians is explored elsewhere ("the myths of great albania -part i"). the serbs, in other words, were as terrified of kosovar irredentism as the kosovars were of serb dominion. their ever more pressing and menacing appeals to belgrade gave the regime the pretext it needed to intervene and milosevic the context he sought in which to flourish. in february , armed with a new constitution which abolished kosovo's autonomy (and, a year later, its stunned government), milosevic quelled a miners' hunger strike and proceeded to institute measures of discrimination against the albanians in the province. discrimination was nothing new to kosovo. the albanians themselves initiated such anti-serb measures following their new gained constitutional autonomy in . now the tide has turned and thousands of albanians who refused to sign new-fangled "loyalty vows" were summarily sacked and lost their pension rights (the most sacred possession of "homo socialismus"). albanian media were shuttered and schools vacated when teacher after teacher refused to abide by the serb curriculum. after a while, the serbs re-opened primary schools and re-hired albanian teachers, allowing them to teach in albanian. but secondary schools and universities remained closed. these acts of persecution did not meet with universal disapproval. greece, for instance, regarded the albanians as natural allies of the turks and, bonded by common enmity, of the macedonians and bulgarians. itself comprised of lands claimed by albania, greece favoured a harsh and final resolution of the albanian question. there can be little doubt that macedonia - feeling besieged by its albanian minority - regarded milosevic as the perfect antidote. macedonia actively assisted yugoslavia to break the embargo imposed on it by the western powers. milosevic was not, therefore, a pariah, as retroactive history would have it. rather, he was the only obstacle to a "great albania". within less than a year, in , the democratic league of kosovo (ldk) was able to claim a membership of , members. hashim thaci ("snake"), sulejman selimi ("sultan") and other leaders of the kla were then years of age. years of swiss education notwithstanding, they witnessed first hand kosovo's tumultuous transformation into the engine of disintegration of the yugoslav federation. it was a valuable lesson in the dialectic of history, later to be applied brilliantly. the leader of the ldk, the forever silk scarfed and mellifluous dr. ibrahim rugova, compared himself openly and blushlessly to vaclav havel and the kosovar struggle to the velvet revolution. this turgid and risible analogy deteriorated further as the kosovar velvet was stained by the blood of innocents. dr. rugova was an unfazed dreamer in a land of harsh nightmares. the sorbonne was never a good preparatory school to the academy of balkan reality. rugova's ideals were good and noble - gandhi-like passive resistance, market economics, constructive (though uncompromising and limited to the authorities) dialogue with the enemy. they might still prevail. and during the early s he was all the rage and the darling of the west. but he failed to translate his convictions into tangible achievements. his biggest failure might have been his inability to ally himself with a "big power" - as did the croats, the slovenes and the bosnians. this became painfully evident with the signature of the dayton accord in which almost completely ignored kosovo and the kosovars. true, the west conditioned the total removal of sanctions against yugoslavia on its humane treatment of its albanian citizens and encouraged the albanians, though circumspectly, to stand for their rights. but there was no explicit support even for the re- instatement of kosovo's status, let alone for the albanians' dreams of statehood. in the absence of such support - financial and diplomatic - kosovo remained an internal problem of yugoslavia, a renegade province, a colony of terror and drug trafficking. the kosovars felt betrayed as they have after the congress of berlin and the balkan wars. perhaps securing such a sponsor was a lost cause to start with (though the kla succeeded where rugova failed) - but then rugova misled his people into sanguinous devastation by declaring the "kosovo republic" prematurely. his choice of pacifism may have been dictated by the sobering sights from the killing fields of bosnia - and proved his pragmatism. but his decision to declare a "republic" was pre-mature, self-aggrandizing and in vacuo. the emergence of a political alternative - tough, realistic, methodical and structured - was not only a question of time but a welcome development. there is no desolation like the one inflicted by sincere idealists. in , rugova set about organizing a republic from a shabby office building and the opposite "cafe mimoza". his government constructed makeshift schools and hospitals, parallel networks of services staffed by the serb-dispossessed, capitalizing on a sweeping wave of volunteerism. albania recognized this nascent state immediately and international negotiators (such as lord owen and cyrus vance) conferred with its self-important figurehead (for instance, in september ). successive american administrations funnelled money into the province and warnings against "ethnic cleansing" were flung at yugoslavia as early as . internally, serb extremists in both belgrade and pristina prevented serb moderates (like then yugoslav prime minister milan panic) from re-opening the schools of kosovo and reducing the massive, northern-ireland-like serb military presence in it. an agreement signed in by both rugova and milosevic to abolish the parallel albanian education system and re- open all the educational facilities in kosovo was thus frustrated. kosovo fractured along ethnic lines with complete segregation of the serbs and the albanians. to avoid contact with the serbs was an unwritten rule, breached only by prominent intellectuals. the "kosovo republic" was far from advocating ethnic cleansing or even outright independence (there were powerful voices in favour of a federal solution within yugoslavia) - but not far from re-inventing an inverted version of apartheid. it faced the ubiquitous problem of all the other republics of former yugoslavia - not one of them was ethnically "pure". to achieve a tolerable level of homogeneity, they had to resort to force. rugova advocated the measured application of the insidious powers of discrimination and segregation. but, once the theme was set, variations were bound to arise. though dominant for some years, rugova and the ldk did not monopolize the kosovar political landscape. following a poll in , boycotted by all other political parties, which resulted in the re-election of rugova as president - the disenchanted and disillusioned had plenty of choice. some joined the kla, many more joined rexhep qosaj's (qosje) united democratic movement (lbd). the political scene in kosovo in the s and early s was vibrant and kaleidoscopic. adem demaci - the marxist ideologue of the kla, a long time political prisoner and the founder of the "revolutionary movement for the merger of albanians" in - established the parliamentary party of kosovo (ppk) before he handed it over to bajram kosumi, a dissident and another venerable political prisoner. the ppk was co-founded by veton surroi, the english-speaking, us- educated, son of a yugoslav diplomat and editor of koha ditore, the albanian language daily. the albanians are not a devout lot, but even islam had its political manifestations in kosovo. the demonstrations gave rise to the popular movement for kosovo (lpk). apparently, it gave rise to the kla, probably in , possibly in pristina. whatever the circumstances, the kla congregated in decani, the region surrounding pristina. two years after the golgovac attack - it tackled a serb border patrol (april) and a serb police station (august) in . light weapons and a crude bomb were used. the serbs were not impressed - but they were provoked into an escalating series of ever more hideous massacres of albanian villagers (the turning point might have been the slaughter by the serbs of the jashari clan in prekaz). machiavellian analysts ascribe to the kla a devilish plot to provoke the serbs into the ethnic cleansing that finally introduced the west to tortured kosovo. the author of this article, aware of the balkan's lack of propensity for long term planning and predilection for self- defeating vengeance - believes that, to the kla, it was all a serendipitous turn of events. whatever the case may be, the kla became sufficiently self-assured and popular to advertise itself on the bbc as responsible for some of the clashes - a rite of passage common to all self-respecting freedom fighters. the selection of targets by the kla is very telling. at first it concentrated its fiery intentions only upon military and law and order personnel. its reluctance to effect civilians was meritorious. a subtle shift occurred when the serbs began to re-populate kosovo with serbs displaced from the krajina region. alarmed by the intent - if not by the execution (only , serbs or so were settled in kosovo) - the kla reacted with a major drive to arm itself and by attacking serb settlements in klina, decani and djakovica and a refugee camp in baboloc. the kla attacks were militarily sophisticated and co-ordinated. serb policemen were ambushed on the road between glogovac and srbica. the serb counter-offensive resulted in dozens of albanian victims - civilians, men, women and children (the "drenica massacre"). the kla tried to defend villages aligned along a pec-djakovica line and thus disrupt the communications and logistics of serb military police and special (ministry of interior) police units. the main arena of fighting was a recurrent one - in the s, albanian guerillas, based in the hills, attacked the serbs in drenica. what finally transformed the kla from a wannabe ira into the fighting force that it has become was the disintegration of albania. history is the annals of irony. the break-up of the kla'a role model - led to the resurgence of its intellectual progeny. the kla absorbed thousands of weapons from the looted armouries of the albanian military and police. angry mobs attacked these ordnances following the collapse of pyramid investment schemes that robbed one third of the population of all their savings. the arms ended up in the trigger-happy hands of drug lords, mafiosi, pimps, smugglers and freedom fighters from tetovo in macedonia to durres in albania and from pristina in kosovo to the sandzak in serbia. the kla was so ill-equipped to cope with this fortuitous cornucopia - that it began to trade weapons, a gainful avocation it found hard to dislodge ever since. the convulsive dissolution of albania led to changes in high places. sali berisha was deposed and replaced by rexhep mejdani, an even more sympathetic ear to separatist demands. berisha himself later allowed the kla to use his property (around tropoja) as staging grounds and supported the cause (though not the "marxist- leninist" kla or its self-appointed government) unequivocally. at a certain stage, he even accused fatos nano, his rival and the prime minister of albania of being the enemy of the albanian people for not displaying the same unmitigated loyalty to the idea of an independent kosovo, under rugova and bujar bukoshi, rugova's money man (and prime minister in exile). the kla was able to expand its presence in albania, mainly in its training and operations centres near kukes, ljabinot (near tirana) and bajram curi. albania had a growing say in the affairs of the kla as it recomposed itself - it was instrumental in summoning the kla to rambouillet, for instance. this armed revelry coupled with the rising fortunes of separatism, led robert gelbard, the senior us envoy to the balkan to label the kla - "a terrorist organization". the serbs took this to mean a licence to kill, which they exercised dutifully in drenica. promptly, the usa changed course and the indomitable madeleine albright switched parties, saying: "we are not going to stand by and watch the serbian authorities do in kosovo what they can no longer get away with in bosnia". this stern consistency was followed by a tightening of the embargo against yugoslavia and by a threat of unilateral action. for the first time in history, the kosovars finally had a sponsor - and what a sponsor! the mightiest of all. as for milosevic, he felt nauseatingly betrayed. not only was he not rewarded for his role as the dayton peacemaker - he was faced with new sanctions, an ultimatum and a direct threat on the very perpetuation of his regime. the kla mushroomed not because it attacked serbs (very sporadically and to a minuscule effect). it ballooned because it delivered where rugova didn't even promise. it delivered an alliance with the usa against the hated serbs. it delivered weapons. it delivered hope and a plan. it delivered vengeance, the self-expression of the downtrodden. it was joined by near and far and, by its own reckoning, its ranks swelled to , warriors. more objective experts put the figure of active fighters at one fourth this number. still, it is an impressive number in a population of . million albanians. during the war, it was joined by overweight suburbanites from north america, albanian volunteers within an "atlantic brigade". it also absorbed albanians with rich military experience from serbia and croatia as well as foreign mercenaries and possibly "afghanis" (the devout moslem veterans of the wars in afghanistan, lebanon and bosnia). the influx of volunteers put pressure on the leadership - both organizational and pecuniary. the kla - an entrepreneurial start up of insurgency - had matured into a national brand of guerilla. it revamped itself, creating directorates, offices and officers, codes and procedures, a radio station and a news agency, an electronic communications interception unit, a word of mouth messenger service and a general military staff, headed since february by "sultan" and divided to seven operational zones. in short, it reacted to changing fortunes by creating a bureaucracy. concurrently, it armed itself to its teeth with more sophisticated weapons than ever before (though it was still short of medical supplies, ammunition and communications equipment). the kla now had shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launchers (like the german "armburst"), mortars, recoilless rifles, anti-aircraft machine-guns and automatic assault rifles. some of the weapons were even bought from serb army officers or imported through hungary. all this required a financial phase transition. that the kla has benefited, directly and knowingly, from money tainted by drug trafficking and smuggling of both goods and people across borders - can be in little doubt. but i find the proposition that the kla itself has traded in drugs unlikely. the long-established albanian clans which control the "balkan route" - the same clans that faced down the fearsome turkish gangs on their own turf - would have never let an upstart such as the kla take over any of their territory and its incumbent profits. the kla might have traded weapons. it might have dabbled in smuggling. it might have received donations from drug lords. in this, it is no different from all major modern guerilla movements. but it did not peddle drugs - not because of moral scruples but because of the lethal competition it would have encountered. that the kla had to resort to such condemnable methods of financing is not surprising. rugova refused to share with it the funds abroad managed by bujar bukoshi on behalf of the "kosovar people". it had no other means of income and, as opposed to rugova, it could act only clandestinely and surreptitiously. the west was no great help either - contrary to the myth spun by the serbs. another source of income was the % "war tax" levied on , kosovar albanians and their businesses in the diaspora (though most of it ended up under bukoshi's and rugova's control). officially collected by the people's movement of kosovo, the ultimate use of the proceeds was the sustenance of the shadow republic. the kla made use of the voluntary and not so voluntary donations to the swiss- based fund "homeland calls" (or "motherland is calling"). the usa - the pragmatic superpower that it is - began to divert its attention from the bumbling and hapless rugova to the emerging kla. the likes of gelbard and, his senior, richard holbrooke, held talks with its youthful political director, hashim thaci - suave, togged up and earnest, he was just what the doctor ordered. to discern that a showdown in kosovo was near required no prophetic powers. the kla might come handy to espy the land and to divert the serb forces should the need arise. "the clinton administration has diligently put everything in place for intervention. in fact, by mid-july us-nato planners had completed contingency plans for intervention, including air strikes and the deployment of ground troops. all that was missing was a sufficiently brutal or tragic event to trigger the process. as a senior defence department official told reporters on july , 'if some levels of atrocities were reached that would be intolerable, that would probably be a trigger.'" - wrote gary dempsey from the cato institute in october . the author of this article published another one in the "middle east times" in august in which the kosovo conflict was delineated in reasonably accurate detail ("the plight of the kosovar"). the article was written in april - by which time the outline of things to come was plain. all along, the kla prepared itself to be a provisional government in-waiting. it occupied regions of kosovo, established roadblocks, administration, welfare offices. its members operated nocturnally. the serb reaction got ever harsher until finally it threatened not only to wipe the kla out of existence but also to depopulate the parts of the province controlled by it. in september , nato threatened air strikes against serbia, following reports of a massacre of women and children in the village of gornje obrinje. this led to the october th agreement with belgrade, which postulated a reduction in the levels of yugoslav troops in the province. the kla was all but ignored in these events. rugova was not. he was often consulted by the american negotiators and treated like a head of state. the message was deafeningly clear: the kla was a pawn on the chessboard of war. it had no place where the civilized and the responsible tread. it had no raison d'etre in peacetime. it reacted by hitting a number of "serb collaborators" (mostly of gorani extract - muslim slavs who speak a dialect of albanian). one of the disposed was enver maloku, rugova's close associate. on january , , in the village of racak, someone murdered scores of people and dumped them by the roadside. the kla blamed the serbs. the serbs blamed the kla and william walker, the head of the osce observer team. the media reports were inconclusive. while everyone was fighting over the smouldering bodies, nato was preparing to attack and walker withdrew his observer team from kosovo into an increasingly reluctant and enraged macedonia. faced with sovereignty-infringing and regime-destabilizing demands at rambouillet, the serbs declined. under pressure and after days of consultations, the albanian delegation accepted the dictated draft agreement hesitatingly. in the absence of the predicted serb capitulation, "operation allied forces" commenced. rambouillet was a turning point for the kla. evidently on the verge of war, the usa reverted to its preferences of yore. the kla, a more useful ally on the ground in battle, took over from the ldk as the us favourite. at the behest of the united states, kla representatives not only were present, but headed the kosovar negotiating team. thaci took some convincing and shuttling between rambouillet, switzerland and kosovo - but finally, in march, he accepted the terms of the agreement with a sombre rugova in tow. these public acts of statesmanship: negotiating, bargaining and, finally, accepting graciously - cemented the role and image of the kla as not only a military outfit but also a political organization with the talent and wherewithal to lead the kosovars. rugova's position was never more negligible and marginal. after "the kla will transform in many directions, not just a military guard. one part will become part of the police, one part will become civil administration, one part will become the army of kosovo, as a defence force. finally, a part will form a political party." agim ceku, kla cdr the western media hit a nadir of bias and unprofessional sycophancy during the kosovo crisis. it, therefore, remains unclear who pulled whose strings. the kla was seen to be more adept at spin doctoring than hubris-infested nato. it started the war as an outcast and ended it as an ally of nato on the ground and the real government of a future kosovo. it capitalized ingeniously on rugova's mysterious disappearance and then on his, even less comprehensible, refusal to visit the refugee camps and to return to liberated kosovo. it interfaced marvellously with both youthful prime ministers - albania's pandeli majko and macedonia's ljubco georgievski. this new-found camaraderie ended in a summit with the latter, organized by arben xhaferi (dzaferi), an influential albanian coalition partner in macedonia (and, many say, thaci's business partner in kosovo). georgievski, who did more for macedonia's regional integration and amicable relationships with its neighbours than all the previous governments of macedonia combined - did not hesitate to shake the hand of the political leader of an organization still decried by his own interior ministry as "terrorist". it was a gamble - bold and, in hindsight, farsighted - but still, a gamble. rugova himself was not accorded such an honour when he finally passed through macedonia, on his way to his demolished homeland. during the war, the kla absorbed new recruits from macedonia (many macedonian albanians died in battle in the fields of kosovo), from germany, switzerland, the usa, australia and some moslem countries. in other words, it was internationalized. it was equipped (though only niggardly) by the west. and it coped with the double task of diplomacy (thaci's famous televised discussions with madeleine albright, for instance) and political organization. it was engaged in field guerilla warfare and reconnaissance without the proper training for either. add to this tactical military co-ordination and the need to integrate a second, rugova and berisha sponsored armed forces of the republic of kosovo (fark) and the kla seems to have been taxed to its breaking point. cracks began to appear and it was downhill ever since. never before was such an enormous political capital wasted so thoroughly in so short a time by so few. one must not forget that victory was not assured until the last moment. the west's reluctance to commit ground troops to the escalating conflict - as mass expulsions cum sporadic massacres of the indigenous population by the serbs were taking place - was considered by many kla fighters to have been a violation of a "besa" (the sacred albanian vow) given to them by nato. opinions regarding the grand strategy of conducting the war differed strongly. the agreement with milosevic that ended the war did not mention any transition period at the end of which the kosovars will decide their fate in a referendum. it felt like betrayal. at the beginning, there was strong, grassroots resistance to disarmament. many kosovars felt that the advantage obtained should be pressed to the point of independence or at least, a transition period. then, when the dust settled, the spoils of war served to widen the rifts. internecine fighting erupted and is still afoot. the occasional murder served to delineate the territories of each commander and faction within the strained kla. everything was and is subject to fluid arrangements of power and profit sharing - from soft drink licences, through cigarette smuggling and weapons dealing and down to the allocation of funds (some of them still of dubious sources). the situation was further compounded by the invasion of criminal elements from albania proper. the kosovar crime clans were effected by the war (though their activities never really ceased) and into the vacuum gushed albanian organized and ruthless crime. but contrary to media-fostered popular images - crime was but one thread in the emerging tapestry of the new kosovo. other, no less critical issues were and are demilitarization and self-government. albanians and serbs have more in common than they care to admit. scattered among various political entities, both nations came up with a grandiose game plan - milosevic's "great serbia" and the kla's "great albania". the idea, in both cases, was to create an ethnically homogeneous state by shifting existing borders, incorporating hitherto excluded parts of the nation and excluding hitherto included minorities. whereas milosevic had at his disposal the might of the yugoslav army (or, so he thought) - the albanians had only impoverished and decomposing albania to back them. still, the emotional bond that formed, fostered by a common vision and shared hope - is intact. albanian flags fly over albanian municipalities in kosovo and in macedonia. the possession of weapons and self-government have always been emblematic of the anticipated statehood of kosovo. being disarmed and deprived of self-governance was, to the albanians, a humiliating and enraging experience, evocative of earlier, serb-inflicted, injuries. moreover, it was indicative of the perplexed muddle the west is mired in - officially, kosovo is part of yugoslavia. but it is also occupied by foreign forces and has its own customs, currency, bank licensing, entry visas and other insignia of sovereignty (shortly, even an internet domain, ko). this quandary is a typically anodyne european compromise which is bound to ferment into atrabilious discourse and worse. the kosovars - understandably - will never accept serb sovereignty or even serb propinquity willingly. ignoring the inevitable, tergiversating and equivocating have too often characterized the policies of the big powers - the kind of behaviour that turned the balkan into the morass that it is today. it is, therefore, inconceivable that the kla has disbanded and disarmed or transformed itself into the ill-conceived and ill- defined "kosovo protection corps" (headed by former kla commander and decorated croat lieutenant general, agim ceku and charged with fire fighting, rescue missions and the like). thousands of kla members found jobs (or scholarships, or seed money) through the international organization for migration (iom). but, in all likelihood, the kla still maintains clandestine arms depots (intermittently raided by kfor), strewn throughout kosovo and beyond. its chain of command, organizational structure, directorates, operational and assembly zones and general staff are all viable. i have no doubt - though little proof - that it still trains and prepares for war. it would be mad not to in this state of utter mayhem. the emergence of the "liberation army of presevo, medvedja and bujanovac" (all towns beyond kosovo's borders, in serbia, but with an albanian majority) is a harbinger. its soldiers even wear badges in the red, black and yellow kla colours. the enemies are numerous: the serbs (should kosovo ever be returned to them), nato and kfor (should they be charged with the task of reintegrating serbia), perhaps more moderate albanians with lesser national zeal or serb-collaborators (like zemail mustafi, the albanian vice president of the bujanovac branch of president slobodan milosevic's ruling socialist party, who was assassinated three months ago). moreover, the very borders of kosovo are in dispute. the territory known to its inhabitants as "eastern kosovo" now comprises , albanians, captives in a hostile serbia. yet, "eastern kosovo" was never part of the administrative province of kosovo. the war is far from over. in the meantime, life is gradually returning to normal in kosovo itself. former kla fighters engage in all manner of odd jobs - from shovelling snow in winter to burning bushes in summer. even the impossible joint administrative council (serbs, albanians and peacekeepers) with its departments, convenes from time to time. the periodic resignation of the overweening bernard kouchner aside, things are going well. a bank has been established, another one is on its way. electricity is being gradually restored and so are medical services and internet connections. downtown pristina is reconstructed by albanians from switzerland. such normalization can prove lethal to an organization like the kla, founded on strife and crisis as it is. if it does not transform itself into a political organization in a convincing manner - it might lose its members to the more alluring pastures of statecraft. the local and general elections so laboriously (and expensively) organized in kosovo are the kla's first real chance at transformation. it failed at its initial effort to establish a government (together with qosaj's democratic union movement, an umbrella organization of parties in opposition to rugova and with hashim thaci as its prime minister). overruled by unmik (united nations mission in kosovo), opposed by berisha's democratic party, recognized only by albania and the main albanian party in macedonia and bereft of finances, it was unable to imbue structure with content and provide the public goods a government is all about. the kla was so starved for cash that it was unable even to pay the salaries of its own personnel. many criminals caught in the act claimed to be kla members in dire financial straits. ineptitude and insolvency led to a dramatic resurgence in the popularity of the hitherto discarded rugova. the kla then failed to infiltrate existing structures of governance erected by the west (like the executive council) - or to duplicate them. thaci's quest to become deputy-kouchner was brusquely rebuffed. the ballot box seems now to be the kla's only exit strategy. the risk is that electoral loss will lead to alienation and thuggery if not to outright criminality. it is a fine balancing act between the virtuous ideals of democracy and the harsh constraints of realpolitik. at this stage and with elections looming, hashim thaci sounds conciliatory tones. he is talking about a common (albanian and serb) resolution of the division of mitrovica and the problem of missing persons. but even he knows that multi-ethnicity is dead and that the best that can be hoped for is tolerant co-existence. his words are, therefore, intended to curry favour with the west out of the misguided and naive belief that the key to kosovo's future lies there rather than in the will of the kosovar people. western aid is habit forming and creates dependence and the kla consumed a lot of it. politically, the kla has not yet pupated. recently, it has embarked on a spate of coalition-forming, initially with bardhyl mahmuti of the democratic progressive party of kosovo (ppdk) - the former kla representative in western europe. it seeks to marry its dwindling funds and seat at the west's banquet with the reputation and clout of the ppdk's local dignitaries. this coveted and negotiable access to western structures of government bears some elaboration. kosovar parties and individuals present at the rambouillet talks were entitled, according to the rambouillet agreement and un general resolution , to serve, together with unmik delegates, on a kosovo transitional council (ktc). thus, when ktc was formed in the wake of operation allied force, it was made of rugova's ldk, thaci's kla, and rexhep qosaj's (qosje) democratic union league. there was a token serb and two independents - the aforementioned veton surroi and blerim shala, editor-in-chief of the pristina weekly zeri. many newly-formed political parties, such as mahmuti's were left out of the ktc and the executive council (which is made of one representative of each of the four largest kosovar political parties plus four representatives from unmik). this - a seat at the cherished table - seems to be the only tangible asset of the kla. but it came at a dear price. the executive council virtually paralysed thaci's self-proclaimed and self-appointed government, absorbing many of its ministers and officials with lucrative offers of salaries and budgets. thaci himself had to give up a part of the plethora of his self-bestowed titles. this move again proves thaci's simplistic perception that to win elections in kosovo one needs to be seen to be a friend of the west. i have no doubt that this photo- opportunity brand of politics will backfire. the kla's popularity among the potential electorate is at a nadir and it is being accused of venality, incompetence and outright crime. a lasting transformation of such an image cannot be attained by terpsichorean supineness. to regain its position, the kla must regenerate itself and revert to its grassroots. it must dedicate equal time to diplomacy and to politics. it must identify its true constituency - and it is by no means unmik. above all, it must hone its skills of collaboration and compromise. politics - as opposed to warfare - are never a zero sum game. the operative principle is "live and let live" rather than "shoot first or die". a mental transformation is required, an adjustment of codes of conduct and principles of thought. should the kla find in itself the flexibility and intellectual resources - rare commodities in ideological movements - needed to achieve this transition, it might still compose the first government of an independent kosovo. if it were to remain intransigent and peevish - it is likely to end up being barely a bloody footnote in history. return narcissists, group behaviour, and terrorism interview with sam vaknin published in "the idler" sam vaknin is the author of 'malignant self love - narcissism revisited', owner of the narcissistic abuse study list, and webmaster of the narcissistic personality disorder topic in suite . he is also an economic and political analyst for united press international (upi). . what is pathological narcissism? all of us have narcissistic traits. some of us even develop a narcissistic personality. moreover, narcissism is a spectrum of behaviours - from the healthy to the utterly pathological (known as the narcissistic personality disorder, or npd). the dsm iv uses this language: "an all-pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behaviour), need for admiration or adulation and lack of empathy, usually beginning by early adulthood and present in various contexts." here are the criteria. having of these "qualifies" you as a narcissist... .	feels grandiose and self-importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents to the point of lying, demands to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements) .	is obsessed with fantasies of unlimited success, fame, fearsome power or omnipotence, unequalled brilliance (the cerebral narcissist), bodily beauty or sexual performance (the somatic narcissist), or ideal, everlasting, all-conquering love or passion .	firmly convinced that he or she is unique and, being special, can only be understood by, should only be treated by, or associate with, other special or unique, or high-status people (or institutions) .	requires excessive admiration, adulation, attention and affirmation - or, failing that, wishes to be feared and to be notorious (narcissistic supply). .	feels entitled. expects unreasonable or special and favourable priority treatment. demands automatic and full compliance with his or her expectations .	is "interpersonally exploitative", i.e., uses others to achieve his or her own ends .	devoid of empathy. is unable or unwilling to identify with or acknowledge the feelings and needs of others .	constantly envious of others or believes that they feel the same about him or her .	arrogant, haughty behaviours or attitudes coupled with rage when frustrated, contradicted, or confronted. the language in the criteria above is based on or summarized from: american psychiatric association. ( ). diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, fourth edition (dsm iv). washington, dc: american psychiatric association. sam vaknin. ( , ). malignant self love - narcissism revisited, second, revised printing prague and skopje: narcissus publications. ("malignant self love - narcissism revisited" http://samvak.tripod.com/faq .html) more data about pathological narcissists o	most narcissists ( %) are men. o	npd (=the narcissistic personality disorder) is one of a "family" of personality disorders (formerly known as "cluster b"). other members: borderline pd, antisocial pd and histrionic pd. o	npd is often diagnosed with other mental health disorders ("co- morbidity") - or with substance abuse, or impulsive and reckless behaviours ("dual diagnosis"). o	npd is new ( ) mental health category in the diagnostic and statistics manual (dsm). o	there is only scant research regarding narcissism. but what there is has not demonstrated any ethnic, social, cultural, economic, genetic, or professional predilection to npd. o	it is estimated that . - % of the general population suffer from npd. o	pathological narcissism was first described in detail by freud. other major contributors are: klein, horney, kohut, kernberg, millon, roningstam, gunderson, hare. o	the onset of narcissism is in infancy, childhood and early adolescence. it is commonly attributed to childhood abuse and trauma inflicted by parents, authority figures, or even peers. o	there is a whole range of narcissistic reactions - from the mild, reactive and transient to the permanent personality disorder. o	narcissists are either "cerebral" (derive their narcissistic supply from their intelligence or academic achievements) - or "somatic" (derive their narcissistic supply from their physique, exercise, physical or sexual prowess and "conquests"). o	narcissists are either "classic" - see definition below - or they are "compensatory", or "inverted" - see definitions here: "the inverted narcissist". o	npd is treated in talk therapy (psychodynamic or cognitive- behavioural). the prognosis for an adult narcissist is poor, though his adaptation to life and to others can improve with treatment. medication is applied to side-effects and behaviours (such as mood or affect disorders and obsession-compulsion) - usually with some success. . human collectives (nations, professions, ethnic groups) and narcissism - stereotyping or racism? having lived in countries in continents now, i firmly believe in "mass psychopathology", or in ethnopsychology. the members of a group - if sufficiently cohesive - tend to react similarly to circumstances. by "cohesive" i mean, if they share the same mental world ("weltanschauung") - possibly the same history, the same language or dialect, the same hopes, folklore, fears, and aspirations ("agenda"), the same enemies and so on. thus, if recurrently traumatized or abused by external or internal forces, a group of people may develop the mass equivalent of pathological narcissism as a defence or compensatory mechanism. by "abuse" and "trauma" i mean any event, or series of events, or circumstances, which threaten the self identity, self image, sense of self worth, and self esteem of the collective consistently and constantly - though often arbitrarily and unpredictably. human collectives go through formation, individuation, separation - all the phases in individual psychological development. a disturbance in the natural and unhindered progression of these phases is likely to result in psychopathology of all the members of the collective. being subjugated to another nation, being exiled, enduring genocide, being destitute, being defeated in warfare - are all traumatic experiences with far reaching consequences. the members of the collective form a "condensate" (in physical terms) - a material in which all the atoms vibrate with the same frequency. under normal circumstances, group behaviour resembles diffuse light. subject to trauma and abuse - it forms a malignant laser - a strong, same wavelength, potentially destructive beam. the group becomes abusive to others, exploitative, detached from reality, bathed in grandiose fantasies, xenophobic, lacking empathy, prone to uncontrolled rages, over-sensitive, convinced of its superiority and entitlement. force and coercion are often required to disabuse such a group of its delusions. but, this of course, only cements its narcissism and justifies its distorted perception of the world. consider the case of the jews. the jews have been subjected to the kind of trauma and abuse i mentioned earlier on an unprecedented and never repeated scale. their formal scriptures, lore, and ethos are imbued with grandiose fantasies and a towering sense of superiority and "mission". yet, the inevitable contempt for their inferiors is tampered by the all- pervasive pragmatism the jews had to develop in order to survive. narcissists are not pragmatic. they live in a universe of their own making. they see no need to get along with others. jews are not like that. their creed is a practical survival guide which obliges them to accommodate others, to empathize with their needs and desires, to compromise, to admit errors, to share credit, to collaborate, and so on. israelis, on the other hand, are "unshackled" jews. they believe themselves to be the mirror image of the diaspora jew. they are physical ("somatic"), strong, productive, independent, in control. they, in short, are less bound by the need to perilously co-exist with baleful, predatory, majorities. they can allow themselves a full, unmitigated, expression of whatever defence mechanisms they evolved in response to millennia of virulent hatred and murderous persecutions. being an israeli, i gained privileged insight into this fascinating transformation from tortured slave to vengeful master. . narcissism and leadership are all politicians narcissists? the answer, surprisingly, is: not universally. the preponderance of narcissistic traits and personalities in politics is much less than in show business, for instance. moreover, while show business is concerned essentially (and almost exclusively) with the securing of narcissistic supply - politics is a much more complex and multi-faceted activity. rather, it is a spectrum. at the one end, we find the "actors" - politicians who regard politics as their venue and their conduit, an extended theatre with their constituency as an audience. at the other extreme, we find self-effacing and schizoid (crowd-hating) technocrats. most politicians are in the middle: somewhat self- enamoured, opportunistic and seeking modest doses of narcissistic supply - but mostly concerned with perks, self-preservation and the exercise of power. most narcissists are opportunistic and ruthless operators. but not all opportunistic and ruthless operators are narcissists. i am strongly opposed to remote diagnosis. i think it is a bad habit, exercised by charlatans and dilettantes (even if their names are followed by a psy.d.). please do not forget that only a qualified mental health diagnostician can determine whether someone suffers from npd and this, following lengthy tests and personal interviews. if the politician in question is also a narcissist (=suffers from npd), then, yes, he would do anything and everything to remain in power, or, while, in power, to secure his narcissistic supply. a common error is to think that "narcissistic supply" consists only of admiration, adulation and positive feedback. actually, being feared, or derided is also narcissistic supply. the main element is attention. so, the narcissistic politician cultivates sources of narcissistic supply (both primary and secondary) and refrains from nothing while doing so. often, politicians are nothing but a loyal reflection of their milieu, their culture, their society and their times (zeitgeist and leitkultur). this is the thesis of daniel goldhagen in "hitler's willing executioners". more about narcissists in positions of authority: http://samvak.tripod.com/faq .html http://samvak.tripod.com/msla .html . political and economic circumstances and emerging narcissistic group behaviours pathological narcissism is the result of individual upbringing (see: "the narcissist's mother" and "narcissists and schizoids" ) and, in this sense, it is universal and cuts across time and space. yet, the very process of socialization and education is heavily constrained by the prevailing culture and influenced by it. thus, culture, mores, history, myths, ethos, and even government policy (such as the "one child policy" in china) do create the conditions for pathologies of the personality. the ethnopsychologist george devereux ("basic problems of ethnopsychiatry", university of chicago press, ) suggested to divide the unconscious into the id (the part that was always instinctual and unconscious) and the "ethnic unconscious" (repressed material that was once conscious). the latter includes all our defence mechanisms and most of the superego. culture dictates what is to be repressed. mental illness is either idiosyncratic (cultural directives are not followed and the individual is unique and schizophrenic) - or conformist, abiding by the cultural dictates of what is allowed and disallowed. our culture, according to christopher lasch teaches us to withdraw into ourselves when we are confronted with stressful situations. it is a vicious circle. one of the main stressors of modern society is alienation and a pervasive sense of isolation. the solution our culture offers us - to further withdraw - only exacerbates the problem. richard sennett expounded on this theme in "the fall of public man: on the social psychology of capitalism" (vintage books, ). one of the chapters in devereux's aforementioned tome is entitled "schizophrenia: an ethnic psychosis, or schizophrenia without tears". to him, the whole usa is afflicted by what came later to be called a "schizoid disorder". c. fred alford (in "narcissism: socrates, the frankfurt school, and psychoanalytic theory", yale university press, ) enumerates the symptoms: "...withdrawal, emotional aloofness, hyporeactivity (emotional flatness), sex without emotional involvement, segmentation and partial involvement (lack of interest and commitment to things outside oneself), fixation on oral- stage issues, regression, infantilism and depersonalization. these, of course, are many of the same designations that lasch employs to describe the culture of narcissism. thus, it appears, that it is not misleading to equate narcissism with schizoid disorder." (page ). consider the balkan region, for instance: http://samvak.tripod.com/pp .html http://samvak.tripod.com/pp .html . christopher lasch, american "culture of narcissism" and the long term effects of the september atrocities lasch and his work are increasingly relevant in post september america. this is partly because the likes of bin laden hurl at america primitive and coarse versions of lasch's critique. they accuse america of being a failed civilization, not merely of meddling ignorantly and sacriligeously in the affairs of islam (and the rest of the world). they fervently believe that america exports this contagious failure to other cultures and societies (through its idolatrous mass media and inferior culture industries) and thus "infects" them with the virus of its own terminal decline. it is important to understand the left wing roots of this cancerous rendition of social criticism. lasch wrote: "the new narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. he seeks not to inflict his own certainties on others but to find a meaning in life. liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of his own existence. superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security of group loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by a paternalistic state. his sexual attitudes are permissive rather than puritanical, even though his emancipation from ancient taboos brings him no sexual peace. fiercely competitive in his demand for approval and acclaim, he distrusts competition because he associates it unconsciously with an unbridled urge to destroy. hence he repudiates the competitive ideologies that flourished at an earlier stage of capitalist development and distrusts even their limited expression in sports and games. he extols cooperation and teamwork while harboring deeply antisocial impulses. he praises respect for rules and regulations in the secret belief that they do not apply to himself. acquisitive in the sense that his cravings have no limits, he does not accumulate goods and provisions against the future, in the manner of the acquisitive individualist of nineteenth-century political economy, but demands immediate gratification and lives in a state of restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire." (christopher lasch - the culture of narcissism: american life in an age of diminishing expectations, ) there is no single lasch. this chronicler of culture, did so mainly by chronicling his inner turmoil, conflicting ideas and ideologies, emotional upheavals, and intellectual vicissitudes. in this sense, of (courageous) self-documentation, mr. lasch epitomized narcissism, was the quintessential narcissist, the better positioned to criticize the phenomenon. "narcissism" is a relatively well-defined psychological term. i expound upon it elsewhere ("malignant self love - narcissism re- visited"). the narcissistic personality disorder - the acute form of pathological narcissism - is the name given to a group of symptoms (see: dsm- ). they include: a grandiose self (illusions of grandeur coupled with an inflated, unrealistic sense of the self), inability to empathize with the other, the tendency to exploit and manipulate others, idealization of other people (in cycles of idealization and devaluation), rage attacks and so on. narcissism, therefore, has a clear clinical definition, etiology and prognosis. the use that lasch makes of this word has nothing to do with its usage in psychopathology. true, lasch did his best to sound "medicinal". he spoke of "(national) malaise" and accused the american society of lack of self-awareness. but choice of words does not a coherence make. "the culture of narcissism - american life in an age of diminishing expectations" was published in the last year of the unhappy presidency of jimmy carter ( ). the latter endorsed the book publicly (in his famous "national malaise" speech). the main thesis of the book is that the americans have created a self-absorbed (though not self aware), greedy and frivolous society which depended on consumerism, demographic studies, opinion polls and government to know and to define itself. what is the solution? lasch proposed a "return to basics": self-reliance, the family, nature, the community, and the protestant work ethic. to those who adhere, he promised an elimination of their feelings of alienation and despair. but the clinical term "narcissism" was abused by lasch in his books. it joined other words mistreated by this social preacher. the respect that this man gained in his lifetime (as a social scientist and historian of culture) makes one wonder whether he was right in criticizing the shallowness and lack of intellectual rigor of american society and of its elites. there is a detailed analysis here, in a reaction i wrote to roger kimball's "christopher lasch vs. the elites""new criterion", vol. , p. ( - - ): http://samvak.tripod.com/lasch.html . are all terrorists and serial killers narcissists? terrorists can be phenomenologically described as narcissists in a constant state of deficient narcissistic supply. the "grandiosity gap" - the painful and narcissistically injurious gap between their grandiose fantasies and their dreary and humiliating reality - becomes emotionally insupportable. they decompensate and act out. they bring "down to their level" (by destroying it) the object of their pathological envy, the cause of their seething frustration, the symbol of their dull achievements, always incommensurate with their inflated self-image. they seek omnipotence through murder, control (not least self control) through violence, prestige, fame and celebrity by defying figures of authorities, challenging them, and humbling them. unbeknownst to them, they seek self punishment. they are at heart suicidal. they aim to cast themselves as victims by forcing others to punish them. this is called "projective identification". they attribute evil and corruption to their enemies and foes. these forms of paranoia are called projection and splitting. these are all primitive, infantile, and often persecutory, defense mechanisms. when coupled with narcissism - the inability to empathize, the exploitativeness, the sense of entitlement, the rages, the dehumanization and devaluation of others - this mindset yields abysmal contempt. the overriding emotion of terrorists and serial killers, the amalgam and culmination of their tortured psyche - is deep seated disdain for everything human, the flip side of envy. it is cognitive dissonance gone amok. on the one hand the terrorist derides as "false", "meaningless", "dangerous", and "corrupt" common values, institutions, human intercourse, and society. on the other hand, he devotes his entire life (and often risks it) to the elimination and pulverization of these "insignificant" entities. to justify this apparent contradiction, the terrorists casts himself as an altruistic saviour of a group of people "endangered" by his foes. he is always self-appointed and self-proclaimed, rarely elected. the serial killer rationalizes and intellectualizes his murders similarly, by purporting to "liberate" or "deliver" his victims from a fate worse than death. the global reach, the secrecy, the impotence and growing panic of his victims, of the public, and of his pursuers, the damage he wreaks - all serve as external ego functions. the terrorist and serial killer regulate their sense of self esteem and self worth by feeding slavishly on the reactions to their heinous deeds. their cosmic significance is daily enhanced by newspaper headlines, ever increasing bounties, admiring imitators, successful acts of blackmail, the strength and size of their opponents, and the devastation of human life and property. appeasement works only to aggravate their drives and strengthen their appetites by emboldening them and by raising the threshold of excitation and "narcissistic supply". terrorists and killers are addicted to this drug of being acknowledged and reflected. they derive their sense of existence, parasitically, from the reactions of their (often captive) audience. appendix - responses in a correspondence following the publication of this interview zionism has always regarded itself as both a ( th century) national movement and a (colonial) civilizing force: see - herzl's butlers - http://samvak.tripod.com/pp .html the holocaust was a massive trauma not because of its dimensions - but because germans, the epitome of western civilization, have turned on the jews, the self-proclaimed missionaries of western civilization in the levant and arabia. it was the betrayal that mattered. rejected by east (as colonial stooges) and west (as agents of racial contamination) alike - the jews resorted to a series of narcissistic defences reified by the state of israel. the long term occupation of territories (metaphorical or physical) is a classic narcissistic trait (of "annexation" of the other). the six days war was a war of self defence - but the swift victory only exacerbated the narcissistic defences. mastery over the palestinians became an important component in the psychological makeup of the nation (especially the more rightwing and religious elements) because it constitutes "narcissistic supply". bin laden (and by extension islamic fundamentalism) is the narcissistic complement of the state of israel. his narcissistic defences are fuelled by unrequited humiliation (millon's "compensatory narcissism"). the humiliation is the outcome of a grandiosity gap between reality and grandiose fantasies, between actual inferiority and a delusional sense of superiority (and cosmic mission), between his sense of entitlement and his incommensurate achievements, skills, and accomplishments. when narcissists are faced with the disintegration of their narcissistic "infrastructure" (their false self) - they decompensate. i have outlined the possible psychodynamic reactions here: http://www.suite .com/article.cfm/npd/ narcissism is always concomitant with the "civilizing" components of colonialism ("white man's burden") - though not with the mercantilist elements. "pathological narcissism is a well defined (and phenomenological) mental health theoretical construct. no doubt, narcissists engage in anti-other discourse and other virulent and pernicious narratives. but the existence of such a discourse is not a determinant of pathological narcissism - merely its manifestation. what gives rise to the grandiosity gap is socio- economic reality. the gap is between the real and the ideal, between the actual and the (self- delusional and fantasized. socio-economic factors breed narcissistic injury and narcissistic rage. return the crescent and the cross introduction "there are two maxims for historians which so harmonise with what i know of history that i would like to claim them as my own, though they really belong to nineteenth-century historiography: first, that governments try to press upon the historian the key to all the drawers but one, and are anxious to spread the belief that this single one contains no secret of importance; secondly, that if the historian can only find the thing which the government does not want him to know, he will lay his hand upon something that is likely to be significant." herbert butterfield, "history and human relations", london, , p. the balkans as a region is a relatively novel way of looking at the discrete nation-states that emerged from the carcasses of the ottoman and habsburg empires and fought over their spoils. this sempiternal fight is a determinant of balkan identity. the nations of the balkan are defined more by ornery opposition than by cohesive identities. they derive sustenance and political-historical coherence from conflict. it is their afflatus. the more complex the axes of self-definition, the more multifaceted and intractable the conflicts. rabid nationalism against utopian regionalism, fascism (really, opportunism) versus liberalism, religion-tinted traditionalism (the local moribund edition of conservatism) versus "western" modernity. who wins is of crucial importance to world peace. the balkan is a relatively new political entity. formerly divided between the decrepit ottoman empire and the imploding austro- hungarian one - the countries of the balkans emerged as unique polities only during the th century. this was to be expected as a wave of nationalism swept europe and led to the formation of the modern, bureaucratic state as we know it. even so, the discrete entities that struggled to the surface of statehood did not feel that they shared a regional destiny or identity. all they did was fight ferociously, ruthlessly and mercilessly over the corrupted remnants of the sick men of europe (the above mentioned two residual empires). in this, they proved themselves to be the proper heirs of their former masters: murderous, suborned, byzantine and nearsighted. in an effort to justify their misdeeds and deeds, the various nations - true and concocted - conjured up histories, languages, cultures and documents, some real, mostly false. they staked claims to the same territories, donned common heritage where there was none, spoke languages artificially constructed and lauded a culture hastily assembled by "historians" and "philologists". these were the roots of the great evil - the overlapping claims, the resulting intolerance, the mortal, existential fear stoked by the kaleidoscopic conduct of the big powers. to recognize the existence of the macedonian identity - was to threaten the greek or bulgarian ones. to accept the antiquity of the albanians was to dismantle macedonia, serbia and greece. to countenance bulgarian demands was to inhumanly penalize its turk citizens. it was a zero-sum game played viciously by everyone involved. the prize was mere existence - the losers annihilated. it very nearly came to that during the two balkan wars of and . allies shifted their allegiance in accordance with the shifting fortunes of a most bewildering battlefield. when the dust settled, two treaties later, macedonia was dismembered by its neighbours, bulgaria bitterly contemplated the sour fruits of its delusional aggression and serbia and austro-hungary rejoiced. thus were the seeds of world war i sown. the yugoslav war of succession (or civil war) was a continuation of this mayhem by other means. yugoslavia was born in sin, in the dictatorship of king alexander i (later slain in france in ). it faced agitation, separatism and discontent from its inception. it was falling apart when the second world conflagration erupted. it took a second dictatorship - tito's - to hold it together for another years. the balkan as a whole - from hungary, through romania and down to bulgaria - was prone to authoritarianism and an atavistic, bloody form of racist, "peasant or native fascism". a primitive region of destitute farmers and vile politicians, it was exposed to world gaze by the collapse of communism. there are encouraging signs of awakening, of change and adaptation. there are dark omens of reactionary forces, of violence and wrath. it is a battle fought in the unconscious of humanity itself. it is a tug of war between memories and primordial drives repressed and the vitality of those still close to nature. the outcome of this fight is crucial to the world. both world wars started in central eastern and south-eastern europe. globalization is no guarantee against a third one. the world was more globalized than it is today at the beginning of the century - but it took only one shot in sarajevo to make this the most sanguineous century of all. an added problem is the simple-mindedness, abrasiveness and sheer historical ignorance of america, the current superpower. a nation of soundbites and black or white stereotypes, it is ill-suited to deal with the nuanced, multilayered and interactive mayhem that is the balkan. a mentality of western movies - good guys, bad guys, shoot'em up - is hardly conducive to a balkan resolution. the intricate and drawn out process required taxes american impatience and bullying tendencies to their explosive limits. in the camp of the good guys, the anglo-saxons place romania, greece, montenegro and slovenia (with macedonia, croatia, albania and bulgaria wandering in and out). serbia is the epitome of evil. milosevic is hitler. such uni-dimensional thinking sends a frisson of rubicund belligerence down american spines. it tends to ignore reality, though. montenegro is playing the liberal card deftly, no doubt - but it is also a haven of smuggling and worse. slovenia is the civilized facade that it so tediously presents to the world - but it also happened to have harboured one of the vilest fascist movements, comparable to the ustasha - the domobranci. it shares with croatia the narcissistic grandiose fantasy that it is not a part of the balkan - but rather an outpost of europe - and the disdain for its impoverished neighbours that comes with it. in this sense, it is more "balkanian" than many of them. greece is now an economically stable and mildly democratic country - but it used to be a dictatorship and it still is a banana republic in more than one respect. the albanians - ferociously suppressed by the serbs and (justly) succoured by the west - are industrious and shrewd people. but - fervent protestations to the contrary aside - they do seem to be intent on dismantling and recombining both yugoslavia (serbia) and macedonia, perhaps at a terrible cost to all involved. together with the turks, the serbs and the bulgarians, the albanians are the undisputed crime lords of the balkan (and beyond - witness their incarceration rates in switzerland). this is the balkan - a florilegium of contradictions within contraventions, the mawkish and the jaded, the charitable and the deleterious, the feckless and the bumptious, evanescent and exotic, a mystery wrapped in an enigma. in this article, i will attempt to study two axes of friction: islam versus christianity and fascism and nationalism versus liberalism. it is hard to do justice to these topics in the procrustean bed of weekly columns - i, therefore, beg the forgiveness of scholars and the understanding of frustrated readers. a first encounter "in accordance with this [right to act], whenever some one of the infidel parents or some other should oppose the giving up of his son for the janiccaries, he is immediately hanged from his doorsill, his blood being deemed unworthy." turkish firman, "...the turks have built several fortresses in my kingdom and are very kind to the country folk. they promise freedom to every peasant who converts to islam." bosnian king stefan tomasevic to pope pius ii "...the porte treated him (the patriarch) as part of the ottoman political apparatus. as a result, he had certain legally protected privileges. the patriarch travelled in 'great splendour' and police protection was provided by the janiccaries. his horse and saddle were fittingly embroidered, and at the saddle hung a small sword as a symbol of the powers bestowed on him by the sultan." dusan kasic, "the serbian church under the turks", belgrade, within the space of years, southeast europe has undergone two paradigmatic shifts. first, from christian independence to islamic subjugation (a gradual process which consumed two centuries) and then, in the th century, from self-determination through religious affiliation to nationalism. the christians of the balkan were easy prey. they were dispirited peasantry, fragmented, prone to internecine backstabbing and oppressive regimes. the new ottoman rulers treated both people and land as their property. they enslaved some of their prisoners of war (under the infamous "pencik" clause), exiled thousands and confiscated their lands and liquidated the secular political elites in thrace, bulgaria, serbia and albania. the resulting vacuum of leadership was filled by the church. thus, paradoxically, it was islam and its excesses that made the church the undisputed shepherd of the peoples of the balkan, a position it did not enjoy before. the new rulers did not encourage conversions to their faith for fear of reducing their tax base - non-moslem "zimmis" (the qur'an's "people of the book") paid special (and heavy) taxes to the treasury and often had to bribe corrupt officials to survive. still, compared to other ottoman exploits (in anatolia, for instance), the conquest of the balkan was a benign affair. cities remained intact, the lands were not depopulated and the indiscriminately ferocious nomadic tribesmen that usually accompanied the turkish forces largely stayed at home. the ottoman bureaucracy took over most aspects of daily life soon after the military victories, bringing with it the leaden stability that was its hallmark. indeed, populations were dislocated and re-settled as a matter of policy called "sorgun". yet such measures were intended mainly to quell plangent rebelliousness and were applied mainly to the urban minority (for instance, in constantinople). the church was an accomplice of the turkish occupiers. it was a part of the ottoman system of governance and enjoyed both its protection and its funding. it was leveraged by the turk sultans in their quest to pacify their subjects. mehmet ii bestowed upon the greek orthodox patriarchate, its bishops and clergy great powers. the trade off was made explicit in mehmet's edicts: the church accepted the earthly sovereignty of the sultan - and he, in turn, granted them tolerance, protection and even friendship. the ottoman religious-legal code, the seriat, recognized the christian's right to form their own religiously self-governing communities. these communities were not confined to the orderly provision of worship services. they managed communal property as well. mehmet's benevolence towards the indigents was so legendary that people wrongly attributed to him the official declaration of a "millet i rum" (roman, or greek, nation) and the appointment of gennadios as patriarch of the orthodox church (which only an episcopal synod could do). the ottoman empire was an amazing hybrid. as opposed to popular opinion it was not a religious entity. the ruling elite included members of all religions. thus, one could find christian "askeri " (military or civil officials) and muslim "reaya" ("flock" of taxpayers). it is true that christians paid the arbitrarily set "harac" (or, less commonly, "cizye") in lieu of military service. even the clergy were not exempt (they even assisted in tax collection). but both christians and muslims paid the land tax, for instance. and, as the fairness, transparency and predictability of the local taxmen deteriorated - both muslims and christians complained. the main problem of the ottoman empire was devolution - not centralization. local governors and tax collectors had too much power and the sultan was too remote and disinterested or too weak and ineffective. the population tried to get istanbul more involved - not less so. the population was financially fleeced as much by the orthodox church as it was by the sultan. a special church-tax was levied on the christian reaya and its proceeds served to secure the lavish lifestyles of the bishops and the patriarch. in true mob style, church functionaries divided the loot with ottoman officials in an arrangement known as "peskes". foreign powers contributed to the war chests of various candidates, thus mobilizing them to support pro- catholic or pro-protestant political stances and demands. the church was a thoroughly corrupt, usurious and politicized body which contributed greatly to the ever increasing misery of its flock. it was a collaborator in the worst sense of the word. but the behaviour of the church was one part of the common betrayal by the elite of the balkan lands. christian landowners volunteered to serve in the ottoman cavalry ("sipahis") in order to preserve their ownership. the ottoman rulers conveniently ignored the laws prohibiting "zimmis" to carry weapons. until , the "sipahis" constituted the bulk of the ottoman forces in the balkan and their mass conversion to islam was a natural continuation of their complicity. other christians guarded bridges or mountain passes for a tax exemption ("derbentci"). local, turkish-trained militias ("armatoles") fought mountain-based robber gangs (serbian "hayduks", bulgarian "haiduts", greek "klephts"). the robbers attacked turkish caravans with the same frequency and zeal that they sacked christian settlements. the "armatoles" resisted them by day and joined them by night. but it was perfectly acceptable to join turkish initiatives such as this. the balkan remained overwhelmingly christian throughout the ottoman period. muslim life was an urban phenomenon both for reasons of safety and because only the cities provided basic amenities. even in the cities, though, the communities lived segregated in "mahalles" (quarters). everyone collaborated in public life but the "mahalles" were self-sufficient affairs with the gamut of services - from hot baths to prayer services - available "in-quarter". gradually, the major cities, situated along the trade routes, became moslem. skopje, sarajevo and sofia all had sizeable moslem minorities. thus, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the picture that emerges is one of an uneasy co-habitation in the cities and a christian rural landscape. the elites of the balkan - church, noblemen, warriors - all defected and collaborated with the former "enemy". the local populace was the victim of usurious taxes, coercively applied. the central administration shared the loot with its local representatives and with the indigenous elites - the church and the feudal landed gentry. it was a cosy and pragmatic arrangement that lasted for centuries. yet, the seeds of ottoman bestiality and future rebellion were sown from the very inception of this empire-extending conquest. the "devsirme" tax was an example of the fragility of the turkish veneer of humanity and enlightened rule. christian sons were kidnapped, forcibly converted to islam and trained as fighters in the fearsome janiccary corps (the palace guards). they were never to see their families and friends again. exemptions from this barbarous practice were offered only to select communities which somehow contributed to ottoman rule in the balkan. christian women were often abducted by local ottoman dignitaries. and the custom of the "kepin", allowed moslems to "buy" a christian daughter off her husband on a "temporary" basis. the results of such a union were raised as moslems. and then there were the mass conversions of christians to islam. these conversions were very rarely the results of coercion or barbarous conduct. on the contrary, by shrinking the tax base and the recruitment pool, conversion were unwelcome and closely scrutinized by the turks. but to convert was such an advantageous and appealing act that the movement bordered on mass hysteria. landowners converted to preserve their title to the land. "sipahis" converted to advance in the ranks of the military. christian officials converted to maintain their officialdom. ordinary folk converted to avoid onerous taxes. christian traders converted to islam to be able to testify in court in case of commercial litigation. converted moslems were allowed to speak arabic or their own language, rather than the cumbersome and elaborate formal turkish. christians willingly traded eternal salvation for earthly benefits. and, of course, death awaited those who recanted (like the orthodox "new martyrs", who discovered their christian origins, having been raised as moslems). perhaps this was because, in large swathes of the balkan, christianity never really took hold. it was adopted by the peasant as a folk religion - as was islam later. in bosnia, for instance, muslims and christians were virtually indistinguishable. they prayed in each other's shrines, celebrated each other's holidays and adopted the same customs. muslim mysticism (the sufi orders) appealed to many sophisticated urban christians. heretic cults (like the bogomils) converted en masse. intermarriage flourished, mainly between muslim men (who could not afford the dowry payable to a muslim woman) and christian women (who had to pay a dowry to her muslim husband's family). marrying a christian woman was a lucrative business proposition. and, then, of course, there was the moslem birth rate. with four women and a pecuniary preference for large families - moslem out- bred christians at all times. this trend is most pronounced today but it was always a prominent demographic fact. but the success of islam to conquer the balkan, rule it, convert its population and prevail in it - had to do more with the fatal flaws of balkan christianity than with the appeal and resilience of islam and its ottoman rendition. in the next chapter i will attempt to ponder the complex interaction between catholicism and orthodox christianity as it was manifested in croatia and bosnia, the border lands between the habsburg and the ottoman empires and between "rome" and "byzantium". i will then explore the variance in the ottoman attitudes towards various christian communities and the reasons underlying this diversity of treatment modalities. the communities of god "from the beginning, people of different languages and religions were permitted to live in christian lands and cities, namely jews, armenians, ismaelites, agarenes and others such as these, except that they do not mix with christians, but rather live separately. for this reason, places have been designated for these according to ethnic group, either within the city or without, so that they may be restricted to these and not extend their dwelling beyond them." bishop demetrios khomatianos of ohrid, late th century and early th century ad "the latins still have not been anathematized, nor has a great ecumenical council acted against them....and even to this day this continues, although it is said that they still wait for the repentance of the great roman church." "...do not overlook us, singing with deaf ears, but give us your understanding, according to sacred precepts, as you yourself inspired the apostles....you see, lord, the battle of many years of your churches. grant us humility, quiet the storm, so that we may know in each other your mercy, and we may not forget before the end the mystery of your love....may we coexist in unity with each other, and become wise also, so that we may live in you and in your eternal creator the father and in his only-begotten word. you are life, love, peace, truth, and sanctity...." east european studies occasional paper, number , "christianity and islam in southeastern europe - slavic orthodox attitudes toward other religions", eve levin, january "...you faced the serpent and the enemy of god's churches, having judged that it would have been unbearable for your heart to see the christians of your fatherland overwhelmed by the moslems (izmailteni); if you could not accomplish this, you would leave the glory of your kingdom on earth to perish, and having become purple with your blood, you would join the soldiers of the heavenly kingdom. in this way, your two wishes were fulfilled. you killed the serpent, and you received from god the wreath of martyrdom." mateja matejic and dragan milivojevic, "an anthology of medieval serbian literature in english", columbus, ohio: slavica, any effort to understand the modern quagmire that is the balkan must address religion and religious animosities and grievances. yet, the surprising conclusion of such a study is bound to be that the role of inter-faith hatred and conflict has been greatly exaggerated. the balkan was characterized more by religious tolerance than by religious persecution. it was a model of successful co-habitation and co-existence even of the bitterest enemies of the most disparate backgrounds. only the rise of the modern nation-state exacerbated long-standing and hitherto dormant tensions. actually, the modern state was established on a foundation of artificially fanned antagonism and xenophobia. religions in the balkan were never monolithic enterprises. competing influences, paranoia, xenophobia and adverse circumstances all conspired to fracture the religious landscape. thus, for instance, though officially owing allegiance to the patriarch in constantinople and the orthodox "oikumene", both serb and bulgarian churches collaborated with the rulers of the day against perceived byzantine (greek and russian) political encroachment in religious guise. the southern slav churches rejected both the theology and the secular teachings of the "hellenics" and the "romanians" (romans). in turn, the greek church held the slav church in disregard and treated the peasants of macedonia, serbia, bulgaria and albania to savage rounds of tax collection. the orthodox, as have all religions, berated other confessions and denominations. but orthodoxy was always benign - no "jihad", no bloodshed, no forced conversions and no mass expulsions - perhaps with the exception of the forcible treatment of the bogomils. it was all about power and money, of course. bishops and archbishops did not hesitate to co-opt the ottoman administration against their adversaries. they had their rivals arrested by the turks or ex- communicated them. such squabbles were common. but they never amounted to more than a balkanian comedia del-arte. even the jews - persecuted all over western europe - were tolerated and attained prominence and influence in the balkan. one bulgarian tsar divorced his wife to marry a jewess. southern orthodox christianity (as opposed to the virulent and vituperative byzantine species) has always been pragmatic. the minorities (jews, armenians, vlachs) were the economic and financial backbone of their societies. and the balkan was always a hodge-podge of ethnicities, cultures and religions. shifting political fortunes ensured a policy of "hedging one's bets". the two great competitors of orthodox christianity in the tight market of souls were catholicism and islam. the former co-sponsored with the orthodox church the educational efforts of cyril and methodius. even before the traumatic schism of , catholics and nascent orthodox were battling over (lucrative) religious turf in bulgaria. the schism was a telling affair. ostensibly, it revolved around obscure theological issues (who begat the holy spirit - the father alone or jointly with the son as well as which type of bread should be used in the eucharist). but really it was a clash of authorities and interests - the pope versus the patriarch of constantinople, the romans versus the greeks and slavs. matters of jurisdiction coalesced with political meddling in a confluence of ill-will that has simmered for at least two centuries. the southern (slav) orthodox churches contributed to the debate and supported the greek position. sects such as the hesychasts were more byzantine than the greeks and denounced wavering orthodox clergy. many a south orthodox pilloried the catholic stance as an heresy of armenian or apollinarian or arian origin - thus displaying their ignorance of the subtler points of the theological debate. they also got wrong the greek argumentation regarding the bread of the eucharist and the history of the schism. but zeal compensated for ignorance, as is often the case in the balkan. what started as a debate - however fervent - about abstract theology became an all out argument about derided customs and ceremonies. diet, dates and divine practices all starred in these grotesque exchanges. the latin ate unclean beasts. they used five fingers to cross themselves. they did not sing hallelujah. they allowed the consumption of dairy products in lent. the list was long and preposterous. the parties were spoiling for a fight. as is so often the case in this accursed swathe of the earth, identity and delusional superiority were secured through opposition and self- worth was attained through defiance. by relegating them to the role of malevolent heretics, the orthodox made the sins of the catholics unforgivable, their behaviour inexcusable, their fate sealed. at the beginning, the attacks were directed at the "latins" - foreigners from germany and france. local catholics were somehow dissociated and absolved from the diabolical attributes of their fellow-believers abroad. they used the same calendar as the orthodox (except for lent) and similarly prayed in church slavonic. the only visible difference was the recognition of papal authority by the catholics. catholicism presented a coherent and veteran alternative to orthodoxy's inchoate teachings. secular authorities were ambiguous about how to treat their catholic subjects and did not hesitate to collaborate with catholic authorities against the turks. thus, to preserve itself as a viable religious alternative, the orthodox church had to differentiate itself from the holy see. hence, the flaming debates and pejorative harangues. the second great threat was islam. still, it was a latecomer. catholicism and orthodoxy have been foes since the ninth century. four hundreds years later, byzantine wars against the moslems were a distant thunder and raised little curiosity and interest in the balkan. the orthodox church was acquainted with the tenets of islamic faith but did not bother to codify its knowledge or record it. islam was, to it, despite its impeccable monotheistic credentials, an exotic oriental off-shoot of tribal paganism. thus, the turkish invasion and the hardships of daily life under ottoman rule found orthodoxy unprepared. it reacted the way we all react to fear of the unknown: superstitions, curses, name calling. on the one hand, the turkish enemy was dehumanized and bedevilled. it was perceived to be god's punishment upon the unfaithful and the sinful. on the other hand, in a curious transformation or a cognitive dissonance, the turks became a divine instrument, the wrathful messengers of god. the christians of the balkan suffered from a post traumatic stress syndrome. they went through the classical phases of grief. they started by denying the defeat (in kosovo, for instance) and they proceeded through rage, sadness and acceptance. all four phases co-existed in balkan history. denial by the many who resorted to mysticism and delusional political thought. that the turks failed for centuries to subdue pockets of resistance (for instance in montenegro) served to rekindle these hopes and delusions periodically. thus, the turks (and, by extension, islam) served as a politically cohering factor and provided a cause to rally around. rage manifested through the acts against the occupying ottomans of individuals or rebellious groups. sadness was expressed in liturgy, in art and literature, in music and in dance. acceptance by conceiving of the turks as the very hand of god himself. but, gradually, the turks and their rule came to be regarded as the work of the devil as it was incurring the wrath of god. but again, this negative and annihilating attitude was reserved to outsiders and foreigners, the off-spring of ishmael and of hagar, the latins and the turks. moslem or catholic neighbours were rarely, if ever, the target of such vitriolic diatribes. external enemies - be they christian or moslem - were always to be cursed and resisted. neighbours of the same ethnicity were never to be punished or discriminated against for their religion or convictions - though half-hearted condemnations did occur. the geographical and ethnic community seems to have been a critical determinant of identity even when confronted with an enemy at the gates. members of an ethnic community could share the same religious faith as the invader or the heretic - yet this detracted none from their allegiance and place in their society as emanating from birth and long term residence. these tolerance and acceptance prevailed even in the face of ottoman segregation of religious communities in ethnically-mixed "millets". this principle was shattered finally by the advent of the modern nation-state and its defining parameters (history and language), real or (more often) invented. one could sometimes find members of the same nuclear family - but of different religious affiliation. secular rulers and artisans in guilds collaborated unhesitatingly with jews, turks and catholics. conversions to and fro were common practice, as ways to secure economic benefits. these phenomena were especially prevalent in the border areas of croatia and bosnia. but everyone, throughout the balkan, shared the same rituals, the way of life, the superstitions, the magic, the folklore, the customs and the habits regardless of religious persuasion. where religions co-existed, they fused syncretically. some sufi sects (mainly among the janiccary) adopted catholic rituals, made the sign of the cross, drank alcohol and ate pork. the followers of bedreddin were jews and christians, as well as moslems. everybody shared miraculous sites, icons, even prayers. orthodox slavs pilgrims to the holy places in palestine were titled "hadzi" and moslems were especially keen on easter eggs and holy water as talismans of health. calendars enumerated the holidays of all religions, side by side. muslim judges ("kadis") married muslim men to non-muslim women and inter-marriage was rife. they also married and divorced catholic couples, in contravention of the catholic faith. orthodox and catholic habitually intermarried and interbred. that this background yielded srebrenica and sarajevo, kosovo and krajina is astounding. it is the malignant growth of this century. it is the subject of our next instalment. return t h e a u t h o r shmuel (sam) vaknin curriculum vitae click on blue text to access relevant web sites - thank you. born in in qiryat-yam, israel. served in the israeli defence force ( - ) in training and education units. education graduated a few semesters in the technion - israel institute of technology, haifa. ph.d. in philosophy (major : philosophy of physics) - pacific western university, california. graduate of numerous courses in finance theory and international trading. certified e-commerce concepts analyst. certified in psychological counselling techniques. full proficiency in hebrew and in english. business experience to founder and co-owner of a chain of computerized information kiosks in tel-aviv, israel. to senior positions with the nessim d. gaon group of companies in geneva, paris and new-york (noga and aprofim sa): - chief analyst of edible commodities in the group's headquarters in switzerland. - manager of the research and analysis division - manager of the data processing division - project manager of the nigerian computerized census - vice president in charge of rnd and advanced technologies - vice president in charge of sovereign debt financing to represented canadian venture capital funds in israel. to general manager of ipe ltd. in london. the firm financed international multi-lateral countertrade and leasing transactions. to co-founder and director of "mikbats - tesuah", a portfolio management firm based in tel-aviv. activities included large-scale portfolio management, underwriting, forex trading and general financial advisory services. to present free-lance consultant to many of israel's blue-chip firms, mainly on issues related to the capital markets in israel, canada, the uk and the usa. consultant to foreign rnd ventures and to governments on macro- economic matters. president of the israel chapter of the professors world peace academy (pwpa) and (briefly) israel representative of the "washington times". to co-owner and director of many business enterprises: - the omega and energy air-conditioning concern - avp financial consultants - handiman legal services total annual turnover of the group: million usd. co-owner, director and finance manager of costi ltd. - israel's largest computerized information vendor and developer. raised funds through a series of private placements locally, in the usa, canada and london. to publisher and editor of a capital markets newsletter distributed by subscription only to dozens of subscribers countrywide. managed the internet and international news department of an israeli mass media group, "ha-tikshoret and namer". assistant in the law faculty in tel-aviv university (to prof. s.g. shoham). to financial consultant to leading businesses in macedonia, russia and the czech republic. collaborated with the agency of transformation of business with social capital. economic commentator in "nova makedonija", "dnevnik", "izvestia", "argumenti i fakti", "the middle east times", "makedonija denes", "the new presence", "central europe review" , and other periodicals and in the economic programs on various channels of macedonian television. chief lecturer in courses organized by the agency of transformation, by the macedonian stock exchange and by the ministry of trade. - economic advisor to the government of the republic of macedonia and to the ministry of finance. - senior business correspondent for united press international (upi) web and journalistic activities author of extensive websites in psychology ("malignant self love") - an open directory cool site philosophy ("philosophical musings") economics and geopolitics ("after the rain") owner of the narcissistic abuse announcement and study list and the narcissism revisited mailing list (more than members) editor of mental health disorders and central and eastern europe categories in web directories (open directory, suite , search europe). columnist and commentator in "the new presence", united press international (upi), internetcontent, ebookweb and "central europe review". web activities author of extensive websites in psychology ("malignant self love") - an open directory cool site philosophy ("philosophical musings") economics and geopolitics ("after the rain") owner of the narcissistic abuse announcement and study list and the narcissism revisited mailing list (more than members) editor of mental health disorders and central and eastern europe categories in web directories (open directory, suite , search europe). weekly columnist in "the new presence", united press international (upi), internetcontent, ebookweb.org and "central europe review". publications and awards "managing investment portfolios in states of uncertainty", limon publishers, tel-aviv, "the gambling industry", limon publishers., tel-aviv, "requesting my loved one - short stories", yedioth aharonot, tel- aviv, "the macedonian economy at a crossroads - on the way to a healthier economy" (with nikola gruevski), skopje, "malignant self love - narcissism revisited", narcissus publications, prague and skopje, , "the exporters' pocketbook", ministry of trade, republic of macedonia, skopje, "the suffering of being kafka" (electronic book of hebrew short fiction) "after the rain - how the west lost the east", narcissus publications in association with central europe review/ceenmi, prague and skopje, winner of numerous awards, among them the israeli education ministry prize (literature) , the rotary club award for social studies ( ) and the bilateral relations studies award of the american embassy in israel ( ). hundreds of professional articles in all fields of finances and the economy and numerous articles dealing with geopolitical and political economic issues published in both print and web periodicals in many countries. many appearances in the electronic media on subjects in philosophy and the sciences and concerning economic matters. contact details: palma@unet.com.mk vaknin@link.com.mk my web sites: economy / politics: http://ceeandbalkan.tripod.com/ psychology: http://samvak.tripod.com/index.html philosophy: http://philosophos.tripod.com/ poetry: http://samvak.tripod.com/contents.html return after the rain how the west lost the east the book this is a series of articles written and published in - in macedonia, in russia, in egypt and in the czech republic. how the west lost the east. the economics, the politics, the geopolitics, the conspiracies, the corruption, the old and the new, the plough and the internet - it is all here, in colourful and provocative prose. from "the mind of darkness": "'the balkans' - i say - 'is the unconscious of the world'. people stop to digest this metaphor and then they nod enthusiastically. it is here that the repressed memories of history, its traumas and fears and images reside. it is here that the psychodynamics of humanity - the tectonic clash between rome and byzantium, west and east, judeo-christianity and islam - is still easily discernible. we are seated at a new year's dining table, loaded with a roasted pig and exotic salads. i, the jew, only half foreign to this cradle of slavonics. four serbs, five macedonians. it is in the balkans that all ethnic distinctions fail and it is here that they prevail anachronistically and atavistically. contradiction and change the only two fixtures of this tormented region. the women of the balkan - buried under provocative mask-like make up, retro hairstyles and too narrow dresses. the men, clad in sepia colours, old fashioned suits and turn of the century moustaches. in the background there is the crying game that is balkanian music: liturgy and folk and elegy combined. the smells are heavy with muskular perfumes. it is like time travel. it is like revisiting one's childhood." the author sam vaknin was born in israel in . a financial consultant and columnist, he lived and published in countries. an author of short stories, the winner of many literary awards, an amateur philosopher - he is a controversial figure. this is his tenth book. source: international copyright conventions circular c, copyright office, washington, dc, pages - . notes: universal copyright convention as revised at paris, . convention and protocols done at paris july , ; ratification advised by the senate of the united states of america august , ; ratified by the president of the united states of america august , ; ratification of the united states of america deposited with the director-general of the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization september , ; proclaimed by the president of the united states of america july , ; entered into force july , . by the president of the united states of america a proclamation considering that: the universal copyright convention as revised at paris on july , , together with two related protocols, the text of which, as certified by the director, office of international standards and legal affairs, united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization, in the french, english and spanish languages, is hereto annexed; the senate of the united states of america by its resolution of august , , two-thirds of the senators present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to ratification of the convention as revised, together with the two related protocols; the president of the united states of america ratified the convention as revised, together with the two related protocols on august , , in pursuance of the advice and consent of the senate; the instrument of ratification by the united states of america was deposited with the director-general of the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization on september , , in accordance with paragraph of article viii of the convention as revised; it is provided in paragraph of article ix of the convention as revised that it shall come into force three months after the deposit of twelve instruments of ratification, acceptance or accession; it is provided in paragraph (b) of each of the protocols that it shall enter into force in respect of each state on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession of the state concerned or on the date of entry into force of the convention with respect to such state, whichever is the later; and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph of article ix of the convention as revised and paragraph (b) of each of the two related protocols, the convention as revised, together with the two related protocols, entered into force on july , . now, therefore, be it known that i, richard nixon, president of the united states of america, proclaim and make public the convention as revised, together with the two related protocols, to the end that they shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the united states of america and by the citizens of the united states of america and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof. in testimony whereof, i have signed this proclamation and caused the seal of the united states of america to be affixed. done at the city of washington this eighteenth day of july in the year of our lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-four and of the independence of [seal] the united states of america the one hundred ninety-ninth. richard nixon by the president: henry a. kissinger, secretary of state the contracting states. moved by the desire to ensure in all countries copyright protection of literary, scientific and artistic works, convinced that a system of copyright protection appropriate to all nations of the world and expressed in a universal convention, additional to, and without impairing international systems already in force, will ensure respect for the rights of the individual and encourage the development of literature, the sciences and the arts, persuaded that such a universal copyright system will facilitate a wider dissemination of works of the human mind and increase international understanding, have resolved to revise the universal copyright convention as signed at geneva on september (hereinafter called "the convention"), and consequently, have agreed as follows: article i each contracting state undertakes to provide for the adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors and other copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works, including writings, musical, dramatic and cinematographic works, and paintings, engravings and sculpture. article ii . published works of nationals of any contracting state and works first published in that state shall enjoy in each other contracting state the same protection as that other state accords to works of its nationals first published in its own territory, as well as the protection specially granted by this convention. . unpublished works of nationals of each contracting state shall enjoy in each other contracting state the same protection as that other state accords to unpublished works of its own nationals, as well as the protection specially granted by this convention. . for the purposed of this convention any contracting state may, by domestic legislation, assimilate to its own nationals any person domiciled in that state. article iii . any contracting state which, under its domestic law, requires as a condition of copyright, compliance with formalities such as deposit, registration, notice notarial certificates, payment of fees or manufacture or publication in that contracting state, shall regard these requirements as satisfied with respect to all works protected in accordance with this convention and first published outside its territory and the author of which is not one of its nationals, if from the time of the first publication all the copies of the work published with the authority of the author or other copyright proprietor bear the symbol of a lower case "c" inside of a circle accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor and the year of first publication placed in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright. . the provisions of paragraph shall not preclude any contracting state from requiring formalities or other conditions for the acquisition and enjoyment of copyright in respect of works first published in its territory or works of its nationals wherever published. . the provisions of paragraph shall not preclude any contracting state from providing that a person seeking judicial relief must, in bringing the action, comply with procedural requirements, such as that the complainant must appear through domestic counsel or that the complainant must deposit with the court or an administrative office, or both, a copy of the work involved in the litigation; provided that failure to comply with such requirements shall not affect the validity of the copyright, nor shall any such requirement be imposed upon a national of another contracting state if such requirement is not imposed on nationals of the state in which protection is claimed. . in each contracting state there shall be legal means of protecting without formalities the unpublished work of nationals of other contracting states. . if a contracting state grants protection for more than one term of copyright and the first term is for a period longer than one of the minimum periods prescribed in article iv, such state shall not be required to comply with the provisions of paragraph of this article in respect of the second or any subsequent term of copyright. article iv . the duration of protection of a work shall be governed, in accordance with the provisions of article ii and this article, by the law of the contracting state in which protection is claimed. . (a) the term of protection for works protected under this convention shall not be less that the life of the author and twenty-five years after his death. however, any contracting state which, on the effective date of this convention in that state, has limited this term for certain classes of works to a period computed from this first publication of the work, shall be entitled to maintain these exceptions and to extend them to other classes of works. for all these classes the term of protection shall not be less than twenty-five years from the date of first publication. (b) any contracting state which, upon the effective date of this convention in that state, does not compute the term of protection upon the basis of the life of the author, shall be entitled to compute the term of protection from the date of the first publication of the work or from its registration prior to publication, as the case may be, provided the term of protection shall not be less than twenty-five years from the date of first publication or from its registration prior to publication, as the case may be. (c) if the legislation of a contracting state grants two or more successive terms of protection, the duration of the first term shall not be less than one of the minimum periods specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b). . the provisions of paragraph shall not apply to photographic works or to works of applied art; provided, however, that the term of protection in those contracting states which protect photographic works, or works of applied art in so far as they are protected as artistic works, shall not be less than ten years for each of said classes of works. . (a) no contracting state shall be obliged to grant protection to a work for a period longer than that fixed for the class of works to which the work in question belongs, in the case of unpublished works by the law of the contracting state of which the author is a national, and in the case of published works by the law of the contracting state in which the work has been first published. (b) for the purposes of the application of subparagraph (a), if the law of any contracting state grants two or more successive terms of protection, the period of protection of that state shall be considered to be the aggregate of those terms. however, if a specified work is not protected by such state during the second or any subsequent term for any reason, the other contracting states shall not be obliged to protect it during the second or any subsequent term. . for the purposes of the application of paragraph , the work of a national of a contracting state, first published in a non-contracting state, shall be treated as though first published in the contracting state of which the author is a national. . for the purposes of the application of paragraph , in case of simultaneous publication in two or more contracting states, the work shall be treated as though first published in the state which affords the shortest term; any work published in two or more contracting states within thirty days of its first publication shall be considered as having been published simultaneously in said contracting states. article ivbis . the rights referred to in article i shall include the basic rights ensuring the author's economic interests, including the exclusive right to authorize reproduction by any means, public performance and broadcasting. the provisions of this article shall extend to works protected under this convention either in their original form or in any form recognizably derived from the original. . however, any contracting state may, by its domestic legislation, make exceptions that do not conflict with the spirit and provisions of this convention, to the rights mentioned in paragraph of this article. any state whose legislation so provides, shall nevertheless accord a reasonable degree of effective protection to each of the rights to which exception has been made. article v . the rights referred to in article i shall include the exclusive right of the author to make, publish and authorize the making and publication of translations of works protected under this convention. . however, any contracting state may, by its domestic legislation, restrict the right of translation of writings, but only subject to the following provisions: (a) if, after the expiration of a period of seven years from the date of the first publication of a writing, a translation of such writing has not been published in a language in general use in the contracting state, by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization, any national of such contracting state may obtain a non-exclusive licence from the competent authority thereof to translate the work into that language and publish the work so translated. (b) such national shall in accordance with the procedure of the state concerned, establish either that he has requested, and been denied, authorization by the proprietor of the right to make and publish the translation, or that, after due diligence on his part, he was unable to find the owner of the right. a licence may also be granted on the same conditions if all previous editions of a translation in a language in general use in the contracting state are out of print. (c) if the owner of the right of translation cannot be found, then the applicant for a licence shall send copies of his application to the publisher whose name appears on the work and, if the nationality of the owner of the right of translation is known, to the diplomatic or consular representative of the state of which such owner is a national, or to the organization which may have been designated by the government of that state. the licence shall not be granted before the expiration of a period of two months from the date of the dispatch of the copies of the application. (d) due provision shall be made by domestic legislation to ensure to the owner of the right of translation a compensation which is just and conforms to international standards, to ensure payment and transmittal of such compensation, and to ensure a correct translation of the work. (e) the original title and the name of the author of the work shall be printed on all copies of the published translation. the licence shall be valid only for publication of the translation in the territory of the contracting state where it has been applied for. copies so published may be imported and sold in another contracting state if a language in general use in such other state is the same language as that into which the work has been so translated, and if the domestic law in such other state makes provision for such licenses and does not prohibit such importation and sale. where the foregoing conditions do not exist, the importation and sale of such copies in a contracting state shall be governed by its domestic law and its agreements. the licence shall not be transferred by the licensee. (f) the licence shall not be granted when the author has withdrawn from circulation all copies of the work. article vbis . any contracting state regarded as a developing country in conformity with the established practice of the general assembly of the united nations may, by a notification deposited with the director-general of the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization (hereinafter called "the director-general") at the time of its ratification, acceptance or accession or thereafter, avail itself of any or all of the exceptions provided for in articles vter and vquater. . any such notification shall be effective for ten years from the date of coming into force of this convention, or for such part of that ten-year period as remains at the date of deposit of the notification, and may be renewed in whole or in part for further periods of ten years each if, not more than fifteen or less than three months before the expiration of the relevant ten-year period, the contracting state deposits a further notification with the director-general. initial notifications may also be made during these further periods of ten years in accordance with the provisions of this article. . notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph , a contracting state that has ceased to be regarded as a developing country as referred to in paragraph shall no longer be entitled to renew its notification made under the provisions of paragraph or , and whether or not it formally withdraws the notification such state shall be precluded from availing itself of the exceptions provided for in articles vter and vquater at the end of the current ten-year period, or at the end of three years after it has ceased to be regarded as a developing country, whichever period expires later. . any copies of a work already made under the exceptions provided for in articles vter and vquater may continue to be distributed after the expiration of the period for which notifications under this article were effective until their stock is exhausted. . any contracting state that has deposited a notification in accordance with article xiii with respect to the application of this convention to a particular country or territory, the situation of which can be regarded as analogous to that of the states referred to in paragraph of this article, may also deposit notifications and renew them in accordance with the provisions of this article with respect to any such country or territory. during the effective period of such notifications, the provisions of articles vter and vquater may be applied with respect to such country or territory. the sending of copies from the country or territory to the contracting state shall be considered as export within the meaning of articles vter and vquater. article vter . (a) any contracting state to which article vbis ( ) applies may substitute for the period of seven years provided for in article v( ) a period of three years or any longer period prescribed by its legislation. however, in the case of a translation into a language not in general use in one or more developed countries that are party to this convention or only the convention, the period shall be one year instead of three. (b) a contracting state to which article vbis ( ) applies may, with the unanimous agreement of the developed countries party to this convention or only the convention and in which the same language is in general use, substitute, in the case of translation into that language, for the period of three years provided for in sub-paragraph (a) another period as determined be such agreement but not shorter than one year. however, this sub-paragraph shall not apply where the language in question is english, french or spanish. notification of any such agreement shall be made to the director-general. (c) the licence may only be granted if the applicant, in accordance with the procedure of the state concerned, establishes either that he has requested, and been denied, authorization by the owner of the right of translation, or that, after due diligence on his part, he was unable to find the owner of the right. at the same time as he makes his request he shall inform either the international copyright information centre established by the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization or any national or regional information centre which may have been designated in a notification to that effect deposited with the director-general by the government of the state in which the publisher is believed to have his principal place of business. (d) if the owner of the right of translation cannot be found, the applicant for a licence shall send, by registered airmail, copies of his application to the publisher whose name appears on the work and to any national or regional information centre as mentioned in sub-paragraph (c). if no such centre is notified he shall also send a copy to the international copyright information centre established by the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization. . (a) licenses obtainable after three years shall not be granted under this article until a further period of six months has elapsed and licenses obtainable after one year until a further period of nine months has elapsed. the further period shall begin either from the date of the request for permission to translate mentioned in paragraph (c) or, if the identity or address of the owner of the right of translation is not known, from the date of dispatch of the copies of the application for a licence mentioned in paragraph (d). (b) licenses shall not be granted if a translation has been published by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization during the said period of six or nine months. . any licence under this article shall be granted only for the purpose of teaching, scholarship or research. . (a) any licence granted under this article shall not extend to the export of copies and shall be valid only for publication in the territory of the contracting state where it has been applied for. (b) any copy published in accordance with a licence granted under this article shall bear a notice in the appropriate language stating that the copy is available for distribution only in the contracting state granting the licence. if the writing bears the notice specified in article iii ( ) the copies shall bear the same notice. (c) the prohibition of export provided for in sub-paragraph (a) shall not apply where a governmental or other public entity of a state which has granted a licence under this article to translate a work into a language other than english, french or spanish sends copies of a translation prepared under such licence to another country if: (i) the recipients are individuals who are nationals of the contracting state granting the licence, or organizations grouping such individuals; (ii) the copies are to be used only for the purpose of teaching, scholarship or research; (iii) the sending of the copies and their subsequent distribution to recipients is without the object of commercial purpose; and (iv) the country to which the copies have been sent has agreed with the contracting state to allow the receipt, distribution or both and the director-general has been notified of such agreement by any one of the governments which have concluded it. . due provision shall be made at the national level to ensure: (a) that the licence provides for just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties normally operating in the case of licenses freely negotiated between persons in the two countries concerned; and (b) payment and transmittal of the compensation; however, should national currency regulations intervene, the competent authority shall make all efforts, by the use of international machinery, to ensure transmittal in internationally convertible currency or its equivalent. . any licence granted by a contracting state under this article shall terminate if a translation of the work in the same language with substantially the same content as the edition in respect of which the licence was granted is published in the said state by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization, at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the same state for comparable works. any copies already made before the licence is terminated may continue to be distributed until their stock is exhausted. . for works which are composed mainly of illustrations a licence to translate the text and to reproduce the illustrations may be granted only if the conditions of article vquater are also fulfilled. . (a) a licence to translate a work protected under this convention, published in printed or analogous forms of reproduction, may also be granted to a broadcasting organization having its headquarters in a contracting state to which article vbis ( ) applies, upon an application made in that state by the said organization under the following conditions: (i) the translation is made from a copy made and acquired in accordance with the laws of the contracting state; (ii) the translation is for use only in broadcasts intended exclusively for teaching or for the dissemination of the results of specialized technical or scientific research to experts in a particular profession; (iii) the translation is used exclusively for the purposes set out in condition (ii), through broadcasts lawfully made which are intended for recipients on the territory of the contracting state, including broadcasts made through the medium of sound or visual recordings lawfully and exclusively made for the purpose of such broadcasts; (iv) sound or visual recordings of the translation may be exchanged only between broadcasting organizations having their headquarters in the contracting state granting the licence; and (v) all uses made of the translation are without any commercial purpose. (b) provided all of the criteria and conditions set out in subparagraph (a) are met, a licence may also be granted to a broadcasting organization to translate any text incorporated in an audio-visual fixation which was itself prepared and published for the sole purpose of being used in connexion with systematic instructional activities. (c) subject to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the other provisions of this article shall apply to the grant and exercise of the licence. . subject to the provisions of this article, any licence granted under this article shall be governed by the provisions of article v, and shall continue to be governed by the provisions of article v and of this article, even after the seven-year period provided for in article v ( ) has expired. however, after the said period has expired, the licensee shall be free to request that the said licence be replaced by a new licence governed exclusively by the provisions of article v. article vquater . any contracting state to which article vbis ( ) applies may adopt the following provisions: (a) if, after the expiration of (i) the relevant period specified in sub-paragraph (c) commencing from the date of first publication of a particular edition of a literary, scientific or artistic work referred to in paragraph , or (ii) any longer period determined by national legislation of the state, copies of such edition have not been distributed in that state to the general public or in connexion with systematic instructional activities at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the state for comparable works, by the owner of the right of reproduction or with his authorization, any national of such state may obtain a non-exclusive licence from the competent authority to publish such edition at that or a lower price for use in connexion with systematic instructional activities. the licence may only be granted if such national, in accordance with the procedure of the state concerned, established either that he has requested, and been denied, authorization by the proprietor of the right to publish such work, or that, after due diligence on his part, he was unable to find the owner of the right. at the same time as he makes his request he shall inform either the international copyright information centre established by the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization or any national or regional information centre referred to in sub-paragraph (d). (b) a licence may also be granted on the same conditions if, for a period of six months, no authorized copies of the edition in question have been on sale in the state concerned to the general public or in connexion with systematic instructional activities at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the state for comparable works. (c) the period referred to in sub-paragraph (a) shall be five years except that: (i) for works of the natural and physical sciences, including mathematics, and of technology, the period shall be three years; (ii) for works of fiction, poetry, drama and music, and for art books, the period shall be seven years. (d) if the owner of the right of reproduction cannot be found, the applicant for a licence shall send, by registered air mail, copies of his application to the publisher whose name appears on the work and to any national or regional information centre identified as such in a notification deposited with the director-general by the state in which the publisher is believed to have his principal place of business. in the absence of any such notification, he shall also send a copy to the international copyright information centre established by the united nations education, scientific and cultural organization. the licence shall not be granted before the expiration of a period of three months from the date of dispatch of the copies of the application. (e) licenses obtainable after three years shall not be granted under this article: (i) until a period of six months has elapsed from the date of the request for permission referred to in sub-paragraph (a) or, if the identity or address of the owner of the right of reproduction is unknown, from the date of the dispatch of the copies of the application for a licence referred to in sub-paragraph (d); (ii) if any such distribution of copies of the edition as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) has taken place during that period. (f) the name of the author and the title of the particular edition of the work shall be printed on all copies of the published reproduction. the licence shall not extend to the export of copies and shall be valid only for publication in the territory of the contracting state where it has been applied for. the licence shall not be transferable by the licensee. (g) due provision shall be made by domestic legislation to ensure an accurate reproduction of the particular edition in question. (h) a licence to reproduce and publish a translation of a work shall not be granted under this article in the following cases: (i) where the translation was not published by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization; (ii) where the translation is not in a language in general use in the state with power to grant the licence. . the exceptions provided for in paragraph are subject to the following additional provisions: (a) any copy published in accordance with a licence granted under this article shall bear a notice in the appropriate language stating that the copy is available for distribution only in the contracting state to which the said licence applies. if the edition bears the notice specified in article iii ( ), the copies shall bear the same notice. (b) due provision shall be made at the national level to ensure: (i) that the licence provides for just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties normally operating in the case licenses freely negotiated between persons in the two countries concerned; and (ii) payment and transmittal of the compensation; however, should national currency regulations intervene, the competent authority shall make all efforts, by the use of international machinery, to ensure transmittal in internationally convertible currency or its equivalent. (c) whenever copies of an edition of a work are distributed in the contracting state to the general public or in connexion with systematic instructional activities, by the owner of the right of reproduction or with his authorization, at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the state for comparable works, any licence granted under this article shall terminate if such edition is in the same language and is substantially the same in content as the edition published under the licence. any copies already made before the licence is terminated may continue to be distributed until their stock is exhausted. (d) no licence shall be granted when the author has withdrawn from circulation all copies of the edition in question. . (a) subject to sub-paragraph (b), the literary, scientific or artistic works to which this article applies shall be limited to works published in printed or analogous forms of reproduction. (b) the provisions of this article shall also apply to reproduction in audio-visual form of lawfully made audio-visual fixations including any protected works incorporated therein and to the translation of any incorporated text into a language in general use in the state with power to grant the licence; always provided that the audio-visual fixations in question were prepared and published for the sole purpose of being used in connexion with systematic instructional activities. article vi "publication", as used in this convention, means the reproduction in tangible form and the general distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it can be read or otherwise visually perceived. article vii this convention shall not apply to works or rights in works which, at the effective date of this convention in a contracting state where protection is claimed, are permanently in the public domain in the said contracting state. article viii . this convention, which shall bear the date of july , shall be deposited with the director-general and shall remain open for signature by all states party to the convention for a period of days after the date of this convention. it shall be subject to ratification or acceptance by the signatory states. . any state which has not signed this convention may accede thereto. . ratification, acceptance or accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument to that effect with the director-general. article ix . this convention shall come into force three months after the deposit of twelve instruments of ratification, acceptance or accession. . subsequently, this convention shall come into force in respect of each state three months after that state has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession. . accession to this convention by a state not party to the convention shall also constitute accession to that convention; however, if its instrument of accession is deposited before this convention comes into force, such state may make its accession to the convention conditional upon the coming into force of this convention. after the coming into force of this convention, no state may accede solely to the convention. . relations between states party to this convention and states that are party only to the convention, shall be governed by the convention. however, any state party only to the convention may, by a notification deposited with the director-general, declare that it will admit the application of the convention to works of its nationals or works first published in its territory by all states party to this convention. article x . each contracting state undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, such measures as are necessary to ensure the application of this convention. . it is understood that at the date this convention comes into force in respect of any state, that state must be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the terms of this convention. article xi . an intergovernmental committee is hereby established with the following duties: (a) to study the problems concerning the application and operation of the universal copyright convention; (b) to make preparation for periodic revisions of this convention; (c) to study any other problems concerning the international protection of copyright, in co-operation with the various interested international organizations, such as the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization, the international union for the protection of literary and artistic works and the organization of american states; (d) to inform states party to the universal copyright convention as to its activities. . the committee shall consist of the representatives of eighteen states party to this convention or only to the convention. . the committee shall be selected with due consideration to a fair balance of national interests on the basis of geographical location, population, languages and stage of development. . the director-general of the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization, the director-general of the world intellectual property organization and the secretary-general of the organization of american states, or their representatives, may attend meetings of the committee in an advisory capacity. article xii the intergovernmental committee shall convene a conference for revision whenever it deems necessary, or at the request of at least ten states party to this convention. article xiii . any contracting state may, at the time of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession, or at any time thereafter, declare by notification addressed to the director-general that this convention shall apply to all or any of the countries or territories for the international relations of which it is responsible and this convention shall thereupon apply to the countries or territories named in such notification after the expiration of the term of three months provided for in article ix. in the absence of such notification, this convention shall not apply to any such country or territory. . however, nothing in this article shall be understood as implying the recognition or tacit acceptance by a contracting state of the factual situation concerning a country or territory to which this convention is made applicable by another contracting state in accordance with the provisions of this article. article xiv . any contracting state may denounce this convention in its own name or on behalf of all or any of the countries or territories with respect to which a notification has been given under article xiii. the denunciation shall be made by notification addressed to the director-general. such denunciation shall also constitute denunciation of the convention. . such denunciation shall operate only in respect of the state or of the country or territory on whose behalf it was made and shall not take effect until twelve months after the date of receipt of the notification. article xv a dispute between two or more contracting states concerning the interpretation or application of this convention, not settled by negotiation, shall, unless the states concerned agree on some other method of settlement, be brought before the international court of justice for determination by it. article xvi . this convention shall be established in english, french, and spanish. the three texts shall be signed and shall be equally authoritative. . official texts of this convention shall be established by the director-general, after consultation with the governments concerned, in arabic, german, italian, and portuguese. . any contracting state or group of contracting states shall be entitled to have established by the director-general other texts in the language of its choice by arrangement with the director-general. . all such texts shall be annexed to the signed texts of this convention. article xvii . this convention shall not in any way affect the provisions of the berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works or membership in the union created by that convention. . in application of the foregoing paragraph, a declaration has been annexed to the present article. this declaration is an integral part of this convention for the states bound by the berne convention on january , or which have or may become bound to it at a later date. the signature of this convention by such states shall also constitute signature of the said declaration, and ratification, acceptance or accession by such states shall include the declaration, as well as this convention. article xviii this convention shall not abrogate multilateral or bilateral copyright conventions or arrangements that are or may be in effect exclusively between two or more american republics. in the event of any difference either between the provisions of such existing conventions or arrangements and the provisions of this convention, or between the provisions of this convention and those of any new convention or arrangement which may be formulated between two or more american republics after this convention comes into force, the convention or arrangement most recently formulated shall prevail between the parties thereto. rights in works acquired in any contracting state under existing conventions or arrangements before the date this convention comes into force in such state shall not be affected. article xix this convention shall not abrogate multilateral or bilateral conventions or arrangements in effect between two or more contracting states. in the event of any difference between the provisions of such existing conventions or arrangements and the provisions of this convention, the provisions of this convention shall prevail. rights in works acquired in any contracting state under existing conventions or arrangements before the date on which this convention comes into force in such state shall not be affected. nothing in this article shall affect the provisions of articles xvii and xviii. article xx reservations to this convention shall not be permitted. article xxi . the director-general shall send duly certified copies of this convention to the states interested and to the secretary-general of the united nations for registration by him. . he shall also inform all interested states of the ratifications, acceptances, accessions which have been deposited, the date on which this convention comes into force, the notifications under this convention and denunciations under article xiv. appendix declaration relating to article xvii the states which are members of the international union for the protection of literary and artistic works (hereinafter called "the berne union") and which are signatories of this convention, desiring to reinforce their mutual relations on the basis of the said union and to avoid any conflict which might result from the coexistence of the berne convention and the universal copyright convention, recognizing the temporary need of some states to adjust their level of copyright protection in accordance with their stage of cultural, social and economic development, have, by common agreement, accepted the terms of the following declaration: (a) except as provided by paragraph (b), works which, according to the berne convention, have as their country of origin a country which has withdrawn from the berne union after january , shall not be protected by the universal copyright convention in the countries of the berne union; (b) where a contracting state is regarded as a developing country in conformity with the established practice of the general assembly of the united nations, and has deposited with the director-general of the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization, at the time of its withdrawal from the berne union, a notification to the effect that it regards itself as a developing country, the provisions of paragraph (a) shall not be applicable as long as such state may avail itself of the exceptions provided for by this convention in accordance with article vbis; (c) the universal copyright convention shall not be applicable to the relationships among countries of the berne union in so far as it relates to the protection of works having as their country of origin, within the meaning of the berne convention, a country of the berne union. resolution concerning article xi the conference for revision of the universal copyright convention, having considered the problems relating to the intergovernmental committee provided for in article xi of this convention, to which this resolution is annexed, resolves that: . at its inception, the committee shall include representative of the twelve states members of the intergovernmental committee established under article xi of the convention and the resolution annexed to it, and, in addition, representatives of the following states: algeria, australia, japan, mexico, senegal and yugoslavia. . any states that are not party to the convention and have not acceded to this convention before the first ordinary session of the committee following the entry into force of this convention shall be replaced by other states to be selected by the committee at its first ordinary session in conformity with the provisions of article xi ( ) and ( ). . as soon as this convention comes into force the committee as provided for in paragraph shall be deemed to be constituted in accordance with article xi of this convention. . a session of the committee shall take place with one year after the coming into force of this convention; thereafter the committee shall meet in ordinary session at intervals of not more than two years. . the committee shall elect its chairman and two vice-chairmen. it shall establish its rules of procedure having regard to the following principles: (a) the normal duration of the term of office of the members represented on the committee shall be six years with one-third retiring every two years, it being however understood that, of the original terms of office, one-third shall expire at the end of the committee's second ordinary session which will follow the entry into force of this convention, a further third at the end of its third ordinary session, and the remaining third at the end of its fourth ordinary session. (b) the rules governing the procedure whereby the committee shall fill vacancies, the order in which terms of membership expire, eligibility for reelection, and election procedures, shall be based upon a balancing of the needs for continuity of membership and rotation of representation, as well as the considerations set out in article xi ( ). expresses the wish that the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization provide its secretariat. in faith whereof the undersigned, having deposited their respective full powers, have signed this convention. done at paris, this twenty-fourth day of july , in a single copy. protocol annexed to the universal copyright convention as revised at paris on july concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees the states party hereto, being also party to the universal copyright convention as revised at paris on july (hereinafter called "the convention"), have accepted the following provisions: . stateless persons and refugees who have their habitual residence in a state party to this protocol shall, for the purposes of the convention, be assimilated to the nationals of that state. . (a) this protocol shall be signed and shall be subject to ratification or acceptance, or may be acceded to, as if the provisions of article viii of the convention applied hereto. (b) this protocol shall enter into force in respect of each state, on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession of the state concerned or on the date of entry into force of the convention with respect to such state, whichever is the later. (c) on the entry into force of this protocol in respect of a state not party to protocol annexed to the convention, the latter protocol shall be deemed to enter into force in respect of such state. in faith whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this protocol. done at paris this twenty-fourth day of july , in the english, french and spanish languages, the three texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the director-general of the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization. the director-general shall send certified copies to the signatory states, and to the secretary-general of the united nations for registration. protocol annexed to the universal copyright convention as revised at paris on july concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations the states party hereto, being also party to the universal copyright convention as revised at paris on july (hereinafter called "the convention"), have accepted the following provisions: . (a) the protection provided for in article ii ( ) of the convention shall apply to works published for the first time by the united nations by the specialized agencies in relationship therewith, or by the organization of american states. (b) similarly, article ii ( ) of the convention shall apply to the said organization or agencies. . (a) this protocol shall be signed and shall be subject to ratification or acceptance, or may be acceded to, as if the provisions of article viii of the convention applied hereto. (b) this protocol shall enter into force for each state on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession of the state concerned or on the date of entry into force of the convention with respect to such state, whichever is the later. in faith whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this protocol. done at paris, this twenty-fourth day of july , in the english, french and spanish languages, the three texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the director-general of the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization. the director-general shall send certified copies to the signatory states, and to the secretary-general of the united nations for registration. certified a true and complete copy of the original of the universal copyright convention as revised at paris on july , of the protocol annexed to the universal copyright convention as revised at paris on july concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees and of the protocol annexed to the universal copyright convention as revised at paris on july concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. paris, . . claude lussier. director, office of international standards and legal affairs, united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization. proofreaders neutral rights and obligations in the anglo-boer war by robert granville campbell preface. this essay is the outgrowth of work done in the political science seminary of the johns hopkins university and is a portion of a larger study dealing with the causes of the anglo-boer war and the questions of international law arising during that conflict. at the beginning of the war the english government was inclined to view the contest as one which would not make it necessary to call into operation the neutrality laws of third parties. it was soon realized, however, that the condition of insurgency was not broad enough to sustain the relations between the two governments. toward the close of november great britain's declaration with a retroactive effect put the contest upon a distinctly belligerent basis and accepted the date of the transvaal's ultimatum, p.m., october , , as the commencement of the war. other powers which had awaited this announcement with some anxiety at once declared their attitude toward the war. among the first to assume this neutral position was the united states with the announcement that its attitude would be in accordance with the requirements of the strictest neutrality. it is the purpose of the first chapter to inquire how far these obligations were fulfilled by the united states government, and in the second chapter the attitude of european governments is considered. in the third chapter the rights and obligations of belligerents and neutrals are discussed with regard to neutral commerce. under this topic the wide divergence of english practice from continental as well as from american opinion on points of international law cannot fail to be noticed. the chief sources of information used in the preparation of the present paper have been the british blue books; the foreign relations of the united states; the house and senate documents not included in the foreign relations; the congressional record, debates in congress, resolutions and reports in answer to requests for information. other sources and authorities are indicated in the footnotes. i wish to express my gratitude to dr. w.w. willoughby, not only for his careful criticism of this study during its preparation, and for the helpful suggestions by which he has attempted to correct some of its obvious deficiencies, but especially for his kindly inspiration at all times. contents. preface chapter i. the neutrality of the united states chapter ii. the neutrality of european powers chapter iii. contraband of war and neutral ports chapter iv. trading with the enemy chapter i. the neutrality of the united states. the neutral attitude assumed by the united states was maintained throughout the war. with reference to any official recognition of the transvaal as an independent state apart from the immediate purposes of war no action was taken. this view of the situation in south africa was entirely consistent with the requirements of international law, and, in carrying out the obligations of a neutral to the belligerents, the governmental position was fully justified by a knowledge of the relations which had existed between the transvaal and great britain in the past. early in october, before war had actually begun, it was understood that mr. pierce, the orange free state consul-general in new york, had made every effort to induce president mckinley to request other nations to act with the united states as arbitrators in the dispute between the governments of the transvaal and great britain, but the close friendship existing between england and the united states and the very friendly attitude assumed by great britain during the spanish-american war made such action impossible. the state department at washington announced that in the event of war the government would maintain an absolutely neutral attitude, and issued instructions early in october to all american consuls in south africa directing them to secure protection for all neutrals of the united states who had not affiliated politically with either great britain or the south african republics, either by exercising the franchise or otherwise. while those whom this definition did not cover were not to be directly under the protection of the united states, the state department expressed itself as ready to use its good offices in their behalf in case they were involved in trouble resulting from the war. such had been the position of the department in the case of mr. john hays hammond, a citizen of the united states who had been involved in the jameson raid, although he had taken part in an expedition which was not officially approved by great britain and which was hostile to a government with which the united states had no quarrel.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , pp. - .] on october , the day before the transvaal ultimatum was presented to great britain, the british ambassador in washington confidentially inquired whether in the event of an attack upon the english forces by the boers, rendering necessary the withdrawal of the british agent, the united states would allow its consul to take charge of the british interests in the transvaal.[ ] consent was very properly given on the eleventh that the united states would gladly allow its consul at pretoria "to afford to british interests in that quarter friendly and neutral protective offices."[ ] on the thirteenth this courtesy was acknowledged and the information given that the british agent had withdrawn. on the same day mr. mccrum was instructed, "with the assent of the south african republic, to afford to british interests the friendly protective offices usual in such contingencies."[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. , tower to hay, oct. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. , hill to tower, oct. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. , tower to hill, and adee to tower, oct. , .] having thus assumed an attitude entirely in accord with the obligations incumbent upon a neutral, the united states refused to heed the popular demand to urge upon great britain its offices as mediator in a matter which directly concerned the british colonial policy. secretary hay properly refused to involve the administration in the complications which would have followed any official interrogation addressed to the british government with reference to its ultimate intentions in south africa. moreover, it was authoritatively stated that any concerted european intervention would not meet with favor in washington, as such action would only tend to disturb general commercial relations by embroiling most of the nations of the world. any attempted intervention would certainly have led to a conflict of the powers, and would have involved questions of national supremacy, disturbed the balance of power, and raised the chinese question, in which last the united states had an important interest. it was a sound policy therefore upon the part of the united states not to encourage any intervention by european nations in the affairs of great britain in south africa. this attitude not only reciprocated the friendly feeling shown by england during the spanish-american war, but was in strict accord with the traditional american policy enunciated by washington. the acquisition of the philippines had only served to exemplify the soundness of this doctrine, and the state department was not in a mood to take the initial steps which might lead to added responsibilities with reference to matters which, in this instance at any rate, were not directly of american concern. the part to be played by the united states was clearly that of an impartial neutral. in his message to congress in president mckinley stated that he was happy to say that abundant opportunity had been afforded in the situation at pretoria to permit the united states consul there to show the impartiality of the government toward both the combatants. developments, however, were to show that things had not gone so smoothly there as was supposed at the time. on december the president had appointed mr. adelbert hay, son of the secretary of state, to succeed mr. mccrum in his position as consul and instructions were sent to him to proceed at once to pretoria. mr. hollis, the american consul at lorenzo marques, was directed at the same time to act _ad interim_ at pretoria after the departure of mr. mccrum and until mr. hay could reach south africa. on december mr. hollis took charge of all british and american interests within the transvaal while still keeping an oversight of the affairs of the united states in and around lorenzo marques. soon after the war had begun mr. mccrum had reported to washington, in reply to inquiries with reference to the british prisoners in the hands of the boers, that it was the wish of the republican government that in the future all requests for the payment of money to officers or other prisoners, as well as inquiries regarding their welfare, should come through the regular military channels at the front. the republic at the same time intimated that it could no longer recognize mr. mccrum in any official capacity on behalf of great britain.[ ] the british representative at once suggested that the united states consul be instructed to point out to the transvaal that such an attitude was a departure from the usual practice in not permitting the american government to use its friendly good offices on behalf of the english prisoners of war. lord salisbury called attention to the fact that during the crimean war "moneys" for the british prisoners in russia were distributed through the danish representatives in st. petersburg and london; and that during the franco-prussian war such small sums of money were handed to the french prisoners in germany through the british foreign office. it was understood as a matter of course that reciprocal privileges would be extended to the boer prisoners in the hands of the english commanders.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. , hay to pauncefote, nov. , .] [footnote : ibid., p. , hay to pauncefote, nov. , .] mr. mccrum, following instructions from his government, had placed the english view of the situation before the transvaal authorities before he left pretoria, and had called their attention to the fact that for them to permit the charitable and humane intervention of the united states consul under the circumstances was the regular course in time of war.[ ] but not until mr. hollis reached pretoria was the attitude of the republic explained. he inquired of the secretary of state as well as of the secretary for foreign affairs with reference to the attitude he would be allowed to assume toward british interests; to what extent he might act on behalf of british prisoners of war in the transvaal and orange free state; and how far he might exercise the usual consular functions on behalf of great britain during the war. [footnote : for. rel., , p. , hay to pauncefote, nov. , , and hay to pauncefote, apl. , .] the report was made to washington "from many official and consular sources that the late british agent at this capital [presumably mr. green] was always a thorn in the side of this government, and that he is, in part, responsible for this present war."[ ] it was pointed out that since this was the attitude of the republican government there existed at pretoria a decided aversion to the recognition of any one who might claim to act as a british agent. the transvaal secretary of state expressed himself emphatically upon the point: "we got rid of the british agent on the eleventh of october last, and god willing, we will never have another one here."[ ] mr. reitz even went so far as to express the confident hope that at the close of the war a british minister and british consuls would reside at pretoria, but he was positive upon the question of receiving any one who was known as an agent of great britain. no one who assumed this relation toward the english government would be acceptable to the transvaal and orange free state. [footnote : for. rel., , p. , hollis to hill, feb. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. , hollis to hill, feb. , .] the attitude which the republic alleged it had been willing and was ready to assume was an unwillingness to recognize the consul of the united states or any other consular officer as the official representative of the british government during the war; an objection to the transmission of the official communications of the english government to that of the south african republic, or of the official despatches of the english government addressed to the british prisoners in the hands of the transvaal, or of "moneys" or funds sent by the british government to the english prisoners of war. on the other hand the transvaal authorities were not unwilling to allow the united states consul at pretoria to perform certain enumerated services in behalf of all british prisoners of war and their friends. no objection was made to the forwarding of letters and papers sent by friends to the prisoners, and, under the supervision of the war office of the transvaal, the republic expressed itself willing to permit the distribution of funds sent to the english prisoners by their friends at home. but it was understood that such services would be reciprocal, and that the republic would have the right to request similar services of the american consular officers on behalf of the boer and afrikander prisoners in the english possessions. the right was reserved to revoke any and all privileges to receive letters, papers, parcels and money, which were enjoyed by british prisoners in the transvaal, should the fact be sufficiently proved that boer or afrikander prisoners in the hands of the english authorities were not receiving kind and humane treatment, or were being denied privileges similar to those enjoyed by british prisoners in the republic. all concessions on the part of the transvaal government would be instantly revoked on these grounds as sufficient reason and cause for such action. the republican government asserted that this had been the attitude in accordance with which it had acted from the commencement of the war.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , pp. - , hollis to reitz, jan. , , and reitz to hollis, feb. , .] with reference to the recall of the american consul and the appointment of mr. adelbert hay, it appears that there had been a certain amount of friction between mr. mccrum and the english censor at durban concerning the consular mails. in connection with this incident, and a little unwisely it would seem, mr. mccrum had reported unofficially that his mail had been tampered with by the censor and had been forwarded to him only after colonel stowe, the american consul-general at cape town, had secured its release. he asserted: "i had the humiliation, as the representative of the american government, of sitting in my office in pretoria and looking upon envelopes bearing the official seal of the american government, opened and officially sealed with stickers, notifying me that the contents had been read by the censor at durban." and he continues, "when i accepted my post as consul i knew nothing of any secret alliance between america and great britain."[ ] these charges brought forth in the house of representatives a resolution which called upon the president to furnish information as to whether the consul's mail had been opened and read by the british censor and, if so, what steps had been taken in the matter. information was also asked as to what truth there was in the statement that a secret alliance existed between the "republic of the united states and the empire of great britain."[ ] [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess.] [footnote : h. res. , cong., sess.; also h. res. .] in response the president reported through the secretary of state that the department had been in regular communication by mail and telegraph with charles e. mccrum, late consul at pretoria, since his entrance upon the duties of the office. communications made to him had been answered by him. his despatches forwarded through the consulate at lorenzo marques had been regularly received during his incumbency in office. it was pointed out that the only instance of complaint had been in november, when a temporary stoppage of the mails had occurred at cape town, against which both mr. mccrum and the consul at lorenzo marques had protested. but arrangements had been then made for the prompt delivery of all the consular mails to the united states consulate at cape town by which they were forwarded to the consul at lorenzo marques and thence to pretoria. the delay had continued only a few days and the difficulty had not occurred again. it was pointed out also that this arrangement had been made known to both mr. mccrum and mr. hollis as early as november , and that no obstacle had since existed to prevent the unhampered correspondence from pretoria to washington. moreover, the secretary of state asserted that mr. mccrum had not officially reported "any instance of violation, by opening or otherwise, of his official mail by the british censor at durban, or any person or persons whatsoever, there or elsewhere;"[ ] he had not so reported since he left pretoria, although ample opportunity was afforded him to do so by mail or in person when he reported to the department on his return. [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess.] in regard to the second charge made by mr. mccrum it seemed hardly necessary to say that there was no truth in the statement that a secret alliance existed between great britain and the united states; that no form of secret alliance was possible under the constitution since all treaties required the advice and consent of the senate. mr. hay concluded, however, by emphatically assuring the members of congress that "no secret alliance, convention, arrangement, or understanding exists between the united states and any other nation."[ ] [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess.] mr. mccrum later appeared before the committee on foreign affairs in the house of representatives and stated his side of the case. he declared that while at pretoria he had _understood_ that the british government was in possession of the united states cable ciphers but he was unable to affirm this from personal knowledge. he based his belief, he said, upon the fact that when on november he had cabled by way of durban to the department asking for leave of absence the incident had been reported to have been published in a durban paper on the following day, although he had cabled in cipher. he was not able to say, however, whether the fact of his desiring leave was actually published on november , as he had not seen the paper, but had heard that the fact had been published. he asserted that the first actual evidence of the opening of his mail was in the case of two opened letters reaching him, but he admitted that he had not reported the matter to the department. when mr. hay mentioned the matter to sir julian pauncefote, the british ambassador in washington, the english government replied that it had no knowledge of the incident, and gave the assurance that if it had occurred it had been contrary to instructions. colonel stowe later informed mr. hay that two letters from the consulate at cape town, one for pretoria, the other for lorenzo marques, had been opened by the censor at durban, but that sir alfred milner, the british high commissioner, had afterward offered a very satisfactory apology. in view of these facts the committee of the house, before which mr. mccrum appeared, made no report, and when mr. adelbert hay reported that he had failed to find on the files of the consulate any evidence of the official mail having been tampered with, the incident was considered closed. mr. hay declared that as far as he could ascertain, no interference had occurred in the communication, either telegraphic or postal, between the state department and the consulate.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. , hay to pauncefote, apr. , .] the new consul at pretoria also reported that everything was as satisfactory as could be expected under the circumstances of war, and his official intercourse with the transvaal government afterwards fully justified this assertion. the republics displayed a proper attitude toward the consulate not only as representing american interests, but as representing great britain during the course of hostilities. every facility was afforded the american consul for performing his duties. for the efficient service he had rendered in connection with the british prisoners he was publicly thanked by the british high commissioner, who expressed the feeling of gratitude which he said existed throughout the british empire for the good work which had been performed by both mr. hay and colonel stowe, the latter at cape town. while enforcing the obligations of a neutral state by an attitude of strict impartiality toward both belligerents, the united states was not inclined to allow popular sympathy for the boers to lead to complications with foreign nations over a matter with which it was only remotely concerned. this position was known to the envoys of the transvaal and orange free state before they left pretoria. ample opportunity to realize the situation had been afforded them before they left europe for america after an unsuccessful tour of the capitals of the continent. nevertheless, they determined to appeal to the united states, and with this purpose in view arrived in washington on may , . a resolution introduced in the senate by mr. allen of nebraska on may , which would have extended the privilege of the floor to them, was laid on the table,[ ] a decision the wisdom of which is unquestionable. the senate stands before the world as an important part of the treaty-making power of the united states. such a privilege, if extended to the mission, could have meant nothing to foreign powers but an official reception to the envoys of a government which was not recognized as legitimate by its former conventional suzerain. it was not the part of the senate to inquire into the substance of the past relations between great britain and the transvaal. especially was this true since the governmental position had been declared early in the war and nothing had occurred to warrant any alteration in that position. this was the view which president mckinley took of the situation, and the policy of dealing with the problem was that of the strictest neutrality. [footnote : cong., sess., record, pp. , - .] on may it was officially announced that the delegates had called by appointment at the state department. the notice given out to the press read: "they were cordially received and remained with the secretary of state for more than an hour. they laid before the secretary at much length and with great energy and eloquence the merits of the controversy in south africa and the desire of the boer republics that the united states should intervene in the interests of peace and use its influence to that end with the british government."[ ] the ambition of the envoys on leaving the transvaal for europe had been "for the purpose of seeking recognition and intervention," but the success of their mission at washington was not to be greater than it had been in european capitals. although mr. hay received them courteously their competence to treat directly with the state department was not recognized. when they realized this fact they appealed directly to the people in the hope of bringing a certain amount of pressure to bear upon the president from that source. he fully realized, however, that under the circumstances no interference was advisable. a departure from this policy would have created a precedent which might later have been appealed to by any european government in behalf of its subjects in this country. as presidential candidate, however, william j. bryan, in effect, if not in express terms, promised a mediation that would mean something should the democrats come into power, and it was hopes created by such utterances which encouraged the boers to believe that intervention on the part of the united states was a possibility. even the senate passed resolutions of sympathy which only held out a vain hope and naturally caused a certain amount of criticism in england. in the end, however, the envoys became convinced that nothing was to be hoped for in the way of dictatorial interference by the united states. [footnote : moore, digest of int. law, vol. i, p. ] in his message to congress, in , three months after the war began, president mckinley had been able to declare: "this government has maintained an attitude of neutrality in the unfortunate contest between great britain and the boer states of africa. we have remained faithful to the precept of avoiding entangling alliances as to affairs not of our direct concern. had circumstances suggested that the parties to the quarrel would have welcomed any kindly expression of the hope of the american people that war might be averted, good offices would have been gladly tendered." and in may, , after the interview with the transvaal delegation, mr. hay gave out a statement through his secretary in which it was declared that this entirely correct neutral attitude had been strictly adhered to: "as the war went on the president, while regretting the suffering and the sacrifices endured by both of the combatants, could do nothing but preserve a strict neutrality between them. this has been steadfastly and constantly done, but there never has been a moment when he would have neglected any favorable occasion to use his good offices in the interest of peace."[ ] mr. hay also pointed to the fact that on march , , at the request of the republics, the united states consul at pretoria had communicated with his government with a view to the cessation of hostilities, and that the same proposal was made to european powers through their respective consuls. [footnote : moore, digest of int. law, vol. vii, p. .] the request of the transvaal was at once despatched to london, and the earnest hope was expressed by the president that a way might be found to bring about peace, with the intimation that he "would be glad to aid in any friendly manner to promote so happy a result." the transvaal was promptly informed of this action and the united states representative in london communicated the president's instructions to lord salisbury. in answer he was requested to "thank the president for the friendly interest shown by him," but it was unmistakably declared that "her majesty's government could not accept the intervention of any power."[ ] this reply was communicated to pretoria, and no further steps were taken, since any insistence upon the part of the united states would have been an unfriendly act. [footnote : moore, digest of int. law, vol. vii, p. .] in justification of the action of the president, in view of the popular feeling that more urgent pressure might have been used to cause the cessation of hostilities, secretary hay clearly showed that the united states government was the only one of all those approached by the republics which had even tendered its good offices in the interest of peace. he called attention to the fact that despite the popular clamor to the contrary the action of the government was fully in accord with the provisions of the hague conference and went as far as that convention warranted. a portion of article iii of that instrument declares: "powers, strangers to the dispute, may have the right to offer good offices or mediation, even during the course of hostilities," but article v asserts, "the functions of the mediator are at an end when once it is declared either by one of the parties to the dispute or by the mediator, himself, that the means of conciliation proposed by him are not accepted."[ ] obviously any further action on the part of the united states was not required under the circumstances, and secretary hay seems fully justified in his statement that "the steps taken by the president in his earnest desire to see an end to the strife which caused so much suffering may already be said to have gone to the extreme limit permitted to him." moreover, had the president preferred not to present to great britain the republic's request for good offices, his action could have been justified by the conditions under which the representatives of the united states at the hague signed that convention. at that time the express declaration was made that "nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the united states of america to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself with questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state."[ ] [footnote : moore, digest of int. law, vol. vii, p. .] [footnote : moore, digest of int. law, vol. vii, p. .] the final utterance of the president in regard to the mission of the boers was the conclusive statement made through secretary hay: "the president sympathizes heartily in the desire of all the people of the united states that the war ... may, for the sake of both parties engaged, come to a speedy close; but having done his full duty in preserving a strictly neutral position between them and in seizing the first opportunity that presented itself for tendering his good offices in the interests of peace, he feels that in the present circumstances no course is open to him except to persist in the policy of impartial neutrality. to deviate from this would be contrary to all our traditions and all our national interests, and would lead to consequences which neither the president nor the people of the united states could regard with favor."[ ] [footnote : moore, digest of int. law, vol. vii, p. .] the attitude of the united states in the immediate vicinity of the war as well as the manner in which the envoys of the transvaal were received in washington rendered criticism impossible with reference to the fulfilment of the obligations of a neutral state. but serious charges were repeatedly made by the transvaal sympathizers with reference to the use to which american ports and waters were put by british vessels or british-leased transports plying between the united states and south africa. it was alleged that great britain was able to create here a base of warlike supplies, and thus to obtain material aid in her operations against the boer forces. the probability of the truth of the transvaal's allegations would seem at first thought to be slight considering the distance of the scene of war from the coasts of the united states, but upon closer inspection these charges become more worthy of belief. that warlike supplies were actually transported from at least one of the ports of the united states under such a systematic scheme as to constitute a base of hostile supplies for the english forces in south africa, would seem to be established. individual commercial transactions with belligerents always occur, and it is not the part of neutral governments to assume responsibility for all such transactions, but the principles of the international law of the present day do require all neutral states to see to it that their respective territories are not made bases for hostile operations. a few minor incidents showed that the obligations of neutrality would be enforced by the united states when it became apparent to the government that the neutrality laws were being evaded. in cincinnati a frenchman giving his name as pierrot was summoned before the united states attorney on a charge of a violation of neutral restrictions. he had been known, it seems, as a recruiting officer for the transvaal government, but avowed that he had engaged men only for the boer hospital corps and not for the army of the republics. the warning that he must cease enlisting men even for this branch of the republican service proved sufficient in this case, but undoubtedly such recruiting on a small scale continued to evade detection. later, the new york courts restrained the steamer _bermuda_ from leaving the port upon the application of a british subject, who alleged that he had been informed that the _bermuda_ was carrying contraband to the transvaal. after a detention of five days the ship was allowed to sail because it was not shown that the allegation had any foundation in fact. toward the close of november, , a charge of a more serious nature was made. it was reported that a british remount establishment was operating in the united states and had just purchased fifty thousand horses and mules for the british forces in south africa, and considerable attention to this alleged violation of neutral obligations was drawn by that portion of the press which was in sympathy with the boers. a resolution was adopted by the house of representatives calling upon the president to furnish information "whether our ports or waters had been used for the exportation of horses, mules, and other supplies for use in south africa, and if so, to what extent and what steps had been taken to prevent such a use being made of neutral territory in time of war."[ ] the request was also made that full information be furnished with reference to the number of horses and mules which had been cleared from the ports of the united states since the beginning of the war, with a detailed statement of the shipments from each port and the dates of such clearances. [footnote : h. res. , , cong., sess., feb. , .] the reply submitted to congress was that the ports of the united states had been used for the exportation of horses and mules and other supplies for use in south africa; that between october, , and january , , the value of such shipments had amounted to $ , , ; that no steps had been taken to prevent the "lawful exportation of horses, mules, and other supplies to south africa;" and that the number of horses and mules shipped from the ports of the united states during this period had been , . it was not practicable, it was asserted, to give the shipments from each port and the dates of such shipments without examining the copies of the manifests of each vessel that had cleared for south africa. such an examination and compilation could not be presented to congress before its adjournment, although copies of the clearance papers were filed with the collectors of the customs at the different ports of the country.[ ] [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess.] in the same report it was shown that of the entire exports to south africa during this period a large proportion had been of warlike supplies, if horses and mules for army purposes can be considered warlike in character; , horses valued at $ , , ; , mules valued at $ , , . gunpowder to the value of $ had also been exported; other explosives to the value of $ , and firearms valued at $ , in all $ , , worth of such supplies exported to one or both of the belligerents in south africa. possibly the larger proportion of the gunpowder, other explosives, and firearms was run into the transvaal by way of delagoa bay as contraband under the usual risks, or was used for purposes apart from the war, but with reference to the supplies for the british army it would seem that a very free use was made of the ports and waters of the united states. one reason why the english government was able to supply its armies in south africa with horses and mules in such large numbers may have been the fact that a better market supply existed in this country, but it is more probable that the evasion of the strictest neutral requirements was easier here than elsewhere. the distance from the scene of war, although it involved an additional cost for transportation, also rendered an evasion of the requirements of neutrality less conspicuous. the supply of horses and mules in the european market was scant, especially in the class of animals which was needed, but it seems obvious that the motive which actuated the purchases was rather the greater ease in evading neutral prohibitions than the desire to secure a better market at a distance of ten thousand miles from the seat of war. possibly both motives actuated the purchases, but it is nevertheless true that the united states ports were used to a far greater extent than those of any other neutral government. the last statement is borne out by the report of the royal commission on the war in south africa, which shows that from november, , to june, , inclusive, no fewer than , horses and mules were shipped from the ports of the united states for the british forces in south africa, aggregating a total cost to great britain of approximately $ , , . the entire cost in the united states and elsewhere for such purchases at the end of july, , amounted to $ , , in round numbers. the entire cost incurred within the united states was greater than that incurred in any other country. in hungary the cost to great britain for horses and mules was $ , , ; in spain $ , , ; in italy $ , ; in the argentine republic, the british colonies and elsewhere, $ , , .[ ] [footnote : sessional papers of the house of commons, c. ( ), p. .] in view of this undoubted use of the ports and waters of the united states by one of the belligerents in a war toward which a neutral attitude had been declared, it may be inquired how far the condition of affairs was known to the administration and what opportunity there was for executive action, especially with reference to the allegation made by the transvaal that the port of new orleans was used as a base of warlike supplies for the british forces. on april , , a resolution of the house of representatives called upon the president for copies of "any report and communication of the governor of louisiana, together with all accompanying affidavits, documents and communications concerning the shipments of horses, mules, and other supplies from louisiana to the seat of war in south africa."[ ] in response a report of secretary hay disclosed the fact that on february , , a certain samuel pearson had appealed to the president against the use to which great britain had been allowed to put the ports of the united states in supplying her armies in south africa. pearson had affirmed that "the port of new orleans was being made the basis of military operations and the port and waters for the purpose of the renewal and augmentation of military supplies for the british army." he further alleged that the attention of the courts had been called to the matter and the united states circuit court for the eastern district of louisiana had declared that the case was not within the cognizance of the court since the matter could be taken up only by the executive branch of the government.[ ] in making his plea directly to the president, pearson asserted that at the port of chalmette, a few miles below new orleans, a british post had been established; that men and soldiers had been assembled there and were daily engaged in warlike operations not only for the renewal and augmentation of military supplies, but for the recruitment of men. he alleged that no concealment was made of the facts as he had stated them; that although the english officers did not appear in uniform war was actually being carried on in behalf of the british government from the territory of the united states. he concluded: "with every respect for the authority of the united states government, may i not consider your silence or inaction the equivalent of consent for me to stop the further violation of the neutrality laws of this port, or to carry on war here for the burghers."[ ] [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess., p. .] [footnote : pearson _v_. parson, fed. rep. .] [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess., p. .] the president referred the matter to the mayor of new orleans with the intimation that a breach of the peace was threatened. the mayor shifted the responsibility to the governor of the state on the ground that the acts complained of were alleged to have been committed in the parish of st. bernard and consequently outside the jurisdiction of the city authorities. finally, under the orders of the governor the sheriff of st. bernard parish made an investigation and reported that pearson's statements had been incorrect in a number of points.[ ] it was admitted that mules and horses had been and were then being loaded at port chalmette for the british government either directly or indirectly; that the operation was being carried out by local men all of whom were citizens of the united states; that the work was being supervised by englishmen who might or might not be officers of the british army, although none of them wore the uniform of great britain. but the sheriff positively asserted that a british post with men and soldiers was not established at the port; that no recruiting of men was taking place within the parish; that the only men taken on the ships were muleteers who were employed in the city of new orleans by the contractors; that these men were taken on board the ships when in mid-stream by tugs which set out from the city wharves. [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess., p. ; nunez, sheriff of st. bernard, to heard, governor of louisiana, feb. , .] in a personal interview "general" pearson made the same charges to the governor that he had made in his letter to the president. he asked that he be allowed to offer forcible resistance to the shipments to south africa, and to the enlisting or employing of men as muleteers, who, he alleged, were later incorporated in the british army. this interview took place the day following the sheriff's letter partially denying the charges to the governor, and the latter was not disposed to take any action in the matter until proof of the accuracy of the averments was produced, although the facts which were alleged had become widely known. the attitude of the administration with reference to pearson's letter, it was believed by the press, was not of a character to inspire great confidence in the strict performance of neutral duties. to ignore an allegation of so flagrant a character as the breach of neutrality, it was declared, constituted a disregard of american ideals in the interest of british imperialism which could not be excused by jocular references to "general" pearson's request to the president "to either put an end to this state of affairs or permit me to strike one blow."[ ] [footnote : the republic of chicago, feb. , .] it was pointed out that the problem raised by pearson was not one that might be laughed out of the white house, but was the serious question whether the british government should any longer be permitted, in violation of american neutrality, to use an american city and port as a base of warlike operations against a friendly people. the newspapers, too, had made public the movements of the english army officers in charge of the shipments. it seems that the base of operations at first used by great britain was southport, but that chalmette had later been selected. the efficiency of the latter station was reported upon in march, , by general sir richard campbell stewart of the british army. everything pertaining to the efficiency of the transportation service was carefully inspected on behalf of the british government. colonel debergh, who was in command of the remount service in the united states, declared that he had not received orders from the british war office to discontinue the shipments, and that they would be continued "unless general pearson and the boer army drive our garrison away."[ ] [footnote : the new orleans picayune, mar. , .] the evidence which pearson was able to place before governor heard and which the latter laid before the president seemed to substantiate the fact that at least one of the ports of the united states had been constantly used and was then being used as a base of military transportation to the british forces in south africa. it was shown that william b. leonard, of new orleans, had contracted with major h.j. scobell, representing the british government, for the purchase of mules to be shipped to south africa for military purposes. the contract had been signed in october, , and during the months from october, , to may, , large numbers had been shipped to south africa under the immediate direction of british army officers.[ ] p.b. lynch made affidavit that he had been employed as clerk and bookkeeper in the bureau of the british remount service in new orleans from december, , to september, . he explained the operations of the remount service as well as its methods, and indicated clearly the direct connection of regularly appointed officers of the british army with the purchase and shipment of horses and mules to south africa. the purchases, it seems, were made at different points in the country and afterward assembled at a place designated by the officer in charge in new orleans. the british army brand was then placed upon the animals, which were immediately consigned to the british officer in new orleans but without giving his military title. they were then transferred to ships the charter parties of which were agents of the english government. it was shown that the ships' agents usually employed muleteers taken on by tugs from the city of new orleans, and it was proved that the whole operation was controlled by english army officers who were detailed from london or from south africa for the purpose.[ ] [footnote : leonard _v_. sparks bros. & mcgee, civil district court, parish of new orleans, division e, no. , , feb. , .] [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess., p. ; also pp. - passim.] the testimony of charles j. cole showed that as foreman in charge of seventy or more men he had made six trips to south africa in the service of the british government or of its agents. his testimony was substantiated by certificates for seamen discharged before the superintendent of a mercantile marine office in the british empire, a british consul, or a shipping officer on board the vessel on which he had sailed. he had been employed on the transports _prah, montcalm, knight bachelor, montezuma_, and _rosetta_, all engaged in transporting horses and mules to the british army in south africa. he testified that the transports were in charge of regular officers of the english army and that from them all orders were received. he also avowed that many of the men were urged and solicited by the officers to join the british army, and were unable to obtain their pay unless they complied with the request.[ ] [footnote : pearson et al. _v_. parson et al., united states circuit court, eastern district of louisiana; also h.r., doc. , cong., sess., p. .] the affidavit of r.j. tourres showed that he had served on the ship _milwaukee_. he averred that the ship's articles were signed by him before the vice-consul of the british government; that he was finally referred to an officer of the english army for duty and acted under his orders during the voyage from new orleans to cape town; that when the vessel was not allowed to land its cargo at that place on account of the plague the consignment of horses and mules for the british army was delivered at durban to english officers in uniform; that he was not allowed to go ashore except upon the condition of signing with the recruiting officer and joining the british army; that during the entire voyage a british military officer in uniform controlled the ship's crew; and that among the men the _milwaukee_ was known as a transport under the direct command of regularly detailed officers of the english army.[ ] [footnote : sworn to before notary public mch. , . h.r., doc. , cong., sess., p. .] the testimony of a number of other witnesses sworn before the commissioner for the eastern district of louisiana showed that the wages of the men employed upon the ship _montcalm_ had been refused by the captain unless they would agree to enlist in the british army, but as american citizens they had refused to enlist and had demanded the wages due them under the ship's articles. august nozeret, an american citizen, foreman of a corps of muleteers on board the _montcalm_, testified that he was told by the ship's officers that the only way to secure his discharge at port elizabeth was to have a recruiting officer vouch for his enlisting in the british army; and that he complied with this demand and escaped enlistment only by pretending to be physically unable to count the number of perforations in a card when required to do so as a test of sight at the recruiting office. the affiant was able to say from his own personal knowledge that certified discharges were not given unless the men were willing to enlist in the english army.[ ] an abundance of other evidence to the same effect was produced, and it was shown that both the _montcalm_ and the _milwaukee_ were under the direct control of the british war authorities. both had their official numbers painted from their hulls before entering the portuguese harbor of beira. [footnote : cramer et al. _v_. s.s. _montcalm_, united states district court, eastern district of louisiana, in admiralty, no. , ; also h.r., doc. , cong., sess., pp. - .] the evidence which was thus placed before the president would seem to show that the spirit at any rate of the neutrality laws of the united states[ ] had been violated, and that this violation had been systematically carried out by the british government and not by individual citizens merely as a commercial venture. [footnote : revised statutes, title lxvii, sections - , inclusive.] the first section of the neutrality laws which were passed by congress in defines the offense of accepting a foreign commission and lays down the penalty for such an offense. the second section forbids any person within the territory of the united states to enlist in a foreign service "as soldier, or as a mariner, or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer." the three following sections prohibit the arming of a vessel to cruise against a people at peace with the united states, or against the citizens of the united states, or the augmentation of the force of any foreign vessel of war. the next prohibits military expeditions of any kind. this section reads: "every person who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the united states, begins, or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince, state, colony, district or people, with whom the united states are at peace, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding $ , , and imprisoned not more than three years."[ ] [footnote : sec. .] section provides for the enforcement of the foregoing provisions. it leaves the cognizance of all complaints in the hands of the several district courts, but empowers the president to employ the land and naval forces to enforce all of the restrictions embodied in the neutrality provisions. the following section empowers the president to compel foreign vessels "to depart the united states in all cases in which, by the laws of nations, or by the treaties of the united states they ought not to remain within the united states," section requires that a foreign armed vessel shall give bond on clearance. section empowers the collectors of the customs to detain foreign vessels: "the several collectors of the customs shall detain any vessel manifestly built for warlike purposes, and about to depart the united states, the cargo of which principally consists of arms and munitions of war, when the number of men on board, or circumstances render it probable that such vessel is intended to be employed by the owners to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens or property of any colony, district or people with whom the united states are at peace, until the decision of the president is had thereon, or until the owner gives such bond and security as is required of the owners of armed vessels by the preceding section." section defines the construction to be put upon the neutrality laws. they are not to be construed to extend to any subject or citizen of any foreign state who is only transiently within the united states, nor directly to be construed in such a way as to prevent the prosecution or punishment of treason, or of any piracy defined by the laws of the united states. possibly the alleged unneutral acts in the territorial waters of the united states did not fall within the strict letter of the restrictions contained in these laws. but if the provisions of are construed so as to require the maintenance of a perfect neutrality it would seem that they were evaded in the transactions which were permitted at the port of new orleans. in this connection the neutrality clause of the treaty of washington is of interest. this treaty was signed in by great britain and the united states and is illustrative of the requirements of neutrality as understood by these two nations should either be at war with a third party. for the immediate purposes of war the allied republics of south africa by the fact of their recognized belligerent status possessed rights equal in international law to those held by spain or by the united states with reference to third powers during the spanish-american war. on april , , the day after this war was declared, the british declaration of neutrality referred to the treaty of washington as embodying the terms upon which a neutral attitude should be observed: "a neutral government is bound ... not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies of arms, or the recruitment of men, ... to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and as to all persons within its own jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties,"[ ] [footnote : art. vi; london gazette extraordinary, april , ; for. rel., , pp. - .] illegal enlistment was clearly defined as understood by great britain: "if any person ... being a british subject, within or without her majesty's dominions, accepts or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with her majesty, ... or whether a british subject or not, within her majesty's dominions, induces any other person to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any ... foreign state ... he shall be guilty of an offense" against this act. and, "if any person induces any other person to quit her majesty's dominions or to embark on any ship within her majesty's dominions under a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state ... he shall be guilty of an offense against this act." [ ] [footnote : british declaration of neutrality, apl. , . it was pointed out that this act extended to all her majesty's dominions, including the adjacent territorial waters.] the last clause of article six of the treaty of read: "and the high contracting parties agree to observe these rules as between themselves in future and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers and to induce them to accede to them."[ ] [footnote : gushing, treaty of washington ( ), p. . great britain was averse to the acceptance of this article of the treaty, but finally acceded to it in the above terms by signing the mutual agreement.] these provisions were strictly enforced during the spanish-american war, and other countries in their declarations defined the neutral attitude which they assumed. the brazilian government in its proclamation of april , , declared: "the exportation of material of war from the ports of brazil to those of either of the belligerent powers, under the brazilian flag, or that of any other nation, is absolutely prohibited."[ ] it was also pointed out that: "individuals residing in brazil, citizens or foreigners, must abstain from all participation and aid in favor of either of the belligerents, and may not do any act which might be considered as hostile to either one of the two parties and, therefore, contrary to the obligations of neutrality."[ ] neither belligerent was to be permitted "to promote enlistment in brazil, not only of its own citizens, but also of the citizens of other countries, for the purpose of incorporating them in its forces of land and sea."[ ] not even merchant vessels were to be permitted to weigh anchor in brazilian ports until permission from the port authorities had been granted, and any movements of the belligerents were to be under the supervision of the customs authorities for the purpose of verifying the proper character of the things put on board.[ ] [footnote : art. iv of the brazilian proclamation of neutrality; for. rel., , pp. ff.] [footnote : for. rel., , pp. ff., art. i.] [footnote : ibid., art. ii.] [footnote : ibid., arts. xvii and iii.] the decree of denmark forbade danish subjects to commit certain enumerated offenses, and among them: "on or from danish territory to assist any of the belligerent powers in the enterprises of war, such as supplying their ships with articles that must be considered contraband of war."[ ] danish subjects were forbidden "to take service in any quality soever in the army of the belligerent powers or on board their government ships, such prohibition to include piloting their ships of war or transports outside the reach of danish pilotage, or, except in case of danger of the sea, assisting them in sailing the ship;"[ ] "to build or remodel, sell or otherwise convey, directly or indirectly, for or to any of the belligerent powers, ships known or supposed to be intended for any purposes of war, or to cooperate in any manner on or from danish territory in the arming or fitting out of such ships for enterprises of war;"[ ] "to transport contraband of war for any of the belligerent powers, or hire or charter to them ships known or supposed to be intended for such use."[ ] [footnote : section i ( ) of danish proclamation of neutrality, apl. , ; for. rel., , p. .] [footnote : ibid., sec. i ( ).] [footnote : ibid., sec. i ( ).] [footnote : ibid., sec. i ( ).] japan forbade "the selling, purchasing, chartering, arming, or equipping ships with the object of supplying them to one or the other of the belligerent powers for use in war or privateering; the assisting such, chartering, arming or equipping,"[ ] [footnote : art. of japanese proclamation of neutrality, may , . for. rel., , p. .] the netherlands proclamation warned all dutch subjects under penalty against exporting "arms, ammunition, or other war materials to the parties at war [to include] everything that is adaptable for immediate use in war."[ ] [footnote : art ii (b) of netherlands proclamation of neutrality. may , . for. rel., , p. .] although the primary object of these prohibitions was the stoppage of all dealings in articles of a contraband nature, when fairly construed in the light of international opinion they would seem to render illegal the wholesale dealing in horses and mules intended for army purposes by one of the belligerents. such animals are undoubtedly "adaptable for immediate use in war" and were in fact a necessity for the successful carrying on of the war. in the light of the express restrictions of the treaty of washington as exemplified in the war between one of the parties to that treaty and a third party in , the obligation imposed upon the united states, impliedly at any rate, by the sixth article of the mutual agreement of might be read: "the united states is bound not to permit great britain to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the south african republics, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies." it would seem obvious that horses and mules when intended for immediate use in military operations are within the meaning of the term "military supplies." in numbers of instances horses have been considered contraband of war. the treaty of between the united states and france declared: "horses with their furnishings are contraband of war,"[ ] in the treaty of december , , between holland and great britain it was understood that "horses and other warlike instruments are contraband of war." and hall declares that horses are generally considered contraband and are so mentioned in the treaties between different states. he points out that the placing of an army on a war footing often exhausts the whole horse reserve of a country and subsequent losses must be supplied from abroad; the necessity for this is in proportion to the magnitude of the armies. every imported horse is probably bought on account of the government, and if it is not some other horse is at least set free for belligerent use. "under the mere light of common sense," he says, "the possibility of looking upon horses as contraband seems hardly open to argument."[ ] [footnote : article xxiv; wharton, digest of int. law ( ), vol. iii, § .] [footnote : international law ( ), pp. - .] oppenheim shows that the importance of horses and beasts of burden for cavalry, artillery, and military transport sufficiently explains their being declared contraband by belligerents. he asserts that no argument against their being held as conditional contraband has any validity, and it is admitted that they are frequently declared absolute contraband.[ ] during the russo-japanese war russia at first refused to recognize any distinction between conditional and absolute contraband, but later altered her decision with the exception of "horses and beasts of burden," which she treated as absolute contraband. [footnote : international law, vol. ii, p. .] the tendency in modern times, however, is to treat horses as only conditional contraband. the only reason that they were not expressly declared contraband in the anglo-boer contest was the character of the war. had the transvaal been able to issue an authoritative declaration and insure respect for it by a command of the sea, horses and mules would have been considered technical contraband as in fact they were actual contraband, being nothing if they were not "warlike instruments." the enforcement of the obligations incumbent upon the united states under the circumstances undoubtedly lay with the federal government rather than with the states. early in a proceeding in equity had been instituted in a federal court in new orleans for the purpose of enjoining the shipment of horses and mules from that port to cape colony. the bill was filed by private individuals who alleged that they had property in the transvaal and orange free state which was being destroyed by the armies of great britain, and that these armies were able to continue their work of destruction only by means of the supplies of horses and mules which were shipped from the port of new orleans. the application for an injunction was denied on the ground that the enforcement of the treaty obligations of the government is a function of the president with which the courts have nothing to do. the district judge in delivering the opinion declared that there was nothing in the principles of international law or in the terms of the treaty of washington, to which an appeal had been made, to prevent the citizens of a neutral state from selling supplies of war to a belligerent. the court went on to discuss the right of private citizens to sell supplies to belligerents, but did not enter upon the question whether or not the united states had permitted the british government to make use of its ports and waters as a base for the purpose of the augmentation of its military supplies. the entire discussion of questions of international law was considered by the court as beyond its cognizance. the court said: "if the complainants could be heard to assert here rights personal to themselves in the treaty just mentioned, and if the mules and horses involved in the case are munitions of war, all of which is disputed by the defendants, it would become necessary to determine, whether the treaty is meant to prevent private citizens from selling supplies to the belligerents." the court then proceeded: "but the nature of this cause is such that none of the considerations hereinbefore set out need be decided," because "the case is a political one of which a court of equity can take no cognizance, and which in the very nature of governmental things must belong to the executive branch of the government."[ ] [footnote : pearson _v_ parson fed. rep. ] it will be seen that the court did not pass upon the question of an improper use of the ports of the united states. clearly an injunction could not be granted since such a measure would not have had the effect of remedying the evil. it could not issue, for it was not established that there were private property rights to be protected. the complainants could show no property in the implications of the treaty, nor could they establish the fact alleged, namely, that horses and mules are munitions of war. the last question was one for the federal government alone to pass upon under the circumstances. political obligations are not proper matters for enforcement by the courts. but the court did declare emphatically that the enforcement of all neutral obligations with reference to the ports and waters of the united states was the function of the executive branch of the government. the question at once arose whether it was a function of the state or of the federal executive to see that the neutrality laws were properly enforced. in submitting the evidence of the operations of the british agents within the state of louisiana governor heard declared it to be his opinion that it was the proper function of the federal and not of the state government to enforce obedience to these laws; but, he concluded, "if such duty belongs to the state where the violations of such laws occur, i would not hesitate to act as the laws may warrant and in keeping with the dignity and responsibilities of statehood."[ ] the governor asked that he be informed immediately what, in the opinion of the federal authorities, were the powers and duties of the state governments in matters of this character. [footnote : h.r., doc. , cong., sess., p. .] unquestionably it lay with the federal executive to see to it that the neutral obligations of all the states were properly observed. certain duties rest upon the governors of the different states, but it is the function of the president to carry into effect the laws regulating neutral obligations as well as the provisions of all treaties with foreign powers as a part of the law of the land. this duty was pointed out by secretary randolph in a circular of april , , to the governors of the different states during the war between france and england. he defined the duties of neutrality and concluded: "as often as a fleet, squadron or ship, of any belligerent nation shall clearly and unequivocally use the rivers, or other waters ... as a station in order to carry on hostile expeditions from thence, you will cause to be notified to the commander thereof that the president deems such conduct to be contrary to the rights of our neutrality.... a standing order to this effect may probably be advantageously placed in the hands of some confidential officer of the militia, and i must entreat you to instruct him to write by mail to this department, immediately upon the happening of any case of the kind."[ ] [footnote : moore, digest of int. law, vol. vii, p. - .] it was the duty of the central government to prevent as far as possible any abuse of the privileges which the laws of war allowed to the belligerents. "a government is justly held responsible for the acts of its citizens," said justice mclean of the united states supreme court, speaking of the canadian insurrection of . and he continued: "if this government be unable or unwilling to restrain our citizens from acts of hostility against a friendly power, such power may hold this nation answerable and declare war against it."[ ] clearly the responsibility for the proper restraint rested upon the president with reference to the incidents which occurred around new orleans. the fact that forbidden acts committed within the jurisdiction of a state of the union escape punishment within that state does not relieve the central government of responsibility to foreign governments for such acts. in view of this fact the citizens of the separate states should remember the consequences which may result from their acts. the warning of justice mclean, speaking of the incident already cited, is to the point: [footnote : citing reg. _v_. recorder of wolverhampton, law t. - ; see also h.r., doc. , cong., sess., p. .] "every citizen is ... bound by the regard he has for his country, by the reverence he has for its laws, and by the calamitous consequences of war, to exert his influence in suppressing the unlawful enterprises of our citizens against any foreign and friendly power." and he concludes: "history affords no example of a nation or people that uniformly took part in the internal commotions of other governments which did not bring down ruin upon themselves. these pregnant examples should guard us against a similar policy, which must lead to a similar result." in the end nothing came of the alleged unneutral conduct of the united states in the use which had been permitted of the port of new orleans during the war. had the south african republic gained an international status claims for indemnity would probably have lain against the united states for a violation of its neutral duties. had the transvaal, recognized in war as a belligerent, become an independent state as the result of that war, such claims would doubtless have been honored and compensation been made upon equitable grounds. had the opponent of great britain in the war been one of the recognized powers of the world such a use of territorial waters could not have been permitted without an effective protest having been made by the state which was injured. the republics, however, were treated at the close of the war as conquered territory and their obligations taken over by the british government. their rights as an independent state vanished when they failed to attain the end for which they fought. the extreme generosity afterward displayed by great britain in the settlement of the claims of all citizens of the united states who had suffered by the war may possibly be explained by the benefits which the english forces were able to secure from the construction which was put upon american neutrality. a resolution of the house of representatives inquiring as to the treatment of citizens of the united states in the south african republic brought out the fact that the number of those who claimed compensation was not large and that the british government was willing to indemnify them.[ ] the terms of settlement allowed to the united states were in marked contrast to those granted to other powers whose citizens or subjects had also presented claims for indemnity through their respective governments. this fact is evident from the transactions before the deportation claims commission, the appointment of which was announced on april , . [footnote : h. res., , cong., sess.; also h.r., doc. , cong., sess.] the commission came together "for the purpose of investigating the claims to compensation which have been made or may be made by persons the subjects of various friendly powers in consequence of their deportation to europe by the british military authorities in south africa."[ ] it was to be composed of five members, among them "r.k. loveday, esq., formerly a member of the late south african republic." the commission was to meet in london to hear such cases as might be presented there and then proceed to south africa with the purpose of continuing its investigations. any further evidence that was considered necessary was to be taken on the return to london. it was announced that all claims should be filed on or before april , , that claimants might appear either in person or by counsel, and that the different governments might represent the combined claims of their respective citizens or subjects. [footnote : for. rel., , pp. - .] mr. r. newton crane appeared before the commission on the part of the united states. in all, fifteen claims were presented. five of these were presented by persons who alleged that they were native-born citizens of the united states, although no evidence was furnished as to the date or place of their birth. eight alleged that they were naturalized citizens, while there were two who could produce no evidence whatever of their status. eight had been deported on the suspicion of having been concerned in the johannesburg plot to murder lord roberts and other english officers; one had been imprisoned at natal as a boer spy; another was captured on the field of battle while serving, as he alleged, with a red cross ambulance corps attached to the boer forces; three others were compelled to leave the country for various reasons, while two more could produce no evidence that they had been forcibly deported; on the contrary it appeared that they had left south africa voluntarily and at their own expense. the whole amount claimed was $ , . on account of actual losses alleged. the commission heard all claims by means of an _ex parte_ statement in each case, with the exception of two for which no statement had been presented. these last two had been mentioned as claimants by the ambassador of the united states on october , , in a communication to lord landsdowne, the english secretary of state for foreign affairs, and were so presented to the consideration of the commission. in dealing with the cases the commission did not insist upon any technical formality in the way of proof. the plan followed was to allow the legal representative of the english government an opportunity to explain why each individual had been deported. the several claimants were then permitted to put in evidence to clear themselves of these charges. after the claims had all been considered in this way the english representative announced the wish of his government to "agree with the representatives of the various governments upon a lump sum to be received by each of the powers in full satisfaction of the demands of their respective claimants," it being understood that the british government "was not to be concerned as to how the sums so paid were allocated among the various claimants."[ ] this proposal was accepted by the united states and by the other governments represented. [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] with the announcement of the decision of the commissioners on october , , mr. crane pointed out that it had been very difficult to determine the real merits of most of the claims. difficulty had been experienced not only in ascertaining the real facts but in applying the principles of international law as well. many of the facts alleged by the claimants were not substantiated, and it was only the considerate view taken by the british government which made possible a settlement so favorable to the united states. holland put in a claim for £ , in behalf of persons who alleged that they were dutch subjects, and received . per cent, of that amount, or £ , , which was the highest actual award made, although the lowest percentage of the sum claimed. germany received £ , , or . per cent, of the amount claimed for persons; austria-hungary £ , , or . per cent, for persons; italy £ , , or . per cent, for persons; the united states £ , , or . per cent, for persons. but mr. crane called attention to the evident error of basing a calculation upon the relation the award in each case bears to the amount claimed. the amount claimed in most cases is not what the claimant thinks he is justly entitled to for the losses he has sustained, but is the amount which his "caprice or cupidity fixes as that which may possibly be allowed him."[ ] among the american claims a number included demands for "moral" damages, and these claims were larger than similar demands put in by citizens of other countries. even among the american claimants themselves there was a wide divergence in appraising their losses, actual as well as moral. of three in the same occupation, the same employment, the same domestic surroundings, deported together, at about the same time, and under almost identical circumstances, one demanded $ , , the second appraised his losses at $ , . , and the third estimated his losses at $ , . [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] with reference to the american claimants the conditions under which the persons were deported were practically the same, and there was little if any distinction as to social rank or grade of employment. mr. crane, therefore, seems justified in his conclusion that the idea conveyed by the percentage relation of the amount demanded to the amount actually awarded is misleading, and should not serve as a precedent without comment for similar claims in the future. a much fairer method for ascertaining what the award really amounts to is shown to be that of computing what average sum each claimant received, since the claimants were practically of one walk of life and employment and were deported under like conditions. such a computation shows that the united states fared much better than any one of the other governments, the average sum received by each claimant being £ s. d., as compared with £ s. for germany; £ s. d. for russia; £ s. d. for austria-hungary; £ s. d. for belgium; £ for norway and sweden; and £ s. d. for italy. the £ , offered by the british government as full compensation for all claims of citizens of the united states on account of wrongful arrest, imprisonment and deportation from south africa up to october , , was accepted by secretary hay. only £ , had been originally offered, but the amount had afterward been increased to £ , . throughout the negotiations the attitude of the english government was generous toward the united states. the claimants included good, bad and indifferent, some of whom were not entitled to compensation at all, since they were not citizens of the united states, while others had actually taken up arms against great britain. the average amount awarded to each alleged citizen of the united states was approximately $ as against $ for each claimant of all other governments taken together. in a number of cases the claimants had contracted with local attorneys upon the basis of a contingent fee of per cent, of whatever might be awarded. in one case the fee of the attorney presenting the claim amounted to $ , although his services consisted in merely filing memorials which were not supported by a single word of proof of the assertions they contained, even after ample time had been given for the introduction of such proof. mr. crane, therefore, urged that in future similar claims should be presented directly by the citizens themselves without the intermediation of attorneys. in the present cases he said that his requests to the attorneys for the different claimants to furnish evidence to meet the accusations of the british government against their clients had met with no response whatever. he felt justified in believing that these attorneys had either given up the presentation of the claims of their clients or that the latter were dead. it was accordingly suggested that in either case the united states would be justified in refusing to pay over to the attorneys such sums as might be allotted to their clients until the latter had been directly communicated with. in this way they would have the opportunity to confirm or withdraw any powers of attorney which they might have executed for the collection of their respective claims. chapter ii. the neutrality of european powers. the attitude of the european powers was generally observant of the requirements of neutrality in so far as governmental action could be proved. the frequent charges which great britain made that the transvaal was recruiting forces in europe were not proved against the states from which the recruits came. the numbers in the parties which perhaps actually joined the boer forces were not large, and no formidable fitting out of an expedition or wholesale assistance was proved against any european government. germany, the power most nearly in touch with the transvaal in south africa with the exception of portugal, early declared the governmental attitude toward the struggle. the german consul-general at cape town on october , , issued a proclamation enjoining all german subjects to hold aloof from participation in the hostilities which great britain at that time had not recognized as belligerent in character. if insurgency be recognized as a distinct status falling short of belligerency, this was perhaps such a recognition, but it was in no sense an unfriendly act toward great britain. it was merely a warning to german subjects as to the manner in which they should conduct themselves under the circumstances. it did not recognize the boers as belligerents in the international sense, but it warned german subjects that a condition of affairs existed which called for vigilance on their part in their conduct toward, the contestants. later, when the british government announced that the war would be recognized retroactively as entitled to full belligerent status, germany declared the governmental attitude to be that of strict neutrality in the contest. an attempt of the boers to recruit in damaraland was promptly stopped by the german officers in control, who were ordered to allow neither men nor horses to cross the border for the purposes of the war. all german steamship lines which held subventions from the government were warned that if they were found carrying contraband they would thereby forfeit their privileges. stringent orders were also given by the different german ship companies to their agents in no case to ship contraband for the belligerents. the attitude assumed by the german government was not entirely in accord with the popular feeling in germany. on october a mass-meeting at göttingen, before proceeding to the business for which the conference was called, proposed a resolution of sympathy for the boers: "not because the boers are entirely in the right, but because we germans must take sides against the english."[ ] but despite popular sentiment, the position which had been taken by the government seems to have been consistently maintained. [footnote : london times, weekly ed., oct. , , p. , col. .] in june, prior to the outbreak of war, president kruger had been advised by the dutch minister for foreign affairs that the transvaal should maintain a moderate attitude in the discussion of the questions at issue with the british government. the german government, too, had advised the republics to invite mediation, but at that time president kruger declared that the moment had not yet come for applying for the mediation of america. the united states, it was considered by both holland and germany, could most successfully have undertaken the role of mediator from the fact that england would have been more likely to entertain proposals of the kind coming from washington than from a european capital. in december, , count von bülow, the german imperial chancellor, speaking of the neutral attitude of germany, declared that when president kruger later attempted to secure arbitration it was not until feeling had become so heated that he was compelled to announce to the dutch government that it was not possible to arrange for arbitration. the german government, it was declared, regarded any appeal to a great power at that time as hopeless and as very dangerous to the transvaal. the german and the dutch governments each believed that president kruger should not have rejected the english proposal then before him for a joint commission of inquiry.[ ] the german government had nothing for which to reproach itself in regard to the outbreak of war or with reference to the fate of the republics. "of course there are certain lengths to which we could not possibly go. we could not, in order to prevent the door from being slammed, let our own fingers be crushed between the door and the hinges; that would not have helped the boers and would only have harmed ourselves,--and when the war had broken out it was impossible for us, in view of the general situation of the world and from the standpoint of german interests as a whole to adopt any attitude except that of strict neutrality."[ ] continuing, count von bülow pointed out the fact that the policy of a great country should not at a critical moment be governed by the dictates of feeling, but should be guided solely in accordance with the interests of the country, calmly and deliberately calculated. [footnote : the german chancellor seems slightly in error in assuming that the transvaal _rejected_ the english proposal for a joint inquiry. it will be remembered that immediately following the bloemfontein conference president kruger had drafted a law considerably modifying the transvaal demands in the conference, and later submitted the proposals of august , which he alleged had been" induced "by their implied acceptance on the part of the british agent. when these proposals lapsed from the fact of their non-acceptance by the british government, he declared that he was ready to return to the discussion of the proposed joint commission of inquiry and was met by the english assertion that the condition of affairs no longer warranted a discussion of the original proposal for such a commission, and that great britain would have to formulate new demands to meet the altered conditions. the outbreak of war had forestalled these demands.] [footnote : speech in reichstag, london times, dec. , , p. , col. .] the possibility of mediation with germany in the role of mediator was shown to have been made conditional upon the acceptance of such a step by both the parties to the contest, as otherwise it would not have been mediation but intervention, with the ultimate possibility of the exercise of force for the purpose of stopping the hostilities. intervention of that kind, involving the idea of coercion, was never considered by the german government because of the general situation of the world and of special german interests. the idea of anything other than entirely peaceful and friendly intervention was not entertained by any power in considering the situation in south africa. the german chancellor declared that "even those powers which academically ventilated the idea of peaceful mediation invariably and expressly laid stress upon the fact that they had no thought or intention of forcing england to accept peace against her will." he asserted that the possibility of mediation was thus excluded since the preliminary condition of such a course was the consent of both parties to the conflict. count von bülow also called attention to the fact that the gentlest form of diplomatic inquiry made by the united states had been rejected by the english government "officially and categorically in the most distinct manner possible." and speaking officially, he continued, "we therefore did what we could as a neutral power and without imperilling direct german interests in order to prevent the outbreak of war. in particular we acted in the most straightforward manner toward the governments of the south african republics inasmuch as from the first and in good time we left them in no doubt regarding the situation in europe and also regarding our own neutrality in the event of war in south africa. in both these regards we made matters clear to the two south african republics and did so in good time."[ ] the chancellor seems to have fairly defined the position maintained by the german government throughout the war, although popular feeling often clamored for official action in behalf of the boers. [footnote : speech in reichstag, dec. , .] a similar course was pursued by the french government despite the fact that in france popular sympathy was more strongly in favor of the transvaal than was the case in germany. no official action, however, was taken which could involve france in complications in view of the declared neutral attitude assumed at the beginning of the war. the administration at paris ordered the prefects throughout the country to have removed from the official minutes the resolutions of sympathy for the boers which had been adopted by the provincial councils. but opposed to the correct attitude of the government, popular feeling was manifested in different ways. a committee of ladies in paris made a direct appeal to the french people. they declared: "we are not biased enemies of the british nation ... but we have a horror of grasping financiers, the men of prey who have concocted in cold blood this rascally war. they have committed with premeditation a crime of _lèse-humanité_, the greatest of crimes. may the blood which reddens the battle-fields of south africa forever be upon their heads.... yes, we are heart and soul with the boers.... we admire them because old men and young women, even, are all fighting like heroes.... alas! to be sure, there is no more a france, nor yet an america.... ah! ideal abode of the human conscience, founded by socrates, sanctified by christ, illuminated in flashes of lightning by the french revolution, what has become of thee? there is no longer a common temple for civilized states. our house is divided against itself and is falling asunder. peace reigns everywhere save on the banks of the vaal, but it is an armed peace, an odious peace, a poisoned peace which is eating us up and from which we are all dying."[ ] such hysterical outbursts in france were not taken seriously by the government, and the feeling which inspired them was possibly more largely due to historic hatred of england than to the inherent justice of the boer cause. [footnote : london times, april , , p. , col. .] the ninth peace conference, which was in session at paris in the fall of , without expressly assuming the right of interfering in the affairs of a friendly nation further than to "emphatically affirm the unchangeable principles of international justice," adopted a resolution declaring that the responsibility for the war devastating south africa fell upon that one of the two parties who repeatedly refused arbitration, that is, it was explained, upon the british government; that the british government, in ignoring the principles of right and justice, in refusing arbitration and in using menaces only too likely to bring about war in a dispute which might have been settled by judicial methods, had committed an outrage against the rights of nations calculated to retard the pacific evolution of humanity; that the governments represented at the hague had taken no public measures to ensure respect for the resolutions which should have been regarded by them as an engagement of honor; that an appeal to public opinion on the subject of the transvaal was advocated and sympathy and admiration were expressed for the english members of the conference.[ ] [footnote : london times, oct. , , p. , col. .] the usual french attitude toward great britain was expressed in these resolutions, but the conference was not prepared to go so far as to adopt a resolution proposed by a member from belgium expressing the hope that the mistake of depriving the republics of their independence would not be committed, and favoring an energetic appeal to the powers for intervention. the resolution was rejected by a large majority on the ground that it would be impolitic and naturally irritating to england and without much probability of favorable results being attained. when the delegation of the boers which was sent to appeal to the european powers for action in behalf of the republics reached paris in july, , the attitude of the french government was not altered, nor were the envoys encouraged to hope for intervention. they were received by the president but only in an informal and unofficial manner when presented by dr. leyds. when they reached berlin in august neither the emperor nor the chancellor was in the city and consequently the visit had no official significance, but in st. petersburg a more favorable reception awaited them. the official messenger announced on august that dr. leyds had been received in audience by the czar. this statement, coming as it did from the official organ of the foreign office, seemed to signify a full recognition of the accredited character of the delegation, and dr. leyds was referred to officially as "minister of the south african republic."[ ] with the exception of the british minister, he was received by all of the diplomatic corps, a courtesy which the members could not well have denied him, but as to practical results the mission to russia amounted to nothing. [footnote : london times, july , .] on their return to germany the envoys received no official notice. the secret instructions which they had opened only upon reaching milan were supposed to have contained certain communications which had been exchanged between the governments of the transvaal and great britain but which it was alleged had not been published in the blue books. this assertion of sinister motives on the part of great britain exerted little influence upon foreign governments in europe. the delegation realized the impossibility of securing the interference of a concert of powers or of any one state against the wishes of england. the mission of the boers had been doomed to failure from the beginning. the action of the queen of holland in receiving the delegation was generally understood as not of an unneutral character but as inspired by sympathy for a kindred people and a willingness to mediate though not to intervene. it was recognized that no nation whose interests were not directly concerned could afford to persist in offers of mediation in view of the fact that great britain had already intimated to the united states that such an offer could not be accepted. although holland refused to intervene, the attitude assumed by the dutch government in other respects caused severe criticism in england. the chief circumstance which confirmed the opinion that holland as a neutral state had not displayed a proper attitude at lorenzo marques was the fact that after the visit of the envoys of the transvaal the hague government had sent a man-of-war to the island of st. helena, which was being used as a prison for the boers who were transported from south africa. this proceeding was viewed by england as officious from the fact that foreign men-of-war were not usually received at that port. popular feeling saw in the despatch of the man-of-war an unfriendly act which might easily have led to difficulty. but the incident, aside from the benevolent character which holland had given to the enforcement of her neutrality laws throughout the war, had no significance in international law. it was generally considered, however, that the feeling which england manifested with regard to the visit of the cruiser gave some ground for the suspicion that the british government might have had something to conceal at st. helena. the general attitude of germany, france and russia toward the boer mission was guided by a policy of strict adherence to the neutral obligations assumed at the beginning of the war. these powers in their official statements all followed such a course, realizing that it was demanded by a sound foreign policy. they considered the idea of intervention out of the question, although friendly interest for the boers and for the peaceful purpose of their mission was evident. from the beginning of the war the active duties of neutrality had fallen upon portugal, since neither the transvaal nor the orange free state possessed a seaport. fifty miles of railway separated the portuguese harbor of lorenzo marques in delagoa bay from the transvaal border, and from this point the road continued to pretoria. lorenzo marques being neutral could not be blockaded, but, being neutral, it was the duty of the portuguese government to observe the laws of neutrality. great britain alleged that a constant stream of supplies and recruits passed over the portuguese border to aid the boer armies. the difficulty on the part of the english government, however, was to prove that the goods were in fact on their way to a belligerent destination or that small parties of men were in reality organized bands of recruits for the fighting forces of the enemy. it was asserted that the manner in which portugal performed her neutral obligations, demanding an absolutely impartial treatment of both belligerents, made delagoa bay and the port of lorenzo marques more valuable to the republics than would have been the case had they actually been in their possession. the efficiency of portugal's performance of neutral duties varied during the war. as early as august , before negotiations had been broken off between the transvaal and great britain, the portuguese governor at lorenzo marques refused to permit two cargoes of mauser ammunition to land because it was consigned to the transvaal. the ammunition was transferred to a portuguese troop ship, and the governor assigned as sufficient reason for his action the fact that great britain had urged the measure upon the portuguese authorities. he stated that orders had been received from lisbon that guns and ammunition for the transvaal should not be landed until further notice from the portuguese government. the transvaal strongly protested against this act as a breach of a treaty between the two governments in which by article vi the portuguese government was prohibited from stopping ammunition intended for the transvaal, but upon representations by england might stop ammunition on its way to any english colony. the opinion in the transvaal was that the act on the part of portugal and great britain constituted an act of war, in that peaceable negotiations were still pending, a view which seems fully warranted since portugal possessed no right to treat any traffic as contraband before war had begun. a petition was circulated at pretoria advising the government to discontinue negotiations pending with england looking to a peaceful settlement of the issues between the two governments. although this step was not taken, the protestations made by the transvaal seem to have had their effect upon the portuguese authorities, for upon the outbreak of war the banks at lorenzo marques continued to accept transvaal coin, and after the first flurry caused by the transition from peace to war the transvaal notes were accepted at their face value. by the middle of december the english government had begun to view the condition of affairs at the port of delagoa bay and the town of lorenzo marques with grave dissatisfaction. it was publicly alleged that lorenzo marques was nothing more nor less than a base from which the transvaal obtained everything that it needed. further than this, it was declared that the town was the headquarters of transvaal agents of every description who were in daily communication with their government and with europe. the english authorities felt themselves helpless to prevent the importation of machinery and other material required for the mines which were worked by the transvaal government. even explosives for the government factory and actual ammunition reached the transvaal by way of lorenzo marques because of the inability of the english cruisers to make a thorough search of foreign vessels bound for a neutral port and professedly carrying foodstuffs. british shippers alleged that while they were prohibited from trading with the enemy foreign shippers were reaping the profits and materially aiding in the prolongation of the war. it later developed that the apparent neglect on the part of portugal to observe a strict watch over the character of goods allowed to pass through to the transvaal was not entirely due to the governmental attitude at lisbon. it seems that the dutch consul at lorenzo marques had taken over in the way of friendly offices the interests of the orange free state as well as those of the transvaal. it was also ascertained that the consul of holland was the manager of the local agencies for a number of steamboat companies, among them the castle packet company, the african boating company, the british india, and the british and colonial steam navigation company. only one english company had put patriotism before profit and transferred its agency from the dutch consul upon the outbreak of war. the british government was also handicapped by the fact that local british banks accepted the drafts issued by the transvaal and orange free state. the transvaal dies of and had been seized by the english, but despite this fact the coins issued with the date of the dies of and were freely used by the local english banks.[ ] this unpatriotic action on the part of british subjects controlling the banks made easy the work of the boer forwarding agents; it was alleged, and the fact seemed pretty well authenticated, that the dutch consul, mr. pott, facilitated this work by allowing contraband to be landed at night. such articles thrown into half-laden trucks upon the railway often reached the transvaal without detection. cases labelled "candles" were hoisted in without pretense of examination. it was alleged also that guns and fifty tons of shells had been landed in december under the very noses of two british warships, and that wholesale smuggling was going on with the connivance of a nominally neutral consular agent. [footnote : london times, weekly ed., jan. , , p. , col. .] under the protests of the british government, however, orders arrived from lisbon which revived an old law requiring all persons leaving portuguese territory to obtain passports signed by the governor-general. the applicants were required to give guarantees through their respective consuls that they were not going to the transvaal for the purpose of enlisting. the portuguese authorities took the matter in hand, and persons attempting to go without passports were promptly sent back. the customs authorities began a stricter watch over the transvaal imports, and on january seized as contraband three cases of signalling apparatus consigned to pretoria.[ ] [footnote : london times, weekly ed., jan. , , p. , col. .] it was claimed, however, that of the imports of £ , to delagoa bay during december there had been forwarded to the transvaal goods valued at not less than £ , . and it seemed evident to england, despite the more stringent port regulations, that the number of foreigners daily entering the transvaal by way of lorenzo marques was far in excess of the number which would be desirous of going to pretoria for peaceful purposes. mr. pott, it was still alleged, was acting as the head of a boer organization for facilitating the entrance of men desiring to enlist with the boer forces. he was consequently cautioned in january by the portuguese governor that if he recruited for the boer forces or was detected doing anything inconsistent with the neutral obligations of portugal, a request would be made to the netherlands government to have him transferred to another field. the portuguese authorities at the same time began a closer supervision of the persons who were allowed to enter the transvaal from portuguese territory. the previous restriction that passports be signed by the respective consuls of persons leaving for transvaal territory was considered insufficient, and the consuls of the different countries represented at lorenzo marques were informed that they must personally guarantee that the applicants whom they endorsed were not military men, and were not proceeding to assist the boer forces in the field. these restrictions, while giving evidence of portugal's efforts to see that the neutrality of the port was respected, did not satisfy the english authorities. the latter still alleged that no doubt existed as to the fact that lorenzo marques was being used by boer agents as a recruiting station for the transvaal forces. it was asserted that large numbers of "men of military stamp" landed daily at lorenzo marques from all parts of europe, and were allowed to proceed to the transvaal for the purpose of either actually enlisting with the boers or working the government mines. it was alleged, too, that a number of these newcomers were "smart looking men," evidently officers. the majority, however, were of a low class, mostly penniless adventurers. on february the report was made to the english authorities that twenty of the better sort, many wearing riding boots and carrying field glasses, had left lorenzo marques for the transvaal, and as tending to throw suspicion upon the purpose of their journey, a transvaal detective was "most assiduous" in his attentions to them.[ ] the influence of the consul of holland largely defeated all efforts to stop entirely the imperfect fulfillment of the duties of neutrality incumbent upon the port. [footnote : london times, weekly ed., feb. , , p. , col. .] at other places any attempts to convey prohibited goods into the transvaal were summarily stopped. arms and ammunition which the boers attempted to land at inhambane were seized by the portuguese customs authorities on the ground that they were consigned under a false description. the consignment was not a large one and the attempt was evidently made as an experiment. this incident, too, indicates the extremity to which the transvaal authorities had been reduced by the increased watchfulness at lorenzo marques, for the distance from the port of inhambane to the transvaal could be covered only by native carriers and required fourteen days for the trip. the difficulties in evading the customs surveillance at lorenzo marques had also been increased by the fact that most of the steamship companies which had at first employed the dutch consul as their agent had later relieved him of this duty. but, notwithstanding the continued protests by england, the hague government seemed reluctant to take any official notice of the evident partiality of its consular agent. with reference to the english protests the administration took the view that while acting as the representative of the transvaal and orange free state during the war mr. pott was only fulfilling the duties incumbent upon him in this triple capacity. as the war progressed, although the administration of the customs at lorenzo marques was made more efficient, this improvement was inversely proportional to the successes of the boer forces in the field. under the circumstances it was almost impossible for england to prove that actual governmental support had been given to any scheme for augmenting the military forces of the transvaal, but the whole manipulation of the customs seemed to be controlled by a weak administration not too scrupulous in seeing that an impartial view was taken of the situation. the failure of the boers to attain their ends in the field did more to improve the efficiency of the administration of the customs than the protests of england. it seems unquestionable that the resources of the transvaal had induced the portuguese authorities at lorenzo marques to display toward the boers an attitude which, according to obsolete ideas, was termed benevolent neutrality. but as the boer hopes declined the portuguese authorities increased their vigilance, and in the end went as far in favor of england as they had previously gone in their benevolent attitude to the republics. passengers arriving by german and other steamers were refused passports upon the instance of the british consul where there was a strong suspicion that they were entering the transvaal for purposes hostile to great britain. portugal, too, refused to accept the offer of the transvaal to advance the amount required of the lisbon government by the beirne arbitration award.[ ] the portuguese government, in courteously declining the offer, stated that the amount had already been provided. great britain, who already held a preemptive title to delagoa bay, was also ready to advance the money, but was denied this privilege by portugal. [footnote : london times, weekly ed., april , , p. , col. .] by august, , it had become evident that the boer hopes of bringing the war to any sort of favorable conclusion were doomed to failure. on august all the customs officials at lorenzo marques were dismissed and their places filled by military officers, and a force of twelve hundred men was sent out from lisbon two days later. the portuguese frontier was put under a strong guard and all boer refugees who arrived were summoned before the governor and warned against carrying on any communications with the transvaal government or with the boer forces still in the field. notice was given them that if they were detected in such transactions they would be sent out of portuguese territory and the right of asylum denied them. and in the further performance of her neutral duties at such a time portugal assumed an entirely correct attitude. in september three thousand boers evacuated their position along the frontier and surrendered to the portuguese governor. they were lodged in the barracks at lorenzo marques and later, to prevent any disturbance in the town that might be caused by their presence, were removed to the portuguese transports lying in the harbor. the governor gave notice to the english commander who had occupied the position evacuated by the boers that all the transvaal troops which had surrendered were being guarded and would not be allowed to rejoin the boer forces still in the field. a number of the refugees agreed to surrender to the british commander as prisoners of war upon the stipulation that they would not be sent out of the country, and thus better terms were obtained than by those captured in the field. others who surrendered to portugal were transported by portuguese ships to lisbon, land being assigned them in the country where they were given permission to settle. in other respects, also, during the later phases of actual warfare, portugal maintained a correct attitude. especially was this attitude noticeable with reference to the investigation of the conduct of the dutch consul at lorenzo marques. in spite of the protests of great britain and of portugal as to his unneutral attitude he had been continued in his position. but on december , , the strain to which the relations between the two governments had been put reached the breaking point. the dutch minister, dr. van weede, withdrew from lisbon and at the same time the portuguese minister at the hague, count de selin, returned to lisbon. the reason for this technical breaking off of friendly relations was explained on december . a member of the second chamber at the hague, m. van bylandt, questioned the minister for foreign affairs as to the cause of the difficulties between the two governments. m. beaufort, in his explanation of the situation, stated that as early as november , , the dutch government had been informed that it would be necessary for the lisbon authorities to cancel the exequatur of mr. pott as consul at lorenzo marques. this cancellation of the agent's credentials, it was alleged, was deemed necessary on account of irregularities with reference to the transshipment of contraband of war from lorenzo marques to the transvaal. it was further represented to the dutch government that the consul under suspension had made an improper use of his position as the acting consular agent for the free state and the transvaal; he had taken advantage of the consular privileges accorded him at lorenzo marques as the representative of a neutral power at a neutral port; the courteous communications made by the portuguese government prior to the final withdrawal of his exequatur had not received from the hague government the attention they deserved; every opportunity had been given the dutch government to take the initiative in the matter by merely recalling their agent, but this step had not been taken. m. beaufort admitted that this had been the attitude of the portuguese government, but asserted that he had not cared to suspend mr. pott without an inquiry, and for this purpose had merely granted him leave of absence for three months. this action, he said, had not been favorably received in lisbon, and he had therefore thought it necessary to warn the portuguese government that the withdrawal of the consul's exequatur would be considered an unfriendly act. but notwithstanding the warning, the consul's credentials had been cancelled by the lisbon government. as a consequence of this act m. beaufort had requested the dutch minister at lisbon to come to the hague that he might take part in a personal interview with the consul under suspension. later, m. beaufort stated that the specific incidents upon which mr. pott's conduct had been arraigned were the illegal importation of heliographic apparatus for the transvaal artillery and a wrongful grant of passports in his dual capacity as consular agent for holland and the republics.[ ] [footnote : london times, march , , p. , col. .] in the end diplomatic relations were resumed between the two governments. holland, after an investigation of the charges against her consul, acquiesced in the action of the lisbon government. but the incident served to demonstrate the fact that the government at lisbon was aware of the inefficient manner in which the duties of neutrality had been enforced at lorenzo marques by the port administration. from this time on to the close of the war the portuguese government displayed greater care in asserting the neutral character of the port. by placing the town under military supervision this purpose was more surely attained, and the only other charge made against portugal for the failure to perform a neutral duty came from the transvaal government, an allegation of a more serious character than any that had been advanced by the english government. the grounds upon which portugal granted a privilege of war to one of the belligerents under protest from the other have not been made so clear as the reasons which led to her apparent dereliction of duty at lorenzo marques. this incident placed the portuguese government in an unfavorable light with regard to its duty in the full and impartial performance of the obligation of neutrality. british troops were allowed to pass across portuguese territory in order to reach belligerent british territory commanding the transvaal position on the north. from rhodesia, the nominal objective point in this movement of troops, the transvaal might be conveniently invaded from the north, as it was already attacked on the south. early in the war the british south africa company, a chartered company which was responsible for the administration of the rhodesian government, became apprehensive as to the fate of this section of the country should the boers decide to invade it. troops had been raised in rhodesia for the war but were employed outside the colony. it was asserted that this fact had left the province in such an unprotected state that, aside from the fear of a boer invasion, a kaffir uprising was imminent. mr. chamberlain had refused to send forces into rhodesia in december upon the ground that troops could not be spared. but it was finally arranged to send five thousand mounted men, some of them to be enlisted in rhodesia and all of them to be furnished outside of england. before the end of january, , a commander had been appointed from the english army, and it was expected that the forces would be upon the borders of bechuanaland by the end of may. difficulty at once arose with reference to the right of passage of these troops, military stores, and in fact a full equipment for warlike purposes. there was not much choice of routes. those through the transvaal and through bechuanaland were closed. the only route left was through the port of beira. this course necessitated the passage of belligerent troops across two hundred miles of neutral territory controlled by portugal as territorial sovereign. beira, situated about four hundred and fifty miles north of lorenzo marques, bears nearly the same relation topographically to british mashonaland and to british rhodesia that delagoa bay does to the transvaal and the orange free state. a railway nearing completion formed an almost continuous route from beira to salisbury in rhodesia, and once in the latter province troops would be in a position to invade the transvaal. under ordinary circumstances it would have been a distinct breach of neutrality on the part of portugal to allow the passage across her territory of the troops of one of the belligerents, since the obvious destination could only be the country of the other belligerent, with whom she was on friendly terms. portugal had granted to england in the right of passage for a field force to be used against the natives in mashonaland.[ ] but that was a case of warfare against a savage tribe, and was not to be considered as a reliable precedent for similar action against a civilized state such as the south african republic. [footnote : times military history of the war in south africa, vol. iv p. ] the principles of the international law of modern times leave little or no doubt as to the proper course for a neutral to follow in such a case. oppenheim says: "in contradistinction to the practice of the eighteenth century, it is now generally recognized that a violation of the duty of impartiality is involved when a neutral allows a belligerent the passage of troops or the transport of war material over his territory. and it matters not whether a neutral give such permission to one of the belligerents only, or to both alike."[ ] and lawrence points out that "it is now acknowledged almost universally that a neutral state which permits the passage of any part of a belligerent army through its territory is acting in such a partial manner as to draw down upon itself just reprobation." the permission given of necessity "to further a warlike end" is "therefore inconsistent with the fundamental principle of state neutrality." "these considerations," he says, "have influenced practice during the present century, and the weight of modern precedent is against the grant of passage in any case."[ ] [footnote : international law ( ), vol. ii, p. ] [footnote : principles of international law, p. . the older writers differed from this view. grotius maintained the right of passage, even by force; vattel practically agreed with grotius that it might be taken by force, but contended that it should be asked and force used only under extreme necessity, or when the refusal was unjust; wheaton denied that the right of passage was a "perfect right" and consequently could not be enforced against the will of the neutral; hall, international law ( ), § , points out that more recent writers take an opposite view, namely, that a grant of passage is incapable of impartial distribution. see also wheaton, international law, § ; vattel, droit des gens, iii, § ; calvo, droit international, d ed., iii, §§ - .] mr. baty, who has made a careful study of the precedents upon the subject, states that while "writers vary in their treatment of the question" of the passage of troops over neutral territory, "the modern authorities are all one way."[ ] he points out that the jurists of the first half of the nineteenth century, with the possible exception of klüber, were "unanimous in following" grotius and vattel, and allowing neutrals to permit belligerents passage as long as they did it impartially. but since the middle of the century a total and violent change in the opinion of authors has operated. every modern author holds that passage is now a benefit which must be refused absolutely, and not offered impartially.[ ] [footnote : international law in south africa, p. .] [footnote : ibid., p. .] [footnote : times military history of the war in south africa, vol. iv, p. ] in february the transvaal government had attempted to bring troops into rhodesia by way of portuguese territory. portugal had promptly sent out forces to prevent such an evasion of portuguese neutrality and had guarded the railway bridges along the line to rhodesia. and in march great britain had met with a refusal to allow a large quantity of foodstuffs, mules, and wagons to be landed at beira for the purpose of transportation to rhodesia. nevertheless, on april , general sir frederick carrington landed at cape town under orders to proceed immediately to beira.[ ] he was to use transports put at his disposal by his government for the purpose of collecting a full equipment for his command of five thousand men to be mobilized at beira, and from that port was to enter rhodesia. this province was then to be made the base for an expedition against pretoria in concert with the english forces advancing from the south. it is undoubted that the laws of neutrality demanded of portugal not only an impartial treatment of both belligerents, as the earlier writers held, but an absolute prohibition against such a warlike expedition by either of them, as unanimously held by all the more recent authorities. at the time english public expression contended that absolute equality of neutrality was not incumbent upon independent states in the performance of their neutral duties. english writers spoke of a "benevolent neutrality" as possible, and cited such cases as that in , when roumania, before taking an active part in the war against turkey, permitted russian troops to march through her territory; and the incident which occurred during the neuchâtel royalist insurrection in when the prussian government requested permission to march through wurtemberg and baden "without any idea of asking those states to abandon their neutrality, or assist prussia against switzerland." it was alleged upon the authority of such precedents that the privilege of passage for troops might be granted by portugal to england without a breach of neutrality really occurring. portugal would be merely giving her neutrality a benevolent character towards one of the belligerents, which it was asserted she was perfectly entitled to do, a view of the situation which is too obsolete in the light of modern times to need criticism. although public opinion throughout europe is usually hostile to england when she is at war, the general condemnation of the proposed use of neutral territory seems therefore to have been well founded in this particular case. the cabinet at paris refused to entertain any question or debate on the proposed passage of english troops through portuguese territory. on april , however, a discussion of the subject occurred in the chamber of deputies in which two interpellations were announced by the president. one of these questioned the government as to what steps had been taken to protect french interests in mozambique; the other had reference to the proposed passage of english troops inland from beira. m. delcasse said that the chamber did not feel that the government should discuss a current question of international law, but he pointed out the fact that france with the other great powers had declared her neutrality at the beginning of hostilities. he added, however, that it was not the part of france to guarantee the neutrality of others. one member asserted that the proposed act would be a distinct violation of her neutral duties by portugal. another declared that europe, by concerted action, should prevent such a flagrant violation of neutrality during a war in which a small nation was already contending against great odds; that france, surrounded by neutral nations, could not afford to see such a precedent established and should appeal to europe to join with her in protesting. although such concerted action as was proposed by the different members was improbable, and although the proposals may have been dictated by the usual french bias in situations where english interests are at stake, these opinions indicate pretty well the real sentiment in europe at the time. the transvaal government formally notified portugal that the passage of british troops and munitions of war through beira would be considered in the transvaal as tantamount to hostile action. nevertheless, on may , the chamber of deputies at lisbon rejected an interpellation made by one of its members to question the action of the government with reference to the privilege which great britain sought. the minister for foreign affairs, however, stated that the transvaal government had not ordered the portuguese consul to leave pretoria. he denied emphatically that any incident whatever had followed portugal's notification to the transvaal. when further interrogated, the minister declared that the english troops had been granted permission to use the railway inland from beira upon the plea of treaty rights already possessed by great britain. no power, he asserted, had protested except the south african republic. it was promised that the government would later justify its action in granting the permission by producing the documents showing the right of england to the privilege, but it was not considered convenient at that time to discuss the question.[ ] [footnote : london times, april , , p. , col. .] the protest of the transvaal against the alleged breach of neutrality on the part of portugal was without effect, and this was the only means the republic had of declaring itself. to have entered upon hostile action against portugal at that time would have had only one result, the stoppage of all communication with the outside world by way of delagoa bay. the british forces were sent into rhodesia, and though the subsequent part they played in the war was not important the purpose of the expedition was admitted. it was to cut off any possibility of a retreat northward into british territory by the boer forces which were being driven back by the english advance upon pretoria. the british military plan was that general carrington should march with his forces and reach pretoria from the north at the same time that general roberts reached that point from the south.[ ] thus, the end for which the troops were to be used was not to quell an insurrection of the natives in rhodesia, as was alleged, but to incorporate the expedition into the regular campaign of the war against the republics. this being the case, the contractual grounds upon which the english government claimed the right of passage should have been beyond question in order to furnish a justification for portugal or for england in what is viewed by international law writers of the present day as a distinct breach of neutrality. when the expedition was sent out the statement was made that england was merely availing herself of existing treaty rights, but it was felt necessary to add that the action was not illegal as was that of the boers in making delagoa bay their virtual base earlier in the war. and on may , in legalizing the proceeding, the cabinet at lisbon also felt impelled to say that the portuguese government had not become an instrument of british ambition; that it was not a question of putting into execution in the territory of mozambique conventions recently concluded with england, but merely of profiting by stipulations agreed upon in the treaty of between great britain and portugal. president kruger was, therefore, informed that the legality of the incident was not to be questioned at pretoria. [footnote : times military history, vol. iv, p. ff.] the consensus of opinion among european powers was that the landing of troops at beira and the passage by rail to rhodesia with the consent of portugal constituted a breach of neutrality on the part of the latter. the opinion was freely expressed that the british government not only placed a strained interpretation upon the only basis for her action, the treaty of , but that even upon this interpretation she possessed no real servitude over the territory used by her for warlike purposes. the only claim of justification advanced by the british government which would appear at all tenable rests upon the statement of calvo: "it may be that a servitude of public order, or a treaty made antecedently to the war, imposes on a neutral state the obligation of allowing the passage of the troops of one belligerent." "in such a case," calvo concludes, "the fulfilment of the legal obligation cannot be regarded as an assistance afforded to that belligerent and a violation of the duties of neutrality."[ ] [footnote : baty, int. law in south africa, p. , quoting calvo. but calvo calls attention to the fact that this is his own "exception to the general rule," in support of which he cites no authorities and only one precedent--that of the passage of foreign troops across the canton of schaffhausen in by virtue of a prior treaty between switzerland and the grand duchy of baden. obviously no general conclusion can be drawn from the conduct of a neutralized state, such as switzerland. the general rule, not the exception, is sought in determining international rights. droit international, d ed., iii, § .] basing his argument largely upon this authority, mr. baty asserts that calvo approves the granting of passage where this privilege has been secured by previous treaty. but the following statement which he cites from calvo, taken in connection with the rule given above, would appear to deny this conclusion: "during war neutrals may oppose, even by force, all attempts that a belligerent may make to use their territory, and may, in particular, refuse one of the belligerents a passage for its armies to attack the enemy; _so much the more so, inasmuch as the neutral who should allow a passage of the troops of one belligerent would be false to its character and would give the other just cause of war."_[ ] [footnote : int. law in south africa, p. . this quotation is slightly misleading, but even as used it clearly denies the english claim.] what calvo says is: "tous les publicistes sont d'accord pour admettre que le territoire d'une nation constitue une véritable propriété ... le territoire neutre doit être à l'abri de toutes les entreprises des belligérants de quelque nature qu'elles soient; les neutres ont le droit incontestable de s'opposer par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, même par la force des armes, à toutes les tentatives qu'un belligerant pourrait faire pour user de leur territoire."[ ] he also calls attention to the fact that grotius, wolff and other authors held that a belligerent, "dont la cause est juste peut, pour aller à la rencontre de son ennemi, traverser avec ses armées le territoire d'une nation neutre."[ ] but his statement of the modern rule is conclusive: "par contre, heffter, hautefeuille, manning et d'autres auteurs modernes se sont avec juste raison élevés contre des principes dans lesquels ils entrevoient la négation implicite des droits et des devoirs stricts de la neutralité. a leur yeux, la nation neutre qui consent au passage des troupes de l'une des parties belligerantes manque à son caractère et donne à l'autre partie un juste motif de lui déclarer la guerre."[ ] [footnote : calvo, § .] [footnote : ibid., § .] [footnote : ibid., § .] mr. baty, without reaching any definite conclusion in the matter, admits that the point to be decided in any case is not so much the fact that there is an antecedent treaty, as the nature of that treaty. he says, "if it granted a real right of way of the nature of a right _in rem_ there is no reason why the way should be stopped against troops any more than why a purchaser of territory should be debarred from using, it as a base of military operations." but he points out, "if the treaty only created a right _in personam_ the case is different." in the latter case it is obvious that the power which claims the way depends entirely on the promise of the territorial power for the exercise of that advantage. "in such a case," he concludes, "it may well be that the performance of its promise by the territorial power becomes unlawful, on the outbreak of war between the promiser and a third party."[ ] for international purposes the true test is, "could the power claiming the right of way, or other servitude, enforce its claims during peace time by force, without infringing the sovereignty of the territorial power?" mr. baty's opinion is that "if it could, and, if the servitude is consequently a real right," the promisee might use its road in time of war, and the owner of the territory would be "bound to permit the use, without giving offense to the enemy who is prejudiced by the existence of the servitude."[ ] but he continues, "if the right of way is merely contractual, then the fulfillment of the promise to permit it must be taken to have become illegal on the outbreak of war and the treaty cannot be invoked to justify the grant of passage." it is asserted that in the former case where a real servitude, a right _in rem_, was possessed, to stop the use of the road would be analogous to the seizure by a neutral of a belligerent warship to prevent its being used against the enemy. in the case where the treaty grants the so-called right _in personam_, a merely contractual or promissory right exists, and the exercise of the right would be analogous to the sale of a warship to a belligerent by the neutral granting the permission stipulated in the treaty. mr. baty is of the opinion that while the belligerent might have "a right _in rem_ to the ship so far as the civil law was concerned," it would have only a "quasi-contractual right _in personam_ against the state in whose waters it lay, to allow it to be handed over." obviously, the performance of that duty, to hand over the vessel, "would have become illegal when hostilities broke out."[ ] [footnote : int. law in south africa, p. .] [footnote : ibid., p. .] [footnote : ibid., p. .] we have seen in previous pages that the consensus of opinion among international law authorities of modern times is that a neutral should in no case whatever allow the use of its territory for the purposes of a belligerent expedition against a state with which it is upon friendly terms. but granting the contention made by mr. baty that such a thing as a real servitude may exist in international relations, let us examine the stipulations in the treaty of june , , by which it has been alleged this right was secured to england. if the british government possessed a right _in rem_, then to all intents and purposes it owned the road internationally, in war as well as in peace, for all the uses to which a road is usually put, namely, that of transporting all kinds of goods, warlike or peaceable. if england only possessed a right _in personam_, this right was a valid one in times of peace and for the purposes stipulated by the terms of the treaty, but became void in time of war, and, being purely personal in character, depended upon the promise of the state through which the road passed. in the former case it would be a "right of way" in peace or in war. in the latter case it would be merely a "license to pass," for the granting of which portugal would have to show valid reasons in view of her neutral duties. the parts of the treaty which may by any possibility apply to the case are articles , , and i .[ ] [footnote : british and foreign state papers, vol. , pp. - , treaty between great britain and portugal, defining the spheres of influence of the two countries in africa, signed at lisbon, june , , ratifications exchanged at london, july , .] a portion of article reads: "it is understood that there shall be freedom for the passage of the subjects and goods of both powers across the zambesi, and through the districts adjoining the left bank of the river situated above the confluence of the shiré, and those adjoining the right bank of the zambezi situated above the confluence of the river luenha (ruenga), without hindrance of any description and without payment of transit dues."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. ] the only applicable portion of article says: "the portuguese government engages to permit and to facilitate transit for all persons and goods of every description over the water-ways of the zambezi, the shiré, the pungwe, the busi, the limpopo, the sabi and their tributaries; and also over the land ways which supply means of communication where these rivers are not navigable."[ ] [footnote : british and foreign state papers, vol. , p. .] the only other clause of the treaty which bears on the case is a portion of article : "in the interests of both powers, portugal agrees to grant _absolute freedom of passage_ between the british sphere of influence and pungwe bay for _all merchandise_ of every description and to give the necessary facilities for the improvement of the means of communication."[ ] [footnote : ibid., pp. - . italics our own.] it is obvious that article could not apply to anything more warlike than "_merchandise_" being transported from pungwe bay, where beira is situated, to the british sphere of influence. it is admitted by mr. baty that article is inapplicable to any routes other than the water-ways specified and the land routes and portages auxiliary to them. it is also admitted that the only other stipulation that might apply, article ii, "obviously applies to the territory far to the north, and concerns the question of access to british central africa."[ ] [footnote : international law in south africa, p. .] mr. baty, however, contends that it was not a new right, that of passage through portuguese territory, but was one created by this treaty. upon the supposition that if the right still existed in times of war it must have been by virtue of article ii, he says, "the question arises, 'was it such a grant as could be valid in war time?'"[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. .] it should be remembered that mr. baty has concluded that calvo asserts the possibility of a neutral, without violating its neutral obligations, allowing a belligerent to pass troops over neutral territory for the purpose of attacking a state which is on friendly terms with the government granting the privilege. mr. baty asserts that a real easement existed in favor of england if she might "force her way along" the routes stipulated in the treaty, "without going to war with portugal," but he says this interpretation is always "subject to the consideration, that the terms of the treaty do not seem to contemplate the use of the road as a military road at all," a conclusion which would seem to settle the question, and deny that any shred of justification existed for the use to which neutral territory was put in time of war. but mr. baty in the same breath says: "there can be such a thing as a military road across neutral territory. the german empire has such a road across the canton of schaffhausen, and there used to be one between saxony and poland. but it seems very questionable whether the roads indicated by the treaty of were not simply commercial, and not for the purposes of war at all."[ ] and this english writer reluctantly admits, "the treaty has, therefore, to be pressed very far to cover the grant of an overland passage for troops from beira inland."[ ] [footnote : international law in south africa, p. .] [footnote : ibid., p. .] the conclusion reached by mr. baty is far more favorable to england than the circumstances of the case warrant. "one may regret," he says, "that the british government should have found it necessary to place a somewhat strained interpretation on a treaty which, even then did not give them in anything like clear terms, an absolute servitude of the kind contended for."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. .] such a conclusion is misleading in the first place because the british government was contending for a right which was not recognized among independent nations at the time the treaty was formed; in the second place, granting that ancient authorities may have declared the possibility of such a right existing in time of war, the stipulations of the treaty itself are the strongest argument against the interpretation used by england. hall has pointed out that, "when the language of a treaty, taken in the ordinary meaning of the words, yields a plain and reasonable sense, it must be taken to be read in that sense."[ ] the only reasonable sense in which the stipulations of the british-portuguese treaty of could be taken was that of a purely commercial agreement. the spirit of the treaty, the general sense and the context of the disputed terms all seem to indicate that the instrument considered only times of peace and became absolutely invalid with reference to the transportation of troops in time of war. the authority already cited says, "when the words of a treaty fail to yield a plain and reasonable sense they should be interpreted by recourse to the general sense and spirit of the treaty as shown by the context of the incomplete, improper, ambiguous, or obscure passages, or by the provisions of the instrument as a whole,"[ ] [footnote : international law ( ), p. .] [footnote : hall, int. law ( ), p. .] unquestionably the provisions of the instrument as a whole yield but one meaning. the treaty is not broad enough to sustain the passage of troops in time of war. nor would there seem to be any plausibility in the claim that certain mutual explanations exchanged between the two governments at the time of the signing of the treaty gave tenable ground for the fulfilment of such a right as that which was granted by portugal. the words of the portuguese notification to the transvaal condemn the action of portugal rather than justify the proceeding in view of the requirements of the neutrality of the present day. this communication read: "the portuguese government has just been informed that in accordance with the mutual explanations exchanged in the treaty of with regard to the right of moving troops and material of war through the portuguese territory in south africa into english territory and _vice versa_, the british government has just made a formal demand for all troops and material of war to be sent through beira to the english hinterland. the portuguese government cannot refuse the demand and must fulfill a convention depending on reciprocity, a convention which was settled long before the present state of war had been foreseen. this agreement cannot be regarded as a superfluous support of one of the belligerent parties or as a violation of the duties imposed by neutrality or indeed of the good friendly relations which the portuguese government always wishes to keep up with the government of the south african republic."[ ] the fact that the assent of the portuguese government was obtained only after ten weeks of pressure brought to bear upon the lisbon authorities would seem to indicate that intrigue is more potent in international relations than accepted precedent. [footnote : times military history of the war in south africa, vol. iv, p. , note.] in its reply to the portuguese dispatch the transvaal reasonably protested that the treaty in question had not been made public and that no notice of it had been received by the republic at the outbreak of war.[ ] it was pointed out that this being the case the treaty could not be applied even if it granted the right contended for by england. and even stronger was the transvaal argument that in no case after war had begun could such a treaty be applied by a neutral state to the disadvantage of third parties. the fact of neutrality had suspended the working of the agreement. the action of portugal, it was justly alleged, put her in the position of an enemy instead of a neutral. [footnote : ibid., p. , note.] the transvaal contention would appear to be fully warranted. in the light of modern international law the action of england in sending troops through neutral portuguese territory against a nation at peace with portugal was based upon a flagrant misreading of a purely commercial treaty. the action of the portuguese government in allowing this to be accomplished was a gross breach of the duties incumbent upon a neutral state in time of war. chapter iii. contraband of war and neutral ports. during the war the question of blockade could not arise for the reason that neither the transvaal nor the orange free state possessed a seaport. lorenzo marques being a neutral portuguese possession could not be blockaded by the english. general buller, commanding the british land forces in south africa, had indeed urged that such a declaration be made, but it was realized by great britain that such a step was not possible under the laws of war.[ ] more stringent measures, however, were taken to prevent the smuggling of contraband through delagoa bay, a transaction which the english alleged was an everyday occurrence. a number of neutral merchantmen bound for this port were seized, but the difficulty experienced by england was her inability to prove that the goods on board were really intended for the enemy, or that the men shown as passengers were actually proceeding to the transvaal as recruits for the boer forces in the field. [footnote : sessional papers of the house of commons, royal commission on the war in south africa, appendices to minutes of evidence being c. ( ).] on october the ship _avondale castle_ had been arrested by the english gunboat _partridge_ and ordered to return under escort to durban. the british cruiser _tartar_ there took over £ , in gold which, it was alleged, had been intended for the transvaal government. it was found, however, that the gold was consigned to the delagoa branch of the transvaal bank from the durban branch of the same institution. the allegation against the consignment, it was considered by the prize court, did not sufficiently contaminate the shipment since the destination was proved to be a neutral one and the point of departure an english port. in february the gold was returned to the bank of durban because the ultimate destination of the consignment did not warrant the presumption that it was enemy's property. in november a french steamer, the _cordoba_, was hailed by the british cruiser _magicienne_. the _cordoba_ refused to recognize the signal to halt seventy miles out from lorenzo marques and was brought to by a blank shot. her papers, however, failed to show any guilt on her part and she was allowed to proceed to her port of destination, lorenzo marques. these seizures indicate the feeling of suspicion which was prevalent in england that apparently innocent descriptions in the bills of lading of steamers arriving at lorenzo marques concealed contraband of war. the question was raised whether the english commanders should not be ordered to open packing cases and the like and not examine merely the manifests in order to furnish evidence which would warrant the confiscation of the goods and possibly the ships carrying contraband, should such be found on board. the council of the british and foreign arbitration association sent a resolution to the english government and to that of portugal which declared: "this association most earnestly and emphatically protests against the permission granted by portugal to the boers of the transvaal to make of lorenzo marques an emporium for the collection of arms and ammunition against great britain with whom the king of portugal is at peace ... thereby ... enlarging the sphere of the present carnage in south africa."[ ] [footnote : london times, weekly ed., dec. , , p. , col. i.] it was alleged in england that at the beginning of the war, when the portuguese government believed victory certain for great britain and only a matter of brief hostilities, the administration at lorenzo marques had put a certain amount of restraint upon the extent to which the port might be used as a base of warlike supplies, but had later relaxed this proper restriction. the only remedy possible to be applied by england was the right of patrol outside the three mile limit, but the detection of forbidden forms of commerce was practically impossible. undoubtedly not only food but munitions of war as well were brought in concealed in the holds of merchantmen and by other devices. to examine the ships properly at sea it was estimated would have required three weeks or more, and it was declared that such an examination alone could have insured great britain in her rights, since the bills of lading were evidently fictitious. recruits came in on the ships in question as waiters, as sailors, as passengers, and when landed were sent on to pretoria. with permanent offices at the hague, dr. leyds, it was asserted, was the recruiting agent of the transvaal, and was successful in sending out men from germany, belgium, russia, sweden, holland, ireland, and as a matter of fact from the whole of europe as a great recruiting station. it was this state of affairs that impelled the english government to assume an attitude toward neutral commerce which it was found difficult to maintain against other nations whose interests were involved. the points in the british position which were most violently attacked were the classification of foodstuffs as contraband in certain cases, and the application which was made of the doctrine of "continuous voyages," not to absolute contraband of war or to goods seeking to cross the line of an established blockade, but to other classes which are usually considered free. there seems little certainty as to the exact circumstances under which a belligerent may treat foodstuffs as contraband, although it is generally admitted that under certain conditions such goods may be so considered. on the other hand doubt is expressed by many writers upon international law as to whether it is ever possible to treat as contraband of war such articles as are necessary for the sustenance of a people. contraband as is well known is generally held to consist of two kinds, first, absolute contraband such as arms, machinery for manufacturing arms, ammunition and any materials which are of direct application in naval or military armaments; second, conditional contraband, consisting of articles which are fit for but not necessarily of direct application to hostile uses. the first class is always liable to capture and confiscation, but with regard to the second class no unanimity of opinion exists. disputes always arise as to what articles, though not necessarily of direct applicability to hostile uses, may nevertheless be considered contraband of war. this question is especially difficult of solution with reference to foodstuffs when seized on their way to a belligerent in neutral bottoms. the case of seizure which occurred during the war involved not only the question of foodstuffs as contraband but brought up also the applicability of the doctrine of "continuous voyages," where the article being conveyed to a belligerent by stages were goods which, except under unusual circumstances, have generally been held to be free from the taint of contraband character. great britain has held that provisions and liquors fit for the consumption of the enemy's naval or military forces may be treated as contraband. in the case of the seizure of "naval or victualling" stores her rule has been their purchase without condemnation in a prize court.[ ] [footnote : holland, manual of naval prize law ( ), p. .] france in declared rice to be contraband when shipped from the southern to the northern ports of china, with whom she was at war. but in declaring that all cargoes so shipped were to be considered as contraband the french government made a distinction as to their intended or probable destination and use. great britain protested at that time, but as no cases came before french prize courts we have no way of judging of the french declaration and its value as a precedent. but the majority of the authorities upon the principles of international law admit that foodstuffs which are destined for the use of the enemy's army or navy may be declared contraband in character. the practice of the united states, of great britain and of japan has been to follow this rule. russia in declared rice and provisions in general to be contraband. when great britain and the united states protested against this decision the russian government altered its declaration so far as to include foodstuffs as conditional contraband only. germany has held that articles which may serve at the same time in war and peace are reputed contraband if their destination for the military or naval operations of the enemy is shown by the circumstances. all authorities seem to agree that contraband to be treated as such must be captured in the course of direct transit to the belligerent, but the difficulty nearly always arises as to what shall be considered direct transit. one rule has been that the shipment is confiscable if bound for a hostile port, another that it is only necessary to show that the ultimate destination of the goods is hostile. the latter rule was declared to apply in the american case of the _springbok_, an english merchantman conveying goods in from a neutral port to a neutral port, but, it was alleged, with the evident intention that the goods should reach by a later stage of the same voyage the belligerent forces of the southern confederacy, then at war with the united states.[ ] in this case, however, the conclusive presumption was that the character of the goods themselves left no doubt possible as to their ultimate destination. the guilt of the vessel was not based upon the ground of carrying contraband but upon a presumption that the blockade established over the southern states was to have been broken. both the ship and its cargo were condemned by the district court of southern new york, but the cargo alone was later considered liable to condemnation by the supreme court of the united states. great britain at the time noted an exception to the decision, but refused to take up claims on the part of the english owners against the united states government for indemnity. earl russell, in refusing the request of the owners for intervention by great britain, said in part: "a careful perusal ... of the judgment, containing the reasons of the judge, the authorities cited by him in support of it, and the ... evidence invoked ... goes ... to establish that the cargo of the _springbok_, containing a considerable portion of contraband, was never really and _bona fide_ destined for nassau [the alleged destination], but was either destined merely to call there, or to be immediately transshipped after its arrival there without breaking bulk and without any previous incorporation into the common stock of that colony, and to proceed to its real port of destination, being a blockaded port."[ ] [footnote : sessional papers of the house of commons, correspondence respecting the seizure of the british vessels "springbok" and "peterhof" by united states cruisers in , miscl. no. i ( ), c. ] [footnote : sessional papers of the house of commons, p. .] this case is often cited as containing an application of the doctrine of "continuous voyages" to contraband _per se_. but it seems that the primary question was not one of contraband. the guilt of the ship lay rather in the intention, presumed upon the evidence, that a breach of an actual blockade was ultimately designed. the supreme court in reviewing the decision of the lower court said: "we do not refer to the character of the cargo for the purpose of determining whether it was liable to condemnation as contraband, but for the purpose of ascertaining its real destination; for we repeat again, contraband or not, it could not be condemned if really destined for nassau, and not beyond, and, contraband or not, it must be condemned if destined to any rebel port, for all rebel ports are under blockade."[ ] in other words, the decision was upon presumption and not upon the evidence in the case; upon the presumption that a breach of blockade was premeditated and not upon the ground that the cargo was contraband. the fact that the cargo was of a character which did not seem likely to be incorporated into the stock in trade of the nassau population gave the judges whatever justification there was for the presumption that the goods were intended to be transshipped without breaking bulk. a recent english writer, mr. atherley-jones, who criticises this decision of the supreme court of the united states as a verdict based upon the principle of the expediency of the moment and not upon the usual rules of evidence, admits that if a vessel sails with the intention of violating a blockade there is no question of the character of the port from which she sets out but insists that there is no necessity in such a case to apply the doctrine of "continuous voyages," if it can be proved, he says, that she is going to a blockaded port, it does not matter whether she is going to a neutral one or not, but it must be made clear that she is going to a blockaded one. he points to the fact that suspicion can never prove this apart from the ship's papers, the admission of the ship's company and the situation and course of the vessel. his view of the case is that the supreme court as well as the lower courts of, the united states "accepted well founded surmise as to a vessel's destination in lieu of proof," and he adds, "the danger of such a departure needs no further comment."[ ] [footnote : op. cit., p. .] [footnote : commerce in war ( ), p. .] the first position taken by great britain to support her right of seizure of foodstuffs bound for delagoa bay seems to have been based upon this departure of the supreme court of the united states in the case of the _springbok_ in . it was found, however, that this basis of justification would not be acceptable to other powers generally nor to the united states when the doctrine of "continuous voyages" was given such an application as practically to include foodstuffs as contraband. without the taint of contraband there could be no justification even upon the _springbok_ decision as a precedent, since there was no blockaded port in question. in the seizure of american goods which were being conveyed by british ships there was the possibility of a violation of a municipal regulation which forbade british subjects to trade with the enemy. but the charge of trading with the enemy to gain plausible ground necessarily carried with it the further presumption that the ultimate intention was that the foodstuffs should reach the transvaal by a later stage of the same voyage. with reference to the arrest and detention of german mail steamers bound for delagoa bay, the english government found the attempt to substitute possibly well-grounded suspicions for facts no more acceptable to third powers than the assumption with regard to foodstuffs had been, if the emphatic statements of the german government indicate the general opinion upon the subject of the carrying of analogues of contraband and unneutral service in general. german seizures. bundesrath, herzog and general. the bundesrath.--it was reported to the english government by rear admiral sir robert harris, on december , , that the german east african mail steamer _bundesrath_ had sailed from aden for delagoa bay. he informed his government that ammunition was "suspected but none ascertained;" that the _bundesrath_ had on board "twenty dutch and germans and two supposed boers, three germans and two australians believed to be officers, all believed to be intending combatants, although shown as civilians; also twenty-four portuguese soldiers."[ ] on the twenty-ninth of the same month the _bundesrath_ was taken into durban, about three hundred miles from lorenzo marques, under the escort of the british cruiser _magicienne_. the german government demanded the immediate release of the steamer upon the assurance made by the hamburg owners that she carried no contraband. great indignation was expressed in hamburg, and a demand was made in the chamber of commerce that measures be taken to insure the protection of german commercial interests. a diplomatic note was sent by germany protesting against the action of england. lord salisbury's reply on the part of his government was that the _bundesrath_ was suspected of carrying ammunition in her cargo, and that it was known that she had on board a number of passengers who were believed to be volunteers for service with the boers. he added, however, that no official details had been received other than those contained in the cable announcing the fact that the ship had been captured.[ ] the german consul at durban protested against the ship's being brought in there as prize, and his government reiterated its request that she be released at once since she carried no contraband. the detention of a mail ship, it was asserted, interfered with public interests in addition to the loss which was inflicted upon the owners of the vessel. [footnote : sessional papers of the house of commons, correspondence respecting the action of her majesty's naval authorities with reference to certain foreign vessels, africa no. i ( ), c. , p. i.] [footnote : ibid., pp. - .] admiral harris reported on december that the _bundesrath_ had changed the position of her cargo on being chased, a fact which was considered suspicious; that a partial search had revealed sugar consigned to a firm at delagoa bay, and railway sleepers and small trucks consigned to the same place. it was expected that a further search would reveal arms among the baggage of the germans on board who admitted that they were going to the transvaal. england's senior naval officer at durban was of the opinion that there was ample ground for discharging the cargo and searching it. the request was accordingly made that authority be given for throwing the ship into a prize court, and that instructions be forwarded as to the proper disposal of the passengers on board. despite the protest of germany that the _bundesrath_ carried neither contraband nor volunteers for the transvaal, instructions were issued that a prize court should take over the ship and a search be at once made by competent authorities. orders were given at the same time, however, that until it became evident that the _bundesrath_ was carrying contraband, "other german mail steamers should not be arrested on suspicion only."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. .] instructions were also issued by the british government that application be made to the prize court for the release of the mails; that if they were released they were to be handed over to the german consul and to be hastened to their destination, "either by an english cruiser if available, or by a mail steamer, or otherwise."[ ] it was pointed out that the ship and its cargo, including the mails, were in the custody of the court and except by the order of that tribunal should not be touched. it was urged, however, that every facility for proceeding to his destination be afforded to any passenger whom the court considered innocent. [footnote : ibid., pp. - ; chamberlain to hely-hutchinson, jan. , .] the german consul at durban reported that no contraband had been found on the _bundesrath_ although a thorough search had been made. the failure to discover goods of a contraband character apparently rendered the action of great britain's naval authorities unjustifiable. germany indeed insisted that had there been contraband disclosed even this fact would not have given england any right to interfere with neutral commerce from one neutral port to another and insisted that the task of preventing the transmission of contraband to the transvaal lay with the portuguese government.[ ] the fact was also pointed out that when war first broke out, the steamship company owning the _bundesrath_ had discharged shipments of a contraband character at dar-es-salaam as well as at port said in order to obviate any possible complication, and since then had issued strict orders that contraband should not be embarked. [footnote : ibid., p. ; lascelles to salisbury, jan. , .] great britain expressed herself as "entirely unable to accede to ... the contention that a neutral vessel was entitled to convey without hindrance contraband of war to the enemy, so long as the port at which she intended to land it was a neutral port."[ ] the novel suggestion was made by germany that "the mail steamer be allowed to go on bail so as not to interfere more than was necessary with her voyage," but the english representative doubted the practicability of such a plan. he was in favor of the suggestion if it could be adopted under suitable conditions, but since the ship had probably gone into the hands of the prize court, that tribunal, he said, would have to act independently. [footnote : ibid., p. ; salisbury to lascelles, jan. , .] on january the mails and the passengers were released by order of the court and were taken on board the german warship, _condor_, for delagoa bay. but not until two weeks later were the ship and its cargo released.[ ] the only reason assigned by the court for the release was that no contraband had been discovered by the search. [footnote : ibid., p. ; hely-hutchinson to chamberlain, jan. , .] since the three cases which attracted most attention, the _bundesrath_, the _herzog_, and the _general_, with a few unimportant exceptions as to details, were similar in regard to the points of law involved, the facts in the remaining cases will be outlined. it will then be possible to discuss the grounds upon which great britain asserted the right of seizure, and the objections which germany made to the english assertion. the herzog.--on december , , a cable from the commander-in-chief of the mediterranean station announced to the british foreign office that the german "steamship" _herzog_ had left the suez canal on the twelfth for south africa carrying "a considerable number of male passengers, many in khaki, apparently soldiers" although "no troops were declared." on the same day an inquiry was made by the commander at the cape whether "a number of passengers dressed in khaki" could be "legally removed" from the _herzog_.[ ] on the twenty-first the senior naval officer at aden reported that the _herzog_ had sailed on the eighteenth for delagoa bay conveying, "probably for service in the transvaal, about forty dutch and german medical and other officers and nurses."[ ] although instructions had been issued on the first of january that neither the _herzog_ nor any other german mail steamer should be arrested "_on suspicion only_" until it became evident that the _bundesrath_, which was then being searched, really carried contraband, the _herzog_ was taken into durban as prize on the sixth by the british ship _thetis_. [footnote : ibid. p. ; admiralty to foreign office, nos. and .] [footnote : ibid., pp. , , ii.] the consul at durban as well as the commander of the german man-of-war _condor_ protested in the name of their government against the seizure of the _herzog_. they urged that the vessel be allowed to proceed since her captain had given the assurance that there were no contraband goods on board; that the only suspected articles were the mails, and certain small iron rails and railway sleepers which were destined for the neutral port of delagoa bay. on board the _herzog_, however, there were three red cross expeditions, one of which had no official connection with the legitimate red cross societies. it had no official character but had been organized by a committee, the "hilfs ausshuss für transvaal in antwerp."[ ] the other red cross expeditions were legitimate, one being german and the other dutch. [footnote : ibid., p. .] on the seventh instructions were issued that the _herzog_ be released at once, unless guns or ammunition were revealed by a summary search. but on the following day the order was added that proceedings might be discontinued and the ship released unless "provisions on board are destined for the enemy's government or agents, and are also for the supply of troops or are especially adapted for use as rations for troops."[ ] on the ninth the _herzog_ was released, arrangements having been made two days before for the passage of one of the passengers, the portuguese governor of zambesi, to delagoa bay by the _harlech castle._ [footnote : ibid., pp. , .] the general.--on the fourth of january the senior naval officer at aden had reported to the english admiralty that the german vessel _general_, another east african mail steamer, was under detention there upon strong suspicion and was being searched.[ ] the german government at once entered a strong protest and demanded in rather brusque terms "that orders be given for the immediate release of the steamer and her cargo, for that portion of her cargo which has already been landed to be taken on board again, and for no hindrances to be placed in the way of the ship continuing her voyage to the places mentioned in her itinerary." count hatzfelt, the german representative in london, continued: "i am further instructed to request your excellency [the marquis of salisbury] to cause explicit instructions to be sent to the commanders of british ships in african waters to respect the rules of international law, and to place no further impediments in the way of the trade between neutrals."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. .] [footnote : ibid., p. .] to the form and imputations of this request the british government took exception, and the situation appeared ominous for a time. instructions had been issued, however, that unless the _general_ disclosed contraband after a summary search it was undesirable to detain the ship since she carried the mails. the report of the naval officer at aden disclosed the fact that he had boarded and detained the ship at that place. the ground for his action was that he had been informed that a number of suspicious articles were on board for delagoa bay, including boxes of ammunition stowed in the main hold, buried under reserve coal. an inspection of the manifest had shown several cases of rifle ammunition for mauser, mannlicher and sporting rifles consigned to mombasa, but this consignment was believed to be _bona fide_. other suspected articles on the manifest were wagon axles and chemicals and at the bottom of the hold was a consignment of food for delagoa bay, with boilers and heavy machinery stowed on top of the reserve coal. the _general_ carried besides a number of flemish and german passengers for delagoa bay, in plain clothes but of "military appearance," some of whom were believed to be trained artillerymen. it was suggested that this last doubt could be cleared up only by a search of the private baggage of the persons suspected, but it was not considered by the british foreign office that there was "sufficient evidence as to their destination to justify further action on the part of the officers conducting the search."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. ; see also pp. , , .] on the seventh the _general_ was released, but was not able to sail until the tenth, a delay due to the labor of restowing her cargo, which was done as quickly as possible. the crew of the english ship _marathon_, assisted by one hundred coolies, having worked day and night after the arrival of the ship on the fourth, completed the search on the sixth but were unable to complete the restowal until the morning of the tenth. the judicial aspects of the seizures. in the discussion which occurred during the detention, and which was continued after the release of the three german ships, the assertions made by the british and german governments brought out the fact that english practice is often opposed to continental opinion in questions of international law. on the fourth of january the german ambassador in london had declared that his government, "after carefully examining the matter" of the seizure of the _bundesrath_, and considering the judicial aspects of the case, was "of the opinion that proceedings before a prize court were not justified."[ ] this view of the case, he declared, was based on the consideration that "proceedings before a prize court are only justified where the presence of contraband of war is proved, and that, whatever may have been on board the _bundesrath_, there could have been no contraband of war, since, according to recognized principles of international law, there cannot be contraband of war in trade between neutral ports." [footnote : sessional papers, africa, no. i ( ), c. , p. ; hatzfelt to salisbury, jan. , .] he asserted that this view was taken by the english government in the case of the _springbok_ in as opposed to the decision of the supreme court of the united states sitting as a prize court on an appeal from the lower district court of the state of new york.[ ] the protest of the british government against the decision of the united states court as contravening these recognized principles, he said, was put on record in the manual of naval prize law published by the english admiralty in , three years after the original protest. the passage cited from the manual read: "a vessel's destination should be considered neutral, if both the port to which she is bound and every intermediate port at which she is to call in the course of her voyage be neutral," and "the destination of the vessel is conclusive as to the destination of the goods on board." in view of this declaration on the part of great britain toward neutral commerce count hatzfeldt contended that his government was "fully justified in claiming the release of the _bundesrath_ without investigation by a prize court, and that all the more because, since the ship is a mail-steamer with a fixed itinerary, she could not discharge her cargo at any other port than the neutral port of destination."[ ] [footnote : this case, it will be remembered, was _not_ decided on the ground of the contraband character of the goods in the cargo but because of the presumption that the ultimate intention of the ship was to break the blockade established over the southern states. this well founded suspicion, based upon the character of the cargo as tending to show that it could be intended only for the forces of the southern confederacy, led to the conclusion that a breach of blockade was premeditated. this presumption no doubt was correct and in this particular case the decision of the court was probably justified, but the course of reasoning by which the conclusion was reached was generally considered a dangerous innovation in international relations. it has been recently again asserted that the decision was not based upon the accepted rules of evidence. supra p. . for a clear statement of the latter view, see atherley-jones, commerce in war, p. .] [footnote : sessional papers, africa, no. i ( ), c. , p. ; hatzfeldt to salisbury, jan. , .] in his reply to the german note lord salisbury thought it desirable, before examining the doctrine put forward, to remove certain "errors of fact in regard to the authorities" cited. he emphatically declared that the british government had not in "raised any claim or contention against the judgment of the united states' prize court in the case of the _springbok_" and he continued: "on the first seizure of that vessel, and on an _ex parte_ and imperfect statement of the fact by the owners, earl russell, then secretary of state for foreign affairs, informed her majesty's minister at washington that there did not appear to be any justification for the seizure of the vessel and her cargo, that the supposed reason, namely, that there were articles in the manifest not accounted for by the captain, certainly did not warrant the seizure, more especially as the destination of the vessel appeared to have been _bona fide_ neutral, but that, inasmuch as it was probable that the vessel had by that time been carried before a prize court of the united states for adjudication, and that the adjudication might shortly follow, if it had not already taken place, the only instruction that he could at present give to lord lyons was to watch the proceedings and the judgment of the court, and eventually transmit full information as to the course of the trial and its results." he asserted that the real contention advanced in the plea of the owners for the intervention of the british government had been that "the goods [on board the _springbok_] were, in fact, _bona fide_ consigned to a neutral at nassau;" but that this plea had been refused by the british government without "any diplomatic protest or ... any objection against the decision ... nor did they ever express any dissent from that decision on the grounds on which it was based."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. ; salisbury to lascelles, jan. , .] this assertion is fairly based upon the reply of the english government to the owners on february , . earl russell had expressly declared that his government could not interfere officially. "on the contrary," he said, "a careful perusal of the elaborate and able judgment, containing the reasons of the judge, the authorities cited by him in support of it, and the important evidence properly invoked from the cases of the _stephen hart_ and _gertrude_ (which her majesty's government have now seen for the first time) in which the same parties were concerned," had convinced his government that the decision was justifiable under the circumstances.[ ] the fact was pointed out that the evidence had gone "so far to establish that the cargo of the _springbok_, containing a considerable portion of contraband, was never really and _bona fide_ destined for nassau, but was either destined merely to call there or to be immediately transhipped after its arrival there without breaking bulk and without any previous incorporation into the common stock of that colony, and then to proceed to its _real destination_, being a _blockaded port_."[ ] the "complicity of the owners of the ship, with the design of the owners of the cargo," was "so probable on the evidence" that, in the opinion of the law advisers of the crown, "there would be great difficulty in contending that this ship and cargo had not been rightly condemned." the only recourse of the owners was consequently the "usual and proper remedy of an appeal" before the united states courts. [footnote : sessional papers, miscl., no. i ( ), c. , pp. - ; russell to lyons, feb. , .] [footnote : ibid. italics our own.] the next point that count hatzfeldt made was not so squarely met by lord salisbury, namely, that the manual of the english admiralty of expressly declared: "a vessel's destination shall be considered neutral, if both the point to which she is bound and every intermediate port at which she is to call in the course of her voyage be neutral." and again, "the destination is conclusive as to the destination of the goods on board." count hatzfeldt contended that upon this principle, admitted by great britain herself, germany was fully justified in claiming the release of the ship without adjudication since she was a mail-steamer with a fixed itinerary and consequently could not discharge her cargo at any other port than the neutral port of destination.[ ] [footnote : sessional papers, africa, no. i ( ), c. , p. .] the only reply that lord salisbury could make was that the manual cited was only a general statement of the principles by which british officers were to be guided in the exercise of their duties, but that it had never been asserted and could not be admitted to be an exhaustive or authoritative statement of the views of the british government. he further contended that the preface stated that it did not treat of questions which would ultimately have to be settled by english prize courts. the assertion was then made that while the directions of the manual were sufficient for practical purposes in the case of wars such as had been waged by great britain in the past, they were quite inapplicable to the case which had arisen of war with an inland state whose only communication with the sea was over a few miles of railway to a neutral port. the opinion of the british government was that the passage cited to the effect "that the destination of the vessel is conclusive as to the destination of the goods on board" had no application. "it cannot apply to contraband of war on board a neutral vessel if such contraband was at the time of seizure consigned or intended to be delivered to an agent of the enemy at a neutral port, or, in fact, destined for the enemy's country."[ ] [footnote : ibid., pp. - . salisbury to lascelles, jan. , .] lord salisbury then cited bluntschli as stating what in the opinion of the british government was the correct view in regard to goods captured under such circumstances: "if the ships or goods are sent to the destination of a neutral port only the better to come to the aid of the enemy, there will be contraband of war and confiscation will be justified."[ ] and, basing his argument upon this authority, he insisted that his government could not admit that there was sufficient reason for ordering the release of the _bundesrath_ "without examination by the prize court as to whether she was carrying contraband of war belonging to, or destined for, the south african republic." it was admitted, however, that the british government fully recognized how desirable it was that the examination should be carried through at the earliest possible moment, and that "all proper consideration should be shown for the owners and for innocent passengers and all merchandise on board of her."[ ] it was intimated that explicit instructions had been issued for this purpose and that arrangements had been made for the speedy transmission of the mails. [footnote : "si les navires ou marchandises ne sont expédiés à destination d'un port neutre que pour mieux venir en aide à l'ennemi, il y aura contrebande de guerre, et la confiscation sera justifiée." droit int. codifié, french translation by lardy, , d ed., § . one of the two cases cited in support of this opinion is that of the _springbok_, but in § , rem. , the following statement is made: "une théorie fort dangereuse a été formulé par le juge chase: 'lorsqu'un port bloqué est le lieu de destination du navire, le neutre doit être condamné, même lorsqu'il se rend préalablement dans un port neutre, peu importe qu'il ait ou non de la contrebande de guerre à bord.'"] [footnote : sessional papers, africa, no. i ( ), c. , p. ; salisbury to lascelles, jan. , .] the german government, agreeing for the moment to put to one side the disputed question of trade between neutral ports in general, nevertheless insisted that since a preliminary search of the _bundesrath_ had not disclosed contraband of war on board there was no justification for delivering the vessel to a prize court. the suggestion was made that future difficulty might be avoided by an agreement upon a parallel of latitude down to which all ships should be exempt from search. and although it was not found possible to reach an exact agreement upon this point, orders were issued by great britain that the right of search should not in future be exercised at aden or at any place at an equal distance from the seat of war and that no mail steamers should be arrested on suspicion alone. only mail steamers of subsidized lines were to be included, but in all cases of steamers carrying the mails the right of search was to be exercised with all possible consideration and only resorted to when the circumstances were clearly such as to justify the gravest suspicion.[ ] [footnote : ibid., pp. - .] it is interesting to note in the positions taken by the german and english governments with regard to the theory of ultimate destination and continuous voyages a wide divergence of opinion. the british government apparently based its contention upon the decision of the united states supreme court in the case of the _springbok_ in , namely, that a continuous voyage may be _presumed_ from an intended ultimate hostile destination in the case of a _breach of blockade_, the contraband character of the goods only tending to show the ultimate hostile intention of the ship. but the english contention went further than this and attempted to apply the doctrine to contraband goods ultimately intended for the enemy or the enemy's country by way of a neutral port which, however, was not and could not be blockaded. the german government contended on the other hand that this position was not tenable and apparently repudiated the extension of the continuous voyage doctrine as attempted by england. in the end the immediate dispute was settled upon the following principles: ( ) the british government admitted, in principle at any rate, the obligation to make compensation for the loss incurred by the owners of the ships which had been detained, and expressed a readiness to arbitrate claims which could not be arranged by other methods. ( ) instructions were issued that vessels should not be stopped and searched at aden or at any point equally or more distant from the seat of war. ( ) it was agreed provisionally, till another arrangement should be reached, that german mail steamers should not be searched in future on suspicion only. this agreement was obviously a mere arrangement dictated by the necessity of the moment, and was not such as would settle the question of the extent to which the doctrine of continuous voyages might be extended in dealing with contraband trade or with alleged traffic of this character. count von bülow, the german chancellor, speaking before the reichstag with reference to the seizures of the german mail steamers said: "we strove from the outset to induce the english government in dealing with neutral vessels consigned to delagoa bay, to adhere to that theory of international law which guarantees the greatest security to commerce and industry, and which finds expression in the principle that _for ships consigned from neutral states to a neutral port, the notion of contraband of war simply does not exist_. to this the english government demurred. we have reserved to ourselves the right of raising this question in the future, in the first place because it was essential to us to arrive at an expeditious solution of the pending difficulty, and secondly, because, in point of fact, the principle here set up by us has not met with universal recognition in theory and practice."[ ] [footnote : sessional papers, africa, no. i ( ), c ; p. , jan. , . italics our own.] summing up what in the opinion of the german government corresponded most closely with the general opinion of the civilized world, the chancellor then declared: "we recognize the rights which the law of nations actually concedes to belligerents with regard to neutral vessels and neutral trade and traffic. we do not ignore the duties imposed by a state of war upon the ship owners, merchants, and vessels of a neutral state, but we require of the belligerents that they shall not extend the powers they possess in this respect beyond the strict necessities of war. we demand of the belligerents that they shall respect the inalienable rights of legitimate neutral commerce, and we require above all things that the right of search and of the eventual capture of neutral ships and goods shall be exercised by the belligerents in a manner conformable to the maintenance of neutral commerce, and of the relations of neutrality existing between friendly and civilized nations."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. .] this doctrine, namely, that "for ships consigned from neutral states to a neutral port, the notion of contraband simply does not exist," clearly defined the contention of great britain that contraband which "at the time of seizure" was "consigned or intended to be delivered to an agent of the enemy at a neutral port, or, in fact, destined for the enemy's country," is liable to seizure and that both ship and cargo may be confiscated.[ ] it also denied the english contention that "provisions on board ... destined for the enemy's government or agents, and ... also for the supply of troops or ... especially adapted for use as rations for troops" may be seized as contraband.[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. ; salisbury to lascelles, jan. , .] [footnote : ibid., p. ; admiralty to harris, jan. , .] count von bülow summarized the action of the german government by saying: "we demanded in the first place the release of the steamers.... in the second place we demanded the payment of compensation for the unjustified detention of our ships and for the losses incurred by the german subjects whose interests were involved.... thirdly, we drew attention to the necessity for issuing instructions to the british naval commanders to molest no german merchantmen in places not in the vicinity of the seat of war, or at any rate, in places north of aden.... fourthly, we stated it to be highly desirable that the english government should instruct their commanders not to arrest steamers flying the german mail flag.... fifthly, we proposed that all points in dispute should be submitted to arbitration.... lastly, the english government have given expression to their regret for what has occurred. we cherish the hope that such regrettable incidents will not be repeated. we trust that the english naval authorities will not again proceed without sufficient cause, in an unfriendly and precipitate manner against our ships."[ ] [footnote : speech in reichstag, jan. , .] the chancellor at the same time set forth certain general propositions as a tentative system of law to be operative in practice, a disregard of which in the opinion of the german government would constitute a breach of international treaties and customs: ( ) "neutral merchant ships on the high seas or in the territorial waters of the belligerent powers ...are subject to the right of visit by the warships of the belligerent parties." it was pointed out that this was apart from the right of convoy, a question which did not arise in the cases under discussion. the proposal was not intended to apply to waters which were too remote from the seat of war and a special agreement was advocated for mail ships. "( ) the right of visit is to be exercised with as much consideration as possible and without undue molestation. "( ) the procedure in visiting a vessel consists of two or three acts according to the circumstances of each case; stopping the ship, examining her papers, and searching her. the two first acts may be undertaken at any time, and without preliminary proceeding. if the neutral vessel resists the order to stop, or if irregularities are discovered in her papers, or if the presence of contraband is revealed, then the belligerent vessel may capture the neutral, in order that the case may be investigated and decided upon by a competent prize court. "( ) by the term 'contraband of war' only such articles or persons are to be understood as are suited for war and at the same time are destined for one of the belligerents." "the class of articles to be included in this definition," it was intimated, "is a matter of dispute, and with the exception of arms and ammunition, is determined, as a rule, with reference to the special circumstances of each case unless one of the belligerents has expressly notified neutrals in a regular manner what articles it intends to treat as contraband and had met with no opposition. "( ) discovered contraband is liable to confiscation; whether with or without compensation depends upon the circumstances of each case. "( ) if the seizure of the vessel was not justified the belligerent state is bound to order the immediate release of the ship and cargo and to pay full compensation." it was the view of the german government according to these principles, and in view of the recognized practice of nations, that it would not have been possible to lodge a protest against the stopping on the high seas of the three german steamers or to protest against the examination of their papers. but by the same standard, it was contended that the act of seizing and conveying to durban the _bundesrath_ and the _herzog_, and the act of discharging the cargoes of the _bundesrath_ and _general_, were both undertaken upon insufficiently founded suspicion and did not appear to have been justified. the end of the discussion between great britain and germany left the somewhat uncertain doctrine of continuous voyages still unsettled. as applied in distinctly to a breach of blockade it was generally considered an innovation. as applied, or attempted to be applied, by great britain in to trade between neutral ports at a time when no blockade existed or was in fact possible, it failed to receive the acquiescence of other nations who were interested. the discussion, however, rendered, apparent a clear line of cleavage between english practice and continental opinion. mr. lawrence characterizes as "crude" the doctrine of the german chancellor, that neutral ships plying between neutral ports are not liable to interference; that, in order for the ship to be legitimately seized, there must be contraband on board, that is, goods bound for a belligerent destination, and that this could not occur where the destination was a neutral port and the point of departure a neutral port. he declares that if this doctrine were accepted the offense of carrying contraband "might be expunged from the international code;" that "nothing would be easier for neutrals than to supply a belligerent with all he needed for the prosecution of his war."[ ] he points out the danger of the acceptance on the part of the powers of such a doctrine by citing the hypothetical case of france engaged in war, and asserts that under such circumstances even arms and ammunition might be poured into the neutral port of antwerp and carried by land to the french arsenals. if germany should be at war, munitions of war might be run in with practically no hindrance through the neutral harbors of jutland. if italy were at war, nice or trieste might be used in the same manner for the italian government to secure arms and ammunition. [footnote : principles of int. law, d ed., p. .] possibly mr. lawrence does not do full justice to the points taken by the german government as enunciated in the speech of count von bülow, although he clearly indicates what he thinks the general tendency of the proposed german system of law would be. it would seem that he does not give a clear statement of the german doctrine. when he asserts that "count von bülow committed himself to the crude doctrine that neutral ships plying between neutral ports would not be liable to interference," the inference is not a necessary result of the german position. nor does it necessarily follow according to the german standard that, "to constitute the offense of carrying contraband a belligerent destination" is "essential, and therefore there" can "be no contraband when the voyage" is "from neutral port to neutral port,"[ ] mr. lawrence possibly has reference only to the position taken _arguendo_ by the german government during the correspondence immediately following the seizure of the german ships and not to the general rules formulated by the german chancellor on january , , in his speech before the reichstag.[ ] there is no indication that mr. lawrence had this speech before him when he passed judgment upon the german doctrine, although the preface to the third edition of his principles of international law is dated august , . [footnote : principles of int. law, p. .] [footnote : the german argument was that according to english expression in the past, notably in , and expressly in her own naval guide, there could not be contraband of war between neutral ports.] it is possibly true that the german rules were advanced because of their expediency in view of the geographical position of germany. but the english writer apparently admits a similar motive in opposing the proposed german system, when he says, "great britain is the only european state which could not obtain," in time of war, "all the supplies she wished for by land carriage from neighboring neutral ports, with which according to the doctrine in question, neutrals would be free to trade in contraband without the slightest hindrance from the other belligerent."[ ] [footnote : principles of int. law, p. .] the view taken by mr. lawrence would seem unfair to the proposed rules in a number of points. count von bülow clearly pointed out that belligerent vessels might capture a neutral vessel if the latter resisted the order to stop, or if irregularities were discovered in her papers, or if the presence of contraband were revealed. under the term "contraband of war" he admitted that articles and persons suited for war might be included, provided they were at the same time destined for the use of one of the belligerents, and he was ready to admit that discovered contraband should be confiscable. it is true the caution was added that should the seizure prove to be unjustifiable the belligerent state should be bound to order immediate release and make full compensation, and that the right of visit and search should be exercised with as much consideration as possible and without undue molestation to neutral commerce. it was understood that neutral merchant vessels on the high seas or in the territorial waters of the belligerent powers should be liable to visit and search, but again with the necessary caution that the right should not be exercised in waters too remote from the seat of war, and that additional consideration be conceded to mail steamers.[ ] [footnote : sessional papers, africa, no. i ( ), c. , p. . speech in reichstag, jan. , .] there would seem to be no necessary opposition between the german position in and that taken by the supreme court of the united states in with reference to the ships _springbok_ and _peterhof_. in the latter case the cargo of the ship was condemned on the ground that the goods, not necessarily contraband in character, were being carried into the neutral mexican port of matamoras. it was believed, however, that the goods were not intended to be sold there as a matter of trade, but were destined for the use of the forces of the southern confederacy across the rio grande river. to these belligerent forces it was presumed the goods were to be conveyed as the final stage of their voyage, but the decision of the court was distinctly upon the guilt of a breach of blockade.[ ] the character of the goods did not give just ground for seizure provided they were intended in good faith for a neutral market, but the character of the goods showed that they were not so intended, and the simulated papers of the ship substantiated this suspicion. but it is to be repeated, condemnation was declared upon the ground of an intended breach of an established blockade as the final stage of the voyage. had there been no blockade of the southern states these decisions could not have been upheld. no contraband of war was possible between the neutral ports in the course of _bona fide_ neutral trade, but the character of the goods and the dishonest character of the ships made possible the conclusive presumption that the goods were ultimately intended for the blockaded enemy. [footnote : sessional papers, miscl., no. i ( ), c. , p. .] in the seizure of the german ships, on the other hand, the british government was not able to show that the ships were really carrying contraband or that there was any irregularity in their papers. the protest of the german government and its later announcement of certain rules which should govern such cases merely cautioned great britain against an undue exercise of the recognized right of visit and search. the attempt was not made to lay down a new system of principles which would render the carrying of contraband by neutrals unhampered by the belligerents, for count von bülow in setting forth the tentative system which in the opinion of his government would protect neutral commerce in time of war laid stress upon the fact that there are as yet no legal principles fixed and binding on all the maritime powers, respecting the rights of neutrals to trade with a belligerent, or the rights of belligerents in respect to neutral commerce. he pointed out that, although proposals had been repeatedly made to regulate this subject all attempts had failed owing to the obstacles created by the conflicting views of the different powers. the peace conference at the hague has in fact expressed the wish that an international conference might regulate, on the one hand, the rights and duties of neutrals, and on the other, the question of private property at sea. the german chancellor intimated that his government would support any plan of the kind for more clearly defining the disputed points of maritime law. the fact was pointed out that maritime law is still in a "liquid, elastic, and imperfect state," that with many gaps which are only too frequently apt to be supplemented by armed force at critical junctures, this body of law opens the way for the criticism that "the standard of might has not as yet been superseded by the standard of right." the institute of international law which met at venice in declared that the destination of contraband goods to an enemy may be shown even when the vessel which carries them is bound to a neutral port. but it was considered necessary to add the caution that "evident and incontestable proof" must make clear the fact that the goods, contraband in character, were to be taken on from the neutral port to the enemy, as the final stage of the same commercial transaction. this latter condition the english government failed to fulfil in the cases of the _bundesrath, herzog_ and _general_, and it was this failure which gave just ground for germany's protests. great britain not only failed to show by "evident and incontestable proof" that the german ships carried actual contraband, but she failed to show that there were on board what have been called "analogues" of contraband. the point was emphasized indeed that while special consideration would be shown to all german mail steamers, not every steamer which "carried a bag of letters" could claim this partial immunity. the english representative said: "we understand by mail steamers, steamers of subsidized lines, and consequently owned by persons whom the german government consider as respectable."[ ] and in this intimation he merely voiced the suspicion in england that with or without the knowledge of the government the german ships had been guilty of unneutral service, which the more recent authorities on international law distinguished from the carrying of contraband. [footnote : sessional papers, africa, no. i ( ), c. , p. ; salisbury to lascelles, jan. , .] it is generally agreed that neutral mail steamers and other vessels carrying the mails by agreement with neutral governments have in certain respects a peculiar position. their owners and captains cannot be held responsible for the nature of the numerous communications they carry. it is equally well understood that a neutral may not transmit signals or messages for a belligerent, nor carry enemy's despatches, nor transport certain classes of persons in the service of a belligerent. but mail steamers may carry persons who pay for their passage in the usual way and come on board as ordinary passengers, even though they turn out to be officers of one or the other of the belligerents. although the tendency of modern times to exempt mail ships from visit and search and from capture and condemnation is not an assured restriction upon belligerent interests, it is a right which neutrals are entitled to demand within certain well-defined limits. it was understood when this immunity was granted by the united states in that "simulated mails verified by forged certificates and counterfeit seals" were not to be protected.[ ] [footnote : wheaton, international law, dana's ed., p. , note.] during the controversy between the english and german governments with reference to the seizure of the three german ships, professor t.e. holland, the editor of the british admiralty manual of prize law of , declared: "the carriage by a neutral ship of troops, or of even a few military officers, as also of enemy despatches, is an enemy service of so important a kind as to involve the confiscation of the vessel concerned, a penalty which under ordinary circumstances, is not imposed upon the carriage of contraband property so called."[ ] under this head if would seem the alleged offense of the ship _bundesrath_ may properly be classed, and charges of a similar character were made against the ships _general_ and _herzog_. it was suspected that persons on board variously described as of a military appearance were on their way to the transvaal to enlist. the suspicion, however, could not be proved, and the result was that the ships were released without guilt upon the charge of unneutral service or upon that of carrying contraband goods in the usual sense of the term contraband. [footnote : international law situations, naval war college, , p. . also arguments of lord stowell in the case of the _orozembo_, rob. ; and the _atlanta_, rob. .] in connection with the attitude of great britain in regard to the doctrine of continuous voyages as applied to both goods and persons bound for delagoa bay, it is interesting to note the view expressed by a leading english authority upon international law with reference to the seizure of the ship _gaelic_ by the japanese government during the chino-japanese war. the _gaelic_, a british mail steamer, was bound from the neutral port of san francisco for the british port of hongkong. information had reached japan that there were on board persons seeking service with the chinese government and carrying a certain kind of material intended to destroy japanese ships. japan arrested the ship at yokohama and had her searched. the suspected individuals, it was discovered, had escaped and taken the french mail-ship _sidney_ from yokohama to shanghai. nevertheless the search was continued by the japanese authorities in the hope of finding contraband. the british government protested, and this protest is especially significant in view of the english contention in the cases of the german mail steamers. the protest against the further detention and search of the _gaelic_ was made on the ground that the ship did not have a hostile destination, sagasaki, a port in japanese territory, being the only port of call between yokohama and hongkong. it was shown by the japanese that ships of the company to which the _gaelic_ belonged often called at amoy, china, a belligerent port, but sufficient proof was not advanced to show that there was any intention to touch there on the voyage in question.[ ] [footnote : takahashi, int. law during the chino-japanese war, pp. xvii-xxvii. note on continuous voyages and contraband of war by j. westlake; also l.q. rev., vol. , p. .] the british assertion that the neutral destination of the ship precluded the possibility of a search being made, and that it was immaterial whether anything on board had a hostile destination ulterior to that of the ship, appears rather surprising when it is seen to be almost the opposite of the position taken in the seizures of ships bound for delagoa bay in portuguese territory. japan on the other hand maintained that the proceedings were entirely correct on the ground: ( ) of the probability that the _gaelic_ might call at amoy; ( ) that the doctrine of continuous voyages was applicable in connection with contraband persons or goods if they were destined for the chinese government even by way of hongkong. this it will be remembered was practically the view taken by great britain in the german seizures, though strenuously opposed in this incident. professor westlake, commenting upon the case of the _gaelic_, states the english view of the doctrine of continuous voyages as affecting: ( ) goods which are contraband of war and ( ) persons who are contraband of war, or analogues of contraband. goods, he says, may be consigned to purchasers in a neutral port, or to agents who are to offer them for sale there, and in either case what further becomes of them will depend on the consignee purchasers or on the purchasers from the agents. he contends that "such goods before arriving at the neutral port have only a neutral destination; on arriving there they are imported into the stock of the country, and if they ultimately find their way to a belligerent army or navy it will be in consequence of a new destination given them, and this notwithstanding that the neutral port may be a well-known market for the belligerent in question to seek supplies in, and that the goods may notoriously have been attracted to it by the existence of such a market."[ ] [footnote : l.q. rev., vol. , p. .] it is obvious that this was the position taken by germany and other nations with reference to the interference with neutral commerce bound for delagoa bay. professor westlake continues in regard to the japanese incident: "the consignors of the goods may have had an expectation that they would reach the belligerent but not an intention to that effect, for a person can form an intention only about his own acts and a belligerent destination was to be impressed on the goods, if at all, by other persons." thus it is agreed, he says, "that the goods though of the nature of contraband of war, and the ship knowingly carrying them, _are not subject to capture during the voyage to the neutral port_"[ ] [footnote : l.q.r., vol. , p. . italics our own.] the german government could not have based its protest against the seizure of german mail steamers upon a stronger argument for the correctness of its position than upon this view expressing the english government's attitude toward neutral commerce at the time of the seizure of the _gaelic_. professor westlake points out, however, that goods on board a ship destined for a neutral port may be under orders from her owners to be forwarded thence to a belligerent port, army or navy, either by a further voyage of the same ship or by transshipment, or even by land carriage. he shows that such goods are to reach the belligerent "without the intervention of a new commercial transaction in pursuance of the intention formed with regard to them by the persons who are their owners during the voyage to the neutral port. therefore even during that voyage they have a belligerent destination, although the ship which carries them may have a neutral one."[ ] in such a case, he declares, by the doctrine of continuous voyages, "the goods and the knowingly guilty ship are capturable during that voyage." in a word, "goods are contraband of war when an enemy destination is combined with the necessary character of the goods." and it is pointed out that "the offense of carrying contraband of war" in view of the doctrine of continuous voyages is committed by a ship "which is knowingly engaged in any part of the carriage of the goods to their belligerent destination."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. .] [footnote : l.q.r., vol. , p. .] it is shown that even if the doctrine of continuous voyages is denied as having any validity, it may still be held that "the goods and the knowingly guilty ship are liable before reaching the neutral port if that port is only to be a port of call, the ultimate destination of the ship as well as of the goods being a belligerent one."[ ] but if the doctrine of continuous voyages is denied it may also be questioned "that a further intended carriage by transshipment or by land can be united with the voyage to the neutral port so as to form one carriage to a belligerent destination, and make the goods and the knowingly guilty ship liable during the first part" of the voyage.[ ] in other words, a belligerent destination both of the goods and of the ship carrying them would be required. [footnote : ibid., p. .] [footnote : ibid., p. .] in regard to the doctrine of continuous voyages as applied to persons, professor westlake says, in speaking of the _gaelic_, "when a person whose character would stamp him as contraband, or an analogue of contraband, is a passenger on board a ship bound for a neutral port, and having no ulterior destination, but intends on arriving there to proceed to a belligerent port, there is no closer connection between the two parts of his journey than that he should hold a through ticket to the belligerent port." it is pointed out that the distinction between a person when considered as contraband and goods or despatches is that "the person cannot be forwarded like a thing." thus in the case of a person holding a through ticket, the ticket is merely a facility, but it must depend upon the person whether he will use it, and consequently, where the passenger is booked only to a neutral port, he "cannot _constructively_ be considered as _bound for a belligerent destination_ until he is _actually bound for one_."[ ] [footnote : ibid., p. . italics our own.] upon professor westlake's reasoning the whole contention of the english government in arresting passengers upon german mail steamers bound for delagoa bay falls to the ground, for he continues: "there must for such a destination be a determination of his own which during the _first part of his journey_ inevitably remains _contingent_ and which is therefore analogous to the new determination which may be given in the neutral port as to the employment of goods which have found a market there." consequently he says: "the doctrine of continuous voyages cannot be applied to the carriage of persons.... a neutral destination of the ship is conclusive in the case of passengers taken on board in the regular course."[ ] accordingly, professor westlake reaches the conclusion that the search of the _gaelic_ was unjustifiable under the right of belligerents against neutrals on the high seas.[ ] [footnote : l.q.r, p. .] [footnote : he held, however, that the search was justifiable as an exercise of the police power of japan within her own territorial waters.] the application which great britain attempted to make of the doctrine of continuous voyages proved unsuccessful both with reference to contraband for neutral ports and the carrying of analogues of contraband by german mail steamers bound for delagoa bay. in the end the british government paid to the german east african line owning the _bundesrath, herzog_ and _general_, £ , sterling, together with an additional sum of £ , as compensation to the consignees. for the detention of the ship _hans wagner_, a german sailing boat which had been arrested on february , , the sum of £ , sterling was paid. the allegation in this case was that of carrying contraband, but the ship was finally released without the cargo being examined, a fact which indicates that in this, the last of the german vessels to be seized, great britain realized the futility of attempting to interfere with commerce between neutral ports. the recommendations for the adjustment of the difficulty in the several cases were made by a commission of five members, two of whom were germans, and the awards gave general satisfaction in germany. the east african line congratulated count von bülow upon the energetic manner in which he had handled the incidents. german commercial interests considered that they might count upon the effective support of the government, and that the result was a complete justification of the attitude which germany had assumed with regard to the conflicting interests of belligerents and neutrals. chapter iv. trading with the enemy. almost contemporaneously with the german-english controversy with reference to the restrictions which might legitimately be put upon german mail steamers great britain and the united states became involved in a lengthy correspondence. various articles of the general nature of foodstuffs were seized upon ships plying between new york and delagoa bay. it developed later that the seizures were justified by england not upon the ground of the guilt of carrying contraband _per se_, but because an english municipal regulation was alleged to have been violated by english subjects in that they had traded with the enemy. but the fact was incontrovertible that the port of destination as well as that of departure was neutral. the burden of proof under the circumstances rested upon the captor to show that goods innocent in themselves were really intended for the enemy. consequently the line of justification which was set up involved not merely an extension of the doctrine of continuous voyages, but an application of this much mooted theory that would show an ultimate intention to trade with the enemy. the offense of trading with the enemy is not a new one in international law. in sir william scott, afterwards lord stowell, sitting upon the case of the _hoop_, which is perhaps the leading case upon the subject, declared that all trading with the enemy by the subjects of one state without the permission of the sovereign is interdicted in time of war[ ]. it was pointed out that, according to the law of holland, of france, of spain and as a matter of fact of all the states of europe, "when one state is at war with another, all the subjects of the one are considered to be at war with all the subjects of the other and all intercourse and trade with the enemy is forbidden." this principle has been accepted in the united states as one of the conditions of warfare. wheaton declares: "one of the immediate consequences of the commencement of hostilities is the interdiction of all commercial intercourse between the subjects of the states at war without the license of their respective governments."[ ] [footnote : c. rob. .] [footnote : elements of international law, dana ed. ( ), § et seq.] in england a declaration of war is equal to an act of parliament prohibiting all intercourse with the enemy except by the license of the crown. the penalty of such illegal intercourse is the confiscation of the cargo and of the ship engaged in such trade. the instructions are emphatic upon the point: "the commander should detain any british vessel which he may meet with trading with the enemy unless, either: ( ) he is satisfied that the master was pursuing such trade in ignorance that war had broken out, or, ( ) the vessel is pursuing such trade under a license from the british government."[ ] [footnote : british admiralty manual of naval prize law ( ), § .] when a vessel is bound for a belligerent port it appears that the burden of proof is thrown upon the ship's captain to show that goods so shipped are not intended for the enemy. in the case of the _jonge pieter_ ( ) goods purchased in england were shipped for an enemy port but were seized by a british cruiser under the right of a belligerent. it was attempted to be set up that the goods belonged to citizens of the united states, but in the absence of documentary proof condemnation was decreed on the ground of hostile ownership.[ ] [footnote : c. rob. ; other cases bearing upon the subject are: the _samuel_ ( ), c. rob. n; the _nayade_ ( ), c. rob. ; the _franklin_ ( ), c. rob. ; see also kent's commentaries, vol. i, p. ; halleck, international law ( ), vol. ii, p. ; moore, digest of int. law, vol. vii, p. ; white, l.q. rev., vol. , p. .] the decisions in these cases as well as the general opinion of the past had shown what the british view was, namely, that all trading with the enemy is absolutely forbidden to british subjects upon the outbreak of war. but in the controversy between the english government and that of the united states with reference to foodstuffs bound for delagoa bay on board english ships the argument set up by the british authorities was not generally considered well founded, since little more than suspicion was produced as evidence to show that any of the ships really intended to trade with the enemy. there was no dissent from the established rule that trading with the enemy on the part of the subjects of the belligerent states is prohibited. but those nations whose citizens or subjects suffered loss by the enforcement of the english law were not satisfied that the english ordinance had been violated either in deed or by intent. soon after war had begun it was known that the english authorities would scrutinize closely any transactions of british ships, or of ships leased by english firms, which had dealings in a commercial way with the warring republics. on november the official imperial gazette of berlin had published the following note: "according to official information british subjects are forbidden by english law to have any trade or intercourse with the south african republic and the orange free state, or with the subjects of these two states, within their territories, during the continuance of the present state of war."[ ] because of this prohibition, it was pointed out, all goods sent by english ships and intended for the south african republic or the orange free state and ships of war, even in cases where the goods were not contraband of war, might be legally detained by the british authorities. attention was called to the fact that this measure might also be applied to goods destined for ports in the neighborhood of the seat of war and not belonging to great britain. german commercial circles were warned that they should consider whether under the circumstances it was not to their interest to avoid using british ships for transporting goods to south africa during the war. [footnote : london times, nov. , , p. , col. .] notwithstanding this announcement, toward the close of december the british foreign office stated that information had reached the secretary of state for foreign affairs which showed that it was not generally known that trading with the enemy was unlawful. the english view of the restrictions upon british subjects was thus pointed out: "british subjects may not in any way aid, abet, or assist the south african republic or the orange free state in the prosecution of hostilities, nor carry on any trade with, nor supply any goods, wares or merchandise to either of those republics or to any person resident therein, nor supply any goods, wares, or merchandise to any person for transmission to either republic, or to any person resident there, nor carry any goods or wares destined for either of the republics or for any person resident therein."[ ] it was further declared that these restrictions applied to all foreigners while they were on british territory, and that all persons, whether british subjects or foreigners, who might commit any of the prohibited acts would be liable to such penalty as the law provided. these municipal restrictions obviously made illegal on the part of english subjects and of strangers temporarily resident upon british soil all commercial acts, from one country to the other, all buying and selling of merchandise, contracts for transportation, as well as all operations of exchange, or the carrying out of any contract which would be to the advantage of the enemy. a time-honored english maxim declares: "_est prohibitum habere commercium cum inimicis."_ [footnote : british and foreign state papers, vol. , p. . notice ... warning british subjects against trading with the enemy, london, december , .] when great britain attempted to enforce these recognized prohibitions against trading with the enemy it was found difficult to show that the suspected ships had in reality had dealings with the public enemy or with its agents. the ships were not bound for a hostile port nor for a blockaded one, but for a neutral harbor which was not even contiguous to either the transvaal or orange free state. other governments, although ready to admit that it was competent for england to forbid her own subjects to trade with the enemy, were not willing to allow their respective subjects to suffer the loss of goods which had been shipped in good faith. the character of the goods apparently excluded the idea of contraband of war, and the ships themselves, since they were bound from neutral ports to a neutral port, appeared to be acting in good faith. the seizures. maria, mashona, beatrice, and sabine. the maria.--as early as september , , the _maria_, a dutch ship, had touched at cape town on her way to delagoa bay with a cargo consisting largely of flour, canned meats and oats shipped from new york[ ]. she was allowed to proceed after a short detention by the british authorities although goods in her cargo were plainly marked for the transvaal. it was realized under the circumstances that there was no ground for the detention of ship or cargo, and in view of the fact that no war was in progress at the time, the detention of the vessel even for a short period would appear to have been unjustifiable. the _maria_ called at port elizabeth, whence she cleared for delagoa bay. on october she put in for coal at durban, three hundred miles from lorenzo marques, and was boarded by the commander of the english ship _tartar_. the _maria's_ captain was willing to be visited and searched without protest. according to the official report, "no guard was placed on her," and "the agents were willing to land all the contraband."[ ] the commander of the _tartar_ informed them that if this were submitted to the vessel need no longer be detained. when the _maria_ had been brought in and no contraband was discovered by the search, the agents of the ship protested against the landing of that portion of the cargo consisting of flour and other goods which they considered innocent, but spoke of the vessel, it was alleged, as belonging to a british company called the "american-african line." the commander of the english cruiser pointed out to them that british subjects could not under the governor's proclamation trade with the enemy, and mentioned the warning in a local customs notice as the penalty for "vessels which carried contraband of war or goods of whatever nature the real destination of which was the enemy or their agents in neutral ports."[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] the _maria's_ cargo included a consignment of lubricating oil as well as a miscellaneous consignment of light hardware. part of the cargo was seized and part merely "detained." the consignment to the netherlands south african railway, a thousand cases of lubricating oil, eighty-four cases of picks, twenty cases of handles, was seized as enemy's property, since there was sufficient evidence, it was thought, to show that these goods belonged to the railway company, the consignees, and not to the new york shippers, the consignors. this opinion was held on the ground that the netherlands south african railway was owned by the south african republic. all of the delagoa bay cargo including the flour and other foodstuffs was landed and the _maria_ put to sea. but on november the authorities at durban were instructed by the british foreign office that foodstuffs were not to be treated as contraband, and the captain of the british cruiser _philomel_ warned the customs that the flour should no longer be detained. it was released and measures were at once taken for reshipping it on the british steamer _matabele_, when it seems for the first time to have occurred to the customs authorities that the flour might thus find its way to pretoria by means of an english ship. according to the official report: "it was then provisionally detained again. but on it being found that the flour was _bona fide_ a part of the _maria's_ cargo the agents and all parties concerned were told that no further restrictions would be placed on the shipment, but it was at the same time pointed out that the flour was going direct to the enemy. the governor's proclamation against trading with the enemy was then studied in connection with the above-mentioned permission, with the result that agents, shippers, and shipowners all refused to ship or carry the flour and nobody would have anything to do with it," although no objection was made by the naval authorities to the cargo being forwarded to its destination.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] for the detention of the _maria_ her owners, upon the protest of the netherlands government, were awarded £ sterling as indemnity. the consignment of flour "detained" at durban was purchased by the english government at the price it would have brought at delagoa bay on november , the day on which it would presumably have reached there had no interruption occurred.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] it was pointed out in the report upon the case that the _maria_ was undoubtedly a dutch ship and that her agents had introduced an element of confusion in the dealings with her by speaking of her as belonging to a british company. it was therefore admitted that possibly some of the goods were removed on the erroneous supposition that she was a british ship and could not lawfully carry them. had she been a dutch ship leased by a british firm her liability would appear to have been as great as if she had been a vessel owned by british subjects. had she belonged to a british company she would have been a british ship, and it would have been unlawful for her to carry for the enemy. the mashona.--on december , , the _mashona_, clearing from new york for delagoa bay, was seized by the british cruiser _partridge_ near port elizabeth, seven hundred and fifty miles from lorenzo marques, and taken into table bay, but later to cape town as prize on the charge of trading with the enemy. consul-general stowe reported the capture, and informed the department at washington that the _mashona_ carried five thousand tons of general cargo, including seventeen thousand bags of flour for the transvaal by way of delagoa bay. foreseeing the probability that the _mashona_ would be brought into cape town as prize, mr. stowe inquired: "is foodstuff such as flour, contraband? being a british ship has the british government a right to seize?"[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; stone to cridler, dec. , .] counsel for the original american shippers upon the _mashona_ stated that the cargo was of the character of general merchandise and was destined "for neutral citizens domiciled in neutral territory." it was pointed out in the prayer of the owners of this portion of the cargo that while the british government might be justified in seizing her own vessels, it appeared that the british naval authorities were illegally jeopardizing the property of american citizens in that the vessel seized was "under contract to deliver to the persons named in the invoices the merchandise therein specified, none of which is contraband of war."[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; hopkins and hopkins to hay, dec. , .] one portion of another shipment was on account of a delagoa bay firm, the other on account of a london one. with reference to the goods consigned to the latter firm the american shippers were unable to say what their ultimate destination might be, but in regard to the shipment to delagoa bay they were positive that the consignees were a firm doing a large local business in lorenzo marques. to the best of their knowledge it was a german firm whose members were not citizens either of the transvaal or of the orange free state. they showed that the goods were sold on four months' time dating from november , and consequently that their loss would fall upon the original shippers, who were citizens of the united states. the fact was pointed out that additional merchandise amounting to five thousand dollars had been purchased for the delagoa bay firm, with a view to immediate shipment, but would have to be held up and probably lost because of a situation which amounted to a blockade declared by great britain over a neutral port, an act which in the end would compel all firms in lorenzo marques to cease buying american goods.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , pp. - ; flint eddy and co. to hopkins and hopkins, dec. , , and hopkins and hopkins to adee, dec. , .] it was alleged by the captors that the ship's papers were not in proper form, and that besides the flour and other foodstuffs she carried a consignment of lubricating oil for the netherlands south african railway. this consignment was held to be enemy's property since it was considered that the railway belonged to the transvaal, the specific charge against the ship being that of trading with the enemy. the fact that a consignment of flour was billed to a lorenzo marques firm but labelled "z.a.r." created a conclusive presumption, it was thought, that the flour was intended for the transvaal, although its owners claimed that the consignment was not destined for the belligerent republic but for local consumption at lorenzo marques.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , pp. - , .] both the cargo consigned to the transvaal and the vessel herself were claimed as lawful prize. the cargo, it was contended, was unprotected since it was enemy's property, and the vessel, by trading with the enemy, had violated a regulation which rendered it confiscable. against this it was urged that the consignees were hostile only by reason of domicile, and that neither the owners of the ship nor the captain had any intention to trade with the enemy. so far as intention was concerned, it was shown that the captain had intended to pass a bond at algoa bay, one of the ports of call, undertaking not to deliver the goods at delagoa bay without the permission of the proper authorities. the three judges of the supreme court of cape colony sitting as a prize court came to different conclusions. the chief justice held that the cargo should be condemned but not the ship. one opinion was that neither ship nor cargo should be condemned; the third that both ship and cargo should be condemned. there were thus two justices to one for condemning the cargo and two to one against the condemnation of the ship. the cargo was consequently condemned and the ship released.[ ] [footnote : decision at cape town, march , , reported in cape times, march , .] different views were also held by the judges with reference to the condemnation of the goods aboard the _mashona_. the chief justice held that the intention of the captain to alter the destination of the goods was sufficiently established to prevent their condemnation. the other justices dissented on this point. they held that the goods should be regarded in prize law as the property of residents of the transvaal, and that such ownership did not seem possible of denial. in their opinion there was sufficient reason for condemning the goods since they were enemy's property captured on the high sea in a non-neutral ship. this view obviously implied that an enemy character was impressed upon persons resident in the transvaal not by nationality but merely by domicile. england's proclamation had in fact forbidden trade with the enemy or with those resident upon enemy territory. in other words, those residing in hostile territory were regarded as enemies when there was a question of trading with the enemy. the same principle was applied when there was a question of property in goods which were on their way to the enemy's territory, a view which would seem reasonable since even the _de facto_ government of a hostile region could possess itself of goods which had been allowed to enter its territory. with regard to the question of condemning the ship the chief justice held that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant confiscation. he cited the case of the _hook_,[ ] which was condemned in , but held that the case of the _mashona_ was not on all fours with the conditions of that decision. he took the view that the case of the _mashona_ was more nearly analogous to the cases of the _minna_ and the _mercurius_,[ ] and consequently declared for the restoration of the ship. [footnote : i.c. rob., p. ; moore, digest of int. law, vol. vii, p. .] [footnote : the _minna_ (edwards , n.; roscoe, english prize cases ( ), p. , note) was restored by sir william scott in on the ground that her voyage was _contingent_ not _continuous_. the ship had been captured on a voyage from bordeaux, destined ultimately to bremen, but with orders to touch at a british port and to resume her voyage if permitted. the _mercurius_ (edwards ; roscoe english prize cases ( ), p. ) was restored by the same judge in on the ground of an "_honest intention_" to procure a license before trading with the enemy.] one justice concurred on the main point at issue, namely, that there appeared to be "sufficient proof in the present case of an honest intention to pass a bond at algoa bay not to take the goods to delagoa bay except with the permission of the proper authorities.... the presumption of an intention of trading with the enemy, arising from the fact that the ship was carrying enemy's goods consigned to delagoa bay and destined for the enemy's country, is entirely rebutted by the conduct of all the parties interested in the ship. the claim for the restitution of the ship must consequently be allowed."[ ] [footnote : decision at cape town, march , , chief justice, mr. justice buchanan concurring.] one justice dissented from this opinion and argued that "as soon as war broke out, it became the duty of the master to decline to convey any goods which, from the papers in his possession, appeared to be the property of enemy consignees." it was contended by this justice that "his contract of affreightment could not be fulfilled" in any event, and he should have been aware of this fact. further, it was urged that there was not convincing evidence to "establish that there was no intention on the part of the master of the ship to trade with the enemy, except with the permission of the proper authorities. in the circumstances, such a defense must be established by very clear proof; ... although there is no reason whatever to impute any disloyal intention, or _mala fides_, ... the proof of non-liability on this ground has not been made out." on the contrary, it was insisted, in this dissent from the leading opinion, "there seems to be an absence of proof that it was not the intention ... to deliver these goods to the consignees unless prevented from doing so by some competent authority; and this cannot be regarded as equivalent to proof that [the master] intended to apply for and obtain a license before engaging in intercourse which, in the absence of the license, was of an unlawful character. from the moment this ship left new york harbour ... she was liable _stricto jure_ ... to seizure and condemnation; as she was still without a license when seized, _stricto jure_ the liability remains."[ ] [footnote : decision, march , ; mr. justice lawrence dissenting.] the fate, however, of the ship itself was of interest to third parties only in so far as its disposition involved the rights of neutrals whose goods were on board. great britain's action in seizing her own ships, or ships chartered by her own subjects, had the effect of placing a virtual blockade upon a neutral port, for few but english ships carried for the transvaal or orange free state, a fact which bore with especial hardship upon american shippers. the "detention" of all delagoa bay cargoes in british bottoms, provided a few articles were found consigned to the transvaal, was a practice which was indignantly protested against by all neutral shippers upon english vessels. the injustice which this practice worked was forcefully brought home to the united states by an apparent disregard of the property rights of innocent neutrals in the seizure of two other ships at about the same time as that of the _mashona_. the beatrice.--this ship, also clearing from new york, was reported in december, , to have been compelled by the english naval authorities to discharge all of her delagoa bay cargo into lighters at east london, some six hundred miles distant from lorenzo marques. it was pointed out by the new york shippers in their protest addressed to secretary hay at washington that, according to the terms of the american and african bill of lading, the steamship line was thus relieved of any further responsibility, since the goods were at the risk and expense of the consignees after leaving the ship's side.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. , norton and son to geldart, dec. , .] the shipments had been made, many of them on regular monthly orders, to portuguese and other firms in lorenzo marques. the policy of insurance did not cover war risks, and the company holding the insurance declared that it was not responsible for any accident which might occur while the merchandise was lying in lighters or hulks at a port of discharge which had been forced upon the ship by the english authorities.[ ] that portion of the cargo of the _beatrice_ which was shipped from new york consisted of large consignments of flour, canned goods, and other foodstuffs, but included also a consignment of lubricating oil as well as a miscellaneous assortment of light hardware, but none of the articles shipped were of a contraband character in the usual meaning of that term. part of the flour was branded goldfields and part was labelled johannesburg, although the whole consignment was marked delagoa bay. the american shippers averred that although they regularly sold flour to merchants engaged in trade in various parts of south africa they "had never sold flour with direct or ulterior destination to the south african republic, by re-sale or otherwise." they made affidavit that all of their sales had been made for the ordinary uses of life, and that "since the war had broken out they had made no sales of flour to merchants or others in the south african republic."[ ] [footnote : according to the terms of sale, on time, the shippers pointed out the obvious fact that unless the goods were delivered, the delagoa bay consignees as well as others would refuse to honor the drafts drawn upon them for the amount of the purchase. consequently the loss would fall upon the american shippers should great britain persist in turning aside innocent consignments from their neutral port of destination.] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; choate to salisbury, jan. , .] the reason assigned in the official report of the english authorities for their action in regard to the _beatrice_ was that she "contained large quantities of goods, principally flour, destined for the south african republic, which the customs authorities at east london required should be landed at that port." since the cargo was stowed in such a manner as to make it impossible to land goods destined for the republic without also discharging goods intended for portuguese east africa, it was alleged that the master and agents of the ship preferred to land the whole of the cargo at east london, where it was stowed by the customs. but it was admitted that the removal of large quantities of the goods so landed had been permitted from time to time "for the purposes of local and _bona fide_ portuguese consumption." the consignment to the netherlands south african railway was held to be enemy's property since it was considered that the railway was owned by the republic. the specific reason assigned for the arrest of the steamer was "that the _beatrice_ being a british ship, was by carrying goods destined for the enemy's territory, illegally engaged in trade with the enemy in contravention of her majesty's proclamation of december , ."[ ] the vessel sailed for calcutta in ballast on december , . [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; salisbury per bertie to choate, jan. , . this proclamation was not retroactive in the sense that it established a new prohibition, but was merely explanatory of an accepted restriction upon trade with the enemy by british subjects. supra, p. .] the sabine.--on february the last of the ships clearing from new york for south african ports was reported to have been seized at port elizabeth, seven hundred and fifty miles from lorenzo marques. the _sabine_ was also a british ship with mossel bay, algoa bay, and durban among her ports of call, and carried shipments aggregating thirty to forty thousand dollars in value made by new york merchants to these ports, all of which are in british territory. but in addition to the allegation which had been brought against the _maria_, _mashona_, and _beatrice_, of trading with the enemy, it was suspected that the _sabine_ was carrying actual contraband of war. the latter suspicion, however, was not pressed, although the authorities who stopped and examined the ship upon the specific charge of violating a municipal law asserted that the _sabine's_ "papers were not in proper form and that goods were found on board which, though shipped to ports this side were marked to persons residing in boer territory." the case was viewed by the english government "as a very suspicious one under municipal law, but, as the evidence was not very complete, they gave the vessel the benefit of the doubt."[ ] after a short detention both ship and cargo were released. [footnote : for. rel., , pp. - .] the news of the reported seizures aroused considerable popular feeling in the united states. in the senate a resolution was introduced which, as finally amended, read: "whereas it is alleged that property of citizens of the united states not contraband of war has been lately seized by the military authorities of great britain in and near delagoa bay, south africa, without good reason for the same, and contrary to the accepted principles of international law; and, whereas it is alleged that property of citizens of the united states is now unjustly detained by the military authorities of great britain, in disregard of the rights of the owners of the same; therefore, resolved by the senate of the united states, that the president is hereby requested to send to the senate, if not, in his opinion incompatible with the public interests, all information in possession of the state department relating to the said alleged seizure and detention, and also to inform the senate what steps have been taken in requesting the restoration of property taken and detained as aforesaid."[ ] [footnote : cong., sess., jan. , , record, vol. , pt. , pp. , .] the final clause of the resolution as at first introduced was stricken out after a discussion as to whether the secretary of state should be "_directed_" or the president be "_requested_" to furnish the desired information. it was realized that the language of the expunged clause, "and whether or not the department has informed the proper british authorities that, if said detention is persisted in, such act will be considered as without warrant and offensive to the government and people of the united states," was neither diplomatic in its tone nor warranted by the circumstances. amicable negotiations were still in progress, and those negotiations were concerned with a discussion of the very question which would thus have been decided in the affirmative by the senate, namely, that the seizures had been contrary to the principles of international law. consequently the resolution only declared that it was "alleged" that great britain had departed from the strict principles of international law, and it was not intimated that her persistence in such acts would probably require a resort to more forcible measures than mere protest on the part of the united states. a motion had been made that the resolution be referred to the committee on foreign relations, where it was hoped by certain members of the senate that it would die a natural death, an end which would have been deserved under the circumstances, since the event to which the resolution referred was then in the course of diplomatic consideration and nothing had indicated that the state department would not be able to secure protection for the interests of all citizens of the united states as neutrals during a recognized belligerent contest. an unsettled question of international law was at issue between great britain and the united states, and was being dealt with as fast as official information reached the british foreign office from the scene of the occurrences which were alleged to have been in contravention of established principles. flour or any other foodstuff might or might not be contraband of war according to the particular circumstances of the case. as a general rule products like flour shipped from a neutral state are not contraband, but it is always a question of fact whether the immediate destination of such flour is for hostile purposes, namely, the sustenance of a belligerent army. if flour or foodstuffs generally were so destined they became contraband of war for the particular case. not less than twenty thousand barrels of flour had been shipped by citizens of the united states upon the three steamers, _maria_, _mashona_, and _beatrice_, and the proposer of the resolution insisted that the senate was entitled to know in what manner the rights of the united states were being asserted in view of the obvious hardship which _bona fide_ neutral shippers had thus suffered. he urged that the seizure of property of citizens of the united states by one of the belligerents was "a thing which profoundly affects the american people; it affects every corn grower, every wheat farmer, the owner of the cattle upon a thousand hills, the mill man, the middleman, everybody who is interested in producing and exporting the products of the farm and the field is interested in this question and is entitled to know what has been done in this case."[ ] [footnote : hale of maine, cong., sess., rec., vol. , pt , p. .] it is to be hoped that the senator's constituents read this speech in the next morning's papers, for otherwise it must go down in history as a burst of eloquence wasted upon unhearing ears. had he been able to pass his resolution so worded as to "_direct_" the secretary of state to throw open the entire files of the department's foreign correspondence for the senate's inspection, instead of merely "_requesting_" the president to furnish such information as the senate desired "if not, in his opinion, incompatible with the public interest," the result would have been practically the same. in either event the president would have controlled the situation, since he can not be compelled to furnish information to the senate when he considers it incompatible with the public interest to do so. the only power possible to be exercised by the senate over the executive in such a case is that of impeachment. and should impeachment be possible or advisable the process could be carried through as well with the words, "if not, in his opinion, incompatible with the public interest," _out_ of a resolution as with those words _in_ such a formal request of the senate.[ ] [footnote : teller of colorado, cong., sess., record, vol. , pt. , p. .] as a rule it is unwise for the senate to interfere while negotiations are pending between the executive department and foreign governments over any question which is at issue. should a resolution "_requesting_" information upon any subject be deemed necessary, it should obviously be addressed to the president and, merely for the sake of courtesy, with the usual _caveat_. it should not be "directed" to the secretary of state, for that official stands in a different relation to the legislative department from that of the secretaries of any of the other departments. the secretary of state is not required by law to report to congress as are all the other cabinet officers. he has been exempted from that requirement for the reason that his duties are mainly diplomatic. negotiations carried on with foreign governments upon matters of a delicate character might involve serious embarrassments if during their pendency the successive steps were reported to congress.[ ] the power of the president in consultation with the secretary of state to deal with foreign governments at least up to the last moment and final consent of the senate has made it possible for the united states to preserve a fairly uniform foreign policy. for despite the repeated changes of administration and of domestic policies the general foreign policy has been closely modeled upon the expedient course of absolute neutrality laid down by washington. were it a practical requirement of the constitution that all foreign correspondence upon any important question should be at once laid before the senate, it is reasonable to suppose that few treaties or important conventions would finally be ratified. in a question of international law such as that under discussion between the governments of great britain and the united states, it would have been extremely unwise during the negotiations for the senate to interfere in any way with the regular course of diplomatic intercourse between the two governments. [footnote : platt of connecticut, cong., sess., record, vol. , pt , p. .] in the end the hale resolution was agreed to, but nothing came of it, for the state department found the english government not unwilling to make an equitable settlement for the losses which citizens of the united states had incurred as a result of the seizures of british ships carrying american goods from new york to delagoa bay. the legality of the seizures. while the fruitless discussion had been in progress in the senate secretary hay had been dealing with the question in such a manner as to safeguard all american interests, but at the same time with a full consideration of the necessity for protesting against any undue extension of belligerent rights. immediately following the seizure of the british ships clearing from new york with american goods on board he had requested a prompt explanation. in his instructions to ambassador choate he said: "you will bring the matter to the attention of the british government and inquire as to the circumstances and legality of the seizures."[ ] and later, mr. choate was further instructed to ascertain "the grounds in law and fact" upon which the interference with apparently innocent commerce between neutral ports was made, and to demand "prompt restitution of the goods to the american owners if the vessels were seized on account of a violation of the laws of great britain, as for trading with the enemy; but if the seizure was on account of the flour ... the united states government can not recognize its validity under any belligerent right of capture of provisions and other goods shipped by american citizens to a neutral port."[ ] mr. hay pointed out the fact that the american shippers had produced evidence intended to show that the goods were not contraband in character, and should this prove to be true prompt action was to be requested on the part of great britain in order to minimize as far as possible the damage to neutral goods. [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; hay to choate, dec. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , pp. - ; hay to choate, jan. , .] the position taken by the english government was indicated on january in a note handed to mr. choate: "our view is that foodstuffs with a hostile destination can be considered contraband of war only if they are supplies for the enemy's forces. it is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used. it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure."[ ] lord salisbury verbally added that the british government did not claim that any of the american goods were actual contraband, but that the ships had been seized on a charge of trading with the enemy, and it was intimated also that "an ultimate destination to the citizens of the transvaal, even of goods consigned to british ports on the way thither, might, if the transportation were viewed as one continuous voyage, be held to constitute in a british vessel such a trading with the enemy as to bring the vessel within the provisions of the municipal law."[ ] he asserted that the offense was cognizable by a prize court alone, but admitted that "if the owners of the cargoes, being neutrals, claim that they are innocent, the cargoes should not be condemned with the ship but should be delivered over to them."[ ] he suggested that the ordinary course would be that the owners should claim the cargoes in the prize court, where the cases would be considered and properly dealt with on their merits.[ ] the owners would be requested, he said, to prove that they were the _bona fide_ owners by submitting bills of lading and invoices to the court. it was intimated that the american flour which had been removed from the ships was not detained in any way but was perfectly open to the owners to make whatever arrangements they pleased for its immediate removal. if they considered themselves aggrieved by the action of the english authorities in causing the flour to be landed it was of course open to them to take such proceedings against the persons concerned as they were advised might be appropriate under the circumstances.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; salisbury per choate to hay.] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; hay to white, march , , citing choate's despatch of april , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] [footnote : see story, manual of naval prize law ( ), pp. - , where the practice in such cases before prize courts is stated; in other portions of the work the claims made by innocent or interested parties are considered.] [footnote : for. rel., , p. , salisbury, speaking with special reference to the _mashona_ and _maria;_ choate to hay, jan. , .] mr. choate at once retorted that in such a case the united states would very probably send the bill to the british government. the fact was pointed out that the operation of the english law did not lessen the obligation incumbent upon great britain to restore the goods to their _bona fide_ neutral owners or to the neutral consignees. although the permission had been given to the owners to come and take their goods at the ports of detention, short of the original port of destination, this permission could not be considered as discharging the obligation to restore the goods. the representative of the united states insisted that nothing short of delivery at their port of consignment would fulfill the english obligation in a commercial sense such as to give the goods the value intended. it was clearly shown that under the application of the english municipal law the goods in question became as inaccessible to their owners for all the purposes of their commercial adventure "as if they had been landed on a rock in mid-ocean."[ ] in his criticism of the english position, mr. choate said: "the discharge from the vessel and landing short of the port of destination and failure to deliver at that port, constitute wrongful acts as against all owners of innocent cargoes."[ ] and he pointed out the inconsistency of the position since it was not claimed that any but british subjects could be guilty of any violation of the english prohibition against trading with the enemy. he was accordingly instructed to insist that the obligation rested upon the british government to indemnify the neutral owners and make good to them all damages and loss sustained by the treatment to which they had been subjected. [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; choate to salisbury, feb. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] the united states was ready to admit that there might have been cause for the seizure and detention for the purpose of examination before a prize court upon the suspicion of trading with the enemy. but the decision of the judges seemed to indicate that such a suspicion was not founded upon facts which could be produced before the courts. the vessels were released upon the ground that they had not in fact traded with the enemy nor intended to do so except with the express or implied permission of the british government. in view of the causes put forward for the seizures and of the reasons stated by the authorities for the subsequent release of the ships it would seem that the cargoes, "except in so far as contraband might have been involved would have the same status as though found aboard british ships trading between neutral ports where there was no question of a belligerent in the neighborhood of the port of detention."[ ] the prize court _did_ decide that there was no question of contraband involved, and the american representative pointed out the fact that the seizures not having been made or justified on account of contraband goods, the only effect of the british decision would seem to be either that great britain possessed the right to seize neutral and non-contraband goods aboard british vessels trading between neutral ports, or else the american owners of such cargoes would be entitled to full compensation for their damages. [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; hay to choate, may , .] lord salisbury in his reply attempted to correct what he considered the misapprehension which underlay the statement of alternatives, namely, that neutral and non-contraband goods were not free in british bottoms between neutral ports, or else full compensation must be made to the owners for their seizure. it was asserted that the british government had neither exercised nor claimed any such right as that which was indicated, nor had they _seized_ neutral and non-contraband goods. he declared that the goods were not seized. their passage to lorenzo marques was merely interrupted, and by this interruption they were detained only to the extent that their being on board the ship which had been arrested made their detention unavoidable. it was further alleged that had the prize court held that the arrest of the ships was not justified they would "_presumably_ have awarded damages against the captors of the ships and the damages would _presumably_ have been so calculated as to enable the ship to meet the claims of merchants arising out of the unjustified interruption of the voyage."[ ] the fact was alleged that the court had not so held and that it appeared that the ships should, therefore, bear the consequences of the arrest and meet the merchants' claims. by the law of the flag under which the ships sailed they could not carry goods destined for the enemy. if they shipped such goods they should bear the consequences. among those consequences was the delaying of the goods until such time as they could be placed on a ship that could legally carry them on to their original port of destination. [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; salisbury to choate, july , .] the result of such a decision is apparent. the american goods, in the words of mr. hay, were "as inaccessible to their owners as if they had been landed on a rock in mid-ocean," since no steamers not belonging to british lines plied between the ports of cape colony and delagoa bay. but there seemed little chance of securing a revision of great britain's decision, which was based upon the principle that she might deal with english subjects and with english ships in accordance with the law of the flag under which those ships sailed. mr. hay, therefore, only endeavored to secure every possible guarantee for american interests involved, but incidentally emphasized the view that, although england might use her own as she saw fit she must show just ground for all injuries suffered by innocent american shippers. instructions were sent to mr. hollis, the united states consul at lorenzo marques, that he should investigate the seizures and make every effort to protect the property of american citizens, and later he was urged to ascertain the facts concerning the detention of american flour on board the ships arrested by great britain.[ ] [footnote : for. rel, , p. ; hay to hollis, dec. , .] it soon developed that freight had been prepaid and that the drafts drawn against the various shipments from new york would be protested for non-payment by the parties on whom they had been drawn at delagoa bay.[ ] consequently the title to the property in such cases was vested in the american shippers, and they urged their government to see that their interests were protected against what they considered an undue extension of belligerent rights against ordinary neutral trade from one neutral port to another. mr. hay pointed out the obvious injustice of the goods being in the prize courts with the vessel, even granting that the ship as a common carrier of international commerce had violated the law of its flag, on the remote possibility of having carried for the enemy. he insisted that, although the shippers might be required to furnish invoices and bills of lading, they should not be sent to the prize court for their property. lord salisbury, however, contended that the prize court had complete control of the situation, and that any neutral shippers who were innocent could secure the release of their goods only by applying to the court with the proper evidence of ownership. the injustice of the vigorous enforcement of this rule of prize law was obvious, and the demand was made that the goods should be released by order of the proper british law officer and not be left to the mercy of the prize court.[ ] it was urged that since the ships had been seized because of a violation of the municipal law of great britain, for trading with the enemy, and since the seizure and detention of the flour and other goods was only incidental to the seizure of the ships, the flour, to which no such offense could be imputed, could not under the circumstances be admitted to be subject to capture because not contraband of war. upon these grounds prompt restitution to the american owners was demanded.[ ] [footnote : for. rel, , p. ; toomey to hay, jan. , .] [footnote : for. rel, , p. ; choate to hay, jan. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; choate to salisbury, jan. , .] the view of the department was that nothing seemed to justify the seizure of the american goods, for to all intents and purposes they were _seized_ although it was considered by great britain that they had merely been _detained_ as an incident of the seizure of the ships on which they were carried. since the flour was sold delivered at delagoa bay it was therefore the property of the united states shippers until the obligation of delivery was fulfilled irrespective of the drafts made against it on delagoa bay. upon the return of these drafts unpaid the flour was left in a critical position even if released.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; toomey to hay, jan. , .] it was clearly shown that the flour had been sold in the regular course of business as for a number of years past, shipments being made of so many bags each month to their regular users who anticipated their ordinary requirements. the consignees, it was urged by the american shippers, were reputable merchants in delagoa bay, and the consignments were not of an unusual character but were a part of the ordinary commerce with the east coast.[ ] it was admitted that certain of the consignments had been to residents of johannesburg, but it was at the same time asserted that the consignees were legitimate flour merchants who were not contractors for the transvaal government at the time the purchases were made.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; choate to salisbury, jan. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. . affidavit of a.j. toomey, president of the penn. milling and export co., jan. , .] the pennsylvania milling and export company suggested that possibly their shipments had been confused with those of an english firm, collier and sons, of bristol. it was alleged to be a notorious fact that this firm had made large shipments of flour to the transvaal government; that arthur may and company were the agents of the firm in the republic, and that the bristol firm had shipped on the same steamers on which american goods were carried. a.j. toomey, president of the pennsylvania firm, in alleging these facts pointed out that he mentioned only what was well known in shipping circles and did so merely to establish the fact that there had been no wrong intent with reference to his shipments. he urged that the question of the justice of indemnification should be settled, leaving the respective rights of consignors or consignees to the proceeds to be settled afterward.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; toomey to hay, feb. , .] mr. choate, in carrying out instructions received from washington, insisted that where the ship was seized and taken into port on the charge of trading with the enemy, and where the flour was not held as contraband, and was not claimed to be contraband, and under the circumstances could not be involved in the specific charge against the ship, it was manifestly a great hardship for the owners of the flour to be compelled to go into the prize court at a port short of the original destination even for the purpose of proving their ownership, which he insisted would involve costs and damages for the detention and possible deterioration in value.[ ] it was intimated that aside from the pecuniary features of the situation it was of primary importance to insist upon the principles involved, with a view to preventing an extension of belligerent rights to the detriment of all neutral commerce in time of war. emphasis was therefore placed upon the point that evidence must be shown that the goods were really for the supply of the enemy's forces and that this was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure. the fact was pointed out that otherwise the action of the british authorities seemed to imply the right to exercise an embargo on the sale and delivery of non-contraband goods in the ordinary course of trade with the people of the republics. it was intimated that this was inconsistent with the view of contraband expressed by the english government, and wholly inadmissible from the point of view of the united states.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; choate to salisbury, jan. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; choate to salisbury, jan. , .] the argument was presented that the british government had seized flour shipped to buyers at delagoa bay and had prevented it from reaching that point in time to meet a good market. consequently, in view of the fact that it was not sold for any purposes hostile to great britain, it was urged that the latter should not be allowed to consider herself relieved of any responsibility for indemnity or direct loss assumed by the shippers, or for any indirect loss for which the shippers might have to compensate the buyers on account of the diversion and detention. it was the opinion of the united states that the mere release of the flour to qualified owners did not meet the obligation in the case because the owners could not possibly take the delivery of the flour owing to the obstacles of war at the points where the goods lay. even if they could do so they would naturally suffer considerable loss by the condition of the market and by any diminution in value that might have occurred to the flour through climatic deterioration. the american state department, therefore, suggested as the only equitable plan apparent under the circumstances that great britain buy the flour and other innocent goods at their invoice price and pay over the proceeds of the purchases to those persons who could prove a just claim for its value. an additional sum was also asked as "reasonable compensation" for loss of market and other losses that might have been suffered by american interests.[ ] in other words, the english government should use the flour, pay the costs and indemnify the owners reasonably, since the latter were entirely innocent and had depended upon the usual rights and immunities of neutral shippers in time of war. the fact was pointed out that the situation was causing an uncertainty and hesitancy in business circles which was detrimental to all american interests. although a number of the consignments were being delivered at delagoa bay, presumably by english ships, it was alleged that the seizures and the unforeseen attitude of great britain had compelled all later shipments to go by way of hamburg or bordeaux when seeking the ports of south africa in the way of ordinary neutral commerce in order to avoid using british bottoms as a means of transportation. many of the drafts had been returned unpaid and others were expected in due course, and whether paid or not they would finally have to be lifted by the shippers from the united states, since they were the final recourse.[ ] all delay tended to reduce the value of the goods, which were perishable, on account of the climate and because of cape colony duties and loss of market. [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; toomey to hay, jan. , .] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; hay to choate, jan. , .] the offer was made by several of the american shippers to sell to great britain for the value of the goods at the port of original destination at the time they would have arrived there had the voyage not been interrupted. and the american representative urged that it would be advisable for all american shippers who were interested to agree to sell upon the same terms with a view to securing an arrangement which would include all neutral american property. he suggested that where the title to property was doubtful both shipper and buyer might unite in the sale, since this course was preferable to incurring questions as between consignors and consignees in the prize courts.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; choate to hay, jan. , .] the english government had naturally been unwilling to buy at current prices for the reason that prices were doubled at delagoa bay after the seizures, but it was considered that the price there on the day of the seizures was not unreasonable. great britain was willing to buy, but emphasized the point that the alleged owners must prove their title to ownership beyond a doubt as an essential condition of the arrangement, since the government could not incur the risk of paying one man only to have another appear later and prove that he was the real owner. fears were expressed that the question of ownership would cause trouble, although the regular shipping documents by which the goods had gotten into the ships, it was thought, should be sufficient proof provided the joint consent of consignors and consignees could be secured.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , pp. , , ] the english view had been that the whole cargo was included in the libel for trading with the enemy declared against the ship, but the plea of the american owners was heard, that the rules of prize procedure should not be so rigorously enforced in the present instances, since such an interpretation would have led to obvious injustice by requiring innocent american owners to appear before the court to prove the title to their property.[ ] such a requirement, it was realized, would have led to difficulties of an almost unsurmountable character under the circumstances. claimants would have had to submit evidence showing a _bona fide_ american citizenship and an actual title to the ownership of the goods at the time they were seized. within the rules of prize jurisdiction the consignee on whose account and at whose expense the goods were shipped is considered the owner of such goods during the voyage. and as a corollary the further rule is suggested that the right to claim damages caused for an illegal seizure would be in the owner. in the prize court the delay caused by all such questions as between consignor and consignee would have been almost endless. [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; choate to hay, feb. , .] the question might naturally have arisen whether there could be any basis for a claim for indirect loss sustained by an american shipper growing out of the sale on credit to citizens of the transvaal. it might be a question, too, whether the consignor might, notwithstanding the seizures, be able to recover at law the full contract price of the goods shipped prepaid to the consignee, and if so, whether the seizure could be considered legally as a wrong against the american consignor. and even granting that the latter were unable to recover at law from the consignee, the question would still remain whether under all the circumstances such inability on the part of the american consignor could be legally imputable to the act of the british government in making the seizure. the question might also have arisen where an agent had bought for the transvaal government on credit, so that the title passed when the goods went on board and the goods were discovered to have been contraband, whether an american shipper might not appear to have been privy to the real character of the purchases. in such a case the united states government could hardly have championed the cause of a party who had shipped contraband. a prize court is filled with pitfalls of the kind, but the diplomacy of secretary hay, backed by the prestige of the united states and a reciprocal feeling of friendship between the two nations, was able to avoid all such questions by inducing great britain to agree upon a settlement without compelling the claimants to go into the prize court. although it was pretty well ascertained that no actual contraband in the usual sense of the term had been carried from america by the ships which were seized, difficult questions were thus avoided as between liens and general ownerships which might have arisen had american shippers been compelled to go into court. it is not a universal rule where the shipper has not been paid for his goods that the property is still in him, so as to constitute him the owner in a prize court, or for the purposes of sale. by the terms of sale and shipment he may not have retained a lien on the goods. but in any case as a rule the title of the absolute owner prevails in a prize court over the interests of a lien holder, whatever the equities between consignor and consignee may be.[ ] consequently the policy adopted by secretary hay in demanding that great britain should settle with all american shippers on an equitable basis without forcing them to take their chances in a prize court was the wisest course that could have been pursued. [footnote : the _winnifred_, blatch. prize cases, , cited halleck, international law, engl. ed. ( ), .] in the final arrangement great britain admitted that the american goods had not been liable to seizure except as a result of the libel attaching to the ships. but any claims for damages due to the owners of the cargoes on account of the failure of the vessels to deliver at the port mentioned in the freight contract, it was asserted, should be made against those who entered into or became responsible for the execution of the contract for the delivery which they failed to perform, and the assumption that such damages could be sustained at law would depend on the terms of the contract of carriage. the english government, however, did not admit that it was in any way liable for damages to the owners of the flour and other goods, since their detention was due entirely to the circumstance that the ships were not able to complete their voyages, and the fact that they could not complete their voyages was due to the circumstance that such voyages were illegal by the law of the flag under which they were sailing.[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , pp. - ; salisbury to choate, march , .] although the financial settlement which great britain was willing to make was accepted by the united states, this acceptance did not imply an acquiescence in the view expressed by the english government with reference to the conditions under which flour and other foodstuffs might become contraband of war, nor in the doctrine of continuous voyages as applied by great britain to trading with the enemy. it was preferred at washington to follow the usual rule and avoid passing upon hypothetical cases until occasion had called them into actual existence. the problem which had been before the department of state was, not to force great britain to declare herself finally upon broad questions of international law, nor to express the final attitude of the united states upon questions which were not immediately at issue, but to meet the demands of american shippers and secure their immediate interests by some equitable agreement with great britain. the arrangement agreed upon, therefore, met only the necessity of the case immediately in view. the united states consul-general at cape town was to arrange with sir alfred milner, the british high commissioner in south africa, for the release or purchase by the british government of any goods owned by citizens of the united states, which, if purchased, were to be paid for at the price they would have brought at the port of destination at the time they would have arrived there had the voyage not been interrupted. against certain articles, especially the oil consigned to the netherlands south african railway, an allegation of enemy's property was justly made and the oil confiscated. in the end most of the american claims were withdrawn or paid in full. in the former event the american owners threw the burden of proof of ownership upon the consignees, who were instructed to present their claims through their respective governments. but it should be noted that in acceding to the american demands by purchasing the goods, the british government emphasized the fact that the act was purely _ex gratia_ on the part of england. the british representative clearly stated that the goods had been legally detained and that it was open for the owners to come and take them upon proof of ownership before the prize court. it was pointed out that the fact that none but british ships ran between cape colony and delagoa bay, although an unfortunate circumstance, was one which could hardly be held to be a fault of the english government. the enforcement of the english law was the right of great britain no matter upon whom the inconvenience might happen to fall. lord salisbury said: "it must be distinctly understood that these payments are made purely _ex gratia_ and having regard to the special circumstances of this particular case. no liability is admitted by her majesty's government either to purchase the goods or to compensate ... for the losses or for the expenses ... incurred."[ ] the view held by the english statesman was that great britain's concession in these cases should not serve as a precedent in the future. [footnote : for. rel., , p. ; salisbury to choate, july , , with reference to the _beatrice_.] the attitude which great britain had assumed with reference to the different seizures was generally considered a menace to neutral commercial interests should the british position be accepted as a precedent for similar cases that might occur. the danger of such a precedent had been realized by secretary hay and throughout the negotiations he had dwelt upon the fact that while the protection of american interests was the end immediately sought, the principles which underlay the disposition of the particular cases were of the greater importance. lord roseberry, too, called attention to the danger of the precedent should england determine to treat foodstuffs in general as contraband of war. it was pointed out, however, that in the seizures of foodstuffs near delagoa bay the question of contraband did not necessarily arise, since all trade with the enemy, even in articles the most innocent, was forbidden under heavy penalty. the seizure of certain classes of foodstuffs as of a contraband character did not of necessity involve the principle of treating all foodstuffs as contraband of war. the english view was that it had long been recognized that a belligerent might discriminate between foodstuffs obviously intended for the commissariat of an army in the field and foodstuffs which might be properly imported for the use of the non-combatant population. the consensus of opinion, however, seems to be that while there may be reasonable ground for including tinned or canned meats and the like in the former category, flour naturally belongs to the latter class, and it has been pointed out that neither the british government nor any other has the power of treating what it pleases as contraband without reference to the prize court, with which alone the decision rests. the prize courts of all countries have held at different times that foodstuffs under certain circumstances are contraband, as, for instance, where they are intended for the supply of a belligerent garrison as well as in less obvious cases, but any decision which considered foodstuffs generally as contraband would be disquieting to all neutral interests. one writer has asserted that such an innovation would not be alarming to great britain as long as she remained predominant at sea, since the more effectual her sea power were declared to be in preventing sustenance from going over sea to her enemy the better it would be for english predominance. it is believed by this writer that during the existence of this supremacy at sea she would be able to protect the passage of general foodstuffs from foreign countries to her own ports. he concludes, however: "of course if we lose our predominance at sea it is another matter. but then, è finita la musica."[ ] [footnote : thos. gibson bowles, jan. , . for. rel., , p. .] the acceptance of the principle that foodstuffs are contraband of war, it need hardly be said, is not even a remote probability except under very exceptional circumstances where they are for the immediate supply of the enemy's army or navy, and in most cases of this kind they can usually be confiscated as enemy's property without a direct implication of a distinctly contraband character. in other words, the use for which they are intended may give reasonable ground for the conclusive presumption that they are for the enemy's immediate supply, whether the title to property in them vests in the enemy or in some other agency, and the last question is always to be decided by the prize court of the particular country which has made the seizure. the decision should be based upon a careful examination of the evidence which is submitted to the court, and not presumed from the fact that the political power has exercised the belligerent right of visit, search and detention. the final decision of confiscation rests with the prize court. by way of recapitulation it may be pointed out that the goods seized or detained by the english authorities in south african waters were shipped by american merchants and manufacturers, many of them on regular monthly orders to alleged reputable merchants in lorenzo marques, delagoa bay, in portuguese territory. certain consignments were intended for alleged reputable firms in johannesburg, south african republic. the articles composing the cargoes of the ships were of the general character of foodstuffs, chiefly flour, canned meats, and other food materials. lumber, hardware and various miscellaneous articles generally considered innocent in character were also included. there was a consignment of lubricating oil to the netherlands south african railway, the latter company held to be the property of the transvaal government, and a like consignment to the lorenzo marques railway, a portuguese concern. at first the seizures which occurred at points between cape colony and delagoa bay were supposed to have been made on account of contraband. later great britain declared that the ships had been seized because of the violation of a municipal ordinance forbidding british subjects to trade with the enemy. the _mashona, beatrice_ and _sabine_ were british ships sailing under the english flag. the _maria_ was a dutch vessel sailing under the flag of holland, but was supposed by the english authorities to have been under charter to an english firm. in the latter case the ship would have been liable to the english law, but for the mistake the owners of the ship as well as the owners of the cargo were indemnified by the english government. the seizure of the cargoes of the british ships was declared to have been merely an unavoidable incident of the seizure of the alleged guilty ships. compensation was made to american shippers by the purchase of the goods. the consignment of oil to the netherlands south african railway was confiscated as enemy's property. the views of great britain and the united states were divergent with reference to the principle of treating foodstuffs as contraband. rather as an _obiter dictum_ the former declared: "foodstuffs with a hostile destination can be considered contraband of war only if they are supplies for the enemy's forces. it is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used; it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of the seizure."[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] the united states declared that the validity of the right to seize goods on the ground of contraband could not be recognized "under any belligerent right of capture of provisions and other goods shipped by american citizens in the ordinary course of trade to a neutral port."[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] england declared: "her majesty's government have not admitted liability in respect of any claims for loss or damage sustained ... in consequence of the delay in the delivery of the ... goods. but they have offered to purchase the flour on board by united states citizens. claims for redress for the non-delivery of the cargo appear to be a matter for settlement between such claimants and the ship which undertook to deliver. british subjects who owned goods on board, having no right to trade with the enemy, are not in the same position as foreign owners. the latter are not guilty of any offense in trading with the enemy from a neutral country unless the goods are contraband and are found on board a british ship in british territorial waters or on the high seas, _and are destined for the enemy's countries_."[ ] [footnote : mr. broderick, under-secretary for foreign affairs, speaking in house of commons in regard to the _mashona_ on march , .] with reference to trading with the enemy great britain attempted to extend the accepted doctrine of continuous voyages. she expressed herself as follows: "an ultimate destination to citizens of the transvaal even of goods consigned to british ports on the way thither, might, if viewed as one "continuous voyage" be held to constitute in a british vessel such a "trading with the enemy" as to bring the vessel within the provisions of the municipal law."[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] the united states held that "the destination of the vessel being only such [british] ports ... the port authorities may presumably, and are assumed to be bound to, prevent transshipment through british territory of contraband destined for the boers."[ ] [footnote : for. rel., , p. .] no contraband was shown, and the attempt which great britain made to extend the ruling of the supreme court of the united states in so as to apply to trading with the enemy cannot be considered to have been successful. the questions of international law involved in the seizures of flour and foodstuffs generally were not answered by the final arrangement between the governments concerned. in his message to congress in president mckinley deplored the fact that while the war had introduced important questions the result had not been a "broad settlement of the question of a neutral's right to send goods not contraband _per se_ to a neutral port adjacent to a belligerent area." two things, however, were apparently admitted: ( ) that a belligerent may declare flour contraband _pro hac vice_; ( ) that a belligerent may detain neutral goods and divert them from their destination on a reasonable suspicion that they are intended for the enemy, subject to a claim for compensation including damage by detention. peace theories and the balkan war by norman angell author of "the great illusion" peace theories and the balkan war by norman angell, author of "the great illusion." the text of this book. whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the powers, or sit in sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no consequence at the present moment.... we have sometimes been assured by persons who profess to know that the danger of war has become an illusion.... well, here is a war which has broken out in spite of all that rulers and diplomatists could do to prevent it, a war in which the press has had no part, a war which the whole force of the money power has been subtly and steadfastly directed to prevent, which has come upon us, not through the ignorance or credulity of the people, but, on the contrary, through their knowledge of their history and their destiny, and through their intense realisation of their wrongs and of their duties, as they conceived them, a war which from all these causes has burst upon us with all the force of a spontaneous explosion, and which in strife and destruction has carried all before it. face to face with this manifestation, who is the man bold enough to say that force is never a remedy? who is the man who is foolish enough to say that martial virtues do not play a vital part in the health and honour of every people? (cheers.) who is the man who is vain enough to suppose that the long antagonisms of history and of time can in all circumstances be adjusted by the smooth and superficial conventions of politicians and ambassadors?--mr. winston churchill at sheffield. mr. norman angell's theory was one to enable the citizens of this country to sleep quietly, and to lull into false security the citizens of all great countries. that is undoubtedly the reason why he met with so much success.... it was a very comfortable theory for those nations which have grown rich and whose ideals and initiative have been sapped by over much prosperity. but the great delusion of norman angell, which led to the writing of "the great illusion," has been dispelled for ever by the balkan league. in this connection it is of value to quote the words of mr. winston churchill, which give very adequately the reality as opposed to theory.--_the review of reviews_, from an article on "the débâcle of norman angell." and an odd score of like pronouncements from newspapers and public men since the outbreak of the balkan war. the interrogations they imply have been put definitely in the first chapter of this book; the replies to those questions summarised in that chapter and elaborated in the others. _the "key" to this book and the summary of its arguments are contained in chapter i. (pp. - )_ contents. i. the questions and their answers ii. "peace" and "war" in the balkans iii. economic causes in the balkan war iv. turkish ideals in our political thought v. our responsibility for balkan wars vi. pacifism, defence, and the "impossibility of war" vii. "theories" false and true; their role in european politics viii. what shall we do? chapter i. the questions and their answer. chapter ii. "peace" and "war" in the balkans. "peace" in the balkans under the turkish system--the inadequacy of our terms--the repulsion of the turkish invasion--the christian effort to bring the reign of force and conquest to an end--the difference between action designed to settle relationship on force and counter action designed to prevent such settlement--the force of the policeman and the force of the brigand--the failure of conquest as exemplified by the turk--will the balkan peoples prove pacifist or bellicist; adopt the turkish or the christian system? chapter iii. economics and the balkan war. the "economic system" of the turk--the turkish "trade of conquest" as a cause of this war--racial and religious hatred of primitive societies--industrialism as a solvent--its operation in europe--balkans geographically remote from main drift of european economic development--the false economies of the powers as a cause of their jealousies and quarrels--- this has prevented settlement--what is the "economic motive"?--impossible to separate moral and material--nationality and the war system. chapter iv. turkish ideals in our political thought. this war and "the turks of britain and prussia"--the anglo-saxon and opposed ideals--mr. c. chesterton's case for "killing and being killed" as the best method of settling differences--its application to civil conflicts--as in spanish-america--the difference between devonshire and venezuela--will the balkans adopt the turco-venezuelan political ideals or the british? chapter v. our responsibility for balkan wars. mr. winston churchill on the "responsibility" of diplomacy--what does he mean?--an easy (and popular) philosophy--can we neglect past if we would avoid future errors?--british temper and policy in the crimean war--what are its lessons?--why we fought a war to sustain the "integrity and independence of the turkish dominion in europe"--supporting the turk against his christian victims--from fear of russian growth which we are now aiding--the commentary of events--shall we back the wrong horse again? chapter vi. pacifism, defence, and "the impossibility of war." did the crimean war prove bright and cobden wrong?--our curious reasoning--mr. churchill on "illusions"--the danger of war is not the illusion but its benefits--we are all pacifists now since we all desire peace--will more armaments alone secure it?--the experience of mankind--war "the failure of human wisdom"--therefore more wisdom is the remedy--but the militarists only want more arms--the german lord roberts--the military campaign against political rationalism--how to make war certain. chapter vii. "theories" false and true: their role in european progress. the improvement of ideas the foundation of all improvement--shooting straight and thinking straight; the one as important as the other--pacifism and the millennium--how we got rid of wars of religion--a few ideas have changed the face of the world--the simple ideas the most important--the "theories" which have led to war--the work of the reformer to destroy old and false theories--the intellectual interdependence of nations--europe at unity in this matter--new ideas cannot be confined to one people--no fear of ourselves or any nation being ahead of the rest. chapter viii. what must we _do_? we must have the right political faith--then we must give effect to it--good intention not enough--the organization of the great forces of modern life--our indifference as to the foundations of the evil--the only hope. chapter i. the questions and their answer. what has pacifism, old or new, to say now? is war impossible? is it unlikely? is it futile? is not force a remedy, and at times the only remedy? could any remedy have been devised on the whole so conclusive and complete as that used by the balkan peoples? have not the balkan peoples redeemed war from the charges too readily brought against it as simply an instrument of barbarism? have questions of profit and loss, economic considerations, anything whatever to do with this war? would the demonstration of its economic futility have kept the peace? are theories and logic of the slightest use, since force alone can determine the issue? is not war therefore inevitable, and must we not prepare diligently for it? i will answer all these questions quite simply and directly without casuistry and logic-chopping, and honestly desiring to avoid paradox and "cleverness." and these quite simple answers will not be in contradiction with anything that i have written, nor will they invalidate any of the principles i have attempted to explain. and my answers may be summarised thus:-- ( ) this war has justified both the old pacifism and the new. by universal admission events have proved that the pacifists who opposed the crimean war were right and their opponents wrong. had public opinion given more consideration to those pacifist principles, this country would not have "backed the wrong horse," and this war, two wars which have preceded it, and many of the abominations of which the balkan peninsular has been the scene during the last years might have been avoided, and in any case great britain would not now carry upon her shoulders the responsibility of having during half a century supported the turk against the christian and of having tried uselessly to prevent what has now taken place--the break-up of the turk's rule in europe. ( ) war is not impossible, and no responsible pacifist ever said it was; it is not the likelihood of war which is the illusion, but its benefits. ( ) it is likely or unlikely according as the parties to a dispute are guided by wisdom or folly. ( ) it _is_ futile; and force is no remedy. ( ) its futility is proven by the war waged daily by the turks as conquerors, during the last years. and because the balkan peoples have chosen the less evil of two kinds of war, and will use their victory to bring a system based on force and conquest to an end, we who do not believe in force and conquest rejoice in their action, and believe it will achieve immense benefits. but if instead of using their victory to eliminate force, they in their turn pin their faith to it, continue to use it the one against the other, exploiting by its means the populations they rule, and become not the organisers of social co-operation among the balkan populations, but merely, like the turks, their conquerors and "owners," then they in their turn will share the fate of the turk. ( ) the fundamental causes of this war are economic in the narrower, as well as in the larger sense of the term; in the first because conquest was the turk's only trade--he desired to live out of taxes wrung from a conquered people, to exploit them as a means of livelihood, and this conception was at the bottom of most of turkish misgovernment. and in the larger sense its cause is economic because in the balkans, remote geographically from the main drift of european economic development, there has not grown up that interdependent social life, the innumerable contacts which in the rest of europe have done so much to attenuate primitive religious and racial hatreds. ( ) a better understanding by the turk of the real nature of civilised government, of the economic futility of conquest of the fact that a means of livelihood (an economic system), based upon having more force than someone else and using it ruthlessly against him, is an impossible form of human relationship bound to break down, _would_ have kept the peace. ( ) if european statecraft had not been animated by false conceptions, largely economic in origin, based upon a belief in the necessary rivalry of states, the advantages of preponderant force and conquest, the western nations could have composed their quarrels and ended the abominations of the balkan peninsula long ago--even in the opinion of the _times_. and it is our own false statecraft--that of great britain--which has a large part of the responsibility for this failure of european civilisation. it has caused us to sustain the turk in europe, to fight a great and popular war with that aim, and led us into treaties which had they been kept, would have obliged us to fight to-day on the side of the turk against the balkan states. ( ) if by "theories" and "logic" is meant the discussion of and interest in principles, the ideas that govern human relationship, they are the only things that can prevent future wars, just as they were the only things that brought religious wars to an end--a preponderant power "imposing" peace playing no role therein. just as it was false religious theories which made the religious wars, so it is false political theories which make the political wars. ( ) war is only inevitable in the sense that other forms of error and passion--religious persecution for instance--are inevitable; they cease with better understanding, as the attempt to impose religious belief by force has ceased in europe. ( ) we should not prepare for war; we should prepare to prevent war; and though that preparation may include battleships and conscription, those elements will quite obviously make the tension and danger greater unless there is also a better european opinion. these summarised replies need a little expansion. chapter ii. "peace" and "war" in the balkans. "peace" in the balkans under the turkish system--the inadequacy of our terms--the repulsion of the turkish invasion--the christian effort to bring the reign of force and conquest to an end--the difference between action designed to settle relationship on force and counter action designed to prevent such settlement--the force of the policeman and the force of the brigand--the failure of conquest as exemplified by the turk--will the balkan peoples prove pacifist or bellicist; adopt the turkish or the christian system? had we thrashed out the question of war and peace as we must finally, it would hardly be necessary to explain that the apparent paradox in answer no. (that war is futile, and that this war will have immense benefits) is due to the inadequacy of our language, which compels us to use the same word for two opposed purposes, not to any real contradiction of fact. we called the condition of the balkan peninsula "peace" until the other day, merely because the respective ambassadors still happened to be resident in the capitals to which they were accredited. let us see what "peace" under turkish rule really meant, and who is the real invader in this war. here is a very friendly and impartial witness--sir charles elliot--who paints for us the character of the turk as an "administrator":-- "the turk in europe has an overweening sense of his superiority, and remains a nation apart, mixing little with the conquered populations, whose customs and ideas he tolerates, but makes little effort to understand. the expression indeed, 'turkey in europe' means indeed no more than 'england in asia,' if used as a designation for india.... the turks have done little to assimilate the people whom they have conquered, and still less, been assimilated by them. in the larger part of the turkish dominions, the turks themselves are in a minority.... the turks certainly resent the dismemberment of their empire, but not in the sense in which the french resent the conquest of alsace-lorraine by germany. they would never use the word 'turkey' or even its oriental equivalent, 'the high country' in ordinary conversation. they would never say that syria and greece are parts of turkey which have been detached, but merely that they are tributaries which have become independent, provinces once occupied by turks where there are no turks now. as soon as a province passes under another government, the turks find it the most natural thing in the world to leave it and go somewhere else. in the same spirit the turk talks quite pleasantly of leaving constantinople some day, he will go over to asia and found another capital. one can hardly imagine englishmen speaking like that of london, but they might conceivably speak so of calcutta.... the turk is a conqueror and nothing else. the history of the turk is a catalogue of battles. his contributions to art, literature, science and religion, are practically nil. their desire has not been to instruct, to improve, hardly even to govern, but simply to conquer.... the turk makes nothing at all; he takes whatever he can get, as plunder or pillage. he lives in the houses which he finds, or which he orders to be built for him. in unfavourable circumstances he is a marauder. in favourable, a _grand seigneur_ who thinks it his right to enjoy with grace and dignity all that the world can hold, but who will not lower himself by engaging in art, literature, trade or manufacture. why should he, when there are other people to do these things for him. indeed, it may be said that he takes from others even his religion, clothes, language, customs; there is hardly anything which is turkish and not borrowed. the religion is arabic; the language half arabic and persian; the literature almost entirely imitative; the art persian or byzantine; the costumes, in the upper classes and army mostly european. there is nothing characteristic in manufacture or commerce, except an aversion to such pursuits. in fact, all occupations, except agriculture and military service are distasteful to the true osmanli. he is not much of a merchant. he may keep a stall in a bazaar, but his operations are rarely undertaken on a scale which merits the name of commerce or finance. it is strange to observe how, when trade becomes active in any seaport, or upon the railway lines, the osmanli retires and disappears, while greeks, armenians and levantines thrive in his place. neither does he much affect law, medicine or the learned professions. such callings are followed by moslims but they are apt to be of non-turkish race. but though he does none of these things ... the turk is a soldier. the moment a sword or rifle is put into his hands, he instinctively knows how to use it with effect, and feels at home in the ranks or on a horse. the turkish army is not so much a profession or an institution necessitated by the fears and aims of the government as the quite normal state of the turkish nation.... every turk is a born soldier, and adopts other pursuits chiefly because times are bad. when there is a question of fighting, if only in a riot, the stolid peasant wakes up and shows surprising power of finding organisation and expedients, and alas! a surprising ferocity. the ordinary turk is an honest and good-humoured soul, kind to children and animals, and very patient; but when the fighting spirit comes on him, he becomes like the terrible warriors of the huns or henghis khan, and slays, burns and ravages without mercy or discrimination."[ ] such is the verdict of an instructed, travelled and observant english author and diplomatist, who lived among these people for many years, and who learned to like them, who studied them and their history. it does not differ, of course, appreciably, from what practically every student of the turk has discovered: the turk is the typical conqueror. as a nation, he has lived by the sword, and he is dying by the sword, because the sword, the mere exercise of force by one man or group of men upon another, conquest in other words, is an impossible form of human relationship. and in order to maintain this evil form of relationship--its evil and futility is the whole basis of the principles i have attempted to illustrate--he has not even observed the rough chivalry of the brigand. the brigand, though he might knock men on the head, will refrain from having his force take the form of butchering women and disembowelling children. not so the turk. his attempt at government will take the form of the obscene torture of children, of a bestial ferocity which is not a matter of dispute or exaggeration, but a thing to which scores, hundreds, thousands even of credible european, witnesses have testified. "the finest gentleman, sir, that ever butchered a woman or burned a village," is the phrase that _punch_ most justly puts into the mouth of the defender of our traditional turcophil policy. and this condition is "peace," and the act which would put a stop to it is "war." it is the inexactitude and inadequacy of our language which creates much of the confusion of thought in this matter; we have the same term for action destined to achieve a given end and for a counter-action destined to prevent it. yet we manage, in other than the international field, in civil matters, to make the thing clear enough. once an american town was set light to by incendiaries, and was threatened with destruction. in order to save at least a part of it, the authorities deliberately burned down a block of buildings in the pathway of the fire. would those incendiaries be entitled to say that the town authorities were incendiaries also, and "believed in setting light to towns?" yet this is precisely the point of view of those who tax pacifists with approving war because they approve the measure aimed at bringing it to an end. put it another way. you do not believe that force should determine the transfer of property or conformity to a creed, and i say to you: "hand me your purse and conform to my creed or i kill you." you say: "because i do not believe that force should settle these matters, i shall try and prevent it settling them, and therefore if you attack i shall resist; if i did not i should be allowing force to settle them." i attack; you resist and disarm me and say: "my force having neutralised yours, and the equilibrium being now established, i will hear any reasons you may have to urge for my paying you money; or any argument in favour of your creed. reason, understanding, adjustment shall settle it." you would be a pacifist. or, if you deem that that word connotes non-resistance, though to the immense bulk of pacifists it does not, you would be an anti-bellicist to use a dreadful word coined by m. emile faguet in the discussion of this matter. if, however, you said: "having disarmed you and established the equilibrium, i shall now upset it in my favour by taking your weapon and using it against you unless you hand me _your_ purse and subscribe to _my_ creed. i do this because force alone can determine issues, and because it is a law of life that the strong should eat up the weak." you would then be a bellicist. in the same way, when we prevent the brigand from carrying on his trade--taking wealth by force--it is not because we believe in force as a means of livelihood, but precisely because we do not. and if, in preventing the brigand from knocking out brains, we are compelled to knock out his brains, is it because we believe in knocking out people's brains? or would we urge that to do so is the way to carry on a trade, or a nation, or a government, or make it the basis of human relationship? in every civilised country, the basis of the relationship on which the community rests is this: no individual is allowed to settle his differences with another by force. but does this mean that if one threatens to take my purse, i am not allowed to use force to prevent it? that if he threatens to kill me, i am not to defend myself, because "the individual citizens are not allowed to settle their differences by force?" it is _because_ of that, because the act of self-defence is an attempt to prevent the settlement of a difference by force, that the law justifies it.[ ] but the law would not justify me, if having disarmed my opponent, having neutralised his force by my own, and re-established the social equilibrium, i immediately proceeded to upset it, by asking him for his purse on pain of murder. i should then be settling the matter by force--i should then have ceased to be a pacifist, and have become a bellicist. for that is the difference between the two conceptions: the bellicist says: "force alone can settle these matters; it is the final appeal; therefore fight it out. let the best man win. when you have preponderant strength, impose your view; force the other man to your will; not because it is right, but because you are able to do so." it is the "excellent policy" which lord roberts attributes to germany and approves. we anti-bellicists take an exactly contrary view. we say: "to fight it out settles nothing, since it is not a question of who is stronger, but of whose view is best, and as that is not always easy to establish, it is of the utmost importance in the interest of all parties, in the long run, to keep force out of it." the former is the policy of the turks. they have been obsessed with the idea that if only they had enough of physical force, ruthlessly exercised, they could solve the whole question of government, of existence for that matter, without troubling about social adjustment, understanding, equity, law, commerce; "blood and iron" were all that was needed. the success of that policy can now be judged. and whether good or evil comes of the present war will depend upon whether the balkan states are on the whole guided by the bellicist principle or the opposed one. if having now momentarily eliminated force as between themselves, they re-introduce it, if the strongest, presumably bulgaria, adopts lord roberts' "excellent policy" of striking because she has the preponderant force, enters upon a career of conquest of other members of the balkan league, and the populations of the conquered territories, using them for exploitation by military force--why then there will be no settlement and this war will have accomplished nothing save futile waste and slaughter. for they will have taken under a new flag, the pathway of the turk to savagery, degeneration, death. but if on the other hand they are guided more by the pacifist principle, if they believe that co-operation between states is better than conflict between them, if they believe that the common interest of all in good government is greater than the special interest of any one in conquest, that the understanding of human relationships, the capacity for the organisation of society are the means by which men progress, and not the imposition of force by one man or group upon another, why, they will have taken the pathway to better civilisation. but then they will have disregarded lord roberts' advice. and this distinction between the two systems, far from being a matter of abstract theory of metaphysics or logic chopping, is just the difference which distinguishes the briton from the turk, which distinguishes britain from turkey. the turk has just as much physical vigour as the briton, is just as virile, manly and military. the turk has the same raw materials of nature, soil and water. there is no difference in the capacity for the exercise of physical force--or if there is, the difference is in favour of the turk. the real difference is a difference of ideas, of mind and outlook on the part of the individuals composing the respective societies; the turk has one general conception of human society and the code and principles upon which it is founded, mainly a militarist one; and the englishman has another, mainly a pacifist one. and whether the european society as a whole is to drift towards the turkish ideal or towards the english ideal will depend upon whether it is animated mainly by the pacifist or mainly by the bellicist doctrine; if the former, it will stagger blindly like the turk along the path to barbarism; if the latter, it will take a better road. [footnote : "turkey in europe," pp. - and - . it is significant, by the way, that the "born soldier" has now been crushed by a non-military race whom he has always despised as having no military tradition. capt. f.w. von herbert ("bye paths in the balkans") wrote (some years before the present war): "the bulgars as christian subjects of turkey exempt from military service, have tilled the ground under stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions, and the profession of arms is new to them." "stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions" is, in view of subsequent events distinctly good.] [footnote : i dislike to weary the reader with such damnable iteration, but when a cabinet minister is unable in this discussion to distinguish between the folly of a thing and its possibility, one _must_ make the fundamental point clear.] chapter iii. economics and the balkan war. the "economic system" of the turk--the turkish "trade of conquest" as a cause of this war--racial and religious hatred of primitive societies--industrialism as a solvent--its operation in europe--balkans geographically remote from main drift of european economic development--the false economies of the powers as a cause of their jealousies and quarrels--this has prevented settlement--what is the "economic motive"?--impossible to separate moral and material--nationality and the war system. in dealing with answer no. i have shown how the inadequacy of our language leads us so much astray in our notions of the real role of force in human relationships. but there is a curious phenomenon of thought which explains perhaps still more how misconceptions grow up on this subject, and that is the habit of thinking of a war which, of course, must include two parties, in terms, solely of one party at a time. thus one critic[ ] is quite sure that because the balkan peoples "recked nothing of financial disaster," economic considerations have had nothing to do with their war--a conclusion which seems to be arrived at by the process of judgment just indicated: to find the cause of condition produced by two parties you shall rigorously ignore one. for there is a great deal of internal evidence for believing that the writer of the article in question would admit very readily that the efforts of the turk to wring taxes out of the conquered peoples--not in return for a civilized administration but simply as the means of livelihood, of turning conquest into a trade--had a very great deal to do in explaining the turk's presence there at all and the christian's desire to get rid of him; while the same article specifically states that the mutual jealousies of the great powers, based on a desire to "grab" (an economic motive), had a great deal to do with preventing a peaceful settlement of the difficulties. yet "economics" have nothing to do with it! i have attempted elsewhere to make these two points--that it is on the one hand the false economics of the turks, and on the other hand the false economics of the powers of europe, colouring the policy and statecraft of both, which have played an enormous, in all human probability, a determining role in the immediate provoking cause of the war; and, of course, a further and more remote cause of the whole difficulty is the fact that the balkan peoples never having been subjected to the discipline of that complex social life which arises from trade and commerce have never grown out of (or to a less degree) those primitive racial and religious hostilities which at one time in europe as a whole provoked conflicts like that now raging in the balkans. the following article which appeared[ ] at the outbreak of the war may summarise some of the points with which we have been dealing. polite and good-natured people think it rude to say "balkans" if a pacifist be present. yet i never understood why, and i understand now less than ever. it carries the implication that because war has broken out that fact disposes of all objection to it. the armies are at grips, therefore peace is a mistake. passion reigns on the balkans, therefore passion is preferable to reason. i suppose cannibalism and infanticide, polygamy, judicial torture, religious persecution, witchcraft, during all the years we did these "inevitable" things, were defended in the same way, and those who resented all criticism of them pointed in triumph to the cannibal feast, the dead child, the maimed witness, the slain heretic, or the burned witch. but the fact did not prove the wisdom of those habits, still less their inevitability; for we have them no more. we are all agreed as to the fundamental cause of the balkan trouble: the hate born of religious, racial, national, and language differences; the attempt of an alien conqueror to live parasitically upon the conquered, and the desire of conqueror and conquered alike to satisfy in massacre and bloodshed the rancour of fanaticism and hatred. well, in these islands, not so very long ago, those things were causes of bloodshed; indeed, they were a common feature of european life. but if they are inevitable in human relationship, how comes it that adana is no longer duplicated by st. bartholomew; the bulgarian bands by the vendetta of the highlander and the lowlander; the struggle of the slav and turk, serb and bulgar, by that of scots and english, and english and welsh? the fanaticism of the moslem to-day is no intenser than that of catholic and heretic in rome, madrid, paris, and geneva at a time which is only separated from us by the lives of three or four elderly men. the heretic or infidel was then in europe also a thing unclean and horrifying, exciting in the mind of the orthodox a sincere and honest hatred and a (very largely satisfied) desire to kill. the catholic of the th century was apt to tell you that he could not sit at table with a heretic because the latter carried with him a distinctive and overpoweringly repulsive odour. if you would measure the distance europe has travelled, think what this means: all the nations of christendom united in a war lasting years for the capture of the holy sepulchre; and yet, when in our day the representatives, seated round a table, could have had it for the asking, they did not deem it worth the asking, so little of the ancient passion was there left. the very nature of man seemed to be transformed. for, wonderful though it be that orthodox should cease killing heretic, infinitely more wonderful still is it that he should cease wanting to kill him. and just as most of us are certain that the underlying causes of this conflict are "inevitable" and "inherent in unchanging human nature," so are we certain that so _un_human a thing as economics can have no bearing on it. well, i will suggest that the transformation of the heretic-hating and heretic-killing european is due mainly to economic forces; that it is because the drift of those forces has in such large part left the balkans, where until yesterday the people lived the life not much different from that which they lived in the time of abraham, to one side that war is now raging; that economic factors of a more immediate kind form a large part of the provoking cause of that war; and that a better understanding mainly of certain economic facts of their international relationship on the part of the great nations of europe is essential before much progress towards solution can be made. but then, by "economics," of course, i mean not a merchant's profit or a moneylender's interest, but the method by which men earn their bread, which must also mean the kind of life they lead. we generally think of the primitive life of man--that of the herdsman or the tent liver--as something idyllic. the picture is as far as possible from the truth. those into whose lives economics do not enter, or enter very little--that is to say, those who, like the congo cannibal, or the red indian, or the bedouin, do not cultivate, or divide their labour, or trade, or save, or look to the future, have shed little of the primitive passions of other animals of prey, the tigers and the wolves, who have no economics at all, and have no need to check an impulse or a hate. but industry, even of the more primitive kind, means that men must divide their labour, which means that they must put some sort of reliance upon one another; the thing of prey becomes a partner, and the attitude towards it changes. and as this life becomes more complex, as the daily needs and desires push men to trade and barter, that means building up a social organisation, rules and codes, and courts to enforce them; as the interdependence widens and deepens it necessarily means disregarding certain hostilities. if the neighbouring tribe wants to trade with you they must not kill you; if you want the services of the heretic you must not kill him, and you must keep your obligation towards him, and mutual good faith is death to long-sustained hatreds. you cannot separate the moral from the social and economic development of a people, and the great service of a complex social and industrial organisation, which is built up by the desire of men for better material conditions, is not that it "pays" but that it makes a more interdependent human society, and that it leads men to recognise what is the best relationship between them. and the fact of recognising that some act of aggression is causing stocks to fall is not important because it may save oppenheim's or solomon's money but because it is a demonstration that we are dependent upon some community on the other side of the world, that their damage is our damage, and that we have an interest in preventing it. it teaches us, as only some such simple and mechanical means can teach, the lesson of human fellowship. and it is by such means as this that western europe has in some measure, within its respective political frontiers, learnt that lesson. each has learnt, within the confines of the nation at least, that wealth is made by work, not robbery; that, indeed, general robbery is fatal to prosperity; that government consists not merely in having the power of the sword but in organising society--in "knowing how"; which means the development of ideas; in maintaining courts; in making it possible to run railways, post offices, and all the contrivances of a complex society. now rulers did not create these things; it was the daily activities of the people, born of their desires and made possible by the circumstances in which they lived, by the trading and the mining and the shipping which they carried on, that made them. but the balkans have been geographically outside the influence of european industrial and commercial life. the turk has hardly felt it at all. he has learnt none of the social and moral lessons which interdependence and improved communications have taught the western european, and it is because he has not learnt these lessons, because he is a soldier and a conqueror, to an extent and completeness that other nations of europe lost a generation or two since, that the balkanese are fighting and that war is raging. but not merely in this larger sense, but in the more immediate, narrower sense, are the fundamental causes of this war economic. this war arises, as the past wars against the turkish conqueror have arisen, by the desire of the christian peoples on whom he lives to shake off this burden. "to live upon their subjects is the turks' only means of livelihood," says one authority. the turk is an economic parasite, and the economic organism must end of rejecting him. for the management of society, simple and primitive even as that of the balkan mountains, needs some effort and work and capacity for administration, or even rudimentary economic life cannot be carried on. and the turkish system, founded on the sword and nothing else ("the finest soldier in europe"), cannot give that small modicum, of energy or administrative capacity. the one thing he knows is brute force; but it is not by the strength of his muscles that an engineer runs a machine, but by knowing how. the turk cannot build a road, or make a bridge, or administer a post office, or found a court of law. and these things are necessary. and he will not let them be done by the christian, who, because he did not belong to the conquering class, has had to work, and has consequently become the class which possesses whatever capacity for work and administration the country can show, because to do so would be to threaten the turk's only trade. if the turk granted the christians equal political rights they would inevitably "run the country," and yet the turk himself cannot do it; and he will not let others do it, because to do so would be to threaten his supremacy. and the more the use of force fails, the more, of course, does he resort to it, and that is why many of us who do not believe in force, and desire to see it disappear in the relationship not merely of religious but of political groups, might conceivably welcome this war of the balkan christians, in so far as it is an attempt to resist the use of force in those relationships. of course, i do not try to estimate the "balance of criminality." right is not all on one side--it never is. but the broad issue is clear and plain. and only those concerned with the name rather than the thing, with nominal and verbal consistency rather than realities, will see anything paradoxical or contradictory in pacifist approval of christian resistance to the use of turkish force. it is the one fact which stands out incontrovertibly from the whole weary muddle. it is quite clear that the inability to act in common arises from the fact that in the international sphere the european is still dominated by illusions which he has dropped when he deals with home politics. the political faith of the turk, which he would never think of applying at home as between the individuals of his nation, he applies pure and unalloyed when he comes to deal with foreigners as nations. the economic conception--using the term in that wider sense which i have indicated earlier in this article--which guides his individual conduct is the antithesis of that which guides his national conduct. while the christian does not believe in robbery inside the frontier, he does without; while within the state he realises that greater advantage lies on the side of each observing the general code, so that civilised society can exist, instead of on the side of having society go to pieces by each disregarding it; while within the state he realises that government is a matter of administration, not the seizure of property; that one town does not add to its wealth by "capturing" another, that indeed one community cannot "own" another--while, i say, he believes all these things in his daily life at home, he disregards them all when he comes to the field of international relationship, _la haute politique_. to annex some province by a cynical breach of treaty obligation (austria in bosnia, italy in tripoli) is regarded as better politics than to act loyally with the community of nations to enforce their common interest in order and good government. in fact, we do not believe that there can be a community of nations, because, in fact, we do not believe that their interests are common, but rival; like the turk, we believe that if you do not exercise force upon your "rival" he will exercise it upon you; that nations live upon one another, not by co-operation with one another--and it is for this reason presumably that you must "own" as much of your neighbours' as possible. it is the turkish conception from beginning to end. and it is because these false beliefs prevent the nations of christendom acting loyally the one to the other, because each is playing for its own hand, that the turk, with hint of some sordid bribe, has been able to play off each against the other. this is the crux of the matter. when europe can honestly act in common on behalf of common interests some solution can be found. and the capacity of europe to act together will not be found so long as the accepted doctrines of european statecraft remain unchanged, so long as they are dominated by existing illusions. * * * * * in a paper read before the british association of this year, i attempted to show in more general terms this relation between economic impulse and ideal motive. the following are relevant passages:-- a nation, a people, we are given to understand, have higher motives than money, or "self-interest." what do we mean when we speak of the money of a nation, or the self-interest of a community? we mean--and in such a discussion as this can mean nothing else--better conditions for the great mass of the people, the fullest possible lives, the abolition or attenuation of poverty and of narrow circumstances, that the millions shall be better housed and clothed and fed, capable of making provision for sickness and old age, with lives prolonged and cheered--and not merely this, but also that they shall be better educated, with character disciplined by steady labour and a better use of leisure, a general social atmosphere which shall make possible family affection, individual dignity and courtesy and the graces of life, not alone among the few, but among the many. now, do these things constitute as a national policy an inspiring aim or not? yet they are, speaking in terms of communities, pure self-interest--all bound up with economic problems, with money. does admiral mahan mean us to take him at his word when he would attach to such efforts the same discredit that one implies in talking of a mercenary individual? would he have us believe that the typical great movements of our times--socialism, trades unionism, syndicalism, insurance bills, land laws, old age pensions, charity organisation, improved education--bound up as they all are with economic problems--are not the sort of objects which more and more are absorbing the best activities of christendom? i have attempted to show that the activities which lie outside the range of these things--the religious wars, movements like those which promoted the crusades, or the sort of tradition which we associate with the duel (which has, in fact, disappeared from anglo-saxon society)--do not and cannot any longer form part of the impulse creating the long-sustained conflicts between large groups which a european war implies, partly because such allied moral differences as now exist do not in any way coincide with the political divisions, but intersect them, and partly because in the changing character of men's ideals there is a distinct narrowing of the gulf which is supposed to separate ideal and material aims. early ideals, whether in the field of politics or religion, are generally dissociated from any aim of general well-being. in early politics ideals are concerned simply with personal allegiance to some dynastic chief, a feudal lord or a monarch. the well-being of a community does not enter into the matter at all: it is the personal allegiance which matters. later the chief must embody in his person that well-being, or he does not achieve the allegiance of a community of any enlightenment; later, the well-being of the community becomes the end in itself without being embodied in the person of an hereditary chief, so that the community realise that their efforts, instead of being directed to the protection of the personal interests of some chief, are as a matter of fact directed to the protection of their own interests, and their altruism has become self-interest, since self-sacrifice of a community for the sake of the community is a contradiction in terms. in the religious sphere a like development has been shown. early religious ideals have no relation to the material betterment of mankind. the early christian thought it meritorious to live a sterile life at the top of a pillar, eaten by vermin, as the hindoo saint to-day thinks it meritorious to live an equally sterile life upon a bed of spikes. but as the early christian ideal progressed, sacrifices having no end connected with the betterment of mankind lost their appeal. the christian saint who would allow the nails of his fingers to grow through the palms of his clasped hands would excite, not our admiration, but our revolt. more and more is religious effort being subjected to this test: does it make for the improvement of society? if not, it stands condemned. political ideals will inevitably follow a like development, and will be more and more subjected to a like test. i am aware that very often at present they are not so subjected. dominated as our political thought is by roman and feudal imagery--hypnotised by symbols and analogies which the necessary development of organised society has rendered obsolete--the ideals even of democracies are still often pure abstractions, divorced from any aim calculated to advance the moral or material betterment of mankind. the craze for sheer size of territory, simple extent of administrative area, is still deemed a thing deserving immense, incalculable sacrifices. * * * * * and yet even these ideals, firmly set as they are in our language and tradition, are rapidly yielding to the necessary force of events. a generation ago it would have been inconceivable that a people or a monarch should calmly see part of its country secede and establish itself as a separate political entity without attempting to prevent it by force of arms. yet this is what happened but a year or two since in the scandinavian peninsula. for forty years germany has added to her own difficulties and those of the european situation for the purpose of including alsace and lorraine in its federation, but even there, obeying the tendency which is world-wide, an attempt has been made at the creation of a constitutional and autonomous government. the history of the british empire for fifty years has been a process of undoing the work of conquest. colonies are now neither colonies nor possessions. they are independent states. great britain, which for centuries has made such sacrifices to retain ireland, is now making great sacrifices in order to make her secession workable. to all political arrangements, to all political ideals, the final test will be applied: does it or does it not make for the widest interests of the mass of the people involved?... and i would ask those who think that war must be a permanent element in the settlement of the moral differences of men to think for one moment of the factors which stood in the way of the abandonment of the use of force by governments, and by one religious group against another in the matter of religious belief. on the one hand you had authority with all the prestige of historical right and the possession of physical power in its most imposing form, the means of education still in their hands; government authority extending to all sorts of details of life to which it no longer extends; immense vested interests outside government; and finally the case for the imposition of dogma by authority a strong one, and still supported by popular passion: and on the other hand, you had as yet poor and feeble instruments of mere opinion; the printed book still a rarity; the press non-existent, communication between men still rudimentary, worse even than it had been two thousand years previously. and yet, despite these immense handicaps upon the growth of opinion and intellectual ferment as against physical force, it was impossible for a new idea to find life in geneva or rome or edinburgh or london without quickly crossing and affecting all the other centres, and not merely making headway against entrenched authority, but so quickly breaking up the religious homogeneity of states, that not only were governments obliged to abandon the use of force in religious matters as against their subjects, but religious wars between nations became impossible for the double reason that a nation no longer expressed a single religious belief (you had the anomaly of a protestant sweden fighting in alliance with a catholic france), and that the power of opinion had become stronger than the power of physical force--because, in other words, the limits of military force were more and more receding. but if the use of force was so ineffective against the spiritual possessions of man when the arms to be used in their defence were so poor and rudimentary, how could a government hope to crush out by force to-day such things as a nation's language, law, literature, morals, ideals, when it possesses such means of defence as are provided in security of tenure of material possessions, a cheap literature, a popular press, a cheap and secret postal system, and all the other means of rapid and perfected inter-communication? you will notice that i have spoken throughout not of the _defence_ of a national ideal by arms, but of its attack; if you have to defend your ideal it is because someone attacks it, and without attack your defence would not be called for. if you are compelled to prevent someone using force as against your nationality, it is because he believes that by the use of that force he can destroy or change it. if he thought that the use of force would be ineffective to that end he would not employ it. i have attempted to show elsewhere that the abandonment of war for material ends depends upon a general realisation of its futility for accomplishing those ends. in like manner does the abandonment of war for moral or ideal ends depend upon the general realisation of the growing futility of such means for those ends also--and for the growing futility of those ends if they could be accomplished. we are sometimes told that it is the spirit of nationality--the desire to be of your place and locality--that makes war. that is not so. it is the desire of other men that you shall not be of your place and locality, of your habits and traditions, but of theirs. not the desire of nationality, but the desire to destroy nationality is what makes the wars of nationality. if the germans did not think that the retention of polish or alsatian nationality might hamper them in the art of war, hamper them in the imposition of force on some other groups, there would be no attempt to crush out this special possession of the poles and alsatians. it is the belief in force and a preference for settling things by force instead of by agreement that threatens or destroys nationality. and i have given an indication of the fact that it is not merely war, but the preparation for war, implying as it does great homogeneity in states and centralised bureaucratic control, which is to-day the great enemy of nationality. before this tendency to centralisation which military necessity sets up much that gives colour and charm to european life is disappearing. and yet we are told that it is the pacifists who are the enemy of nationality, and we are led to believe that in some way the war system in europe stands for the preservation of nationality! [footnote : review of reviews, november, .] [footnote : in the "daily mail," to whose editor i am indebted for permission to reprint it.] chapter iv. turkish ideals in our political thought. this war and "the turks of britain and prussia"--the anglo-saxon and opposed ideals--mr. c. chesterton's case for "killing and being killed" as the best method of settling differences--its application to civil conflicts--as in spanish-america--the difference between devonshire and venezuela--will the balkans adopt the turco-venezuelan political ideals or the british? an english political writer remarked, on it becoming evident that the christian states were driving back the turks: "this is a staggering blow to _all_ the turks--those of england and prussia as well as those of turkey." but, of course, the british and prussian turks will never see it--like the bourbons, they learn not. here is a typically military system, the work of "born fighters" which has gone down in welter before the assaults of much less military states, the chief of which, indeed, has grown up in what captain von herbert has called, with some contempt, "stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions," formed by the people whom the turks regarded as quite unfit to be made into warriors; whom they regarded much as some europeans regard the jews. it is the christian populations of the balkans who were the traders and workers--those brought most under economic influences; it was the turks who escaped those influences. a few years since, i wrote: "if the conqueror profits much by his conquest, as the romans in one sense did, it is the conqueror who is threatened by the enervating effect of the soft and luxurious life; while it is the conquered who are forced to labour for the conqueror, and who learn in consequence those qualities of steady industry which are certainly a better moral training than living upon the fruits of others, upon labour extorted at the sword's point. it is the conqueror who becomes effete, and it is the conquered who learn discipline and the qualities making for a well-ordered state." could we ask a better illustration than the history of the turk and his christian victims? i exemplified the matter thus: "if during long periods a nation gives itself up to war, trade languishes, the population loses the habit of steady industry, government and administration become corrupt, abuses escape punishment, and the real sources of a people's strength and expansion dwindle. what has caused the relative failure and decline of spanish, portuguese, and french expansion in asia and the new world, and the relative success of english expansion therein? was it the mere hazards of war which gave to great britain the domination of india and half of the new world? that is surely a superficial reading of history. it was, rather, that the methods and processes of spain, portugal, and france were military, while those of the anglo-saxon world were commercial and peaceful. is it not a commonplace that in india, quite as much as in the new world, the trader and the settler drove out the soldier and the conqueror? the difference between the two methods was that one was a process of conquest, and the other of colonizing, or non-military administration for commercial purposes. the one embodied the sordid cobdenite idea, which so excites the scorn of the militarists, and the other the lofty military ideal. the one was parasitism; the other co-operation.... "how may we sum up the whole case, keeping in mind every empire that ever existed--the assyrian, the babylonian, the mede and persian, the macedonian, the roman, the frank, the saxon, the spanish, the portuguese, the bourbon, the napoleonic? in all and every one of them we may see the same process, which is this: if it remains military it decays; if it prospers and takes its share of the work of the world it ceases to be military. there is no other reading of history." but despite these very plain lessons, there are many amongst us who regard physical conflict as the ideal form of human relationship; "killing and being killed" as the best way to determine the settlement of differences, and a society which drifts from these ideals as on the high road to degeneration, and who deem those who set before themselves the ideal of abolishing or attenuating poverty for the mass of men, "low and sordid." thus mr. cecil chesterton[ ]: in essence mr. angell's query is: "should usurers go to war?" i may say, in passing, that i am not clear that even on the question thus raised mr. angell makes out his case. his case, broadly stated, is that the net of "finance"--or, to put it plainer, cosmopolitan usury--which is at present spread over europe would be disastrously torn by any considerable war; and that in consequence it is to the interest of the usurers to preserve peace. but here, it seems to me, we must make a clear differentiation. it may easily be to the interest of a particular usurer, or group of usurers, to provoke war; that very financial crisis which mr. angell anticipates may quite probably be a source of profit to them. that it would not be to the interest of a nation of usurers to fight is very probable. that such a nation would not fight, or, if it did, would be exceedingly badly beaten, is certain. but that only serves to raise the further question of whether it is to the ultimate advantage of a nation to repose upon usury; and whether the breaking of the net of usury which at present unquestionably holds europe in captivity would not be for the advantage, as it would clearly be for the honour, of our race.... the sword is too sacred a thing to be prostituted to such dirty purposes. but whether he succeeds or fails in this attempt, it will make no difference to the mass of plain men who, when they fight and risk their lives, do not do so in the expectation of obtaining a certain interest on their capital, but for quite other reasons. mr. angell's latest appeal comes, i think, at an unfortunate moment. it is not merely that the balkan states have refused to be convinced by mr. angell as to their chances of commercial profit from the war. it is that if mr. angell had succeeded to the fullest extent in convincing them that there was not a quarter per cent. to be made out of the war, nay, that--horrible thought!--they would actually be poorer at the end of the war than at the beginning, they would have gone to war all the same. since mr. angell's argument clearly applies as much or more to civil as to international conflicts, i may perhaps be allowed to turn to civil conflicts to make clear my meaning. in this country during the last three centuries one solid thing has been done. the power of parliament was pitted in battle against the power of the crown, and won. as a result, for good or evil, parliament really is stronger than the crown to-day. the power of the mass of the people to control parliament has been given as far as mere legislation could give it. we all know that it is a sham. and if you ask what it is that makes the difference of reality between the two cases, it is this: that men killed and were killed for the one thing and not for the other. i have no space to develop all that i should like to say about the indirect effects of war. all i will say is this, that men do judge, and always will judge, things by the ultimate test of how they fight. the german victory of forty years ago has produced not only an astonishing expansion, industrial as well as political of germany, but has (most disastrously, as i think) infected europe with german ideas, especially with the idea that you make a nation strong by making its people behave like cattle. god send that i may live to see the day when victorious armies from gaul shall shatter this illusion, burn up prussianism with all its police regulations, insurance acts, poll taxes, and insults to the poor, and reassert the republic. it will never be done in any other way. if arbitration is ever to take the place of war, it must be backed by a corresponding array of physical force. now the question immediately arises: are we prepared to arm any international tribunal with any such powers? personally, i am not.... turn back some fifty years to the great struggle for the emancipation of italy. suppose that a hague tribunal had then been in existence, armed with coercive powers. the dispute between austria and sardinia must have been referred to that tribunal. that tribunal must have been guided by existing treaties. the treaty of vienna was perhaps the most authoritative ever entered into by european powers. by that treaty, venice and lombardy were unquestionably assigned to austria. a just tribunal administering international law _must_ have decided in favour of austria, and have used the whole armed force of europe to coerce italy into submission. are those pacifists, who try at the same time to be democrats, prepared to acquiesce in such a conclusion? personally, i am not. i replied as follows: mr. cecil chesterton says that the question which i have raised is this: "should usurers go to war?" that, of course, is not true. i have never, even by implication, put such a problem, and there is nothing in the article which he criticises, nor in any other statement of my own, that justifies it. what i have asked is whether peoples should go to war. i should have thought it was pretty obvious that, whatever happens, usurers do not go to war: the peoples go to war, and the peoples pay, and the whole question is whether they should go on making war and paying for it. mr. chesterton says that if they are wise they will; i say that if they are wise they will not. i have attempted to show that the prosperity of peoples--by which, of course, one means the diminution of poverty, better houses, soap and water, healthy children, lives prolonged, conditions sufficiently good to ensure leisure and family affection, fuller and completer lives generally--is not secured by fighting one another, but by co-operation and labour, by a better organisation of society, by improved human relationship, which, of course, can only come of better understanding of the conditions of that relationship, which better understanding means discussion, adjustment, a desire and capacity to see the point of view of the other man--of all of which war and its philosophy is the negation. to all of this mr. chesterton replies: "that only concerns the jews and the moneylenders." again, this is not true. it concerns all of us, like all problems of our struggle with nature. it is in part at least an economic problem, and that part of it is best stated in the more exact and precise terms that i have employed to deal with it--the term's of the market-place. but to imply that the conditions that there obtain are the affair merely of bankers and financiers, to imply that these things do not touch the lives of the mass, is simply to talk a nonsense the meaninglessness of which only escapes some of us because in these matters we happen to be very ignorant. it is not mainly usurers who suffer from bad finance and bad economics (one may suggest that they are not quite so simple); it is mainly the people as a whole. mr. chesterton says that we should break this "net of usury" in which the peoples are enmeshed. i agree heartily; but that net has been woven mainly by war (and that diversion of energy and attention from social management which war involves), and is, so far as the debts of the european states are concerned (so large an element of usury), almost solely the outcome of war. and if the peoples go on piling up debt, as they must if they are to go on piling up armaments (as mr. chesterton wants them to), giving the best of their attention and emotion to sheer physical conflict, instead of to organisation and understanding, they will merely weave that web of debt and usury still closer; it will load us more heavily and strangle us to a still greater extent. if usury is the enemy, the remedy is to fight usury. mr. chesterton says the remedy is for its victims to fight one another. and you will not fight usury by hanging rothschilds, for usury is worst where that sort of thing is resorted to. widespread debt is the outcome of bad management and incompetence, economic or social, and only better management will remedy it. mr. chesterton is sure that better management is only arrived at by "killing and being killed." he really does urge this method even in civil matters. (he tells us that the power of parliament over the crown is real, and that of the people over parliament a sham, "because men killed and were killed for the one, and not for the other.") it is the method of spanish america where it is applied more frankly and logically, and where still, in many places, elections are a military affair, the questions at issue being settled by killing and being killed, instead of by the cowardly, pacifist methods current in europe. the result gives us the really military civilisations of venezuela, colombia, nicaragua, and paraguay. and, although the english system may have many defects--i think it has--those defects exist in a still greater degree where force "settles" the matters in dispute, where the bullet replaces the ballot, and where bayonets are resorted to instead of brains. for devonshire is better than nicaragua. really it is. and it would get us out of none of our troubles for one group to impose its views simply by preponderant physical force, for mr. asquith, for instance, in the true castro or zuyala manner, to announce that henceforth all critics of the insurance act are to be shot, and that the present cabinet will hold office as long as it can depend upon the support of the army. for, even if the country rose in rebellion, and fought it out and won, the successful party would (if they also believed in force) do exactly the same thing to _their_ opponents; and so it would go on never-endingly (as it has gone on during weary centuries throughout the larger part of south america), until the two parties came once more to their senses, and agreed not to use force when they happened to be able to do so; which is our present condition. but it is the condition of england merely because the english, as a whole, have ceased to believe in mr. chesterton's principles; it is not yet the condition of venezuela because the venezuelans have not yet ceased to believe those principles, though even they are beginning to. mr. chesterton says: "men do judge, and always will judge, by the ultimate test of how they fight." the pirate who gives his blood has a better right, therefore, to the ship than the merchant (who may be a usurer!) who only gives his money. well, that is the view which was all but universal well into the period of what, for want of a better word, we call civilisation. not only was it the basis of all such institutions as the ordeal and duel; not only did it justify (and in the opinion of some still justifies) the wars of religion and the use of force in religious matters generally; not only was it the accepted national polity of such communities as the vikings, the barbary states, and the red indians; but it is still, unfortunately, the polity of certain european states. but the idea is a survival and--and this is the important point--an admission of failure to understand where right lies: to "fight it out" is the remedy of the boy who for the life of him cannot see who is right and who is wrong. at ten years of age we are all quite sure that piracy is a finer calling than trade, and the pirate a finer fellow than the shylock who owns the ship--which, indeed, he may well be. but as we grow up (which some of the best of us never do) we realise that piracy is not the best way to establish the ownership of cargoes, any more than the ordeal is the way to settle cases at law, or the rack of proving a dogma, or the spanish american method the way to settle differences between liberals and conservatives. and just as civil adjustments are made most efficiently, as they are in england (say), as distinct from south america, by a general agreement not to resort to force, so it is the english method in the international field which gives better results than that based on force. the relationship of great britain to canada or australia is preferable to the relationship of russia to finland or poland, or germany to alsace-lorraine. the five nations of the british empire have, by agreement, abandoned the use of force as between themselves. australia may do us an injury--exclude our subjects, english or indian, and expose them to insult--but we know very well that force will not be used against her. to withhold such force is the basis of the relationship of these five nations; and, given a corresponding development of ideas, might equally well be the basis of the relationship of fifteen--about all the nations of the world who could possibly fight. the difficulties mr. chesterton imagines--an international tribunal deciding in favour of austria concerning the recession of venice and lombardy, and summoning the forces of united europe to coerce italy into submission--are, of course, based on the assumption that a united europe, having arrived at such understanding as to be able to sink its differences, would be the same kind of europe that it is now, or was a generation ago. if european statecraft advances sufficiently to surrender the use of force against neighbouring states, it will have advanced sufficiently to surrender the use of force against unwilling provinces, as in some measure british statesmanship has already done. to raise the difficulty that mr. chesterton does is much the same as assuming that a court of law in san domingo or turkey will give the same results as a court of law in great britain, because the form of the mechanism is the same. and does mr. chesterton suggest that the war system settles these matters to perfection? that it has worked satisfactorily in ireland and finland, or, for the matter of that, in albania or macedonia? for if mr. chesterton urges that killing and being killed is the way to determine the best means of governing a country, it is his business to defend the turk, who has adopted that principle during four hundred years, not the christians, who want to bring that method to an end and adopt another. and i would ask no better example of the utter failure of the principles that i combat and mr. chesterton defends than their failure in the balkan peninsula. this war is due to the vile character of turkish rule, and the turk's rule is vile because it is based on the sword. like mr. chesterton (and our pirate), the turk believes in the right of conquest, "the ultimate test of how they fight." "the history of the turks," says sir charles elliott, "is almost exclusively a catalogue of battles." he has lived (for the most gloriously uneconomic person has to live, to follow a trade of some sort, even if it be that of theft) on tribute exacted from the christian populations, and extorted, not in return for any work of administration, but simply because he was the stronger. and that has made his rule intolerable, and is the cause of this war. now, my whole thesis is that understanding, work, co-operation, adjustment, must be the basis of human society; that conquest as a means of achieving national advantage must fail; that to base your prosperity or means of livelihood, your economic system, in short, upon having more force than someone else, and exercising it against him, is an impossible form of human relationship that is bound to break down. and mr. chesterton says that the war in the balkans demolishes this thesis. i do not agree with him. the present war in the balkans is an attempt--and happily a successful one--to bring this reign of force and conquest to an end, and that is why those of us who do not believe in military force rejoice. the debater, more concerned with verbal consistency than realities and the establishment of sound principles, will say that this means the approval of war. it does not; it merely means the choice of the less evil of two forms of war. war has been going on in the balkans, not for a month, but has been waged by the turks daily against these populations for years. the balkan peoples have now brought to an end a system of rule based simply upon the accident of force--"killing and being killed." and whether good or ill comes of this war will depend upon whether they set up a similar system or one more in consonance with pacifist principles. i believe they will choose the latter course; that is to say, they will continue to co-operate between themselves instead of fighting between themselves; they will settle differences by discussion, adjustment, not force. but if they are guided by mr. chesterton's principle, if each one of the balkan nations is determined to impose its own especial point of view, to refuse all settlement by co-operation and understanding, where it can resort to force--why, in that case, the strongest (presumably bulgaria) will start conquering the rest, start imposing government by force, and will listen to no discussion or argument; will simply, in short, take the place of the turk in the matter, and the old weary contest will begin afresh, and we shall have the turkish system under a new name, until that in its turn is destroyed, and the whole process begun again _da capo_. and if mr. chesterton says that this is not his philosophy, and that he would recommend the balkan nations to come to an understanding, and co-operate together, instead of fighting one another, why does he give different counsels to the nations of christendom as a whole? if it is well for the balkan peoples to abandon conflict as between themselves in favour of co-operation against the common enemy, why is it ill for the other christian peoples to abandon such conflict in favour of co-operation against their common enemy, which is wild nature and human error, ignorance and passion. [footnote : from "everyman" to whose editor i am indebted for permission to print my reply.] chapter v. our responsibility for balkan wars. mr. winston churchill on the "responsibility" of diplomacy--what does he mean?--an easy (and popular) philosophy--can we neglect past if we would avoid future errors?--british temper and policy in the crimean war--what are its lessons?--why we fought a war to sustain the "integrity and independence of the turkish dominion in europe"--supporting the turk against his christian victims--from fear of russian growth which we are now aiding--the commentary of events--shall we back the wrong horse again? here was a war which had broken out in spite of all that rulers and diplomatists could do to prevent it, a war in which the press had had no part, a war which the whole force of the money power had been subtly and steadfastly directed to prevent, which had come upon us not through the ignorance or credulity of the people; but, on the contrary, through their knowledge of their history and their destiny.... who is the man who is vain enough to suppose that the long antagonisms of history and of time can in all circumstances be adjusted by the smooth and superficial conventions of politicians and ambassadors? thus mr. churchill. it is a plea for the inevitability, not merely of war, but of a people's "destiny." what precisely does it mean? does it mean that the european powers have in the past been entirely wise and honest, have never intrigued with the turk the one against the other, have always kept good faith, have never been inspired by false political theories and tawdry and shoddy ideals, have, in short, no responsibility for the abominations that have gone on in the balkan peninsula for a century? no one outside a lunatic asylum would urge it. but, then, that means that diplomacy has _not_ done all it might to prevent this war. why does mr. churchill say it has? and does the passage i have quoted mean that we--that english diplomacy--has had no part in european diplomacy in the past? have we not, on the contrary, by universal admission played a predominant role by backing the wrong horse? but, then, that is not a popular thing to point out, and mr. churchill is very careful not to point it out in any way that could give justification to an unpopular view or discredit a popular one. he is, however, far too able a cabinet minister to ignore obvious facts, and it is interesting to note how he disposes of them. observe the following passage: for the drama or tragedy which is moving to its climax in the balkans we all have our responsibilities, and none of us can escape our share of them by blaming others or by blaming the turk. if there is any man here who, looking back over the last years, thinks he knows where to fix the sole responsibility for all the procrastination and provocation, for all the jealousies and rivalries, for all the religious and racial animosities, which have worked together for this result, i do not envy him his complacency.... whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the powers or sit in sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no consequence at the present moment. now if for this tragedy we "all have our responsibility," then what becomes of his first statement that the war is raging despite all that rulers and diplomats could do to prevent it? if the war was "inevitable," and rulers and diplomats have done all they could to prevent it, neither they nor we have any responsibility for it. he knows, of course, that it is impossible to deny that responsibility, that our errors in the past _have_ been due not to any lack of readiness to fight or quarrel with foreign nations, but precisely to the tendency to do those things and our _in_disposition to set aside instinctive and reasonless jealousies and rivalries in favour of a deeper sense of responsibility and a somewhat longer vision. but, again, this quite obvious moral, that if we have our responsibility, if, in other words, we have _not_ done all that we might and _have_ been led away by temper and passion, we should, in order to avoid a repetition of such errors in the future, try and see where we have erred in the past, is precisely the moral that mr. churchill does _not_ draw. again, it is not the popular line to show with any definiteness that we have been wrong. an abstract proposition that "we all have our responsibilities," is, while a formal admission of the obvious fact also at the same time, an excuse, almost a justification. you realise mr. churchill's method: having made the necessary admission of fact, you immediately prevent any unpleasant (or unpopular) practical conclusion concerning our duty in the matter by talking of the "complacency" of those who would fix any real and definite part of the responsibility upon you. (because, of course, no man, knows where lies, and no one would ever attempt to fix, the "sole" responsibility). incidentally, one might point out to mr. churchill that the attempt to see the errors of past conduct and to avoid them in the future is _not_ complacency, but that airily to dismiss our responsibility by saying that it is of "no consequence whether we sit in sackcloth and ashes" _is_ complacency. mr. churchill's idea seems to be that men should forget their errors--and commit them again. for that is what it amounts to. we cannot, indeed, undo the past, that is true; but we can prevent it being repeated. but we certainly shall not prevent such repetition if we hug the easy doctrine that we have always been right--that it is not worth while to see how our principles have worked out in practice, to take stock of our experience, and to see what results the principles we propose again to put into operation, have given. the practical thing for us if we would avoid like errors in the future is to see where _our_ responsibility lies--a thing which we shall never do if we are governed by the net impression which disengages itself from speeches like those of mr. churchill. for the net result of that speech, the impression, despite a few shrewd qualifications which do not in reality affect that net result but which may be useful later wherewith to silence critics, is that war is inevitable, a matter of "destiny," that diplomacy--the policy pursued by the respective powers--can do nothing to prevent it; that as brute force is the one and final appeal the only practical policy is to have plenty of armaments and to show a great readiness to fight; that it is futile to worry about past errors; (especially as an examination of them would go a long way to discredit the policy just indicated); that the troublesome and unpopular people who in the past happen to have kept their heads during a prevailing dementia--and whose policy happens to have been as right as that of the popular side was wrong--can be dismissed with left-handed references to "complacency," this sort of thing is popular enough, of course, but-- well, i will take the risks of a tactic which is the exact contrary to that adopted by mr. churchill and would urge upon those whose patriotism is not of the order which is ready to see their country in the wrong and who do feel some responsibility for its national policy, to ask themselves these questions: is it true that the powers could have prevented in large measure the abominations which turkey has practised in the balkans for the last half-century or so? has our own policy been a large factor in determining that of the powers? has our own policy directly prevented in the past the triumph of the christian populations which, despite that policy, has finally taken place? was our own policy at fault when we were led into a war to ensure the "integrity and independence of the turkish dominions in europe"? is the general conception of statecraft on which that policy has been based--the "balance of power" which presupposes the necessary rivalry of nations and which in the past has led to oppose russia as it is now leading to oppose germany--sound, and has it been justified in history? did we give due weight to the considerations urged by the public men of the past who opposed such features of this policy as the crimean war; was the immense popularity of that war any test of its wisdom; were the rancour, hatred and scorn poured upon those men just or deserved? * * * * * now the first four of these questions have been answered by history and are answered by every one to-day in an emphatic affirmative. this is not the opinion of a pacifist partisan. even the _times_ is constrained to admit that "these futile conflicts might have ended years ago, if it had not been for the quarrels of the western nations."[ ] and as to the crimean war, has not the greatest conservative foreign minister of the nineteenth century admitted that "we backed the wrong horse"--and, what is far more to the point, have not events unmistakably demonstrated it? do we quite realise that if foreign policy had that continuity which the political pundits pretend, we should now be fighting on the side of the turk against the balkan states? that we have entered into solemn treaty obligations, as part of our national policy, to guarantee for ever the "integrity and independence of the turkish dominions in europe," that we fought a great and popular war to prevent that triumph of the christian population which will arise as the result of the present war? that but for this policy which caused us to maintain the turk in europe the present war would certainly not be raging, and, what is much more to the point, that but for our policy the abominations which have provoked it and which it is its object to terminate, would so far as human reason can judge at all have been brought to an end generations since? do we quite realise that _we_ are in large part responsible, not merely for the war, but for the long agony of horror which have provoked it and made it necessary; that when we talk of the jealousies and rivalries of the powers as playing so large a part in the responsibility for these things, we represent, perhaps, the chief among those jealousies and rivalries? that it is not mainly the turk nor the russian nor the austrian which has determined the course of history in the balkan peninsular since the middle of the th century, but we englishmen--the country gentleman obsessed by vague theories of the balance of power and heaven knows what, reading his _times_ and barking out his preposterous politics over the dinner table? that this fatal policy was dictated simply by fear of the growth of "russian barbarism and autocracy" and "the overshadowing of the western nations by a country whose institutions are inimical to our own"? that while we were thus led into war by a phantom danger to our indian possessions, we were quite blind to the real danger which threatened them, which a year or two later, in the mutiny, nearly lost us them and which were not due to the machinations of a rival power but to our own misgovernment; that this very "barbaric growth" and expansion towards india which we fought a war to check we are now actively promoting in persia and elsewhere by our (effective) alliance? that while as recently as fifteen years ago we would have gone to war to prevent any move of russia towards the indian frontier, we are to-day actually encouraging her to build a railway there? and that it is now another nation which stands as the natural barrier to russian expansion to the west--germany--whose power we are challenging, and that all tendencies point to our backing again the wrong horse, to our fighting _with_ the "semi-asiatic barbarian" (as our fathers used to call him) against the nation which has close racial and cultural affinity to our own, just as half a century since the same fatal obsession about the "balance of power" led us to fight with the mohammedan in order to bolster up for half a century his anti-christian rule. the misreading of history in this matter is, unfortunately, not possible. the point upon which in the crimean war the negotiations with russia finally broke was the claim, based upon her reading of the vienna note, to stand as religious protector of the greek christians in the balkan peninsular. that was the pivot of the whole negotiations, and the war was the outcome of our support of the turkish view--or, rather, our conduct of turkish policy, for throughout the whole period england was conducting the turkish negotiations; indeed, as bright said at the time, she was carrying on the turkish government and ruling the turkish empire through her ministers in constantinople. i will quote a speech of the period made in the house of commons. it was as follows: our opponents seem actuated by a frantic and bitter hostility to russia, and, without considering the calamities in which they might involve this country, they have sought to urge it into a great war, as they imagined, on behalf of european freedom, and in order to cripple the resources of russia.... the question is, whether the advantages both to turkey and england of avoiding war altogether, would have been less than those which are likely to arise from the policy which the government has pursued? now, if the noble lord the member for tiverton is right in saying that turkey is a growing power, and that she has elements of strength which unlearned persons like myself know nothing about; surely no immediate, or sensible, or permanent mischief could have arisen to her from the acceptance of the vienna note, which all the distinguished persons who agreed to it have declared to be perfectly consistent with her honour and independence. if she had been growing stronger and stronger of late years, surely she would have grown still stronger in the future, and there might have been a reasonable expectation that, whatever disadvantages she might have suffered for a time from that note, her growing strength would have enabled her to overcome them, while the peace of europe might have been preserved. but suppose that turkey is not a growing power, but that the ottoman rule in europe is tottering to its fall, i come to the conclusion that, whatever advantages were afforded to the christian population of turkey would have enabled them to grow more rapidly in numbers, in industry, in wealth, in intelligence, and in political power; and that, as they thus increased in influence, they would have become more able, in case any accident, which might not be far distant, occurred, to supplant the mahommedan rule, and to establish themselves in constantinople as a christian state, which, i think, every man who hears me will admit is infinitely more to be desired than that the mahommedan power should be permanently sustained by the bayonets of france and the fleets of england. europe would thus have been at peace; for i do not think even the most bitter enemies of russia believe that the emperor of russia intended last year, if the vienna note or prince menchikoff's last and most moderate proposition had been accepted, to have marched on constantinople. indeed, he had pledged himself in the most distinct manner to withdraw his troops at once from the principalities, if the vienna note were accepted; and therefore in that case turkey would have been delivered from the presence of the foe; peace would for a time have been secured for europe; and the whole matter would have drifted on to its natural solution--which is, that the mahommedan power in europe should eventually succumb to the growing power of the christian population of the turkish territories. now, looking back upon what has since happened, which view shows the greater wisdom and prevision? that of the man who delivered this speech (and he was john bright) or those against whom he spoke? to which set of principles has time given the greater justification? yet upon the men who resisted what we all admit, in this case at least, to have been the false theories and who supported, what we equally admit now, to have been the right principles, we poured the same sort of ferocious contempt that we are apt now spasmodically to pour upon those who, sixty years later, would prevent our drifting in the same blind fashion into a war just as futile and bound to be infinitely more disastrous--a war embodying the same "principles" supported by just the same theories and just the same arguments which led us into this other one. i know full well the prejudice which the names i am about to cite is apt to cause. we poured out upon the men who bore them a rancour, contempt and hatred which few men in english public life have had to face. morley, in his life of cobden, says of these two men--cobden and bright: they had, as lord palmerston said, the whole world against them. it was not merely the august personages of the court, nor the illustrious veterans in government and diplomacy, nor the most experienced politicians in parliament, nor the powerful journalists, nor the men versed in great affairs of business. it was no light thing to confront even that solid mass of hostile judgment. but besides all this, cobden and mr. bright knew that the country at large, even their trusty middle and industrial classes, had turned their faces resolutely and angrily away from them. their own great instrument, the public meeting, was no longer theirs to wield. the army of the nonconformists, which has so seldom been found fighting on the wrong side, was seriously divided. public opinion was bitterly and impatiently hostile and intractable. mr. bright was burnt in effigy. cobden, at a meeting in his own constituency, after an energetic vindication of his opinions, saw resolutions carried against him. every morning they were reviled in half the newspapers in the country as enemies of the commonwealth. they were openly told that they were traitors, and that it was a pity they could not be punished as traitors. in the house, lord palmerston once began his reply by referring to mr. bright as "the honourable and reverend gentleman," cobden rose to call him to order for this flippant and unbecoming phrase. lord palmerston said he would not quarrel about words. then went on to say that he thought it right to tell mr. bright that his opinion was a matter of entire difference, and that he treated his censure with the most perfect indifference and contempt. on another occasion he showed the same unmannerliness to cobden himself. cobden had said that under certain circumstances he would fight, or if he could not fight, he would work for the wounded in the hospitals. "well," said lord palmerston in reply, with the sarcasm of a schoolboy's debating society, "there are many people in this country who think that the party to which he belongs should go immediately into a hospital of a different kind, and which i shall not mention." this refined irony was a very gentle specimen of the insult and contumely which was poured upon cobden and mr. bright at this time.... it is impossible not to regard the attitude of the two objects of this vast unpopularity as one of the most truly honourable spectacles in our political history. the moral fortitude, like the political wisdom of these two strong men, begins to stand out with a splendour that already recalls the great historic heights of statesmanship and patriotism. even now our heart-felt admiration and gratitude goes out to them as it goes out to burke for his lofty and manful protests against the war with america and the oppression of ireland, and to charles fox for his bold and strenuous resistance to the war with the french republic. before indulging in the dementia which those names usually produce, will the reader please note that it is not my business now to defend either the general principles of cobden and bright or the political spirit which they are supposed to represent. let them be as sordid, mean, unworthy, pusillanimous as you like--and as the best of us then said they were ("a mean, vain, mischievous clique" even so good a man as tom hughes could call them). we called them cowards--because practically alone they faced a country which had become a howling mob; we called their opponents "courageous" because with the whole country behind them they habitually poured contempt upon the under dog. and we thus hated these men because they did their best to dissuade us from undertaking a certain war. very good; we have had our war; we carried our point, we prevented the break-up of the turkish empire; those men were completely beaten. and they are dead. cannot we afford to set aside those old passions and see how far in one particular at least they may have been right? we admit, of course, if we are honest--happily everyone admits--that these despised men were right and those who abused them were wrong. the verdict of fact is there. says lord morley:-- when we look back upon the affairs of that time, we see that there were two policies open. lord palmerston's was one, cobden and bright's the other. if we are to compare lord palmerston's statesmanship and insight in the eastern question with that of his two great adversaries, it is hard, in the light of all that has happened since, to resist the conclusion that cobden and mr. bright were right, and lord palmerston was disastrously wrong. it is easy to plead extenuating circumstances for the egregious mistakes in lord palmerston's policy about the eastern question, the suez canal, and some other important subjects; but the plea can only be allowed after it has been frankly recognized that they really were mistakes, and that these abused men exposed and avoided them. lord palmerston, for instance, asked why the czar could not be "satisfied, as we all are, with the progressively liberal system of turkey." cobden, in his pamphlet twenty years before, insisted that this progressively liberal system of turkey had no existence. which of these two propositions was true may be left to the decision of those who lent to the turk many millions of money on the strength of lord palmerston's ignorant and delusive assurances. it was mainly owing to lord palmerston, again, that the efforts of the war were concentrated at sebastopol. sixty thousand english and french troops, he said, with the co-operation of the fleets, would take sebastopol in six weeks. cobden gave reasons for thinking very differently, and urged that the destruction of sebastopol, even when it was achieved, would neither inflict a crushing blow to russia, nor prevent future attacks upon turkey. lord palmerston's error may have been intelligible and venial; nevertheless, as a fact, he was in error and cobden was not, and the error cost the nation one of the most unfortunate, mortifying, and absolutely useless campaigns in english history. cobden held that if we were to defend turkey against russia, the true policy was to use our navy, and not to send a land force to the crimea. would any serious politician now be found to deny it? we might prolong the list of propositions, general and particular, which lord palmerston maintained and cobden traversed, from the beginning to the end of the russian war. there is not one of these propositions in which later events have not shown that cobden's knowledge was greater, his judgment cooler, his insight more penetrating and comprehensive. the bankruptcy of the turkish government, the further dismemberment of its empire by the treaty of berlin, the abrogation of the black sea treaty, have already done something to convince people that the two leaders saw much further ahead in and than men who had passed all their lives in foreign chanceries and the purlieus of downing street. it is startling to look back upon the bullying contempt which the man who was blind permitted himself to show to the men who could see. the truth is, that to lord palmerston it was still incomprehensible and intolerable that a couple of manufacturers from lancashire should presume to teach him foreign policy. still more offensive to him was their introduction of morality into the mysteries of the foreign office.[ ] what have peace theories to do with this war? asks the practical man, who is the greatest mystic of all, contemptuously. well, they have everything to do with it. for if we had understood some peace theories a little better a generation or two ago, if we had not allowed passion and error and prejudice instead of reason to dominate our policy, the sum of misery which these balkan populations have known would have been immeasurably less. it is quite true that we could not have prevented this war by sending peace pamphlets to the turk, or to the balkanese, for that matter, but we could have prevented it if we ourselves had read them a generation or two since, just as our only means of preventing future wars is by showing a little less prejudice and a little less blindness. and the practical question, despite mr. churchill, is whether we shall allow a like passion and a like prejudice again to blind us; whether we shall again back the wrong horse in the name of the same hollow theories drifting to a similar but greater futility and catastrophe, or whether we shall profit by our past to assure a better future. [footnote : / / ] [footnote : _the life of richard cobden._--unwin.] chapter vi. pacifism, defence, and "the impossibility of war." did the crimean war prove bright and cobden wrong?--our curious reasoning--mr. churchill on "illusions"--the danger of war is not the illusion but its benefits--we are all pacifists now since we all desire peace--will more armaments alone secure it?--the experience of mankind--war "the failure of human wisdom"--therefore more wisdom is the remedy--but the militarists only want more arms--the german lord roberts--the military campaign against political rationalism--how to make war certain. the question surely, which for practical men stands out from the mighty historical episode touched on in the last chapter, is this: was the fact that these despised men were so entirely right and their triumphant adversaries so entirely wrong a mere fluke, or was it due to the soundness of one set of principles and the hollowness of the other; and were the principles special to that case, or general to international conflict as a whole? to have an opinion of worth on that question we must get away from certain confusions and misrepresentations. it is a very common habit for the bellicist to quote the list of wars which have taken place since the crimean war as proof of the error of bright and cobden. but what are the facts? here were two men who strenuously and ruthlessly opposed a certain policy; they urged, not only that it would inevitably lead to war, but that the war would be futile--but not sterile, for they saw that others would grow from it. their counsel was disregarded and the war came, and events have proved that they were right and the war-makers wrong, and the very fact that the wars took place is cited as disapproving their "theories."[ ] it is a like confusion of thought which prompts mr. churchill to refer to pacifists as people who deem the _danger_ of war an illusion. this persistent misconception is worth a little examination. * * * * * the smoke from the first railway engines in england killed the cattle and the poultry of the country gentlemen near whose property the railroad passed--at least, that is what the country gentleman wrote to the _times_. now if in the domain of quite simple material things the dislike of having fixed habits of thought disturbed, leads gentlemen to resent innovations in that way, it is not astonishing that innovations of a more intangible and elusive kind should be subject to a like unconscious misrepresentation, especially by newspapers and public men pushed by commercial or political necessity to say the popular thing rather than the true thing: that contained in the speech of mr. churchill, which, together with a newspaper comment thereon, i have made the "text" of this little book, is a typical case in point. it is possible, of course, that mr. churchill in talking about "persons who profess to know that the danger of war has become an illusion," had not the slightest intention of referring to those who share the views embodied in "the great illusion," which are, _not_ that the danger of war is an illusion, but that the benefit is. all that happened was that his hearers and readers interpreted his words as referring thereto; and that, of course, he could not possibly prevent. in any case, to misrepresent an author (and i mean always, of course, quite sincere and unconscious misrepresentations, like that which led the country gentlemen to write that railway smoke killed poultry) is a trifling matter, but to misrepresent an idea, is not, for it makes that better understanding of facts, the creation of a more informed public opinion, by which alone we can avoid a possibly colossal folly, an understanding difficult enough as it is, still more difficult. and that is why the current misrepresentation (again unconscious) of most efforts at the better understanding of the facts of international relationship needs very badly to be corrected. i will therefore be very definite. the implication that pacifists of any kind have ever urged that war is impossible is due either to that confusion of thought just touched upon, or is merely a silly gibe of those who deride arguments to which they have not listened, and consequently do not understand, or which they desire to misrepresent; and such misrepresentation is, when not unconscious, always stupid and unfair. so far as i am concerned, i have never written a line, nor, so far as i know, has anyone else, to plead that war is impossible. i have, on the contrary, always urged, with the utmost emphasis that war is not only possible but extremely likely, so long as we remain as ignorant as we are concerning what it can accomplish, and unless we use our energies and efforts to prevent it, instead of directing those efforts to create it. what anti-bellicists as a whole urge, is not that war is impossible or improbable, but that it is impossible to benefit by it; that conquest must, in the long run, fail to achieve advantage; that the general recognition of this can only add to our security. and incidentally most of us have declared our complete readiness to take any demonstrably necessary measure for the maintenance of armament, but urge that the effort must not stop there. one is justified in wondering whether the public men--statesmen, soldiers, bishops, preachers, journalists--who indulge in this gibe, are really unable to distinguish between the plea that a thing is unwise, foolish, and the plea that it is impossible; whether they really suppose that anyone in our time could argue that human folly is impossible, or an "illusion." it is quite evidently a tragic reality. undoubtedly the readiness with which these critics thus fall back upon confusion of thought indicates that they themselves have illimitable confidence in it. but the confusion of thought does not stop here. i have spoken of pacifists and bellicists, but, of course, we are all pacifists now. lord roberts, lord charles beresford, lord fisher, mr. winston churchill, the navy league, the navier league, the universal military service league, the german emperor, the editor of _the spectator_, all the chancelleries of europe, alike declare that their one object is the maintenance of peace. never were such pacifists. the german emperor, speaking to his army, invariably points out that they stand for the peace of europe. does a first lord want new ships? it is because a strong british navy is the best guarantee of peace. lord roberts wants conscription because that is the one way to preserve peace, and the editor of _the spectator_ tells us that turkey's great crime is that she has not paid enough attention to soldiering and armament, that if only she had been stronger all would have been well. all alike are quite persuaded indeed that the one way to peace is to get more armament. well, that is the method that mankind has pursued during the whole of its history; it has never shown the least disposition not to take this advice and not to try this method to the full. and written history, to say nothing of unwritten history, is there to tell us how well it has succeeded. unhappily, one has to ask whether some of these military pacifists really want it to succeed? again i do not tax any with conscious insincerity. but it does result not merely from what some imply, but from what they say. for certain of these doughty pacifists having told you how much their one object is to secure peace, then proceed to tell you that this thing which they hope to secure is a very evil thing, that under its blighting influence nations wane in luxury and sloth. and of course they imply that our own nation, about a third of whom have not enough to eat and about another third of whom have a heart-breaking struggle with small means and precariousness of livelihood, is in danger of this degeneration which comes from too much wealth and luxury and sloth and ease. i could fill a dozen books the size of this with the solemn warning of such pacifists as these against the danger of peace (which they tell you they are struggling to maintain), and how splendid and glorious a thing, how fine a discipline is war (which they tell you they are trying so hard to avoid). thus the editor of _the spectator_ tells us that mankind cannot yet dispense with the discipline of war; and lord roberts, that to make war when you are really ready for it (or that in any case for germany to do it) is "an excellent policy and one to be pursued by every nation prepared to play a great part in history." the truth is, of course, that we are not likely to get peace from those who believe it to be an evil thing and war and aggression a good thing, or, at least, are very mixed in their views as to this. before men can secure peace they must at least make up their minds whether it is peace or war they want. if you do not know what you want, you are not likely to get it--or you are likely to get it, whichever way you prefer to put it. and that is another thing which divides us from the military pacifists: we really do want peace. as between war and peace we have made our choice, and having made it, stick to it. there may be something to be said for war--for settling a thing by fighting about it instead of by understanding it,--just as there may be something to be said for the ordeal, or the duel, as against trial by evidence, for the rack as a corrective of religious error, for judicial torture as a substitute for cross-examination, for religious wars, for all these things--but the balance of advantage is against them and we have discarded them. but there is a still further difference which divides us: we have realised that we discarded those things only when we really understood their imperfections and that we arrived at that understanding by studying them, by discussing them,--because one man in london or another in paris raised plainly and boldly the whole question of their wisdom and because the intellectual ferment created by those interrogations, either in the juridical or religious field, re-acted on the minds of men in geneva or wurtenburg or rome or madrid. it was by this means, not by improving the rapiers or improving the instruments of the inquisition, that we got rid of the duel and that catholics ceased to torture protestants or _vice versa_. we gave these things up because we realised the futility of physical force in these conflicts. we shall give up war for the same reason. but the bellicist says that discussions of this sort, these attempts to find out the truth, are but the encouragement of pernicious theories: there is, according to him, but one way--better rapiers, more and better racks, more and better inquisitions. mr. bonar law, in one of the very wisest phrases ever pronounced by a statesman, has declared that "war is the failure of human wisdom." that is the whole case of pacifism: we shall not improve except at the price of using our reason in these matters; of understanding them better. surely it is a truism that that is the price of all progress; saner conceptions--man's recognition of his mistakes, whether those mistakes take the form of cannibalism, slavery, torture, superstition, tyranny, false laws, or what you will. the veriest savage, or for that matter the ape, can blindly fight, but whether the animal develops into a man, or the savage into civilized man, depends upon whether the element of reason enters in an increasing degree into the solution of his problems. the militarist argues otherwise. he admits the difficulty comes from man's small disposition to think; therefore don't think--fight. we fight, he says, because we have insufficient wisdom in these matters; therefore do not let us trouble to get more wisdom or understanding; all we need do is to get better weapons. i am not misrepresenting him; that is quite fairly the popular line: it is no use talking about these things or trying to explain them, all that is logic and theories; what you want to do is to get a bigger army or more battleships. and, of course, the bellicist on the other side of the frontier says exactly the same thing, and i am still waiting to have explained to me how, therefore, if this matter depends upon understanding, we can ever solve it by neglecting understanding, which the militarist urges us to do. not only does he admit, but pleads, that these things are complex, and supposes that that is an argument why they should not be studied. and a third distinction will, i think, make the difference between us still clearer. like the bellicist, i am in favour of defence. if in a duelling society a duellist attacked me, or, as a huguenot in the paris of the sixteenth century a catholic had attacked me, i should certainly have defended myself, and if needs be have killed my aggressor. but that attitude would not have prevented my doing my small part in the creation of a public opinion which should make duelling or such things as the massacre of st. bartholomew impossible by showing how unsatisfactory and futile they were; and i should know perfectly well that neither would stop until public opinion had, as the result of education of one kind or another, realised their futility. but it is as certain as anything can be that the churchills of that society or of that day would have been vociferous in declaring (as in the case of the duel they still to-day declare in prussia) that this attempt to prove the futility of duelling was not only a bad and pernicious campaign, but was in reality a subtle attempt to get people killed in the street by bullies, and that those who valued their security would do their best to discredit all anti-duelling propaganda--by misrepresentation, if needs be. let this matter be quite clear. no one who need be considered in this discussion would think of criticising lord roberts for wanting the army, and mr. churchill for wanting the navy, to be as good and efficient as possible and as large as necessary. personally--and i speak, i know, for many of my colleagues in the anti-war movement--i would be prepared to support british conscription if it be demonstrably wise or necessary. but what we criticise is the persistent effort to discredit honest attempts at a better understanding of the facts of international relationship, the everlasting gibe which it is thought necessary to fling at any constructive effort, apart from armament, to make peace secure. these men profess to be friends of peace, they profess to regret the growth of armament, to deplore the unwisdom, ignorance, prejudice and misunderstanding out of which the whole thing grows, but immediately there is any definite effort to correct this unwisdom, to examine the grounds of the prejudice and misunderstanding, there is a volte face and such efforts are sneered at as "sentimental" or "sordid," according as the plea for peace is put upon moral or material grounds. it is not that they disagree in detail with any given proposition looking towards a basis of international co-operation, but that in reality they deprecate raising the matter at all.[ ] it must be armaments and nothing but armaments with them. if there had been any possibility of success in that we should not now be entering upon the , th or , th war of written history. armaments may be necessary, but they are not enough. our plan is armaments plus education; theirs is armament versus education. and by education, of course, we do not mean school books, or an extension of the school board curriculum, but a recognition of the fact that the character of human society is determined by the extent to which its units attempt to arrive at an _understanding_ of their relationship, instead of merely subduing one another by force, which does not lead to understanding at all: in turkey, or venezuela, or san domingo, there is no particular effort made to adjust differences by understanding; in societies of that type they only believe in settling differences by armaments. that is why there are very few books, very little thought or discussion, very little intellectual ferment but a great many guns and soldiers and battles. and throughout the world the conflict is going on between these rival schools. on the whole the western world, inside the respective frontiers, almost entirely now tends to the pacifist type. but not so in the international field, for where the powers are concerned, where it is a question of the attitude of one nation in relation to another, you get a degree of understanding rather less than more than that which obtains in the internal politics of venezuela, or turkey, or morocco, or any other "warlike" state. and the difficulty of creating a better european opinion and temper is due largely to just this idea that obsesses the militarist, that unless they misrepresent facts in a sensational direction the nations will be too apathetic to arm; that education will abolish funk, and that presumably funk is a necessary element in self-defence. for the most creditable explanation that we can give of the militarist's objection to having this matter discussed at all, is the evident impression that such discussion will discourage measures for self-defence; the militarist does not believe that a people desiring to understand these things and interested in the development of a better european society, can at the same time be determined to resist the use of force. they believe that unless the people are kept in a blue funk, they will not arm, and that is why it is that the militarist of the respective countries are for ever talking about our degeneration and the rest. and the german militarist is just as angry with the unwarlike qualities of his people as the english militarist is with ours. just note this parallel: british opinion on british apathy and german vigour. "there is a way in which britain is certain to have war and its horrors and calamities; it is this--by persisting in her present course of unpreparedness, her apathy, unintelligence, and blindness, and in her disregard of the warnings of the most ordinary political insight, as well as of the example of history. "now in the year , just as in , and just as in , war will take place the instant the german forces by land and sea are, by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can be made certain. 'germany strikes when germany's hour has struck.' that is the time-honoured policy of her foreign office. it is her policy at the present hour, and it is an excellent policy. it is, or should be, the policy of every nation prepared to play a great part in history."--lord roberts, at manchester. "britain is disunited; germany is homogeneous. we are quarrelling about the lords' veto, home rule, and a dozen other questions of domestic politics. we have a little navy party, an anti-militarist party; germany is unanimous upon the question of naval expansion."--mr. blatchford. german opinion on german apathy and british vigour. "whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. with the increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a solution at the present time."--general von bernhardi in "germany and the next war." "there is no one german people, no single germany.... there are more abrupt contrasts between germans and germans than between germans and indians." "one must admire the consistent fidelity and patriotism of the english race, as compared with the uncertain and erratic methods of the german people, their mistrust, and suspicion.... in spite of numerous wars, bloodshed, and disaster, england always emerges smoothly and easily from her military crises and settles down to new conditions and surroundings in her usual cool and deliberate manner, so different from the german."--_berliner tageblatt_, march , . presumably each doughty warrior knows his own country better than that of the other, which would carry a conclusion directly contrary to that which he draws. but note also where this idea that it is necessary artificially to stimulate the defensive zeal of each country by resisting any tendency to agreement and understanding leads. it leads even so good a man as lord roberts into the trap of dogmatic prophesy concerning the intentions of a very complex heterogeneous nation of million people. lord roberts could not possibly tell you what his own country will do five, ten, or fifteen years hence in such matters as home rule or the suffragists, or even the payment of doctors, but he knows exactly what a foreign country will do in a much more serious matter. the simple truth is, of course, that no man knows what "germany" will do ten years hence, any more than we can know what "england" will do. we don't even know what england will _be_, whether unionist or liberal or labour, socialist, free trade or protectionist. all these things, like the question of peace and war depends upon all sorts of tendencies, drifts and developments. at bottom, of course, since war, in mr. bonar law's fine phrase, is "never inevitable--only the failure of human wisdom," it depends upon whether we become a little less or a little more wise. if the former, we shall have it; if the latter, we shall not. but this dogmatism concerning the other man's evil intentions is the very thing that leads away from wisdom.[ ] the sort of temper and ideas which it provokes on both sides of the frontier may be gathered from just such average gems as these plucked recently from the english press:-- yes, we may as well face it. _war with germany is inevitable_, and the only question is--shall we consult her convenience as to its date? shall we wait till germany's present naval programme, which is every year reducing our advantage, is complete? shall we wait till the smouldering industrial revolution, of which all these strikes are warnings, has broken into flame? shall we wait till consols are and our national credit is gone? shall we wait till the income tax is s. d. in the pound? or shall we strike now--_finding every out-of-work a job in connection with the guardianship of our shores_, and, with our mighty fleet, either sinking every german ship or towing it in triumph into a british port? _why_ should we do it? _because the command of the seas is ever ours_; because our island position, our international trade and our world-wide dominions _demand that no other nation shall dare to challenge our supremacy_. that is why. oh, yes, the cost would be great, but we could raise it to-day all right, _and we should get it back_. if the struggle comes to-day, we shall win--and after it is over, there will be abounding prosperity in the land, and no more labour unrest. yes, we have no fear of germany to-day. the only enemy we fear is the crack-brained fanatics who prate about peace and goodwill whilst foreign _dreadnoughts_ are gradually closing in upon us. as mr. balfour said at the eugenic conference the other day, man is a wild animal; and there is no room, in present circumstances, for any tame ones.--_john bull_, aug. , . the italics and large type are those of the original, not mine. this paper explains, by the way, in this connection that "in the chancelleries of europe _john bull_ is regarded as a negligible journalistic quantity. but _john bull_ is read by a million people every week, and that million not the least thoughtful and intelligent section of the community, they _think_ about what they read." one of the million seems to have thought to some purpose, for the next week there was the following letter from him. it was given the place of honour in a series and runs as follows:-- i would have extended your "down with the german fleet!" to "down with germany and the germans!" for, unless the whole ---- lot are swept off the surface of the earth, there will be no peace. if the people in england could only realise the quarrelsome, deceitful, underhanded, egotistic any tyrannical character of the germans, there would not be so much balderdash about a friendly understanding, etc., between england and germany. the german is a born tyrant. the desire to remain with britain on good terms will only last so long until germany feels herself strong enough to beat england both on sea and on land: afterwards it'll simply be "_la bourse ou la vie_," as the french proverb goes. provided they do not know that there are any english listeners about, phrases like the following can be heard every day in german restaurants and other public places: "i hate england and the english!" "never mind, they won't be standing in our way much longer. we shall soon be ready." and _john bull_, with its million readers, is not alone. this is how the _daily express_, in a double-leaded leader, teaches history to its readers:-- when, one day, englishmen are not allowed to walk the pavements of their cities, and their women are for the pleasure of the invaders, and the offices of the tiny england newspapers are incinerated by a furious mob; when foreign military officers proclaim martial law from the royal exchange steps, and when some billions of pounds have to be raised by taxation--by taxation of the "toiling millions" as well as others--to pay the invaders out, and the british empire consists of england--less dover, required for a foreign strategic tunnel--and the channel islands--then the ghosts of certain politicians and publicists will probably call a meeting for the discussion of the fourth dimension.--leading article, _daily express_, / / . and not merely shall our women fill the harems of the german pashas, and englishmen not be allowed to walk upon the pavement (it would be the german way of solving the traffic problem--near the bank), but a "well-known diplomat" in another paper tells us what else will happen. if england be vanquished it means the end of all things as far as she is concerned, and will ring in a new and somewhat terrible era. bankrupt, shorn of all power, deserted, as must clearly follow, as a commercial state, and groaning under a huge indemnity that she cannot pay and is not intended to be able to pay, what will be the melancholy end of this great country and her teeming population of forty-five millions? ... her shipping trade will be transferred as far as possible from the english to the german flag. her banking will be lost, as london will no longer be the centre of commerce, and efforts will be made to enable berlin to take london's place. her manufactures will gradually desert her. failing to obtain payments in due time, estates will be sequestered and become the property of wealthy germans. the indemnity to be demanded is said to be one thousand millions sterling. the immediate result of defeat would mean, of course, that insolvency would take place in a very large number of commercial businesses, and others would speedily follow. those who cannot get away will starve unless large relief funds are forthcoming from, say, canada and the united states, for this country, bereft of its manufactures, will not be able to sustain a population of more than a very few millions.--from an article by "a well-known diplomatist" in _the throne_, june , . these are but samples; and this sort of thing is going on in england and germany alike. and when one protests that it is wicked rubbish born of funk and ignorance, that whatever happens in war this does not happen, and that it is based on false economics and grows into utterly false conceptions of international relationship, one is shouted down as an anti-armament man and an enemy of his country. well, if that view is persisted in, if in reality it is necessary for a people to have lies and nonsense told to them in order to induce them to defend themselves, some will be apt to decide that they are not worth defending. or rather will they decide that this phase of the pro-armament campaign--which is not so much a campaign in favour of armament as one against education and understanding--will end in turning us into a nation either of poltroons or of bullies and aggressors, and that since life is a matter of the choice of risks it is wiser and more courageous to choose the less evil. a nation may be defeated and still live in the esteem of men--and in its own. no civilized man esteems a nation of bashi-bazouks or prussian junkers. of the two risks involved--the risk of attack arising from a possible superiority of armament on the part of a rival, and the risk of drifting into conflict because, concentrating all our energies on the mere instrument of combat, we have taken no adequate trouble to understand the facts of this case--it is at least an arguable proposition that the second risk is the greater. and i am prompted to this expression of opinion without surrendering one iota of a lifelong and passionate belief that a nation attacked should defend itself to the last penny and to the last man. and you think that this idea that the nations--ours amongst them--may drift into futile war from sheer panic and funk arising out of the terror inspired by phantoms born of ignorance, is merely the idea of pacifist cranks? the following, referring to the "precautionary measures" (_i.e._, mobilization of armies) taken by the various powers, is from a leading article of the _times_:-- "precautions" are understandable, but the remark of our berlin correspondent that they may produce an untenable position from which retreat must be humiliating is applicable in more than one direction. our vienna correspondent truly says that "there is no valid reason to believe war between austria-hungary and russia to be inevitable, or even immediately probable." we entirely agree, but wish we could add that the absence of any valid reason was placing strict limitations upon the scope of "precautions." the same correspondent says he is constantly being asked:--"is there no means of avoiding war?" the same question is now being asked, with some bewilderment, by millions of men in this country, who want to know what difficulties there are in the present situation which should threaten europe with a general war, or even a collision larger than that already witnessed.... there is no great nation in europe which to-day has the least desire that millions of men should be torn from their homes and flung headlong to destruction at the bidding of vain ambitions. the balkan peoples fought for a cause which was peculiarly their own. they were inspired by the memories of centuries of wrong which they were burning to avenge. the larger nations have no such quarrel, unless it is wilfully manufactured for them. the common sense of the peoples of europe is well aware that no issue has been presented which could not be settled by amicable discussion. in england men will learn with amazement and incredulity that war is possible over the question of a servian port, or even over the larger issues which are said to lie behind it. yet that is whither the nations are blindly drifting who, then, makes war? the answer is to be found in the chancelleries of europe, among the men who have too long played with human lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so enmeshed in formulas and the jargon of diplomacy that they have ceased to be conscious of the poignant realities with which they trifle. and thus will war continue to be made, until the great masses who are the sport of professional schemers and dreamers say the word which, shall bring, not eternal peace, for that is impossible, but a determination that wars shall be fought only in a just and righteous and vital cause. if that word is ever to be spoken, there never was a more appropriate occasion than the present; and we trust it will be spoken while there is yet time. and the very next day there appeared in the _daily mail_ an article by mr. lovat fraser ending thus:-- the real answer rests, or ought to rest, with the man in the train. does he want to join in armageddon? it is time that he began to think about it, for his answer may soon be sought. now we have here, stated in the first case by the most authoritative of english newspapers, and in the second by an habitual contributor of the most popular, the whole case of pacifism as i have attempted to expound it, namely: ( ) that our current statecraft--its fundamental conceptions, its "axioms," its terminology--has become obsolete by virtue of the changed conditions of european society; that the causes of conflict which it creates are half the time based on illusions, upon meaningless and empty formulas; ( ) that its survival is at bottom due to popular ignorance and indifference--the survival on the part of the great mass of just those conceptions born of the old and now obsolete conditions--since diplomacy, like all functions of government, is a reflection of average opinion; ( ) that this public opinion is not something which descends upon us from the skies but is the sum of the opinions of each one of us and is the outcome of our daily contacts, our writing and talking and discussion, and that the road to safety lies in having that general public opinion better informed not in directly discouraging such better information; ( ) that the mere multiplication of "precautions" in the shape of increased armaments and a readiness for war, in the absence of a corresponding and parallel improvement of opinion, will merely increase and not exorcise the danger, and, finally, ( ) that the problem of war is necessarily a problem of at least two parties, and that if we are to solve it, to understand it even, we must consider it in terms of two parties, not one; it is not a question of what shall be the policy of each without reference to the other, but what the final upshot of the two policies taken in conjunction will be. now in all this the _times_, especially in one outstanding central idea, is embodying a conception which is the antithesis of that expressed by militarists of the type of mr. churchill, and, i am sorry to say, of lord roberts. to these latter war is not something that we, the peoples of europe, create by our ignorance and temper, by the nursing of old and vicious theories, by the poorness and defects of the ideas our intellectual activities have developed during the last generation or two, but something that "comes upon us" like the rain or the earthquake, and against which we can only protect ourselves by one thing: more arms, a greater readiness to fight. in effect the anti-educationalists say this: "what, as practical men, we have to do, is to be stronger than our enemy; the rest is theory and does not matter." well the inevitable outcome of such an attitude is catastrophe. i have said elsewhere that in this matter it seems fatally easy to secure either one of two kinds of action: that of the "practical man" who limits his energies to securing a policy which will perfect the machinery of war and disregard anything else; or that of the idealist, who, persuaded of the brutality or immorality of war, is apt to show a certain indifference concerning self-defence. what is needed is the type of activity which will include both halves of the problem: provision for education, for a political reformation in this matter, _as well as_ such means of defence as will meantime counterbalance the existing impulse to aggression. to concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the other half is to render the whole problem insoluble. what must inevitably happen if the nations take the line of the "practical man," and limit their energies simply and purely to piling up armaments? a critic once put to me what he evidently deemed a poser: "do you urge that we shall be stronger than our enemy, or weaker?" to which i replied: "the last time that question was asked me was in berlin, by germans. what would you have had me reply to those germans?"--a reply which, of course, meant this: in attempting to find the solution of this question in terms of one party, you are attempting the impossible. the outcome will be war, and war would not settle it. it would all have to be begun over again. the navy league catechism says: "defence consists in being so strong that it will be dangerous for your enemy to attack you."[ ] mr. churchill, however, goes farther than the navy league, and says: "the way to make war impossible is to make victory certain." the navy league definition is at least possible of application to practical politics, because rough equality of the two parties would make attack by either dangerous. mr. churchill's principle is impossible of application to practical politics, because it could only be applied by one party, and would, in the terms of the navy league principle, deprive the other party of the right of defence. as a matter of simple fact, both the navy league, by its demand for two ships to one, and mr. churchill, by his demand for certain victory, deny in this matter germany's right to defend herself; and such denial is bound, on the part of a people animated by like motives to ourselves, to provoke a challenge. when the navy league says, as it does, that a self-respecting nation should not depend upon the goodwill of foreigners for its safety, but upon its own strength, it recommends germany to maintain her efforts to arrive at some sort of equality with ourselves. when mr. churchill goes further and says that a nation should be so strong as to make victory over its rivals certain, he knows that if germany were to adopt his own doctrine its inevitable outcome would be war. the issue is plain: we get a better understanding of certain political facts in europe, or we have war. and the bellicist at present is resolutely opposed to such political education. and it is for that reason, not because he is asking for adequate armament, that some of the best of this country look with the deepest misgiving upon his work, and will continue to do so in increasing degree unless his policy be changed. now a word as to the peace pacifist--the pacifist sans phrases--as distinct from the military pacifist. it is not because i am in favour of defence that i have at times with some emphasis disassociated myself from certain features and methods of the peace movement, for non-resistance is no necessary part of that movement, and, indeed, so far as i know, it is no appreciable part. it is the methods not the object or the ideals of the peace movement which i have ventured to criticize, without, i hope, offence to men whom i respect in the very highest and sincerest degree. the methods of pacifism have in the past, to some extent at least, implied a disposition to allow easy emotion to take the place of hard thinking, good intention to stand for intellectual justification; and it is as plain as anything well can be that some of the best emotion of the world has been expended upon some of the very worst objects, and that in no field of human effort--medicine, commerce, engineering, legislation--has good intention ever been able to dispense with the necessity of knowing the how and the why. it is not that the somewhat question-begging and emotional terminology of some pacifists--the appeal to brotherly love and humanity--connotes things which are in themselves poor or mean (as the average militarist would imply), but because so much of pacifism in the past has failed to reconcile intellectually the claims of these things with what are the fundamental needs of men and to show their relation and practical application to actual problems and conditions. [footnote : as a matter of fact, of course, the work of these two men has not been fruitless. as lord morley truly says: "they were routed on the question of the crimean war, but it was the rapid spread of their principles which within the next twenty years made intervention impossible in the franco-austrian war, in the american war, in the danish war, in the franco-german war, and above all, in the war between russia and turkey, which broke out only the other day."] [footnote : thus the editor of the _spectator_:-- "for ourselves, as far as the main economic proposition goes, he preaches to the converted.... if nations were perfectly wise and held perfectly sound economic theories, they would recognize that exchange is the union of forces, and that it is very foolish to hate or be jealous of your co-operators.... men are savage, bloodthirsty creatures ... and when their blood is up will fight for a word or a sign, or, as mr. angell would put it, for an illusion." therefore, argues the _spectator_, let the illusion continue--for there is no other conclusion to be drawn from the argument.] [footnote : need it be said that this criticism does not imply the faintest want of respect for lord roberts, his qualities and his services. he has ventured into the field of foreign politics and prophecy. a public man of great eminence, he has expressed an english view of german "intentions." for the man in the street (i write in that capacity) to receive that expression in silence is to endorse it, to make it national. and i have stated here the reasons which make such an attitude disastrous. we all greatly respect lord roberts, but, even before that, must come respect for our country, the determination that it shall be in the right and not in the wrong, which it certainly will be if this easy dogmatism concerning the evil intentions of other nations becomes national.] [footnote : the german navy law in its preamble might have filched this from the british navy league catechism.] chapter vii. "theories" false and true: their role in european progress. the improvement of ideas the foundation of all improvement--shooting straight and thinking straight; the one as important as the other--pacifism and the millennium--how we got rid of wars of religion--a few ideas have changed the face of the world--the simple ideas the most important--the "theories" which have led to war--the work of the reformer to destroy old and false theories--the intellectual interdependence of nations--europe at unity in this matter--new ideas cannot be confined to one people--no fear of ourselves or any nation being ahead of the rest. but what, it will be said, is the practical outcome? admitting that we are, or that our fathers were, in part responsible for this war, that it is their false theories which have made it necessary, that like false theories on our part may make future wars inevitable--what shall we do to prevent that catastrophe? now while as an "abstract proposition" everyone will admit that the one thing which distinguishes the civilized man from the savage is a difference of ideas, no one apparently believes that it is a dangerous and evil thing for the political ideas of savages to dominate most of our countrymen or that so intangible a thing as "ideas" have any practical importance at all. while we believe this, of course--to the extent to which we believe it--improvement is out of the question. we have to realize that civic faith, like religious faith, is of importance; that if english influence is to stand for the right and not the wrong in human affairs, it is impossible for each one of us individuals to be wrong; that if the great mass is animated by temper, blindness, ignorance, passion, small and mean prejudices, it is not possible for "england" to stand for something quite different and for its influence to be ought but evil. to say that we are "for our country right or wrong" does not get over the matter at all; rather is it equivalent to saying that we would as readily have it stand for evil as for good. and we do not in the least seem to realize that for an englishman to go on talking wicked nonsense across the dinner table and making one of the little rivulets of bad temper and prejudice which forms the mighty river drowning sane judgment is to do the england of our dreams a service as ill (in reality far more mischievous) as though the plans of fortresses were sold to germany. we must all learn to shoot straight; apparently we need not learn to think straight. and yet if europe could do the second it could dispense with the first. "good faith" has a score of connotations, and we believe apparently that good politics can dispense with all of them and that "patriotism" has naught to do with any. of course, to shoot straight is so much easier than to think straight, and i suppose at bottom the bellicist believes that the latter is a hopeless object since "man is not a thinking animal." he deems, apparently, we must just leave it at that. of course, if he does leave it at that--if we persist in believing that it is no good discussing these matters, trying to find out the truth about them, writing books and building churches--our civilization is going to drift just precisely as those other civilizations which have been guided by the same dreadful fatalism have drifted--towards the turkish goal. "kismet. man is a fool to babble of these things; what he may do is of no avail; all things will happen as they were pre-ordained." and the english turk--the man who prefers to fight things out instead of thinking things out--takes the same line. if he adopts the turkish philosophy he must be content with the turkish result. but the western world as a whole has refused to be content with the turkish result, and however tiresome it may be to know about things, to bother with "theories" and principles, we have come to realise that we have to choose between one of two courses: either to accept things as they are, not to worry about improvement or betterment at all, fatalistically to let things slide or--to find out bit by bit where our errors have been and to correct those errors. this is a hard road, but it is the road the western world has chosen; and it is better than the other. and it has not accepted this road because it expects the millenium to-morrow week. there is no millenium, and pacifists do not expect it or talk about it; the word is just one of those three-shies-a-penny brickbats thrown at them by ignorance. you do not dismiss attempts to correct errors in medicine or surgery, or education, or tramcars, or cookery, by talking about the millenium; why should you throw that word at attempts to correct the errors of international relationship? nothing has astonished me more than the fact that the "practical" man who despises "theories" nearly always criticises pacifism because it is not an absolute dogma with all its thirty-nine articles water-tight. "you are a pacifist, then suppose...," and then follows generally some very remote hypothesis of what would happen if all the orient composed its differences and were to descend suddenly upon the western world; or some dogmatic (and very theoretical) proposition about the unchangeability of human nature, and the foolishness of expecting the millenium--an argument which would equally well have told against the union of scotland and england or would equally justify the political parties in a south american republic in continuing to settle their differences by militarist methods instead of the pacifist methods of england. human nature may be unchanging: it is no reason why we should fight a futile war with germany over nothing at all; the yellow peril may threaten; that is a very good reason why we should compose our differences in europe. men always will quarrel, perhaps, over religious questions, bigotry and fanaticism always will exist--it did not prevent our getting rid of the wars of religion, still less is it a reason for re-starting them. the men who made that immense advance--the achievement of religious toleration--possible, were not completely right and had not a water-tight theory amongst them; they did not bring the millenium, but they achieved an immense step. they _were_ pioneers of religious freedom, yet were themselves tyrants and oppressors; those who abolished slavery _did_ a good work, though much of the world _was_ left in industrial servitude; it _was_ a good thing to abolish judicial torture, though much of our penal system did yet remain barbaric; it _was_ a real advance to recognise the errors upon which these things rested, although that recognition did not immediately achieve a complete, logical, symmetrical and perfect change, because mankind does not advance that way. and so with war. pacifism does not even pretend to be a dogma: it is an attempt to correct in men's minds some of the errors and false theories out of which war grows. the reply to this is generally that the inaptitude of men for clear thinking and the difficulties of the issues involved will render any decision save the sheer clash of physical force impossible; that the field of foreign politics is such a tangle that the popular mind will always fall back upon decision by force. as a matter of fact the outstanding principles which serve to improve human conduct, are quite simple and understandable, as soon as they have been shorn of the sophistries and illusions with which the pundits clothe them. the real work of the reformers is to hack away these encumbering theories. the average european has not followed, and could not follow, the amazing and never-ending disputation on obscure theological points round which raged the reformation; but the one solid fact which did emerge from the whole was the general realization that whatever the truth might be in all this confusion, it was quite evidently wicked and futile to attempt to compel conformity to any one section of it by force; that in the interests of all force should be withheld; because if such queries were settled by the accident of predominant force, it would prove, not which was right, but which was stronger. so in such things as witchcraft. the learned and astute judges of the th century, who sent so many thousands to their death for impossible crimes, knew far more of the details of witchcraft than do we, and would beat us hopelessly in an argument on the subject; but all their learning was of no avail, because they had a few simple facts, the premises, crooked, and we have them straight; and all that we need to know in this amazing tangle of learned nonsense, is that the probabilities are against an old woman having caused a storm at sea and drowned a scottish king. and so with the french revolution. what the encyclopaedists and other pioneers of that movement really did for the european peoples in that matter, was not to elaborate fantastic schemes of constitution making, but by their argumentation to achieve the destruction of old political sophistries--divine rights of kings and what not--and to enable one or two simple facts to emerge clearly and unmistakeably, as that the object of government is the good of the governed, and can find its justification in nothing else whatsoever. it was these simple truths which, spreading over the world--with many checks and set-backs--have so profoundly modified the structure of christendom. somewhere it is related of montaigne that talking with academic colleagues, he expressed a contemptuous disbelief in the whole elaborate theory of witchcraft as it existed at that time. scandalised, his colleagues took him into the university library, and showed him hundreds, thousands, of parchment volumes written in latin by the learned men of the subject. had he read these volumes, that he talked so disrespectfully of their contents? no, replied montaigne, he had not read them, and he was not going to, because they were all wrong, and he was right. and montaigne spoke with this dogmatism because he realised that he saw clearly that which they did not--the crookedness and unsoundness of just those simple fundamental assumptions on which the whole fantastic structure was based. and so with all the sophistries and illusions by which the war system is still defended. if the public as a whole had to follow all the intricacies of those marvellous diplomatic combinations, the maze of our foreign politics, to understand abstruse points of finance and economics, in order to have just and sound ideas as to the real character of international relationship, why then public opinion would go on being as ignorant and mistaken as it had been hitherto. but sound opinion and instincts in that field depend upon nothing of the sort, but upon the emergence of a few quite simple facts, which are indisputable and self-evident, which stare us in the face, and which absolutely disprove all the elaborate theories of the bellicist statesmen. for instance, if conquest and extension of territory is the main road of moral and material progress, the fundamental need which sets up all these rivalries and collisions, then it is the populations of the great states which should be the most enviable; the position of the russian should be more desirable than that of the hollander; it is not. the austrian should be better off than the switzer; he is not. if a nation's wealth is really subject to military confiscation, and needs the defence of military power, then the wealth of those small states should be insecure indeed--and belgian national stocks stand points higher than the german. if nations are rival units, then we should benefit by the disappearance of our rivals--and if they disappeared, something like a third of our population would starve to death. if the growth and prosperity of rival nations threatens us, then we should be in far greater danger of america to-day than we were some years ago, when the growth of that power disturbed the sleep of our statesmen (and when, incidentally, we were just as much afraid of the growth of that power as we are now afraid of the growth of germany). if the growing power of russia compelled us to fight a great war in alliance with the turk to check her "advance on india," why are we now co-operating with russia to build railroads to india? it is such quite simple questions as these, and the quite plain facts which underlie them which will lead to sounder conceptions in this matter on the part of the peoples. it is not we who are the "theorists," if by "theorists" is meant the constructors of elaborate and deceptive theorems in this matter. it is our opponents, the military mystics, who persistently shut their eyes to the great outstanding facts of history and of our time. and these fantastic theories are generally justified by most esoteric doctrine, not by the appeal to the facts which stare you in the face. i once replied to a critic thus:-- in examining my critic's balance sheet i remarked that were his figures as complete as they were absurdly incomplete and misleading, i should still have been unimpressed. we all know that very marvellous results are possible with figures; but one can generally find some simple fact which puts them to the supreme test without undue mathematics. i do not know whether it has ever happened to my critic, as it has happened to me, while watching the gambling in the casino of a continental watering resort, to have a financial genius present weird columns of figures, which demonstrate conclusively, irrefragably, that by this system which they embody one can break the bank and win a million. i have never examined these figures, and never shall, for this reason: the genius in question is prepared to sell his wonderful secret for twenty francs. now, in the face of that fact i am not interested in his figures. if they were worth examination they would not be for sale. and so in this matter there are certain test facts which upset the adroitest statistical legerdemain. though, really, the fallacy which regards an addition of territory as an addition of wealth to the "owning" nation is a very much simpler matter than the fallacies lying behind gambling systems, which are bound up with the laws of chance and the law of averages and much else that philosophers will quarrel about till the end of time. it requires an exceptional mathematical brain really to refute those fallacies, whereas the one we are dealing with is due simply to the difficulty experienced by most of us in carrying in our heads two facts at the same time. it is so much easier to seize on one fact and forget the other. thus we realize that when germany has conquered alsace-lorraine she has "captured" a province worth, "cash value," in my critic's phrase, sixty-six millions sterling. what we overlook is that germany has also captured the people who own the property and who continue to own it. we have multiplied by _x_, it is true, but we have overlooked the fact that we have had to divide by _x_, and that the resultant is consequently, so far as the individual is concerned, exactly what it was before. my critic remembered the multiplication all right, but he forgot the division. just think of all the theories, the impossible theories for which the "practical" man has dragged the nations into war: the balance of power, for instance. fifteen or twenty years ago it was the ineradicable belief of fifty or sixty million americans, good, honest, sincere, and astute folk, that it was their bounden duty, their manifest interest, to fight--and in the words of one of their senators, annihilate--great britain, in the interests of the monroe doctrine (which is a form of the "balance of power"). i do not think any one knew what the monroe doctrine meant, or could coherently defend it. an american ambassador had an after-dinner story at the time. "what is this i hear, jones, that you do not believe in the monroe doctrine?" "it is a wicked lie. i have said no such thing. i do believe in the monroe doctrine. i would lay down my life for it; i would die for it. what i did say was that i didn't know what it meant." and it was this vague theory which very nearly drove america into a war that would have been disastrous to the progress of anglo-saxon civilization. this was at the time of the venezuelan crisis: the united states, which for nearly one hundred years had lived in perfect peace with a british power touching her frontier along three thousand miles, laid it down as a doctrine that her existence was imperilled if great britain should extend by so much as a mile a vague frontier running through a south american swamp thousands of miles away. and for that cause these decent and honourable people were prepared to take all the risks that would be involved to anglo-saxon civilisation by a war between england and america. the present writer happened at that time to be living in america, and concerned with certain political work. night after night he heard these fulminations against great britain; politicians, congressmen, senators, governors, ministers, preachers, clamouring for war, for a theory as vague and as little practical as one could wish. and we, of course, have had our like obsessions without number: "the independence integrity of the turkish dominion in europe" is one. just think of it! take in the full sound of the phrase: "the independence integrity of the turkish dominion in europe!" what, of course, makes these fantastic political doctrines possible, what leads men to subscribe to them, are a few false general conceptions to which they hold tenaciously--as all fundamental conceptions are held, and ought to be. the general conceptions in question are precisely the ones i have indicated: that nations are rival and struggling units, that military force is consequently the determining factor of their relative advantage; that enlargement of political frontiers is the supreme need, and so on. and the revision of these fundamental conceptions will, of course, be the general work of christendom, and given the conditions which now obtain, the development will go on _pari passu_ in all nations or not all. it will not be the work of "nations" at all; it will be the work of individual men. states do not think. it is the men who form the states who think, and the number of those men who will act as pioneers in a better policy must, of course, at first be small: a group here and a group there, the best men of all countries--england, france, germany, america--influencing by their ideas finally the great mass. to say, as so many do in this matter: "let other nations do it first" is, of course, to condemn us all to impotence--for the other nations use the same language. to ask that one group of forty or seventy or ninety million people shall by some sort of magic all find their way to a saner doctrine before such doctrine has affected other groups is to talk the language of childishness. things do not happen in that in human affairs. it is not in that way that opinion grows. it did not grow in that way in any one of the steps that i have mentioned--in the abolition of religious persecution, or slavery, or judicial torture. unless the individual man sees his responsibility for determining what is right and knowing how and why it is right, there will be no progress; there cannot even be a beginning. we are to an even greater degree an integral part of european society, and a factor of european policy, than we were at the time of the crimean war, when we mainly determined it; and our theories and discussions will act and re-act upon that policy just as did any considerable body of thought, whether french political thought of the eighteenth century, or german religious thought of the sixteenth century, even at a time when the means of producing that reaction, the book, literature, the newspaper, rapid communication, were so immeasurably more primitive and rudimentary than ours. what we think and say and do affects not merely ourselves, but that whole body politic of christendom of which we are an integral part. it is a curious fact that the moral and intellectual interdependence of states preceded by a long period, that material and economic independence which i have tried recently to make clear. nothing is more contrary to fact than to suppose that any considerable movement of opinion in europe can be limited to the frontiers of one nation. even at a time when it took half a generation for a thought to travel from one capital to another, a student or thinker in some obscure italian, swiss or german village was able to modify policy, to change the face of europe and of mankind. coming nearer to our time, it was the work of the encyclopaedists and earlier political questioners which made the french revolution; and the effect of that revolution was not confined to france. the ideas which animated it re-acted directly upon our empire, upon the american colonies, upon the spanish colonies, upon italy, and the formation of united italy, upon germany--the world over. these miracles, almost too vast and great to conceive, were the outcome of that intangible thing, an idea, an aspiration, an ideal. and if they could accomplish so much in that day when the popular press and cheap literature and improved communication did not exist, how is it possible to suppose that any great ferment of opinion can be limited to one group in our day, when we have a condition of things in which the declaration of an english cabinet minister to-night is read to-morrow morning by every reading german? it should be to our everlasting glory that our political thought in the past, some of our political institutions, parliamentary government, and what not, have had an enormous influence in the world. we have some ground for hoping that another form of political institution which we have initiated, a relationship of distinct political groups into which force does not enter, will lead the way to a better condition of things in christendom. we have demonstrated that five independent nations, the nations of the british empire, can settle their differences as between one another without the use of force. we have definitely decided that whatever the attitude australia, canada, and south africa may adopt to us we shall not use force to change it. what is possible with five is possible with fifteen nations. just as we have given to the world roughly our conception of parliamentary government, so it is to be hoped may we give to the world our conception of the true relationship of nations. the great steps of the past--religious freedom, the abolition of torture and of slavery, the rights of the mass, self-government--every real step which man has made has been made because men "theorised," because a galileo, or a luther, or a calvin, or a voltaire, rousseau, bentham, spencer, darwin, wrote and put notes of interrogation. had they not done so none of those things could have been accomplished. the greatest work of the renaissance was the elimination of physical force in the struggle of religious groups, in religious struggles generally; the greatest work of our generation will be elimination of physical force from the struggle of the political groups and from political struggles generally. but it will be done in exactly the same way: by a common improvement of opinion. and because we possess immeasurably better instruments for the dissemination of ideas, we should be able to achieve the political reformation of europe much more rapidly and effectively than our predecessors achieved the great intellectual reformation of their time. chapter viii. what must we _do_? we must have the right political faith--then we must give effect to it--good intention not enough--the organization of the great forces of modern life--our indifference as to the foundations of the evil--the only hope. what then must we _do_? well the first and obvious thing is for each to do his civic duty, for each to determine that he at least shall not reject, with that silly temper which nearly always meets most new points of view, principles which do at least seek to explain things, and do point to the possibility of a better way. the first thing is to make our own policy right--and that is the work of each one of us; to correct the temper which made us, for instance, to our shame, the partners of the turk in his work of oppression. and we must realise that mere good intent does not suffice; that understanding, by which alone we can make headway, is not arrived at by a pleasant emotion like that produced by a beethoven sonata; that we pay for our progress in a little harder money than that, the money of hard work, in which must be included hard thinking. and having got that far, we must realise that sound ideas do not spread themselves. they are spread by men. it is one of the astonishing things in the whole problem of the breaking of war, that while men realise that if women are to have votes, or men to be made temperate, or the white slave traffic to be stopped, or for that matter, if battleships are to be built, or conscription to be introduced, or soap or pills to be sold, effort, organisation, time, money, must be put into these things. but the greatest revolution that the world has known since mankind acquired the right to freedom of opinion, will apparently get itself accomplished without any of these things; or that at least the government can quite easily attend to it by asking other governments to attend a conference. we must realise that a change of opinion, the recognition of a new fact, or of facts heretofore not realised, is a slow and laborious work, even in the relatively simple things which i have mentioned, and that you cannot make savages into civilised men by collecting them round a table. for the powers of europe, so far as their national policies are concerned, are still uncivilised individuals. and their conferences are bound to fail, when each unit has the falsest conception concerning the matters under discussion. governments are the embodied expression of general public opinion--and not the best public opinion at that; and until opinion is modified, the embodiment of it will no more be capable of the necessary common action, than would red indians be capable of forming an efficient court of law, while knowing nothing of law or jurisprudence, or worse still, having utterly false notions of the principles upon which human society is based. and the occasional conferences of private men still hazy as to these principles are bound to be as ineffective. if the mere meeting and contact of people cleared up misunderstandings, we should not have suffragettes and anti-suffragettes, or mr. lloyd george at grips with the doctors. these occasional conferences, whether official, like those of the hague, or non-official like those which occasionally meet in london or in berlin, will not be of great avail in this matter unless a better public opinion renders them effective. they are of some use and no one would desire to see them dropped, but they will not of themselves stem or turn the drift of opinion. what is needed is a permanent organisation of propaganda, framed, not for the purpose of putting some cut and dried scheme into immediate operation, but with the purpose of clarifying european public opinion, making the great mass see a few simple facts straight, instead of crooked, and founded in the hope that ten or fifteen years of hard, steady, persistent work, will create in that time (by virtue of the superiority of the instruments, the press and the rest of it which we possess) a revolution of opinion as great as that produced at the time of the reformation, in a period which probably was not more than the lifetime of an ordinary man. the organization for such permanent work has hardly begun. the peace societies have done, and are doing, a real service, but it is evident, for the reasons already indicated, that if the great mass are to be affected, instruments of far wider sweep must be used. our great commercial and financial interests, our educational and academic institutions, our industrial organizations, the political bodies, must all be reached. an effort along the right lines has been made thanks to the generosity of a more than ordinarily enlightened conservative capitalist. but the work should be taken up at a hundred points. some able financier should do for the organization of banking--which has really become the industry of finance and credit--the same sort of service that sir charles macara has done for the cotton industry of the world. the international action and co-ordination of trades unions the world over should be made practical and not, in this matter, be allowed to remain a merely platonic aspiration. the greater european universities should possess endowed chairs of the science of international statecraft. while we have chairs to investigate the nature of the relationship of insects, we have none to investigate the nature of the relationship of man in his political grouping. and the occupants of these chairs might change places--that of berlin coming to london or oxford, and that of oxford going to berlin. the english navy league and the german navy league alike tell us that the object of their endeavours is to create an instrument of peace. in that case their efforts should not be confined to increasing the size of the respective arms, but should also be directed to determining how and why and when, and under what conditions, and for what purpose that arm should be used. and that can only be done effectually if the two bodies learn something of the aims and objects of the other. the need for a navy, and the size of the navy, depends upon policy, either our own policy, or the policy of the prospective aggressor; and to know something of that, and its adjustment, is surely an integral part of national defence. if both these navy leagues, in the fifteen or sixteen years during which they have been in existence, had possessed an intelligence committee, each conferring with the other, and spending even a fraction of the money and energy upon disentangling policy that has been spent upon the sheer bull-dog piling up of armaments, in all human possibility, the situation which now confronts us would not exist. then each political party of the respective parliaments might have its accredited delegates in the lobbies of the other: the social democrats might have their permanent delegates in london, in the lobbies of the house of commons; the labour party might have their permanent delegates in the lobbies of the reichstag; and when any anglo-german question arose, those delegates could speak through the mouth of the members of the party to which they were accredited, to the parliament of the other nation. the capitalistic parties could have a like bi-national organisation. "these are wild and foolish suggestions"--that is possible. they have never, however, been discussed with a view to the objects in question. all efforts in this direction have been concentrated upon an attempt to realize mechanically, by some short and royal road, a result far too great and beneficent to be achieved so cheaply. before our conferences, official or unofficial, can have much success, the parties to them must divest their minds of certain illusions which at present dominate them. until that is done, you might as reasonably expect two cannibals to arrive at a workable scheme for consuming one another. the elementary conceptions, the foundations of the thing are unworkable. our statecraft is still founded on a sort of political cannibalism, upon the idea that nations progress by conquering, or dominating one another. so long as that is our conception of the relationship of human groups we shall always stand in danger of collision, and our schemes of association and co-operation will always break down. appendix. many of the points touched upon in the last two chapters are brought out clearly in a recent letter addressed to the press by my friend and colleague mr. a.w. haycock. in this letter to the press he says:-- if you will examine systematically, as i have done, the comments which have appeared in the liberal press, either in the form of leading articles, or in letters from readers, concerning lord roberts' speech, you will find that though it is variously described as "diabolical," "pernicious," "wicked," "inflammatory" and "criminal," the real fundamental assumptions on which the whole speech is based, and which, if correct, justify it, are by implication admitted; at any rate, in not one single case that i can discover are they seriously challenged. now, when you consider this, it is the most serious fact of the whole incident--far more disquieting in reality than the fact of the speech itself, especially when we remember that lord roberts did but adopt and adapt the arguments already used with more sensationalism and less courtesy by mr. winston churchill himself. the protests against lord roberts' speech take the form of denying the intention of germany to attach this country. but how can his critics be any more aware of the intentions of germany-- millions of people acted upon by all sorts of complex political and social forces--than is lord roberts? do we know the intention of england with reference to woman's suffrage or home rule or tariff reform? how, therefore, can we know the intentions of "germany"? lord roberts, with courtesy, in form at least and with the warmest tribute to the "noble and imaginative patriotism" of german policy, assumed that that policy would follow the same general impulse that our own has done in the past, and would necessarily follow it since the relation between military power and national greatness and prosperity was to-day what it always has been. in effect, lord roberts' case amounts to this:-- "we have built up our empire and our trade by virtue of the military power of our state; we exist as a nation, sail the seas, and carry on our trade, by virtue of our predominant strength; as that strength fails we shall do all these things merely on the sufferance of stronger nations, who, when pushed by the needs of an expanding population to do so, will deprive us of the capacity for carrying on those vital functions of life, and transfer the means of so doing to themselves to their very great advantage; we have achieved such transfer to ourselves in the past by force and must expect other nations to try and do the same thing unless we are able to prevent them. it is the inevitable struggles of life to be fought out either by war or armaments." these are not lord roberts' words, but the proposition is the clear underlying assumption of his speech. and his critics do not seriously challenge it. mr. churchill by implication warmly supports it. at glasgow he said: "the whole fortune of our race and empire, the whole treasure accumulated during so many centuries of sacrifice and achievement would perish and be swept utterly away, if our naval supremacy were to be impaired." now why should there be any danger of germany bringing about this catastrophe unless she could profit enormously by so doing? but that implies that a nation does expand by military force, does achieve the best for its people by that means; it does mean that if you are not stronger than your rival, you carry on your trade "on sufferance" and at the appointed hour will have it taken from you by him. and if that assumption--plainly indicated as it is by a liberal minister--is right, who can say that lord roberts' conclusion is not justified? now as to the means of preventing the war. lord roberts' formula is:-- "such a battle front by sea and land that no power or probable combination of powers shall dare to attack us without the certainty of disaster." this, of course, is taken straight from mr. churchill, who, at dundee, told us that "the way to make war impossible is to be so strong as to make victory certain." we have all apparently, liberals and conservatives alike, accepted this "axiom" as self-evident. well, since it is so obvious as all that we may expect the germans to adopt it. at present they are guided by a much more modest principle (enunciated in the preamble of the german navy law); namely, to be sufficiently strong to make it _dangerous_ for your enemy to attack. they must now, according to our "axiom," be so strong as to make our defeat certain. i am quite sure that the big armament people in germany are very grateful for the advice which mr. churchill and lord roberts thus give to the nations of the world, and we may expect to see german armaments so increased as to accord with the new principle. and lord roberts is courageous enough to abide by the conclusion which flows from the fundamental assumption of liberals and conservatives alike, _i.e._, that trade and the means of livelihood can be transferred by force. we have transferred it in the past. "it is excellent policy; it is, or should be, the policy of every nation prepared to play a great part in history." such are lord roberts' actual words. at least, they don't burke the issue. the germans will doubtless note the combination: be so strong as to make victory certain, and strike when you have made it certain, and they will then, in the light of this advice, be able to put the right interpretation upon our endeavours to create a great conscript force and our arrangements, which have been going on for some years, to throw an expeditionary force on to the continent. the outlook is not very pleasant, is it? and yet if you accept the "axiom" that our empire and our trade is dependent upon force and can be advantageously attacked by a stronger power there is no escape from the inevitable struggle--for the other "axiom" that safety can be secured merely by being enormously stronger than your rival is, as soon as it is tested by applying it to the two parties to the conflict--and, of course, one has as much right to apply it as the other--seen to be simply dangerous and muddle-headed rubbish. include the two parties in your "axiom" (as you must) and it becomes impossible of application. now the whole problem sifts finally down to this one question: is the assumption made by lord roberts and implied by mr. churchill concerning the relation of military force to trade and national life well founded? if it is, conflict is inevitable. it is no good crying "panic." if there is this enormous temptation pushing to our national ruin, we ought to be in a panic. and if it is not true? even in that case conflict will equally be inevitable unless we realise its falseness, for a universal false opinion concerning a fact will have the same result in conduct as though the false belief were true. and my point is that those concerned to prevent this conflict seem but mildly interested in examining the foundations of the false beliefs that make conflict inevitable. part of the reluctance to study the subject seems to arise from the fear that if we deny the nonsensical idea that the british empire would instantaneously fall to pieces were the germans to dominate the north sea for hours we should weaken the impulse to defence. that is probably an utterly false idea, but suppose it is true, is the risk of less ardour in defence as great as the risk which comes of having a nation of roberts and churchills on both sides of the frontier? if that happens war becomes not a risk but a certainty. and it is danger of happening. i speak from the standpoint of a somewhat special experience. during the last months i have addressed not scores but many hundreds of meetings on the subject of the very proposition on which lord roberts' speech is based and which i have indicated at the beginning of this letter; i have answered not hundreds but thousands of questions arising out of it. and i think that gives me a somewhat special understanding of the mind of the man in the street. the reason he is subject to panic, and "sees red" and will often accept blindly counsels like those of lord roberts, is that he holds as axioms these primary assumptions to which i have referred, namely, that he carries on his daily life by virtue of military force, and that the means of carrying it on will be taken from him by the first stronger power that rises in the world, and that that power will be pushed to do it by the advantage of such seizure. and these axioms he never finds challenged even by his liberal guides. the issue for those who really desire a better condition is clear. so long as by their silence, or by their indifference to the discussion of the fundamental facts of this problem they create the impression that mr. churchill's axioms are unchallengeable, the panic-mongers will have it all their own way, and our action will be a stimulus to similar action in germany, and that action will again re-act on ours, and so on _ad infinitum._ why is not some concerted effort made to create in both countries the necessary public opinion, by encouraging the study and discussion of the elements of the case, in some such way, for instance, as that adopted by mr. norman angell in his book? one organization due to private munificence has been formed and is doing, within limits, an extraordinarily useful work, but we can only hope to affect policy by a much more general interest--the interest of those of leisure and influence. and that does not seem to be forthcoming. my own work, which has been based quite frankly on mr. angell's book, has convinced me that it embodies just the formula most readily understanded of the people. it constitutes a constructive doctrine of international policy--the only statement i know so definitely applicable to modern conditions. but the old illusions are so entrenched that if any impression is to be made on public opinion generally, effort must be persistent, permanent, and widespread. mere isolated conferences, disconnected from work of a permanent character, are altogether inadequate for the forces that have to be met. what is needed is a permanent and widespread organization embracing trades unions, churches and affiliated bodies, schools and universities, basing its work on some definite doctrine of international policy which can supplant the present conceptions of struggle and chaos. i speak, at least, from the standpoint of experience; in the last resort the hostility, fear and suspicion which from time to time gains currency among the great mass of the people, is due to those elementary misconceptions as to the relation of prosperity, the opportunities of life, to military power. so long as these misconceptions are dominant, nothing is easier than to precipitate panic and bad feeling, and unless we can modify them, we shall in all human probability drift into conflict; and this incident of lord roberts' speech and the comment which it has provoked, show that for some not very well defined reason, liberals, quite as much as conservatives, by implication, accept the axioms upon which it is based, and give but little evidence that they are seriously bestirring themselves to improve that political education upon which according to their creed, progress can alone be made. yours very faithfully, a.w. haycock. american world policies by walter e. weyl author of "the new democracy," etc. new york the macmillan company copyright, , by the macmillan company set up and electrotyped. published february, . the macmillan company new york -- boston -- chicago -- dallas atlanta -- san francisco macmillan & co., limited london -- bombay -- calcutta -- melbourne the macmillan co. of canada, ltd. toronto table of contents part i our idealistic past chapter page i america among the nations . . . . . . . . . . ii the skeleton of war . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii peace without effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv an unripe imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . v facing outward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . part ii the root of imperialism vi the integration of the world . . . . . . . . . vii the root of imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . viii imperialism and war . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix industrial invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . x the revolt against imperialism . . . . . . . . xi the appeal of imperialism . . . . . . . . . . xii the american decision . . . . . . . . . . . . part iii towards economic internationalism xiii natural resources and peace . . . . . . . . . xiv an antidote to imperialism . . . . . . . . . . xv american interests abroad . . . . . . . . . . xvi pacifism static and dynamic . . . . . . . . . xvii towards international government . . . . . . . xviii the freedom of the seas . . . . . . . . . . . xix the higher imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . xx the forces of internationalism . . . . . . . . xxi an immediate programme . . . . . . . . . . . . index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . { } part i our idealistic past american world policies chapter i america among the nations the great war has thrown america back upon itself. it has come as a test and challenge to all our theories. suddenly, yet subtly, it has shaken our optimism and undermined our faith in the peaceful progress of humanity. our isolation is gone, and with it our sense of security and self-direction. americans, who a few days ago would have dared to abolish army and navy as a supreme earnest of good faith, reluctantly agree to arm. "self-defence," they now say, "comes before progress. we must lay aside our hopes of a world at peace and must guard our gates." doubtless there is some exaggeration in our change of mood. men speak as though a miracle had swept away the atlantic ocean, leaving us stranded on europe's western shore. fortunately the ocean, always america's ally, still lies there, narrowed and curbed, yet three thousand miles of storm-swept water. physically and morally, however, our isolation has dwindled. dreadnaughts, submarines and airships can now reach us and our commerce, industry and national ambitions are interwoven with those of europe. we shall never again stand aloof from the world. { } to americans this change has come so suddenly, though it has been long preparing, that we fail to visualise the new situation. we glibly repeat that our isolation is gone, but do not ask ourselves what is the nature of the bond that has ended our isolation. is it amity or enmity? are we to become one of a dozen clutching, struggling, fighting nations, seeking to destroy each other, or are we to contribute to a solution of the problems that now divide nations into warring groups? though our isolation is gone, we still preserve a latitude of action. we may choose between two foreign policies, between nationalistic imperialism and internationalism. we may elect to fight for our share of the world's spoils or to labour, and, if necessary, to fight for a world peace and for just international relations, upon which alone a permanent peace can be based. such a choice involves for americans the main trend of our civilisation; for europe it is hardly less vital. our influence upon europe, like hers upon us, has grown with the shrinking of the earth's surface. our bulk, our resources and our remnant of inaccessibility give us a weight in world affairs far in excess of our military power. we are advancing in population, wealth and general education, and our future progress in these directions is likely to be more rapid than that of western europe. moreover we are the only strong nation not tied up in existing international enmities. our hands are unbound. how we shall act, therefore, whether we shall add to the complications of europe or aid in disentangling them, is a world as well as a national problem. in the main such national determinations are dependent upon great economic forces, acting upon the nation from within and without. these economic forces, however, do not work upon stones but upon those loose bundles of { } instincts, reactions, ideals and prejudices that we call men. we need not dig deep into american history to uncover the human elements that will influence our decision. on the surface of our life appear two strong tendencies pulling in opposite directions. it is easier to describe than to define these tendencies. the first we might perhaps call pacifism, liberalism, humanitarianism, democracy, though none of these words exactly defines the generous, somewhat ineffectual, peace ideal, which has grown up in a democratic people with no hostile neighbours. at this moment by the light of the european camp-fires we are likely to belittle this easy do-nothing idealism. we find our idealists prosaic. they are not gaunt fanatics consumed by their own passion, but hard-working, self-respecting, religiously inclined men, asking good prices and high wages, eating good food, wearing good clothes and perhaps running a ford automobile. to some of these meliorists, europe seems almost as distant as china, but towards the peoples of both places they preserve a vague and benevolent missionary attitude. they want peace with europe and peace for europe, and would even be willing to pay for it, as they pay for relief for belgium and martinique. there is little passion in this good-will but there is even less hypocrisy. one may ridicule this cornfed, tepid idealism, but it is none the less the raw material out of which great national purposes are formed. the present desire of americans for a world peace is no vaguer or more ineffectual than was the seemingly faint sense of the wickedness of slavery, as it existed in our northern states in the days of the missouri compromise. yet out of that undirected, crude and luke-warm emotion, there burst forth within a generation the white-hot flame, which consumed the detested institution and freed the millions of negro slaves. { } but not all americans are idealists even of this commonplace sort. in our ultra-keen capitalistic competition we have evolved an american of different type. self-centred, speculative, narrow, measuring success by the dollars gained and spent, this individualist has a short way with idealisms and larger ends. to him our involuntary _rapprochement_ with europe is an opportunity not for service but for gain. war is good or bad as it is profitable or the reverse. he is a realist, as is the mole, attached to the earth and not worrying about the skies. his ideal is that of a selfish nation dominated by selfish, social classes. here then we have the two americanisms, both of them native and redolent of the soil, both vital and growing. both have appeared in many of our national controversies, in the philippine question, in porto rico, in our relations with mexico. the one is liberal, democratic, often visionary, though confident because many of its visions have come true; the other is concrete, short-sighted, intense but with a low moral sensibility. each appeals to a patriotism formed in the image of the patriot. it is upon this divided america that there comes the sense of the impinging of europe. these men of two opposed types (with innumerable intermediate variations) suddenly perceive that the great war is being fought not only near our shores but even within our borders. they dimly perceive that the war is but an incident in a greater, though less spectacular contest, that it is in reality a phase of a long drawn-out economic struggle in which we too have blindly played our part. to both groups, to all americans, the war comes close. it is being fought with motives like our motives and ideals like our ideals. it is a conflict which proves to us that international peace is still very far from attainment. war on a scale never before known: war--deliberate, organised, scientific--fought { } by combatants and noncombatants alike, reveals itself as one of the central facts of our modern life, a fact not to be ignored or preached or argued away, a fact which for us on this side of the ocean, whatever our instincts and our philosophies, has its deep and permanent significance. our changed relation to this central fact of war constitutes one of the gravest problems that we face to-day. growing up in a peaceful environment we had imbibed the idea that war was a thing alien to us, monarchial, european. we had come to hold that a nation could avoid war by not desiring it, by not preparing for it, by minding its own business. we believed that what share in the world we had and wanted was what every reasonable nation would willingly concede us, and if certain powers proved refractory and unreasonable--a most improbable contingency--we could always send forth our millions of minute men, armed with patriotism and fowling-pieces. with european conflicts we had no concern; we might deplore the senseless brutality of such wars, but need not take part in their conduct or in their prevention. in due course europe would learn from america the lessons of republicanism, federalism and international justice and the happiness and wisdom of an unarmed peace. ourselves unarmed, we could peacefully wrest the weapons from europe's hand. the sheer, unthinking optimism of this earlier american attitude ended abruptly on the outbreak of the present war. it is not surprising that our first reaction towards this war, after its full sweep and destructiveness were visible, was one of fear. if a peaceful nation like belgium could suddenly be overrun and destroyed, it behooved us also to place ourselves on guard, to be ready with men and ships to repel a similarly wanton attack. the result was a demand for preparedness, an instinctive demand, { } not based on any definite conception of a national policy, but intended merely to meet a possible, not clearly foreseen, contingency. the whole preparedness controversy revealed this rootlessness. it was in part at least an acrid discussion between careless optimists and unreasonable scare-mongers, between men who held positions no longer tenable and others who were moving to positions which they could not locate. our ideas were in flux. whether we should arm, against whom we should arm, how we should arm, was decided by the impact of prejudices and shadowy fears against an obstinate and optimistic credulity. nothing was more significant of the externality of these debates than the fact that they seemed to ignore everything that we had cared about before. the case for armament was presented not as a continuation of earlier national policies but as a sort of historical interlude. past interests were forgotten in the insistence upon the immediate. until the war broke in upon us we had been groping, both in foreign and domestic policies, towards certain forms of national expression; arbitration, international justice, democracy, social reform. throughout a century, we had believed that we had blundered towards these goals, and that our history revealed an aspiration approaching fulfilment. we had settled a continent, built an ordered society, and amid a mass of self-created entanglements, were striving to erect a new civilisation upon the basis of a changed economic life. now it was assumed that all this stubbornly contested progress was forever ended by the conflict engulfing the world. this whole idealistic phase of american life was disparaged by our sudden ultra-patriots. these men, with a perhaps unconscious bias, opposed their brand new martial idealism to what they falsely believed was a purely { } materialistic pacifism. actually both advocates and opponents of increased armaments were contending under the stress of a new and bewildering emotion. for decades we had concerned ourselves with our own affairs, undisturbed by events which convulsed europe. but the present war, because of its magnitude and nearness, had set our nerves jangling, excited us morbidly, dulled us to horror and made us oversensitive to dread. we read of slaughter, maiming, rape and translated the facts of belgium and servia into imaginary atrocities committed against ourselves. we wanted to be "doing something." not that we wished war, but rather the chance to rank high according to the standards in vogue at the hour. while hating the war, we had insensibly imbibed the mental quality of the men who were fighting. we were tending to think as though all future history were to be one continuing cataclysm. for the moment, like the rest of the world, we were hypnotised. upon our minds a crude picture had been stamped. we were more conscious of peril than before the war, though the peril was now less. our immediate danger from invasion was smaller than it had been in june, ; yet while we were perhaps foolishly unafraid in , in we trembled hypnotically. it was to this state of the american mind that all sorts of appeals were made. those who wanted universal conscription and the greatest navy in the world argued not only from dread of invaders but from the necessity of a united nation. they wanted "americanism," pure, simple, undiluted, straight. there was to be no hyphen, no cleavage between racial stocks, no line between sections or social classes. america was to be racially, linguistically, sectionally one. it was an ideal, good or bad, according to its { } interpretation. a more definitely integrated america, with a concrete forward-looking internal and foreign policy, could aid disinterestedly in untying the european tangle. in the main, however, the demand for americanism took on an aggressive, jingoistic, red-white-and-blue tinge. out of it arose an exaggerated change of mood toward the "hyphenate," the american of foreign, and especially german, lineage. newspapers teemed with attacks upon this man of divided allegiance. in other ways our agitation for a united america took a reactionary shape. though a pacific nation, we experienced a sudden revulsion against pacifism and hague tribunals, as though it were the pacifists who had brought on the war. contempt was expressed for our industrialism, our many-tongued democracy, our policy of diplomatic independence. those most opposed to prussianism, as it has been defined, were most stubbornly prussian in their proposals. we heard praises of the supreme education of the german barracks, and a clamour arose for universal service, not primarily industrial or educational but military in character. a decaying patriotism of americans was deplored quite in the manner of bernhardi. more than ever there was talk of national honour, prestige, the rights of america. our former attitude of abstention from european disputes was called "provincial," and we were urged to fight for all manner of reasons and causes. even though we cravenly desired peace, we were to have no choice. an impoverished germany, beaten to her knees, was to pay her indemnity by landing an army in new york and holding that city for ransom. around such futilities did many american minds play. all this appeal would have been more convincing had it not been most insistently urged by influential financial groups. the extent of certain financial interests in large { } armaments, in a spirited foreign policy and in other widely advertised new doctrines, was obvious. the war had built up a vast armament industry, war stocks had been widely distributed, and upon the advent of peace these properties would shrink in value unless america made purchases. more important was the complex of financial interests, likely to be created in latin america and elsewhere. speculators were dreaming of great foreign investments for american capital. we were to become a creditor nation, an imperialistic power, exploiting the backward countries of the globe. we were to participate in international loans, more or less forced, and to make money wherever the flag flew. for such a policy there was needed the backing of a patriotic, united, disciplined and armed nation, and to secure such arms, any excuse would suffice. at the most, of course, these financial adventurers were merely leaders in a movement that arose out of the peculiar conditions of the moment. the roots of our sudden desire for armament and for an aggressive foreign policy ran far deeper than the interests of any particular financial group. a sense that american ideals were in peril of being destroyed by a new barbarism impelled us to new efforts. we dimly perceived that we must solve new problems, accept new responsibilities, and acquit ourselves worthily in new crises. the most obvious result of this campaign for preparedness was a largely increased expenditure for armies and navies. its deeper significance, however, lay in the fact that it marked the end of our former theory that war can be ended by precept and example and that no nation need fear war or prepare for war so long as its intentions are good. hereafter the size and character of our national armament was to be determined in relation to the possibility of war with europe and of war in europe. the { } campaign for military preparation is not ended. it will not end until some relation is established between our new armament and the national policy which that armament is to serve. so long as these preparedness debates lasted we believed that the fundamental cleavage in american sentiment was between those who wished to arm and those who did not. yet the proposal to increase the army and navy was defended by men of varying temperaments and opinions, by liberals and conservatives, by workmen and capitalists, by members of peace societies and representatives of the navy league. as the first stage of mere instinctive arming passes, however, it suddenly appears as though the true cleavage in american thought and feeling runs perpendicular to the division between those who favour and those who oppose armament. the real issue is the purpose to which the arms are to be put. we may use our armed strength to secure concessions in china or mexico, to "punish" small nations, to enter the balance of power of europe or to aid in the promotion of international peace. we may use our strength wisely or unwisely, for good or for ill. we began to arm before we knew for what we were arming, before we had a national policy, before we knew what we wanted or how to get it. our problem to-day is to determine upon that policy, to create out of the constituent elements forming american public opinion a national policy, determined by our situation and needs, limited by our power, and in conformity with our ideals. it is the problem of adjusting american policy to the central fact of international conflict and war. as we approach this problem we discover that the two great elements in our population tend to pull in contrary directions. in the question of defence the one instinctively follows the lead of european nations, piling up { } armies and navies and attempting to make us the most formidable power in the world; the second seeks by understandings with other nations to prevent disagreements and to avert wars. the first group emphasises american rights on "land and sea," the property rights of americans, our financial interests in backward countries, and the military force necessary to secure our share; the second thinks of establishing international relations in which such rights may be secured to all nations without the constant threat of force. both of these elements are national in the sense that they desire to preserve the country's interest, but while the first group envisages such interest as separate and distinct from others, to be defended for itself alone as a lawyer defends his client, the other sees the national interest in relation to the interests of other nations and seeks to secure international arrangements by which conflicting claims can be adjusted. the first element lays stress upon the legalistic attitude, upon our honour, our rights, our property; the second is less jingoistic, less aggressive, less jealous in honour. which of these two elements in our population will secure the ascendency and dictate our foreign policy, or which will contribute more largely to the decision, will be determined chiefly by the course of our internal evolution and especially by our economic development. whether we are to go into international affairs to get all we can--concessions, monopolies, profits--will depend upon how great is the internal economic strain pressing us outward, upon whether our conditions are such that the gains from a selfish national aggrandisement will outweigh the large, slow gains of international co-operation. ideals will also count, as will tradition and precedent. even chance enters into the decision. if, for example, by some change in the internal affairs of germany we are thrown into an alliance { } with england, france and russia, a direction will be given to our international policy which it may take years to change. the accident which found admiral dewey in asiatic waters on a certain day in april, , has not been without its influence upon the ensuing foreign policy of the united states. for those who wish to use our armed forces to secure special advantages (trade, monopolies, fields for investment), the road is broad and clearly marked. they have only to do what other aggressive and imperialistic nations have done--prepare the means of fighting and threaten to fight either alone or with allies whenever a favouring opportunity offers. but for those of us who desire to make america an agency in the creation of international peace the problem is infinitely more difficult. peace and internationalism cannot be secured by fervent wishes or piety but only by persistent effort and measureless patience. that for which men have sought in vain during so many centuries will not fall like ripe fruit into our laps. towards this goal of internationalism all that is best in america aspires. the american tradition points towards internationalism. our early settlers, as also many of our later immigrants, came to these shores to escape political and religious warfare, and brought with them a broad humanitarian ideal, an ideal of peace, internationalism, freedom and equality. they also brought an antipathy towards those monarchical and aristocratic institutions, with which in america we still associate conceptions of imperialism and war. the simplicity and inherent equality of our frontier life, its self-government and its local independence, tended to reinforce our leaning towards a peaceful internationalism. our large spaces, our ease of movement, our freedom from the militaristic and excessively nationalistic traditions of the european continent { } influenced us in a like direction, as did also the merging of many peoples into one nation. we were not disillusioned by any conflict with harder-pressed nations, desiring what we had or having what we desired. we believed vaguely in an inevitable beneficent internationalism, which would bring all nations into harmony and banish war from the world. actually our pacifists and internationalists have accomplished little, if anything, towards a realisation of this ideal. what has hampered them, apart from the overwhelming difficulty of the problem, has been the fact that they did not realise how distant was the goal towards which they were marching. their approach to the problem was not realistic. they conceived of the world as a group of nations in all fundamentals like america and of peace as a process by which these other nations would approximate to the united states. the great solvents of war were democracy, education and industrialism. democracy would take from the ruling classes the right to declare wars; education would destroy in the people the last vestiges of bellicosity and international prejudice, while industrialism would in the end overcome militarism, and turn battleships and howitzers into steam-ploughs and electric cranes. the triumphant progress throughout the world of democracy, education and industrialism would speedily bring about peace and a firm internationalism. unfortunately the problem of imperialism and war is far more intricate than this popular theory assumes. all these forces tend perhaps in the general direction of peace but they do not bring about peace automatically and in many cases actually intensify and augment the impulse towards war. our present age of advancing democracy, education and industrialism has been, above all other periods, the age of imperialism, of exaggerated nationalism { } and of colonial wars. democratic peoples have not been cured of nationalistic ambition, and education, in many countries at least, has aided in the creation of an imperialistic and militaristic spirit. even our unguided industrialism has not ended wars or brought their end perceptibly nearer. there is no easy road to internationalism and peace, and those who strive for these ends without understanding the genesis and deep lying causes of war are striving in vain. if in america therefore, we are to contribute to the promotion of internationalism and peace, we must recognise that war is not a mere accident or vagary but a living thing growing out of the deepest roots of our economic life. it is not caused alone by human unreason, by the pride of individuals, the greed of social classes, the prejudices of races and nationalities, but is closely intertwined with those economic ideals upon which the best as well as the worst in our civilisation is reared. we had believed that industrialism and militarism were mutually opposed and that the factory would automatically destroy the army. to-day we see how each of these has entered into the spirit of the other and how each helps the other. the army is industrialised and the national industry is put upon a military, fighting basis. the same forces that impel a nation to develop its trade, increase its output, improve its industrial technique, also impel it to raise large armies and to fight for the things for which men work. to divorce economic ambition from the national aggression that leads to war will not be easy. it is a sobering task which faces those who wish to use america's influence in the cause of peace. whatever our course of action, however, whether we strive for an american imperialism or for internationalism, one thing is certain: it cannot be instinctive, fluctuating, { } undirected. we cannot revolutionise our international relations with each new administration or with each change of the moon. nor can we stay at home and, ignorant of the causes of war, content ourselves with a long-distance preaching of peace to the menaced nations of europe. each of the two courses open to us involves self-direction, valour and strength. if we are to enter upon a struggle for place, power and profits, we must prepare for a dangerous contest: if we are to labour for a new international harmony, for peace and good-will and the delicate adjustments without which these are but words, we shall also need courage--and infinite patience. without knowledge we shall accomplish nothing. to enter upon an international career without a sense of the conditions underlying peace and war, is to walk in darkness along a dangerous path. { } chapter ii the skeleton of war to ascribe world events to the action of a single individual is a naïve yet persistent manner of thought. all over europe men blamed the war upon a wicked kaiser, a swaggering, immature crown prince, a weak-fisted von berchtold, a sinister tisza, a childish poincaré, an unscrupulous sir edward grey, an abysmally astute sasonof. we in america blamed everything on von tirpitz and the irrepressible reventlow. in all countries, millions of men drifted helplessly toward a war, which they believed was due to the evil machinations of a man. so long as the belief holds that one man can set the world on fire, there can be no reasonable theory of war or peace. it is a conception which makes world destiny a plaything, unmotived in any large sense, accidental and incalculable. on the other hand, those who regard war as merely irrational, a general human idiocy, are equally far from any true approach to the problem. we are being deluged to-day with books and newspaper articles describing war as a reversion of mankind to a lower type, a betrayal of reason, a futile, revolting struggle, creating no rights, settling no problems and serving no useful purpose except, in lord salisbury's phrase, "to teach people geography." let us be rational and adult, cry these authors, adjuring an insane world to return to its sanity. no wonder that there is prejudice against this particular variety of abstract pacifism. it is a negative { } doctrine, anæmic and thin-haired, with a touch of gentle intolerance and a patient disregard of facts. it does not recognise the real motives to war, upon which alone a theory of peace may be based. it defeats itself because ultra-rationalistic. for if war, though irrational, has always been, would it not follow that man himself is irrational, that the fighting instinct is deeper than reason, and that to-morrow, as to-day, men will fight for the joy of killing? if this were true, pacifism might as well resign. in truth, this interpretation of war as a mere expression of man's fighting instincts is no more adequate than is the personal devil theory. war has outgrown the fighting instinct. it has become deliberate, businesslike, scientific. it demands sacrifices from those to whom fighting is an abomination. how many red-blooded warriors could the german emperor or the french president have enrolled, had there been no appeal to national interest, duty, justice, indignation? war is won to-day by peace-loving men, who abhor the arms in their hands. the closer we study its motives, incentives and origins, the more deeply do we find the elements of this problem imbedded in the very foundations of national or group life. war depends upon growth in population, emigration, the use of natural resources, agricultural progress, trade development, distribution of wealth, taxation. it is never unrelated to the economic web in which the people live their lives; it is seldom unaffected by the necessity of expanding and the opposition of neighbours, the desire for bread and the longing for luxuries. war and peace are functions of the national life, steps in national progress or retrogression. peace and war are two paths leading often in the same general direction, and whether we may take one path or must take the other is often determined for us long before we reach this parting of the ways. { } at first glance this economic or business side of war is obscured. we find tribes and nations fighting for women and heads and scalps, to please the gods, to destroy sorcerers, to slay heretics, to show prowess, and for other reasons which seem equally remote from an economic motive. a nation will go to war "to save its face," or to annihilate the "hereditary enemy," as well as to improve its position in the world. yet these diverse human motives are related to, though not fully absorbed in, the omnipresent economic motive. the "hereditary enemy" usually is no other than the tribe or nation that blocks our way; the "gods" enjoin war against neighbours who occupy the lands we need or can furnish us tribute; the women, whom we capture, are tame and pleasant beasts of burden, who help to swell our numbers. as for pride and tribal vanity, which so often precipitate war, these are a powerful social bond, which by holding the tribe together permits it to conquer the things it needs. a war for prestige is often a war for economic gain once removed. there remains a residue of martial emotion, not so closely united with the desire for economic gain, but all these derivative motives do not prevent the economic factor from remaining preponderant. remove the economic factors leading to war, give men more than enough, and the chief incentive to war disappears. the modern historical trend has been towards a fuller recognition of the influence of this potent, though often disguised, motive to war. historians are recognising that the mainspring of social action is not an emperor's dream or soldier's ambition, but the demand of vast populations for food, clothing and shelter, then for better food, clothing and shelter, and finally for the rights, privileges and institutions which will make such economic progress assured. ancient war, which seemed so empty and causeless, is now { } revealed as a half-conscious effort of human societies to adjust themselves to changing economic conditions. it is a struggle for bread. indeed, so complete has been this change in our theories that we often exaggerate this economic influence, and speak as though no emotion save hunger impelled humanity. but such exclusion of other motives is not necessary to an economic interpretation. we can emphasise the influence of economic desires, which modern americans and germans share with ancient greeks and babylonians, while still admitting the influence of other factors. race, creed, language, geographical position, increase national friendship or animosity. while these factors influence wars, however, they are less universal, if not less potent than is the economic motive. the significance of this economic motive to war can hardly be overstated. if wars are in the main due to fundamental, economic conflicts, then we cannot end or limit war unless we discover some alternate way to compose such economic differences. we cannot hope that the human race will stop wanting things. men have never lived like the lilies of the field, nor wished to live so. according to our every-day morality, wanting and getting are ethical and wise, and not-wanting is unethical and decivilising. our whole intricate, complex civilisation depends upon the physical well-being and the economic ambition of our populations, and morally, as well as physically, a beggared nation tends to decline. we may trace this degeneration of impoverished groups in some of our mountainous districts, where communities, shut off from the main productive energies of the nation, brutalise and decay. all the conditions of our life impel nations, like individuals, to advance economically, to fructify labour, to gain. if, however, the nation in its struggle for new wealth clashes with other nations, intent also upon gain, if { } these mobilised, economic ambitions necessarily lead to destructive wars, then we must cease declaiming against war's immorality, and seek instead to discover whether economic readjustments cannot circumscribe or even prevent wars. to a modern business man or to a city workman this theory of the economic cause of wars is not unsatisfactory. he may quite properly introduce more idealistic elements, a desire for independence, a love of conquest, the influence of personal prejudices, dynastic affiliations, racial antagonism and religious hatreds, but in the end he will apply to this business of war the same canons of judgment that he applies to his own business. "whom does it pay? what is 'in it' for the nations or for classes or individuals within the nations?" and if you tell him that in the present war servian hatred was intensified because austria discriminated against servian pigs, or that germany was embittered because of russian tariffs and french colonial policies, if you speak to him in these economic terms, you are immediately intelligible. economic motive is one of the obvious facts of life. it is the transcendentalists who interpret war in more idealistic terms. in every country, but especially in germany, there is a whole school of historical and pseudo-historical romanticists, who defend war by elevating it high above the reach of reason. you cannot shake the convictions of such writers by an account of war atrocities, of slaughter, pillage, rape, mutilations and the spitting of infants upon lances, just as you cannot deter murderers by the sight of public executions. all these horrors are but a part of war's terrible fascination. "in war," writes the late professor j. a. cramb, one of the most eloquent of these war mystics, "man values the power which it affords to life of rising above life, the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue the ideal." there is, and can be, { } in his view, no reason for war; war transcends reason. in spite of its unreason, war, which has always governed the world, always ruled the lives of men, always uplifted the strong and deposed the weak, will remain beautifully terrible, immortally young. as in ancient days, in india, babylon, persia, china, hellas and rome, so to-day, men will choose "to die greatly and with a glory that will surpass the glories of the past." men are always greater than the earthly considerations that seem to guide their lives. as patriotism ruled the hosts of rome and carthage, as the ideal of empire drove forth the valorous englishmen who conquered india, so to-day, to-morrow and until the end of time high and noble ideas, far above the comprehension of mere rationalists, will impel men to war, "to die greatly." it may seem importunate to reason with men upon a subject which they include among the mysteries, beyond reason. yet if we analyse the instances, which professor cramb and others cite of wars waged for great ideal purposes, we stumble incontinently upon stark economic motives. carthage and rome did not fight for glory but for food. the prize was the fertile wheat fields of sicily. there was nothing transcendental in the wars between athens and sparta, but a naked conflict for commerce and exploitative dominion. as for the british conquest of india, the "ideal of empire" was perfectly translatable into a very acute desire for trade. we shall make little progress unless we understand this business or economic side of war, for to see war truly we must see it naked. all its romanticism is but the gold lace upon the dress uniform. the idealism of the individual is a mere derivative of those crude appetites of the mass that drive nations into the conflict. wherever we open the book of history, and read of marching and counter-marching, of { } slaughter and rapine, we discover that the tribes, clans, cities or nations engaged in these bloody conflicts were not fighting for nothing, whatever they themselves may have believed, but were impelled in the main by the hope of securing economic goods--food, lands, slaves, trade, money. it is a wide digression from the immediate problems of our closely knit world of to-day to the blind, animal instincts that ruled the destinies of endless successions of hunting tribes, exterminating each other in the savage forest. yet among hunting tribes, at all times, the raw conflict of economic motive, which we find more decently garbed in modern days, appears crude and stark. to kill or starve is the eternal choice. since population increases faster than food, war becomes inevitable, for the tribe that hunts on _our_ land, and eats _our_ food, is our hereditary enemy. to pastoral nations, war is equally necessary, unless babies and old people are to be ruthlessly sacrificed. to fill new mouths larger flocks are necessary, to feed larger flocks new pastures are required; and there is only one way to obtain fresh pastures. there comes a period of drought, and the hunger-maddened nation, accompanied by its flocks, hurls itself suddenly upon feebler agricultural peoples, destroying empires and founding them. these are the great _völkerwanderungen_, the restless migrations of mobile pastoral nations in search of food. it is the eternal bloody quest. nor are agricultural populations immune. not only must they defend their patches of cultivated land, but, as numbers increase, must strike out for new lands. when the growing population makes conditions intolerable, youths are chosen, perhaps by religious rites, to adventure, sword in hand, and carve out new territory or die fighting. there are always more than there is place for, and it is always possible for a young fortinbras to shark up "a list of { } lawless resolutes for food and diet, to some enterprise that hath a stomach in 't." all the interminable battling of the early middle ages reveals this effort of fecund agricultural populations to solve the problem of over-breeding by slaughter. even the crusades partake of this economic character. among the crusaders were exalted souls, who wished to rescue their lord's sepulchre, but there were many more who dreamed of free lands, gold and silver, and the beautiful women of the orient. the religious motive was present; it was strong and intolerant, though it did not in the later crusades prevent christians from attacking christians. at bottom, however, certain strong economic factors forced on the struggle. there had been famine in lorraine and pestilence from flanders to bohemia, and all the discontent, hunger and ambition of western europe answered to urbano's call. "a stream of emigration set towards the east, such as would in modern times flow towards a newly discovered gold-field--a stream carrying in its turbid waters much refuse, tramps and bankrupts, camp-followers and hucksters, fugitive monks and escaped villains, and marked by the same motley grouping, the same fever of life, the same alternations of affluence and beggary, which mark the rush for a gold-field to-day."[ ] not until it was seen that they no longer paid did the crusades end; not heavenly but earthly motives inspired most of these soldiers of christ. it was business, the business of a crudely organised, over-populated, agricultural europe. even with the development of commerce, the motive does not change in character, though its form becomes different. all through history we find maritime cities and states fighting for the control of trade routes, the exploitation of { } markets and peoples, the right to sell goods and keep competitors from selling. athens, venice, genoa, pisa, florence, holland, england--it is all the same story. undoubtedly, with the development of commerce, wealth takes a new form. land is no longer the sole wealth, and successful warriors need no longer be paid in land and live off the land, as they are forced to do in every feudal society. a money economy, a conversion of values into money, changes the technique of war by creating professional mercenary armies. but the business goes on as before. rival groups fight for a monopoly of trade as they once fought for land. there is still not enough to go around, and no way of deciding between rival claimants except by the arbitrament of war. perhaps it will be objected that an analysis of war such as this leaves us merely with the dead body of facts while killing the soul of truth. surely, it may be urged, war is more than a sordid calculation; a roland or bayard does not weigh his danger against booty. of course that is so. economic motive is only the skeleton of war; the flesh and skin are of a totally different texture. idealism, nobility, heroism exist in war, and are no less sincere because based upon the gross facts of economic necessity and desire. without such idealism, manufactured or evolved, you can no more win wars, especially in these latter days, than without ammunition. idealism is a weapon with which we kill our enemies. yet if we read our history rightly, we shall find less of this luminous nobility among warriors than our annalists pretend. the greeks of the trojan war were not patriots but free-booters. those great english sailors, drake, morgan and the rest, who ravaged the caribbean and smashed the spanish sea-power, were pirates, unashamed of their piracy. as for the heroic warriors of the scotch border, would they not to-day be { } jailed as cattle-thieves? look where you will, at the great wars and at the blood-tracked colonising movements of history, and always you will find two kinds of men: the stone-blind idealist, and the crass, open-eyed, fleshly man. one fights for ideals, the other for something else worth fighting for. both, however, are in reality impelled by economic motive, working upon them either directly and consciously, or transmuted into ideals through the medium of a people's thought. nor does this fighting for things, to be obtained only by fighting, involve moral turpitude. nothing could be more grotesque than the moralistic tone in which we industrious moderns lecture the ancient fighting peoples. they did what we do, gained the things they wanted in the only way they could. men will fight or work rather than starve, and whether they fight or work depends upon which, in the given circumstances, is the feasible mode of accumulation. perhaps these peoples loved fighting and praised fighting more than we do. but as fighting was their _métier_ and the measure of their success, their minds, like their muscles, became habituated, and their morality discovered virtue to be the thing at which the moralists were adept. nothing can be wrong that is necessary to survival. warfare is not immoral until there is an alternative. such an alternative might easily have arisen with the vast impetus given to accumulation by the discovery of america and of the new route to the east. but these events not only did not end but actually intensified war, while bringing out more sharply its preponderatingly economic character. for three generations europe was enmeshed in the italian wars, in which great rival nations sought to control italian wealth and the dominion of the mediterranean. there followed the so-called religious { } wars, in which sweden played for control of the baltic, holland for the east indian colonies, and england for trade supremacy, while catholic france, to strengthen her position at the expense of austria, came to the aid of protestant germany. for another century, from the peace of westphalia in to the peace of paris in , there was a succession of commercial wars, in which england wrested from holland and then from france the mastery of the sea as well as the control of asia and america. during all this period the rising commercial classes of england were brutally "upon the make." markets were gained in america and valuable commercial rights obtained from portugal, while in the famous contract, known as the "_assiento_," english merchants secured from spain the lucrative privilege of shipping one hundred and forty-four thousand negro slaves to the spanish colonies of america. of such was the texture of the complex european diplomacy that held the world in war. in all these conflicts there was precious little idealism. the astute councillors of elizabeth, of james, of louis xiv, did not waste their august sovereign's time upon discourses concerning britain's honour and the grandeur of france, but talked trade, privileges, monopolies, colonies to be exploited, money to be made. so too the napoleonic wars, those great conflicts between democracy and absolutism, reveal themselves as a continuation of the commercial wars of the eighteenth century. it was all the same process, the ranging of the nations, as formerly of tribes and of cities, for the conquest, first, of the means to live, and, second, of a preferred economic position in the world. such is the business of war, and it is the oldest business in the world. it is aided by patriotism, prejudice, uncharitableness and a whole calendar of ugly tribal virtues, { } which enjoin us to love the means by which we get and hate the men from whom we take. it is aided by racial scorn, a thing as deep as life, yet subject on the whole to that more impelling factor, economic motive. the history of war and peace is a history of the overriding of sentimental considerations by imperious economic needs. during the revolutionary war, no love was lost between the rigid, race-conscious englishman and the despised red-skin, yet both joined hands to scalp americans in the lonely settlements along our frontier. to-day german and turk, italian and russian, frenchman and senegambian, briton and japanese, love each other at least temporarily because pursuing like interests. not that the influence of race and nationality upon those mutual repulsions which lead to war can be brushed aside in a paragraph. they are potent, modifying factors, with a certain independence of action, and serving, with regard to economic motives, as accelerators, intensifiers or, to change the illustrations, as containers. yet it is no great exaggeration to say that no racial antagonism can wholly sunder allies joined by a vital economic bond, and no racial sympathy firmly unite nations who want one indivisible thing. the "anglo-saxon cousins" now live in concord, but not solely because they are anglo-saxons. as for religious differences, which have in the past so often exacerbated the war spirit, this influence is less than appears. even the godly live on bread and butter. the protestant princes of the reformation hated the scarlet woman because of the real presence, but they also hated her because of the golden stream that flowed from germany to rome. the english reformation had less to do with mistress anne boleyn than with the wealth of the monasteries. especially among modern industrial nations, with their increasing theological { } apathy, are religious differences of relatively small importance in determining wars. it is the economic motive which tells.[ ] considering all these facts of history, so hastily reviewed, considering that in practically all countries and at all times economic impulses have tended to push men into war, is the conclusion forced upon us that we shall have war so long as we have economic desires, and that in the future mankind will continue to drag itself along a blood-stained path? can we change in human nature that desire for material things, which has always been the great survival virtue of the race? to many men the answer points to perpetual war. they believe that nations will fight so long as they are hungry, and they will always be hungry. war and birth are the twin immortals; there will always be more babies than can be fed and there will always be war. as well preach against death as against war, since the peaceful, abstaining nations are doomed to extinction and the war-like nations survive and determine the character of humanity. the meek nations do not inherit the earth. they go down in the ceaseless struggle between the living and the dying peoples. during the last one hundred and fifty years, however, a more optimistic conviction has struggled for expression. the industrial revolution has enormously increased the wealth of the world, and has enabled over-populated industrial countries to secure their food from agricultural { } lands thousands of miles away. there has grown up a vast complementary trade between old and new countries, and even competing manufacturing nations find it profitable to trade with one other. the hope has therefore arisen that perhaps this war-breeding, economic motive may hereafter lead to peace and away from war. admitted that peoples once had to fight, may it not in this new world of industry be "good business" to live and let live, to agree with your competitor, to trade amicably? may not the industrial transformations, undreamed of in past centuries, permit a world-population to live off its labour, immune from the necessity of killing? have we not here an alternative to war? the doctrine is that of _laissez-faire_, untrammelled competition, free trade. from adam smith down to the present day, it has been preached to us that each man's enlightened selfishness, unguided and unimpeded, will work out to the welfare of each society and to peace between all societies. the interests of nations in trade is held to be reciprocal. buyer and seller both gain, so that england cannot prosper unless germany prospers, and england cannot suffer without germany suffering. you need not fight for commerce. trade does not follow the flag but the line of greatest mutual advantage, as was shown, it is claimed, when britain after losing political control of america doubled her commerce with america. it does not pay to fight for colonies, since colonials if left alone will buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. with nothing to fight for, peace and prosperity will come with free trade, which the nations will adopt as soon as they perceive their own interests. there is no economic reason for warfare, which like other superstitions will vanish as men emerge from the darkness of ignorance. it is a pacifying theory, and yet something seems wrong { } with it. the optimistic forecasts have been belied; the nations have not acclaimed free trade, but rear tariff walls higher than ever. nor do the nations abjure colonial expansion, but fight for colonies and "spheres of influence" and lands for "peaceful penetration," as tribes once fought for pastures, and cities for trade-routes. the national spirit, instead of succumbing to an era of peaceful individualism and cosmopolitanism, is stronger and more embittered than ever. armaments pile up. colonial disputes become more acrid, international jealousies more acute, until in the end we are cast into the pit of the long-dreaded world war. we do not know that this is the last world war. we are not sure that the same inveterate, millennium-old struggle for food, the same bitter "business" which has always meant war, is yet finished and done for. even if war does not cease, however, may we not at least be exempt from the scourge on this safe side of the broad atlantic? though it rains outside, may we not keep dry beneath our big umbrella? we americans are accustomed to think of ourselves as a peace-loving, unaggressive people, envying no nation its dominion or wealth, and incurring the enmity of no nation. let the peoples of europe destroy themselves in ceaseless, insane conflicts, but let us, by keeping to our side of the ocean, save ourselves from slaughter as lot was saved from the fate of gomorrah. it is not a noble caution that thus disregards the fate of the world and seeks only the national safety. nor is it in truth a wise caution. those who are too circumspect incur the greatest danger, and those who trust to their own unoffending reckon on a doubtful factor. why should we alone, among the nations be exempt from economic forces, which drive peace-loving nations into war? have we by our rapid expansion, to say nothing of our monroe declaration and other pretensions, failed to give offence in a world, { } in which mere having is aggression and mere growing a menace? has our peace in the past been due to our own meekness and unaggressiveness, or has it been the gift of a fortunate economic condition, which may pass? before we rely upon the continuance of a peace of mere isolation, we shall do well to inquire into the economic conditions which so long gave us peace. [ ] ernest barker. crusades. encyclopedia britannica, eleventh edition, vol. vii, p. . [ ] for a sketch of the economic influences bearing upon war, see the brilliant essay of prof. edward van dyke robinson, "war and economics in history and theory," _political science quarterly_, vol. xv, pp. - . reproduced in "sociology and social progress," compiled by prof. thomas nixon carver ( ), pp. - . in the present chapter i have borrowed extensively from professor robinson's essay. { } chapter iii peace without effort to the average american of a few years ago the maintenance of peace seemed as natural and easy as breathing. except for our brief and episodical conflict with spain we had had no war with a european power for a hundred years and we saw no reason why we should go to war in any of the coming centuries. peace was merely an abstention from war, a not doing something, which we had no desire to do. we had no reason to provoke war, no foreign nation had a legitimate grievance against us. in any case we were inherently different from europe. we were peaceful while europe was war-like. so long as we tended to our own affairs---and that was our intention--peace was assured. believing thus in our intrinsic peacefulness, it was in no spirit of humility that we met the outbreak of the great war. we did not put ourselves in the place of the fighting nations, and acknowledge that in their circumstances we too might have been struggling in the dust. rather we boasted of our restraining democracy, and of our perfect co-operative union, which protected us from the european anarchy. we, a people unassailed, talked loudly of our superior merit, and, as we looked over the broad oceans and saw no enemy, thanked god that he had not made us as other nations. our compassion for the peoples of europe was tinged with a bland, self-righteous arrogance. it is not pleasant to-day to read the homilies which { } america, during those early months of the war, preached to unheeding europe. throughout runs a note of subdued self-exaltation. we, the americans, so ran the boast, are not ruled by kaiser or czar, and cannot be stampeded into war against our will. we do not extend our national territory by force. of all nations we are the one that has best compounded economic differences and best dissolved racial hatreds. we live in amity with all the world, and with piety preach our lessons to the war-mad races. how fundamentally insolent, though well-intentioned, was this message of one of our leading citizens to germany. "the american people cry with one voice to the german people, like ezekiel to the house of israel: 'turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die?'" even in our churches we made the same unconscious boast. on sunday, october , , at the request of the president of the united states, millions of americans went down on their knees, and prayed god no longer to scourge the peoples of europe. it was a sincere prayer, evoked by real compassion. yet nothing could more clearly have revealed our moral detachment, our obliviousness to the fact that the passions which brought forth this war were human, not european passions. we, the virtuous, interceded for the vicious; our prayer was "deliver them from evil." with malice toward none, with charity towards all, envying no nation its treasures, content to enjoy in peace what god had given us, america folded its hands in prayer. to a sceptical european, accustomed to the cant of international protestations, this boasted peacefulness of ours seems suspicious. "have you," he might ask, "always been peaceful? did you not fight england, mexico and spain? have you not taken advantage of your neighbours' necessities?" such a european might not regard { } americans as a nation, divinely appointed to bring peace to a world rent by war. he might not acknowledge that we are more law-abiding than other peoples, freer from race hatreds, gentler towards the unfortunates of our own race. he might point to our lynchings and riots; to our unpunished murders of chinese, italians and mexicans; to the system of repression, by which the southern whites terrorized the freedmen after the civil war. if europe did not solve the balkan problem in peace, did americans end slavery without resort to arms? we may not like these imputations, but it would be hard to deny that in certain national crises we have not been impossibly virtuous. we have not always subordinated our national interests to the ideal of setting a righteous example. what we wanted and could get we got, whether it was florida, texas, california or panama. we were not above the twisting or even the breaking of a treaty, we did not discourage filibustering expeditions too rigorously, and we were never, never meek. thus in , to take a single example, we addressed to spain a polite communication in which we asserted that "the united states can as little compound with impotence as with perfidy, and that spain must immediately make her election, either to place (an adequate) force in florida or cede to the united states a province, of which she retains nothing but the nominal possession." many of our communications to mexico, chile, spain, and even england were equally arrogant. the truth is that our peace has been a peace of circumstances, due to a favouring geographical and economic situation. our peacefulness came down to us like our rivers, farms and cities, a heritage of exceptional conditions. we were inaccessible to european armies. we were supreme on a fertile, sparsely settled continent. we could afford peace. our resources were immensely great and if { } we did not reach out for more, it was because we already had as much as we could handle. what we did need we could take from weak peoples, and a nation which fights weak peoples need not be martial, just as a man who robs orphans need not be a thug. it might have been different. had our westward progress been opposed by millions of indians, had france been able to resist our march beyond the appalachians, or mexico stood like a disciplined germany between us and the westward ocean, we should have developed a military civilisation. as our growing population pressed upon our narrow frontiers, we should have had our war scares, our border conflicts, our national hatreds, our huge standing army, and the whole paraphernalia of militarism. still another element, besides our geographical isolation and our economic self-sufficiency, contributed to our intactness and security and permitted us to indulge in the luxury of pacifism. europe protected us from europe. we were one and the european powers many. so delicate was the balance that the european nations could not hazard a really serious trans-atlantic venture. they had little to gain and much to lose by fighting us, as we had nothing to gain by fighting them. our interest in such european affairs as the independence of greece, hungary and poland was purely sentimental. towards europe we were peaceful as we were peaceful towards mars. true, our safe orators delighted in twisting the lion's tail and upbraiding the czar of all the russias. during the eighty-three years between and , however, we were never at war with a european nation. it was not that we loved europe too well. england we detested and hardly a decade passed without some acrid boundary dispute. we thought her arrogant, greedy, supercilious, and she thought us arrogant, greedy and { } coarse. millions of irish immigrants intensified this animosity and our national vanity did the rest. but though we hated england she was too formidable to be attacked. therefore we bluffed and she bluffed, and in the end we compromised. with other countries it was still easier to keep at peace. prussia, austria and the smaller german states were too distant to affect our interests. for russia we had a vague attachment, and except on one occasion, she never threatened our ambitions. with france we were on good terms except during our civil war. we disliked spain and despised her, but events prevented our going to war with her. it was because it paid that we kept at peace; any other policy would have been wasteful, even suicidal. our future depended upon our ability to keep out of war. a sparse population on the edge of a vast continent, our hope of national success lay in an isolation, which would give us strength for future struggles. our mission was to settle the empty lands to the west before other nations could pre-empt them. to embroil ourselves with strong powers was to court disaster, while even to interest ourselves in european politics would divert our mind from our own imperative task. our first american foreign policy, therefore was disentanglement. we often speak as though america passively abstained from entering european politics. we were, however, already a part of the unsteady balance of power, and warring france and england sought our aid, much as the two coalitions might seek the aid of a bulgaria, not loving her but needing her help. it was a bold and above all a positive policy that washington established when he broke the french treaty and declared our neutrality. though denounced as dishonourable, this policy was { } essential to our welfare and peace, for the country was more dangerously divided in than in . how intimately our peace has depended upon our economic development is revealed by the early failure of this policy of disentanglement. prior to our immediate economic interests overhung our territory and transcended our sovereignty. all europe being at war, we were the neutral carriers of the world. our ships brought merchandise to france from her colonies and allies, and goods from the west indies and south america to all parts of europe. in the decade ending our foreign trade, which was dependent upon the indulgence of europe, more than quadrupled. the profits on our carrying trade were immense. our shipbuilding industry increased, and not only were orders filled for our own foreign trade but many ships were manufactured for export. the prices of agricultural products almost doubled and our meat, flour, cotton and wool found a ready market in europe. our prosperity depended upon this newly created foreign trade. sail-makers, ship-builders, draymen, farmers, merchants were dependent upon a trade which menaced the commercial supremacy of great britain and upon which even france looked with jealous apprehension. it was this conflict of our interests with those of a stronger nation that brought on the bitter controversies with great britain, and resulted in the tedious war of . we were more dependent upon europe than europe upon us, as was shown by the fiasco of our embargo policy. england, determined to kill our commerce, would have fought many years to accomplish this purpose. but it did not prove necessary. our commercial progress, that had been merely an incident in a european war, lessened after the peace. for us this was fortunate. our future lay in our own continent, and not on the high sea where as { } a relatively weak nation, we should have been forced to compete with the world and war continually with england. to-day, one hundred years later we are still pacific, because of the direction taken by our economic development since . while we developed agriculture, constructed turnpikes, canals and railroads, manufactured for the home market, and filled up the country from the appalachians to the pacific, our american-borne commerce and our shipbuilding declined; by , our american tonnage in foreign trade was less than in . but the profits of this carrying trade were no longer necessary, since in exchange for our imports from europe we could now export cotton. we were no longer competitors with europe, but had become contributors to european prosperity. prior to england looked upon us as a commercial rival; after we became the unconscious economic allies of all the industrial nations. the extent to which our economic system had become complementary to the european economic system is illustrated by a study of the statistics of our foreign commerce. of our exports one-half was raw cotton, and upon a steady supply of this fibre a great european industry depended. later we shipped huge quantities of food which was also needed by the manufacturers across the sea. as our cotton area extended, as our wheat and meat exports increased, european, and especially british, industry profited. at the same time, despite our high tariffs we furnished an increasing market for wares manufactured in europe, while our own manufactures did not largely compete in the world markets. moreover the rapid development of our internal resources furnished lucrative investment opportunities to european capital. a source of raw material, a market for manufactured products, a field for profitable investment, { } america was europe's back-yard, an economic colony, though politically independent. in the midst of this almost colonial development, there occurred one startling interlude. about we developed a new type of sailing vessel, the american clipper ship. soon we had control of the china trade and by our shipping (including domestic trade and the fisheries) about equalled that of great britain. after the civil war, however, our chance of competing with great britain either in ship-building or carrying disappeared. the iron steamship had arrived, and, in the manufacture of such vessels, we were no match for the english. even without the civil war we should have been beaten; the southern privateers, outfitted in english ports, merely hastened an inevitable decay. we were not yet to enter upon a competition with england for commercial supremacy. there being thus no economic basis for war our outstanding questions with european nations, and with england especially, were peacefully settled. the canadian fisheries and the maine boundary dispute gave rise to much bitter feeling but were not worth a war. even the monroe doctrine did not bring on a clash. though great britain hated its assumptions she was content with its practical workings. what the united states gained was immunity from the settlement of latin america by powerful military nations; what england gained was a profitable trade (denied her by spain) together with opportunities for investing capital. the immediate force behind the monroe doctrine was the self-interest and naval power of a nation, which did not recognise the doctrine. our westward expansion, which obliterated boundaries and overran the possessions of other powers, also failed to bring war with europe. doubtless this expansion was not { } entirely welcome to france, england and spain. but just as napoleon, though dreaming of a french empire on our western border, had been compelled to sell us louisiana to prevent its falling into british hands, so later england resigned herself to our almost instinctive growth. it was believed in the forties that england not only wished to prevent our acquiring california but desired the territory for herself, and it was known that her interests in oregon were in the sharpest conflict with american claims. england would also have preferred that texas remain politically independent of the united states and commercially dependent upon herself. fortunately for us, however, an aggressive colonial policy, such as that which during the last forty years has partitioned africa, was not yet popular in europe. england was thinking in terms of free trade and commercial expansion, of a world rather than a colonial market. at bottom, moreover, this american expansion was to the relative advantage of europe. when spain was cajoled and worried into selling florida; when texas, and later california, arizona and new mexico were taken from a nation too weak almost to feel resentment, the result was a better use of the territory and a greater production of the things which europe needed. if europe was not to control these regions, it was at least better for her to have them pass to us rather than remain with mexico. so long as we held politically aloof, sold europe cotton and wheat, bought from her manufactured products and gave her the chance to invest in our railroads, so long as we did not compete on the sea or in the world markets, europe, though she envied us our easy expansion, had no interest in opposing it by war. england would possibly have fought us had we taken nicaragua and almost certainly had we taken canada, but she was less concerned about the fate of mexico, the chief victim of our expansion. { } this complementary relation of ours with european nations was as useful to us as to them. besides furnishing us with necessary capital europe sent us immigrants, who made our march across the continent rapid and irresistible. in the end this immigrant population contributed to our peaceful attitude. as the number of our alien stocks increased, the desirability of going to war with any european nation diminished. to get the immigrant's vote, we spoke highly, and in the end almost thought highly, of the nations from which they had come. by admitting the children of europe we had given hostages to peace. in the main, however, we paid no attention to europe. we forgot about her. lost in contemplation of our own limitless future, we turned our eyes westward towards our ever receding frontier. in foreign, as in home relations, we developed a frontier mind, and even to-day, long after our last frontier has been reached, we are still thinking of europe, as of so many of our internal problems, in terms of this great colonising adventure. the individualist, who pushed his way across the continent, left on america the impress of a simple philosophy, a belief that there was a chance for all, that it was better to work than to fight, that arbitration and the splitting of the difference were the best policy. to the average american, with his frontier mind, wars seemed unnecessary, and all the class distinctions, inseparable from militarism, a mere frippery. wars, he held, are for the crowded old peoples of europe, with their dynastic superstitions, their cheating diplomacy, their ancient rancours, their millions of paupered subjects, condemned to a life of subordination. wars are not for the free and equal americans who live in the wide spaces of a continent and, having no neighbours, hate no man and fear no man. it is out of this frontier mind that we have evolved our { } present american notion of war and foreign policy. peace is common sense; war, foolishness, a superstition like the belief in kings, emperors and potentates, a calamity caused by the refusal of the petty european nations to join into one great united states. for it must be remembered that americans, whatever their sentimental attachments, are really more contemptuous than are germans of little nations that insist upon surviving. we ridicule the european customs barriers, which the express train strikes every few hours, and associate national greatness with territorial size. even great britain, france, germany and austria are ignorantly regarded as "little nations," which would be all the better for a wholesome amalgamation. the frontier mind believes stubbornly that short of such a union, these "little" peoples should develop their own resources in peace. in other words, our attitude towards europe, which is a result of our elbow room and our economic self-sufficiency, is vaguely missionary, with not the slightest tinge of hypocrisy. we have no concern with europe and no duty to interfere, beyond expressing our belief in our own superior institutions and the hope that europe will learn by our example. the development of our manufacturing industries, until recently at least, did not alter these views concerning our proper attitude to europe. the new industries, chiefly designed for a home market, made on the whole for peace. nor did we need a foreign outlet for capital. no one wished to go to war for the dubious privilege of investing in peru or china when our own iron mills, cotton factories and railroads were clamouring for capital, to say nothing of our farmers in oklahoma and the dakotas. psychologically, also, this self-poised industrialism, this domestic stay-at-home business of ours, which prevailed until a few decades ago, worked powerfully for peace. { } we became a highly individualistic manufacturing nation, composed of millions of self-seeking, money-making men. as "business men" we hated wars as we hated strikes and whatever else "interfered with business." our ideal was a strenuous life of acquisition, in which dollars were added to dollars, and the prosperity of all depended upon the bank account of each. wars were like earthquakes and other interruptions of the ordained process of accumulation; you could no more win a war than you could win an earthquake. america's manifest destiny was to multiply and increase. we were to mind our own business and live in peace with neighbours, whom we did not know and rather despised. since everything worth exploiting was in our own country, since europe left us alone and had nothing that we were willing to fight for, we were free to ignore all foreign relations. the diplomacy which accompanied and aided this development, though not heroic, was at least successful. it enabled us to grow strong and hold strong enemies away. not always consistent, not always able, not always honest, our diplomacy maintained a certain unity, kept us aloof from european quarrels, guarded us from threatened intervention during the civil war crisis, warned europe against the conquest of latin america, and above all--permitted us to grow. from to our population increased from eight to seventy-two millions, while that of the united kingdom increased only from some twenty to forty-one millions and that of france from twenty-nine to thirty-nine millions. our wealth increased at a more rapid rate than that of any other nation. small wonder that in the last decades of this period our diplomacy sank to the lowest level of incapacity. having grown strong without europe's aid or hindrance, having reached that pleasant degree of independence in which { } diplomacy seemed a mere international formality, we came to believe that the best diplomacy was none at all. we did not require in our ambassadors knowledge or astuteness; any fool would do. our diplomats were often despised, but since we were not dependent upon europe's favour, it did not matter. economic forces, stronger than the diplomats of all the world, were making for peace between america and europe. but even while we were sending political adventurers to some of the great capitals of europe, a change was impending. all at once the united states found itself at war with a european power, and, a few months later, in surprised, not to say embarrassed, possession of tropical asiatic islands. suddenly we discovered that we were feared and disliked; that there were points of controversy between us and various european countries; that europe somehow did not regard the monroe doctrine as a divine dispensation, which it would be impious to oppose. we heard talk of international competition, world power, "the american menace." beneath the surface there appeared indications that our long mutuality of economic interest with europe was no longer complete. the easy instinctive peace which had enabled us to attain our ends without considering europe seemed about to end. { } chapter iv an unripe imperialism it was in the year that the united states made its earliest plunge into imperialism. then for the first time we secured "dominions beyond the sea"; dominions too thickly populated to be adapted for purposes of colonisation. by our earlier conquests and purchases (louisiana, florida, texas, california, new mexico), we had secured relatively empty territories which a flow of emigrants from our eastern states could rapidly americanise. but in porto rico, the philippines and hawaii, there was neither prospect nor intention of colonising. the impulse that led to their taking was the desire to possess their wealth, to rule and "civilise" them, and above all not "to haul down the flag." it was an impulse not very different from that which led to the european partition of africa.[ ] the change in our policy was startling. we had seemed, after the civil war, to have reached a stage of satiety, to be through with expansion. henceforth the ocean was to be our boundary; we were not, like the slave-owners before the war, to scheme for new lands in central { } america and the caribbean. when in russia offered us a territory almost three times as large as germany for a sum about equal to the value of the equitable building, we accepted only to oblige russia and because we believed that we were in honour bound to buy. we refused to purchase st. thomas and st. johns, although denmark offered to sell cheap, and we declined to annex san domingo or to entertain sweden's proposal to purchase her west indian possessions. again in , instead of annexing hawaii, we vainly sought to bolster up the sovereignty of a native queen. then suddenly porto rico, the philippines and guam were annexed; hawaii was incorporated and samoa was divided up with germany. in part this change in foreign policy was due to military considerations. the possession of hawaii, panama and guantanamo in cuba was obviously necessary for the defence of our coasts. just as the monroe doctrine was intended to protect us from the approach of great military powers, so these new acquisitions were desired to pre-empt near-lying bases, from which, in enemy possession fleets might assail our trade or cut off our communications.[ ] such strategic considerations, however, do not explain the whole of our new imperialistic policy. economic motives played their part. we changed our foreign policy because at the same time we were undergoing a commercial and industrial revolution. as a result of this industrial change our merchants had begun to think in terms of foreign markets and our financiers in terms of foreign investments. we had passed { } through the stage in which our industrial life was completely self-sufficing. we were becoming a manufacturing nation, requiring markets for the disposal of surplus products. we were, it appeared, being drawn into a great international competition, in which markets in china, south america and backward countries were the prizes. simultaneously our foreign commerce had changed. our growing population had made increasing demands upon our food products, leaving less to be exported, and at the same time our exports of manufactures had increased. in we exported manufactures (ready for consumption) to the value of ninety-three millions of dollars; in to the value of two hundred and twenty-three millions. other industrial factors tended also to bring about a change in our national ideals. we were beginning to believe in the economic efficiency of trust organisation, and our industry, conducted on a larger scale, was being increasingly concentrated. a new class was in financial control of our great industries. the trust magnate, the new conductor of vast industrial enterprises, was looking forward toward a strong unified banking control over industries and a definite expansion of american trade in foreign countries. american capitalists were beginning to believe that their economic needs were the same as those of the european capitalists, who were enticing their nations into imperialism. psychologically, also, we were ripe for any imperialistic venture, for we enormously exaggerated the progress we had made towards industrialisation, and were thinking in terms of europe. we suddenly believed that we too were over-filled with capital and compelled to find an outlet for investments and trade. innumerable editorials appeared, presenting the arguments for imperialism that had been { } urged ad nauseam in europe. we could not resist, it was argued, the ubiquitous economic tendency toward expansion. in all countries, including america, capital was to become congested. an over-saving of capital, invested in manufacturing plants, produced far in excess of the possible consumption of the people. we had reached a stage of chronic over-production, in which increased saving and increased investment of capital would permanently outstrip consumption. everywhere wealth was being heaped up; the savings-banks overflowed; the rate of interest fell and capital sought desperately for new investments. the capitalist system must either expand or burst. certain superficial developments in the united states formed the groundwork of these gloomy prophecies. we had just passed through a commercial depression, during which prices and interest rates fell and great numbers of workers were left unemployed. these facts were exploited by political leaders and industrial magnates, who thought in terms of the subordination of american foreign policy to the needs of big business. it is not surprising therefore that they became infected with the new imperialism, which in europe had been growing steadily for over fifteen years, and that they came to the conclusion that america could not hold hands off while the markets and investment fields of the world were divided up among her rivals. "the united states," wrote charles a. conant, one of the intellectual leaders of this movement (in ), "cannot afford to adhere to a policy of isolation while other nations are reaching out for the command of new markets. the united states are still large users of foreign capital, but american investors are not willing to see the return upon their investments reduced to the european level. interest rates have greatly declined here within the last { } five years. new markets and new opportunities for investment must be found if surplus capital is to be profitably employed." like so many of the pamphleteers of , mr. conant was convinced that imperialism offered the only cure "for the enormous congestion of capital." no civilised state, he contended, would accept the doctrine that saving should be abandoned. and while human desires were expansible, he doubted whether the demand for goods could possibly increase with sufficient rapidity to absorb the new productive capacities of the nation. "there has never been a time," he writes, "when the proportion of capital to be absorbed has been so great in proportion to possible new demands. means for building more bicycle factories than are needed, and for laying more electric railways than are able to pay dividends, have been taken out of current savings within the last few years, without producing any marked effect upon their amount and without doing more, at the most, than to stay the downward course of the rate of interest." it therefore follows conclusively that the american conquest of markets and fields for investment must go on. the method of such a conquest is of little importance. "in pointing out," he says, "the necessity that the united states shall enter upon a broad national policy, it need not be determined in just what manner that policy shall be worked out. whether the united states shall actually acquire territorial possessions, shall set up captain generalships and garrisons, whether they shall adopt the middle ground of protecting sovereignties nominally independent, or whether they shall content themselves with naval stations and diplomatic representations as the basis for asserting their rights to the free commerce of the east, is a matter of detail." { } i have quoted mr. conant at length because he is so largely typical of the state of mind of the american plutocracy in the year . it would have been easily possible, however, to have presented any amount of confirmatory material of exactly the same nature. an article by w. dodsworth in the october, number of the _nineteenth century_ is along the same lines. here again we read of an unprecedented industrial revolution during the preceding half century and a vast increase in foreign trade and accumulated wealth. again we read of the falling rate of interest and of the failure of trusts and combines to resist the outside pressure of necessitous capital, seeking to force its way into industries. it was held quite impossible for consumption to absorb the products of an over-fertile industry. "i am no pessimist," writes mr. dodsworth, "but i cannot conceal my deep conviction that, if this relief is not forthcoming, a stage of grave industrial collapse, attended with the agitation of equally grave political issues, becomes only too probable, and the energies of our seventy-five millions of producers may have to be restrained until we learn to appreciate the penalty of our neglect of foreign enterprise." such were the arguments with which in the united states plunged into imperialism. we were to break out of the narrow circle which confined our economic life to become the work-shop of the world as england had once been, to export and export and ever increasingly export until all the nations should be our debtors. our capital, like our wares, was to go to all countries. it flattered our pride when, a few years later, europe trembled at the spectre of an american commercial invasion and even england wondered whether she could withstand the flood of cheap manufactured american goods, dumped on her { } shores. we pictured a vastly increasing trade with our new colonial possessions and with china; we envisaged opportunities, not only of an immense american investment, but of an even greater american trade. what we believed of ourselves, europe only too credulously believed of us. leading european economists and publicists were completely convinced that the united states was irrevocably embarked on "the sea of imperialism." "the recent entrance of the powerful and progressive nation of the united states of america upon imperialism," wrote prof. john a. hobson in , "... not only adds a new formidable competitor for trade and territory, but changes and complicates the issue. as the focus of political attention and activity shifts more to the pacific states, and the commercial aspirations of america are more and more set upon trade with the pacific islands and the asiatic coast, the same forces which are driving european states along the path of territorial expansion seem likely to act upon the united states."[ ] professor hobson and other foreign observers believed that our great trusts, which were being formed with reckless suddenness, would enormously increase the capital seeking an outlet, and that new imperialistic ventures would result. "cuba, the philippines, hawaii," he insisted, "are but the _hors d'oeuvre_ to whet an appetite for an ampler banquet."[ ] this development toward a congestion of capital, though confidently anticipated both in the united states and in europe, did not take place. about the end of the century an enormous extension of the general field for foreign investment raised interest rates all over the world. the demand for capital grew with astonishing rapidity. in { } part this was due to british, french and german foreign investments, but it was also the result of a quickened economic tempo in all countries. new industries were created, wages rose (though in most countries not so rapidly as prices) and the outlets for the supposed superfluous capital were greater than ever. especially in the united states was the development contrary to that which had been anticipated. capital was not rendered idle because of any slackening in the nation's consuming capacity, for the men of average and small income were able to purchase more than ever before. the farmers alone, whose property increased in value from twenty and a half billions of dollars in to forty-one billions in (an increase of over per cent. as compared with less than per cent. in the previous decade) added stupendously to a new demand for goods of all sorts. of automobiles, unknown in , there are in almost three millions. innumerable other industries arose and expanded; the anticipated arrest of accumulation did not occur. the result of this economic development soon made itself apparent. we discovered, fortunately for us, that we were not at this time to become the work-shop of the world. we could not continue to produce articles cheaper than england or germany, and undersell these countries in their home markets. we discovered that our own country still furnished an admirable field for investment. while our foreign commerce increased, it continued to form only a small part of our whole trade. so long as vast new opportunities for the investment of capital in the united states presented themselves, we ceased to worry about foreign or colonial outlets, and for every dollar of american money invested in porto rico and the philippines, hundreds of dollars were invested in the states. our capital { } though accumulating at an ever-increasing rate, did not equal the demand.[ ] in other words, the conditions in america did not yet warrant an imperialistic policy. we were economically younger than we had thought; more elastic, with greater capacity for internal growth. as a result of this discovery, our sudden enthusiasm for dominions beyond the seas died down. we were disgusted and bored by the philippine war; we hated the rôle of oppressors, in which we unwillingly found ourselves. we hated the water cure, punitive expeditions, and the endless controversies over the status of filipinos under american law. the anti-imperialistic elements in america, men whose interests did not lie in foreign trade and speculation, stolidly opposed the retention of the islands. had the election of been fought upon this single issue it would probably have been won by the anti-imperialists. even though we kept the islands, we set definite limitations to our imperialistic ventures. we secured for the philippines an administration which prevented the exploitation of the natives and the importation of chinese labour. we set our faces against any policy of sacrificing the interests of the indigenous population to the interests of american financiers. and to-day, could we do it with due regard to the interests of the filipinos, we would retire from the archipelago. as we look over this experiment, we cannot help recognising that it was a precocious, an unripe imperialism. for us it was too early to secure asiatic islands; too early { } to worry about american investments in foreign lands. it was an imperialism carried out somnambulistically. our taking the philippines was an accident, unforeseen and undesired.[ ] our hope of being the work-shop and banking centre of the world, of being the heart of a great empire like that of britain, and of doing all this within a short period, was a dream, which vanished with the new demands made upon american capital by an increasing economic expansion. the truth is that this unripe imperialism did not represent the interests of the majority nor even of any considerable group of our capital owners. it was doomed to disappearance once the revival of american industry offered opportunities, not only for the ordinary capitalist, but for that more speculative investor, who in other countries clamours for imperialism. the experiment revealed, however, that the same forces which act upon capital in europe act also upon capital in america, and that the united states, given the right conditions, is liable to the same ambitions as are imperialistic countries and is as likely to engage in war to satisfy these ambitions. the imperialistic trend acts upon all nations at a given stage in their economic development. it cannot be stopped by traditions of peacefulness or by mere protestations, however sincere. it is a part of the great economic strife, out of which devastating wars arise. [ ] "early in the year , a foreign ambassador at washington remarked in the course of a conversation that, although he had been in america only a short time, he had seen two different countries, the united states before the war with spain, and the united states since the war with spain. this was a picturesque way of expressing the truth, now generally accepted, that the war of was a turning point in the history of the american republic."--"the united states as a world power," by archibald gary coolidge. new york, . [ ] for a study of these strategic considerations see "the interest of america in sea power, present and future," by captain (later rear-admiral) a. t. mahan, a series of articles written between and . boston, . [ ] john a. hobson, "imperialism," p. . london, . [ ] _op. cit._, p. . [ ] in , twenty-six years after the cession of the islands our combined import to and export from the philippines amounted to only $ , , , or less than / of our entire foreign commerce. our commerce with china, which was to have been opened by our possession of the philippines was less than one-half of that with brazil and less than one-twelfth of that with great britain. [ ] "at the beginning of the war (with spain) there was perhaps not a soul in the whole republic who so much as thought of the possibility of this nation becoming a sovereign power in the orient."--"world politics," by prof. paul i. reinsch, new york, , p. . { } chapter v facing outward while the imperialistic venture of was premature and did not lead, as had been expected, to a conscious participation of america in the international scramble for colonies, it affected our national thinking and forced us to re-consider the position of america in relation to the ambitions and plans of other great nations. our acquisition of new dependencies led us to recognise that we were at last a world power, with the responsibilities of a world power. we were obliged to learn from england and other imperialistic nations the lessons of colonial administration. year by year we were drawn into closer relations with the west indies and the caribbean countries, and were compelled to assume financial control of hayti and san domingo in the interest both of foreign capital and of the countries themselves. the completion of the panama canal increased our sense of international danger and international responsibility. finally the revolution in mexico proved to us that whatever our positive action we could not remain passive. our monroe doctrine also, which had always seemed our charter of independence of europe, forces us in the end to come to an understanding with europe. we had set our faces against european conquest in the americas, and therefore against any punitive expedition, likely to lead to permanent occupation. but if we protected hayti and san domingo from europe, we assumed a certain { } responsibility for the actions of these countries. in the existing state of international law, a nation assumes the right to protect its citizens from spoliation and to compel debtor countries to meet their obligations. in this right to collect debts by force of arms, which has been the excuse for innumerable imperialistic extensions, all the great creditor nations are interested. had the united states refused to intervene in san domingo, while forbidding the great powers to secure redress by threats, we might possibly have been forced to fight against overwhelming odds in defence of a people and cause, for which we had little sympathy. by its very prohibitions the monroe doctrine compels us increasingly to intervene between the weaker latin-american countries and the warlike creditor nations of europe. the gradual extension of the doctrine, moreover, vastly increases our possible area of friction with europe. originally planned to prevent european nations from conquering parts of the americas, the doctrine has now been extended to forbid foreign corporations subsidised or controlled by an old world government to acquire any land in the americas which might menace the safety or communications of the united states. our action in mexico indicates that we are determined not only to prevent europe from introducing monarchical institutions into american countries, but to insist that those countries themselves adhere to the outward forms of popular government. secretary olney was speaking no doubt largely for home consumption when he declared that "the united states is practical sovereign on this continent (hemisphere), and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interpretation." nevertheless the extension of control either by the united states or some group of powers is almost inevitable, and with the widening of the monroe { } doctrine, as a result of closer relations between latin america and the old world, the necessity for some arrangement between the united states and the great european powers becomes increasingly obvious. our possession of hawaii and the philippines acts in the same manner. in a military sense the philippines are indefensible; we cannot secure them against a near-lying military power. nor can we in the present stage of national feeling permit them to be conquered. consequently we watch the actions of japan with quite different feelings than if we had not given her provocation and a bait. the building of the panama canal equally increases our international liabilities. it contributes a vast new importance to the caribbean sea and adds a new weak point to american territory. having built and fortified the canal, we are compelled to think of ways and means of defending it, of armies, navies, _ententes_ and alliances. while all these factors, however, have contributed to our changed point of view, it was the world war which most completely revealed to americans the necessity of accommodating our national development to that of other countries. the war proved that we were in a military sense vulnerable; that undisciplined citizen soldiery was no match for trained armies; that mere distance is no complete safety, and that the initial advantage, which accrues to the prepared nation is out of all proportion more valuable than later victories. the war showed that unarmed neutrality and a mere lack of hostile intention does not always save a nation from invasion. moreover, we discovered that our interests were affected favourably or adversely by a conflict, in which we had no direct part. we, who had always conceived ourselves as a supremely disinterested nation, a remote island in the blue sea, began { } to ask whether it was to our advantage to have france defeated, belgium destroyed, germany crushed, the british empire disintegrated. we began to ask how our national interest was affected by the international competition for colonies, by the freedom or unfreedom of the seas, by the extension of the right of blockade, by the abrogation of established laws of warfare; and what the effect upon us would be of an economic alliance against germany by the allied western powers. in other words, we discovered a real national interest in international arrangements created by the war or to be established after the war. our first preoccupation was naturally one of defence. we looked outward, but only saw armed nations ready to seize upon our wealth and territory. responsible authors predicted that the victor in this war would at his leisure move across the ocean and despoil the united states. from ponderous puerilities of this sort to the lurid descriptions of massacre and pillage, vouchsafed us by magazine and moving picture writers, was a short step. more serious arguments prevailed, and in the end a large addition was made to our military and naval forces. but the whole campaign was based solely upon the theory of defence, and the theory so formulated, was merely a continuation of the policy of isolation. it involved the idea that we were to act alone and protect ourselves alone against all nations. it did not concern itself with our national aims. it was not based upon a definition of our relations to europe and to the several nations of europe. as our preparations increase, however, and as we realise how insufficient our force must be against a european coalition, we shall be faced with the alternative of entering into agreements or alliances (to make our defence real) or into some other policy, which might make defence unnecessary. in either case we must face outward, must { } look at the world as it is and is to be, and define our relation to europe. we must substitute a positive for a negative policy. this we are forced to do even though we may have no immediate friction points with europe. the economic interpenetration of all nations involves us in conflicts of interest and adjustments, which require a positive national policy. it is our economic development that most strongly pushes us in this direction. we are gradually destroying the complementary industrial system which formerly held us to europe; we are competing with european countries for world markets and have even begun to compete for investment opportunities in backward countries. we are exporting manufactures, and this exportation is likely to increase. of the six chief requisites of a great manufacturing nation--coal, iron, copper, wood, cotton and wool--we are the greatest single producer of all except the last, and to this advantage of cheap raw materials, there is added an efficient manufacturing organisation and a large manufacturing capital. from to that capital increased six and a half fold (from . to . billions of dollars). it is therefore no wonder that we are exporting tools, sewing-machines, locomotives, typewriters, automobiles and electrical apparatus. these products compete increasingly with similar products from england and germany and invade the markets which europe desires for herself. our total exports to latin america, for example, have almost quadrupled in twenty-two years, increasing from millions of dollars in to millions in . the significance of this competition, as it exists to-day and will exist to-morrow, is greater for europe than for us. our fundamental welfare does not absolutely depend { } upon this exportation; we could lose a part of this trade, as we lost our shipping, without fatal results, for we should still have our cotton and many half-finished products to exchange for our imports. were great britain, however, to lose her markets for manufactured goods, she would shrink into insignificance, if she did not literally starve. in the united kingdom spent $ , , , on imported foods, drink and tobacco, and for this, as for her importation of raw materials, she must pay. while our export of manufactures still forms but a trifling part (perhaps one thirtieth) of our total product, the british and the german export constitutes an immensely larger proportion. our export of finished wares, despite its rapid increase, was in only some seven dollars per capita, while that of the united kingdom was about forty-five dollars per capita.[ ] it will therefore not be wondered at if our increasing export of manufactures both to europe and to the countries to which europe exports, causes us to be involved, as we have not been for over a century, in the ambitions, conflicts and life-interests of the great european nations. for at bottom a commercial war is an industrial war, a struggle for national prosperity. if, for example, germany fails to hold her foreign markets, she must shut down factories. her industrial problem is to buy raw materials from abroad cheap, ship to germany, manufacture into finished products, transport to a country { } willing to buy, and from this enterprise secure profits enough to purchase food for her people. if she is beaten out, let us say, in the export cotton industry she must turn to something else. she may try to save the industry by increasing efficiency or reducing wages, but if she fails, she must close up some of her mills. if she cannot employ the growing masses who depend upon export industries, she must let her surplus people--and with them a part of her capital--emigrate. like other european countries she has learned this lesson by experience. thus it often happened when america increased her tariff rates that european factories, unable to compete, migrated, men and capital, to this country. it is true that the world market constantly expands, but the producing capacity of the manufacturing nations also increases, and competition becomes ever more severe. the more rapidly america invades the markets which europe has hitherto held, the more she squeezes them, the more bitter the feeling against her will become. that bitterness of feeling (in the conditions preceding the present war) was more likely to arise in germany than in england and more likely in england than in france. we have spoken of these as rival nations, but there are intensities of rivalry varying in proportion to the similarity of products and of methods of production. germany, like the united states, is a new-comer in international industry, pushing and aggressive. more scientific and better organised than we, she possesses far more meagre resources. we both have trusts or cartels, and both manufacture huge quantities of cheap, standardised products. our competition therefore is of the keenest, and is likely to grow more intense, if, as seems likely, germany recovers from the effects of this war. less keen is our competition with great britain. like an old firm, grown { } rich and conservative, great britain is not pushing, not scientific, not well organised. we are gaining on her in those branches of manufacture which permit standardisation and production in huge quantities, and have no hope, and but little wish, of competing in articles of high finish and therefore high labour cost. with france we compete still less, since much of her export trade is in articles of taste and luxury, in which we are hopelessly inferior.[ ] in this battle for the world market, the united states has the disadvantage of coming late and of being intellectually unprepared. on the other hand, not only have we superior natural resources, but also the advantage that to us success is not vital. whatever trade we gain is a mere improvement of a situation already good. we are playing "on velvet." finally, like germany, we have the advantage of large scale production by strong corporations working with what is practically a bounty upon exports. because of their control of a protected home market, our great corporations can make their sales at home cover all initial and constant costs, and as these costs need not be applied to exports, are able to sell goods cheaper in rio janeiro or lima than in chicago or new york. they are able to "dump" their surplus goods.[ ] the opening of the panama canal cannot but increase the competition of the united states especially with the nations bordering on the pacific ocean. from - to - the average annual exports from the united states to these pacific countries (mexico, central america and columbia, the remaining west coast of { } south america, china, japan, the philippines and british australasia) increased from . millions to . millions, a growth of . per cent., while the export from germany increased . per cent. and from the united kingdom only . per cent. in the same period our average annual imports from these countries increased . per cent. (as compared with . per cent. for germany and . per cent. for the united kingdom).[ ] the trade with these pacific countries lies largely with the united kingdom, the united states and germany (in the order named) and the united states seems to be slowly moving forward to first place.[ ] what progress the united states has made, moreover, has been achieved under certain great disabilities which the panama canal removes. "by present all-sea routes new york is, in general, at a disadvantage compared with liverpool."[ ] new york by the suez route is days further away from australasia (for ten knot vessels) than is liverpool; by the panama route new york is from to days nearer. for points on the west coast of north and south america, new york is one and a half days nearer than is liverpool by the all-sea route and about eleven days nearer by the panama route. when all the conditions of distance, speed, cost of coal, tolls, etc., are considered, it is found that the panama canal gives in many parts of the world an advantage to new york over liverpool, antwerp and hamburg. the result is an impulse towards a keener american competition in the pacific trade. if our foreign commerce was gaining before the war, it has made even greater progress since the outbreak of { } hostilities. while germany's foreign commerce has been temporarily destroyed and that of great britain has been hampered by the war, our total commerce has immensely increased. in the year we exported over a billion dollars in excess of our exports of , our exports in the latter year exceeding those of the united kingdom or of any other country in any year of its history.[ ] this development, it is true, was abnormal and consisted partly in increases in prices and temporary deflections in trade. nevertheless, while many american industries, especially those engaged in the manufacture of war munitions, will suffer severely at the end of the war, and while our export of such commodities will dwindle, the war cannot but result in a relative advantage to american manufacturers of export commodities. moreover, the war by destroying established connections between neutral countries and their natural purveyors of manufactured goods in europe has opened the way to a future extension of american export. like a protective tariff, it gives an initial advantage to americans, and helps them to overcome the early handicaps. it induces american manufacturers to think in terms of foreign markets instead of concentrating their attention upon a protected home market. in the beginning, it is true, the buying capacity of certain countries, such as those of south america, was diminished by the shattering of financial arrangements with europe. but such a condition is purely temporary. there will always be a demand for { } the wheat, corn, meats, hides and wool of argentine, for the copper and nitrates of chile, for the coffee and rubber of brazil, for the wool of uruguay, for the sugar and cotton of peru, for the tin of bolivia, for the beef and tagua nuts of venezuela and colombia. so long as they sell raw materials, these countries will furnish a demand for finished products. american manufacturers are to-day determined to secure an increased share of this expanding market.[ ] they are slowly learning that you cannot push your goods, in south america let us say, unless you learn to pack your goods, have studied local requirements, are willing to print catalogues in spanish and portuguese, and have your salesmen know these languages. in the past americans have been hampered by their unwillingness or inability to extend long credits, but this drawback is being removed by the improvement of banking facilities. the government, moreover, now seeks actively to promote american trade with foreign countries, and especially with latin america. a new merchant marine is expected to give additional facilities to american exporters and enable them to meet their british and german competitors on more nearly equal terms. moreover, the united states is learning that in the export trade co-operation is desirable, and the { } federal trade commission seems about to grant permission to manufacturers to combine for the conduct of business in foreign countries.[ ] all this does not mean that american manufacturers are completely to displace their european competitors in south america and other markets. competition after the war will be severe, and whatever the course of wages and employment in europe, a measure of success for industrial countries like great britain, germany and belgium is absolutely essential to the maintenance of their populations. desperate efforts will be made by these nations to re-establish their foreign business. a great part of south america is as near to london and rotterdam as to new york, and much of the trade and of its future increase will revert to europe. in the years to come, however, more than in the present or past, the united states will be a formidable competitor for the world-markets, and will incur enmity and jealousy in the attempt to maintain and improve its position. { } a similar development is taking place in the field of investment. in former years, british, french, dutch, belgian and german financiers were requested, indeed begged, to invest their surplus capital in american enterprises. to these financiers we went cap in hand, and they did not lend their money cheaply. the complementary relation between lending europe and borrowing america was productive of the friendship of mutual benefit. to-day we are still a debtor nation, but only in the sense that the great financier is a debtor. we ourselves have a large capital, and in the main go to europe merely for the sale of safer and less remunerative bonds, while the common stock of new enterprises is likely to remain in america. or we graciously "let europe in on a good thing," conferring, not asking, a favour. in the meantime, we are paying off our indebtedness as is indicated by the balance of trade, which since has almost invariably been strongly in our favour.[ ] the war has still further reduced our foreign obligations. during the two years ending june , our excess of exports over imports was over three and one-quarter billions of dollars. moreover, in we did not incur, as ordinarily, a large debt as a result of the expenditures of americans in europe. the result of this development has been twofold; a considerable transfer of european holdings of american securities to americans, and the direct loan of american capital to europe. while it is impossible to quote exact figures, the american debt to europe can hardly have been reduced during the two years ending august , , by less than two to { } two and a half billions, or perhaps a third, or even a half, of our former debt to europe.[ ] in the meantime the united states though still a debtor nation has also become a creditor nation. just as germany, before the war, borrowed from france and loaned to bulgaria and turkey, so the united states, while still owing europe, invested in mexico, canada and south america. it is probable that by considerably over one and a quarter billion dollars of american capital was invested in canada, mexico, cuba and the republics of { } central and south america, not including the capital represented by the panama canal.[ ] even to-day (nov. , ) there is still a probable excess of our debts over our credits with foreign nations of at least two billions of dollars. in comparison with our total wealth, however (estimated by the census of at billions and since then largely increased), this indebtedness seems comparatively small. the national income is rapidly expanding and as the chance to secure exceptionally large profits in railroad and industrial enterprises diminishes there is an increased temptation for surplus capital to flow abroad. whether or not we shall again have recourse to the fund of european capital in developing our immense resources, it is hardly to be doubted that we shall increasingly invest in foreign countries, and especially in mexico, and elsewhere in the americas.[ ] such a development is entirely legitimate and within bounds desirable both for the united states and to the countries to which our capital (and trade) will go. the possible field of investment in latin america and the orient, to say nothing of other regions, is still immensely great, and as capital develops these areas their { } international trade will also grow. there is no reason why the united states should not take its part both in the investment of capital and the development of trade with these non-industrial countries. as we so invest and trade, however, we must recognise the direction in which our policy is leading us and the dangers, both from within and without, that we are liable to incur. the more we invest the more we shall come into competition with the investing nations of europe. we are already urged to put capital into south america on the just plea that trade follows investment, and the same forces that are pushing our trade outward will seek opportunities for investment in the mines and railroads of the politically backward countries. like european nations, we too shall seek for valuable concessions, and may be tempted (and herein lies the danger) to use political pressure to secure investment opportunities. what happened in morocco, persia, egypt, where the financial interests of rival nations brought them to the verge of war, may occur in mexico, venezuela or colombia, and the united states may be one of the parties involved. we seem thus to be entering upon an economic competition not entirely unlike that which existed between germany and england. we too have gone over to a policy of extending our foreign markets and of protecting our foreign investments. more and more we shall be interested in politically and industrially backward countries, to which we shall sell and in which we shall invest. inevitably we shall face outwards. we shall not be permitted by our own financiers, manufacturers and merchants, to say nothing of those of europe, to hold completely aloof. we have seen, even in the present mexican crisis, how american investment tended to precipitate a conflict. we have learned the same lesson from england, { } france and germany. as we expand both industrially and financially beyond our political borders we are placed in new, difficult and complicated international relations, and are forced to determine for ourselves the rôle that america must play in this great development. we can no longer stand aside and do nothing, for that is the worst and most dangerous of policies. we must either plunge into national competitive imperialism, with all its profits and dangers, following our financiers wherever they lead, or must seek out some method by which the economic needs and desires of rival industrial nations may be compromised and appeased, so that foreign trade may go on and capital develop backward lands without the interested nations flying at each other's throat. isolation, aloofness, a hermit life among the nations is no longer safe or possible. whatever our decision the united states must face the new problem that presents itself, the problem of the economic expansion of the industrial nations throughout the world. [ ] this comparison is not exact, since the british statistics include articles under manufactures which we do not include, and exclude articles which we include. i cite these figures merely to show that there is a vast difference in the relative importance to the united kingdom and the united states of their export of manufactures, but not to show exactly what that difference is. similarly the comparison above between the total product of american manufacturing and our export of manufactures is approximate. [ ] see an analysis--let us say of argentine trade. [ ] on the other hand the very extension of our home market tends to make us negligent of foreign exports of manufactures and to consider the profits from this business as a mere by-product. a large and successful foreign market can be maintained only by careful study and continuous work. [ ] hutchinson (lincoln), "the panama canal and international trade competition," p. _et seq._ new york, . [ ] despite the fact that as yet the _absolute_ increase is greater in the british than in the american trade with these countries. [ ] hutchinson (lincoln), _op. cit._ [ ] from to our exports of merchandise increased from to millions of dollars (an increase of per cent.) and our balance of exports over imports rose from to millions (an increase of per cent.). monthly summary of foreign commerce of the united states, june, . (corrected to aug. , , subject to revision.) [ ] "in spite of inexperience, crude methods, lack of banks and of ships we have made notable gains in south american trade. there seems to be no reason to question the probability of a continued rapid increase during the next few years.... the process of building and making more efficient our own manufacturing plants has been carried far, so that we are prepared, in the opinion of competent judges, to proceed more rapidly than ever with the production of goods for foreign markets."--william h. lough, "banking opportunities in south america," bureau of foreign and domestic commerce (dept. of commerce), special agents series no. , washington, , p. . [ ] in a recent address (see date) to the american iron and steel industry, mr. edwin w. hurley, vice-chairman of the federal trade commission, points out how during the last quarter of a century the germans have co-ordinated their foreign trade, with the result that of the steel business per cent. has been brought under a single control. the effect has been a victory for the german over the british export business. mr. hurley states that while a constructive programme has been worked out by the interstate commerce commission for the railroads, and co-operation among the farmers has been stimulated by the department of agriculture, the manufacturing industries concerned in the export trade are hampered by provisions of the anti-trust law. "is it reasonable to suppose," he asks, "that congress meant to obstruct the development of our foreign commerce by forbidding the use in export trade of methods of organisation which do not operate to the prejudice of the american public, are lawful in the countries where the trade is to be carried on, and are necessary if americans are to meet competitors there on equal terms?"--new york _evening sun_, june , . [ ] in the last forty years the balance has been against us in only three years, , and . the real balance is not nearly so great as the apparent balance, but there can be little doubt that it represents a considerable repayment of the principal of our great debt to europe. [ ] according to w. z. ripley the american debt to europe amounted in to $ , , , of which $ , , , was owed to england, $ , , to holland, $ , , to germany, $ , , to switzerland, $ , , to france, and $ , , to the rest of europe. after there was a reduction in the amount of european holdings of american securities (mostly railroad bonds and stocks), but since there was again an increased purchase, so that by the american debt to europe was considerably greater than it had been in . see new york _journal of commerce_, dec. , . also, hobson, c. k., "the export of capital." new york, , p. - . according to a compilation made by president l. f. loree of the delaware and hudson railroad, the american railroad securities formerly held in foreign hands but which were absorbed by the american market during the eighteen months ending july , , amounted to $ , , , par value and to $ , , market value. the railroad securities remaining abroad (july , ), amounted to $ , , , par value with a market value of $ , , , . in other words according to these statistics of returned securities (which mr. loree believes are largely underestimated) about per cent. (market value) of the railroad securities held abroad on january , , had been returned eighteen months later. (new york _times_, sept. , .) the new york _times_ states that "it is high banking opinion that at the outbreak of the war, the total of industrial securities held abroad amounted to about per cent. of the railroad securities, and that the liquidation of industrials since has been in about the same proportion to the total as the liquidation of rails." on this basis the foreign holdings of american railroad and industrial securities on july , , would have amounted to only $ , , , (market value). [ ] for data used as the basis of this estimate, see hobson, c. k., "export of capital" (p. and following), together with sources there cited. [ ] "the adoption of the federal reserve system has ... released and made available for other forms of financing great sums which were formerly tied up in scattered reserves. we have only to look at the monetary history of the german empire during the last forty years to see how powerful an influence on industry, trade, and investment is exerted by the centralisation and control of bank reserves. the london _statist_ has calculated the ultimate increased lending power of american banks, under the federal reserve system, at $ , , , ."--lough, _op. cit._, p. . { } part ii the root of imperialism chapter vi the integration of the world for decades, the foreign and domestic policies of the united states were determined by our ambition to subdue and people a wilderness. our immediate profit, our ultimate destiny, our ideals of liberty, democracy and world influence, were all involved in this one effort. to us the problem was one of national growth. to-day we are beginning to realise that this western movement of ours affected all industrial nations, and was only a part of a vaster world movement--an economic revolution, which has been developing for more than a century. that revolution is the opening up of distant agricultural lands and the binding of agricultural and industrial nations into one great economic union. it is a world integration. to this world development the crude physical hunger of the western populations has contributed. the urbane chinese official, who voices the sentiments of mr. lowes dickinson, attributes europe's solicitous interference in china to the fact that the western world cannot live alone. "economically," he says, "your (western) society is so constituted that it is constantly on the verge of starvation. you cannot produce what you need to consume, nor consume what you need to produce. it is matter of life and death to you to find markets in which you may dispose of your manufactures, and from which you may derive your food and raw material. such a { } market china is, or might be; and the opening of this market is in fact the motive, thinly disguised, of all your dealings with us in recent years. the justice and morality of such a policy i do not propose to discuss. it is, in fact, the product of sheer material necessity, and upon such a ground it is idle to dispute."[ ] necessity is a large and a vague word; it may mean any degree of compulsion or freedom. yet the chinese official is right when he emphasises the immensity of the economic forces driving the western nations outward. not adventure, ambition or religious propagandism will account for the full momentum of this movement. back of the missionaries, traders, soldiers, financiers, diplomats, who are opening up "backward" countries stand hundreds of millions of people, whose primary daily needs make them unconscious imperialists. at the bottom this outward driving force is the breeding impulse, the growth of population. in , one hundred and twenty-two millions of people lived in western europe, whereas in the population was two hundred and forty millions,[ ] and the rate of increase is still rapid. the population has doubled; the area has remained the same. the new millions cannot be fed or clothed according to their present standard of living unless food and raw materials come from abroad. they depend for their existence on outside agricultural countries. this increase of european population, moreover, has been a net increase, after emigration has been deducted. { } although during the last century tens of millions of immigrants have gone from western europe to the united states, canada, brazil and the argentine; the home population has increased by over one hundred and seventeen millions and is to-day increasing by twenty millions a decade.[ ] for all of these twenty millions no sufficient outlet can be found either in old or in new lands. the problem, therefore, is not to find homes for them abroad but to secure their existence at home. and this existence can only be secured by raising the necessary food in distant agricultural countries and by turning over a large part of western europe to manufacturing and commercial enterprises. colonisation, imperialism, the opening up of new agricultural countries, is therefore the other side of industrialism. the present revolution in the world to-day is thus in a real sense a sequel to the industrial revolution, which gave birth to our modern industry. that imposing industry depends upon non-industrial populations, who produce food, cotton, wood and copper, and exchange them for manufactured goods. since the people who fashion and transport products must be fed by those who raise them, agricultural production must be stimulated at home and abroad. the nation must expand economically. this expansion, which is broader than what is usually called imperialism, is not a merely political process. it takes small account of national boundaries, but develops farming wherever possible. the movement is vast and intricate: commerce { } between industry and agriculture is carried to the outermost parts of the earth; africa is divided up, colonies, dependencies and protectorates are acquired; agriculture is promoted in politically independent countries, and an internal colonisation, a colonisation within one's own country, occurs simultaneously. in australia, the canadian west, in argentine, in siberia settlers lay virgin fields under the plough, and the new lands are bound commercially to the great complex of western industrial nations. they are also bound psychologically. as the machine which conquered the nation now conquers the world, so the spirit of manchester and london and of pittsburgh and new york rules ancient peoples, breaking up their rigid civilisations, as it rules naked savages in the congo forests. it is a materialistic, rationalistic, machine-worshipping spirit. the unconscious christian missionaries to china, who teach the natives not to smoke opium and not to bind the feet of their women, are unwittingly introducing conceptions of life, as hostile to traditional christianity as to confucianism or buddhism. they are teaching the gospel of steam, the eternal verities of mechanics, and the true doctrine of pounds, shillings and pence. feudalism, conservatism, family piety, are dissolved; and, as the conquering mobile civilisations impinge upon quiescent peoples, new ambitions and desires are created among populations hitherto content to live as their forefathers lived. these desires are the inlet of the restless discontent which we call european civilisation. when the ancient peoples, civilised or not, desire guns, whiskey, cotton goods, watches and lamps, their dependence upon western civilisation is assured. bound to the industrial nations, they toil in mines or on tropical plantations that they may buy the goods they have learned to want, and that europe may live. { } in this cosmopolitan division of labour, which destroys the old economic self-sufficiency of nations, england took the lead. a hundred years ago, when the british agriculturist sold his produce to the british manufacturer in return for finished wares, and foreign commerce was insignificant, the population was limited by the food it could produce. every increase in the number of englishmen meant recourse to less fertile fields, an increase in rents, a lowering of wages and a resultant pauperism. the hideous distress during the napoleonic wars and after was largely due to an excessive population striving to live upon narrow agricultural resources. the alternative presented was to stop bearing children or find food abroad; stagnation or industrialism. if england (with wales) could in barely support twelve millions, how could she maintain thirty-six millions in ? only by going over to free trade, by raising her food and raw materials in countries where land was cheap, and employing her people in converting these into finished products. to-day three live in england better than one lived before; on the other hand, a large part of the food supply is raised abroad. had great britain literally become "the workshop of the world," manufacturing for sixteen hundred million inhabitants, there would have been no limit to her possible increase in population. no such national monopoly, however, was possible, or from a world point of view desirable. belgium, france, germany and later other thickly populated countries were also faced with the choice between stagnation and industrialism, and as english machines, english industrial methods and english factory organisation could be imported, these nations, one after another, went over to manufacturing, ceased to export food and { } began to import both food and raw materials, competing with great britain for industrial supremacy. these competing industrial nations had a great common interest, to increase the total food and raw materials to be bought and therefore the manufactured products to be sold. the greater the development of foreign agriculture the better for industry in all these nations. to secure this agricultural base abroad, the nation was not compelled to establish its own colonies, for belgium and holland could buy food and raw materials even if the congo and java were nonexistent. as a consumer it made little difference to england whether she got her wheat from russia or india, or her sugar from germany or mauritius, so long as the supply was plentiful, cheap and constant. actually a large part of the food supply came from politically independent countries, the united states alone increasing its food exports from fifty-one millions of dollars in to five hundred and forty-five millions in , and its cotton in equal ratio. but as american economic development proves, it is difficult to maintain this common agricultural base. the agricultural nation, in the temperate zone, grows in population, converts itself into an industrial community, and not only consumes its own food and raw materials but draws upon the common agricultural fund of the older industrial nations. to-day the united states is rapidly lessening its food exports, is increasing its imports of sugar, coffee, tea, fish, and other foods, and is thus forcing industrial europe to find a new agricultural base. this conversion of agricultural into semi-industrial nations proceeds rapidly. switzerland, austria, italy, japan, even russia, increase their manufacturing, and intensify the demand for the world's supply of raw materials. it is a normal and in present circumstances an inevitable { } process. when, however, the exportable supply of food and raw material of an agricultural country dwindles, a new equilibrium must be established. new states, territories, colonies, hitherto exporting but little agricultural produce, are opened and their production stimulated. from russia, the danube valley, canada, australia, brazil, argentine and many parts of africa, new supplies of raw material are secured. fresh sources are also discovered for the production of fodder, flax, cotton, wool and ores. it is an equilibrium, forever destroyed and forever re-established, between an increasing number of industrial nations with increasing populations and new agricultural bases, upon which the superstructure of the world's export industry is reared. it is not, however, by the sale of present manufactured goods alone that the industrial nations can secure their foreign food. one may own abroad as well as earn abroad. an englishman with a thousand acres in north dakota or alberta may export the wheat that he raises exactly as though the farm were in devon. if he owns shares in the pennsylvania railroad, he may with his dividends purchase wheat, which he may ship to his own country without exporting commodities in return. the true economic dominion of england extends wherever englishmen hold property. subject to the laws of the land where the property is held, this ownership gives the same claim to the product of industry as does an investment at home. as we read the imperialistic literature of to-day, we discover that the chief emphasis is laid on the great value of new countries as a field for this sort of profitable investment. investment, not commerce, is the decisive factor, and money is to be made out of opportunities to build railroads, open mines, construct harbours and irrigate arid districts. the diamond mines of the transvaal were more { } attractive to the english than the chance to trade, and what was of immediate value in morocco were the iron mines and future railways and not the right to sell tallow candles to the berbers. in large part this foreign investment of capital has the effect of broadening the agricultural base. while to the individual investor, capital export means getting eight per cent. instead of four, and to the promoter, a chance to make a few hundred thousand dollars or pounds, to the industrial nation it means that a fund is created which will help pay for a steady flow of agricultural products and raw materials. to the whole complex of industrial nations and to the world at large it means even more. the export of capital increases the capacity of the agricultural nation to serve as a feeder to all industrial peoples. it provides cheap transportation and improved agricultural machinery. had great britain not invested in american railways during the fifties the united states would have exported less food to europe in the seventies. freight rates dropped and the industrial nations were flooded with cheap wheat. british capital in american railways aided british manufacturing more than if the same capital had been placed at home. to-day for the same reason the process continues elsewhere. in russia, south east europe, canada, australia, south america, asia and africa, capital, furnished by the industrial countries, is increasing the production and exportation of food and of raw materials, and is thus indirectly promoting the industry of western europe.[ ] { } such investment abroad is not new. in the middle ages the bankers of northern italy, and later of spain and portugal advanced small sums to impecunious foreign sovereigns. but the thousand marks borrowed by henry v from genoese merchants, or the loans made by holland in the th century, did not compare with the vast sums invested by england since the napoleonic wars, nor by other countries since . for, as in manufacturing, so also in the export of capital, france, belgium, holland, germany and even the united states entered the field. the source from which capital could be obtained widened with the increase in the number of wealthy industrial nations, and the volume of investment expanded rapidly. the foreign investments of the united kingdom, according to an estimate made by dr. bowley, amounted in to two and three-quarter billions of dollars. for , sixty years later, these holdings were estimated at seventeen and one-half billions. it is believed that the french have invested some eight billions of dollars and the germans four billions.[ ] the entire foreign investment of capital by the industrial nations of europe cannot have amounted (in ) to less than thirty-two or thirty-five billions of dollars.[ ] if this great investment were made solely in countries with a highly developed capitalism, with stable political conditions and strong economic ambitions, no imperialistic policy would be necessary. england need not "own" the united states in order to invest here safely or for purposes of trade. nor is she under an economic compulsion to rule canada or australasia. were these british colonies quite independent politically, canadians and australians would { } still endeavour to sell wheat and mutton to europe and to attract and protect european capital. their own self-interest, not any outside compulsion, makes them serve european, in serving their own interests. in morocco, on the other hand, and in tunis, persia, jamaica, senegal and the congo, the situation is different. the natives of these lands lack most of the elements which make for the ordered economic development demanded by europe. under native rule there is governmental incompetence and venality, disorder, revolt, apathy and economic conservatism. foreign investment is impossible and trade precarious. it is here where the industrial system of western europe impinges upon the backward countries that economic expansion merges into modern imperialism. [ ] "letters from a chinese official. being an eastern view of western civilisation." new york (mcclure, phillips & co.), , p. . [ ] see "handwörterbuch der staatswissenschaften," ii, pp. , , third edition, jena, - . western europe here includes all of europe except russia, hungary, bosnia and herzegovina, the balkan states and turkey. [ ] the absolute increase in the population of western europe is itself increasing. in the decade - , the increase was . millions; in the nine succeeding decades it was . ; . ; . ; . ; . ; . ; . ; . and . millions. in the fifty years ending the population increased . millions; in the fifty years ending , . millions. [ ] not all foreign investment of capital results or is intended to result in stimulating agriculture and other extractive industries. much of it is spent unproductively on guns, ships and royal and presidential luxuries, and much in stimulating manufacturing in agricultural nations, thus narrowing instead of widening the agricultural base of the capital-exporting countries. [ ] see hobson, "export of capital." [ ] moreover this investment, until the outbreak of the war, was rapidly increasing, amounting to no less than $ , , , a year. { } chapter vii the root of imperialism "the free west indian negro," writes sir sidney olivier, "is not only averse as a matter of dignity to conducting himself as if he were a plantation slave, and bound to work every day, but also enjoys the fun of feeling himself a master. and so, on a big sugar estate, when expensive machinery is running, and the crop has to be worked without stoppage, or on a banana plantation, when the steamer has been telephoned at daybreak, and two or three thousand bunches have to be at the wharf by noon, the negro hands will very likely find it impossible to cut canes or fruit that morning. it isn't a strike for better conditions of labour; they may have no grievance; another day they will turn up all right: but a big concern cannot be run on that basis. that is the root of the demand for indentured labour in the west indies."[ ] it is also the root of imperialism. for imperialism from an economic point of view is in the main a foreign political control to make the "niggers" work. the industrial nations, desiring food, raw materials, markets and a field for investment, being thwarted by conditions in certain backward agricultural countries, seek to remedy these conditions by means of political sovereignty. it is not necessary to control well-governed countries which are peopled by economically ambitious men who will work six { } days a week, fifty-two weeks in a year. in politically independent countries, however, and especially in the tropics, production is rendered ineffective by the disturbed political conditions, the lack of capital and capitalistic intelligence, the absence of fixed industrial habits, as well as by a general inertia and distaste for continuous labour under the hot sun. as a result, industrial nations are deprived of the markets and food supplies, which they consider necessary to their development.[ ] no necessity of feeding europeans appeals to the west indian negro when he emerges from his thatched hut after a comfortable night's sleep. though unskilled, he is a strong and capable man, willing, when incited by friendship or gratitude, to incur trouble and endure fatigue. but, as olivier points out, "the capitalist system of industry has never disciplined him into a wage-slave," and perhaps never will. the tropical negro "has no idea of { } any obligation to be industrious for industry's sake, no conception of any essential dignity in labour itself, no delight in gratuitous toil. moreover, he has never been imbued with the vulgar and fallacious illusion which is so ingrained in competitive industrial societies, that service can be valued in money.... work and money are not yet rigidly commensurable in the consciousness of the african. half a dollar may be worth one day's work for him, a second half-dollar may be worth a second day's work, but a third half-dollar will not be worth a third day's work.... moreover he lives in climates where toil is exacting, and rest both easy and sweet. there are few days in the year in england when it is really pleasant to loaf, and the streets of civilised cities are not tempting to recumbent meditation."[ ] it is not always necessary for a foreign power to intervene in order to disturb this "recumbent meditation." in certain tropical and sub-tropical countries there develops within the nation a group of exploiters, who control the government, such as it is, and force the natives to work. the atrocities of the putumayo district in brazil illustrate the capitalistic spirit in its very worst form, as did also the forced labour on the yucatan plantations during the diaz régime in mexico. to meet the economic needs of the industrial world, it makes little difference whether peons are enslaved by mexican, american or english capitalists, so long as the output is the same. but native capitalists are often unable to secure the desired economic result because they are too ruthless and, through lack of adequate financial and military resources, cannot maintain order. despotism tempered by revolution, oppression interrupted by savage reprisals, is not { } an approved economic stimulus. the difficulty in mexico to-day, as also in venezuela and in colombia, is the laming of industry by frequent revolutions. it is the same difficulty that was encountered in india, persia and morocco. the east indian is as unflagging as the french or italian peasant, but not until the british occupation could he secure the legal protection necessary to a higher economic development. peace, sanitation, industrial promotion and an economic or legal compulsion to work constitute the tools of imperialism, as they are applied to agricultural countries in the tropical and sub-tropical world. there is one outstanding difference between temperate and tropical countries, which gives to modern imperialism its essential character. given a low stage of civilisation, temperate lands are likely to be thinly populated, while tropical countries, however rudimentary their economic processes, may maintain large, low-grade populations. in the temperate climes, therefore, the intruder, who is more highly developed economically, soon outnumbers the natives, while in tropical countries, the white immigrant, even when he withstands the climate, is scarcely able to hold his own, and the very improvements which he introduces lead to an increase in the indigenous population. the white man either remains above and in a sense outside the population, or loses his identity by mixing his blood with that of the natives. the result is the maintenance of a people ethnically distinct from that of the nation exercising political control. to just what extent such control is necessary and effective constitutes a difficult question. it cannot be denied that the export from many colonies is far greater than would be the case if these had remained independent. the naturally rich country of haiti is far less valuable to the industrial nations than the poorer island of porto { } rico.[ ] in many parts of the world large agricultural resources are unavailable because owned by uncivilised nations or tribes maintaining their political independence. indeed, if an immediate increase in production and export were the only factor to be considered, a government of all tropical america by a capable industrial nation, like england or germany, would be of distinct advantage. other considerations, however, do enter. even a semi-efficient nation, like chili or brazil, gradually establishes order, secures foreign capital, intelligence and labour, and develops its resources. as opposed to europe, the united states stands in its monroe doctrine for the principle that latin-american countries, if left independent, will in time develop, and that a slow evolution may be more advantageous to the world than a more rapid exploitation under foreign dominion.[ ] ultimately, however, the capacity of the nation to utilise its resources does constitute the test which decides whether it shall retain independence or become subject to foreign domination. it is this test which is being applied to-day to mexico and certain other latin-american countries.[ ] as yet this imperialistic régime is in its beginning. food and raw materials are still mainly derived from { } independent nations and from temperate, settlement colonies, in which production is not affected by political control. the major part of the food-stuffs imported by europe come from russia, the united states, canada, australia, the argentine, the balkans; cotton comes chiefly from the united states; wool from australia; hides from the argentine; copper, coal, wood, oil from countries of temperate climate. more sugar is actually produced in temperate than in tropical countries, though the export from tropical countries largely preponderates. thus the external commerce of the specifically tropical countries subject to imperialistic rule is small compared to that of temperate countries exporting raw materials. india with its developed agricultural system exports only some $ , , of food and raw materials[ ] (in excess of its imports of like commodities) or about $ . per capita, while the per capita exportation of roumania is over ten times as great, of the argentine about twenty times, and of australia forty times.[ ] if the present commerce with tropical countries were not to increase, the new tropical imperialism would have but a slender economic base, and it might well be questioned whether it was worth europe's while to govern hundreds of millions of yellow, brown and black men in all parts of the globe. but the english colonies in america, two hundred years ago, also exported little, and a similar immensity of growth may be expected from the commerce of tropical countries. "as civilisation advances and population becomes more dense," writes mr. edward e. slosson,[ ] "the inhabitants of temperate zones { } become necessarily more dependent on the tropics. where the sunshine falls straightest and the rain falls heaviest there the food of the future will be produced." cacao, coffee, copra, cotton, rubber, sugar cane, bananas and other fruits are all becoming increasingly important in our consumption, and these and other raw materials are the product of a scientific exploitation of tropical regions.[ ] more and more the west-european nations, as also the united states and japan, are realising these immense potentialities. into many tropical countries, new crops are introduced, experiment stations established, railroads built, agricultural machines imported and efforts made not only to bring new lands into cultivation but also to increase the output of older lands. the experimental spread of cotton culture is a case in point. in the british cotton growing association was created to promote the growth of cotton in british dependencies. the fibre is now being raised in egypt, northern nigeria and central africa, while the possible output of west africa, it is claimed, could supply all the mills of lancashire. an ample supply of cotton for many decades to come seems reasonably assured. the gradual filling up of the temperate zones emphasises the immense future possibilities of the tropical regions. according to mr. earley vernon wilcox, the total land area of the world is about , , square miles (of which about , , are considered fertile) and of this total area about , , square miles are to be found in tropical and sub-tropical regions. "in , the united states imported tropical agricultural products to the value of $ , , ," and the exports from ceylon, brazil, { } the dutch east indies, cuba, hawaii and egypt were enormous. "the control and proper development of the tropics" writes mr. wilcox, "is a problem of tremendous consequences. year by year more tropical products become necessities in cold climates. this is apparent from the mere casual consideration of a list of the commonly imported tropical products, such as cane sugar, cocoanuts, tea, coffee, cocoa, bananas, pineapples, citrus fruits, olives, dates, figs, sisal, manila hemp, jute, kapok, raffia, rubber, balata, gutta-percha, chicle and other gums, cinchona, tans and dyes, rice, sago, cassava, cinnamon, pepper, cloves, nutmeg, vanilla and other spices, oils, such as palm, china wood, candlenut, caster, olive, cotton, lemon oil, etc."[ ] in estimating the value of the economic gains to an imperialistic nation, a moralist might be inclined to introduce other factors. the problem whether a political subjection, which is of the essence of imperialism, is or is not justified raises an uncomfortable question in ethics. however carefully native rights are safe-guarded, these subject races are forced to obey a foreign will not primarily for their own good but for that of the sovereign power. several industrial nations, above all the united states and in second instance, england, have undoubtedly embarked upon imperialism with a truly missionary zeal for the welfare of the natives. on the other hand, the twentieth century outrages in the congo were almost as bad as the cruelties of the conquistadores in hispaniola and peru. even in well-governed countries, like egypt, the introduction of european legal systems has resulted in the expropriation of innumerable small property-holders, while the increase in population, due to better economic and { } sanitary arrangements, has led to an intensification of misery. to what extent the average _fellah_ of egypt is better off than under the reign of mehemet ali or of ismail, how much the jamaican poor are more prosperous than the poor of haiti is at best an unpromising inquiry. on the whole, there has doubtless been improvement. in africa slave-catching has been abolished, and famine and pestilence circumscribed. but the gain such as it is, has been in the main incidental, the by-product of an exploitation primarily for the benefit of others.[ ] yet however we discuss the moral question, the problem is determined by quite other considerations. so long as hundreds of millions in the industrial countries require and demand that these backward countries be utilised, humanitarian laws will not be allowed to interfere with the main economic purpose of the colonies. the imperialistic argument is always the same: the resources of the world must be unlocked. three hundred thousand indians must not be permitted to occupy a land capable of maintaining three hundred millions of civilised people.[ ] { } the earth and the fulness thereof belong to the inhabitants of the earth, and if the product is somewhat unevenly divided, that, the imperialists assert, is hardly to be avoided. back of the ethical argument lie necessity and power. let the backward countries be exploited with the utmost speed; in the centuries to come, we will go into these moral questions at our leisure. this submission of ethical ideals to economic needs is illustrated in the prevailing colonial labour policy, which reveals with clarity the quality and power of the economic impulse to imperialism. the great industrial nations, having reached the economic stage in which an ample labour supply can be secured without other compulsion than that of hunger, accept at home the ideal of a free labour contract, with a certain protection to the wage-earner. in their colonies, however, though they may wish to be fair to the natives, one form or another of forced labour is generally adopted. an african native, who wants little here below and can get that little easily, is compelled to neglect or surrender his diminutive banana patch or farm and come to the european's plantation or mine, or work for nothing or next to nothing on the public roads. either this compulsion is exerted by means of a heavy hut tax, the money to pay which can be obtained only by wage-labour, or by stringent vagrancy laws, or by a refusal to allow the natives to become independent proprietors, or by outright expropriation. in some colonies penal labour contracts are enforced, and the miserable native who breaks his agreement is imprisoned or flogged. credit bondage is also in favour, and no sooner does the native work off his original indebtedness than he finds that he is more in { } debt than ever. finally if the natives cannot be compelled to give enough labour, coolies are imported, chiefly from china and india, and after their period of service are expatriated. even a more direct pressure is not always wanting. while the imperialistic nations theoretically oppose slavery, and have rather effectively checked the horrible slave trade of the arabs, they themselves have not always escaped the temptation to introduce slavery under new forms. at various times and in various colonies, the _corvée_ has been adopted both for public and private works, and in the belgian congo a thinly disguised slavery in its most atrocious form has been adopted. to justify this european slavery, which is infinitely more brutal than was the mild and customary native slavery, the same ethical and religious arguments are advanced as were utilised by the sixteenth century spaniards in establishing their _encomiendas_. the natives, especially in africa, are lumped together as worthless idlers, and their benevolent rulers are urged to teach these benighted creatures the christianity of hard and continuous labour.[ ] but the real motive is to secure the greatest amount of profits for the investors and of tropical produce for the european { } populations. whether even from this point of view a less exacting and ruthless labour policy might not be desirable need not here be discussed. what is immediately significant is the immense power of the forces driving european nations into colonial policies, intended to increase the export of tropical products. because of this demand for tropical produce, tropical markets, tropical fields for investment, the vast machinery of imperialism is set in motion. because of this demand, present and future, european armies march over deserts and jungles, and slay thousands of natives in spectacular _battues_. to satisfy the needs of european populations and adventurers, millions of brown men toil in the crowded, dirty cities of india, on sun-lit plantations in java and egypt, in the cotton fields of nigeria and togo. to grasp this imperialism, to realise the big, pulsing, dramatic movement of it, one must view the peons on hennequin plantations, the barefoot mexican labourers in silver mines, the rack-rented fellaheen in the nile valley, the patient chinese and japanese toilers on the hawaiian sugar plantations. one must gain a sense of the dull ambitions and compulsions working on these men, the desire for the cheap products of manchester and chemnitz, the craving for liquor, the fear of starvation and of the lash. and as these coloured peoples toil, not knowing for what they toil, other men in london and paris, in berlin, brussels and new york are speculating in the securities which represent their toil. they are buying "kaffirs" as they once bought "yankee rails." seated in their offices, these white-faced men are irrigating deserts, building railroads through jungles and wildernesses, and secure in the faith that all men, black, yellow and brown, can be made to want things and work for things, are revolutionising countries they have never seen. even these organisers, these { } seemingly omnipotent shapers of the world, are themselves only half-conscious agents of a vast economic process not solely desired by a class or nation but dictated by a far wider necessity. it is a process varied in its many-sided appeal; a process which reveals itself in the transfusion of capitalistic ideals by means of little school-houses in the philippines, by means of the strict and rather harsh justice in british colonies, by means of the unconscious teachings of christian missionaries, by means of the swift decay of ancient, tenacious faiths. it is a process linking the ends of the world, uniting the statesmen and financiers of the imperialistic nation with wretches in the swarming cities of the east, with half-drunken men seeking for rubber in tangled forests, with negroes searching over great expanses of country for the ivory tusks of elephants, with the kaffirs in the diamond mines who enter naked and depart naked, and whose bodies are examined each day to discover the diamonds which might be buried in the flesh. at one end of the line are the urbane diplomats seated about a table at some algeciras, at the other, in the very depths of distant colonies, there is slavery, flagellation, political and intellectual corruption, missionary propaganda, and the day to day business and planning of white settlers, who are anxious to make their fortune quick and get back to "god's own country." it is a process so vast, so compelling, so interwoven with the deepest facts of our modern life that our ordinary moral judgments seem pale and unreal in contact with it. and so too with religion. christianity which changed in its passage from judea to rome and from rome to the northern barbarians takes on again a new aspect when imperialistic nations encounter the peoples they are to utilise. this imperialistic christianity defends forced labour and slavery as an advance over a mere doing nothing. the parable of the ten { } talents is the one christian doctrine in which the imperialist fervently believes. this modern imperialism, which compels subject peoples to work at extractive industries at the behest of the swarming millions of the industrial nations, which excites, stimulates, urges, pushes, forces coloured peoples to raise bananas and cotton and buy shirts, gew-gaws, and whiskey, is at bottom a movement compelled by the economic expansion and necessity of the older countries. it is an outlet for the pressure, strain and expansiveness of the growing industrial nations, an outlet for industrialism itself. it ranges the industrial nations as a whole against the backward agricultural countries, and binds them together into a forced union, in which the industrial nations guide and rule and the backward peoples are ruled. but while the industrial nations have a common interest in imperialism, they have also separating and antagonistic interests. though the nations would prefer to have any one of their number, england, germany or france, rule all tropical countries rather than go without tropical colonies at all, each nation, for economic, as well as political and military reasons, desires that it, and not its neighbour and competitor, should be the supreme colonial power. it is because of this fact that modern imperialism takes on the form of a bitter nationalistic competition for colonies, and leads to diplomatic struggles and eventually to war. [ ] "white capital and coloured labour," pp. , . london, . [ ] the case for tropical imperialism is argued by dr. j. c. willis (director of the royal botanic gardens at ceylon) as follows: "in the present condition of the world the temperate zones cannot get on without the products of the tropics. the latter provide many things, such as rubber, tea, coffee, cinchona, jute, cane-sugar, spices, etc., which are among the necessaries of modern civilised life. the need for these has led to the settlement of europeans at trading stations in the tropics, at calcutta, malacca, calabar and many other places. once settled there, the insecurity of the traders and the inefficiency of the natives have led to the conquest of adjacent territories, until now most of the valuable areas in the tropics are in european or american hands." the conquering nations "work on the principle of governing the country for the benefit of the governed; but they must also so arrange matters that the tropical countries shall take their share in the progress of the world at large, and produce and export certain commodities for the benefit of that world which cannot get along properly without them. if the countries of the tropics can be made to progress so far that they shall themselves, with their own population, produce these things, so much the better; _but the things must be produced_."--"agricultural progress in the tropics,"--_science_, london, vol. v, pp. , . (my italics.) [ ] "white capital and black labour," pp. - . [ ] in the exports for haiti amounted to a little over $ and in to a little under $ per capita; the exports of porto rico (to the united states and foreign countries) amounted to almost $ per capita. [ ] historically, of course, this theory was not the real motive behind the doctrine. that motive was the unwillingness of the united states to have strong, military nations in its immediate vicinity. [ ] a failure to meet the requirements of the industrial nations does not necessarily involve a complete extinction of political independence. any measure of control, any merely reserved right, such as the united states retains in cuba, may suffice for the purpose. [ ] "food, drink, tobacco, raw materials and produce and articles mainly unmanufactured." [ ] owing to differences in method of classification, these comparisons are only approximate. [ ] the _independent_, oct. , . [ ] for a brilliant statement of the growing significance of tropical products, see benjamin kidd, "the control of the tropics," new york, , especially part i. [ ] "tropical agriculture," new york and london, , p. . [ ] the case is analogous to that of the operation of cotton mills in the south. despite low wages and brutal exploitation of children, the introduction of these mills has automatically raised the standard of living, but the goal desired was not this but the quickest possible making of profits. [ ] "no false philanthropy or race-theory," writes prof. paul rohrbach, one of the more humane of the german imperialists, "can prove to reasonable people that the preservation of any tribe of nomadic south african kaffirs or their primitive cousins on the shores of lakes kiwu or victoria is more important for the future of mankind than the expansion of the great european nations, or the white races as a whole. should the german people renounce the chance of growing stronger and more serviceable, and of securing elbow room for their sons and daughters, because fifty or three hundred years ago some tribe of negroes exterminated its predecessors or expelled them or sold them into slavery, and has since lived its useless existence on a strip of land where ten thousand german families may have a flourishing existence, and thus strengthen the very sap and force of our people?"--rohrbach, "german world policies" ("der deutsche gedanke in der welt.") translated by edmund von mach. new york (macmillan), (pp. - .) [ ] prof. paul s. reinsch, from whose admirable books i have drawn extensively in this description of colonial labour, rescues from undeserved oblivion an article by the rev. c. usher wilson on "the native question and irrigation in south africa," published in the _fortnightly_ for august, . "a careful study of educated natives," writes this pious gentleman, "has almost persuaded me that secular education is not a progressive factor in social evolution. the salvation of a primitive people depends upon the force of christianity alone, special attention being paid to its all-important rule 'six days shalt thou labour.' ... in the education of the world it has ever been true that slavery has been a necessary step in the social progress of primitive peoples."--reinsch, "colonial administration," new york, , p. . { } chapter viii imperialism and war if the entire imperialistic process could be directed by one omniscient individual, representing the interest of all industrial and agricultural countries, the progress of imperialism would be regular, rapid and easy. or if one nation, say england, could take over all colonies and run them in the common interest of the industrial nations alone, imperialism would be robbed of its greatest peril, that of embroiling the nations in war. unfortunately we have hit upon no such device for preserving the common interest of imperialist nations, while safe-guarding their separate interests. each nation desires the biggest share for itself. imperialism is directed by the conflicting ambitions, crude pretensions and confident vanities of selfish nations, and in the conflicts of interest that break out, the soup is spilled before it is served. from an economic point of view, this special interest of the nations in imperialism, like their common interest, is three-fold: markets for manufactured products, opportunities to invest capital and access to raw materials. if trade never followed the flag, if india imported as much from germany as from great britain, and madagascar as much from austria as from france, if there were an absolutely open door in each colony and a real as well as legal equality for all merchants, there would be a weaker competition for the dominion of backward countries. { } germans, englishmen and frenchmen might then compete on equal terms in morocco, egypt and southwest africa as they compete to-day in chile or argentina. but no such equality exists in countries controlled by european powers, and many of these colonies are consciously utilised in a bitter economic competition between the nations. to what such competition may lead is suggested in a sensational article in the _saturday review_ of almost twenty years ago. says the anonymous author of this article: "in europe there are two great, irreconcilable, opposing forces, two great nations who would make the whole world their province, and who would levy from it the tribute of commerce. england, with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will-force, but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. in the transvaal, at the cape, in central africa, in india, and the east, in the islands of the southern sea, and in the far northwest, wherever--and where has it not?--the flag has followed the bible and trade has followed the flag, the german bagman is struggling with the english pedlar. is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade-gin, the german and the englishman are struggling to be first. a million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. if germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an englishman in the world who would not be richer. nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession, must { } they not fight for two hundred and fifty million pounds of yearly commerce?"[ ] no doubt this assertion of a complete opposition between british and german commerce and investment contains an element of exaggeration. in england was the greatest consumer of german goods and germany an excellent customer of great britain and the british colonies. if germany were to be extinguished, englishmen would be poorer, not richer. yet the competition between german bagman and english pedlar is real, and this commercial competition is merely an expression of a far more significant industrial competition. as german organisation, science, and technical ability build up iron, steel, machinery, chemical and other industries, british industry, though still growing, finds itself circumscribed. if national colonies can be utilised for special national advantage, financial, industrial or commercial, the attempt will be made. if trade and investment can be made to follow the flag, the nation has an interest in securing colonies. there is always a certain presumption that colonials, partly from tradition, and partly from commercial patriotism, will deal with their home country. the merchant in british colonies is familiar with british firms and trademarks and rather resents the necessity of becoming acquainted with foreign wares and the standing of foreign merchants. prices being equal, we patronise the people we know and like. investment also leads to trade. the englishmen who control the vast resources of india, tend, without compulsion, to buy of british merchants. the possession of even a free-trade colony often insures the retention of its most profitable commerce. it is true that this presumption in favour of the home { } nation may be overborne. lower prices, better service, a more active and intelligent business propaganda may divert trade to foreign merchants. before the war, german manufacturers found an increasing market in british colonies, overcoming colonial prejudice as they overcame the prejudice in great britain itself. geographical nearness is even more decisive. thus canada is economically far more closely bound to the united states than to england. in - we sold canada $ . worth of goods for every dollar sold by the united kingdom.[ ] to jamaica our exports exceeded those of the united kingdom, while our imports from the island were over three times as great as the british imports.[ ] the united states profits far more immediately from the economic development of canada and jamaica than does the united kingdom.[ ] in the main, however, even under free trade, subtle influences are constantly at work to bring the colony into closer commercial relations with the home country. thus in - , per cent. of the imports of british india came from the united kingdom, and other british dependencies showed a similar preponderance of trade with great britain.[ ] the volume of the entire traffic between the home country and its colonies is overwhelming. in , the united kingdom imported from british { } possessions no less than £ , , , or over per cent. of its total imports, and exported to these british possessions £ , , or almost per cent. of its total exports (of british produce).[ ] this trade, which is increasing faster than the total trade of the united kingdom, is peculiarly valuable. from her overseas dominions great britain secures a far larger proportion of food products and raw materials than from foreign countries, and to these overseas dominions she sends a large proportion of manufactured goods, containing a high percentage of labour. thus, says prof. reinsch,[ ] "from the point of view of the development and prosperity of national industry it is important that the exports of the nation should be composed largely of manufactured goods, the value of which includes as high as possible an amount of labour cost. the export of raw material, of coal, of food materials, and of machinery used in factories, cannot be considered of the highest advantage to the industrial life of a manufacturing country, nor is it most profitable from a national point of view to furnish foreign countries with ships, which help to build up their merchant marines." but according to the figures of "only per cent. of the exports of british goods to the colonies consist of those commodities which the national industry derives relatively the least profit from, while for foreign countries the figure is per cent."[ ] { } the general colonial trend has been in the direction of deliberately securing by legislative means a preferential advantage for the home country. "france," writes dr. wilhelm solf, former german secretary of state for the colonies, "has assimilated algeria and a portion of her colonies from the point of view of customs. she regards them almost completely as within her tariff boundaries, which fact gives french commerce the advantage over that of other nations trading with these colonies. in regard to her other colonies france has introduced preferential tariffs favouring the motherland, and reciprocally the colonies, which amount to as much as per cent. of the normal duties. in tunis, likewise, france has favoured her own trade in important lines, such as grain, by admitting them free of duty when carried in french bottoms. portugal has introduced discriminating customs rates up to per cent. of the regular tariff in favour of her own colonial shipping. spain has acted similarly. england also enjoys tariff advantages as high as per cent. of the normal rate in her self-governing colonies. she has in this manner secured for british industry a market which, without this preference, she would not have been able to maintain to the same degree. likewise, the united states has to a large extent assimilated its colonies in customs matters. belgium has, it is true, no preferential tariff, but by means of her extensive system of concessions she has practically precluded the competition of other states and secured a monopoly in the trade with her own colonies."[ ] { } no such colonial preference amounts to a complete exclusion of the trade of competitors. the germans, not the english, are the chief purchasers of india cotton, and from the german colonies, diamonds go chiefly to antwerp, west african copper to the united states and belgium, and east african skins and hemp to north america. in many colonies and dependencies a complete legal equality of trade is maintained. on the whole, however, whether as a result of tariffs or of quiet discrimination by local authorities, the foreign merchant finds obstacles placed in his way and the trade goes to the home country. thus in , of algerian imports per cent. came from france, while of her exports per cent. went to france.[ ] the trade of all the other french colonies and dependencies tends also to go to france. thus of the import of all french colonies and dependencies (exclusive of algeria and tunis) per cent. in came from france and french colonies, while of the exports per cent. went to france and french colonies.[ ] similarly in of the entire import and export trade of german colonies (exclusive of kiau-chau), . per cent. were with germany.[ ] to the citizens of the home country go also the investment opportunities, the chances to secure concessions for mines, railroads and tramways. the legal right to these lucrative monopolies inheres in the nation that develops the backward country. this preferred position, this assured possession of a sole and undivided privilege is of the essence of imperialism. all the economic arguments for peace based upon the theory that trade heals enmities, { } shatter upon this fact. free traders never tire of insisting that trade is reciprocally advantageous, blessing him who sells and him who buys; that the more trade there is, the more there is to get. they argue that england, germany, america and japan might continue until the end of time amicably exporting pianos and gingham aprons to the backward peoples, and receive in return unimaginable quantities of sugar, rubber and tobacco. but modern imperialism, extending its dominion ever further, is dreaming not alone of this field for competitive selling, but of concessions, monopolies, exclusive privileges, immensely lucrative pre-emptions. there are whole worlds to exploit, and whoever rules garners. when france extends her sway over north africa and develops these lands, the valuable concessions go to french corporations. the actual capital used comes in last analysis from the great capital fund of western europe, from french, english, belgian, dutch and german capitalists, and whoever wishes to make four or five per cent. may lend his money to the banks that lend to the development companies that invest in the new country. but the big profit--the cream--does not go to these petty ultimate investors but to the political and high finance promoters, and these are french if the enterprise is french. moreover, trade accompanies and follows investment, and if france secures control, the imported locomotives, rails, cars and mining machinery come from france. in morocco, france keeps the inside track, as does england in egypt and india, and germany in togo and east africa. let who will pick up the scraps.[ ] { } this prevailing monopolistic character of colonial exploitation led prior to the war of to great dissatisfaction among those powers, which were least favoured colonially. in germany liberal imperialists like paul arndt and friedrich naumann bewailed the fact that germany was industrially handicapped because of the meagreness of her colonial possessions. "germans," complained prof. arndt, "receive no railway, harbour, shipping, telegraph or similar concessions in english, russian, french, american and portuguese colonies. everywhere citizens are preferred to foreigners, which is easily explicable and in fact natural...."[ ] as colony after colony is formed, the field for the free competition of germany with the world is narrowed, so that at last only countries like abyssinia, siam, china and above all the southern half of america remain independent and open. the french success in gaining and closing colonies arouses german envy. why is france's colonial empire more than two and a half times as large as that of germany? asks dr. naumann. how is france ahead of us? "we have beaten her in the field of battle, but she has recovered diplomatically. she is weaker in a military sense but in a political sense stronger."[ ] between envying france her colonial empire and determining at some favourable opportunity to redress the inequality is but a short step. to discontent with the present is added fear for the { } future. those nations, which are least blessed with colonies and which lack at home a broad agricultural base for the support of their industries, look anxiously towards a possible development, which will rob them not only of their markets and investment opportunities but also of their necessary raw materials. to the country ruling the colony belongs in last instance the right to decide what shall be done with its food and raw materials. suppose that australia, by a special arrangement with the mother country, lays a heavy duty upon all wool exported to other countries than great britain, and thus makes german competition in the woollen industry impossible. suppose the cotton supply of the united states is rendered dearer by some scheme of valorisation, like that which brazil applied to coffee exports, or by action of financial groups in america, or, given a change in the federal constitution, by an export duty on raw cotton. how then will germany compete? what could germany do if foreign nations shut her off from access to ores, foods and textiles? how could she solve the problem of a dwindling supply of iron ore? as population outstrips home production of raw materials, the dependence of industrial nations upon the countries producing such materials increases, and the fear arises that such foreign resources will be monopolised, and the excluded industrial nations forced to stop their advance and to descend in the scale of power. as this fear grows, the backward countries cease to be regarded as a common agricultural base and become merely separate national preserves. each nation strives by means of an exclusive possession of colonies to become self-sufficing. the competition for colonies becomes a struggle for national existence. in such a struggle for national existence, all vested rights go by the board. a nation needing outlets will pay { } small heed to maxims concerning peace, internationalism and the status quo; it will ask for the title deeds of the nations that own what it wants. so long as germany, for example, felt that colonies were absolutely essential to her future prosperity, it mattered little to her that england and france had been first in the field, that they had planted and sowed in foreign fields while she was still struggling to secure national unity. "where were you when the world was divided?" the germans asked themselves, and they came to the belief that their own economic needs justified their colonial ambitions, wherever those ambitions might lead them. rather than have the world shut to them they were willing to make sacrifices and incur dangers. war, they held, was better than stagnation, poverty and famine. but for a country like germany colonial ambitions conflicting with those of other european powers are especially dangerous, because a struggle for africa or asia means battles in champagne, westphalia or posen. "the future of germany's world policy," said an author who wrote under the pseudonym "ruedorffer," "will be decided on the continent. german public opinion has not yet fully comprehended the interdependence of germany's military peace in europe and her freedom of action in her foreign enterprises."[ ] though bismarck understood this interrelation, he was primarily interested in the european and not in the colonial situation. "bismarck," wrote ruedorffer, "looked upon the consolidation of germany's newly acquired unity as the first and principal task after the fortunate war with france. to divert the attention of france from the rhine { } border, he favoured, as much as he could, french expansion in africa and asia. when, toward the end of his career, he attempted to secure, for a future colonial activity of germany, a few african tracts which had not yet been claimed by any other power, he was extremely careful not to encroach upon england's interests. he avoided pushing germany's claims beyond southwest africa and annexing the _hinterland_ of the cape colony, a territory to-day known as rhodesia.... bismarck kept germany's world policies within the limits which, according to his opinion, were prescribed by her continental policies." as german colonial ambition grew, however, partly as a result of her fear of exclusion from colonial markets and sources of supply, she began to fear that she might raise up enemies in europe itself. "in every enterprise," wrote ruedorffer, "whether on african, turkish, persian, or chinese soil, germany's policy will necessarily have to take account of the presumable reaction on the european political constellation. if germany encounters russian interests in turkey, in persia, or in china, she will thereby bind russia still more closely to immutable france; if she infringes upon england's interests in mesopotamia, she will see england on the side of her opponents." "this reciprocal dependence of world policies and continental policies constitutes, if you please, a _circulus vitiosus_, the vicious circle of germany's foreign policy. german enterprises abroad react on the continental policy, and it is under pressure from the continental policy that germany's world policies find their limitations." as a result germany, with potential enemies on all sides, was constantly oppressed by the _cauchemar des coalitions_, the nightmare of jealous hostile alliances. it is this dependence of colonial upon continental politics that intensifies the dangers of imperialism, increases { } its ruthlessness and recklessness, and causes it to become a deadly conflict, with diplomacy _à la manière forte_ in the foreground, and in the background, war. the danger of war as a result of imperialism is immensely increased by the disunion and disequilibrium of europe. the continental nations are always embattled and ready to strike. it is not an accidental or transient condition but is rooted deep in geographical, historical and economic causes. europe, since history began, has been overfilled with clashing peoples and races with variant beliefs, traditions and languages, and with opposed economic interests. to grow, to prevent others from growing, these crowded groups went to war. it was no fault or vice of the europeans, but merely the tragic fact that there was no firm basis for european union. after the downfall of the western roman empire, no power was strong enough to dominate europe. the dreams of universal dominion of a charlemagne and of a rudolf of hapsburg remained dreams; the great, loose federations like the holy roman empire were no match for the smaller but more compact nations, which grew up after the middle ages. these new nations, moreover, inevitably meant increased antagonism, a perpetual struggle for more territory, more trade, more gold; a despotic, militaristic, fighting society. the age of the rise of nations was also that of professional armies under the direction of a despot, and of wars for the spoliation of still unorganised peoples, like the germans and the italians. if european union was difficult to achieve in past centuries, it has become even more difficult to-day. the last century has been the century of nationalities, a period during which nations and nationalistic groups developed consciousness. group consciousness is, of course, no new thing, for all groups, possessing survival quality, have { } conceit, self-esteem and veneration for the bond that unites them and for all qualities, characteristics, experiences and institutions which distinguish them. to-day this group consciousness has become national consciousness, and the impulse towards nationalistic expression spreads and makes itself felt not only in organised nations but also among submerged, conquered and dispersed peoples like the czechs, poles, finns and irish. the clash of europe's hundreds of millions for a satisfactory existence upon an insufficient area is intensified by the marshalling of these millions into nationalistic groups, speaking different languages and ruled by hostile traditions. the antagonism is the worse because in many parts of europe history and geography have conspired to jumble ethnic and linguistic groups without mixing them. in bohemia, east prussia, dalmatia, macedonia and lorraine, hostile groups intermingle without fusing. though the last century has brought about a certain approximation of state boundaries to the boundaries of nationalities, the process is far from complete. about many nations there is a fringe of people of like nationality subject to other states. roumania, servia, italy, each has its _irredenta_; austria-hungary, russia and turkey are loose bundles of nationalities, hating each other, while the balkan states cannot discover any nationalistic principle upon which to divide up macedonia. each nationality seeks independence and strength to maintain itself against the encroachment of rivals, and this desire for self-preservation through size, causes a nationality, which has attained to nationhood, to oppress smaller nationalistic groups within its borders. the condition is artificial and anomalous. absurd nationalistic claims are advanced in defence of aggression, and while learned pan-slavs convert balkan { } dwellers into russians, the dutch, flemings and danes are proved by pan-germans to be only germans once removed. the progress of democracy has intensified this nationalistic strife and made it a matter of _amour propre_. so long as no citizen had rights, it mattered little whether the king were german or hungarian. with the participation of the people in government, however, the subject nationalities feel themselves disgraced. the pole longs for a free democratic poland; he is not content to become german, austrian or russian. rather than surrender his nationality he is willing to tear up the map of europe and thrust the world into war. in this condition we have the seeds of perpetual conflict in europe. partly for the sake of increasing the national strength and partly for the benefit of certain financial groups, the lesser nationalities are ruthlessly exploited by the dominating nationality within a given country. the oppression of roumanians and slavs by the magyar ruling classes of hungary causes a deep revulsion of feeling in roumania, servia and other countries across the border, just as the ambitions of pan-germans to make germany a nationalistic state arouse the indignation of the french and the fears of the dutch and danes. moreover the nationalistic groups often discover that they have antagonistic economic interests. the danger of this situation is immensely increased by the fact that all these hostile nations impinge territorially on one another, and modern warfare gives an enormous advantage to the nation gaining the initial success. austria, belgium, france may be overrun and permanently defeated by a campaign of six or seven weeks, and it is difficult thereafter to retrieve these early defeats. { } european nations therefore live in the fear of immediate attack and conduct a hair-trigger diplomacy. this is the true interpretation of _realpolitik_, of a nationally selfish policy, devoid of sentiment and laying an excessive emphasis upon immediate and material ends. a nation in danger of annihilation cannot indulge in the luxury of sentiment, cannot consider long time views, cannot be over-generous or trust to the generosity of rivals. each nation is compelled to enter into offensive and defensive alliances, and these alliances, perpetually suspecting each other, are compelled to prepare for instant war. but preparation for war under such conditions makes war inevitable. if a nation believes that it is to be assailed, five, ten or fifteen years from now, it is tempted to precipitate the "inevitable" war at the moment when its chances are the best. the doctrine of "the war of prevention," however perilous, is, in the prevailing circumstances, natural. it is meeting a supposedly inevitable danger half way. still another element adds to the menace of imperialism. just as a successful imperialistic policy depends upon the ability of the european nation to defend itself at home, so also it depends upon access to the colonies, upon a control of the seas. had spain been a hundred times as powerful on land as the united states, she still could not have defended cuba. were germany to secure valuable colonies, she could not be sure of their retention against england (which lies on germany's lines of communication), so long as the british possessed an overwhelming naval supremacy. it was therefore natural, and indeed inevitable, that, sooner or later, german colonial ambitions should find expression in a naval expansion, which, whatever the intentions of its promoters, was potentially a menace to the british empire and even to the very { } existence of england. the desire for imperialistic expansion thus led, in the absence of any formula of reconciliation upon a higher plane, to an irrepressible conflict between england and germany, in short, to a world war. herein lay and still lies the peril of imperialism, the danger that for fifty years to come europe, and perhaps america also, will be again and again embroiled in wars immeasurably more destructive than were the long colonial wars of the eighteenth century. the present world war does not automatically end the imperialistic struggle. there is china to consider, there is the independence of latin america, to say nothing of colonies securely held for the time being by one or another of the european powers. the allies, if successful in this war, will not necessarily remain allies. the ambitions of england, of russia, of japan, not to speak of france, germany, italy and perhaps the united states, may come into conflict. nor upon the signing of a treaty of peace will the forces making for imperialism become extinct. in the future, as in the past, a nationalistic competition for colonies will carry with it the seeds of war. [ ] the _saturday review_, volume lxxxiv, sept. , . [ ] our exports to canada in that year amounted to $ , , ; those of the united kingdom, $ , , . our imports from canada were $ , , ; the imports of the united kingdom, $ , , (canadian figures). statesman's year book, , p. . [ ] jamaican imports ( - ). from the u. s., £ , , ; from the u. k., , , . exports: to the u. s., £ , , ; to the u. k., £ , (jamaican figures). statesman's year book, , p. . [ ] naturally our proportion of the trade would be still greater if canada and jamaica were within the american customs union. [ ] statesman's year book, , p. . [ ] in the trade of the united kingdom with british possessions was still greater, though it formed in that year a smaller percentage of the entire trade of the country. statesman's year book, , p. . the trade of the united kingdom with foreign countries was considerably less (in ) than was that of germany. [ ] "colonial administration," pp. - . [ ] _op. cit._ "it has further been shown that in the foreign trade of great britain the export of manufactured goods is declining while that of raw material and machinery is increasing." [ ] "germany's colonial policy," in "modern germany in relation to the great war." new york, mitchell kennerley, , p. . see also "british white book," a report on colonial preferences given in various countries. oct. , , no. . for an able analysis of the results of the open and the closed door in colonies see jöhlinger (otto), "die koloniale handelspolitik der weltmachte," (_volkswirtschaftliche zeitfragen_) vol. xxxv, berlin, . [ ] statesman's year book, , pp. - . [ ] statesman's year book, , p. . [ ] but the whole trade was small, amounting to less than per cent. of the entire foreign trade (in ) of germany. [ ] in his defence of german colonial policy, dr. solf makes much of the fact that of the total sum of , , marks invested in german colonies, no less than , , marks belongs to foreigners. but this means that germany which has little capital to export has invested over per cent. and all the other countries of the world less than per cent. moreover the character of the investment, not the absolute amount, is significant. competitive investment, as in a brewery or cotton factory, does not bring the same profit as does a concession for a railroad, tramway or bank. [ ] paul arndt. "grundzüge der auswärtigen politik deutschlands," quoted by ludwig quessel, _sozialistische monatshefte_, vol. , ii, june , . [ ] fr. naumann. die hilfe, nov. , . quoted by ludwig quessel. "auf dem weg zum weltreich." _sozialistische monatshefte_, vol. , . [ ] ruedorffer, j. j., "grundzüge der weltpolitik in der gegenwart," stuttgart und berlin, , quoted by paul rohrbach, "germany's isolation" ("der krieg und die deutsche politik"). chicago, . { } chapter ix industrial invasion the direct competition between great industrial nations for the products and profits of the backward countries would suffice to create an international antagonism even if no other economic forces contributed to this result. closely though not obviously bound to this struggle for colonies, however, is an equally intense struggle among the industrial nations to force their way economically into each other's home territory. germany, it is alleged, forces her way industrially into france, switzerland, italy, belgium and holland. she penetrates these countries economically, crushes their industries, forces upon them her own industrial products, extracts from them the profits which should go to their own manufacturers. industrially, commercially, financially she seeks to rule italy and belgium as great britain rules the argentine or canada. she holds these countries, so it is claimed, in industrial non-age. it is all a quiet economic infiltration, a matter of buying and selling and of lawful contracts, but it is none the less war. "war is war," admits prof. maurice milloud, a student of this phenomenon of german industrial expansion, "but make no mistake that it is war."[ ] within the last few years there have appeared numerous books by french, swiss, belgian and italian[ ] { } publicists attacking the policy by which germany prior to the war secured a partial control of her neighbouring markets. with the merits of this controversy and with the morality or immorality of the procedure, we need not concern ourselves. to us the only point of interest is the nature of the economic forces leading to such a conflict and the effect of this conflict in creating national animosity and in inciting to war. all the industrial nations export to one another as well as to the agricultural countries. why, then, is germany's course so bitterly resented? at first glance one might suppose that the chief objection to this german enterprise lay in its ruthlessness and economic terrorism. a french manufacturer of formic acid is crushed outright by a sudden price reduction; a swiss or italian manufacturer is ruined by being spied upon by his own employés in the pay of a german competitor. but the main objection to the german competition seems to be its formidableness. germany exports not only wares but men, and in all the neighbouring countries are to be found german chemists, engineers, business men and clerks. it is claimed that these pioneers hold together, advance together, maintain the cult of _deutschtum_ in an alien country, and act as agents for the home industry. it is also claimed that germany "dumps" her goods on foreign markets, thus causing losses or even total destruction to rival industries. yet all these things have been done before, and even the nations which object are not always innocent of like practices. what is deeply resented, however, is that the german competition is a disciplined state-aided competition, that it is collective rather than individual. the belgian, italian or dutch { } manufacturer feels that behind his german competitor stand the gigantic power and resources of the whole german nation. it is not individual germans who compete, but germany; a patient, resourceful, long-sighted germany, willing to make temporary sacrifices for permanent gains, a germany forced to expand industrially and bending its immense wealth and power to this one purpose. against such an organised body what can a single manufacturer avail? the means at germany's disposal in this invasion of near-lying markets are varied and great. industry is organised; the german has a genius for organisation. in all the near-lying countries, concerns with german connections open up a wide channel for the incoming wares. in antwerp, in rotterdam, in zurich, a large part of the big business is in german hands. german banks are established and these aid directly or indirectly in the importation of german commodities. moreover, the germans are better informed than any of their rivals concerning all the minute knowledge necessary to the conquest of a local market. their business plans are not only far flung but meticulous; they have a card-index method of study and their training is admirably adapted to just these methods of commercial penetration. no such penetration would be possible, however, but for the intelligence with which german industry is conducted at home. in germany the scientifically trained man is more highly regarded than in any other country. the chemist, the engineer, the specialist of every sort is called into consultation and the laboratory is united to the factory. the vast expense of maintaining a corps of inventors forever working at new problems is more than compensated for by the frequent technical improvements which result from their studies. the scientific men employed by { } the german chemical factories have revolutionised methods and given germany almost a monopoly in this rapidly growing industry. in germany also, as in america, there is a willingness to discard old methods and machinery, whatever the initial expense. in a few years the losses due to the change are retrieved and the german business is creating values more efficiently than ever. such an industry must in its nature be immensely productive. the germans, like the americans, are successful in mass production, the fashioning of vast quantities of cheap, standardised articles. factories tend to grow larger. formerly competing concerns are united into associations or cartels, which buy or sell in common, save a vast amount of unnecessary friction within the trade and act as a clearing house for information and ideas. a high protective tariff enables these cartels to maintain a remunerative price in the home market while dumping their surplus products upon foreign markets. what this "dumping" may mean for manufacturers in the countries upon which the wares are dumped may be made clear by an example. "the german ironmasters," writes prof. milloud, "sell their girders and channel iron for marks per ton in germany, for to in switzerland; in england, south america and the east for to marks; in italy they throw it away at marks and _make a loss of from to marks per ton_, for the cost price may be reckoned at to marks per ton."[ ] other iron products have been sold by germans in italy far cheaper than they could be sold or even produced in germany, with the result that the struggling italian iron industry is hardly able to exist. nor is this dumping a mere temporary expedient to relieve the german manufacturer of an unexpected surplus. it is { } systematic, organised and intentional, designed to destroy competitors and establish a monopoly. it is a procedure with which we in america are unpleasantly familiar, since it has been long the practice of our trusts to destroy competition in a circumscribed local market by temporarily reducing prices and then to raise prices after the competitor is _hors de combat_. the most striking difference between the flooding of adjacent markets by german cartels and the destruction of competitors by american trusts is that in the former case the operation is international, and the manufacturers who suffer live in one country and those who profit in another. moreover, the german government is itself directly concerned in the process. not only is the government one of the associated concerns in certain cartels, but by its railroad policy it gives an immense impetus to dumping. railroad rates are cheaper if the commodity carried is to be exported. to take one out of a thousand instances "the freight of a double wagon of german coal from duisbourg to hamburg, a distance of kilometers, costs marks, whilst, in the reverse direction, from the sea-board to the industrial centres in the interior, the freight charge is marks in the case of german coal, and as high as in the case of foreign coal."[ ] the government grants an export bounty upon coal (and other commodities) in the shape of reduced transportation rates. we need not study in detail the vastness and complexity of that integration of german industry, which permits it to act as a unit in its invasion of near-lying territories. we need not recount the almost vertiginous growth of the german banking system, with its tendency towards a narrow concentration, its bold conduct and control of german industry and its establishment of { } branch organisations in the countries to be invaded. nor need we consider the practice of long credits by which german manufacturers secure a foothold in new markets or the system by which german capital, labour and intelligence migrate to the foreign country, and as branches of a german concern, continue the process of dumping from within. the significant fact is that the entire process is organised and thought out. it is a concrete national policy for securing german economic control in neighbouring industrial countries. nothing could better illustrate the collective nature of this economic invasion than the history of the german cartels. "it is evidently to the cartels," writes fritz-diepenhorst, "that germany owes in great measure the conquest of foreign markets."[ ] the german cartel differs from the trust in that it does not represent the absorption of weaker rivals by one powerful concern but is a federation of business units which retain their legal independence but surrender a part of their industrial and commercial autonomy. in the beginning the german cartels represented an effort to regulate prices in the home market, but after the adoption of a protective tariff and during the period when germany launched out upon a policy of large-scale exportation, the cartels grew in numbers and power. their policy was to maintain prices at home and sell at a lower rate abroad. but this policy, owing to a near-sighted individualism, injured the german export industry itself. the coal cartel determined its policy irrespective of the interests of the coke cartel, which in turn fixed its prices irrespective of the interests of the iron industry. as a result vast { } quantities of raw materials and semi-manufactured products were shipped abroad at prices which permitted the foreign manufacturer of finished wares to undersell the german manufacturer. it was a boomerang dumping, which worked to the advantage of the dumped and to the disadvantage of the dumper. within the last fifteen years, however, and especially since the report in of the german parliamentary commission on cartels, this early anarchy has been gradually abolished, and arrangements have been made by which a cartel grants lower prices not only for its own exports but also for such part of its home-sold product as is to be used in the manufacture of more highly finished wares, which are in turn to be exported. the coal used in iron manufactures that are to be shipped to foreign countries is sold cheaper than the coal used in iron manufactures which are not to be exported. a community of interest among the cartels is thus created. the result is an amazing industrial solidarity. "the individual exporter disappeared in the cartel, and the cartel itself is absorbed in this sort of cartel of cartels, which ends by becoming the german industry.... for an economic guerilla warfare there is substituted a mass action, a veritable strategy."[ ] the excesses of dumping are cured and dumping becomes a national economic policy. but how can this organised conquest of adjacent industrial countries be averted without some alternative method for the economic expansion of a highly organised industry? the same forces that push germany and england into an imperialistic policy and into a conquest of the markets of agricultural countries also force them into a competition to secure the markets of industrial countries. the two processes are not quite alike, since the trade between, { } let us say, brazil and germany is a complementary and mutually beneficial commerce, while the dumping of german rails and girders on italy is a competition or war between two industrial nations. the impulse and motive in both cases is, however, the same. it is the desire to increase buying power. germany can secure more of the wool of australia and of the wheat of the argentine if she can establish even a limited economic dominion over adjoining countries. it is the lack of a sufficient home market that forces germany to dump her goods on switzerland and belgium just as it forces england to sell largely to her colonies and to invest in backward countries. how far this policy of industrial invasion can safely go is one of the interesting international problems of the future. it is of course not the desire of any country to sell permanently below cost to the foreigner, since such a policy means, if not actual loss, at least a diminution of profits.[ ] germany would prefer to get the same price for her girders in england and italy as she does at home. but she must take what she can get. her industry is based upon a productiveness in excess of the demands of the home market, and she is under the necessity of paying for large importations of food and raw material and of profitably employing increasing numbers of workmen. her industrial invasion of neighbouring countries is alternative and supplementary to an attempt to secure a { } needed colonial market. it is, parenthetically, a necessity imposed upon an industrial nation menaced by a constantly growing population. be this policy of invasion ever so well organised, however, it cannot escape inherent limitations and obstacles. the german export policy maintained itself only by holding up prices at home, which meant an increased cost of living and a rise in money wages. the imposition of tariffs by neighbouring countries meant an increase in the difficulties to be overcome in exportation and a reduction in the net profits of the foreign trade. to a considerable extent this export of cheapened goods was at the mercy of the importing nations, which, at any moment, might levy prohibitory duties. at the best the whole development led to strong opposition and prejudice, to counter-attacks, to the violation of favouring commercial treaties and to the imposition of punitive duties (as in the canadian tariff) especially aimed at dumpings. in the opinion of many observers, the policy provided an insecure base for a top-heavy industry, with the result that in germany industrial crises were frequent and destructive and the economic development showed the weaknesses of a forced growth. it is too early to pass judgment upon the relative success or failure of this industrial invasion. prof. milloud believes that the policy by had demonstrated its failure, and that the fear of an industrial _débacle_ forced germany to escape from an impossible economic position by throwing europe into war. how far this is true it is difficult to determine.[ ] it is evident, however, that the { } difficulty of this german penetration of adjacent countries must have intensified a desire for an easier market in the colonies. the italian trade for which germany fought so hard must have seemed unremunerative and unpromising as compared with the practically monopolised market which france possessed in north africa or with that which germany could obtain through the bagdad railway and the penetration of asia minor. the sharpness of the conflict for nearer lying markets illustrated anew the necessity of securing colonial outlets. if, however, the competition among industrial countries to secure each other's markets results in national antagonism, the competition of the same nations for the exclusive possession of colonies and dependencies leads, as we have seen, to an equally bitter struggle. the choice seems to lie between the devil and the deep sea. it is no wonder therefore that as the rapid expansion of industry brings the great nations into ever keener antagonism, voices are raised against the whole imperialistic policy. just as the german consumer objects to paying high prices for german commodities which the belgian or italian can buy cheap, so also opposition is encountered to a policy of extending colonial development at the expense and imminent risk of the nation and to the obvious benefit of certain preferred classes in the community. [ ] "the ruling caste and frenzied finance in germany." boston, , p. . [ ] see in the first instance milloud, _op. cit._, and prof. henri hauser, "les méthodes allemandes d'expansion economique," paris, . also g. preziosi, "la germania alia conquista dell' italia," florence, . [ ] _op. cit._, pp. - . his italics. [ ] milloud, _op. cit._, p. . [ ] _revue économique internationale_, , ii, p. , quoted from hauser (h.) "les méthodes allemandes d'expansion économique," p. . [ ] hauser, h., _op. cit._, p. . [ ] the goods exported to foreign countries may show a profit if they are sold at a price less than the average cost of production but greater than the marginal cost. if it costs $ a unit to produce a million units of a given product for the home market and only $ a unit to produce an additional , units then there is a profit in permanently selling this extra amount at any price above $ . to break down a foreign competition it may pay _temporarily_ to sell at or even dollars, in order to raise prices again after competition is destroyed. [ ] prof. milloud's argument based upon the relative growth of british and german exports is far from conclusive. he shows that in the period from - to - the german export trade increased only per cent while the british export trade increased per cent. if we consider the statistics for the subsequent period, to (which figures were quite accessible to prof. milloud), we find that the german export industry increased much more rapidly than did that of britain. { } chapter x the revolt against imperialism what determines whether a backward country is to be exploited by its own people or by some beneficent imperialistic power is not any consideration of its own welfare, but the chance of profits held out to certain adventurous financiers in the capitals of europe. these modern pioneers are a ruthless, dangerous group, with the bold, speculative imagination that has marked adventurers since the world began. they have a domestic and a foreign morality, an ethics for home consumption and a fine contempt for "greasers" and "niggers." they know the difference between five per cent. and twenty per cent., and their business consists in investing their money at high rates of profit (because the enterprise is hazardous) and then in taking out the hazard by making their home government compel the fulfilment of their impossible contracts. the methods of these men are monotonously similar. they lend, they invest, they support revolutions, they invoke "the protection of the flag." they need not pay attention to the public opinion of the backward countries; they do not believe such countries have a public opinion. all that these speculators need is the support of their home government, and that they may secure through bribery, newspaper influence and patriotism. the first two cost money and are worth all they cost; the third can be had for { } nothing. as for the excuse for intervention, it is that used by the wolf when he took a fancy to the lamb. money is loaned at usurious rates to some rogue who poses in history as the president of the lamb republic or to some spendthrift imbecile of a khedive. concessions are secured. by a concession in this instance is meant a solemn contract, by which, for and in consideration of nothing, duly paid in hand, the whole nation, its territory and population, are turned over in perpetuity. the negotiations are ratified by a battle cruiser; a few marines are landed, a few barelegged natives are buried in a tropical back-yard, a treaty of peace and amity is concluded between the imperial power and its latest morsel, and the real business of imperialism begins. it is good business and pays big dividends. but to whom do the dividends go? what profit has the french artisan or peasant in all these grand concessions from the illustrious sultan of morocco? how does the english workman prosper when english capital employs cheap indian labour to undersell british factories? obviously the immediate profits accrue to large capitalists rather than to the mass of the people. if a french peasant can invest his savings in morocco, he may earn a few extra dollars per year on his holdings of a thousand francs, but his whole interest payment forms a small proportion of his annual income. to the financier, on the other hand, who directs the investment of hundreds of millions, a concession in morocco is of value. the case of french foreign investments is pertinent. as a result of the activity of great bankers, who rule both finance and politics, some forty billion francs have been invested in foreign countries. the individual investor has little choice and no intelligent direction in these large affairs. it is even possible that the whole course of french { } investments has been disadvantageous; that too much french capital has been sent abroad to cultivate foreign fields (or pay for war preparations) and too little has been absorbed at home. the profit to bankers does not prove that the loans are equally profitable to the nation. in any definite imperialistic policy, as that in morocco, this difference in interest between the directors and small owners of capital becomes even clearer. the promoters can afford even to risk war, while for the small investor, who, after all, can invest elsewhere, the net gain is less apparent, especially as the war, if it comes, must be fought by him and be paid for by him. from the beginning, therefore, a revolt or opposition has been manifested (in certain sections of the industrial nations) to the whole principle and policy of imperialism. this revolt relies for support upon those elements in the population who believe either that they are not benefited by imperialism or only slightly benefited. liberal and socialistic sentiment forms the core and centre of this opposition. for the most part the socialists are theoretically opposed to imperialism on the ground that it is immoral, brutal, anti-democratic and uneconomic. it does not, they believe, pay the people who in the end pay for it. this anti-imperialistic philosophy of the socialists is chiefly derived from the anti-colonial attitude of the liberals of the early nineteenth century. that attitude was founded on opposition to special trade privileges, which was the basis of the old colonial policy, and also on the belief that colonies did not benefit the mother country. in the middle of the eighteenth century turgot had declared that "colonies are like fruits which cling to the tree only till they ripen," and he predicted that "as soon as america can take care of herself, she will do what carthage did." when the american colonies later fulfilled this prediction { } by securing their independence, and when it was perceived that this separation did not lessen england's commerce with america, the opponents of colonialism, who were also advocates of free trade, were reinforced in their convictions. the only true extension was trade, and to secure trade political domination was unnecessary. it was by no means contended even by the most doctrinaire free trader that an increase in the population and wealth of new countries, such as the united states and canada, was undesirable. all they opposed was political dominion by the home country and the adoption of a restrictive trade policy. similarly the orthodox socialists of to-day make a sharp distinction between colonisation and imperialism, between the acquisition, by conquest or otherwise, of lands suitable for settlement and the seizure of populous countries to which emigration is impossible. in this distinction it is not the intention but the fact that counts; whatever the motives of the explorers, the new country becomes a colony if it furnishes homes. such colonising is a direct national gain, benefiting all classes. the redemptioner, who was carried off to the british settlements in america, did in the end improve his economic condition, and his descendants, like those of the free immigrants, now form the population of the country. on the other hand tropical dominions, like porto rico or egypt, can provide profits for investors but no homes for settlers. this distinction negates by definition the claim that imperialism is an outlet for a redundant population. of the emigrants from the united kingdom during the last thirty years only a microscopic percentage went to britain's tropical colonies. in british india in only one in every two thousand was british born. similarly, most french, german, belgian and dutch colonies furnish no { } outlet to the surplus populations of these nations. even in algeria the europeans constitute only one-seventh of the population, and in tunis only about one-tenth. the entire european population in all german, french and british possessions (exclusive of the five self-governing colonies), is less than the net immigration to the united states every two or three years.[ ] the opponents of imperialism moreover claim that all the regions fit for colonisation are already pre-empted. there is room for many millions in the five self-governing colonies of great britain, as there is in siberia and south america, but where can place be found in regions newly acquired by imperialism? where can homes be had to-day for some twenty million germans (the excess of german population in a single generation), to say nothing of tens of millions of italians, british, austrians and poles? it is frequently claimed that the new medical science, which conquers tropical diseases, will make these regions habitable by the whites. but though the sanitary improvement in the canal zone permitted thousands of americans to help build the canal, it did not result in the actual physical work of construction being performed by white men. despite sanitary improvements, the jamaica negro could endure a hard day's work under the tropical sun far better than a man from illinois. the economic advantage of the lower-priced coloured labour is still more decisive. while in the highly organised industries of england, germany or the united states, high wages frequently mean small labour cost, in the lower-geared industries of the tropics the coloured man, black or yellow, easily holds his { } own. since the european excess of births over deaths is about forty millions per decade, the impossibility of finding a place for this excess population in tropical and subtropical countries is manifest. if the countries still to be overrun are not adapted for colonisation, the benefits accruing from imperialism, according to these anti-imperialists, will go to merchants, manufacturers and investors and not to wage-earners. it is often claimed that this trade which arises from an imperialistic policy is not great enough to exercise a beneficent influence upon the fortunes of the masses. prof. hobson, writing in , states that during the period since , when great britain launched into its latest imperialistic policy, british foreign commerce did not grow as rapidly as population, and actually declined in proportion to wealth. the british colonies increased their trade with other nations more rapidly than with the home country. the newly acquired colonies, the last fruits of imperialism, were the least profitable. their commerce was small, fluctuating and of low quality. mr. hobson therefore comes to the conclusion "that our modern imperialistic policy has had no appreciable influence whatever upon the determination of our external trade."[ ] when we consider individual countries which have been the cause of much rivalry and dissension, we discover that their commerce is often extremely small. france has almost monopolised the trade of martinique, but in her total trade with that country was less than a sixtieth of her trade with the united kingdom and less than a fiftieth { } of her trade with germany. the specifically tropical countries, for which the nations are fighting, do not have a commerce worth a fraction of the cost of their acquisition.[ ] nor are the investments in the imperialistic domain nearly so large as those in countries over which the european nations exercise no political control. france has invested largely in russia and the balkans; germany has put capital into the united states, south america and asia minor; england has gigantic sums in countries over which she exercises no dominion. the profits from imperialistic investments are merely a bonus. though they loom large in the popular imagination, they are only a small part of the national income, and even at the best these profits go to capitalists and not to the people. moreover, what advantage is it to the wage-earner to have his country's wealth exported beyond his reach? concerning this movement towards absentee ownership of capital, the widest divergence of opinion prevails. the optimists among the investing classes find it all good and sanctified by its results. the exportation of capital, they hold, not only fructifies the waste places of the world but does not decrease the capital in the exporting country, since it raises the rate of interest and thus stimulates saving. but such a rise in the interest rate means an increase in the cost of living and a reduction in the real wages of labour. in so far as it goes into competitive industrial enterprises abroad, it lessens the opportunity of labour at home. thus if british capital, exported to india, is used to erect cotton mills in calcutta, india will import fewer cotton goods from england, and british capital will be employing { } indian labour and throwing british labour out of employment. this situation is analogous to that which was created when northern textile manufacturers, instead of increasing their new england plants, built mills in georgia, thus transferring the demand for employment from the north to the south. it is further contended by these opponents of imperialism that the export of capital is profoundly demoralising to the exporting nation, which ceases, in a real sense, to be industrial, and becomes financial. gradually the nation, with a large fixed income derived from foreign labour, ceases to care for its export industry, loses its intensity and keen application to business, becomes conservative in the technique of production, and, being no longer interested in the development of home industries (since its gains come from abroad), converts hundreds of thousands of industrial wage-earners into liveried house-servants, who minister to the cultivated wants of a sport-loving and decoratively idle upper class. the effect of this development upon england, the classic land of capital export, is portrayed in an acute study by dr. schulze-gaevernitz.[ ] the author shows how the steadily mounting income derived by great britain from foreign investments has led to a relative restriction of the field of employment in home manufacturing industries. in per cent. of the population of england and wales were workers in the chief industries as compared with only per cent. a half century later.[ ] imports increase; exports do not increase proportionately. an ever larger proportion of the population becomes rentiérs, { } "living on the sweat of coloured labour, whom it is their first interest to hold in political subjection." some of these rentiérs, large and small, are wholly unoccupied or only half occupied. they are sleeping partners, briefless barristers, professors of professions which do not exist. to these income-receivers or rentiérs, whom schulze-gaevernitz estimates at a million, must be added enormous numbers of servants and lackeys, who are paid, though indirectly, from the kimberley mines and investments in the argentine. upon the industry of the backward countries these idle and semi-idle people make increasing demands, and industry becomes a production of luxuries. in the meantime the nation falls behind in its competition with more purely industrial countries like germany and the united states. in the machine industry, in ship-building, in applied chemistry england does not hold her own.[ ] her technique of production, her methods in commerce and banking become old-fashioned and ineffective; her invention (as measured by the issuance of patents) does not keep pace with that of her chief competitors. and all this conservatism does not inhere in the british character (for formerly the briton revolutionised the world) but is attributable to the fact that great britain is pre-eminently a _rentnerstaat_, a country of pensioners and creditors, increasingly independent and careless of its foreign export, and of the industries which formerly kept that export going.[ ] { } there is some exaggeration but also much truth in this description of a _rentnerstaat_. psychologically the account fits the englishman less exactly than the frenchman, who is industrially less venturesome. moreover from the individual's view-point it makes little difference whether his fixed income is derived from abroad or at home. economically, however, the influence of a large class of individuals living by foreign industry is difficult to exaggerate. their interests are abroad; at home they are concerned chiefly with the maintenance of low prices. the nation becomes in a sense parasitic, living without effort upon the "lesser breeds" in all parts of the world. whatever its evil results, however, there is little reason to believe that any nation will willingly surrender the income on its foreign investments or cease to export new capital if conditions are favourable. the interest-receiving nations are the world's aristocrats, happy in their favoured position, and if they can thus live partly on their past labour they see no reason for receiving less or working more. the social evils resulting at home from such a condition can be cured by changes in taxation and the distribution of wealth, by legislation which gives a greater part of the income from foreign investments to the nation as a whole, and thus forces the rentiérs back into industrial life. so long, however, as foreign investment is essential to the widening of the agricultural base of industrial nations, it will not be stopped by its beneficiaries.[ ] those who advocate a complete cessation of the export { } of capital,[ ] therefore, might as well argue against its accumulation. you could not stop it if you wished, and would be none the wiser for wishing it. the export of capital is merely an export of goods, paid for in credit instead of in goods, and the only way to prevent credit from coming into the country is the suicidal method of expelling the creditor. it is unlikely, therefore, that this movement will cease until the demand for capital is fairly equalised throughout the world, until the backward nations of to-day are sated with capital or have themselves become industrial countries. the danger lies in exactly the opposite direction, not in an abstention by wealthy nations from investing abroad, but in so keen, unscrupulous and rough-handed a competition for the right to invest as to result in war. this danger of war is the final argument of anti-imperialists. they argue that the sacrifices which result in increased profits to investors and merchants are made by the masses who profit least from such investment. not only do the people pay for the armaments to secure political domination, but also for the wars, which in these days of clashing imperialistic ambitions are an ever-present possibility. so long as the imperialistic scramble continues war will be inevitable. for no new dominion can be secured without threatening the interests or pretensions of rival imperial nations. the vastly extended empires are cheek by jowl. an extension of one power anywhere menaces the colonies of another nation; rival colonial ambitions merge with strategical questions. just as the united states will not endure japan on the west coast of mexico, nor england germany on the west coast of morocco or on the persian gulf, so each nation fears the approach of other nations to its most distant { } possessions. immediately even visions arise of coaling stations, from which great fleets may later issue, to be followed by transports of disciplined troops. in the seventeenth century england, france, spain and holland could hold colonies in north america and be reasonably out of each other's way. in the twentieth century, this is no longer possible. the increased cost of war adds to the opposition of these democratic groups. no longer is war a mere isolated venture of a single nation, but a conflict between alliances on a scale utterly unthought-of in former generations. no conceivable gain derived from any colonial venture of the last fifty years could compensate for the mere economic losses involved in the present war, to say nothing of the loss of life, the maiming and crippling of young men and the disruption of international bonds. and if war costs much so also does the preparation for war. until some mutual accommodation can be secured, even the most pacific nation must bear the burden of increasing armaments. there is a still deeper antagonism to these imperialistic ventures. from the beginning, the dominant classes in societies which are developing towards democracy have used foreign adventure to allay domestic discontent and to oppose democratic progress. when war is begun or even threatened it is too late to speak of uninteresting and seemingly petty internal reforms. between industrial and political democracy on the one hand and a policy of foreign adventures on the other, there is an inevitable opposition. it is not that the political and industrial interests of the dominant classes favour war, but rather a policy involving the constant fear of war. this fear itself is worth millions. it means a huge vested interest in the creation { } of munitions and armaments. it means political quiescence and domination by a financial-military group. but for the fear of war and the imperialistic policies which kept this fear alive, the militaristic _junker_ class of germany could not have maintained its domination.[ ] to disband the german army would cost these landed proprietors more than would a russian invasion. and a similar if lesser conflict in class interest is found in france, england, austria and to a certain extent in the united states. in all countries, the imperialistic policy, even when it redounds ultimately to the nation's advantage, is a class policy used to further class purposes. in europe, however, it is difficult for democratic leaders to make headway against imperialism. for the tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that where nations are constantly on the watch against each other, the imperialistic motive is interwoven with other motives of self-defence and nearer territorial aggression. if germany is intent upon war, and if her road leads over france, then france must arm. to be effective in defence, she must have { } universal service, professional officers, a true military spirit, a certain degree of autocracy in military arrangements, as well as offensive and defensive alliances, not based on a true community of interest or similarity of ideals, but upon the need of beating back the foe. if england fears german aggression she cannot afford to maintain an isolation however magnificent, but is obliged to enter into alliances, _ententes_ and secret engagements. for if you play the game you must play it according to the rules. moreover, if you have the armament and alliances necessary for defence, you are tempted to use them for an aggressive and imperialistic policy. indeed, such an imperialistic policy may actually form the cement of your alliances. all these considerations lame and thwart the movement against imperialism. moreover, the problem of governing the backward countries remains. for their own sake you cannot leave them alone, and the abstention of one nation merely makes the imperialistic ventures of other nations easier. if governments refrain from organising backward countries, the private capitalistic exploitation of these regions will be more ruthless than ever. the anti-imperialists are thus faced with a difficult situation which they cannot meet with _a priori_ argument and pious formula. with them or without them, some form of co-operation must be effected between industrial and agricultural nations as well as some form of control over countries incapable of self-government. there is need for a definite, concrete democratic policy for the government of such backward countries. [ ] in the philippines in , out of a total population of almost nine millions ( , , ), less than , were europeans and americans, including troops. the density of the native population is greater than that of indiana and over three times that of the united states as a whole. [ ] "imperialism," p. . a survey of more recent figures somewhat modifies these conclusions of mr. hobson. the statistics of prove that british commerce with british colonies has not only greatly increased but has increased faster than british commerce with foreign countries. trade with canada, australia, india, egypt, new zealand and the straits has grown steadily and rapidly. [ ] this argument, however, is not entirely conclusive, since it concerns itself with the _present_ trade exclusively. the profits in on the trade with canada would not have justified great britain in seeking to acquire it. [ ] "britischer imperialisms und freihandel." [ ] in the chief industries there were , , out of a population of , , in and , , out of a population of , , in . [ ] no such criticism can apply to the relative british decline of such crude industries as the production of coal and raw iron, since it is natural and desirable for more highly developed industrial nations to go over increasingly from the cruder to the more refined and differentiated forms of production. [ ] "as we look back, we survey the long road which england has traversed in a century. towards the end of the eighteenth century the leading man was the landlord and behind him the _breitspurig_ comfortable farmer; towards the middle of the nineteenth century it was the manufacturer and behind him the industrial workers, ripening into trade unionists and members of co-operative societies; to-day it is the financier and behind him the broad masses of the _rentiérs_." _op. cit._, p. . [ ] there may, however, be regulation, although this is, for any one nation, a difficult operation. [ ] see burgess' "homeland." [ ] in his celebrated book, "the nation in arms," the late field-marshall von der goltz shows how necessary is the sense of the imminence of war to the maintenance of the prestige of the officer class, which, as he states, is "chosen from the german aristocracy." he quotes approvingly the words of decken: "now, when in consequence of a long peace the memories of past services have become completely obliterated, and there is no immediate prospect of a war, the citizens take more and more note of the burden of the upkeep of an army, and attempt to convince themselves of the uselessness of this institution." to which von der goltz adds: "the present day ( ), especially in germany is favourable in this respect to the officer class. great and successful wars have enhanced its renown, and have moderated the envy of others. but should peace endure for several decades to come, it may again become necessary to remind the people that external favours may, without harm, be extended to the military profession, and especially to the officers."--popular edition, london, , p. . { } chapter xi the appeal of imperialism it is a significant fact that despite a democratic opposition to imperialism it is precisely the democratic nations, england and france, which are most imperialistic. the british public seems always willing to make sacrifices to extend the empire, and an almost equal enthusiasm is found among great sections of the french democracy. also in germany, when an election was fought in upon a colonial issue, thousands who usually voted the socialist ticket gave their adhesion to the imperialists. such a popular adhesion is essential to the success of an imperialistic policy. the masses need not be consulted upon the first steps but they are urgently called into conference when trouble begins and "pacification" or war is necessary. your financier, with all his money, is helpless against the rival ambitions of a great nation, and, he must have the support of his own country, its navy, army, credit, and millions of patriotic citizens. how is he to secure this support? to understand the implications of this question we must consider the changes in modern warfare and the rise of democracy in the western world. the mercenary soldiers once employed by absolutist princes would go anywhere at any time and no questions asked. war was a game played by small teams of professionals. to-day it is a national conflict in which entire populations, old and young, male and female, are pitted against each other. this fact gives { } to the peoples a passive quasi-veto upon war, for success in a crucial conflict depends upon enthusiasm and supreme unity. to-day germany would crumple if her people were actively hostile or even merely listless towards the war. it would be difficult to raise loans, to sequester goods, to ensure the continuance of the industries upon which the nation and army live. victory depends upon the morale of the entire population. during the war itself, it is true, a nation tends to lose its power of self-criticism and to fight blindly. it defends proposals that in peace would be indefencible; it works itself up to a pitch of righteous self-justification. but war to-day is won before the first shot is fired; it is won by preparation. an army must be raised, a reserve of officers created, munitions stocked, strategic railways built, and plans elaborated for rapid military mobilisation and for a war organisation of industry. all this costs money--hundreds of millions. if then the nation is to be taxed for military budgets, and if the people as a whole secure an increasing veto over such expenditures, would it not seem likely that the nations would look askance at dangerous imperialistic ventures which contributed so obviously to the danger of war and to the size of military expenditures. would not the people say to the financiers, "keep your capital at home. make your profits at home"? to avert an attitude so fatal to any national policy of imperialism likely to lead to war, enthusiasm must be aroused and support secured. this support may be sought by a two-fold appeal; to direct economic interest, and to the sentiment of patriotism. the two appeals are not sharply separated, but merge. the economic argument for imperialism is that its advantages are in the end widely distributed. better access to raw material and a wider market for manufactures { } means a flourishing national industry, steadier employment, better wages, and a prosperity of the whole population. a similar argument is made for investment in colonies. the whole nation is benefited if its capital brings the largest returns, and these are to be obtained only abroad and by an imperialist policy. this diversion of profits, works itself out in various ways. by swelling the income of the wealthy classes, foreign investment increases the expenditure at home for the labour of nationals, thus leading to steadier employment and higher wages. the servants of england are supported by india, egypt and the rand mines, as also by the profits on new york real estate and american rails.[ ] the distribution of such income, moreover, is a matter over which the british nation has the final say. the entire national dividend, whencesoever derived, is a fund out of which all social improvements may be paid. social insurance, popular education, and other government projects for the national welfare are supported, and may be increasingly supported, by a taxation which in the form of income and inheritance taxes falls heavily on the rich. such a policy, by creating a certain community of interest between classes, gives to the entire population an economic interest in the wealth of the few. the profits from foreign, as from domestic investments, may be drawn upon at will for national purposes. the importance of this development in its effect upon nationalism and imperialism has been largely overlooked. { } we have heard much of the german doctrine of the state as power, but have failed to realise how germany, like certain other european nations, has used its powers of taxation and governmental expenditure to create for the masses an ever larger stake in the national income. a policy, which increasingly taxes the rich for the benefit of the poor, establishes a certain unity in the commonwealth. even the socialist parties alter their allegiance. the early socialists were aggressively anti-patriotic, opposing to all conceptions of nationalism the solidarity of the working classes of the world. karl marx for example, declared that the workingman had no fatherland, "for in none is he a son." he was a nomad of society, doomed to a life hardly more secure, though far more burdensome, than that of the tramp or gipsy. long before the war, however, many socialists had accepted a more nationalistic view. not only did wage-earners realise that they already participated to some extent in the social surplus, but they also saw that their increasing political power would enable them to influence the future distribution of the national income, however that income were obtained.[ ] once this interest in the national dividend was assured, it became desirable, even to socialists, to make that dividend as large as possible. the belief spread that all groups within a nation have common interests opposed to the interest of other nations. thus the austrian socialist dr. otto bauer in his "imperialisms und die nationalitaetsfrage" denies that the immediate interests of the wage-earners are the same in all countries and asserts that the workers may { } find good reason to side with the employers of their own nation against wage-earners and employers in another country. "we do not say that there are no conflicts of interests between the nations, but we say, on the contrary, that as long as exploitation and oppression continue, there will be conflicts of interests between nations."[ ] from which follows the conclusion that until capitalism is destroyed, and that may take many decades, it is essential for the workman to develop the welfare of the wage-earners of his own country, rather than of the world in general.[ ] this argument is to immediate interest, which, as a rule, overrides considerations of ultimate interest. to the german workman, for example, it seems plain that english proletarians will not gain _his_ salvation; he must gain it himself. the german wage-earner must be better fed, clothed, housed, educated, organised, and all these needs translate themselves into more regular work, better paid. but if german industry is defeated by english industry, the german workman will suffer unemployment, reduction of wages, lockouts, unsuccessful strikes, and a decline in trade union membership. such a retrogression means a { } delaying of the ultimate working class victory as well as a worse situation in the present. and, parenthetically, workingmen and socialists, being ordinary men with the ambitions and appetites of ordinary men, do not spend seven evenings in the week in contemplation of a co-operative commonwealth any more than the average church-goer devotes his entire mind to the day of judgment. the german socialist has his bowling club and his _stammtisch_; he must buy shoes for the children and a new pipe for himself, and his weekly wages count more than his share in a new society, which will not come until he is dead. besides his wages, he is interested in his government insurance premiums, in the education of his children, in the things that he and his family and the families of his class wish to enjoy. if imperialism appears to raise wages as well as profits, he is not likely to oppose it on sentimental grounds, especially as there are theorists who stand ready to prove that imperialism is merely the last phase of capitalism and will bring socialism all the sooner. and the argument for the beneficial reaction of imperialism upon wages seems at first glance convincing. the german workman sees that wages are high in england. he is told that the cause is the early british conquest of foreign markets.[ ] his own rapid progress during recent { } years he associates with a simultaneous increase in german industry and foreign trade. if therefore the foreign field is to be extended, why is the german eternally to be left out in the division? such a workman does not like the methods used, but so long as markets are to be seized, whether germany takes part or not, he is, with mental reservations, in favour of a "firm" policy.[ ] he wants not war, but foreign markets. let germany become rich by means of imperialism and the wage-earner in due time will be able to get his share. if such an appeal can be made to the socialist, it can be made with even greater success to the middle classes, who have no anti-nationalistic prejudice and whose attitude is easily influenced by that of the great capitalists. the influence of the imperialistic propaganda was shown in a searching analysis of german public opinion made in or by a frenchman and reproduced in the french yellow book. the colonial expansion of france was regarded with intense irritation. "germans" it was held, "still require outlets for their commerce, and they still desire economic and colonial expansion. this they consider as their right as they are growing every day, and the future belongs to them." the treaty of with france (concerning morocco) is considered to be a defeat for germany, and france is represented as bellicose. on these two points, all groups are unanimous, "deputies of all parties in the reichstag, from conservatives to socialists, university men of berlin, halle, jena and marburg, students, teachers, employés, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, traders, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, the editors of democratic and socialist newspapers, jewish publicists, { } members of the trade unions, pastors and shop-keepers of brandenburg, _junkers_ from pomerania and shoe-makers of stettin, the owners of castles, government officials, curés and the large farmers of westphalia."[ ] "the resentment felt in every part of the country is the same. all germans, even the socialists, resent our having taken their share in morocco." the german diplomatic defeat is a "national humiliation."[ ] the words "national humiliation" used by this french observer illuminates both the force and limits of the economic motive in throwing nations into imperialism. the desire for greater profits and higher wages present themselves not nakedly, but garbed with idealistic motives. "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind," as well as a desire to gain one's own self-respect, compels men to represent their more crassly egoistic desires as part of an ethical plan. it is not hypocrisy, but a transformation of material into ideal values. thus nationalism enters into the problem, and the appeal to the supposed interests of the masses becomes an appeal to their "patriotism." the nation is outraged, humiliated, despised. its honour, which is in reality its prestige and inflated self-esteem, is affected. though not quite identical with the economic interests of the citizens, national honour has much to do with the conservation and furtherance of those interests. it is a mirror cracked and smudged with ancient dirt, which reflects imperfectly the economic motives of the classes dominant in the nation. the more primitive and instinctive a man, the more he is actuated by these idealistic elements. the crowds on { } the london streets on mafeking day did not know what they wanted with the rand mines, but they were true-blue britishers, a trifle drunk but all the more patriotic. it is to this feeling of patriotism, sober or half-sober, to which the men who have something to gain from imperialism appeal. the home nation has its sacred duty to perform to the backward country, which does not pay its debts and is rent by revolutions, fomented perhaps abroad. the home nation must not relinquish its arduous privilege. it must not haul down the flag. it must not defer to other nations. beyond the seas there is to be created a new england, a new france, a new germany, to which all the national virtues are to be transplanted. the emigrants now lost to alien lands will carry their flag with them, and the nation will no longer strew its seed upon the sand. this nation (whichever one it happens to be) has a divine mission, which it can never perform unless it has a suitable army and navy, and unless this day week it sends a battleship to a certain port in china or africa. this quasi-idealistic element in imperialism strongly reinforces the economic argument. the german, englishman or frenchman dreams of extending _his_ culture, _his_ language, _his_ influence, _his_ sovereignty. he takes pride in the thought that _his_ people rule in distant lands, in deserts and jungles, in islands lying in tropical seas, and on frozen tundras, where civilised man cannot live. it is this dim mystic conception, this sense of an identification of a man's small personality with a vast imperium, that inspires the democracies, which year by year vote supplies for imperialistic ventures, far-sighted or absurd. though this idealism is partly the expression of an unrecognised economic need, yet for the most part, though perhaps decreasingly, the average citizen looks at imperialism as a sort of _aura_ to his beloved nation, and the conceptions { } of national prestige and of imperialistic dominion fuse. moreover, even the calmer minds are reached by the fundamental argument of the necessity for extension. they recognise that despite the brutality and bloodiness of colonialism, it at least represents a certain phase or form of an inevitable development, the creation of an economic unity of the world. without colonial development, without an exploitation of unlocked resources, the industrial growth of the manufacturing countries cannot be maintained, and they will be thrown back upon their own meagre resources. so long as agriculture remains what it is to-day, the increasing millions of western europe, of japan, of the eastern united states, must rely more and more upon their commerce with the backward states, and must take a hand in stimulating their production. the present nationalistic imperialism may not be the best, it is perhaps the very worst form, that this world integration might assume, but in any case the problem remains to be solved either by this or some other means. as a consequence the opposition to our present nationalistic imperialism is tending to change from a merely negative attitude to a positive programme for an imperialism at once humane, democratic and international. it is an imperialism, the ideal of which is to safe-guard the interests of the natives, to prepare them for self-government and to carry on this process not by competition and war between the interested nations but by mutual agreements for a common benefit. the present cruelties and dangers are to be avoided. the nations are to unite in a joint, higher imperialism. it is this ideal which is to-day informing some of the leading minds of europe, an ideal which will convert the competitive imperialistic strivings of rival nations into a joint and beneficent rule of countries demonstrably { } incapable of ruling themselves by a group of nations acting in the interest of the world. such a pooling of claims is admittedly difficult and is likely to be opposed by immense vested interests of classes and nations. it is this problem of a joint imperialism, the solution of which alone stands between europe and the continuance of bitter strife and war. [ ] the profits from imperialism are only a part of the profits from foreign investment. in an economic sense, england, france, germany, holland and belgium own parts of the united states, and the profits of the pennsylvania railroad go largely to europe as do the profits of egyptian railways. there is this difference: the united states retains control of the physical property, and can, if it wishes, tax these incomes out of existence, while egypt can not. [ ] "'if social democracy is not yet in power, it has already a position of influence which carries certain obligations. its word weighs very heavily in the scale.'"--edward bernstein, "die voraussetzungen des sozialismus," p. , quoted by jane t. stoddart. "the new socialism," new york and london, p. . [ ] quoted by william english walling, "the socialists and the war," new york, , p. . [ ] "the improvement of the lot of the workers has as a necessary condition the prosperity of the industrial development; the ruin of commerce and industry would encompass their own ruin. in a speech delivered at stuttgart, mr. wolfgang heine, a socialist member of the reichstag, declared that 'the economic solidarity of the nation exists despite all antagonism of interest between the classes, and that if the german fatherland were conquered, the workers would suffer like the employers and even more than these.'" "the alliance between trade union socialism and military imperialism was manifested for the first time at the stuttgart (international socialist) congress in . the majority of german delegates, composed above all of trade union representatives, were opposed to the marxist resolution condemning colonial wars."--"l'imperialisme des socialistes allemands," _la révue_, vol. cxii. paris, . [ ] in their admirable "history of trade unionism" sidney and beatrice webb ascribe the rapid increase in the growth and power of british trade unions after in large part to the development of british commerce and industry. "this success we attribute mainly to the spread of education among the rank and file, and the more practical counsels which began, after , to influence the trade union world. but we must not overlook the effect of economic changes. the period between and (in which "magnificent hopes ended in bitter disillusionment") was remarkable for the frequency and acuteness of its commercial depressions. from industrial expansion was for many years both greater and steadier than in any previous period." [ ] this is the real but not the avowed policy of a large section of the workers, especially of trade unionists, in the social democratic party of germany. [ ] french yellow book, no. . the document, according to the german commentators is falsely dated. [ ] french yellow book, no. . annexe i. { } chapter xii the american decision we have seen how in europe the outward expansion, which leads to international friction and war, has been due to deep-lying economic motives acting on ordinarily peace-loving populations. we have seen how national interest, blended with class interest, has distorted this expansion and has turned a wholesome process of world-development into a reckless scramble for territory and a perpetually latent warfare. lastly we have seen how in all countries broad sections of the population have been sickened by the stupid brutality and imminent peril of this unenlightened nationalic competition and have groped for some plan by which commerce might expand and industry grow without the nations going to war. such a plan must involve a basis of agreement, if not a community of interest, among nations requiring economic security and industrial growth. the choice does not lie between national expansion and contraction but between an expansion which ranges the nations in hostile camps and one which affords more equal opportunities of development to all competing powers. for each nation it is a choice between a headlong national aggrandisement, which takes no account of the needs and ambitions of other powers and the development of an economic world system, in which the industrial growth of one nation does not mean the stagnation or destruction of its neighbours. like the nations of europe, the united states is faced { } with the necessity of making this decision. the problem presents itself less clearly to us, since in the past we have largely expanded within; we have been able to grow by a more intensive utilisation of what was already conceded to us instead of spreading out into regions where international competition was intense. those classes which in other countries are strongly driven by economic interest towards imperialism were in america otherwise occupied. but to-day we are beginning to overflow our boundaries, and we tend already to do instinctively what in the future we may do of set purpose. the men who wish to use army and navy to obtain american concessions in mexico, south america and china are not distantly related to the imperialists of germany, who believed that kiau-chau was a fair exchange for two dead missionaries, or to those of great britain and france who drove their nations into the boer war and the morocco imbroglio. our anti-imperialists also are animated by ideals similar to those of european anti-imperialists. the issue between these two groups and these two policies and ideals does not result in a single act of the national will. we do not go to the polls and vote once for all to be imperialistic or non-imperialistic, to grab what we can or seek a concert of the world. the issue resolves itself into many immediate and seemingly unrelated decisions. what we shall do in mexico to-day, what action we shall take in regard to a railroad concession in china, opposed by japan, what part we shall take in the coming peace negotiations are a few of the many decisions, which slowly crystallise into a national state of mind and finally into a national policy. the policy need not be absolutely rigid or consistent. while in the early days america decided upon a policy of isolation, we did occasionally interfere in europe, and despite our emphatic monroe { } doctrine, we made at least one agreement--the clayton bulwer treaty--in flat contradiction to its principles. the decision, which we are now making between nationalistic imperialism and internationalism[ ] is of vast moment. it is a decision which determines not only our foreign but our domestic policy. for europe it is equally important, since it influences the balance of power between those groups that are fighting for and those fighting against imperialism and militarism. by our comparative freedom of action, we can exert an immense influence either in accentuating the struggle between the industrial nations or in promoting a concert of action, based upon a discovered community of interest. how we shall in the end decide is not yet certain. though we are still upon the whole anti-imperialistic, voices already are raised in favour of a vigorous imperialistic policy. "the imperialism of the american," writes one defender of a policy of indefinite expansion, "is a duty and credit to humanity. he is the highest type of imperial master. he makes beautiful the land he touches; beautiful with moral and physical cleanliness.... there should be no doubt that even with all possible moral refinement, it is the absolute right of a nation to live to its full intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means such as armed { } conquest, commerce, diplomacy. such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right and in the case of the united states it is a particular duty, because we are idealists and are therefore bound by establishing protectorates over the weak to protect them from unmoral kultur."[ ] it is not given to all imperialists to present their case with so naïve a self-deception. not all would argue that it is our duty "to get richer and richer by ... armed conquest" to avert the "unmoral kultur" of some other nation which also desires to get richer and richer. yet in many other forms our imperialistic drift appears. voices call upon us to perform deeds of blood and valour, which bring national renown. ardent prophecies reveal that we shall become the first maritime power of the world and that we "are born to rule seas, as the romans were to conquer the world." but in the main american imperialistic sentiment is not vocal. it manifests itself in a vague determination to push american "interests" everywhere; to control mexico and the caribbean countries, to exert an increasing influence in south america, to be a decisive factor in china's exploitation. just how all these ambitions are to conflict with those of other imperialistic nations, our imperialists have not yet determined. let us be strong enough in our own might and in our alliances and we can take what we want and find excellent reasons for the taking. such a policy is not less dangerous because inchoate and undirected. it is all the more dangerous on that account. without thoroughly understanding the world into which they inject their undefined ambitions, our imperialists have not advanced far beyond a mental attitude. they are { } anxious to conquer and rule, to exert economic, financial and military dominion, but their future domains are not yet surveyed. this new spirit has been strengthened by the passing of our isolation. since we cannot hold aloof, our imperialists believe that we must do as other nations do, seize our fortune at any risk. we must repudiate "our idealistic past," cease to be a dilettante in international relationships, take our share of the burden and get our share of the profits in the scrimmage which we call nationalistic imperialism. if we cannot live by ourselves, let us live as do other aggressive nations. in the future this new imperialism may drift in one of two directions. we may build up an american empire, a (probably plutocratic) republic with outlying dominions, or we may enter into a close association with the british empire, converting it gradually into an anglo-american dominion. the first method is the more obvious but also the more dangerous. to secure a semi-economic, semi-political control over all north america, south of the th parallel, to rule the antilles and islands in the pacific, to control in part the policy of china, might be possible without a british alliance. but any further imperialistic development would meet with opposition. almost all the valuable countries have been pre-empted. to absorb canada, to conquer australia or new zealand, would mean relentless war against us by england and perhaps other powers. such a conflict, though undesired, is not impossible. even if it is not true, as one latin-american writer confidently prophesies, that "the disintegration of the anglo-saxon empire will be the work of the united states,"[ ] there may { } come many industrial or commercial conflicts which in an imperialistic atmosphere may lead to war. a policy of encroachment cannot but be dangerous.[ ] a more secure road to american imperialism lies in a closer union with the british empire. at present such a union would be opposed by an overwhelming majority of americans. in certain circles, however, there is a perceptible movement towards an agreement with england which might become an alliance and eventually a union. for such a union there are strong arguments. the kinship in blood, the similarity in language, traditions and points of view as well as a certain range of common interests tend to bring these two nations into closer relations. it would be a step towards a world-peace if the united states, the united kingdom, australia, new zealand, south africa, canada and newfoundland were to be guaranteed against war among themselves. the chance of peace is probably increased when the number of possible conflicts between nations is lessened. unfortunately many who desire an anglo-american alliance or union think of it only as a means of protecting rights, the defence of which would mean a circumscription of the rights of other nations and in the end a world war. writing over twenty years ago, captain mahan extolled the idea of such an alliance (although he held it to be premature) on the ground that with a strong navy the united states could help england to control the seas. he deprecated the proposal that the coalition should surrender the right to prey upon hostile commerce. it was only from the relative weakness of great britain, "or possibly { } from a mistaken humanitarianism" that any concessions from the early rigours of naval warfare were wrung by neutrals. the alliance between great britain and the united states "looks ultimately and chiefly to the contingency of war," and such an alliance "would find the two (nations) united upon the ocean, consequently all-powerful there, and so possessors of that mastership of the general situation which the sea always has conferred upon its unquestioned rulers.... but why, then, if supreme, concede to an enemy immunity for his commerce."[ ] such an alliance would mean nothing less than an imperialistic predominance in the world. the trans-oceanic colonies of all nations would be held subject to anglo-american consent. the power thus possessed might be used with wisdom and moderation or unwisely and immoderately. in either case the united states would enter upon the patrimony of the british empire. the interests controlling and exploiting the vast resources of the empire would come to be american as well as british. wall street would make money throughout the empire, and we might some day find a harvard graduate installed in the governor's chair of jamaica even if he did not actually become viceroy of india. the pressure towards such an imperialistic merger grows with the increasing sense in great britain of her precarious international position. the british empire is over-extended; it has too narrow a base for the length of its frontier. in arguing for an imperial federation, the _round table_ of london declared (in ) that "the safety of the imperial system cannot be maintained much longer by the arrangements which exist at present.... great britain alone cannot indefinitely guarantee the { } empire from disruption by external attack. the farther one looks ahead the more obvious does this become. a nation of , , souls, occupying a small territory and losing much of the natural increase in its population by emigration, cannot hope to compete in the long run even against single powers of the first magnitude--even russia, for instance, with its , , inhabitants, with america with its , , , with germany with its , , increasing by nearly a million a year, to say nothing of china with its , , souls. far less can it hope to maintain the dominant position it has hitherto occupied in the world, with a dozen new powers entering upon the scene.... what will be the position of the empire then, if it has to depend upon the navy of england alone?"[ ] even with the addition of the self-governing colonies, the population of the united kingdom is increased by less than a third,[ ] and the sixty millions of the six british nations are little more capable of defending the british empire than are the forty-five millions of the united kingdom. the advantage of far more than doubling the population back of the british empire is therefore apparent. as compared with the united states, great britain is growing slowly. moreover she is in a permanently perilous situation, lying near the strongest military powers and unable to recover, once her navy is destroyed. great britain preserves her empire only by alliances which { } prevent the forming of a hostile european coalition, and in the future an american alliance may seem indispensable to the maintenance of the empire and even to the safety of britain. at such time it may appear better to divide and rule than risk the chance of ruin by carrying the burden alone. this problem of defence is not one of valour but of economic resources and geographical position. the men of britain are as courageous to-day as were their forefathers, but just as the brave hollanders could not maintain supremacy on the sea because with their small numbers they were forced to make front against the french, so the english are now compelled to face an increasingly difficult international situation. in war, bulk, territory and weight of numbers count, and how these factors will affect the relation between great britain (even with her colonies) and other strong powers a half-century hence is a serious question. there is always the unpleasant possibility that a failure of the clever diplomacy by which great britain has hitherto divided her enemies will some day incite an attack from an overwhelming coalition of land-hungry powers. to american imperialists an invitation to share in the profits, prestige and cost of maintenance of the british empire might prove an overwhelming temptation. america would become an imperialistic people by adoption. without having laboured and fought we should overnight enter upon a joint control of the greatest imperium the world has seen. together with britain it would be ours to enjoy, and in the common possession of these vast domains the divisive forces between the british and american peoples would vanish. our american historians would forget that there had ever been a revolutionary war or would interpret that incident as a purely internal { } conflict, which temporarily lost us a few excellent islands, since regained. but if the british empire, to say nothing of new rights, privileges and possessions would be ours to enjoy, it would also be ours to defend. an anglo-american empire would arouse the envy and the fear of other nations. we should have to defend not only our new joint dependencies but the most distant approaches to them. we could not rest quietly unarmed with these possessions in our house. an anglo-american imperialism, indeed any anglo-american alliance which does not include france, germany, russia and other powers, thus brings us no nearer to peace or to a solution of the international problem. it is but the prelude to a new balance of power, a new alignment of hostile national ambitions. if great britain and the united states grow and prevent other nations from growing, exploit and prevent other nations from exploiting, we shall be merely reproducing the present fatal scission of europe upon a large scale. as against this ideal of american imperialism, on its own account or in alliance with the greatest imperialistic power, stands the ideal of internationalism. it is an ideal which looks forward towards the creation of a concert of interest among the nations, the growth of international law and the more equal utilisation of the world by the nations. it is an ideal which can be realised only as nations perceive that their ultimate advantage lies in compromising their extreme demands and merging national interests in a larger international interest. to-day an overwhelming majority of americans desire a foreign policy looking towards internationalism. they prefer to strive for peace in america and europe rather than to attempt any imperialistic expansion likely to perpetuate the war-breeding competition between nations. { } to realise this ideal, indeed to make any progress whatsoever towards its realisation, we must seek to alter the economic web in which the nations of the world now live. there is at present a conflict between two principles, economic nationalism and economic internationalism. each nation seeks to obtain for itself security, progress and a favoured position; each has its separate national ambitions. at the same time all the industrial nations have a common interest in maintaining themselves upon the resources of the agricultural countries, and in building up a vast system, in which the world's resources will be utilised most efficiently for the benefit of the world inhabitants. the problem, therefore, is to promote this economic internationalism and to limit as far as possible the disturbing influence of the divisive national interests. we cannot destroy and we cannot ignore nationalism. we cannot resolve humanity into a mass of denationalised atoms, citizens of the world with no economic or political allegiance to any state. all we can do is so to compromise and adjust strong and vital national claims, as to permit the growth of the international interest. the progress of economic internationalism, without which a permanent peace cannot be maintained, is to be furthered only as each nation attains to a political and economic security, both in the present and for the future. if a reasonable degree of industrial, commercial and colonial progress can be guaranteed, so that the great industrial nations do not live in constant peril, the vast forces which make for an international exploitation of the world's resources will be unchained. a common right to the use of the highway of the sea, a joint imperialism, an international development of commerce and of industry, a mutual insurance of the nations against war, and against national aggression likely to lead to war, will be factors in the establishment of an economic { } internationalism, which is the next stage in the economic development of the world. the united states cannot by itself create a new economic world system; all that it can do is to contribute with other nations to the removal of obstacles that retard the coming development. the opportunity to advance this movement, however, is greater in the case of the united states than in that of the nations of europe. a nation tends to prefer its immediate national interest to its larger but more distant international interest directly in proportion to the economic or political danger in which it lives. because of our wealth, our sparse population and our relative immunity from attack, it devolves upon us to be the leader in the promotion of an economic internationalism. this potential leadership of ours, however, may be lost as a result of an unfavourable economic and social development in the future. what our attitude towards internationalism, nationalism, imperialism and war is to be ten, thirty or fifty years from now will depend upon our internal development. we cannot decide for a policy of internationalism if we grow to be an over-populated country of impoverished men, with great capitalists pushing us out towards foreign adventures, economic and military. an imperialistic war-like spirit will arise if the internal pressure upon the population becomes excessive. in measuring this pressure, we are dealing with relatives, not absolutes. during many centuries the chinese coolies have become so accommodated to a meagre life that they do not seek to conquer other nations but choose rather to starve quietly within their walls. there is a higher standard of living in germany to-day than in the more pacific germany of seventy years ago, but desires have increased more rapidly than wages. as a result the nation is forced outwards. { } though in many respects conditions of life in america are improving, discontent and frustrated ambition increase. as our numbers grow, farms become relatively scarce, and a class of tenant farmers and an agricultural proletariat develop. the chances of success for both these classes are slighter than a generation ago. manufacturing is conducted on an ever larger scale and the opportunity to rise is becoming less. the openings in retail trade, though many, are small, and there are vast numbers of failures. wages are less in relation to the standards of living surrounding the workman, and fear of unemployment is chronic. the country is full of poor men with no firm purchase on life. income, it is true, is more evenly distributed than property, but even here a crass inequality reigns. upon the wage-earners falls the heavy incidence of industrial injuries, disease, and unemployment. it is of such conditions that imperialism and wars are made. to develop millions of landless men without wealth and with precarious jobs is to create a material superlatively inflammable. you can appeal to such men for a "strong" policy that will conquer foreign markets and therefore "jobs." there is a group much lower in economic status--the men submerged below the poverty line. these men, with no money in their pockets and no steady employment, but with voices, votes and newspaper organs, are susceptible to jingoism. they have a high narrow sensibility created by precariousness and hunger. here we are creating a culture for war bacteria. the concentration of wealth at the top of our society acts similarly. we are developing in america, the type of big business adventurer, who desires an aggressive foreign policy, not only for his direct business interests, but also to allay unrest at home by pointing a minatory finger at the foreigner beyond our borders. { } already we have many of the elements that go to make up the war spirit. in the present conflict we have been pacific owing to the division of our sympathies, the deadening realisation of the immense forces engaged and losses incurred, and the realisation that our interests were not involved. to these factors there was added a sudden prosperity contingent upon our remaining at peace. but even as early as , when the proletarisation of america was less developed, we had millions of inflamed patriots, who would willingly have fought all europe rather than "haul down our flag" in the philippines. what will happen twenty years from now, when our export trade is greater and more necessary and when (unless we change conditions) there will be more poverty and insecurity than to-day? if at such a time germany, japan or russia, or all three, determine upon an action, which will injure our pretensions and throw many of our citizens out of work, we shall surely feel resentment. we cannot safely predict that we will adopt a gentle attitude. like france in , like russia in , we may stumble into a war over our rights and pretensions, may be rushed into it not only because of a conflict of interests which we did not foresee but because of a vicious internal development which we did not avert. all our customary self-assurances that we shall never fight nations now friendly are mere deception. so we thought just before the war of . we were never more pacific than in when we ventured on a desperate challenge to england, or in when we attacked spain. though we averted war with germany over the _lusitania_ matter, our public mind was so uninformed that we might easily have been pushed into the conflict by a more bellicose president. we should have a better chance of keeping the peace if we were not so blindly confident of our { } peacefulness. it takes only one to make a quarrel, and the aggressor might not impossibly be ourselves. nor can peace be predicted on the ground that we have given no offence and do not intend to give offence. the other nation will be the judge of that. and if we become imperialistic we shall have given offence enough. neither will our religion, our almost universal christianity, strike the weapons from our hands. it is doubtful whether religion ever kept a nation out of war. the germans and the english are both christian peoples and therefore quite willing to fight god's battle, which is their battle. if a crisis arose in america out of our economic conflicts with europe and our own psychological instability, we should find the ministers of the gospel on the same side as the editors, politicians, and the people generally, as they have been at most times when peace has been threatened. a war rooted perhaps in the rival interests of american and foreign oil companies in venezuela would be hailed on both sides as a battle for civilisation and the lord. not even our diversity of racial stocks would prevent such a war, though it would no doubt make us hesitant. we should be loath to fight against germany, austria, italy or england, because of the presence in our midst of natives of these lands. once the fighting had begun, however, all opposition would be overcome, and the war would go on despite its spiritual costs. if we are to decide therefore not for imperialism and imperialistic wars but for a policy which will mean peace for ourselves and peace and international reorganisation for europe and the world, we must begin our labours at home. unless we are able to build a democratic civilisation upon the basis of a thoroughly scientific utilisation of our own resources, unless we so direct our american development that we shall not be forced to fight for a { } larger share of the remaining exploitable regions, we shall make little progress towards a settlement of the grave problems which now divide the nations. to promote an economic internationalism we must make our own internal economic development sound; to help cure the world we must maintain our own health. internationalism begins at home. [ ] it is difficult to find terms in which to express clearly the two policies between which we are choosing. in a sense the issue is between imperialism and internationalism, but since any international attempt to solve the problem of the backward countries must lead to some joint occupation, exploitation or dominion, which may be called imperialistic, the opposition of the two terms is not complete. nor do the terms nationalism and internationalism describe the two policies. the internationalism for which we are striving does not negate nationalism. it is not a cosmopolitanism, a world-union of undifferentiated and denationalized individuals, but a policy of compounding and accommodating permanent and distinct national interests. [ ] _seven seas magazine_ (organ of the navy league of the united states), nov., , pp. - . [ ] f. garcia calderon, "latin-america. its rise and progress." new york, , p. . [ ] a second prophecy of señor calderon is to the effect that "unless some extraordinary event occurs to disturb the evolution of the modern peoples, the great nations of industrial europe and japan, the champion of asiatic integrity, will oppose the formidable progress of the united states."--_op. cit._, . [ ] mahan (a. t.), "possibilities of an anglo-american reunion." _north american review_, july, . [ ] _round table_, london, may, , pp. - (?). [ ] the combined white population of new zealand, australia, south africa, newfoundland and canada (in ) was only . millions, or almost exactly the increase in the (total) population of continental united states in the one decade ending . the white population of the united states already constitutes / of the total white english-speaking population of the world. moreover, population is increasing far more rapidly in the united states than in the six british nations. { } part iii towards economic internationalism chapter xiii natural resources and peace for the united states to attempt to secure an economic internationalism, which shall form the basis of an enduring peace, is to enter upon a task which bristles with difficulties. these difficulties fall into two classes, those which tend to deprive america of her freedom of action and disqualify her for leadership, and those which are found in deep antagonisms among the nations to be reconciled. america cannot succeed in her efforts to bring about an economic internationalism if she herself is economically or psychologically unstable or if her own foreign policy is grasping, aggressive and imperialistic. nor can she succeed unless her efforts are wisely directed towards the solution of the real problems which now divide the world. in all such discussions we are likely to take america's pacific intentions in the future for granted. such an assumption, however, is unwarranted. to-day the peace-maker is the organiser of the world and no nation can lead in the peace movement, nor even be assured of its own peace, unless it has reached a certain stage of economic stability and is organised on a reasonably satisfactory economic basis. our danger of war lies partly within. if we launch out upon an imperialistic policy, placing our vital national interests within the area of keen international rivalry, we shall be in peril of a war, evoked by ourselves. the time to prevent such a conflict is not immediately { } before its threatened outbreak but during the period in which the forces making for war are slowly maturing. these forces, in our case at least, take their rise in home conditions. our chance of peace with england, germany, japan or russia twenty or thirty years from now depends upon what we do with our own territory and our own resources to-day. this may at first glance seem a paradox. why should we fight germany or japan because our agriculture is inefficient or our fiscal policy inadequate or because our wealthy are too wealthy and our poor too poor? yet the connection is close. bellicosity is not spontaneous, a thing evolved out of nothing. peoples do not fight when they have what they want, but only when they are frustrated and cramped and need air and elbow room. war is like emigration. the individual migrant leaves home for personal reasons, but the great movement of emigration is nothing but an escape from worse to better economic conditions. if the natural resources of a nation are too small or are badly utilised the resulting insecurity and poverty may lead to international conflicts. or if the national economy though otherwise efficient and self-contained is so ordered that huge masses of the population are impoverished and destitute, there will always be a centrifugal force inciting to foreign adventures and wars. where there is no place at home for "younger sons" they will seek a place outside. nowhere can one study this tremendous internal outward-driving pressure better than in japan. that nation, though extremely poor, spends huge sums upon armies, navies and fortifications, and engages in a dangerous and perhaps eventually fatal conflict with other powers. but it is not pride of race or dynastic ambition which compels japan to enter upon these imperialistic courses, but a { } sheer lack of economic reserves. her area, not including korea, formosa, sakhalin, etc., is , square miles, or less than that of california, while her population ( ) is , , . moreover, japan is so extraordinarily mountainous that the greater part of her area is unfitted for agriculture. despite a very low standard of living, therefore, and a highly intensive culture, the land cannot feed the population, and foodstuffs must be imported. the population is growing with great rapidity, the excess of births over deaths amounting to over six hundred thousand a year. nor has japan a sufficient outlet through emigration. the immigration of japanese into australia, british columbia, the united states and south africa is practically prohibited. most parts of eastern asia are too crowded with men living still lower in the scale to permit any large infiltration of japanese. to japan, therefore, there are but two alternatives to an ultimate famine: the settlement of korea and manchuria, and industrialism. for industrialism, however, japan is rather ill-fitted by tradition and lack of raw materials. her best chance is to sell to china and to develop manchuria and korea, in both of which directions she runs counter to european ambitions. as a result, japan becomes imperialistic and militaristic. the american temptation to imperialism is far weaker than is that of japan. there is for us no overwhelming necessity to enter upon a scramble for new territories or to fight wars to secure such territories. our aggressiveness is latent, though with a capacity for growth. there are two ways to lessen this potential aggressiveness. the first is to weaken economic interests favouring imperialism and war and strengthen opposed interests; the second is to build up in the people a tough intellectual and emotional resistance to martial incitement. the remedy resolves itself into two { } factors, economic completeness and internal stability and equality. economic completeness depends in the first place upon a certain relation between natural resources and population. if the fields and mines of a country are too unproductive or its population excessive, there will be an inevitable leaning upon the resources of foreign countries and an intense competition for new territory, trade or investment facilities. a nation, however, may possess most of the elements of economic completeness and yet suffer through a bad geographical position. its commerce, even its coast-wise commerce, may be at the mercy of a foreign country, or it may not control the mouths of its own rivers, or may be shut off completely from the sea. switzerland, hungary, bohemia cannot secure their economic independence of spain or france, but must depend upon the good will of other nations. because of such geographical conditions an otherwise pacific nation may fail completely to build up a resistance to war. an event in our own history will illustrate this point. from to , our settlers in the ohio valley were entirely dependent for the sale of their products upon an outlet through the mississippi river. unless spain and later france would permit the rude arks, laden with tobacco, flour and bacon, to unload at new orleans, the west would be shut off from markets. railroads had not yet been invented and there were no good roads over the mountains. animosity towards the owner of new orleans was therefore inevitable,[ ] since unless we could { } control the mouth of the mississippi, we could not secure the allegiance of our own settlers west of the alleghenies. the interests of our citizens lay beyond our borders; the key to our door was in the hands of a foreign power. but for the lucky accident that peacefully gave us louisiana, we should sooner or later have been forced into war. the cession of this territory tended to establish for us an economic completeness. an economic completeness for the united states does not of course mean that we should become a hermit nation, absolutely shut up within our tariff walls. it would be manifestly undesirable to prohibit foreign commerce or the foreign investment of american capital and no such sacrifice, even if possible, would be necessary to prevent a too violent friction with europe. there is a more direct way in which to increase america's economic reliance upon herself and diminish her dependence upon the accidents and hostilities of the world competition. it can be done by a better utilisation of our own resources. as yet we have merely skimmed the cream of one of the richest parts of the earth, and have exploited, rather than developed, our great continental territory. we have been superficial not thorough, hasty not scientific, in our utilisation of our resources. we have still a margin in which further to develop agriculture and other great extractive industries in order to lay at home the basis for a population which is bound to increase during the coming decades. how great our friction with europe is to be will depend on whether our economic development in the main is to { } consist of activities which impinge upon those of the great industrial countries or of activities which do not so impinge, whether for example, five per cent. or thirty per cent. of our people are to be engaged in industries which actively compete in foreign markets with the industries of europe. certain of our economic activities are for us pacific in tendency, inasmuch as they do not affect industrial europe or actually benefit her. of such a nature is agriculture. every added bushel of wheat or bale of cotton raised in the united states improves the chances of european industry, lessens our competition with europe and increases our market for european wares. the same is largely true of our production of copper, gold, silver, petroleum and other natural products. upon these extractive enterprises, including coal and iron ore, is based a vast manufacturing industry which supplies our home population, and an immense transportation and commercial system which has its roots in our home resources. our railroads do not appreciably compete with those of england and germany; on the contrary the industrial progress of those countries is hastened by the development of our transportation system, which cheapens their food and raw materials. on the other hand a development of the american carrying trade, a growth of ship-building, shipping and export trade, however necessary or desirable, trenches immediately upon british and german shipbuilding, carrying and export trade, and leads directly and inevitably to economic conflict.[ ] { } the dependence of our economic mutuality with europe upon our agriculture may be illustrated by an hypothesis. assume that our agricultural products were permanently cut in half while our population remained constant. we should have no food to export and would be obliged to import food. millions of men would be forced out of agriculture into manufacturing industries, and as the home demand for these industries would be lessened a foreign market would be essential. our railroad traffic would diminish, and railroad workers, thrown out of employment, would enter the export trade. we should be forced to secure foreign markets, and if political pressure were necessary, it would be forthcoming. similarly, our chances for investment in agriculture and in railroad and industrial companies being lessened, capital would be forced to find an outlet in other countries, especially in semi-developed lands to which european capital flows. the rate of interest would fall, big risks would be taken, and if american investments were endangered by unrest or disorder in the backward country, our government would intervene. we should have no choice and could afford no scruples. given such a fall in our agricultural product, the country would become imperialistic and bellicose, and there would be not the remotest possibility of our taking the lead in a policy to promote international peace. the hypothesis is far-fetched, but exactly the same result would follow if instead of our agricultural product dwindling, it remained constant while our population grew. if our population increased per cent. and our agricultural product remained stationary or increased only twenty or forty per cent., it would be impossible to maintain our present relation to the world. we must uphold a certain, not quite constant relation between our agricultural (and other extractive) industries and our { } population if we are to keep out of the thickest of the european complications. a secure basis for a policy of non-aggression lies therefore in the development of home agriculture.[ ] it is not, however, to be expected that the proportion of farm workers will remain constant. in the united states this proportion has steadily fallen. of every thousand males in all occupations were engaged in agricultural pursuits in as compared with only in .[ ] but despite this relative decline agriculture did not become less productive. more horses and more agricultural machinery were used, and fewer persons were able to perform the same amount of work. what is more significant than the number of persons employed is the amount of land available for agriculture. until we were in the extensive period of american farming, during which an increase in the population was met by an increased farm acreage. from to our population increased from to millions, but our farm area increased almost as fast and the improved farm area even faster.[ ] during the decade ending , however, a strong pressure of population upon american agriculture became obvious. in these ten years the country's population increased per cent. while the total farm area increased only . per cent.[ ] while , , { } people were added to the population the increase in farm area was equal only to what would accommodate an additional three and a half million people. it is no longer easy to stretch the farm area and to a large extent our farms must grow by the increase of the improved at the expense of the unimproved acres.[ ] actually the per capita agricultural production in (the year covered by the census of ) was less than that of a decade before. though the crops in the latter year were far higher in value, the increase in the quantity of product was only per cent., as compared with an increase in population of per cent.[ ] had the american people consumed all the american product in both years, they would have been obliged to cut down their ration by about one-tenth;[ ] instead there was a vast diminution of exports. the growing population began to consume the agricultural products formerly exported. the question is therefore pertinent whether it will be possible for us indefinitely to feed from our own fields our increasing millions or whether we shall be forced to depend increasingly for food on outside sources and to secure this food by a development of our export trade in manufactured products. to many this question will seem to answer itself. it is commonly assumed that there are almost no limits to { } our possible agricultural production and therefore to our desirable increase of population. france is almost self-sufficing with a population of . to the square mile; when the united states (continental area) has an equally dense population we may maintain a population of five or six hundred millions. we need merely take up new lands and cultivate more intensively. the opportunities for the further development of american agriculture, however, while undoubtedly great, are not immeasurable. at present we have some , , acres in farms, of which , , (or . per cent. of our total land area) are improved.[ ] but of the rest of our area much is not useful. some , , acres in the western part of the country have an annual precipitation of fifteen inches or less, and of these acres, not over , , could be profitably irrigated at present prices of farm products, labour, land and capital. this addition of , , acres would increase our present improved area by less than seven per cent. besides the permanently arid acres, moreover, there is other unusable land in national forests, roads, cities and in swamps and over-flow lands difficult to reclaim. with these deductions made, we have only , , , acres as the maximum farm area of the future. this is . per cent. greater than the present farm area.[ ] it is true that a larger part of the farm area can be cultivated. from to the area of improved lands increased . per cent. if this rate of increase could continue there would be about one billion acres improved by , and this seems to be the absolutely { } outside upper limit. but this does not mean that a billion acres could be improved and cultivated at the same cost per acre as at present. the improved lands would require a constantly increasing amount of capital and labour to secure returns equal to those which the farmer now obtains. similarly there are limits to the extent to which we can afford to divide up our land into smaller farms in order to secure a larger production per acre. intensive cultivation is an alluring phrase but in the production of many staple crops intensive cultivation is dear cultivation. the movement in progressive agricultural communities is towards a moderately large farm. it is the smaller farms (of from to acres) that the boys and girls leave most rapidly. "the farm management studies," writes mr. eugene merritt of the u. s. department of agriculture[ ] "indicate that on these small-sized farms, man labour, horse labour, and agricultural machinery cannot be used efficiently. in other words, economic competition is eliminating the unprofitable sized farms."[ ] { } the pressure of agricultural population upon a given farm area results either in the growth of an inefficient small scale production or of a large rural proletariat. both are undesirable and neither will permit farming on as cheap a scale as at present. the actual trend to-day in districts where cereals are raised is towards larger farms (of to acres), and this tendency is likely to be increased by the introduction of cheap tractor engines, which now seems to impend. there is doubtless a considerable opportunity in the united states for an improvement in the average product per acre even though the increase in the area of cultivation constantly brings in land of decreasing fertility. if in the course of forty or fifty years we can increase the area under cultivation by fifty per cent. and the product per acre by per cent. we shall have an increase in product of per cent., which would provide for an increase in the population of , , without any greater leaning upon foreign resources than to-day.[ ] we are likely, however, to lean upon certain foreign resources, and more especially upon canada and the caribbean countries. whatever its political allegiance canada is and will probably remain economically a part of the united states. the iowa farmers, who sold out their home farms to buy cheaper land in canada, unconsciously illustrated the closeness of this economic bond. we may draw upon canadian wheat, fish, lumber and iron ore almost exactly as though the territory were our own. it is canada's interest to sell to us and buy from us, and even preferential duties cannot entirely overcome our immense geographical advantage over europe. similarly { } we shall draw upon the caribbean countries, whether or not we have a political union, for vast quantities of tropical food stuffs. whatever our importation of food an increase in agricultural efficiency is also probable. we have already improved and cheapened our farm machinery and have disseminated agricultural education and information. but much progress remains to be made. we can use better seeds, raise better crops and cattle, and work more co-operatively instead of individualistically. our transportation system can be better co-ordinated with our agriculture, so that food, now wasted because it will not pay the freight, can be brought to market.[ ] a better knowledge of the science of farming would greatly increase our agricultural production. if our country roads were improved, if we varied our crops more intelligently, if we refrained from impoverishing our soils, if we drained some tracts and irrigated others, we should speedily discover a vast increase in our agricultural productiveness, a larger return to the farmers, a greater home demand for manufactured products, and a better opportunity for capital at home. { } if by putting more capital and intelligence upon our farms, we were to add several billions to the value of their output, we should broaden the base of our whole economic life, enlarge the volume of our non-competitive exports, and in the end approximate conditions that would make for a peaceful foreign policy and for the promotion of an economic internationalism. but though we widen our agricultural base, our population unless its rate of progress is checked, will eventually, and perhaps soon, overtake any extension.[ ] though we increase agricultural knowledge and substitute mechanical for animal power and gasoline for hay, the law of diminishing returns will remain. ten men cannot secure as large a per capita product from a given area as five, or twenty as large as ten. but if our population were to maintain its present geometrical increase we should have , , inhabitants in and, to assume the almost impossible, , , in . long before the latter figure could be reached there would be positive and preventive checks to further growth, but if these checks were late in being applied, there would come increased inequality, misery and economic uncertainty, and an enhanced liability to war. for us as for other nations a too rapid increase in population spells this constant danger of war. our farms cannot absorb more than a certain proportion of our population without causing lowered wages and increasing poverty, and we cannot expand our export trade without entering into the range of international conflict. while therefore an improved agriculture with high food prices will permit of an increase in our population, it is { } advantageous that that increase does not proceed too rapidly. if we grow to two hundred millions in seventy-five or one hundred years instead of in thirty-seven, we shall still be strong enough to protect our present territories and shall have less occasion to fight for new. fortunately our rate of population increase, despite immigration, is steadily decreasing. in the decade ending our population increased . per cent., in the period to at an average decennial rate of . per cent., and in the three following decades . per cent., . per cent. and . per cent respectively. the fall in our natural increase was even greater. while the death rate has declined[ ] the birth rate has fallen off even more rapidly. our birth statistics are inadequate, but we can gain some idea of this decline by comparing the number of children under years of age living at each census year with the number of women between the ages of to inclusive. in there were children per , women in these ages; in , ; in , ; in , ; in , .[ ] for a number of decades a continuation in this falling off in the birth rate is probable. it is rendered necessary by the fall in the death rate and possible by the fact that birth has ceased to be a mere physiological accident { } and is coming under human control. "the most important factor in the change," says dr. john shaw billings, "is the deliberate and voluntary avoidance or prevention of child-bearing on the part of a steadily increasing number of married people who prefer to have but few children."[ ] the spreading of the knowledge of birth control and the increasing financial burden of children in an urbanised society composed of economically ambitious people will probably prevent our population from ever again increasing as rapidly as it did half a century ago.[ ] in the meanwhile our immigration (until the outbreak of the present war) continued to increase. in the ten years ending june , , over ten million immigrant aliens arrived in the united states, of whom approximately seven millions remained. nor has the high point in immigration been surely attained. the european population increases so rapidly that the excess of births over deaths is between three and four times the entire emigration. immigration tends to flow from countries where the pressure of population is greater to countries like the united states, where the pressure is less. unless there is restriction we may witness within the next decades a new vast increase in immigration, which will result in a rapid growth of our population and a resulting pressure upon our agricultural (and other natural) resources, that will vastly increase the intensity and bitterness of our { } competition for the world's markets and the world's investment opportunities. by thus increasing our agricultural product, and developing our home market and our less directly competitive industries and by slackening an increase in our population, which would otherwise force us into foreign adventures, we tend to approach a balanced economic system and a parallel growth of extractive and manufacturing industries. such a dependence in the main on home resources for the nation's primal needs is in the circumstances the best preventive of an imperialistic policy that might lead to war. but there is an even closer-lying incentive to imperialism and war. a nation may have a sufficiently wide base and an efficient industrial development but because of internal economic mal-adjustments may be driven into imperialistic courses. a policy not dictated by national needs may be forced upon the nation by the necessities and ambitions of its dominating class. [ ] "there was," he (president jefferson) said, "one spot on the face of the earth so important to the united states that whoever held it was, for that very reason, naturally and forever our enemy; and that spot was new orleans. he could not, therefore, see it transferred to france but with deep regret. the day she took possession of the city the ancient friendship between her and the united states ended; alliance with great britain became necessary, and the sentence that was to keep france below low-water mark became fixed."--john bach mcmaster, "history of the people of the united states," vol. ii, p. . [ ] agriculture is not essentially pacific; in various stages of historical development agricultural nations war upon each other in order to secure more land or to levy tribute of grain. the pacific tendency of our present agricultural development arises out of the needs of industrial europe. our agricultural progress, however, is peaceful only in so far as it increases the product of our fields; it would not be peaceful, and might be the exact reverse, if we sought to increase our acreage by, let us say, a conquest of canada. [ ] by this is not meant that the nation should be preponderatingly agricultural, but only that where agriculture is sufficiently developed to maintain a large industrial population working for the home market the competition for foreign markets and foreign investment fields becomes less intense. [ ] "agricultural pursuits" includes agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry. these figures from the united states census, , vol. iv, p. , are only approximately exact, owing to almost insuperable difficulties in classifying occupations. see vol. iv, p. . [ ] thirteenth census of the united states, vol. v, agriculture, p. . [ ] the improved farm acreage increased . per cent., and the acreage devoted to the principal crops . per cent. [ ] the new lands, moreover, are not so good as the old. from to the lands brought into cultivation (illinois, iowa, etc.) were better than the earlier area, but since the farmers have driven forward into more arid lands further removed from transportation. "across the great plains, the farmer has pushed closer and closer to the base of the rockies and, as he has done so, the difficulty of producing a bushel of corn or wheat has continually increased."--king. (willford isbell.) "the wealth and income of the people of the united states," new york (macmillan), : pp. , . [ ] for the comparability of the years and , see census volume on agriculture, p. . [ ] actually . per cent. [ ] total land area equals , , , acres. [ ] thompson, warren s. "population: a study in malthusianism." studies in history, economics and public law, columbia university vol. lxiii, no. . new york, . [ ] "the agricultural element in the population:" _american statistical association quarterly_, march, , p. . [ ] the dwarf farms found in many parts of europe are even less economical. the bavarian, french, or belgian peasant secures more per acre than the american farmer but much less per hour or year of work. "small scale farming, as we have defined it," says prof. thomas nixon carver, "invariably means small incomes for the farmers, though the land is usually well cultivated and yields large crops per acre." "the french or the belgian peasant (because of the smallness of his farm) frequently finds it more profitable to dispense altogether with horses, or even oxen, as draft animals, using rather a pair of milch cows, or only a single cow, for such work as he cannot do with his own muscles." "he would likewise find a reaping or a mowing machine a poor investment. the general result of such small scale staple farming is necessarily the use of laborious and inefficient methods."--"principles of rural economics," pp. - . new york, . [ ] if, however, the average product per acre remains constant or decreases, the pressure of the population will make itself felt far sooner. [ ] the loss in perishable farm products, to cite only one instance, is tremendous. a very large proportion of the perishable fruits and vegetables, and a smaller proportion of the dairy and poultry products, decay on the farmer's hands. according to a study made by mr. arthur b. adams, "at least per cent. of the perishables which arrive at the wholesale markets is hauled to the dump-pile because it is unfit for human consumption.... in warm weather florida oranges lose per cent. in transportation alone, and if we add the decay after the fruit reaches the consuming centre the total loss would be astounding. there is a loss of per cent. in eggs from producer to consumer, due to breakage, decay, etc., but butter has an equally great loss.... it is not an over-estimate, therefore, to say that between and per cent. of the perishables which are raised on the farms are never consumed at all, but are a complete social loss."--"marketing perishable farm products." studies in history, economics and public law. columbia university. vol. lxxii, no. , p. . new york, . [ ] it is of course assumed that no means will soon be found by which cheap food can be produced synthetically; if that happens, all our conclusions go by the board. [ ] in the decade - the death rate in new york city was . per cent., in the period - only . per cent.; in massachusetts, in the same periods, the death rate was . and . per cent. respectively. the diminution was due, partly to a change in the age-constitution of the population and partly to a progressive control of diseases.--walter f. willcox, "the nature and significance of the changes in the birth and death rates in recent years." _american statistical association quarterly_, march, , p. . [ ] prof. willcox, who presents the table from which these figures are drawn, illustrates the decline by showing that its continuation would wipe out all births in years, so that by we should live in a baby-less world.--_op cit._, pp. , . [ ] quoted by prof. willcox, _op. cit._, pp. , . [ ] that there lies a danger in exactly the opposite direction cannot be denied. there are limits to the fall in the death rate, but practically no limits to the possible decline in child-bearing. the limitation of births is almost entirely determined by individual (or family) considerations, and may proceed to a point where population will decline rapidly and perhaps deteriorate in quality. a linking up of the individual interest in small families to the social interest in having the population maintained or slowly increased, as well as improved in quality, is essential. { } chapter xiv an antidote to imperialism a nation, though economically complete, in the sense that it could, if it desired, maintain its population upon its own resources may yet be lured into an imperialistic and warlike policy. just as political disintegration leads to internal conflicts, disorders and finally foreign intervention, so an economic disequilibrium, by placing the interests of certain classes within the arena of international friction may evoke a struggle, which can have no other issue than war. this is exactly the effect, for example, of a gross inequality of wealth and income. such an inequality means that multi-millionaires, gaining far more than they can spend, are impelled to invest their surplus funds in outside ventures. the capital that can be profitably absorbed by industries manufacturing for home consumption depends upon the ability of the population to purchase food, clothes, houses, furniture, watches, and automobiles. if the population cannot or will not increase purchases at a rate commensurate with the increase of national savings, a vast capital must either be diverted to manufacturing for the export trade or must itself be exported. neither of these deflections is in itself bad; in moderation, both are good. there is, however, a certain degree of intensity of competition for foreign trade and investment which means industrial war and the danger of military war. the wider the interval between { } national savings and national consumption, the more powerful and dangerous is this expulsive tendency of capital. such a tendency may arise in a country in which, despite an equality in wealth, the national savings are excessive, but the greatest danger is in countries in which the returns to capital, rent and business enterprise are large and the returns to labour small. the big profits come from the manufacture of articles of common use, and the home demand for such articles is limited by the consuming capacity of poor men. the surplus capital must therefore find a vent, and the larger this surplus capital, the more venturesome it grows and the more insistently it demands that the state back up its enterprises. we may trace this development in the recent history of great britain. though british wages rose during the half century ending in , the consuming capacity of the masses was not sufficient to employ the rapidly expanding capital. british capital went everywhere; among other places to the transvaal. there was more money in "kaffirs" than in making socks for the british artisan, and if international friction resulted from this capital export, it was all the better, or at least none the worse, for the financiers. the men who controlled the rand mines knew when shares were to rise and when they were to fall, and profited by their knowledge. nor were war preparations disadvantageous. an extra dreadnought helped british capital more than would the expenditure of the cost of such a vessel in increasing the wages of school teachers. yet it was because school teachers and other wage-earners in britain, as in many other countries, were poorly paid, that the accumulating capital of the nations was forced increasingly into foreign lands and into imperialistic ventures. morocco, egypt, korea and manchuria offered larger rewards than did the highly { } competitive businesses which depended on the custom of french, english and russian peasants or wage-earners. the inequality in the distribution of wealth proved to be a stimulus to imperialistic competition. those who are satisfied with things as they are never tire of speaking of this distribution of wealth as an immutable thing, protected by economic laws more potent than legislative enactments. they insist that law cannot control the expansion of capital or the distribution of wealth. but our whole system of distribution is based on law. if england had not preserved entail and primogeniture, if france had not decreed the equal inheritance by all children, if the united states had not adopted a liberal land policy, the distribution of wealth in each of these countries would have been far different. within wide limits the economic course of the nation can be controlled. such a peaceful programme for creating a better distribution of wealth, a wider consumption and therefore a larger employment of capital in industries for home consumption has the added advantage that it is a policy in complete harmony with the interests of great sections of the population. the average man desires peace feebly; he does not think of it day and night and is not willing to fight for it. but he is willing to fight for things which actually contribute more towards peace than do arbitration treaties. the demand of the workman for higher wages, shorter hours and better conditions is, whether the wage-earner knows it or not, a demand for international peace. progressive income and inheritance taxes, the regulation of railroads and industrial corporations, the conservation of natural resources are all opposed to an imperialistic policy leading to war. in short the entire { } democratic struggle against the narrow concentration of wealth, by increasing the demand for capital within the country, tends to preserve us from a meddlesome, domineering, dangerous imperialism. to increase the consumption of the masses of our people is easier for us than for germany or england because of our wider economic base, our bulk, territory and immense potential wealth. to increase wages, we need not, like the crowded countries of western europe, acquire new resources beyond our borders. we already have a place in the sun, and out of our waste can extract more than can germany or france out of colonies for which they must fight. it is easier for us to increase industrial rewards because we now waste more in our unregulated scramble for wealth than germany gains in her scientific, economical use of her smaller resources. compared to industrial germany we are a spendthrift nation. had germany our resources and numbers, she would be peaceful and rich; were we obliged to live on her narrow territory, we should be bellicose and impoverished. not that germany has solved the whole problem; all she has learned is to be efficient. her early poverty taught her to make a little go a great way, to combine the peasant's industry and parsimony with the far-flung plans of the business organiser. so capably has she done this that living conditions have improved as her population has increased. where all nations have as yet failed, however, is in the distribution of the industrial product. in the end a gross inequality of wealth and income, as we find it in all developed countries, is another form of waste. it means fewer economic satisfactions, less true value. a few billion dollars added to the income of twenty thousand families is of less utility than when distributed among { } twenty millions. inequality of wealth, moreover, involves low wages, over-work, child labour, insecurity, unemployment, preventable disease, premature death, in short, a bad economy. it also involves an inability on the part of the masses to consume the product of industries in which the wealthy invest. the economic inequality in the united states does not as yet present the same imminent dangers as in certain european countries. wealth, it is true, is most unevenly distributed,[ ] but while incomes are also very unequal,[ ] the rate of wages[ ] and the returns to farmers and to small business men are far greater than in the industrial countries of europe. our statistics of consumption reveal an immense and constantly increasing demand for all kinds of articles and services. as compared with england or germany the distribution of income in the united states permits a high standard of living and creates a vast demand for the use of capital in industries for home consumption. there is, however, a danger that these conditions may grow worse. an unrestricted growth of the population { } either through natural increase or immigration would tend to increase monopoly profits and reduce real wages, thus accentuating the inequality of distribution and forcing an enormous surplus capital to be devoted to foreign trade and foreign investments. on the other hand there is an opportunity to improve our conditions. there is still a wide margin for a real increase in wages, for shorter hours, better labour conditions, improved education, improved recreational facilities, and in general a deflection of a large part of the national dividend to the improvement of the conditions of life of the whole population. for a long time americans ignored the necessity of any such social policy. we were almost as wasteful of our human as of our physical resources. from birth to burial we regarded our men and women as human accidents, who died or lived, languished or grew great, as circumstances decreed. though in recent decades we have approached to a keener sense of collective national responsibility, we still suffer not only from a high infantile death-rate but also from a disastrous neglect of children who survive. our educational system is still rudimentary, conventional, and ill adapted to our economic needs. there is little industrial education, less vocational guidance, and almost no care at all for the adjustment of the educational system to the later needs of the children. millions of children, who in the next generation are to decide questions of war or peace, are growing up, anemic, underfed, intellectually sterile, and without morale, firmness or strength. our slums, our low wages, our evil conditions in mines and sweat-shops unite to give us the tramp, the corner loafer, the exploiter of vice, the criminal. such conditions are in every sense dangerous to our peace as also to our well-being. they mean a low economic efficiency, a restricted consumption, a barrier to the proper capitalisation of our country. { } apart from this, the corruption arising out of such conditions menaces our national character. we hear praise to-day of the iron discipline of the german army, but we hear less of the discipline of the german school, factory system, social legislation, trade-union. if millions of americans are shiftless, shuffling, undisciplined and only vaguely and crudely patriotic, the cause is to be found in our neglect of the lessons of modern social life. to state these conditions of human waste and exploitation is to suggest the remedies. all such remedies cost money, hundreds of millions. there is no progress without higher taxes, better spent, and we shall not advance except by the path of a vast increase in collective expenditure for common purposes. in the end, of course, such improvements will pay for themselves. if we spent fifty millions a year upon agricultural education, we could easily reimburse ourselves out of our increased production. we spend over five hundred million dollars annually upon public elementary and secondary education, a sum much greater than that spent in any other country. if, however, we could efficiently organise our school system, we could more profitably spend three times as much. there are many other chances for the ultimately profitable investment of our capital upon agencies which make for a more intelligent, active, industrious and self-disciplined population. there is an added use to which such higher taxation may be put. by means of a larger collective expenditure, a more equal distribution of income and a wider consumption by the masses may be secured. what can be attained by industrial action, such as strikes, can be effected in even greater measure through fiscal action. taxes, to redress inequality, should be sharply graduated. by taxes on unearned increment and monopoly profits, by the { } regulation of the wages, prices, dividends and profits of great corporations, we could increasingly divert large sums to wage-earners, consumers, stockholders and to the nation as a whole. by increasing the consumption both of individuals and of the national unit, such taxation would give an impetus to home industrial development. if this deflection of wealth from the rich caused a temporary lack of capital, the resulting rise in interest rates would stimulate saving and repair the evil. such a progress would mean not only an advance towards a fuller, freer and more active life for the population but also a diminution of the impulse to imperialistic adventure and war. an increased income for the men at the bottom creates a broader economic base, a less top-heavy structure, with smaller necessity for support from without. it increases our home market, widens the home investment field and reduces the intense sharpness of competition for the profits of the backward countries. it affords the opportunity to be disinterested in foreign policy and to work for the promotion of international peace. equally important is its effect upon the national psychology. it gives the people a stake at home. a device, familiar to certain statesmen, is to divert the people's minds from domestic affairs by arousing animosity against the foreigner. is it impossible to allay hatred of the foreigner by concentrating interest on home concerns? psychologically this process is nothing but immunisation. a disease may be resisted by the absence in the blood and tissues of substances needed by the bacteria for their growth and increase. as we may immunise the body, so we may immunise the mind of individual or nation. we protect our children from error, not by forbidding the publication of false doctrine but by creating in the child's mind a true knowledge and a faculty of { } criticism. similarly to guard against the infection of the war spirit a public opinion can be created in which war bacteria will find no nutriment. to immunise society is not, however, a mere juggler's trick; we cannot ask washington to legislate us into immunity. what is needed is a potent social change, arousing enthusiasms and antagonisms, and involving a new attitude towards business and politics, freedom and discipline; a new efficiency; a new balance of power within society; a new attitude towards the state; a new value placed upon the life of each individual. such a change involves a patriotism so exigent that the nation will resent poverty in fall river or bethlehem as it resents murder in mexico. many americans would find such a revolution in our conditions and attitudes uninteresting or worse; some, with vast material interests at stake, would prefer a dozen wars. against this indifference and opposition, the change, if it comes, must make its way. such a progress would not, of course, create perpetual peace within the community. we read much to-day of satiated nations, unwilling to fight for more, but considered from within, there is no satiated society. everywhere groups fight for economic, political or social advancement. in a democratic community the mass of the people, and especially the manual workers, though in a more favourable economic situation, would still be unsatisfied. conflict would endure. it is well that it should be so, for a society in which all were contented in a buttressed, routine life would go to war through sheer boredom. the economic antidote to imperialism thus resolves itself into a very necessary intellectual and emotional antidote. the lure of war persists even to-day, when soldiers dig themselves into burrows and individual courage is lost in the vast magnitude of the contest. nor can you { } counteract the temptation to fight (or have others fight) by preaching sermons against war, for the sermon and the bugle-call seem to appeal to different cells in the brain. all you can do is to polarise a man's thoughts and inspire him with other interests, ambitions and ideals. a full, varied, intense life is a better antidote than a mere vacuity of existence, without toil, pleasure, pain or excitement. in his search for an antidote to war, william james points out how utterly the ordinary pacifist ignores the stubborn instincts that impel men to battle. "we inherit," he says, "the war-like type.... our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years won't breed it out of us. the popular imagination fairly fattens on the thoughts of war." the men at the bottom of society, james assures us, "are as tough as nails and physically and morally almost as insensitive," and if not to these then to all "who still keep a sense for life's more bitter flavours ... the whole atmosphere of present-day utopian literature tastes mawkish and dishwatery." for the discipline of war, william james wishes to substitute another and more strenuous discipline, "a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against _nature_." "the military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life. to coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in december, to dish-washing, clothes-washing and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stokeholes, and to the frames of sky-scrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the { } childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideals."[ ] even in a society which would permit an industrial conscription both of rich and poor, a certain latent bellicosity, making for war, would undoubtedly persist. there seems to be an irreducible minimum of jingoism, just as whatever your precautions, you cannot quite do away with rats or noxious germs. no nation is free from this cheapest intoxicant. you may find it with the expensive american on his travels or on the cracker-barrels in the country store and you cannot help stumbling over it in the yellow journals and in many dull and respectable newspapers which do not know that they are yellow. even the self-depreciating type of american may turn out to be a jingo if you will trouble to take off his peel. such jingoism, however, though unpleasant may be quite innocuous. we all have a trace of it as we all are supposed to have a trace of tuberculosis. so long as our jingoes confine themselves to merely trumpeting national virtues, actual and imputed, we may rest content. such men will scarcely be capable of stirring a whole population to war, if men are living under decent conditions, struggling for still better conditions, and competing on a high plane. if we can secure prosperity, efficiency and equality and can make life fuller, more intense, varied and romantic, the ravages of jingoism will be circumscribed. it will be argued, however, that though we make our conditions what we will we shall still be anxious to fight at the first opportunity. "it is evident," says prof. sumner,[ ] { } "that men love war; when two hundred thousand men in the united states volunteer in a month for a war with spain which appeals to no sense of wrong against their country and to no other strong sentiment of human nature, when their lives are by no means monotonous or destitute of interest, and where life offers chances of wealth and prosperity, the pure love of adventure and war must be strong in our population." if two hundred thousand volunteer for a war when we are not obviously attacked, will not the whole country go to war for the sake of "honour"? it would be foolish to answer this question categorically; no one can predict what a nation will do when wounded in its self-esteem. the heir of thousands of centuries of fighting, man is to-day, as always, a fragile container of dynamite, not guaranteed against explosion, and there are experts in the touching off of dynamite. when bismarck falsified the ems despatch he knew exactly what its effect would be upon the french sense of honour. but "honour" is an ambiguous word, meaning everything, from a scrupulous regard to national obligations freely entered upon to a mere truculent bellicosity. the honour of nations, in the sense that nations usually fight for honour, is mere prestige, and prestige is not much more than an acknowledgment of formidableness. the danes and the dutch are honourable, but, in the sense in which the word is ordinarily used, neither denmark nor holland can afford honour. the claims of national honour, moreover, are strangely shadowy and transitory. what seems imperatively demanded by honour at the moment becomes insignificant later. for a number of years the united states paid tribute to the barbary pirates; our citizens were sold into slavery and his serene majesty, the dey of algiers, treated our representative in a manner which a great power to-day would hardly adopt in an ultimatum to { } paraguay or san marino.[ ] but it was not then convenient to fight and so we pocketed our honour until a more convenient occasion. the dey of algiers has long since gone to the scrap-pile of history, while the united states remains, a respected and honourable nation. nations which are sure of themselves, like men who respect themselves, are somewhat slower to resent affronts than nations which are insecure and fearsome. in austria was solicitous of her honour, which, she believed, was assailed by servia, and russia was solicitous of hers, for these two powers were engaged in a contest over the fears and prepossessions of the balkan states, and "honour" meant adherents. but when in the same year, a mexican government offered what was believed to be an affront to the united states, our people were in no mood to feel insulted. we did not need prestige. after all, questions of honour are usually questions of interest. in the _lusitania_ controversy, we did not receive the apologies which we believed were due to us. but as we had no interest in fighting germany, and as germany gained less from her submarine campaign than she would have lost in a war with us, the matter was amicably, though not logically, settled or at least postponed. had we, however, been in a different economic position, had a few million unemployed men been striking, rioting and threatening to revolt, or, on the other hand had we had plans for our aggrandisement at the expense of germany, acts of war would have followed within twenty-four hours of the massacre. we should have been far more "jealous in honour." but we were otherwise engaged. the headlines were full of the events { } in europe and the horror of that tragedy in the atlantic, but the gaze of america was inward. we were interested day by day in the ambitions of peace. thus our hope of remaining at peace ourselves and of contributing to the peace and economic reorganisation of the world depends not only upon the conservation and development of our natural resources but also upon a distribution of wealth and income which will widen the consumption by the masses and will give to the whole population the opportunity of a full, varied and purposeful life. all these things, as well as the moral discipline which is so urgently needed, can be secured only as we learn to apply a national policy to our own nation. it is our own slackness, our own "state-blindness," our lack of a complete democracy, which increases our chances of imperialism and war. it is, on the other hand, our increasing willingness to take a national view of internal affairs, our increasing desire to base american prosperity upon american resources and to make life fuller and more valuable, that acts as a deterrent to war and fits us for the difficult task of contributing to a world peace. finally such a contribution to the peace of the world implies the condition that our own foreign policy shall not be in conflict with the international ideals which we are seeking to promote. if we ourselves are interested in the parcelling out of backward countries, we shall not be able to exert a restraining influence upon nations whose necessities are greater than ours. by this is not meant that we are to stay at home completely and enjoy no rights beyond our borders. such an effacement would mean a monastic seclusion for the united states. but while in the world beyond there is a fair field for peaceful competition, in which we also may take our part, our hope of promoting economic internationalism depends upon our not playing { } a lone hand, upon our abstention from a selfish and short-sighted policy of national aggression and upon our free co-operation with other nations seeking the goal of international peace. [ ] according to estimates based on studies of estates probated in massachusetts and wisconsin, it appears that per cent. of the population owned almost per cent. of the wealth while the poorest per cent. of the population died in possession of only about per cent. of the wealth. see king (w. i.), "the wealth and income of the people of the united states," new york, ; also cited sources. [ ] twenty per cent. of the population receive . per cent. of national income and the remaining eighty per cent. of the population . per cent. of the national income.--king, _op. cit._, p. . [ ] from to the total wages (and salaries) paid in the united states increased from . to . thousands of millions of dollars; the average wage increased from $ to $ ; the increase in the annual wages, taking into account differences in the cost of living, was per cent. for basis of these calculations see king. [ ] william james. the moral equivalent of war. in "memories and studies." new york. longmans, green & co. . [ ] sumner (william graham). "war and other essays," new haven (yale university press), , p. . [ ] "in captain bainbridge, arriving at algiers with the usual tribute, was ordered to carry dispatches to constantinople. 'you pay me tribute,' explained the dey, 'by which you become my slaves, and therefore i have a right to order you as i think proper.'"--fish. (carl russell.) "american diplomacy," new york ( ), p. . { } chapter xv american interests abroad no nation in its foreign policy is completely disinterested, in the sense that it willingly abandons or sacrifices its larger interests. what generosity it displays is usually in smaller matters, like a rich man's gift to a beggar. england may sacrifice interests in jamaica to uphold the principle of human freedom, while at the same time fighting china to force the admission of opium. similarly the united states may generously return money to japan (as in the shimonoseki case) or to china, or relieve the sufferers of messina or of belgium. in really vital matters, however, nations are not self-sacrificing, but tenaciously pursue their own interests. there are two senses, however, in which a nation may be disinterested in its foreign policy. either it may possess no interest or its separate interest may be so small in relation to its larger interests elsewhere that it is willing to make a sacrifice. if, for example, the present war ended in a deadlock and the two groups of powers, unwilling to trust each other, were to confide constantinople and the straits to the keeping of the united states, it would be almost unthinkable that we should be false to the trust. we should have no interest in favouring one group of nations as against the other; we should have no political axe to grind and no economic or territorial gains to make. we should be fair and disinterested because we had no interest. { } our recent attitude toward cuba, the philippines and mexico has been relatively disinterested in the second sense. we might have made money by exploiting these countries. we could have held cuba; we might have imported a million chinese into the philippine islands and grown rich on their toil, while in mexico, where we already had invested a large capital which was menaced and in part destroyed by the revolution, we could have taken what we wanted and held what we took. certain motives of decency prevented us from following this ruthless course; our self-satisfaction was worth more to us than a few hundred million dollars. the important fact, however, was that we were not pressed for this wealth. we were not compelled by poverty or pressure of population to grab what we could. we were able to seek a larger interest, to lay the basis of a slower but surer prosperity and to gain the good will, if not of cubans, filipinos and mexicans, at least of the nations generally. in the long run it was a policy that will pay, and our conditions are such that we can still afford to consider the long run. but although we have been occasionally disinterested or have shown at least a chemical trace of disinterestedness, our foreign policy has usually pursued concrete national aims. it has been a conservative, relatively uneventful policy, consisting for the most part in a quiet, unhurried advancement of our interests, with a not excessive consideration for the opinions of other nations. we have been cautious though persistent. we have avoided forcing quarrels upon powerful nations until we had grown irresistible. usually we obtained the large thing, but where we could obtain it only by fighting formidable opponents, we compromised. when as in we found ourselves in a dangerous position, we endured aggression by france and spain until we were again free { } to compel redress. time worked for us, the passing years were our allies and we could afford to move slow. but we moved always in one direction--toward our perceived national interest. the issue, therefore, is not whether we shall sacrifice our national interests, but whether in our foreign policy we shall pursue ultimate, or at least relatively permanent, interests in a large way or seek immediate, smaller gains. it is a choice similar to that which a great store makes when it sells standard goods at a fixed price instead of seeking immediate advantage by petty cheatings and interminable and multitudinous hagglings. as nations advance towards power, stability and security, they are enabled to base their programmes increasingly on long time views and, ceasing to be interested in small advantages, to seek their larger interests in a policy of tolerance and seeming magnanimity. it was to england's real interest to be scrupulously fair in peace time toward weaker naval nations; it was equally to her larger interest to open her dependencies to the trade of the world and to accord political rights to her lately conquered dutch subjects in south africa. a tighter and harder policy would have been short-sighted. even had it gained immediate advantages, it might have left england in a day of adversity with the great powers ranged against her. the choice between immediate and ultimate interest in foreign policy presents itself daily. we could, for example, simply take the danish west indies, instead of paying for them, and doubtless might secure ourselves against a future retaliation by the great powers. such an adventure, however, to say nothing of its ethics, would be monstrously stupid. or, while the european nations are looking elsewhere, we might "go" into mexico and keep { } what we wanted. we have a better excuse than in and an equally safe opportunity. we should be richer to-morrow if we took mexico, but would it pay in the end? would such a conquest accord with our larger policies and our true ambitions in the world? it is in this light that we should view the problem of our foreign policy as it shapes itself to-day. we must preserve certain national interests, material and spiritual. we must ward off certain dangers, securing ourselves as other nations secure themselves. but for better or worse, we have become a world power and a world influence, and what we do outside, as well as within, our borders, must affect the decisions and actions of other nations. if our ideal is not aggrandisement or empire but an equal fellowship with other great nations, if we desire to contribute to the progress of international development and not merely get all we can in the scramble, how shall we shape our foreign policy? on what broad general principle shall we decide the urgent questions which arise day by day in most unexpected conjunctions? the answer to these questions is not easy; there is not even an agreement as to what our interests are. what, after all, do the hundred million americans want beyond their borders? what are we willing to fight for rather than forego? what do we already have or claim, the retention of which would justify us in fighting? how we shall answer this depends upon our temperament and our special interests. certain americans would advise us to fight all europe, rather than recede from an action already determined upon or acknowledge that american policy is conditioned by the will of foreigners. one need not argue against such convictions. it is the current, instinctive philosophy of "my country right or wrong, wise or foolish; my country against the world." to fight { } all europe, however, is not to fight at all, but merely to be assassinated. to act as though europe had no rights which america needs respect is to adopt a principle profoundly hostile to our own welfare. to a financier, whose interests in mexico, guatemala or indo-china are attacked, war seems preferable to a neglect of those interests. he would not put the matter so crudely; he would say that he preferred defeat or even disaster to a peace dictated by fear. what would lead him to this patriotic conclusion, however, would be the conviction that to do nothing would lose him his property, whereas even a disastrous war would cost him only his share in the national loss. and the war might be gained or even avoided, if only the united states were bold enough. he would, therefore, define our national interests as including all those things to which we in our good judgment believed that we had some claim. those with no special interest in foreign investments are less solicitous. a default on the bonds of mexican railways is less costly to the iowa farmer or boston stonemason than the contraction of debts for the purpose of pacifying mexico. to fight england or germany seems more costly to the average american than to forego extra opportunities for making money in china or the argentine. even the farmer or stonemason, however, feels that the united states has certain interests and rights abroad. our citizens should have the right to travel freely upon the high seas and in foreign countries and to enjoy privileges and immunities granted to citizens of other nations. we should have equal access with other nations to the sources of raw materials and to world markets, subject to the reserved right of each nation, including the united states, to levy customs duties for the protection of its own industries. finally we should enjoy the right of { } investing our capital and conducting our businesses abroad under the equal protection of the laws of the particular country. all this is of course vague. it does not determine what protection we should assure ourselves in a country whose government is corrupt or unstable, nor does it consider the contingency of a weak nation, granting under duress more favourable conditions to some other foreign nation than to us. while however we cannot arrive at any final decision as to the details of our foreign policy, we can at least formulate in general terms certain principles which we may seek to apply. the most vital of these principles is equal opportunity for all nations, and no special advantage for ourselves or others. in accepting such a principle the united states would be merely applying to a territory, over which it held a dominant influence, a policy which, if universally applied by all the great powers, would immensely reduce the area of international friction. to apply such a principle in good faith is the first and most obvious contribution that we can make to economic internationalism. we cannot in reason demand the open door in asia or in europe's colonies if in our own colonies and in other lands where we are paramount, we adopt a contrary policy. we can afford to concede this principle of equal opportunity because of our resources at home and the large share of trade and investment opportunities which will come to us without special favours. what we might get above that is not worth the risk. a policy of taking all we can get, whether other nations suffer or not, is, apart from all other considerations, injudicious. such a policy of aggression might be cloaked for instance under the monroe doctrine, a vague tenet, capable { } of contraction or infinite expansion. if we allow our speculators to determine its meaning, we shall in due course interpret the doctrine as the right of the united states to control south america politically and exploit it industrially. the downward path to such an interpretation is easy. to secure an inside track in latin america we need only look askance upon concessions to europeans and with benevolence upon concessions to americans. we can place obstacles in the way of foreign corporations recovering damages for injuries suffered, while we aid american companies to secure redress. we can make our ministers to latin america "business agents" of exporters and big banking concerns. such a policy would mean economic and eventually political control, the much feared _conquista pacifica_. if we embark upon such a policy we shall earn the hatred both of europe and of latin america. hitherto the monroe doctrine has been safe from serious attack by europe because england with her preponderant sea-power has been commercially the chief benefactor, and the other nations believed that, for the time being at least, south america was held open for joint exploitation. moreover, europe had nearer problems in the disposition of balkan territory and in the partition of africa and sections of asia. so long as european nations were not ready to divide up latin america, or so long as they believed that it would remain independent and thus open to the commerce of all, the temptation to fight for a slice of the great continent, though alluring, was not sufficiently powerful to overcome the sense of the peril of such an undertaking. for germany to seek to conquer a part of brazil would have been to add all the american nations to her already long list of enemies. but this tolerance of the monroe doctrine is conditioned upon our playing { } the part of a guardian and not of a conqueror. we can neither monopolise latin america industrially nor rule it politically (which might involve the same result) without trenching upon the common patrimony of europe. to secure the inside track means therefore either to fight all europe, which is impossible, or to share the booty with one or two allied powers, like england and france, and thus to enter into all the complications and dangers of european politics. a pan-americanism of this sort would involve us in the next balkan imbroglio or the next quarrel over the persian gulf, and our peace would be at the mercy of any little monarch who struck the first blow at one of our allies. in latin america itself such a policy of aggression by the united states is already feared and resented.[ ] the people to the south of us do not take our professions of disinterestedness with the simple faith of little children, but see in us a virile, formidable, unconsciously imperialistic nation, which has already benefited by its guardianship and hopes to benefit still more. they fear the colour prejudice in the united states and a certain unreasoning contempt for latin-american civilisation might lead us impatiently to set aside their rights if they conflicted with our own interests. the latin americans already speak of a "north american peril." they remember texas, { } panama, porto rico. indeed, they recognise that the united states, in despite of itself, may be forced to expand southwards. "it is more than probable," writes the mexican sociologist, f. bulnes, "that by the united states will hold a population of , , inhabitants. they will then scarcely be sufficient for the needs of this population, and will no longer be able to supply the world with the vast quantity of cereals which they supply to-day. they will therefore have to choose between a recourse to the methods of intensive culture and the conquest of the extra-tropical lands of latin america, which are fitted, by their conditions, to the easy and inexpensive production of cereals."[ ] there is a nearer danger. "sometimes," writes garcia calderon, "this north american influence becomes a monopoly, and the united states takes possession of the markets of the south. they aim at making a trust of the south american republics, the supreme dream of their multi-millionaire _conquistadors_."[ ] thus to shut off latin america, as spain once did, would, however, injure the southern republics and create an antagonism that would find its expression in armed resistance. nor would this resistance be entirely negligible. a century ago, latin america had a population of fifteen millions; to-day its population is eighty millions and is rapidly increasing. as an ally to european nations, opposed to aggression by the united states, a latin-american country or group of countries might well exert a decisive influence. ill defined and vague, capable of being indefinitely expanded by all sorts of sudden interpretations, the monroe { } doctrine is to-day a peril to latin america and to ourselves. it is likely to become even more dangerous if turned over to an american plutocracy for its elucidation. if on the other hand, we restrict our policy to the protection of the interests of latin americans, europeans and ourselves, we shall not only be safe-guarding our own peace, but shall be removing a future coveted area from the field of international strife. to adopt such a policy, however, means that we must be better informed and more concrete. it is absurd to lump together all latin-american countries, as though all were equally advanced in civilisation. to compare the argentine with san domingo is to discover differences almost as great as between holland and abyssinia. mexico is far more significant to us politically, economically and in a military sense than brazil or chile. into the question of panama, haiti and the west indian islands generally, elements enter that are absent from our relations with venezuela or ecuador. our policy towards these countries need not be identical. we should have a mexican policy, a separate policy for the west indian islands, another policy for the caribbean states, and an individual policy for each south american state. our interests and obligations differ in these states. we cannot pretend to the same vital interest in the internal peace of argentina as in that of our next door neighbour. we cannot cover these diverse conditions with the blanket of one vague doctrine. in our relations to latin america, moreover, we should not grasp at political sovereignty, if the reasonable economic interests of the world can in any way be secured without political incorporation. we are gradually being forced into a policy of acquiring dominion over certain caribbean countries. we have a financial guardianship in haiti and san domingo; we have "taken" panama, { } and it probably needs only a little disorder to give us a quasi-protectorate over other small countries in the same neighbourhood. the united states, however, is on the whole still averse from such interference, wherever avoidable. we have kept faith with cuba and there is strong opposition to acquiring mexico, despite the agitation of financiers and instinctive border-line patriots. the problem is not easy, for a measure of peace in these neighbouring states is not only essential to us but is demanded by europe (who will interfere if we do not) and peace may eventually require intervention. in countries like haiti, which show at present an invincible distaste for orderly government, abstention is almost impossible. the chief danger in our relations with certain latin-american countries lies in this political instability and unripeness that makes property and life unsafe and the administration of justice notoriously corrupt. the result is extortion, bribery and violence clothed in legal form. investors and creditors plead for intervention to enforce contracts, sometimes of doubtful validity, sometimes obviously dishonest. to meet the problems arising from such claims, we should have more information. our bureau of foreign commerce should ask for data concerning american investments abroad and especially in latin america. such information, supplied in the first instance by the corporations, should be verified by official investigations. there should be full publicity. our consular representatives should not seek to secure special privileges or business orders, and our governmental influence should guarantee equal economic opportunities to all nations. no claim by americans should be enforced until it has been reported upon favourably by a court of arbitration composed of representatives of nations with no interest in the controversy. { } whether the united states should seek the aid of england or of some other european power in the maintenance of the monroe doctrine or should endeavour to internationalise the doctrine by gaining the adhesion of all nations, or should support the doctrine with the aid of the latin-american countries alone is a question the answer to which will depend upon the future attitude of european nations, and especially upon the relation of the united states to those nations. the difficulty of securing an international guarantee lies in the necessary vagueness of the doctrine. in the present state of mind concerning international guarantees, there is perhaps more immediate advantage in a special guardianship by the united states, the argentine, brazil and chile, especially as in the case of an assault upon the doctrine by one or more european powers, the assistance of other european nations could probably be obtained. the important consideration at present is that the strength of the doctrine will be in direct proportion to the disinterestedness of the united states. the more clearly the doctrine can be made to serve the common interests of the world instead of the special interests of a single country, the more likely is it to secure the support in any crisis of a group of nations possessing a preponderance of world power. our relations with canada present fewer temptations. our policy should look towards the creation of friendly relations and a nearer economic union, but neither immediately nor ultimately towards a forced annexation. a willing political incorporation of canada into the united states might be excellent, but an annexation against the opposition of the canadian people would be a crime and blunder. it would mean an american alsace-lorraine upon an immense scale. economically canada and the united states are rapidly becoming one. with exports to { } canada already more than twice as great as those of all other nations (including great britain) we can at will draw upon her immense agricultural and mineral resources by the simple expedient of letting down our tariff wall. we can invest there as safely as britisher or canadian, and can benefit by canada (as canada benefits by us) as though she were a part of the united states. a growth of the eight million canadians to twenty or more millions will mean for us an enhanced prosperity. despite absurd prejudices on both sides of the border the economic union grows stronger.[ ] if we do not strive for an inside track in latin america nor for the conquest of canada, should we be willing to fight for the "open door" in china, for equal privileges in all parts of that empire? the phrase the "open door" has a pleasing sound. there can be no doubt that the opening up of china's ports to commerce with all nations on equal terms would be of immediate advantage to us, and probably to china herself. our interest in the matter, however, is frankly selfish. though we have a kindly feeling for the chinese, so long as they stay in china, our "open door" policy is intended in the first instance to benefit our own merchants and investors. the alternative to the open door is to { } permit other nations to divide up china, a proceeding in which we do not care to take part, and to exclude us from certain trade and investment opportunities. it is doubtful whether these chances which we should lose by an unaggressive policy, are sufficiently important to justify us in entering upon a conflict with japan or with japan and russia.[ ] our losses would be less than is imagined, for whoever opens up china will be compelled to admit other industrial nations upon reasonable terms. japan cannot finance herself, to say nothing of financing china, and the nations, called upon to supply capital, would necessarily be consulted in essential political and economic arrangements. even if japan secured a relatively excessive share of the commerce, it would mean a diversion of other trade, which she formerly possessed, since her own factories would be busy. in the end, we could afford to permit other nations to take upon themselves the burden of policing china, in view of the fact that while our { } own profits might be less our expenses also would be less. a deeper problem, however, is involved in this question of china. just as by the monroe doctrine we seek to prevent european powers from conquering, colonising and dividing up america, so in china, our interest, apart from a share of the trade and investment chances, lies in contributing to the world's peace by removing that vast territory from the field of international political competition. what we should mean by "the open door" in china is the integrity of that country and its immunity from conquest, partition and forced exploitation. the plea of an "open door," as a mere tariff policy, comes with ill grace from us, who have closed the door both in porto rico and at home, but china's integrity is an issue of a different character.[ ] it is important to us not so much for immediate economic reasons as because it is likely to promote peace. it is a world, rather than a national, interest. because it is a world-interest, it should be secured by the efforts of many nations and not by the united states alone. { } in principle, therefore, the six-power loan, which in a sense was a joint guarantee, was a step in the right direction. that its specific terms were unreasonable and that the loan was in a degree forced were perhaps sufficient reasons for our withdrawal from the arrangement. along somewhat similar lines, however, the early development of china should proceed, and it is to our interest to promote any plan that will prevent china from being the bone of contention among the belligerent nations of europe.[ ] our relations to latin america, canada and china are perhaps the most immediate of our foreign concerns. these are the lands in which we have the greatest stake and the greatest temptation to pursue an imperialistic policy. the real power in this world, however, lies in europe. it is europe that decides the fate of asia, africa, australia, and may in the end decide that of south america. it is from europe that the fear of war arises, and it is in our dealings with europe, and in the dealings of european nations with one another, that the hope of peace and of progress in international development must centre. [ ] for a view of latin america's fear of aggression by the united states, see such books as "el imperialismo norte-americano," by f. caraballo sotolongo, havana, , and américa latina ante el peliogro, by salvador k. merlos, san josé (costa rica), . both of these books are shrill and somewhat uncritical but they fairly represent a large body of latin-american thought. there is usually a division of opinion as to whether the united states is to attain its ends by military or by financial means. "it is not _manu militari_," writes a french author, "that brother jonathan intends to carve out his place in the sun, but by the force of dollars."--"l'imperialisme allemand," by maurice lair, paris, . [ ] f. bulnes, "l'avenir des nations hispano-americaines," quoted by f. garcia calderon, "latin america," p. . [ ] f. garcia calderon, "latin america. its rise and progress," p. . [ ] the problem of canada's relation to european controversies and wars may in the future present difficult problems for the united states. if in the present war germany had been able to land armies on canadian soil, or if in the future russia or japan were to do so, the position of the united states might be rendered dangerous by the permanent establishment of a strong military power, let us say in british columbia. yet we could not demand that canada be allowed to send troops against russia or japan and those nations be forbidden to attack in return. the problem of the immobilisation, and even of the neutrality, of canada in certain future wars, in which great britain is engaged but we ourselves are neutrals, may become an urgent question. [ ] a guess at our possible losses through a non-aggressive policy in china is made by mr. thomas f. millard in his "our eastern question." "it is roughly estimated," he says, "that china's administrative, commercial, and economic development in the next twenty years will need $ , , , of foreign capital. under a genuine application of the hay doctrine, america would have approximately one-fourth of this financing.... the returns from this investment would be partly interest and partly trade. five per cent. interest on $ , , is $ , , income annually." in other words for the privilege of gaining twenty years from now $ , , a year from an investment which if made at home or in the argentine or in russia would bring us in little less, mr. millard would have us put japan in her place and if necessary join with england and perhaps france to fight both japan and russia. even if we add the trade profits to this interest on investment, the total result is pitiably small. at our present rate of increase in wealth we may add about one hundred and fifty billions of dollars in the next twenty years. whether or not one-half billion is invested in china is, nationally speaking, superlatively unimportant. if we intervene in china let us not do it for a few million dollars annually. (see millard, _op. cit._, p. .) [ ] the significant question has been raised whether manchuria should be included in the china, whose integrity is to be secured. while china is very densely populated, manchuria prior to had only , , people on an area of , square miles, a density of population considerably less than that of minnesota. with immense natural resources, its development has, says dr. james francis abbott in "japanese expansion and american policies," p. , been prevented by "the existence of wandering brigands 'hunghuntzies,' who terrorised the country." dr. abbott distinguishes between the japanese occupation of shantung, which is filled with chinese, and of south manchuria which "was a sparsely settled province of which china was merely the nominal owner. the russians, and after them the japanese, occupied it as americans occupied california and annexed it for the same reason." korea and manchuria are absolutely necessary to japan. "japan's needs for expansion are real and obvious. manchuria and korea could hold the double of the japanese population" (p. ). in other words dr. abbott advises a policy of maintaining the integrity of a china, excluding however both korea and manchuria. [ ] if china does develop an industrial civilisation it may be quite capable before many generations of maintaining its own integrity and independence. the weaknesses under which china now suffers would tend to disappear once it became industrially organised. that this impending industrial progress of china would mean ultimate economic danger to western europe is probable, but this remote danger would not prevent those nations pursuing their immediate economic interests in developing china. { } chapter xvi pacifism static and dynamic if at home we have a firm basis for national development, if we grow up as a great power beyond the range of fierce conflicts between the nations, the opportunity will be offered us to contribute in some degree to the ultimate establishment of peace, or at least to the limitation of war, in the world outside. our influence can be cast upon the side of peace and augment the forces making for peace. our hope lies in a national development, which will permit us while pursuing our larger national interests to work towards a great community of interest among other nations. in such an international peace the united states has a direct and an indirect interest. it has been recently asserted that we in america might regard the present war with equanimity since it brought us huge profits. undoubtedly there is money to be made out of the selling of provisions and munitions as well as from trade in countries from which competitors are temporarily excluded. on the other hand, the war means the impoverishment of european nations, who are our main purveyors and customers, and eventually the losses suffered by combatants must be shared to some extent by us who are non-combatants. the war brings about a dislocation of the world industry, a shrinking of capital, and in the end higher prices and a possible reduction in real wages. { } in the years to come we shall be forced to pay our share of the cost. nor is this economic motive our sole reason for desiring international peace. we are linked to the nations of europe, and however we declaim against "hyphenates," cannot prevent our immigrants from sympathising with the land of their birth. the present straining of loyalties in this country is a sufficient reason for our desiring peace in europe. nor do we like bloodshed or the political reaction and the backwash of barbarism that wars entail. finally, however neutral we remain, there is always the possibility that we may be plunged into a great european conflict, in which in the beginning at least we shall have no direct interest. diplomatically also, war in europe is of no overwhelming advantage to us. in the early days of the republic, a constant balancing of hostile forces prevented england and france from taking advantage of our weakness. the quarrels of europe enabled us to preserve our independence by opposing a unitary strength to the enfeebling european dualism; otherwise we might not have dared to use so shrill a tone in admonishing the great powers. but even had the eagle not screeched, we might still have led a satisfactory national existence. whatever was true in the past, however, we need no longer be so completely defenceless that we must fear that peace in europe would mean a conquest of america. we should rather have europe fight itself than us, but--in dollars and cents as in other values--we should prefer to see the world at peace. we shall not secure peace, however, by merely wishing for it or by merely preaching it. in the midst of war there has always been the longing for peace, and throughout the centuries voices have been raised calling upon mankind to give up its war upon itself. the ideal of peace { } pervades much of all folklore; it inspires the old testament prophets and is everywhere expressed in the new testament. the religious ideals of the chinese, hindus and persians are suffused with the hope of peace, and greek and roman philosophers and poets dreamed of a peaceful commonwealth of peoples and planned the federation of the world. the early church fathers, irenæus, clement of alexandria, tertullian, cyprian, augustine, preached the gospel of peace, and while the church doctrines later changed in this respect, there reappeared again and again during the mediæval period the conception of a world state, presided over by emperor or pope, and ending once for all the ceaseless strife among princes. after the reformation religious sects grew up, like the mennonites and the quakers, who preached not only peace but non-resistance. out of all this longing for peace, out of all these proposals, however, came nothing. similarly the pacifist writings of the abbé de st. pierre, of rousseau, of leibnitz, of montesquieu, of voltaire, of kant, of jeremy bentham and of hundreds of others did not bring the world a single step nearer to an elimination of war.[ ] throughout this long history, pacifism failed because it was in no sense based upon the actual conditions of the world. it was a religious, sentimental, hortatory pacifism. finding peace desirable, it pleaded with the men who ruled nations to compose their quarrels. it was an appeal not to the interest but to the sentiments of men. it discovered that war was evil and exhorted nations and rulers to refrain from evil. with the period of enlightenment that began shortly before the french revolution, the movement for peace was { } accelerated. the ideas that were once current only among philosophers began to spread among considerable sections of the population. gradually also pacifism became rationalistic rather than religious or moral. war was attacked not because it was evil in the eyes of god but because, like high taxes, monopolies and tariffs, it was adverse to the economic interests of nations and peoples. the growth of the doctrine of _laissez-faire_ and of free trade gave a new impetus to the pacifist movement. the people of the world were looked upon as a myriad of human atoms, whose welfare did not depend upon the power of the particular state of which they chanced to form a part, but upon the free enterprise of each and the unobstructed exchange of products among all these individuals. it was held that the world would be better if there were no customs barriers, and free trade on equal terms for all the people of the world was predicted as a proximate consummation. there would then be no need for wars or fleets or armies, which cost money and prevented the progress of humanity. wars were economically inadvisable. they did not benefit the sovereign individual, and therefore could not benefit the nation, which was merely a huge assemblage of individuals. like the religious and emotional pacifism which preceded it, this rationalistic pacifism broke down through its sheer inapplicability to the facts of life. while the philosophers of the french revolution were still proclaiming the advent of peace, the greatest wars until then in all history were already preparing, and again when in at the first world's exposition in london men began to hope that the era of peace had at last come, a long period of war was again imminent. never was there more talk of peace or hope of peace than in the years preceding the great conflict of . no wonder many advocates and { } prophets of war believe that peace is forever impossible. "there," wrote the late prof. j. a. cramb, "in its specious and glittering beauty the ideal of pacificism remains; yet in the long march of humanity across thousands of years or thousands of centuries it remains still an ideal, lost in inaccessible distances, as when first it gleamed across the imagination."[ ] "despite this hubbub of talk down all the centuries war has continued--absolutely as if not a word had been said on one side or the other. man's dreadful toll in blood has not yet all been paid. the human race bears still this burden. declaimed against in the name of religion, in the name of humanity, in the name of profit-and-loss, war still goes on."[ ] but the fact that war still exists does not at all prove that it is inevitable, but merely that it has not yet been avoided. militarists argue that war is biologically necessary, an ingrained ineradicable instinct, a necessary evil or an inescapable good, a gift of a stern god. there is a curious sentimental fatalism about our war prophets, but in the end their arguments come down to two, that we have always had wars and that we still have them. it was said many years ago that "the poor ye have always with you" and to-day poverty on an immense scale still exists in every part of the planet. yet we do not despair of limiting or even of eradicating poverty. tuberculosis has existed for centuries and still exists, but to-day we understand the disease and it is doomed. if war is inevitable it is so for reasons which have not yet been established. until it is proved that war accompanies life and progress as the shadow accompanies the body, men will strive to eliminate war, however frequent and discouraging their failures. the cause of these failures of pacifism has been its { } unreality, its too confident approach to a difficult problem. many pacifists have tended to exhort about war instead of studying it; they have looked upon it as a thing accursed and irrational, beyond the pale of serious consideration. they have likened the belief that war has accomplished good in the past to a faith in witchcraft and other superstitions. they have tilted at war, as the mediæval church tilted at usury, without stopping to consider what relation this war-process bore to the basic facts of social evolution. it was an error to consider war as a thing in itself instead of an effect of precedent causes. fortunately the newer pacifists, who have been rendered cautious by many bitter disappointments, are changing their approach and seeking to cure war not directly but by removing its causes. they are striving to outflank war. along this line alone can progress be made. you cannot end war without changing the international polity which leads to war. the bloody conflicts between nations, being a symptom of a world maladjustment and frequently an attempt to cure that maladjustment, can be averted only by policies which provide some other cure. to destroy war one must find some alternative regulator or governor of societies. in their failure to provide such a regulator, or even to recognise that such a regulator is necessary, lies the vital defect of many of the peace plans to-day. pacifism may be either static or dynamic; it may seek to keep things as they are, to crystallise international society in its present forms, or on the other hand may base itself on the assumption that these forms will change. it may address itself to the problem of stopping the world as one stops a clock, of forbidding unequal growth of nations, of discountenancing change, or it may seek to find an outlet and expression for the discontent and unrest which all growth { } brings. pacifism that is static is doomed. our only hope lies in a dynamic, evolutionary pacifism, based on a principle of the ever-changing adjustment of nations to an ever-changing environment. at the bottom of static pacifism lies a conception somewhat as follows. the nations of the earth have an interest in maintaining peace, but are forced, tricked or lured into war by the tyranny or craft of princes and capitalists or by their own prejudices and sudden passions. some nations are peaceful and some, by reason of an evil education, hostile; wherefore the hostile nations must be restrained by the peaceful, as the anti-social classes are restrained by the community. honest differences of opinion among nations must be arbitrated; angry passions must be allowed to cool, and the nations must go about unarmed that there may be no indiscriminate shooting. given these precautions we shall have peace. but it is a peace without change, and such a peace, apart from its being impossible, is not even desirable. what the static pacifist does not perceive is that he is hopelessly conservative and stationary in a swiftly moving world. he would like to build a wall against time and change, to put down his stakes and bid evolution cease. it is this pathetic clinging to fixity, to a something immutable, that vitiates his proposals. nations that hate war prefer it nevertheless to the preservation of unendurable conditions, and the best conditions, if they remain unaltered, speedily become unendurable. we should not be satisfied to-day with the best constitution of the world agreed upon a hundred years ago, before there were railroads and telegraphs, and when democracy and nationalism were weaker than to-day. if to-morrow morning our wisest and most forward-looking men were to re-constitute society and petrify it in peace, our descendants would be far from content. { } the best heritage that the world can have is not a perfect constitution but a feasible principle of change. a dynamic pacifism, on the other hand, must assume that the world is in change, and that no peace is possible or desirable which does not permit great international transformations. these transformations arise from various causes. thus a candid consideration of the facts of international life must convince us that in the present era nationality is a potent, vital and probably a growing force, and that many of the ambitions and desires of men are mobilised nationally. the nations, however, grow unequally and are subjected to unequal pressure by their various environments. as a consequence certain nations become increasingly dissatisfied with their place in the world, and naturally, and in the present circumstances wisely, prefer the risks and costs of war to their present position. such nations have an interest in war, if change cannot be otherwise effected. moreover, it is clear to the dynamic pacifist that certain classes by the fact of their position in society are more bellicose than others, that classes grow at unequal rates and exert a varying influence, and that certain classes may have a direct and obvious interest in throwing their nation into war. the neglect of any such dynamic conception of world society is revealed in all the proposals of the static pacifists. for example, the proposal to create a united states of europe is based on a palpably false analogy with the united states of america, and ignores grossly the living principle of nationality. the states of europe are either nations or are approaching nationhood. they lack the racial, linguistic and traditional bonds, which made the union of the american colonies not indeed easy but at least possible. these trans-atlantic nations suffer from being jostled one against the other and their keen sense of { } national difference is accentuated by economic pressure and by a perpetual fear of foreign military aggression. to unite all these nations into one federal state, with a senate, a house of representatives and an impartial supreme court, is not only a static but a mechanical proposal. nations grow; they are not manufactured. equally static is the proposal for immediate and universal disarmament. nations will arm so long as they are afraid and so long as they want something vital that can be obtained only by warfare. moreover, there is no principle to determine the permitted armament of each nation or to designate the country which shall control the international police that is to enforce disarmament. an unequal disarmament would be unwise because it would take from the more pacific and civilised nations the weapons necessary to restrain unorganised and retrograde peoples. the fundamental defect of the proposal, however, is that it provides no way by which one nation, injured by another, can secure redress. if there is to be neither war nor an effective international regulation, what limits can a nation set to non-military aggression by its neighbour?[ ] the belief that all wars may be averted by arbitration is equally a static conception. during the last few decades international arbitration has settled many controversies, which could not be adjusted by ordinary diplomatic means. increasingly cases have been submitted to arbitral decision. { } the real questions over which nations clash, however, are not arbitrable. one cannot arbitrate whether russia or germany should control the balkans, whether the united states should admit japanese immigrants, or whether alsace should go to france or germany, or trieste to italy or austria. arbitration has the limitations of judicial processes. it is possible to arbitrate questions concerning the interpretation of treaties and formal agreements or the application of recognised principles of international law, but no nation will arbitrate its right to exist. moreover, the very fact that arbitration is a judicial process, based upon precedents and the assumption of the _status quo_ renders it unacceptable to the nations which are dissatisfied with present arrangements. the necessity which knows no law respects no arbitration, and no board of arbitration, however impartial, could decide that one nation should have more colonies because she needed them or because she was growing, while another nation must stand aside because feeble and unprogressive. it is probably not in the interest of the world that portugal and belgium should retain their colonies in africa, but on what precedent could these nations be forced to sell? questions of vital interest therefore are in truth non-justiciable. no powerful nation will accept a subordinate position in the world because some arbitral body decides it may not adopt a certain policy. arbitration is not a process of adjustment of growing nations to a changing environment. but if nations will not gladly accept arbitration where supposedly vital interests are concerned, can they not be coerced? out of the obvious need of such coercion arises a whole series of plans to force recalcitrant nations to accept mediation, to delay hostilities and even to abide by the arbitral award. a league to enforce peace is a proposed union of pacific nations to prevent immediate or even { } ultimate recourse to war, to force combatants to arbitrate justiciable disputes and to place the sanction of force behind the decisions of the nations. this proposal contains within it an element valuable and indeed essential to international peace. it frankly assumes the right of a group of nations to compel a refractory nation by the use of force. it is far more realistic than the conception of a world peace based upon a sudden conversion of the nations to the iniquity of war, which is at bottom an anarchistic conception. for however we deplore a use of force we cannot rely exclusively upon anything less. force is not intrinsically immoral, and without force no morality can prevail. the compulsion which the parent exercises over a child, and organised communities over the individual citizen, must equally form the basis of an international system. one cannot base such a system upon mere moral suasion, which, though of value as a precedent and complement to force, is frequently thwarted by the public opinion of each nation, formed within its borders and protected from outside influence by pride and a blinding national interest. outside nations could not have persuaded germany that it was unethical to invade belgium. she would have appealed to her own moral sense and trusted to the future to make good her right to attack. had germany realised, however, that an invasion of belgium would be actively resisted by otherwise neutral nations, overwhelming in force, she might have been willing to debate the question. the immorality of force lies merely in improper use. all through history compulsion has been exerted for evil as well as for good purposes. the future of international concord lies, therefore, not in refraining from force or potential force, not in a purely _laissez-faire_ policy, but in applying force to uphold a growing body of international { } ethics, increasingly recognised by the public opinion of the world. but a league of peace, unless it is _more_ than a league of peace, suffers from the same defect of not providing an alternative to war. if italy is not to attack austria, some way must be found to protect italian interests in the trentino and trieste, and if germany is not to attack england, some security must be given that german commerce will be safe and german colonial aspirations not entirely disregarded. if the nations believe, rightly or wrongly, that their vital interests are being disregarded in the peace which the league enforces, there will be defections and revolts. such a league would then become useless or worse, since it can only exert an influence so long as it possesses an immense preponderance of power. the same defect inheres in a league of satisfied powers. such powers, preferring the _status quo_ to any probable revision of the affairs of the world, are in the beginning united by a common conservative instinct. but no nation is completely satisfied; each wants a "rectification" here and a "compensation" there. the same disagreements over the spoils of the world that would be found outside such a league would also make their appearance within, and in the end one or more of the satiated nations would join the group of the unsatisfied, and the league would cease to be a guarantee of peace. it would die of the endless flux in human affairs. similarly static is the proposal that all nations wait, or be compelled to wait, a set term before beginning hostilities. in many cases such a compulsory postponement would be advantageous in that it would favour the mobilisation of the pacific elements in the community and thus tend to prevent wars being suddenly forced upon the nation against the national interest by a small, bellicose social class. the { } underlying theory, however, is that nations always go to war because they are hot-headed, whereas in very many cases the decision to wage war at the proper time is perfectly deliberate and cold-blooded. moreover, a compulsory wait before declaring war would alter the balance of power between the groups of powers, and would adversely affect certain ready nations, which could therefore only be coerced into accepting the arrangement. unless some adequate provision were made (and it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to make it) to prevent a nation from preparing for war during the year's wait, the countries with the largest resources, such as great britain, the united states and russia, would secure an enormous advantage, while nations like germany and japan would lose. an event in the very recent past illustrates this point. on august , the german secretary of state intimated to the british ambassador that a failure on the part of russia to demobilise would cause germany to declare instant war. "russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. this was not the case with germany. she had the speed and russia had the numbers, and the safety of the german empire forbade that germany should allow russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions."[ ] in other words, for germany to give up her greater speed of mobilisation would be to destroy her advantage while assuring that of russia. actually, under present circumstances, such a proposal would tend to preserve the _status quo_ and to aid the satisfied nations. in practice it would take from the dissatisfied nations the power to alter arrangements, which they feel are unjust. { } most of these plans, a federation of nations, a progressive disarmament, a wider application of the principle of arbitration, and a league to enforce peace, have elements of value, once they are divorced from purely static conceptions and are united with proposals to effect some form of progressive adjustment of nations to each other and to the world. in this effort at adjustment lies the real problem of securing international peace. so long as the nations have conflicting economic interests so wide and deep as to make their surrender perilous to the national future, so long will they find some way to escape from the restraints of peace. they will drive their armies through any compact or agreement, adverse to their economic interests, and in the process will smash whatever machinery has been created for establishing peace. a dynamic pacifism, therefore, must take into account this factor of the constantly changing, balancing, opposing economic needs of rival nations. it must devise not only some rudimentary form of international government but also arrangements by which the things for which the nations go to war may peacefully be distributed or utilized in a manner equitable to all. [ ] for a brief digest of the history of pacifism, see dr. edward krehbiel, "nationalism, war and society," new york, . see also books cited by him. [ ] "england and germany," p. . [ ] p. . [ ] the proposal for disarmament also raises the question of the inner stability of each nation. in each country there must be some police force to keep down the anti-social classes and prevent revolution. such a force might be small in england or the united states; it would have to be large and powerful in russia and austria, if the subject nations were to be held down. but a large police force is an army under a different name. if each disarmed nation were permitted to decide its own police needs, the whole principle of disarmament would be whittled away. [ ] british white paper, no. . { } chapter xvii towards international government these are three ways in which the united states might conceivably attempt to promote the international adjustments without which peace cannot be secured. we might seek to "go it alone," righting one wrong after another, intervening whenever and wherever our national conscience directed. or we might enter into an alliance with one or a few selected democratic and enlightened nations to force international justice and comity upon other nations. finally we might refrain from ubiquitous interventions and peace-propagating alliances and devote ourselves, in conjunction with all other willing nations, to the formulation of principles of international policy, and unite with those nations in the legalisation and enforcement of such principles. in other words we might become the standard about which the peaceful parties and groups of all nations might rally. the first of these courses is quite impossible. it is grotesque to think of us, or of any country, as a knight-errant, rescuing nations forlorn from evil forsworn powers. there are two things, besides a saving sense of humour, which preclude us from essaying this rôle; we have not the knowledge and we have not the power. for the making of peace more than good will is required. nothing is more harmful in international intercourse than a certain sentimentalism and contempt for realities on the part of many of our pacifists. the difficulty with most plans for intervention by one { } moral and infallible power is that they attribute a pikestaff simplicity to international--as, in fact, to all questions. according to certain superlatively well-intentioned people, some nations are wicked and others virtuous; some nations love the clash of arms, some the ways of peace; some nations are greedy, brutal and dishonourable, others are generous, gentle and honourable. it is the absolute bad and the impossible good of the melodrama, in which the human sheep and goats are sundered by an obvious moral boundary line. in point of fact, no nation is good or bad in this simple sense, but all have a certain justice in their claims, however difficult it is to square these claims with the moral philosophy of the neutral country. the british had a certain justice in their conflict with the transvaal as had also the dutch burghers who resisted them. even in our brutal attack upon mexico in we had the justification arising from our greater ability to use the conquered territory. it is easy to find phrases to be used whenever we wish to interfere, but these phrases sometimes conceal an ambiguous meaning and sometimes have no meaning at all. are we, for instance, to become the defenders of small nationalities, ready to go to war whenever one is invaded? has a small nation a right to hold its present territory when that right conflicts with the economic advance, let us say, of a whole continent? should we respect canada's right to keep new york, had that city originally been settled by canadians? should we compel russia to treat her poles and jews fairly and concede to russia the right to compel us to treat our negroes fairly? some extension of the right of interference in what are now called the internal affairs of other nations must be admitted, but it is a precipitous road to travel. the united powers may compel roumania or greece to { } behave, but the united states, acting alone, would find it irksome to have to constrain or discipline russia. by this it is not meant that we should never intervene. it would be futile to fix such a rule for conduct which, in the end, will be determined by circumstances. in any question of interference, however, the burden of proof should rest heavily upon the side which urges a nation to slay in order to secure what it believes to be the eternal principles of justice. the general development will be toward greater interference, but this intervention will be increasingly international, not national. in actual practice the problem when to interfere is immensely difficult. it is easy to say "let america assume her responsibility for policing the world," but the question arises, "what in particular should we do and what leave undone?" should we war against germany because of belgium, and against france and england because of greece? should we fight japan to aid china? are we to mete out justice even-handed to the poles, finns and jews of russia, the czechs and southern slavs of austria, the armenians and alsatians? should we have interposed to save persia from benevolent absorption by russia and england? clearly we could not do these things alone, and to attempt them would be to strike an impossibly virtuous attitude. even if we had the wisdom or the sure instinct to save us from error, we should not have a fraction of the power necessary to make our benevolent intervention effective. to right the wrongs of the world, to build up a firm international policy and thus to create and establish peace seems easier if it be attempted in alliance with two or three other virtuous powers. but if we unite with england, france and russia, to maintain virtue in the world, may we not, at least hypothetically, be playing a fool's { } part in a knave's game of diplomacy? may we not be simply undermining germany and austria? to use our army and navy for such purposes would constitute us a part of one great european combination against the other, and our disinterested assistance might be exploited for purposes with which we had no sympathy. a proposal, at least potentially more popular, is the formation of an anglo-american union for the maintenance of peace. it is assumed that the two nations, and the five self-governing british colonies are kindred in blood, inspired by the same ideals and united by a common language. their white population exceeds one hundred and fifty millions. they are capable, energetic, individualistic peoples, favourably situated on an immense area, and holding dominion over hundreds of millions in various parts of the world. these britons, colonials and americans, by reason of geographical position, are naval rather than military, and if they could hold the sea, would be able to preserve peace in lands not accessible to military powers and to dictate peace even to the military nations. such an integration of the english-speaking peoples would thus constitute a step towards international peace. it is not here proposed to discuss the value of this proposal as a means of defending the united states. in general, its defensive value for us would probably be less in the coming decades than for britain and her colonies. the british empire has the greater number of enemies and is the more easily assailed. great britain cannot protect her colonies without maintaining her naval supremacy not alone in the north sea, but in the pacific as well. as for england, she occupies the same position towards us in any attack from the european continent that belgium occupies towards england. she is an outpost. our own continental territory could probably be protected in { } most cases by a smaller military and naval effort than would be required of us as part-defenders of a british-american union. it is true that these conditions might change, with the result that we should need great britain's help most urgently. for the time being, however, we are discussing a british-american alliance or federation not as a possible protection to us but as an instrument for eliminating war. in all probability such an instrument would work badly, and to the non-anglo-saxon world would look much like a sword. for the fundamental defect of such a proposal lies in the fact that it is a plan for the coercion of other powers by a group of nations, not at all disinterested. if the british and americans possessed eighty per cent. of the military and naval power of the world, they might establish a peace like that which the roman empire was able to establish. it would be a peace dictated by the strong. in fact, however, there would be no such superiority of power. russia, germany, austria, japan united, would be quite capable of exerting a far superior force. even if the force opposed were only equal, the result would be a confrontation of peoples in all essential respects like the balance of power in europe, but on a vaster scale. we should not have advanced an inch towards the goal of a world peace or a world economy. for the united states to enter into such a federation would be to take our part in the world wars to come and the intrigues that precede and accompany such wars. we might be called upon to halt russia's progress towards suez, the persian gulf, or the indian border. we might be obliged to defend belgium, holland, denmark, norway and sweden. we could not permit any nation to reach a point where british commerce might be assailed. we should cease to be interested in { } the freedom of the seas because sharing the dominion of the seas. we should have no leisure and no inclination to seek a more equal utilisation of the backward countries. we should need armies and navies to protect the approaches to england and to hold back the land nations. against us would work immense potential forces. strong, growing, ambitious populations, envying our arrogant sea-power and forced by their insecurity to remain militaristic and become navalistic would prepare unceasingly for the day when they could try conclusions with us. the anglo-saxon federation may be an exhilarating conception, but it is not peace. parenthetically an agreement or understanding with great britain, less ambitious and pretentious than the proposed federation, is in the interest of the two nations. in the more than one hundred years of acrid peace between the two countries, there has been revealed a certain community of interest, which might properly be utilised to prevent future conflicts. while we are not ready to involve ourselves in britain's european and imperialistic policies, and do not want a whole world in arms against us, we do wish to avoid misunderstandings with england. we should be better off were we to give great britain assurances that we would not contest her naval supremacy (however much we may strive to alter its nature), and if we were to obtain from england her unconditional support of the doctrine that the latin-american countries are not to be colonised or conquered. in our efforts to secure a basis of international peace, however, we must rely not upon england or any other single nation or group of nations but upon a league, into which all nations may enter upon identical terms. we must depend upon all-inclusive, not upon exclusive alliances. { } at this point it may be well to recapitulate the difficulties and inevitable limitations of any such plan. in the first place nationality exists and cannot be exorcised. the several nations, though they have common interests, are also sundered in interest, and in present circumstances may gain more from a given war than they lose. no nation, because of a moral appeal, will surrender its vital interests, and each believes that its own ambitions are morally justified. to pursue these interests the nations arm, and this competitive armament breeds fear, which in turn provokes war. in various parts of the world broken nationalities seek to attain to national independence or autonomy and these nationalistic differences are exacerbated by economic quarrels. moreover, within the nations certain sections or groups find their true economic interest in policies leading to war, and these groups are able by means of ceaseless propaganda to drive their nation into war-provoking policies. finally we are faced with the grim fact that in europe at least no great nation can pursue a consistent policy of peace unless other nations move simultaneously in the same direction. furthermore the instinctive efforts of each nation to secure its own peace by force constitute a menace to other nations and a danger to the world's peace. the outlook for peace is thus not cheering; "the war against war," to use william james's expression, "is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party." fortunately, however, there are certain factors making for peace, and upon these factors we are able to build. all over the world there is a peace sentiment, a vast, undisciplined, inchoate desire to discover ways and means by which this scourge of war may be lifted. it is not inherently impossible to organise this sentiment, crystallise it, direct it and make it effective. the task is essentially { } similar to that of organising democracy, for wars increasingly are becoming national wars, in which success depends not upon princes but upon the willingness and enthusiasm of the great slow peoples. the millions who bear the chief burdens of war and derive only its lesser gains are in all countries moving towards self-expression and domination. it is in the end upon these masses, with their inherent prejudices and passions, and not upon diplomats and rulers that any project for peace must be based. the appeal to these millions though it be couched in terms of morality and sentiment, must be an appeal to interest. what is necessary is to recognise the economic motives that drive such populations to war and to reverse those motives. it does not suffice to preach that wars are never in the interest of the people; the nations know otherwise. it is necessary rather to change conditions so that wars will in actual fact lose their economic value to nations. peace must be made not only to appear but actually to be in the interest of the peoples of the world. the popular horror of war, the growing sense of its immense costs, the slowly maturing sympathy between individual members of hostile nations form the substantial groundwork upon which an opposition to war _in general_ is based. added to these are the waning of the romanticism of war and the growth of a sense of its mechanical (rather than human) quality. the present war has immensely increased this opposition. it has disenchanted the world. in all countries millions of men now realise that wars must be fought not alone by adventurous youths, who do not put a high value upon life, but by husbands and fathers and middle-aged men, who are somewhat less susceptible to the glamorous appeal of battle. they are beginning to recognise that wars are not won by courage alone { } but by numbers, by money, by intimidation, by intrigue, by mendacity and all manner of baseness. the lies spread broadcast throughout the world and the money spent by germans and allies to bribe bulgarian patriots are quite as great factors in deciding the issue of the war as the valour of the _poilus_ at verdun. in a moral sense war has committed suicide. this increasing comprehension of war's real nature and of war's new manifestations is leading the peoples to demand the right to decide for themselves when and how war is to be declared and to take part in negotiations which may lead up to war. the power to provoke wars is the last bulwark of autocracy; when the nation is in danger (and in present circumstances it is always in danger), democracy goes by the board. let the socialists and liberals in all countries declaim as they will against armies, navies, imperialism, colonialism, and international friction, let members of parliament ask awkward questions in the house, the answer is always the same, "it is a matter of national safety. to reply to the question of the honourable gentleman is not in the public interest." against this stone wall the efforts of organisations like the british "union of democratic control" break ineffectually. the socialists have also failed, at least externally. identifying the war-makers and imperialists with those classes to which they were already opposed in internal politics, the socialists sought to make good their democratic antagonism to war. they opposed armies and proposed disarmament; they threatened national strikes in case aggressive wars were declared; they fought with a sure democratic instinct against every manifestation of militarism. in the crisis, however, they failed. they failed because their conception of war was too narrow, { } arbitrary and doctrinaire. they perceived the upper class interest in war but failed to recognise, or rather obstinately ignored, the national interest. when at last the nation was threatened, the socialists and peace-makers not only closed ranks with those who desired war, but even lent a willing ear to proposals of annexation (for purposes of national security) and agreed to other international arrangements likely to be the cause or at least the occasion of future wars. the general will for peace we have with us already; what is to-day most necessary is the knowledge and insight which will direct this will to the attempted solution of the causes of war. towards this knowledge the present war has contributed. never before have so many men recognised the strength of the economic impulses driving nations into the conflict. the war, it is true, has intensified national hatreds by its wholesale breach of plighted agreements; it has increased terror and distrust; it has sown broadcast the seeds of future wars by a series of secret, but known, agreements, creating a new europe even more unstable than was the europe of . on the other hand, it has forced men to open their eyes to the real facts of war, and to recognise that wars will continue until the motives for war are reversed, until conditions are created in which nations may realise their more moderate hopes of development without recourse to fighting. it is upon this recognition, upon this guide to the blind passion for peace, that any league for peace must be based. such a league can probably not be immediately constructed and permanently maintained. it depends upon the slow growth of an international mind, upon a willingness, not indeed to sacrifice national interests but to recognise that national interests may be made to conform with the larger interests of humanity. it means the { } fulfilment not the destruction of nationality. it requires for its realisation the breaking of two chains, an inner chain which binds the nation to the will of a selfish minority class, an outer chain which binds its national interest to war. how such a league will come about it is perhaps premature to discuss. in the immediate future we are likely to have not a true league of peace but rather a league of temporarily satisfied powers, seeking their group interest in the _status quo_ and pursuing their common aims at the expense of excluded nations in much the same spirit in which a single nation now pursues its separate interest. such a grouping of interested nations is likely to be only temporary, as dissensions will arise and new alignments be made comprising the nations formerly excluded. it is bound to break up when the _status quo_ becomes intolerable to several of its members. on the other hand the spirit of such an organisation might not impossibly change. the league of satisfied nations might discover that it was to its real interest, or might be compelled by outer pressure, to make concessions to the excluded nations, and finally to admit them on certain terms. such a development would be comparable to that by which autocracies have gradually become constitutional monarchies and republics. but, however the league is formed, two things are essential to its continued existence. one is the acceptance of principles of international regulation, tending to reduce the incentive and increase the repugnance to war, in other words a measure of international agreement, secured either by an international body having legislative power, or in the beginning by a series of diplomatic arrangements as at present. the second essential is a machinery for enforcing agreements. such machinery cannot be { } dispensed with. peace cannot come by international machinery alone; neither can it come without machinery. peace between nations, like peace within a nation, does not depend upon force alone. unless the effective majority of the nations (or of the citizens) are reconciled to the system to be enforced, unless they desire peace, whether international or internal, the application of force will be impossible. on the other hand, peace is equally impossible without force. if no compulsion can be applied the smallest minority can throw the world into war. such a compulsion of one nation by others does not necessarily mean a bombardment of cities or the shedding of blood. the force to be applied may be economic instead of military. no nation to-day, above all, no great industrial nation, is socially and economically self-sufficient, but all depend upon constant intercourse with other nations. it is therefore true, as one writer says,[ ] that "if all or most of these avenues of intercourse were stopped, it (the offending nation) would soon be reduced to worse straits than those which germany is now experiencing. if all diplomatic intercourse were withdrawn; if the international postal and telegraphic systems were closed to a public law-breaker; if all inter-state railway trains stopped at his frontiers; if no foreign ships entered his ports, and ships carrying his flags were excluded from every foreign port; if all coaling stations were closed to him; if no acts of sale or purchase were permitted to him in the outside world--if such a political and commercial boycott were seriously threatened, what country could long stand out against it? nay, the far less rigorous measure of a financial boycott, the closure of all foreign exchanges to members of the outlaw state, the prohibition of all { } quotations on foreign stock exchanges, and of all dealings in stocks and shares, all discounting and acceptances of trade bills, all loans for public or private purposes, and all payments of moneys due--such a withdrawal of financial intercourse, if thoroughly applied and persisted in, would be likely, to bring to its senses the least scrupulous of states. assuming that the members of the league included all or most of the important commercial and financial nations, and that they could be relied upon to press energetically all or even a few of these forms of boycott, could any country long resist such pressure? would not the threat of it and the knowledge that it could be used form a potent restraint upon the law-breaker? even the single weapon of a complete postal and telegraphic boycott would have enormous efficiency were it rigorously applied. every section of the industrial and commercial community would bring organised pressure upon its government to withdraw from so intolerable a position and to return to its international allegiance." it cannot be assumed that the attempt to organise such a boycott would be invariably successful. not all nations would be equally injured, for while a boycott of italy or greece would be fatal, the united states or russia might survive such economic pressure. a boycott would not be easy to enforce. it would be necessary to secure a concert of opinion and action in states, which, however they may agree upon any particular question, have widely divergent interests in other matters. different boycotting nations would be variously affected. a boycott of germany, while it might injure the united states or japan would almost certainly ruin holland and belgium. even were these small countries to be partially reimbursed for their special losses, they might still hesitate. there would also remain the fear that some of the boycotting nations would { } be detached through economic bribery, with the result that the boycott broken, the nations faithful to their agreements would suffer. finally, if holland joined in a boycott of germany, she might within a few days be compelled to resist a german invasion. an economic boycott might easily lead to war. this obvious connection between economic and military compulsion is often disregarded by men who dislike war but are willing to commit their nation to participation in economic compulsion. the two, however, are inseparable, though they may not be inseparable for each nation. the boycotting nations must be prepared to prevent reprisals, must be willing if necessary to fight. it is not, however, necessary for each nation upholding international law to contribute equally to this military compulsion. certain nations might use their armies and fleets while others, more remote from the struggle, might merely continue to boycott. it would not be possible, to enforce a decision against nations having a preponderance of military power, nor even against a group with a large, though not the preponderant share of military and economic resources. germany, austria and russia combined could not be compelled. the essence of the problem, however, is not the creation of a state of war between coalitions almost equal in size, but the gradual adoption of a policy of peace by securing a unity of interest among so large a group of nations that this group would hold a clearly preponderant power over any other group. just as peace within a state cannot be secured where the law-breakers are a majority, so international peace cannot be secured unless the preponderance of power is clearly on the side of peace. even with a majority of nations agreeing "in principle," the difficulties of actually creating a league of { } peace and international polity would be great. to carry out such a plan, to work out modes of action which will conform to the world's evolving sense of the necessity for more stable international relations, requires an international machinery, concerning which nations and classes will disagree. some channel, however, is necessary for the flow of the peace forces resident in the world. a machinery must be created which will approximate in some degree to that by which a nation, composed of conflicting classes and economic groups, manages to secure a degree of common interest and action among such groups. there must be an international executive, an international legislative body and some approach to an international court. that there are immense difficulties in the creation of such a machinery is obvious and admitted. that the machinery cannot work perfectly, that it may repeatedly break down; that it can be perfected only through trial and error, are facts, which though in themselves discouraging, need not lead to the abandonment of the effort. there is nothing inherently impossible in the gradual creation and elaboration of such machinery. the development of the future lies in that direction.[ ] let the machinery be ever so perfect, however, it is useless unless principles are formulated which meet the requirements of the nations which are to be bound over to keep the peace. a league to enforce peace is a futility unless it is also a league to determine international polity. peace cannot be negative, a mere abstention from war. it must be a dynamic process, an adjustment of the nations of the world to their international environment. [ ] hobson (john a.), "towards international government," new york (the macmillan co.), , pp. , . [ ] it is not pertinent to this book to discuss in detail the plans which are being formed for the gradual evolution of such international machinery. for readers who desire to secure a _prècis_ of such arrangements, the book of john a. hobson, "towards international government," is recommended. { } chapter xviii the freedom of the seas we have seen that the problem of peace cannot be solved without at the same time avoiding the economic conflicts now sundering the nations. we have seen that these divisive interests which are real and vital, can be accommodated neither by the force of good will alone (although good will is essential), nor by an appeal to national unselfishness nor by proposals which merely mean the perpetuation of the _status quo_. we have also seen that in the last instance force, or at least the threat of force is necessary, that this force cannot be applied by the united states alone or by a group of two or three beneficent powers, but only by an all-inclusive league of nations, acting according to established rules and with a machinery previously elaborated. only so can a programme of peace be made effective. such a programme will consist of three elements. the first is the freedom of the seas; the second is a joint imperialism; the third is the promotion of an economic internationalism. the freedom of the seas is necessary because without it the other elements cannot be supplied. no division or joint use of colonies will promote peace unless each nation is assured of continuous access to such colonies. a promise of the products and the profits of the backward countries will not satisfy a nation if it believes that at the first outbreak of war it will be deprived not only of colonial but also of all commercial rights. { } in recent decades the problem of the freedom of the seas has grown in significance as access to the oceans has become more important and the nations increasingly interdependent. to-day trans-oceanic colonies are worthless, commerce is insecure and a satisfactory economic life at home difficult without such access. in peace the vessels of all nations may travel anywhere, but in war a belligerent's merchant vessels may be seized and confiscated and her shores blockaded. she may even be deprived of the right to import goods through neighbouring neutral countries. in the advocacy of the freedom of the seas the united states has taken a leading part, while england has pursued a policy of obstruction. in this respect england has been a menace to the world's peace. she has stood fairly consistently against a modernisation of naval law; has insisted on the right of capture of merchant vessels and the right to blockade, and in the present war has reverted, under grave provocation it is true, to the most rigorous maritime repression. it is by means of our influence on england that we can take the first step towards creating a better international system. if we are to become friends with england, the price must be the freedom of the seas. it may seem incongruous to suggest as a condition of friendship that our friend weaken herself, but as will later be indicated such a surrender of rights by great britain might in the end redound to her security and greater strength. the reason is obvious. the insecurity of each nation is the weakness of all. so long as a nation is insecure it will arm. so long as one nation arms all must arm. moreover, england is peculiarly vulnerable. the british empire is threatened whenever any nation seeks an outlet to the sea. nations will build navies against great britain so long as { } without navies their commerce and colonies are threatened. the case of the german-british conflict is in point. england lies on germany's naval base. it is an unfortunate thing for germany, and indeed for england, but it is a geographical fact and unalterable. for germany this situation is tolerable so long as peace endures, but when war breaks out, all her commerce is stopped. the future of germany depends upon her developing industrially to a point where she can no longer feed her population from her own farms. she needs, if not colonies, at least markets. she requires a foreign base for her industry and uninterrupted access to that foreign base both in war and peace. she can be throttled, strangled, starved under the present usages of sea war. the war may not be of her own making. in other words twenty or fifty years of commercial development may be swept away at a moment's notice in a war, declared, it may be, by england for purely commercial purposes. to these apprehensions of the germans, england may answer that in peace times german commerce is secure. but immunity in war as well as in peace is necessary. therefore, the germans do what other nations would do in like circumstances, take the matter into their own hands. they build a navy strong enough to make england hesitate to attack their merchant marine. it is an understandable attempt to protect what is an absolutely vital interest. but for germany to build a navy capable of measuring arms with the british navy is intolerable to great britain. it is useless for germany to protest that she will not use her fleet aggressively. so long as she can use it aggressively, she is a menace to england's life. england must prevent germany from building { } a navy equal in power, for if she is defeated at sea, her fate is sealed. germany must be threatened on land by france and russia or she will be able to devote her energies exclusively to her navy and thus out-build england. given this situation, an anglo-german war is inevitable. nor is the situation in the north sea unique. once this conflict of interest begins, it spreads everywhere. germany may not have morocco or tripoli because with a foothold and a naval base on the mediterranean, she could exert pressure there in order to change conditions elsewhere. similarly the pacific commerce of russia is at the mercy of japan; her black sea traffic at the mercy of turkey, or whoever controls turkey, her baltic sea traffic at the mercy of germany, denmark and england. no wonder russia demands constantinople, which will at least open the inner doors of the black sea. but if she gets constantinople, she controls the whole danube traffic of austria, hungary and roumania, and she herself is menaced by british and french fleets at malta, gibraltar and aden. what is the probable, or at least possible, policy of russia in such circumstances? not immediately, not inopportunely, but in the right season? clearly it is to build a navy which will secure her control of the mediterranean and thus protect her outgoing trade from odessa and batum as well as her incoming trade. although not pre-eminently a naval power, russia must ultimately seek to accomplish what germany tried to do--make it dangerous for england to menace her mediterranean and red sea trade even in war times. but to secure naval supremacy in the mediterranean means to threaten egypt and india, thus breaking the neck of the { } british empire. given the present unfreedom of the sea, therefore, great britain's vital interests oppose those of russia as they now oppose those of germany. this is the meaning of the historic british policy of the right of capture at sea, the right of blockade, the right to use naval power to work injury to the trade of hostile countries and to prevent colonial expansion. the policy is a menace to the british empire and to the independence of great britain herself. it stimulates other nations to outbuild great britain. and in the end that is at least a possible contingency. if a generation or two from now russia and germany should unite, russia attacking in the mediterranean and aiding germany in the north sea, the british empire would be put to a severe test. there might be no way of saving egypt and india or holland and denmark and these outposts gone, great britain might be menaced and attacked at leisure. if her navies were defeated she would starve. the rules of naval warfare, which britain has so long upheld, would be turned against her. it is thus to great britain's real interest to surrender this doctrine. in the present war it has been of value, but only because germany and austria were surrounded by powerful enemies, and all adjacent neutral powers with sea bases were small enough to be intimidated. the blockade of a nation is to-day of little value unless adjacent nations can also be blockaded. the railroad unites all land nations. if france had been neutral in this war, germany could not have been blockaded, for a british threat to blockade france would have thrown her into the arms of germany. even if italy had remained neutral, an effective blockade might have forced italy into the war on the side of the teutonic powers. england is using a weapon { } which at the most means a serious loss to her enemies but which effectively turned against her would mean instant death. there are certain powerful groups in england who are obstinately opposed to any revision of the sea law in favour of neutral and belligerent nations. they feel to-day, as pitt felt in , when the doctrine was advanced that a neutral flag might protect enemy's property. "shall we," asked pitt, "give up our maritime consequence and expose ourselves to scorn, to derision, and contempt? no man can deplore more than i do the loss of human blood--the calamities and distresses of war; but will you silently stand by and, acknowledging these monstrous and unheard-of principles of neutrality, insure your enemy against the effects of your hostility!... whatever shape it assumes, it (this doctrine) is a violation of the rights of england, and imperiously calls upon englishmen to resist it, even to the last shilling and the last drop of blood, rather than tamely submit to degrading consequences or weakly yield the rights of this country to shameful usurpation."[ ] this doctrine, rather than accept which pitt was willing that england should fight to the death, was quietly accepted by great britain in the declaration of paris ( ) and, half a century later ( ), the declaration of london protected neutral rights even more strongly. but the spirit of pitt is by no means dead. the declaration of london failed of ratification in parliament partly because of mere factional opposition and partly because of ancient pride in england's naval supremacy. it was held that britain being the strongest naval power should uphold all naval rights { } and all necessary naval aggressions both against belligerents and neutrals. the argument advanced in support of this position is that so long as the enemy disregards international law in land warfare britain has the right to disregard the laws of sea war. if germany violates belgium's neutrality, why should england surrender her power to put the maximum pressure upon her unscrupulous enemy? this argument, however, begs the whole question, whether it is to britain's real advantage that the naval law go back to what it was in the days of pitt and napoleon instead of being progressively liberalised. britain is not only the greatest naval but overwhelmingly the greatest maritime nation in the world. she has something to gain and everything to lose from a reaction towards the unregulated sea-warfare of (and ); she has much to gain and little to lose from the establishment of a true freedom of the sea. so long as england persists in a reactionary naval policy she will be menaced by every nation which feels itself menaced by her, and by every future development of naval warfare. the harshness of the british attitude in this matter of naval warfare leads to such brutal reprisals as that of the german submarine campaign against merchantmen. that campaign was not without its influence in laming the commercial activity of great britain; had the war broken out ten years later, with germany better equipped with submarines, the result might have been far more serious. a future submarine war carried on by france against england might be disastrous to the island kingdom. even the german campaign, hampered as it was by the fewness and remoteness of the german naval bases, might easily have had a crippling effect upon british industrial life but for the pressure brought to bear { } upon germany by the united states. in the long run england cannot have it both ways. she must either defend her commerce from submarines alone or else accept a revision of the naval law. fortunately there are men in great britain who accept this broader view. "one of the promises of victory," writes the englishman, h. sidebotham, "is that great britain will be able to review her whole naval policy in the light of the experience gained in the war. sir edward grey has himself indicated that such a review may be appropriate in the negotiations for peace after victory has been won."[ ] towards such a change in attitude the public opinion of the united states can largely contribute. while the majority of americans side strongly with britain and her allies, they make little distinction in their thought between a detested german militarism and a detested british navalism. our traditional attitude is one of hostility to the pretensions of the mistress of the sea. "how many more instances do we need," writes prof. j. w. burgess, "to demonstrate to us that the system of colonial empire with the dominance of the seas, and the unlimited territorial expansion which it claims, is not compatible with the freedom and prosperity of the world? can any american with half an eye fail to see that our greatest interest in the outcome of this war is that the seas shall become free and neutral, and that, shall they need policing, this shall become international; that the open door for trade and commerce shall take the place of colonial restrictions or preferences, or influences and shall, in times of peace, be the universal principle; that private property upon the high seas shall be inviolable; that trade between neutrals in time of war shall be entirely { } unrestricted, and that contraband of war shall have an international definition?"[ ] even if england did not recognise her true national interest in a revision of the sea-law, we could not co-operate with her in any broad attempt to establish the conditions of peace in europe without such a surrender on her part of rights which have become indefensible. it is not, of course, to be anticipated that a complete freedom of the sea will be immediately established, but unless the nations, not controlling the ocean, are given reasonable assurances of safety for their commerce and colonial development, each new war will merely lay the seeds of new wars. to establish the freedom of the sea, five things are desirable: ( ) the abolition of the right of capture. ( ) the abolition of the commercial blockade. this would permit the blockading of a naval port or base, the exclusion or destruction of naval vessels, the searching of merchant vessels for absolute and conditional contraband, and the blockade of a city or port where the naval blockade was merely the completion of a land blockade, but it would give to all ordinary merchant vessels, either enemy or neutral, the same access to enemy ports that they enjoy in peace, without any further delay than is necessary for the prevention of non-neutral acts by merchantmen. ( ) the establishment of international prize courts and the submission of controversies to such courts. ( ) the internationalization of such straits as the dardanelles, the suez canal, the panama canal, the kiel canal, the straits of gibraltar, as far as that can be achieved by international agreement. { } ( ) establishment of an international naval convention and of an international body to enforce its decisions, to which international body all powers, naval and non-naval, should be admitted. an anglo-american agreement to enforce such a convention could be made the corner-stone of an international organisation, open to all nations. a naval force of neutral powers would enforce the freedom of the sea in the interest of england's enemies and in her own interest. with such an agreement in force much of the present naval rivalry would lose its meaning. if german commerce were safe in time of war, if she could not be blockaded and her ships captured, she would have a weaker interest in building against england. she might still desire a fleet to bombard enemy coasts or to invade england, but even without such a navy she would have a large measure of security. she might well prefer to forego some of her naval ambitions in order to secure british friendship. in any case even a naval disaster would not be so utterly crushing to england nor so great a hardship to germany as under present conditions. naturally the value of such an arrangement would depend upon the belief of the nations in its faithful enforcement by all the signatory powers. international promises fall in value as wars come to be fought by powerful coalitions instead of by individual nations, each immensely weaker than the whole group of neutral powers. when all nations of the first rank become engaged actively or by sympathy, the truly neutral powers are too weak to exercise much influence. they cannot compel the belligerents even to live up to their acknowledged agreements. what in such cases is the value of a naval convention between england and germany, which neither of the { } nations believes that the other will observe in the day of trial? the difficulty is a real one as the uncontrolled savagery and the unnumbered violations of international law during the present war amply prove. it is this doubt as to whether opposed groups will live up to their agreements, or whether neutral groups will enforce such agreements, that strikes at the root of international, as also of national cohesion. if we believe that our neighbors will not pay their personal property taxes, it is highly improbable that we will pay ours; a nation, which believes that its enemy will violate an agreement anticipates such action by violating the agreement first.[ ] yet without such international agreements no international concert is possible. moreover the very condition, which made agreements so perishable during the present war (the number and strength of the belligerents and the weakness of the neutrals) is one which itself is likely to be remedied by agreements made in advance. if germany, england, france, italy and russia have even a qualified sense of security concerning their over-sea possessions and their commerce, they will be less likely to enter into these hostile, world-embracing coalitions, which rob such agreements of so much of their value. especially would this be true if certain terms of the agreement--such as the { } neutralisation of strategic water-ways--could be effected in peace times. in any case this evolving and increasing half-trust in agreements is one of the fragile instruments with which we must work. if, therefore, an international arrangement were made, or a series of compacts were formed between individual nations, by which, for example, a group of powers promised to attack any nation violating these naval agreements (even if it pleaded counter violations by the enemy) a basis of faith in the new arrangements would be laid. there would remain, however, the question of colonies. so long as there is no principle by which the colonial opportunities of the world can be distributed, we shall have competitive nationalistic imperialism and the constant threat of war. [ ] quoted by h. sidebotham. "the freedom of the seas." "towards a lasting settlement," by various authors; edited by charles roden buxton, london, , p. . [ ] h. sidebotham, _op. cit._, p. . [ ] "the european war of . its causes, purposes and probable results," chicago, , p. . [ ] some of the german defenders of the belgian invasion claim that the germans were convinced that had they not used belgium as a base for military operations, england or france would have done so at the first convenient moment, though possibly with belgium's consent (which, however, belgium had no legal right to give). whether or not this fear was justified, it is evident that violations and proposed violations of international law by one group of belligerents led to violations by the other, reprisals were answered by counter-reprisals, and grave breaches of international law by all belligerents were defended on the ground that the opponent would do, or had done, the same. { } chapter xix the higher imperialism one of the greatest difficulties in the problem of working out an international colonial policy is our neglect of the immediate and overwhelming influence of colonies, as of other economic outlets, in the provocation of destructive wars. until the nations recognize that wars are in the main wars of interest, fought for concrete things, and unless such things can be utilised with some regard to the desires of all nations involved, war cannot be avoided. if these questions of interest were merely a matter of short division, of so much trade to be distributed, the problem, though difficult, would be easier of solution. but in many cases a single, indivisible prize must be awarded. there is only one antwerp, one trieste, one constantinople, and there are many claimants. is russia to control the yellow sea or is japan? is the persian gulf to be british, russian or german? is the present division of colonial possessions to be maintained or is there to be a new distribution, from which some nations will gain and others lose? what is to decide what colonies shall belong to what nation or what share each nation shall have in the profits of exploitations? these and a hundred other questions indicate the wide range of complicated economic interests which to-day divide nations and illustrate the difficulty of establishing a basis of agreement. clearly we cannot solve the problem by permanently { } maintaining the _status quo_. for the _status quo_, being based upon the relative power of nations in the past, does not conform to the power of the same nations to-day or to-morrow. moreover, the maintenance of the _status quo_ means the perpetuation of absurd anachronisms. it is undesirable as well as impossible. nations are not static. you can no more assure exclusive economic advantages to a weak and unprogressive nation than you could have preserved the american continent to the aborigines. even if there were no single economic principle to apply, it would not follow that some approach to an economic equilibrium would be impossible. as law develops out of an endless chaos of human relations by means of decisions (based on temporary exigencies) until a rule of law is established, as the market-price grows out of the innumerable hagglings of the market, so even without the aid of a fundamental principle, some _modus vivendi_, some approach to an economic concert, could be attained. economically considered, war is an attempt to solve the problem of the utilisation of the world's resources. if the world's wealth and income can be so distributed among the world's inhabitants, grouped into nations, as to render those nations, not indeed satisfied, but sufficiently satisfied not to go to war, a basis for peace results, even though the arrangement is not ideal. if, however, the distribution is obviously at variance with the relative power and needs of the nations, then one nation or group seeks to overturn the arrangement by force. to secure such a distribution requires the establishment of certain canons of international policy and modes of international procedure. the decision must in some degree conform to the median expectations of the powers. back of any particular economic arrangement also, there { } must be the force of tradition, a sense of security, a sense of justice. the redistribution must be such that the resulting motive to war will be weaker than the motive to peace. but before we can even approach such a plan to prevent war by reducing the economic incentive, we must frankly recognise that in certain circumstances a nation may have a direct economic interest in war. to deny such an interest is not only fallacious but even dangerous. for if we believe that nations have no economic motive to war, when in truth they have, we are likely to neglect to do things necessary to reverse such motives. our international task is to make arrangements which will cause nations to lose their interest in war. it is not that of trying to persuade nations that they have no such interest. there is much ambiguity and incoherence in most discussions concerning the economic advantages of war. on the whole, while the world does not usually gain by war, but loses through the destruction of capital and through industrial deterioration, an individual nation may clearly gain. england gained from the seven years' war, the united states from the war with mexico, germany from the war of , japan from its war with china. by war nations may secure markets, access to raw materials, better opportunities for investment and a firm basis for industrial progress; they may cripple troublesome competitors; they may exact indemnities. much that is accounted gain on this score may in the end prove to be loss, but it is false to state that there can be no profit at all. the discussion whether or not a war is profitable often takes the superficial form of a comparison between the indemnity received and the money expended on the war. it is pointed out, for example, that in japan received a larger sum from china than { } had been spent on the war, while on the other hand it is emphasised that thereafter the military expenditures of japan increased so rapidly that much more than this profit was spent. but the indemnity was the smallest part of japan's gain and the military expenditures were made necessary, not by the chinese war nor by the payment of the indemnity but by a concrete military policy, which was largely based on concrete economic needs. either an expansion into asia was necessary and in the end possible for japan or it was not; if it was, the expenditure of a few hundred million dollars on the wars against china, russia and germany were a paying investment, irrespective of indemnities; if it was not the wars would have been a bad investment even had they shown a clear balance on the books. the problem is not whether every war is advantageous to the victor but whether any war is of benefit. it is highly improbable that the war of will in the end pay most if any of the combatants, but if germany by a victory as easy as that of could have secured from france an indemnity of four or five billion dollars and the cession of northern africa, it would surely have paid. a war between germany and holland, if the other powers held off, would be equally profitable to the stronger power. if a coalition of nations could defeat and blockade great britain, they could easily recoup themselves for any expenditures involved. it is true that they could not physically remove british railways and mines, but they could confiscate the navy, the merchant marine, a part of the foreign and colonial investments and a certain part of the profits of business within the kingdom. to assert that a nation can never gain at war is merely to state that nations never have conflicting interests, whereas in truth some nations are cramped economically by other nations, { } and a large part of the wealth and income of most nations can be diverted by means of physical compulsion. the problem of internationalism is therefore not solely to teach the nation its own interest but so to change the conditions that the nation's interest in war will disappear. the temptation to war can be overcome only by reversing the motives of the nation, either by making war no longer profitable, or by making the nation harmless. within the nation the same problem exists with regard to classes. either the bellicose class must be satisfied in some other way, must have its energies directed to some other task, or it must be made impotent. the first problem, that of destroying the economic root of war, can be solved only by securing a community of interest among great nations, an economic internationalism. not, of course, a complete community; there is perhaps no such thing in the world. the inter-class relations within a nation illustrate this point. these social classes, wage-earners and capitalists, industrialists and agriculturalists, are separated by many differences and have no complete community of interest, yet are sufficiently united to prevent a complete dissolution of the state. so, internationally, a community of interest may be partial and tentative if it suffices to give the countries enough, or the promise of enough, to discourage them from easily resorting to the costly and dangerous expedient of war. in securing this concert, we must work upon the general principle that wherever possible, a joint use of a given resource by various nations is better than an exclusive use by any one nation. the progress of society within the last few centuries has been toward an extension of this principle of joint use. more and more things are held by society for the benefit of the nation. { } similarly an increasing number of the things for which nations compete might be held by the nations of the world for the joint use of humanity. while such a joint use is not always possible, especially when it runs counter to long usage, an immense opportunity for such joint use remains. this principle of joint use might advantageously be applied to the development of backward countries. nothing has been more difficult than the distribution among industrial nations of the advantages accruing from colonial exploitation. there are three methods by which nations, if they can agree at all, may seek to adjust their rival claims. the first is to do nothing nationally; to permit the backward countries to be exploited at will by individual competitors. the second is to divide the new territories among the rival powers. the third is to secure a joint development by all the great powers. the first method usually means both a ruthless exploitation of natives and a constant conflict among the interested nations. the nationals of one country conspire against those of another for a control of the native government. if, for example, we were to leave the philippines entirely alone, various enterprising capitalists would immediately organise and support corrupt native governments, lend money at usurious rates and secure exclusive concessions. to upset these arrangements, financiers of a rival nation would foment revolutions, and the country would be split up into political factions, supported by money from various european capitals. the political leaders though talking grandiloquently of independence and native sovereignty, would be, and perhaps would know that they were, merely pawns in a financial chess game. the second method, now more or less usual, of { } establishing national spheres of influence, also leads to friction and the threat of force. the crucial difficulty of this plan lies in the fact that great nations which have come late into the colonial competition are left without a sufficient agricultural base for their industry and live in fear of having the colonies of rival powers shut against them. the whole plan is based upon the assumed right of each nation to monopolise the resources of colonies, in other words, to use exclusively what might be used jointly. as a result of this method the temptation to go to war over colonies is immensely great. if by a single war, germany could secure enough colonial territory from france to maintain her industry for three or four generations, it might well be worth her while to fight. it is the lives of one or of two million men to-day against tens of millions of lives a generation hence. a nation which would not fight for a somewhat larger share in the exploitation of a given colony would be tempted to fight for a sole and monopolistic possession. the third plan of distribution is what may be called the internationalisation of colonies. it is a step in the direction of an international imperialism, as opposed to the nationalistic imperialism of to-day. there have been numerous proposals to secure a machinery for such internationalism in colonies. especially during the last decade or two many men in europe and america have come to the conclusion that the danger of the present international scramble for colonies is so great that any change, even though not in itself unassailable, is better than the present anarchy. even among socialists the belief is now expressed that the colonial problem is to be solved, not by leaving it alone, but by a concerted action of the great powers, which will give each nation the assurance of a { } certain stake in colonial development, and will lessen the temptation to wage imperialistic wars. of the various recent plans two concrete proposals are worth citing. thus mr. walter lippmann[ ] suggests a permanent international conference of the great powers which would act as a senate to the native legislative body of the backward country, let us say morocco, and would in time supervise the budget, fix salaries and make appointments. it is hoped by mr. lippmann, though not confidently predicted, that such a body would guarantee the open door and give equal opportunities to the investors of all nations in the particular colony. a broader plan, proposed by mr. h. w. brailsford[ ] involves the union into a permanent international syndicate of all companies and individuals seeking railroad, mining and other concessions in a backward country. fundamentally the plan of mr. brailsford is based on the open door for colonial trade and the equal (and automatic) participation of the great nations in colonial investment. "the remedy," he says, "is so simple that only a very clever man could sophisticate himself into missing it, and it is as old as cobden. it is not necessary to establish universal free trade to stop the rivalry to monopolise colonial markets; it would suffice to declare free trade in the colonies, or even in those which are not self-governing." "it ought not to be utterly beyond the statesmanship of europe to decree some limited form of colonial free trade by general agreement--to apply it, for example, to africa." "for the plague of concession-hunting the best expedient would probably be to impose on all the competing national groups in each area the duty of { } amalgamating in a permanently international syndicate. if one such syndicate controlled all the railways and another all the mines of china and turkey, a vast cause of national rivalry would be removed. the interests of china and turkey might be secured by interposing a disinterested council or arbitrator between them and the syndicate to adjust their respective interests. short of creating a world state or a european federation, the chief constructive work for peace is to establish colonial free trade and internationalise the export of capital."[ ] both the plans mentioned are limited in scope and difficult of application, but each contains the germ of a possible development. that of mr. brailsford seems on the whole the more promising. it is likely that a senate such as is proposed by mr. lippmann would go to pieces over the question whether a certain valuable and exclusive concession should go to a french or to a german syndicate or whether a punitive expedition should or should not be sent against the tribes in the interior. on the other hand the plan of mr. brailsford, which by no means excludes the other, has the advantage of making once and for all a fixed and certain distribution of all eventual profits and thus effecting a real community of interest among the promoters and investors of all nations. it is an economic rather than a political solution, and it is along the line of a present trend, the evolution of international investment and of economic internationalism generally. it would seem easier for the capitalists of six great nations to form a great international trust for specific purposes than for an international senate to make a multitude of decisions each affecting strong national interests. a difficulty, inhering in all plans, is that there is no rule of law or morals that will decide how much each { } nation should secure from the profits of exploitation. to what extent shall american, dutch, belgian, austrian or japanese capitalists contribute to the international syndicate which is to exploit the backward countries? but this problem, though difficult, is less hopeless than that of equitably distributing colonies _en bloc_. for there is no principle on which to divide such colonies. neither national wealth nor population nor the strength of the national army and navy will serve as a criterion, though all perhaps would be factors in determining the shares of the different countries. a still greater difficulty however arises from the fact that the most valuable colonies are already distributed. even if germany were to receive a share in moroccan opportunities, might she not still seek by war to obtain the exclusive possession of the immense french colonial empire. perhaps no arrangement for a joint exploitation of new and presumably less valuable colonies would wholly satisfy the imperialists of great european powers, so long as the old colonies are so unevenly divided. to satisfy the nations without colonies, some arrangements must also be made for a redistribution of rights in colonies already belonging to the great powers. but against such redistribution immense forces are opposed. algeria is now safely french; india has been british for more than a century and a half. whatever rights are conceded in these countries to foreign investors, whatever division of profits is granted, will be effected only under the political control of the french and british governments. the best concessions have long since been given out, and the nation which has had political control has in the main favoured its own nationals. the essential problem here, however, is the open door. if the nations without colonies or sufficient agricultural resources at home can sell their products and buy their { } raw materials on the same terms as do the nations owning colonies, a large part of the present bitterness and discontent would disappear. there are of course two difficulties in the way of the establishment of such an open door. the first is that commerce may be legally free and yet be hampered by a mass of local, illegal discriminations, and the second is that the trend at the present time is opposed to such equality in colonial commerce. the first difficulty is not unsolvable; the second constitutes an obstacle, which will only be removed when the forces making for an internationalisation of colonies become stronger than they are to-day. even a settlement of the colonial problem would not solve all the economic questions dividing the nations; equally perplexing difficulties are found nearer home. a generation or two from now germany might be completely ruined by a refusal on france's part to grant her access to the iron mines of lorraine. at any moment russia may prohibit the temporary emigration of agricultural laborers upon whom the prosperity of the east prussian agriculture largely depends. italy, switzerland, belgium, holland and other countries can be ruined by adverse tariff legislation. in very few countries is there such a balanced economic structure, such a complete control over the essentials of industry as to render an economic assault by other nations innocuous. it is not essential, however, in working out an economic concert that all the problems that separate the nations be completely and finally settled. given a satisfactory solution of the chief difficulties, some way will be sought to prevent secondary problems from leading nations to war. a single instance of a joint successful enterprise of the powers in a single economic field would act as a powerful inducement to attempt joint action in other { } cases. it is not to be assumed that all the questions dividing europe are to be solved in a day or by a single decision. what is required is not one plan which will safeguard all the nations all the time but an inclination or desire to afford a measure of economic security to all and a gradual working out of a machinery, which will effect a settlement here and a settlement there and will in the end develop certain general lines of policy. it is not for a single economic setback that nations go to war, nor even because of a slower development than that of rivals; the chief animus is an ever present fear of industrial _débacle_. economic insecurity, even more than present economic distress, forces nations to resort to arms. the way out is towards some form of internationalisation of the great external opportunities upon which the home industry of the nation depends. is such a development probable? will the nations in this generation or in five generations agree to make sacrifices to permit their rivals to live? it is a question not lightly to be answered. we cannot be dogmatic concerning the future development of industry and of international relations when we cannot see clearly a dozen years ahead. yet the very intensity, the almost pathological intensity, of the nationalistic economic struggle to-day is an indication that it may be approaching a change. in the midst of this struggle, there appears below the surface the signs of a growing economic internationalism. [ ] "the stakes of diplomacy," new york, , pp. - . [ ] the _new republic_, may , . [ ] the _new republic_, may th, . { } chapter xx the forces of internationalism an internationalism, which will bind the nations together into one economic unit, can be secured only as a result of a further political and economic development, limiting the power and autonomy of the several nations. without pressure, external or internal, no union or agreement among the nations can be expected. the thirteen american colonies would not have been willing to live together had they been able to live separately, and, similarly, to-day the great powers would make no concessions to internationalism were it safe and profitable to retain a complete liberty of action. but no such plenary independence is longer possible. forces are at work which circumscribe national autonomy and compel each nation to act with reference to the will of others. in the case of small nations this tendency is manifest. belgium before was a neutralised state, a ward of europe. it had surrendered its right to declare war or form alliances. switzerland, denmark, norway and sweden, while preserving their technical liberty, were by their weakness precluded from entering upon policies disapproved by stronger nations. even the six great powers were forced to pool issues. austria dared not carry out a programme which germany opposed, nor could russia or france act without the other's acquiescence. group policies were substituted for purely nationalistic aims. { } economically a similar interdependence is being created. no nation is wholly self-sufficing. italy must import coal and iron, germany cotton, wool, leather and fodder. france requires germany's coal and germany the iron of france. a safe access to these markets and sources of raw material can only be assured by alliance with other powers. the economic dependence of one nation, moreover, influences the policies of its neighbours. the stress of a country suffering from industrial disequilibrium is transmitted to other nations. if, when germany has exhausted her iron ore, she is prevented from obtaining a supply, let us say from french lorraine, she will be faced with the alternative of dismantling her works in westphalia and silesia or of forcing france to sell ore to her. germany's stringency will thus vitally affect france's international policy. equally, if russia or austria cannot obtain what it needs from abroad, the nations which close the gates are endangered. caution alone must prevent a nation from allowing its neighbour to risk starvation. however ill-founded in precedent, the right to secure what it imperatively needs is a right that every people will fight for. from this political and economic interdependence among nations potentially hostile, there results a vague community of interest in peace. this common interest is strongly reinforced by the staggering costs of modern war. the present conflict is teaching us that europe cannot continue to live and fight, since more than what it fights for is lost in the fighting. on the other hand it cannot stop fighting until it evolves principles of settlement based on the economic security of the vanquished. what the industrial powers will gain from this conflict is but an insignificant part of its cost. compared with the billions { } of dollars which france has spent upon this war, how insignificant are the few tens of millions that she may have gained from a monopolistic administration of her colonies! how little would the open door have cost the successful colonial nations as compared with the losses of this war! not that colonial administration was the only or the main cause of the conflict; other factors contributed, such as the megalomania of the pan-germans. it seems probable, however, that pan-german fanaticism was rendered infectious only by the fear that germany was to be economically encircled and undermined. this fear may well outlast the war. a german defeat, however crushing, will not solve the peace problem, for defeat without security means militarism and reaction in germany, which in turn means militarism and reaction in europe. the special advantages which the nations, possessing colonies, may in the future secure will be dearly bought at the expense of new wars, as costly and decivilising as that under which we now live. this is the chief sanction of internationalism, the price which is exacted from both beneficiaries and victims of a narrow nationalistic policy. whether a liberal internationalism would not pay better, even on the plane of dollars and cents, is a question that admits of but one rational answer. at this moment[ ] there is small likelihood that that rational answer will be given. fighting inhibits thinking, and in the allied countries the belief is held that germany provoked the war through mere wantonness and not because of economic pressure, and that security can come only by ending prussian militarism. in germany there is an analogous conception of her opponents. the theory that the war was merely wanton has the { } merit of simplicity, but like other simple interpretations, it does not cover the facts. there were in germany certain current ideas concerning racial dominion, the natural mission of the german and the absolute supremacy and moral self-sufficiency of the state, which intensified the war spirit. the pan-germans harangued in press and on platform to a people intoxicated by former military and economic triumphs and rendered susceptible by army discipline to martial intoxication. had it not been for a real sense of insecurity, however, peaceable germans would have been less receptive to such martial ideas. for a generation after germany, though armed, had been pacific because secure; her economic centre of gravity lay within. it was not until her national interests extended beyond her boundaries that this sense of insecurity arose. pan-germanism was the intellectual and emotional expression of an economic malaise. to boycott germany after the war will neither decrease her anxiety nor improve the prospects of peace in europe. such a "war after the war," as it is now proposed, is a flat denial of the economic interdependence of nations. its obvious result would be to intensify, rather than moderate, the industrial competition. driven from the markets of the allies, germany would be forced to dump her goods into all neutral countries (at the expense of the trade of the boycotting nations), as well as to form a counter economic alliance and if possible a military coalition. a permanent economic injury to the central powers would at the first convenient moment provoke military retaliation. and, parenthetically, a nation like germany, with its growing population and resources, cannot remain crushed. even if too weak to make headway against a powerful group of nations, it will always be strong enough to act as a make-weight between two opposed coalitions. { } thus if england and russia, no longer united by a common peril, were to clash in the mediterranean or in persia, the presence of an economically threatened and therefore bellicose germany would tend to precipitate hostilities. if a boycotted germany by an economic or military alliance could detach one or more of her present enemies, the international situation created would be as dangerous as that of .[ ] the argument that economic insecurity does not tend toward war is thus seen to halt on all fours. there is, however, a stronger or at least a more obvious argument against the promotion of economic internationalism. it is the claim that wars are caused by nationalistic strife. if the incessant struggle between nationalities cannot be appeased but must lead again and again to world-wide wars, then it is futile to seek to avert war by the creation of an economic internationalism. no agreement among the great nations about trade or colonies will avail so long as poles, bulgars and southern slavs can throw the world into war to fulfil their nationalistic aspirations. until this nationalistic problem is solved no sure advance towards a permanent peace is possible. undoubtedly the struggle of subject nationalities to be { } free, and of independent nations to annex their kin, has been a fruitful source of strife during the last century. the sense of nationality has been intensified by the nation's mobilisation of the economic interests of its citizens; it has become almost pathological as a result of petty nationalistic fragments competing for separate existence. bulgarians, greeks and serbians want the same tract in macedonia; roumanians, italians and serbs wish to redeem their subject brethren in the austro-hungarian empire; france seeks to rescue the francophile though german-speaking alsatians and lothringians, and germany would gladly welcome the dutch and flemings back to their putative german allegiance. there is no limit to these nationalistic claims; no room for arbitration; no fixed principle to determine to which nation each group shall be awarded. the result, quite apart from any action among the great powers, seems war--inevitable and endless.[ ] { } it is impossible to withhold one's admiration for the inspiring fight which oppressed peoples all over the world are making for their independence. we thrill over the old story of the grecian revolt against turkey, of the great risorgimento of italy, of the long slow struggle of germany to achieve statehood. the century since the vienna congress has marked an almost uninterrupted victory for the principle of nationality. yet though we sympathise with the aspirations of poles, finns, armenians and bohemians, an unlimited independence cannot always be desired. nationalities are not sundered geographically, but men of diverse stocks and traditions are interspersed, as though a malign power had wished to make concord forever impossible. ireland cannot secure autonomy, to say nothing of independence of great britain, without encountering ulster's demand to be independent of ireland. similarly a great roumania, a greater serbia, a poland, an independent bohemia can be secured only by denying the equal rights of lesser racial groups. to-day hungarians misrule the roumanians of transylvania; to-morrow a greater roumania may misrule the transylvania hungarians. the principle of the independence of nationalities collides with itself. it also collides with overwhelming economic facts. racially trieste is semi-italian, but if italy acquires the city (and includes it in her customs union), a vast austrian and german _hinterland_ is deprived of a necessary commercial outlet. italy can hold the east adriatic only by smothering serbia. moreover many of these foetal nationalities are too weak and geographically too insecure for independent political existence. what reality would attach to an independent bohemia held in a vice between two hostile german neighbours, and with a german population in its own territory? even in peace the { } teutonic powers could gently strangle the new nation by means of discriminating tariffs. finally many of the claims for nationalistic expansion are inspired by a motive quite different from what appears on the surface. what the nation usually wants is not merely its own unredeemed brethren, but more territory and people. its unredeemed brethren are the easiest to take. but while roumania demands sovereignty over the roumanians of transylvania, she will not let the bulgarians of the dobrudja go. in the one case she upholds the sacred principle of nationality; in the other she discards that principle for the sake of a strategic frontier. serbians and greeks ask not only for the right to recover their ancient territory but also for the right to rule over bulgarians and turks. what they really desire is access to the sea, ample resources for an adequate population, and the national power, without which an independent existence is an illusion. it is too late to dream of a really independent existence for each pigmy nationality, strewn about in eastern europe. in the absence of a balkan confederation, servia, roumania, bulgaria, montenegro and greece may preserve their separate sovereignties, though only if they submit to the "advice" of greater nations, as portugal submits to britain. but for such nations to have conflicting nationalistic aspirations, to wage bloody wars for larger territory and more subjects, is a ridiculous and a tragic situation. servia, dreaming of the restoration of the empire of tsar stephen dushan, whose armies marched to the walls of constantinople, greece aspiring to the empire of the east, are a menace to the peace of the world. it is doubtful whether all of these ambitious nationalities can even preserve their separate national existence. if the welfare of europe conflicts with the { } independence of a montenegro or a bohemia, some lesser form of self-government must be discovered. that lesser form of self-government might be sought in a local autonomy under a federal government. it is not improbable that the political development, of south-eastern europe for example, will tend towards group organisations based on the co-operation of diverse nationalities and stocks somewhat on the swiss model. if the political question could be divorced from the question of the economic exploitation of these small nations, and if each nationalistic group were permitted to retain its language, traditions and _kultur_, the result might be better than a mere _morcellement_ of south-eastern europe, with petty nationalities fighting the battles of their big backers. in such a larger switzerland, each group might be represented in proportion to its numbers, and the worst evils of the present racial contests be avoided. the important question in the present connection, however, is not what the particular solution is to be, but whether any solution is possible. it need not be a perfect but only a permanent settlement. such a settlement presupposes a concert among the great powers, an agreement concerning their own problems. given such an agreement, however, the powers could in time work out a balkan arrangement, which neither servia nor bulgaria, roumania nor greece would dare resist. in the end, if the arrangement were definite, practicable, in reasonable conformity with nationalistic lines, and with a strong and certain sanction, the small nations would become resigned. to-day they have boundless ambitions because the division among the great powers gives them a chance of realising ambitions, and what ambitions they have not to start with, austria or russia will lend to them on short notice. in this sense and to this extent, the { } nationalistic problem in its worst form is an appendage to the vast struggle between the powers, and it may cease to be provocative of great wars once a basis of agreement is established among these larger nations. with the best will such a basis of international agreement among the great powers cannot be established in a few years. it requires a gradual development, a progressive give and take, a continuous widening of the principle of joint use. an international convention, altering the rules of maritime warfare, would be a long step in this direction; a congress of the nations for opening up the trade of colonies (like our international postal conventions) would be another step. the internationalisation of panama, kiel, gibraltar, constantinople, would immensely enhance security, and advance the progress of internationalisation. so also an economic convention between france and germany, or between germany and russia, in which reciprocal industrial advantages were accorded. such specific arrangements, which permit of international interpretation and enforcement, would help to bring about a larger economic internationalism. but for the real foundations of peace we must look far below the level of all these diplomatic and political arrangements, in the world industry itself. to-day we are still in the full momentum of an economic development that makes for war, but we are also at the beginning of an economic trend towards peace. in the present world-economy the nation is the unit and international friction the rule, but the movement, at what rate we do not know, tends towards a world business in which the unit will be international and there will be peace between partners. we are already in the first beginnings of the internationalism of capital. this development is in part the cause of a general { } phenomenon, the growth of an internationalism of class. each social group seeks to establish relations with similar groups across the border, for the protection of interests that traverse national boundaries. thus we have a certain internationalism of the wage-earning class, of finance, of various scientific groups. the possibility of this internationalism grows with the integration of the world through commerce, industry, communication and the spread of knowledge. the most obviously international of social groups is the proletariat. though sundered on the question of immigration, though (in some countries) nationalistic and even militaristic in spirit, the wage-earners on the whole have less to gain from imperialism and national aggression than have wealthier classes, while they share disproportionately in the burdens that war entails. on the other hand workers have less influence in the making of diplomatic decisions than do their employers. in the end, moreover, their decision, like that of the capitalist class, is chiefly determined by economic forces largely beyond their control. it is the nascent internationalism of capital, not of capitalists or of wage-earners, that is the supreme element making for peace. we must beware, however, of welcoming all foreign investment as a portent of a growing internationalism of capital. much that is accounted economic internationalism is in truth merely an extended nationalism, an extra-nationalism. for investments to allay international discord they should create a community of interest between nations potentially hostile. if britain invested freely in germany and germany in britain there would be created a mutuality of interest which would render peace probable. each nation would have a stake in the prosperity of the other; each would have given hostages to peace. { } but when the london financier puts his money in india, canada or the argentine, he is not co-operating but competing with potentially hostile nations. the process is an extension of the national economy to outlying districts, a transition to a larger national unit, like that created in the middle ages when the free cities ruled adjoining farm territory. such an economic extension exacerbates national antagonisms and leads to war. while foreign investment is preponderatingly of this sort, however, there also exist the beginnings of a movement more truly international. the securities of one nation are dealt with upon the stock exchanges of another, capital flows across national borders and great international business concerns are created. the movement in favourable circumstances is likely to accelerate, either by the mutual economic interpenetration of nations, as when the french build factories in germany or the germans in france, or by the amalgamation of the capitals of two countries and their use in joint enterprises. the formation of large international syndicates for the exploitation of backward countries, whatever its other consequences, tends towards the creation of a community of interest. if the powers unite, for example, and can agree upon a chinese loan, a step forward will have been taken towards an internationalism of capital. the process of trust formation tends in the same direction. as competing industries within a nation frequently end by combining, so in many great industries the competing national units may develop a gentleman's agreement to regulate output and finally may establish an international cartel. considerable progress has already been made in the division of the international field. a further development along these lines, though not easy, is by no means impossible or even improbable. { } we may seek to understand this eventual international evolution of business by visualising a world organisation of the steel industry. either one corporation might be formed or a common control might be established among national steel companies through an interchange of stock. the result might be somewhat as follows: in the united states we should have an organisation comprising all american steel concerns, its directors representing constituent companies as well as the government, labour and consumers. in its domestic affairs, it would be under governmental jurisdiction. its capital might amount to a few billion dollars, of which a part would represent holdings of european companies in return for american stock, transferred to european companies. such a world corporation would be a financial aggregation immensely greater than any in the past. its principles of organisation, however, would not materially differ from those with which we are familiar. in each country a board of directors would hold control over constituent companies, and at london, paris or new york a high federal council would settle controversies and make arrangements for the business of the world. each company would have two elements of protection against unfair treatment; a community of interest secured through an interchange of stock and a representative on the federal council. a development, such as is here outlined, is in advance of the psychological preparation of the world. we have not yet succeeded in regulating corporations, and there would remain innumerable difficulties and inequalities as between nations, which could not easily be settled. the price which such concerns might be allowed to pay for ores or charge for finished products and the pressure which they might put upon workmen might cause financial { } quarrels, leading to international controversies. if the governments held hands off, even greater evils might result. the various peoples would hesitate to turn over their basic industries to a private corporation beyond the regulation either of competitors or of their own government. but we are here concerned not with the end but with the direction of international capitalism, and this direction tends to be the same as that of national capitalism. division of the field, interchange of stock, community of interest, co-operation and combination in one form or another are as much a temptation in the relation of firms separated by a frontier as between those within one customs union. capital is fluid. it is quantitative. it is potentially international. a hundred dollars is indistinguishable from a certain number of pounds, marks or francs. the machinery for an international combination of capital is already present, the beginnings of international investment have already been made. further progress waits only upon the removal of barriers, in part traditional. the larger economic interests of the nations, and of most of the classes within the nations, lead towards the removal of these barriers and towards the gaining of that security without which international investment is dangerous and conventions and agreements almost worthless. given such an economic co-operation and such an economic interpenetration of rival european nations, and the political and diplomatic conflicts would grow less acrid and dangerous. as the process continued the interest of each nation in the welfare of its neighbours would become so great as to make international war as unthinkable as a war of pennsylvania against new york. a vital and powerful international spirit, which already exists but is held in check by the fear and insecurity of each { } independent nation, would be given full sway. there would be a new europe and a new world, in which war would be but a vague and hateful memory. such developments, however, are slow and generations live their uncertain lives during a period of transition. while waiting for an economic internationalism to develop to maturity the nations remain on guard, armed, threatened and threatening. the change from our present anarchy to a future concord will not be swift. for the time even an increase of the economic unit to include several nations instead of one is not likely to put an end to all international economic strife. it is not improbable that the proximate economic development will be not internationalism but _supra-nationalism_. just as the customs union grew from a district to a nation, so it may grow to include a group of nations but not the whole world. the world may come to be divided into a group of five or six vast economic units, each of which would be composed of one or several or indeed many political units. the british empire, the russian empire, the united states, china and japan, south america, one or two economic coalitions of west and central europe (with their colonial possessions) would furnish a far more stable economic equilibrium for the world than is the present division of the powers. each of these groups would have both agricultural and manufacturing resources; none of them would be imperatively obliged to fight for new territories. while there would be friction, while one group would have a population in proportion to its resources in excess of a neighbouring group, the sheer brutal necessity of expansion which now forces nations to fight would be largely moderated. such a division of the world into seven or six or perhaps fewer economic aggregates though not easy is quite within { } the bounds of possibility. three of these aggregates, britain, russia and the united states, are already political units; the chief difficulty would consist of western and central europe. no thoroughgoing political amalgamation of such countries as france, germany and italy is at all proximate, but some form of economic unity is not impossible. the bond which would join these countries might be less tight and therefore stronger than the _ausgleich_, which holds together the kingdoms of austria and hungary. in the beginning it might be merely a series of trade conventions terminable on notice; from this it might grow to more permanent trade agreements and finally to a customs union. while the opposition to such an economic union would be strong the forces driving in this direction would also be powerful. as the really great nations emerge, as russia, the united states and the british empire increase their population into the hundreds of millions and their wealth into the hundreds of billions, the individual nations of europe will become economically insignificant and economically unsafe. only by a pooling of their resources will they be able to escape from the crushing superiority of the nations with large bulk and from an insecurity which makes for war. even with such an economic rearrangement of the world the west european coalitions would be unsafe unless they lessened the rate of increase of their population. never before has this population grown so rapidly. in the decade ending western europe (including the nations lying to the west of russia), added . millions to its numbers; in the decade ending it added almost millions. despite a decline in the birth-rate, the mortality has fallen so far that the population is reaching a point where it will be difficult to secure adequate food supplies from abroad. rather than starve or live under the { } constraint of scarce food and high food prices, the west european powers will fight for new territory from which to feed their people. with the industrial development of asia, and especially of china, this danger will be enhanced. of the three great nuclei of population in the world, eastern asia, southern asia and western (and central) europe, only one has been able to draw upon the surplus food of the world. eight hundred million asiatics have been forced to live on their own meagre home resources. as china begins to export coal, iron, textiles and other manufactured products, however, she will be able, whether politically independent or not, to compete with europe for the purchase of this food supply. not only will china's population probably increase with the advent of industrialism but the standard of living of her population will rise, and her competition with europe for the sale of manufactured products and the purchase of food will become intense. the cheap, patient, disciplined labour of china's hundreds of millions will be fighting with the belgian, the german and the italian wage-earners to secure the food which it will be necessary to import. it is not a yellow, but a human peril; a mere addition to the hungry mouths that are to be fed. the supply of exportable food that can be raised in the world has of course not reached its maximum, but beyond a certain point every increase in agricultural production means a more than proportional increase in the cost of the product. to feed eight hundred millions costs much more than twice as much as to feed four hundred millions. even though china secure only a minor part of the exportable food, it will by just so much increase the strain upon the industrial populations of europe. it is a crisis for european industrialism, a slowly { } preparing crisis with infinitely tragic possibilities. what it involves is not a mere re-distribution of wealth and income but an adjustment of population to the available home and foreign resources in food. collectivism will not permanently save the european wage-earner from hunger if he continues to multiply his numbers faster than the visible food supply increases. a decline in the rate of population growth is essential. fortunately this decline is already in progress. all the nations of western and central europe are moving towards a lower birth-rate and in france this diminution has reached a point where there is no longer a natural increase. in a few decades the birth rate will probably begin to fall everywhere faster than the death rate declines. an adjustment of the population to its probable resources will be in progress. in this progressive decline in the birth rate is to be found the greatest of all the factors making for internationalism and peace. it is a development which takes away the edge from the present frantic effort of industrial nations to secure a monopolistic control of foreign resources. it permits the gradual creation of an equilibrium between the nation's population and its physical resources at home and abroad. powerful forces in the world are at present slowly making for an economic internationalism to supplant the economic nationalism which to-day makes for war. the problem that faces the united states is what shall be its policy and action in view of the present nationalistic strife and of the slowly maturing economic internationalism. [ ] november, . [ ] the proposal to boycott germany after the war is sometimes based upon weirdly moral rather than economic considerations. "is it possible," writes one c. r. enoch, "that trade relations with the nation that has outraged every tenet of international and moral decency, every consideration of humanity, and has committed unspeakable atrocities, as has germany in her conduct of the war, can be taken up again at the point where they were broken off? ... there is only one procedure compatible with honour and justice--namely, that no ordinary commercial dealings should be carried out with germany until the _generation of teutons that did these things has passed away_, unless absolute penitence and reparation--if reparation be possible--is done therefor." "can we set the world in order." london, , p. . (my italics.) [ ] the granting of permission to the people of the disputed district to decide their own allegiance is a good general principle, but, unfortunately, does not carry us far. the main difficulty lies in determining what shall be the unit of territory and population which is to decide. if ireland votes as a unit, all ireland will have home rule; if each county is to have the right of self direction, ulster will be detached from the rest of the island. if alsace-lorraine votes to become french, whole districts, which will have voted to remain german, will be dissatisfied. moreover, in the latter case, should all the residents of the two provinces be permitted to vote or only those people and their descendants who were living there in ? if the first plan is adopted a premium is placed upon the policy of legally dispossessing the inhabitants of a conquered land and filling their places with loyal _immigrés_; if the latter is chosen, the principle of the right of a population to determine its allegiance is abandoned. finally, if the decision of the population of the disputed district were adverse to the interests of europe as a whole, it would be irrational to validate such a result. the interests of europe are superior to those of any nation, however powerful, and vastly superior to those of a luxemburg, ulster or alsace-lorraine. { } chapter xxi an immediate programme to the practical man who wants to know what to do and when and how to do it, general principles seem unreal and valueless. he is interested in the decisions of the next few months, not in a vague general direction of events for the coming century. and so in international politics he would like to decide what the nation shall do _now_ about the british blacklist, the german submarines, the mexican revolution, the california-japanese situation, and he is not keenly interested in the formulation of a policy which seems to hang high above the difficult concrete problems that must be solved immediately. he may languidly agree with proposals to create a community of interest among colonising nations and to establish the freedom of the sea, but he wishes to know whether in the meanwhile we are to back up carranza in mexico and what we are to do if the revolutionists "shoot up" an american town. while we work for these ideals, are we to allow germany to sink our liners and japan to swallow up china, or are we to fight? this attitude is not unreasonable. a general policy is of little value unless we can make successive decisions conform to it. but it is not easy or always possible to predict these decisions. we can tell approximately how many people in the united states will die next year, but not how many will die in any particular family. we can { } advise a man who is walking from new york to san francisco to take a generally westward course, but for any given mile of the road the direction may be north or south or east. a trend of policy is made up of innumerable deflections, small or large; it is an irregular chain of successive actions, which do not all tend in one direction. even if we narrow our field of vision and seek to elaborate a more immediate policy, we do not escape from the vagueness which inheres in all such general conclusions. in the main our problem consists in using the influence of the united states to create such an economic harmony among the nations, and to give each nation such a measure of security as to permit them to agree upon an international policy, which will be in the interest of all. the chief elements of this programme are two in number: to create conditions within the united states which will permit us to exert a real influence; and to use this influence in the creation of an international organisation, which will give each nation a measure of economic and military security, and prevent any nation from wantonly breaking the peace. how far we can progress towards such an organisation will depend upon the course and uncertain issue of the present war. the war may end with the central allies crushed, with germany reduced in size and austria and turkey dismembered. it may end with a lesser defeat for the central powers and with lesser penalties. there may be an inconclusive peace, which may either be a mere truce or a new basis of agreement between nations disillusioned by the conflict. finally the war may end with the partial or even complete victory of the central powers, either through their overcoming the united opposition of their enemies or by detaching one or more from their alliances. { } what the united states can effect at the conclusion of the war will inevitably depend upon which of these developments takes place. assuming that we ourselves are not drawn into the conflict, it is probable that our influence will be larger if neither of the great coalitions wins an overwhelming victory. if the western and eastern allies completely crush the resistance of the central powers, it is hardly likely that they will concede to us, who have not borne a share of the danger and toil, a large discretion in proposing the terms of peace. such an unconditional victory by either side would probably lead to an onerous and vindictive settlement, for each coalition is bound together by promises to its constituent nations, and these promises cannot be fulfilled without wholesale spoliation. moreover, each coalition will wish to weaken the future power of its opponents. a request by the united states that the victorious alliance deal generously with the defeated nations in order to create the conditions of a permanent peace would therefore probably meet with a more or less courteous denial. on the other hand, a drawn battle, or one in which the defeated party asking for peace still retained a considerable power of resistance, might lead to conditions in which the influence of the neutral nations, led by the united states, would be all-decisive. a situation might be created out of which no further fighting could bring a tolerable peace, and the nations might agree to some form of incipient international organisation, to which the united states could contribute. the problem of constantinople illustrates this possibility. that city, with the command of the straits, is likely to go to russia if the allies win, and to fall under a disguised german-austrian domination if the central powers are victorious. either situation would be vicious; { } either would leave the commerce of the defeated nations at the mercy of the great power that held the bosphorus. if on the other hand, the two opposed alliances were almost equally formidable at the end of the war, or if england and france became unwilling to fight longer in order to give russia a strategic position at constantinople, a true solution of the problem might be obtained by neutralising the straits. a union of all the powers might guarantee the free passage of these waters at all times, and an american commissioner in command of a small american army might carry out the wishes of an international council. it would not be a pleasant or in any sense a profitable adventure for the united states, and we should accept the task most unwillingly. our sole motive would be the belief that our acceptance of this responsibility would remove one of the greatest causes of future war. such an assumption of obligations at constantinople would constitute for us a new and dangerous international policy. while constantinople is easily defended and while ample assistance would be forthcoming if defence were necessary, it can hardly be doubted that a rupture of such an international agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of the straits would bring on a war in which we should be obliged to take our part. yet the danger which we thus incur by entering upon an agreement looking to international peace is perhaps less than the danger of not entering since if constantinople causes another world war, as it may if not neutralised, it is by no means unlikely that sooner or later we may be forced into the struggle. it is better to risk our peace in seeking to avert a world disaster than to permit the great war to come. there are other international policies which in favouring circumstances might be urged by the united states at { } the close of the war. we might append our signature to international conventions defining and guaranteeing a freedom of the seas, to agreements looking towards a co-operative exploitation of backward countries, to laws regulating the settlement of arbitrable international disputes, and to such special conventions as might be made for the re-neutralisation of belgium. upon the basis of such agreements, even though they were but tentative and partial, we might enter with the other nations upon some form of a league of peace and international polity, which would secure these new conventions from being rudely disturbed by the aggression of one or two powers. whether we help to carry out these policies at the close of this war, will depend upon the balance of power then existing in europe and upon the mood of the nations. if russia wants constantinople, if britain insists upon the right of capture at sea, if france, italy, servia, roumania and the british colonies demand territorial gains without compensation, and these powers are able to enforce their will, our delegates to the peace conference may make representations and suggestions, but will not be able to carry them through. nor if the central powers are victorious and unyielding, shall we be able to make our advice count. no one power or group of powers could carry out such a policy against the will of a majority or even of a strong minority of powers. unless the conditions at the end of the war are such as to convince the victors (if there are victors) that it is wiser to readjust the world than to get all they can, unless great nations like britain, france and germany can agree that a groundwork for future peace is more valuable than territorial gains and punitive damages, the opportunity for a peaceful reconstruction will pass. new coalitions will be formed; new wars will be fought. it is of course possible that such an international { } reconstruction will be entered upon only with hesitation by several of the nations, including some of the victors. it is even conceivable that the movement might be furthered by certain of the belligerents on both sides, as for example germany, great britain, france and italy (aided by the united states and other neutrals) and be opposed to some extent by, let us say, russia and turkey. it is not assumed that this particular division among the nations will actually occur, but merely that upon the conclusion of the war the moral integrity of the alliances may be shattered and with the prospect of new cleavages and disagreements, an effort be made, aided by the neutrals, to create conditions doing away with the present balance of power. a war disintegrates the elements making for success in war; enemies become allies and allies enemies. at the final council board each nation tends to return to its allegiance to itself, and with the passing of the old alliances a new league based upon totally different principles becomes possible. it is, however, with a tempered optimism that we should approach the international conference that is to end this war. even if america is represented and wisely represented, even if the powers are willing to listen to proposals looking toward international reconstruction, the probability that there will be an inclination to make concessions is not overwhelming. hatred, distrust, the injection of petty interests, the tenacity of diplomatic conservatism will all work against a wise forbearance and a far-seeing policy, and the errors of the vienna conference of and of the berlin conference of may be duplicated or worse. there is at least an even chance that the international situation will be quite as unsatisfactory and perilous in as it was in . progress towards international reconstruction is a possible but by no means { } certain part of the agenda of the diplomatic conference, which will meet when enough millions of the youth of europe have been slaughtered and maimed. but those who desire peace and the international relations which will alone make peace possible have learned to be patient, and if the problem advances only slowly to a solution it will be sufficient satisfaction to know that it advances at all. after this war there will be many long years during which the nations may study at their leisure the clumsiness of the arrangements which make for international conflict. there will be years in which america, if she is worthy and strong, will be able to make her influence for peace felt. the problem, however, is not how rapidly we shall move but whether we shall move at all and in what direction. that direction seems to be clearly indicated by the recent trend of world events. with the passing of our isolation we are given the opportunity to use our immense influence directly, continuously and intelligently for the strengthening of the economic bonds which make for a world peace. time and the economic trend work on our side. we can hasten, though we cannot and need not create, the vast unifying movement which comes with the further integration of industry. what we can contribute to this consummation is an ability to see the world as it is and a willingness to work and if necessary to fight for the changes without which international peace is impossible. we must avoid a cautious yet dangerous clinging to a philosophy of national irresponsibility, as we must likewise avoid the excesses of a nationalistic imperialism. we must take our part manfully, side by side with the other nations, in the great reorganisation of the world, which even to-day is foreshadowed by an economic internationalism, now in its beginnings. { } in the last century and a half the united states has made three great contributions to the political advancement of the world. the first was the adoption of the constitution, an experiment in federalism on a scale larger than ever before known in history. the second was the adoption of a policy, by which the vast territories of all the states were held in common, and these new territories admitted to statehood upon exactly the same terms as the original commonwealths, which formed the union. our third contribution was the monroe doctrine, which removed two continents from the field of foreign conquest and guaranteed to each american nation the freedom to determine its own form of government and its own sovereignty. to-day the nation is again in a position to contribute to the political progress of the world. it stands before a fourth decision. either it can cling hopelessly to the last vestiges of its policy of isolation or can launch out into imperialistic ventures, or finally it can promote, as can no other nation, a policy of internationalism, which will bind together the nations in a union of mutual interest, and will hasten the peaceful progress of the economic and political integration of the world. { } index a abbott, j. f., "japanese expansion and american policies," quoted, n. africa, slavery under imperialistic system in, . agricultural nations, how war was a necessity to early, - ; effect of conversion of, into industrial nations, - . agricultural progress, as one of the causes of war, . agriculture, an economic activity that is pacific in tendency, ; how america's economic mutuality with europe may depend upon, ; a secure base for a policy of non-aggression in development of, ; amount of land available for, in america, - ; growth in products of, compared with growth in population, - ; opportunities for further development of american, - ; probable increase in efficiency in, - . alaska, attitude of america in purchase of, . algeria, preferential treatment of, as to tariffs, by france, ; volume of trade of, with france compared with that with other countries, . america, effect of great war upon, ; choice of foreign policies open to, ; influences which will determine national trend, - ; attitude of pacifist idealists, ; attitude of self-seeking individualists, ; origin and character of demand in, for preparedness, - ; the ideal of a united, - ; interest of financial groups in preparedness and "united america" ideal, - ; question as to what purpose armament in, is to be used, ; the group for defence and the group for establishment of proper international relations, - ; factors which will determine foreign policy of, - ; goal of internationalism to be aspired for by, ; causes of failure of, to realise ideal of internationalism, ; imperialistic ideas in, - ; steadfastness necessary in whatever course decided on, - ; not exempt from economic forces which cause war, - ; attitude of, toward peace and war, - ; period of clipper ships in, ; character of diplomacy of, - ; plunge taken by, in ; into imperialism, ; strategic and industrial motives behind change in foreign policy of, - ; "congestion of capital" argument proved futile, - ; effect upon thought in, of imperialistic venture, ; relations of, with europe, as affected by monroe doctrine, and international responsibilities thrust upon, - ; lessons derived by, from european war, - ; a positive policy to be substituted for a negative, - ; comparative intensity of competition with great britain, germany and france for foreign trade, - ; development in field of investment, - ; obvious entrance of, upon economic competition, - ; isolation evidently no longer possible to, ; decision to be made by, as to nature of expansion policy to be adopted, - ; choice lies between nationalistic imperialism and internationalism, ; arguments of imperialists as to course to be taken by, - ; dangers of imperialistic policy to, - ; secure road to imperialism for, in anglo-american union, - ; arguments for ideal of internationalism, - ; capability of, for leading in promotion of international peace, dependent on economic development, ff.; tendency to imperialistic policy from unequal distribution of wealth, ff.; danger of present favourable conditions as to incomes and wages not continuing, - ; foreign policy must accord with international ideals, - ; course to be followed by, in foreign policy, in choosing between immediate and ultimate interest, - ; question of future relations with canada, - ; policy toward china, - ; three ways open to, of promoting international adjustments aimed to secure peace, ; absurdity of method of "going it alone," - ; the method of forming an alliance with one or more selected nations, - ; third and most promising method, to constitute our nation a rallying-point for the formulation and enforcement of principles of international policy, - ; leading part taken by, in advocacy of freedom of the seas, ; hostility of, to british domination of the seas, ; an immediate programme for, - . americanism, as an ideal, - . anglo-american union, arguments favouring, - ; drawbacks to plan of, ; further discussion of possible value of, and disadvantages of, - . anti-imperialists, arguments of, - ; considerations which work against, - . arbitration, defects of, as a plan for preserving peace, - . aristocracy, benefits of imperialism confined to the, - ; evil effects of imperialistic system upon, . arndt, paul, on handicapping of germany because of meagreness of colonial possessions, . b backward countries, root of imperialism in exploitation of, by imperialistic powers, - ; problem of governing, an argument for imperialism, ; proposed joint development of, by all the great powers, - . banks, german, in foreign countries, , - . barker, ernest, article "crusades," quoted, . bauer, otto, quoted on diversified interests of wage-earners in different countries, - . belgium, monopoly of trade with her colonies secured by, ; industrial invasion of, by germany, ff.; truths illustrated by german invasion of, ; position of, before , as a neutralised state, . birth rate, decline in, the greatest of factors making for internationalism and peace, . bismarck, policy of, in encouraging france's colonial ambitions, - . boycott, proposed for states violating principles of international league for peace, - ; discussion of, of germany after the war, - . brailsford, h. w., quoted on solution of colonial problem, - . brazil, tropical imperialism and the atrocities in, . bulnes, f., quoted on future relations of united states and latin america, . burgess, "homeland," cited, . burgess, j. w., "the european war of ," quoted, - . business, international evolution of, - . c canada, trade of, with united states compared with that with great britain, ; present and future relations of united states with, - . capital, internationalism of, - . caraballo sotolongo, f., work by, cited, n. cartels, description of german, - . carver, t. n., quoted on small-scale farming, n. children, dangers of neglect of, in united states, - . china, views of official of, quoted, - ; question of america's policy regarding, - ; possibilities of the impending industrial progress of, n. class, increasing internationalism of, . class policy, imperialism viewed as a, . coercion, preserving peace by, - . colonies, how germs of war are carried in nationalistic competition for, ff.; tendency of, to trade with home country, - ; preference given to, by tariff legislation, ; the open and the closed door policy in treatment of, by home countries, ; future advantages resulting from possession of, - ; problem of, in plans for a higher imperialism, , ff.; internationalisation of, under proposed higher imperialism, - . colonisation, failure of argument for imperialism based on, - . coloured labour and the root of imperialism, - . commerce, development of, and the economic motive for war, - . conant, c. a., arguments of, for american imperialism, - . constantinople, problem of, after the war, and part america might play, - . coolidge, a. c., "united states as a world power," quoted, n. cramb, j. a., war mystic, quoted, , ; book, "england and germany," quoted, . crusades, economic motives behind, . d dardanelles, internationalisation of, , . democracy, the american tradition of, - ; failure to achieve ideal purpose of, . diepenhorst, fritz, quoted on german cartels, . diplomacy, character of american, - . disarmament, defects in proposal for universal, . distribution of wealth, incentive to war found in unequal, . dodsworth, w., arguments of, in favour of imperialism, . "dumping" of surplus goods by germany, ; as one of germany's methods of industrial invasion, , - . e economic forces, determination of national policies by, - ; one of chief causes of wars, , - , - ; hope of directing toward peace rather than war, - . economic gains to imperialistic nation from tropical agriculture, . economic invasion, of other countries by germany, - ; relative success or failure of system of, - . educational system in america, imperfections of, - . emigration, as one of the causes of war, . england, relations between america and, - , ; economic competition between germany and, - ; strength of imperialism in, . _see_ great britain. enoch, c. r., on boycotting germany after the war, n. europe, importance to, of american foreign policy, ; attitude of pacifist idealists and of individualistic realists concerning america's relations with, - ; attitude of america toward, - ; economic competition of united states with, ff.; significance to, of american competition for latin-american trade, - ; renewed competition of, for foreign trade after the war, ; financial relations of america and, - ; foreign investment by, in new countries, - ; lack of firm basis for union of peoples of, - ; problems presented by canada's relation to controversies in, n. extractive industries, pacific tendency of, . f farms, possibilities for future development of, in america, - . _see_ agriculture. fear of war, value to certain interests of, - . federation of nations, defect of plan for, to preserve peace, - . finance, internationalism of, - . financial relations of america and europe, - . financiers, interest of, in preparedness and spirited foreign policy, - . foreign investment and the internationalism of capital, - . _see_ investment. foreign policy of america, effect of european war upon, ff., - ; special factors which will figure in future, - ; change in, after the spanish war, ; in part due to military considerations, ; part played by economic motives in, - ; must accord with international ideals which we aim to promote, - ; the choice between immediate and ultimate interest, - ; concerning latin america, - ; concerning canada, - ; concerning china, - . foreign trade, effect on america's, of opening of panama canal, - ; america's gain in, since outbreak of european war, - ; european competition for, after the war, ; question of value of, resulting from imperialism, - . france, relations between america and, ; american competition with, for foreign trade, less keen than with germany, ; preferential tariffs given to colonies of, ; industrial invasion of, by germany, ff.; appeal of imperialism in, . freedom of the seas, one of the elements in a programme of peace, ; growth in significance of problem of, ; opposite sides taken by america and england concerning, ; benefits and drawbacks of england's policy, - ; five things desirable in order to establish, - ; international organisation to enforce convention regarding, with anglo-american agreement as a corner-stone, ; value of proposed international arrangement, dependent upon belief of nations in its enforcement, - . free trade, as an antidote to war, ; error lurking in the doctrine, - . g garcia calderon, f., quoted on course of united states in the future, - ; on north american influence in latin america, . geographical location, effect of, on a nation's policy, - . germany, defence of war offered by romanticists in, - ; possibility of future competition with, by america, in battle for world market, - ; economic competition between england and, - ; volume of trade of colonies with, compared with that with other countries, ; handicapping of, through lack of colonial possessions, ; dangers of colonial ambition of, ; bismarck's policy regarding colonies, - ; industrial invasion of competing countries by, ; tactics of, in trade invasions, ff.; limitations and obstacles to policy of invasion of, ; appeal of imperialism in, ; why imperialism appeals to wage-earners in, - ; frugality and efficiency characteristic of, ; the proposal to boycott after the war, - . gibraltar, straits of, internationalisation of, , . great britain, what loss of markets for manufactured goods would mean to, ; american competition with, for foreign trade, less keen than that with germany, - ; comparative volume of trade between colonies and, - ; arguments for alliance between america and, - ; how surplus capital seeking a vent may lead to an imperialistic policy shown by, ; policy of obstruction followed by, regarding freedom of the seas, ; necessity to, of navy and command of seas, illustrated by case of germany, - ; discussion of advantages and disadvantages of attitude of, on naval supremacy, - . h hauser, henri, work by, cited and quoted, , , . hawaii, acquisition of, by united states, ; america's international liabilities increased by, . hobson, c. k., "the export of capital," cited, n., . hobson, john a., "imperialism," quoted, , ; "towards international government," quoted and cited, , . holland, industrial invasion of, by germany, ff. honour, the demands of national, - . hunting tribes, war inevitable among, . hurley, edwin w., address by, cited and quoted, n. hutchinson, lincoln, "panama canal and international trade competition," cited, . i idealists, position of pacifists as, ; mystic interpretation of war by, - . immigration, effect of growth of america's population due to, on nation's economic development and foreign policy, . imperialism, american ideal of internationalism opposed to, - ; intricacy of problem of, ; the present an age of, - ; america's plunge into, in , ; strategic and industrial arguments for american, - ; not warranted by real conditions in america, - ; significance of america's premature venture into, ; root of, found in necessity of compelling subject peoples to labour for industrial nations, - ; arguments against, ff.; results of, for investment purposes beneficial only to a few, ; regarded by socialists as immoral, brutal, anti-democratic, and uneconomic, ; revolt against, led by people of imperialistic powers not benefited by policy, ff.; outlet for redundant population not secured by, - ; questionable value of foreign trade resulting from, - ; danger of war resulting from, - ; a class policy, - ; difficulty in europe of democratic leaders making headway against, - ; popular appeal of, ; economic argument for, - ; patriotic appeal of, - ; decision to be made by america between internationalism and, - ; road open to america, through anglo-american union, - ; lack of economic reserves as an impelling force toward, - ; relation between geographical location and, - ; relation of inequalities of wealth and income to, ff.; a more equal distribution of wealth an antidote to, - ; in what the economic antidote to, really consists, - ; measures necessary to achievement of higher form of, - . income, equable distribution of, an antidote to imperialism, . india, british conquest of, due to desire for trade, ; tendency of, to give bulk of trade to home country, , ; small percentage of british born in, . industrial invasions of each other's territory by competing countries, - ; question of success or failure of policy of, - . inequality of wealth and income, risk of imperialistic policy resulting from, - . intensive cultivation, limitations of, . internationalisation of colonies, - ; of capital, - . internationalism, ideal of, to be aspired for by america, ; causes of failure of america to realise ideal of, ; what is necessary if america decides on the course of, - ; decision to be made by america between nationalistic imperialism and, - ; meaning of ideal of, as opposed to ideal of imperialism, ; steps necessary to achievement of, - ; to be secured only by further political and economic development, ; forces making for, ff.; actual profit of, ; impossibility of independence for small subject nations, - . intervention, objections to a policy of, for preserving peace, - . investment, america's development in field of foreign, - ; value of new countries as a field for, - ; extent of foreign, by european countries, ; internationalism of capital shown by foreign, - . iron, "dumping" of, by germany in foreign countries, - . italy, industrial invasion of, by germany, ff.; "dumping" of german products in, . j jamaica, trade of, with united states compared with that with united kingdom, . james, william, "the moral equivalent of war," quoted, - . japan, relations between america and, as influenced by philippine islands, ; an example of a nation driven to imperialistic policy through lack of economic reserves, - . jingoism, the irreducible minimum of, - . jöhlinger, otto, on the open and the closed door in colonies, n. k kidd, benjamin, "control of the tropics," cited, . kiel canal, internationalisation of, , . king, w. i., "wealth and income of people of united states," cited, n. krehbiel, edward, digest of history of pacifism by, n. l latin america, competition of america for trade of, - ; possibilities of, as a field for investment, - ; course to be followed by america toward, - ; fear of policy of aggression on part of united states by, - ; danger in our relations with, from its political instability and unripeness, . league for peace, foundations of a true, - ; question of how to form, premature, ; things essential to continued existence of, - ; methods of enforcing system, - ; creation of international machinery for working out modes of action, . league to enforce peace, arguments for and against a, - , . lippmann, walter, quoted on solution of colonial problem, . loree, l. f., compilation by, cited, n. lough, w. h., quoted on trade of united states with south america, n. m mcmaster, j. b., quotation from, n. mahan, a. t., "interest of america in sea power," etc., cited, ; on the possibilities of an anglo-american alliance, - . marx, karl, on the workingman's lack of a fatherland, . merles, salvador r., work by, cited, n. merritt, eugene, on disadvantages of small-sized farms, . mexico, significance of revolution in, to united states, ; inferences to be drawn from action of united states concerning, - ; laming of industry by frequent revolutions in, . _see_ latin america. millard, t. f., "our eastern question," quoted, n. milloud, maurice, "the ruling caste and frenzied finance in germany," quoted, , , , . mining, an economic activity that is pacific in tendency, . monroe doctrine, the, ; effect of, on america's relations with europe, - ; stands for principle that latin-american countries will develop naturally, ; possibility of cloaking a policy of aggression under, - ; tolerance of, by europe, conditioned upon america's acting as guardian and not conqueror, - ; peril in, both to united states and to latin america, - ; question of future treatment of, . munition makers, value to, of constant fear of war, - . mystic interpretation of war, - . n napoleonic wars, economic factors in, . national consciousness, development of, in europe, - . nationalism and internationalism, discussion of use of terms, n. nationalities, the struggle of subject, for independence, - ; impossibility of independence for all, - . natural resources, lack of, a cause of militaristic and imperialistic policy, - . naumann, friedrich, on handicapping of germany through meagreness of colonial possessions, . navies, arguments for reduction of, to secure freedom of the seas, - . o olivier, sir sidney, "white capital and coloured labour," quoted, , - . olney, richard, on sovereignty of united states in western hemisphere, . open door, america's policy of the, relative to china, ; what america should mean by, ; problem of, the essential one in solution of question of colonies, - . orient, possibilities of, as a field for investment, - . p pacifism, history of, - ; must be either static or dynamic, ; our hope in dynamic type of, ; character of dynamic as opposed to static, - . _see also_ peace. pacifists in america, attitude of, toward national policies, ; effect upon, of great war and the demand for preparedness, - ; mistaken ideas concerning war and its causes held by many, - . panama canal, international liabilities of united states increased by, ; competition of united states for foreign trade increased by, - ; internationalisation of, , . pastoral nations, war a necessity to, . peace, direct and indirect interest of america in, - ; the classic ideal of, - ; change in character of movement for, before french revolution, - ; proven inapplicability of rationalistic theories of, - ; cause of failures of pacifist efforts, - ; criticism of plans of static type for preserving, - ; the all-pervasive sentiment for, ; decline in population rate a help toward, ; proposed league for, _see_ league for peace. philippine islands, acquisition of, by america, ; change in feeling of americans regarding ownership of, - ; increase of america's international responsibilities by, ; small percentage of europeans and americans in, . popular appeal of imperialistic policy, ; reason for, found in economic argument, - ; patriotic ideals and, - . population, growth in, one incentive to war, ; increase in, one of the chief forces driving western nations outward, - ; imperialism not an outlet for superfluity of, - ; overtaking of extension of agriculture by, ; statistics of, ; diminishing rate of increase in, ; increase of america's, by immigration, ; distribution of wealth among, in united states, n.; increase in, means increased inequality in distribution of wealth, - ; decline in rate of, the greatest of factors making for internationalism and peace, . preparedness, origin and character of demand for, - ; effect of, on pacifist ideals, - ; interest of financial groups in policy of, - . preziosi, g., work by, cited, . punic wars, economic motives behind, . r railroad policy of germany, impetus given to "dumping" by, . rationalistic pacifism, inapplicability of, to the facts of life, - . reinsch, paul, "world politics," quoted, n.; "colonial administration" by, cited and quoted, , . religion, a lesser cause of war than economic interests, - ; not a preventive of war, . ripley, w. z., cited concerning american debt to europe, n. robinson, e. v. d., essay by, cited, n. rohrbach, paul, "german world policies," quoted, n. ruedorffer, j. j., quoted on future of germany's world policy, . russia, relations between america and, . s _saturday review_ article on competition between england and germany, . schulze-gaevernitz, dr., work by, cited and quoted, - . scottish border wars, viewed as cattle-stealing raids, - . shipping, an economic activity that is not pacific in tendency, . sidebotham, h., "the freedom of the seas," quoted, , . six-power loan, in principle a right step, . slavery, modern forms of, under system of tropical imperialism, . slosson, e. e., article by, quoted, - . social democratic party in germany, attitude of, toward imperialism, . socialists, anti-imperialistic philosophy of, - ; allegiance of, to their own countries, - ; reason for failure of, to prevent war, - ; agreement of, with theory that colonial problem can be solved only by concerted action of great powers, - . solf, wilhelm, quoted on germany's colonial policy, , n. south american trade, competition of united states for, - . _see_ latin america. suez canal, internationalisation of, . sumner, w. g., quoted on war, - . supra-nationalism, the proximate economic development, . switzerland, industrial invasion of, by germany, ff., . t taxation, an underlying cause of war, . thompson, warren s., "population: a study in malthusianism," cited, . trade development, as one of the causes of war, . trojan war, a free-booting expedition, . tropical imperialism, conditions causing, ; arguments for and against, - . tropical products, growing significance of, - . trusts, tendency to internationalism in process of formation of, - . tunis, trade of, favoured by france, . u united states. _see_ america. united states of europe, fallacy in proposal to create a, - . v von der goltz, field-marshal, quoted on necessity of imminence of war to maintenance of prestige of officer class, n. w wage-earners, imperialistic arguments that appeal to, - ; internationalism of, . wages, supposed beneficial reaction of imperialism upon, - . war, popular theories regarding, ; the real motives, incentives and origins of, ; reason for both ancient and modern, traced to economic forces, - , - ; interpretation of, by school of romanticists, - ; question of permanence of, as an institution, ; attitude of americans toward, ff.; cause of attitude of average american toward, - ; how system of imperialism tends to lead to, - , - ; value of fear of, to certain political and industrial interests, - ; elements in america that foster spirit of, ; antidotes to imperialistic policy and, - . _see also_ peace. war after the war, the, . war of , effect of, upon america, - ; lessons derived by america from, - ; the part that america might play at close of, - . wealth, equal distribution of, an antidote to imperialism, - . webb, sidney and beatrice, "history of trade unionism," quoted, n. west indies, working of modern imperialistic methods in, - . wilcox, e. v., "tropical agriculture," quoted, - . willcox, w. f., birth and death rate statistics by, n. willford, isbell, "wealth and income of people of united states," quoted, n. willis, j. c., arguments by, for tropical imperialism, n. wilson, c. usher, article on "the native question and irrigation in south africa," quoted, n. printed in the united states of america. italy, france and britain at war by h. g. wells author of "mr. britling sees it through," "what is coming," etc. here mr. wells discusses with an incisiveness and penetrativeness all his own, conditions as he has seen them in three of the great countries engaged in the european war. the book is divided into four main sections: i. the passing of the effigy, in which are reviewed certain changing sentiments as regards war; ii. the war in italy, taking up the isonzo front, the mountain war and behind the front; iii. the western war, and iv. how people think about the war, in which are found such topics as do they really think at all, the yielding pacifist, the religious revival and the social changes in progress. the macmillan company publishers - fifth avenue new york _by the same author_ the new democracy an essay on certain political and economic tendencies in the united states by walter e. weyl, ph.d. a chief issue in the presidential campaign is "socialized democracy." dr. weyl's new work gives a clear summary of its causes and aims. _crown vo, blue cloth, gilt top, $ . _ _standard library edition . _ some press comments "a masterly, scathing, and absolutely fearless arraignment of things that ought not to be in a republic, and of tendencies that no democracy ought to tolerate."--_boston herald_. "a thoughtful volume ... a big synthesis of the whole social problem in this country. a keen survey."--_chicago evening post_. "a searching and suggestive study of american life.... a book to make people think.... notable for its scholarship and brilliant in execution, it is not merely for the theorist, but for the citizen."--_newark evening news_. "dr. weyl's book is a strong analysis of the whole subject. it will be read widely and will exercise a large influence."--_the evening mail_. "dr. weyl has read the modern writing on the wall and interprets it to us more clearly than has yet been done."--_new york globe_. "a masterly interpretation of the industrial, political, social, and moral revolution that is going on in this country."--_albany argus_. "a complete and circumstantial statement of the whole case ... our social and economic unrest is not to lead to a war of classes, but to a 'national readjustment.'"--_new york tribune_. "the best and most comprehensive survey of the general social and political status and prospects that has been published of late years."--_the pittsburg post_. the macmillan company publishers - fifth avenue new york _our national problems_ _decorated boards -------- each fifty cents_ the pentecost of calamity by owen wister "one of the most striking and moving utterances.... let all americans read it."--_the congregationalist_. "it is written with sustained charm and freshness of insight."--_n. y. times_. their true faith and allegiance by gustavus ohlinger "hundreds of thousands of this book should be distributed as tracts for all honest, loyal, decent american citizens to read and digest."--_n. y. sun_. the forks of the road by washington gladden (this book won the first prize offered by the church peace union for the best essay on war and peace.) "small as the book is, it is full of 'meat for strong men,' and its closely reasoned argument is likely to set many people thinking along unaccustomed lines."--_n. y. times_. the heritage of tyre by william brown meloney "in terse, striking, forceful language the author of this most valuable little volume shows us the greatest weakness america has, and the most ominous danger such weakness involves."--_boston transcript_. straight america by frances a. kellor "practical, candid, and most earnest. it gets down to the first principles of american needs and discusses them with honesty, ability, and a straight-from-the-shoulder forcefulness that ought to prove inspiring and infectious."--_new york times_. americanization by royal dixon "no better beginning with the immigrant can be made than to teach him along the lines laid down in mr. dixon's sincere and ardent little manual of decency in democracy."--_new york sun_. what's the matter with mexico by caspar whitney "a vital question answered intelligently, fully and without hesitation.... should be read by every one whose sense of fair play has not been warped by a baneful sophistry."--_philadelphia public ledger_. the macmillan company publishers - fifth avenue new york brazil: today and tomorrow by lillian elwyn elliott, f. r. g. s. literary editor of the pan-american magazine, new york. this volume seeks to show how and to what extent brazil "has been opened up" and developed, and by whom, and to outline some of the work that remains to be done. miss elliott first of all discusses present social conditions in brazil, explaining who the brazilian is, what political and social events have moulded him and what he has done to develop his territory; a territory , square miles larger than that of the united states. later sections deal with finance, the monetary conditions of the country, the problem of exchange, and the source of income. still others take up various means of transit, the railroads, the coast-wise and the ocean service, rivers and roads. industries are treated in considerable detail--cattle, cotton raising, weaving, coffee growing and the rubber trade. an unusual feature comes under the heading of "the world's horticultural and medicinal debt to brazil" in which the reader is made to realize something of the immense forestal treasure house comprised in the huge, wild, half explored regions of north brazil. the macmillan company publishers - fifth avenue new york [illustration: david low dodge] war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ by david low dodge with an introduction by edwin d. mead published for the international union ginn & company, boston copyright, , by the international union all rights reserved . contents page introduction vii war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ war is inhuman: i. because it hardens the heart and blunts the tender feelings of mankind ii. war is inhuman, as in its nature and tendency it abuses god's animal creation iii. war is inhuman, as it oppresses the poor iv. war is inhuman, as it spreads terror and distress among mankind v. war is inhuman, as it involves men in fatigue, famine, and all the pains of mutilated bodies vi. war is inhuman, as it destroys the youth and cuts off the hope of gray hairs vii. war is inhuman, as it multiplies widows and orphans, and clothes the land in mourning war is unwise: i. because, instead of preventing, it provokes insult and mischief ii. war is unwise, for instead of diminishing, it increases difficulties iii. war is unwise, because it destroys property iv. war is unwise, as it is dangerous to the liberties of men v. war is unwise, as it diminishes the happiness of mankind vi. war is unwise, as it does not mend, but injures, the morals of society vii. war is unwise, as it is hazarding eternal things for only the chance of defending temporal things viii. war is unwise, as it does not answer the professed end for which it is intended war is criminal: i. going to war is not keeping from the appearance of evil, but is running into temptation ii. war is criminal, as it naturally inflames the pride of man iii. war necessarily infringes on the consciences of men, and therefore is criminal iv. war is criminal, as it is opposed to patient suffering under unjust and cruel treatment v. war is criminal, as it is not doing to others as we should wish them to do to us vi. war is inconsistent with mercy, and is therefore criminal vii. war is criminal, as the practice of it is inconsistent with forgiving trespasses as we wish to be forgiven by the final judge viii. engaging in war is not manifesting love to enemies or returning good for evil ix. war is criminal, because it is actually rendering evil for evil x. war is criminal, as it is actually doing evil that good may come; and this is the best apology that can be made for it xi. war is opposed to the example of the son of god, and is therefore criminal objections answered hymn the mediator's kingdom not of this world: but spiritual introduction to david low dodge of new york belongs the high honor of having written the first pamphlets published in america directed expressly against the war system of nations, and of having founded the first peace society ever organized in america or in the world. his first pamphlet, _the mediator's kingdom not of this world_, was published in . his second and more important pamphlet, _war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ_, was prepared for the press in . this was two years before the publication of noah worcester's _solemn review of the custom of war_, which was issued in boston on christmas day, . early in mr. dodge and his friends in new york deliberated on the expediency of forming a peace society; but on account of the excitement attending the war with great britain this was postponed until . in august of that year the new york peace society, the first in the world, was organized, with mr. dodge as its president. this was four months before the organization of the massachusetts peace society (december , ) under the leadership of noah worcester, and nearly a year before the english peace society, the first in europe, was formed (june , ) in london. the preëminent historical interest attaching to mr. dodge's pioneering work in the peace cause in this country would alone justify and indeed seem to command the republication of his pamphlets at this time, when the great ideas for which he so courageously and prophetically stood are at last winning the general recognition of humane and thoughtful men. but it is not merely historical interest which warrants a revival of attention to these almost forgotten papers. their intrinsic power and worth are such as make their reading, especially that of the second essay, _war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ_, which stands first in the present volume, edifying and inspiring to-day. marked by few literary graces and cast in a theological mold which the critical thought of the present has in large measure outgrown, there is a force of thought, a moral earnestness, a persevering logic, a common sense, a hatred of inhumanity, a passion for justice, a penetration and a virtue in them, which commends them to the abiding and reverent regard of all who work for the peace and order of the world. among such workers to-day are men of various political philosophies, and perhaps only a small minority are nonresistants of the extreme type of david l. dodge; but to that minority, we cannot fail to remark, belongs the greatest and most influential of all the peace prophets of this time, leo tolstoi. none can read these old essays without being impressed by the fact that their arguments are essentially the same as those of the great russian. there is little indeed of the tolstoian thunder and lightning, the pathos, wrath, and rhetoric, the poetry and prophecy, in these old-fashioned pages; but the doctrine is the same as that of _bethink yourselves!_ and _patriotism versus christianity_. in his central thought and purpose, in his religious trust and reliance upon the christian principle, the new york merchant was a tolstoi a hundred years before his time. david low dodge was born june , , in that part of pomfret, connecticut, now called brooklyn. this was the home of israel putnam; and david dodge's father, a farmer and carpenter, was putnam's neighbor and friend,--may well have been near him when in april, , upon hearing of the battle of lexington, he left his plow in the furrow and started to join the forces gathering at cambridge. david dodge's father, grandfather, and great-grandfather each bore the name of david dodge. the great-grandfather was a congregational minister, who was understood to have come from wales,--a learned and wealthy man, who was for a while settled in the vicinity of cape ann in massachusetts. the grandfather, who also received a liberal education, probably in england, came into the possession of his father's estate, for that day a large one, and we are not informed whether he followed any profession or regular business. he was a man fully six feet tall, of great muscular power, and a lover of good horses, on which he spent much time and money. he married ann low, from a wealthy massachusetts family, and settled in beverly, where their sons david and samuel were born, and where the family fortunes became much embarrassed. about the family removed to pomfret, connecticut, and the boys, whose education at the hands of their mother had been but slight, were apprenticed, david to a carpenter and samuel to a shoemaker. their father, obtaining at this time a commission in the army invading canada, met his death in a bateau which attempted to descend the falls of the oswego and was dashed to pieces on the rocks with the loss of every soul on board. david low dodge's mother, when a girl, was mary stuart, and when she married his father, in , was a widow bearing the name of earl. the young husband hired a small farm, the wife by her industry and economy had furniture sufficient to begin housekeeping, and the little home was founded in which david low dodge's only sister mary was born in . three years later the father hired a more expensive place in the same town, where the boy was born in . "during that year," he writes in his autobiography, "my father became serious, and commenced family prayer. he was educated in the old semi-arminian views of his mother and the halfway covenant. my mother was a rigid calvinist of the whitefield school. neither of them ever made a public profession of religion, but they were careful to observe external ordinances, catechize their children, and give religious instruction. they were honest, industrious, temperate, kind-hearted people, universally respected and esteemed by all who were acquainted with them." such was the atmosphere in which the boy grew up. "the american revolution at this period was convulsing the whole country, drafting and enlisting soldiers. wagons were needed for the army, and by the advice of the putnams, the old general and his son israel, who was about two years younger than my father, he was induced to engage in the manufacture of continental wagons. he hired a convenient place for carpenters and blacksmiths, took several journeymen into the family, and embarked all his earnings in the business." the boy's half-brothers, william and jesse earl, entered the army at the tender ages of fourteen and sixteen, endured battles, sickness, and every privation, and both died towards the close of the war, the event almost wrecking the nervous system of the mother, a woman of acute sensibility. thus early were the horrors of war brought personally home to the boy. he remembered hearing the distant cannonading when new london was burned by the british, and the exclamation of the man beside him, "blood is flowing to-day." "news came the next morning that the forts were stormed, the garrisons put to the sword, new london burnt, and the british were marching upon norwich, and would proceed up into the country. my mother wrung her hands, and asked my father if we had not better pack up some things to secrete them." the boy's education was slight and fragmentary. the summer he was six years old he attended the school of a venerable irish maiden lady about sixty years of age, learning watts' _divine songs_, texts of scripture, and the _shorter catechism_. from the age of seven to fourteen--the family now living on a farm in the neighboring town of hampton--he attended the district school for two terms each winter, having no access to any other books than the primer, spelling book, arithmetic, and bible. "i used often, when not at work in the shop evenings, to retire to the old kitchen fireplace, put my lamp into the oven, and, sitting with my back against it, take my arithmetic, slate, and pencil, and try to cipher a little. i often think how i should have been delighted to have had one fifth part of the advantages enjoyed by most of my descendants." confined to the house for seven weeks a little later as the result of accidents, he turned hungrily to such books as he could secure--dilworth's _arithmetic_, webster's _abridged grammar_, and salmon's _universal english geography_. "this opened a new and astonishing field to me for contemplation. i now obtained the first glimpse of the boundaries of land and water, of the lofty mountains, and of the mighty rivers which had cut their channels through the earth. i read and surveyed the maps and meditated upon them until i began to lecture to my young companions, and was considered quite learned in geography. having an object in view, i began to thirst for knowledge, and succeeded in borrowing in succession _the travels of cyrus_, _xerxes' expedition into greece_, _the history of alexander the great_, and _hannibal's invasion of rome_." he proposed and brought about the formation of a society of young men in the town, for the improvement of minds and manners. there were fourteen young men, with an equal number of young women presently added, each furnishing a useful book as the beginning of a library. "we obtained some of the british classics, such as the _spectator_, _guardian_, etc., with a few histories; the subjects formed a foundation for conversation when we met together." now the young man's ambition turned from farming to school-teaching. he began with district schools, becoming a successful teacher from the start, prosecuting his own studies assiduously in every leisure hour, fired with a desire to improve the schools, which were everywhere as wretched as can well be imagined. for some months in he left teaching to join other young men in building a bridge at tiverton, rhode island. then he attended the academy at north canterbury, connecticut, under the charge of the eminent teacher, john adams. "this was the only opportunity i ever enjoyed of attending a good school, and this was abridged to fulfill my engagement to teach the town school in mansfield." in he opened a private school in norwich, adding the next year a morning school for young ladies and an evening school for apprentices and clerks, all of which flourished. during this time he was profoundly interested in religious matters, attending many revivals and becoming more and more concerned with moral and social problems. now, too, he married, his wife being a daughter of aaron cleveland of norwich, a strong character, afterwards a clergyman, "whose name you will find enrolled among the poets of connecticut," and who as early as published a poem on slavery, which, condemning slavery as wholly antichristian, attracted a good deal of notice. he was the first man in connecticut to arraign slavery publicly. elected to the general assembly from norwich on that issue, he introduced a bill in behalf of emancipation. with health somewhat impaired and with family cares increasing, david dodge now turned from teaching to trade. first it was as a clerk in norwich, then as a partner in a general store, then as head of various dry goods establishments in hartford and other connecticut towns, always and everywhere successful. in messrs. s. and h. higginson of boston, cousins of his wife, a firm of high standing and large capital, made him a proposition to enter into a copartnership with a view to establishing an extensive importing and jobbing store in the city of new york; and he accepted the proposition, going to new york the next year to take charge of the concern in that city. he took a store in pearl street, and the year afterwards the family took possession of the house connected with the store, still reserving the house in hartford as a retreat in case of yellow fever in new york. from this time until his death, april , , new york was, with occasional interruptions, his home and the center of his varied and ever enlarging activities. just before the outbreak of the war with england his partners became bankrupt through losses in extensive shipping of american produce to europe. "bonaparte sprung his trap upon more than a million dollars of their property." mr. dodge now established cotton factories in connecticut, and later commenced anew the dry goods business in new york, his home for years alternating between new york and the norwich neighborhood; and for the nine years following he occupied a large farm in plainfield, new jersey. active as was his business life, and faithful his devotion to his large business affairs,--and he came to rank with the most prominent mercantile men of his day,--his mind was always intent upon social and religious subjects. "during the years of to our business became extensive and demanded much thought and attention; yet i think my affections were on the subject of religion." revivals of religion, the interests of his church in norwich or new york, the improvement of the lives of his factory operatives, the organization in new york of the christian friendly society for the promotion of morals and religion,--such were the objects which commanded him. throughout his long residence in new york he was a prominent worker in the presbyterian church, for many years an elder in the church. he took a leading part in organizing the new york bible society and the new york tract society, was much engaged in the early missionary movements in new york, and in promoting the education of young men for the ministry. he was a lover of knowledge, a great reader, and one who thought and wrote as he read. deeply interested in history, ancient and modern, his chief interest was in theological discussion. he was familiar with the chief theological controversies of the day, and upon many of them committed his views to writing. his knowledge of the bible was remarkable; he read it through critically in course forty-two times. he held firmly the calvinistic system of doctrine, and he addressed to his children a series of letters, characterized by great ability and logical force, in defense of the faith, and constituting together a compendious system of theology. several of these letters are included in the memorial volume published for the family in under the editorial supervision of rev. matson m. smith. this volume contains, besides the two essays on war here reprinted, and various verses and letters, the interesting autobiography which he prepared, at the request of his children, a few years before his death, and a supplementary biographical sketch by his pastor, rev. asa d. smith. in the mass of manuscripts which he left behind was an essay upon "the relation of the church to the world," and one upon "retributive judgment and capital punishment,"--to which he was sharply opposed. he was opposed indeed to so much in human governments as now constituted,--"whose ultimate reliance," he said, "is the sword," and whose laws he felt to be so often contrary to the laws of christ to which he gave his sole allegiance,--that he would neither vote nor hold office. strict and inflexible as he was in his views of political and religious duty, he was one of the most genial and delightful of men, a christian in whom there was no guile, fond of the young, affectionate, courteous, "given to hospitality," "careful habitually to make even the conventionalities of life a fitting accompaniment and expression of the inward principle of kindness." a face as strong as it is gentle, and as gentle as it is strong, is that which looks at us in the beautiful portrait preserved in the family treasures, and a copy of which forms the frontispiece of the present volume. the character and influence of the family which he founded in new york, during the three generations which have followed, constitute an impressive witness to david dodge's force and worth, his religious consecration, and high public spirit. at the junction of broadway and sixth avenue stands the statue of his son, william earl dodge, whose life of almost fourscore years ended in . for long years the head of the great house of phelps, dodge & co., the manager of immense railway, lumber, and mining interests, the president of the new york chamber of commerce, a representative of new york in congress, a leader in large work for temperance, for the freedmen, for the indians, for theological education, for a score of high patriotic and philanthropic interests, new york had in his time no more representative, more useful, or more honored citizen. and what is said of him may be said in almost the same words of william earl dodge, his son, who died but yesterday, and who combined broad business and philanthropic activities in the same strong and influential way as his father and grandfather before him. president of many religious and benevolent associations, he was pre-eminently a patriot and an international man. the logic of his life and of his heritage placed him naturally at the head of the national arbitration committee, which was appointed at the great conference on international arbitration held at washington in the spring of , following the anxiety attendant upon president cleveland's venezuelan message,--a committee which, under his chairmanship, and since his death that of hon. john w. foster, has during the decade rendered such great service to the peace and arbitration cause in this country. it is to be noted also that the names of his son and daughter, cleveland h. dodge and grace h. dodge, names so conspicuously associated to-day with charitable, religious, and educational efforts in new york, are associated, too, like his with the commanding cause of the world's peace and better organization; both names stand upon the american committee of the thirteenth international peace congress, which met in boston in . thus have the generations which have followed him well learned and strongly emphasized the lesson taught by david dodge almost a century ago, that war is "inhuman, unwise, and criminal," and "inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ." it was in that a startling personal experience prompted the train of thought which soon and forever made david l. dodge the advocate of the thorough-going peace principles with which his name is chiefly identified, and led him to condemn all violence, even in self-defense, in dealings between men, as between nations. accustomed to carry pistols when traveling with large sums of money, he was almost led to shoot his landlord in a tavern at providence, rhode island, who by some blunder had come into his room at night and suddenly waked him. the thought of what his situation and feelings would have been had he taken the man's life shocked him into most searching thinking. for two or three years his mind dwelt on the question. he turned to the teaching and example of christ, and became persuaded that these were inconsistent with violence and the carrying of deadly weapons, and with war. the common churchman sanctioned such things, but not the early christians; and he found strong words condemning war in luther and erasmus, the moravians and quakers. discussing the matter with many pious and christian men, he found them generally avoiding the gospel standard. he was shocked by the "general want of faith in the promises"; but he himself laid aside at once his pistols and the fear of robbers. he became absolutely convinced that fighting and warfare were "unlawful for the followers of christ"; and from now on he began to bear public testimony against the war spirit. early in the spring of he published his essay, _the mediator's kingdom not of this world_, which attracted so much attention that in two weeks nearly a thousand copies were sold. three literary men joined in preparing a spirited and sarcastic criticism of it; and he immediately published a rejoinder. _the mediator's kingdom_ was republished in philadelphia and in providence, and mr. dodge writes truly: "these publications gave the first impulse in america, if we except the uniform influence of the friends, to inquiry into the lawfulness of war by christians. some who were favorable to the doctrines of peace judged that, with a bold hand, i had carried the subject too far; and doubtless, as it was new and had not been much discussed, i wrote too unguardedly, not sufficiently defining my terms. the rev. dr. noah worcester was one who so judged, and a few years after he published his very spirited and able essay, _the solemn review of war_." this famous essay of worcester's represents the platform of the great body of american peace workers for a century, the position of men like channing and ladd and jay and sumner; but to a nonresistant and opponent even of self-defense, like david dodge, these seemed the exponents of a halfway covenant. mr. dodge entered into private correspondence on the lawfulness of war with rev. lyman beecher, rev. aaron cleveland, his father-in-law, rev. john b. romeyn, and rev. walter king. he preserved among his manuscripts letters of twenty-five pages from dr. romeyn and mr. cleveland, and copies of his reply to dr. romeyn (one hundred and thirty-two pages) and to dr. beecher (forty-four pages). important letters from dr. beecher and governor jay he had lost. all these took the position of dr. worcester, sanctioning strictly defensive war in extreme cases,--all except mr. cleveland, who finally came into complete accord with mr. dodge, and published two able sermons on "the life of man inviolable by the laws of christ." early in the friends of peace whom mr. dodge had gathered about him in new york conferred upon the forming of a peace society, "wholly confined to decided evangelical christians, with a view to diffusing peace principles in the churches, avoiding all party questions." there being at this juncture, however, intense political feeling over the threatened war with great britain, they feared their motives would be misapprehended, and decided for the moment simply to act individually in diffusing information. mr. dodge was appointed to prepare an essay on the subject of war, stating and answering objections; and, removing at this time to norwich, he there, in a period of great business perplexity, completed his remarkable paper on "war inconsistent with the christian religion," which was published in the very midst of the war with england. upon his return to new york, the friends of peace there had two or three meetings relative to the organization of a society; and in august, , they formed the new york peace society, of between thirty and forty members, their strict articles of association condemning all war, offensive and defensive, as wholly opposed to the example and spirit and precepts of christ. the peace societies formed immediately afterwards in massachusetts, ohio, rhode island, and london were organized, according to mr. dodge, without any knowledge of each other, the movements being the simultaneous separate results of a common impulse. of the new york society mr. dodge was unanimously elected president. monthly meetings were arranged, and at the first of these mr. dodge read an address upon "the kingdom of peace under the benign reign of messiah," of which a thousand copies were at once printed and circulated. within two years the society had increased to sixty members, men active not only against war--which the society regarded as "the greatest temporal evil, as almost every immorality is generated in its prosecution, and poverty, distress, famine, and pestilence follow in its train"--but in all the benevolent enterprises of that day. "several respectable clergymen united with the society,--rev. drs. e. d. griffin and m. l. parvine, rev. e. w. baldwin (to whose pen we were much indebted), rev. samuel whelpley, and his son, rev. melancthon whelpley, rev. h. g. ufford, and rev. s. h. cox. dr. cox, however, afterwards entertained different views on the subject." the new york peace society had friendly correspondence with all the other peace societies, and for several years took two hundred copies of dr. worcester's _friend of peace_. this seems finally to have contributed to divide the society, some relinquishing the nonresistant views of mr. dodge and adopting worcester's less extreme position. but our brave tolstoian was a "thorough," and never wavered. "if it was morally wrong for individuals to quarrel and fight, instead of returning good for evil,"--these are his last words on the subject in his autobiography,--"it was much more criminal for communities and nations to return evil for evil, and not strive to overcome evil with good. in fact, the great barrier to our progress was the example of our fathers in the american revolution. that they were generally true patriots, in the political sense of the term, and many hopefully pious, i would not call in question, while i consider them as ill directed by education as st. paul was when on his way to damascus." the new york peace society maintained its existence and work for many years. in it united with other societies in the creation of the american peace society, which was organized in new york on may of that year on the initiative of william ladd. after this the new york society seems to have done little separate work, and finally its independent existence ceased. mr. dodge assisted in the organization of the new national society, and presided at its first annual meeting, may , . he was chosen a member of its board of directors, and later became a life director, maintaining his connection with the society until his death in , faithful to the end to the radical views by which he had become so powerfully possessed almost half a century before. for two generations new york has been without a local peace society. the services of eminent individual citizens of the city and state of new york for the peace cause during that period, however, have been signal. judge william jay of new york was for a decade president of the american peace society,--the important decade covering the great peace congresses in europe at the middle of the last century; and it was his proposal that an arbitration clause should be attached to all future commercial treaties which furnished the basis for the most constructive debates of the first congress, that at london in . the three really important members of the american delegation at the hague conference were citizens of new york,--andrew d. white, seth low, and frederick w. holls. a remarkable plan adopted by the new york state bar association suggested important features of the hague court as finally constituted. it is a citizen of new york, andrew carnegie, who has given $ , , for a worthy building for the court at the hague,--a temple of peace. mr. carnegie, whose influence in behalf of international fraternity is perhaps second to that of no other to-day, has also given $ , , to establish a pension fund for "heroes of peace," whose heroism, too long comparatively neglected, he rightly sees to be not less than the heroism of the soldier. the most important series of arbitration conferences in recent times have been those at lake mohonk, in the state of new york, arranged by albert k. smiley,--conferences of growing size and importance, commanding world-wide attention, and performing for this country almost the same service performed for france and england by their national peace congresses. finally, it must not be forgotten that theodore roosevelt, the president of the united states, through whose initiative the second hague conference will presently meet, is also a citizen of new york. at this very time a promising movement is gaining head to organize once more in david dodge's city a new york peace society. at one of the recent mohonk conferences a large committee of new york men, under the chairmanship of mr. warner van norden, was formed for conference with this end in view. upon the american committee of the international peace congress which met in boston in were no less than sixteen residents of the city of new york,--andrew carnegie, hon. oscar s. straus, hon. george f. seward, walter s. logan, felix adler, william d. howells, mrs. charles russell lowell, mrs. anna garlin spencer, miss grace h. dodge, rev. josiah strong, rev. charles e. jefferson, cleveland h. dodge, george foster peabody, professor john b. clark, leander t. chamberlain, and j. g. phelps stokes. in the week following the boston congress a series of great peace meetings was held in new york, at the cooper union and elsewhere, arranged by members of this committee; and out of all this a new impulse has come to plans for local organization in new york. as one result a strong society was formed by the germans of the city, and a large women's peace circle has since been organized and begun important educational work. the larger new york peace society is now certainly a thing of the near future. to the men and women who will constitute that society, the noble body of those now working in their various ways in the great city for the cause of peace, is dedicated especially this republication of the old essays of david dodge, the founder of the first peace society in the world, who by his pioneering and prophetic service gave to new york a place so significant in the history of what is to-day the world's most commanding cause. september, edwin d. mead war inconsistent with the religion of jesus christ humanity, wisdom, and goodness at once combine all that can be great and lovely in man. inhumanity, folly, and wickedness reverse the picture, and at once represent all that can be odious and hateful. the former is the spirit of heaven, and the latter the offspring of hell. the spirit of the gospel not only breathes "glory to god in the highest, but on earth peace, and good will to men." the wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated; but the wisdom from beneath is earthly, sensual, and devilish. it is exceedingly strange that any one under the light of the gospel, professing to be guided by its blessed precepts, with the bible in his hand, while the whole creation around him is so often groaning under the weight and terrors of war, should have doubts whether any kind of wars under the gospel dispensation, except spiritual warfare, can be the dictate of any kind of wisdom except that from beneath; and much more so, to believe that they are the fruit of the divine spirit, which is love, joy, and peace. an inspired apostle has informed us from whence come wars and fightings. they come from the lusts of men that war in their members. ever since the fall, mankind have had naturally within them a spirit of pride, avarice, and revenge. the gospel is directly opposed to this spirit. it teaches humility, it inculcates love, it breathes pity and forgiveness even to enemies, and forbids rendering evil for evil to any man. believing as i do, after much reflection and, as i trust, prayerful investigation of the subject, that all kinds of carnal warfare are unlawful upon gospel principles, i shall now endeavor to prove that war is inhuman, unwise, and criminal, and then make some general remarks, and state and answer several objections. in attempting to do this i shall not always confine myself strictly to this order of the subject, but shall occasionally make such remarks as may occur, directly or indirectly, to show that the whole genius of war is contrary to the spirit and precepts of the gospel. war is inhuman i. because it hardens the heart and blunts the tender feelings of mankind that it is the duty of mankind to be tender-hearted, feeling for the distress of others, and to do all in their power to prevent and alleviate their misery, is evident not only from the example of the son of god but the precepts of the gospel. when the saviour of sinners visited this dark and cruel world he became a man of sorrow and was acquainted with grief, so that he was touched with the feeling of our infirmities. he went about continually healing the sick, opening the eyes of the blind, unstopping the ears of the deaf, raising the dead, as well as preaching the gospel of peace to the poor. he visited the houses of affliction and poured the balm of consolation into the wounded heart. he mourned with those who mourned, and wept with those that wept. love to god and man flowed from his soul pure as the river of life, refreshing the thirsty desert around him. he was not only affectionate to his friends but kind to his enemies. he returned love for their hatred, and blessing for their cursing. when he was surrounded by all the powers of darkness and resigned himself into the hands of sinners to expiate their guilt, and they smote him on the cheek and plucked off the hair, he "was dumb and opened not his mouth." while suffering all the contempt and torture which men and devils could invent, instead of returning evil for evil he prayed for his murderers and apologized for his persecutors, saying, "father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." the apostle exhorts christians, saying, "be ye kind and tender-hearted, forgiving one another, even as god for christ's sake hath forgiven you." authority in abundance might be quoted to show that the spirit of the gospel absolutely requires the exercise of love, pity, and forgiveness, even to enemies. but who will undertake to prove that soldiers are usually kind and tender-hearted, and that their employment has a natural tendency to promote active benevolence, while it requires all their study of mind and strength of body to injure their enemies to the greatest extent? though we often hear of the generosity and attention of soldiers to prisoners, and notwithstanding i am willing to allow that feelings of humanity are not altogether obliterated from every soldier, yet much of this apparent kindness may flow from a desire of better treatment themselves should circumstances be reversed, or from a hope of the applause of mankind. my object, however, is not to prove that all soldiers are destitute of humanity, but that their occupation has a natural tendency and actually does weaken their kind and tender feelings, and harden their hearts. is it not a fact that those who are engaged in the spirit of war, either in the council or in the field, are not usually so meek, lowly, kind, and tender-hearted as other men? does the soldier usually become kind and tender-hearted while trained to the art of killing his fellow-man, or more so when engaged in the heat of the battle, stepping forward over the wounded and hearing the groans of the expiring? does he actually put on bowels of tenderness, mercy, and forgiveness, while he bathes his sword in the blood of his brother? do these scenes generally change the lion into the lamb? on the contrary, do not the history of ages and the voice of millions bear testimony that the whole trade of war has a natural tendency to blunt the tender edge of mercy and chill all the sympathizing feelings of the human heart? who that is a parent, having an uncommonly hard-hearted and unfeeling son, would send him into the camp to subdue his inhumanity and to stamp upon him kind and tender feelings? if war has not a natural tendency to harden the heart, permit me to inquire why mankind do not usually feel as much at the distress occasioned by war as by other calamities? it would be truly astonishing, were it not so common, to see with what composure the generality of mankind hear the account of barbarous and destructive battles. they may have some little excitement when they hear of savages--whose religion teaches them revenge--using the tomahawk and scalping knife; but when thousands are torn to pieces with shot and shells and butchered with polished steels, then it becomes a very polite and civil business, and those who perish are contemplated as only reclining on a bed of honor. if an individual in common life breaks a bone or fractures a limb, all around him not only sympathize but are ready to aid in alleviating his distress; but when thousands are slain and ten thousand wounded in the field of battle, the shock is but trifling, and the feelings are soon lost in admiring the gallantry of this hero and the prowess of that veteran. and why all this sensibility at the pains of an individual, and all this indifference at the sufferings of thousands, if war has not a natural tendency to harden the heart and destroy the tender feelings of mankind? it is a fact, however, so notorious that the spirit and practice of war do actually harden the heart and chill the kind and tender feelings of mankind, that i think few will be found to deny it, and none who have ever known or felt the spirit of christ. the spirit of war must be very unlike the spirit of the gospel, for the gospel enforces no duty the practice of which has a natural tendency to harden men's hearts, but in proportion as they are influenced by its spirit and actuated by its principles they will be humane; therefore, if war hardens men's hearts it is not a christian duty, and of course it cannot be right for christians to engage in it. ii. war is inhuman, as in its nature and tendency it abuses god's animal creation when god at first created man, he gave him authority over the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the deep. after he had swept away the old ungodly world of mankind for their violence with all the animal creation, except those in the ark, he was pleased to renew to noah the same privilege of being lord over the animal world. it may not perhaps be improper here to digress a little and remark that this appears to have been the original bounds of man's authority,--that of having dominion only over the animal world and not over his fellow-man. it appears that god reserved to himself the government of man, whom he originally created in his own image; from which it may be inferred that man has no lawful authority for governing his fellow-man except as the special executor of divine command, and that no government can be morally right except that which acknowledges and looks up to god as the supreme head and governor. but to return: although the animal world is put under the dominion of man for his use, yet he has no authority to exercise cruelty towards it. "for the merciful man regardeth the life of his beast." god is very merciful to his creatures; he not only hears the young ravens when they cry but he opens his hand and supplies the wants of the cattle upon a thousand hills. though god has decorated the earth with beauty and richly clothed it with food for man and beast, yet where an all-devouring army passes, notwithstanding the earth before them is like the garden of eden, it is behind them a desolate wilderness; the lowing ox and bleating sheep may cry for food, but, alas! the destroyer hath destroyed it. the noble horse, which god has made for the use and pleasure of man, shares largely in this desolating evil. he is often taken, without his customary food, to run with an express, until, exhausted by fatigue, he falls lifeless beneath his rider. multitudes of them are chained to the harness with scanty food, and goaded forward to drag the baggage of an army and the thundering engines of death, until their strength has failed, their breath exhausted, and the kindness they then receive is the lash of the whip or the point of a spear. in such scenes the comfort of beasts is not thought of, except by a selfish owner who fears the loss of his property. but all this is trifling compared with what these noble animals, who tamely bow to the yoke of man, suffer in the charge of the battle; the horse rushes into the combat not knowing that torture and death are before him. his sides are often perforated with the spur of his rider, notwithstanding he exerts all his strength to rush into the heat of the battle, while the strokes of the sabers and the wounds of the bullets lacerate his body, and instead of having god's pure air to breathe to alleviate his pains, he can only snuff up the dust of his feet and the sulphurous smoke of the cannon, emblem of the infernal abode. thus he has no ease for his pains unless god commissions the bayonet or the bullet to take away his life. but if such is the cruelty to beasts in prosecuting war, what is the cruelty to man, born for immortality? no wonder that those who feel so little for their fellow-men should feel less for beasts. if war is an inhuman and cruel employment, it must be wrong for christians to engage in it. iii. war is inhuman, as it oppresses the poor to oppress the poor is everywhere in the scriptures considered as a great sin: "for the oppression of the poor, for the sighing of the needy, now will i arise, saith the lord"; "whoso stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself and not be heard"; "what mean ye that ye beat my people to pieces, and grind the faces of the poor? saith the lord god of hosts." the threatenings against those who oppress the poor, and the blessings pronounced upon those who plead their cause, are very numerous in the scriptures. the threatenings are so tremendous and awful that all men ought to consider well before they are active in any step which has a natural tendency to oppress the poor and needy. that war actually does oppress the poor may be heard from ten thousand wretched tongues who have felt its woe. very few, comparatively, who are instigators of war actually take the field of battle, and are seldom seen in the front of the fire. it is usually those who are rioting on the labors of the poor that fan up the flame of war. the great mass of soldiers are generally from the poor of a country. they must gird on the harness and for a few cents per day endure all the hardships of a camp and be led forward like sheep to the slaughter. though multitudes are fascinated to enlist by the intoxicating cup, the glitter of arms, the vainglory of heroes, and the empty sound of patriotism, yet many more are called away contrary to their wishes by the iron hand of despotic laws. perhaps a parent is enrolled whose daily labor was hardly sufficient to supply a scanty pittance for a numerous offspring, who are in his absence crying for bread. and why all this sorrow in this poor and needy family? because the husband and father is gone, and probably gone forever, most likely to gratify the wishes of some ambitious men who care as little as they think of his anxious family. perhaps an only son is taken from old, decrepit parents, the only earthly prop of their declining years; and with cold poverty and sorrow their gray hairs are brought down to the dust. war cannot be prosecuted without enormous expenses. the money that has been expended the last twenty years in war would doubtless have been sufficient not only to have rendered every poor person on earth comfortable--so far as money could do it--during the same period, but, if the residue had been applied to cultivate the earth, it would have literally turned the desert into a fruitful field. only the interest of the money that has been expended in a few years by the european nations in prosecuting war would have been sufficient, under proper direction, to educate every poor child on earth in the common rudiments of learning, and to support missionaries in abundance to convey the gospel of peace to every creature. what a noble employment if those nations had exerted their powers for these objects as much as they have for injuring each other! and what a difference would have appeared in the world! blessings would have fallen on millions ready to perish, instead of desolation, terror, and death. the vast expenses of war must be met by corresponding taxes, whether by duties on merchandise or direct taxes on real estate; yet they fall most heavily on the poor. whatever duty the merchant pays to the customhouse, he adds the amount to the price of his goods, so that the consumer actually pays the tax. if a tax is levied on real estate, the product of that estate is raised to meet it, and whoever consumes the product pays the tax. in times of war the prices of the necessaries of life are generally very much increased, but the prices of the labor of the poor do not usually rise in the same proportion, therefore it falls very heavily on them. when the honest laborers are suddenly called from the plow to take the sword and leave the tilling of the ground, either its seed is but sparingly sown or its fruit but partially gathered, scarcity ensues, high prices are the consequence, and the difficulty greatly increased for the poor to obtain the necessaries of life, especially if they were dependent on the product of a scanty farm which they are now deprived of cultivating. many a poor widow, who has been able in times of peace to support her fatherless children, has been obliged in times of war in a great measure to depend on the cold hand of charity to supply their wants. the calamities of war necessarily fall more on the poor than on the rich, because the poor of a country are generally a large majority of its inhabitants. these are some of the evils of war at a distance, but when it comes to their doors, if they are favored personally to escape the ferocity of the soldiers, they fly from their habitations, leaving their little all to the fire and pillage, glad to escape with their lives, though destitute and dependent; and when they cast round their eyes for relief, they only meet a fellow-sufferer, who can sympathize with them but not supply their wants. thus does war not only oppress the poor but adds multitudes to their number who before were comfortable. if war actually does oppress the poor, then we may infer that in its nature and tendency it is very unlike the genius of the gospel, and not right for christians to engage in it. iv. war is inhuman, as it spreads terror and distress among mankind in the benign reign of messiah the earth will be filled with the abundance of peace; there will be nothing to hurt or destroy; every one will sit quietly under his own vine and fig tree, having nothing to molest or make him afraid. but in times of war, mankind are usually full of anxiety, their hearts failing them for fear, looking for those things which are coming upon our wicked world. one of the most delightful scenes on earth is a happy family where all the members dwell together in love, being influenced by the blessed precepts of the gospel of peace. but how soon does the sound of war disturb and distress the happy circle! if it is only the distant thunder of the cannon that salutes the ear, the mother starts from her repose, and all the children gather round her with looks full of anxiety to know the cause. few women can so command their feelings as to hide the cause; and let it be said to the honor of the female sex that they have generally tender feelings, which cannot easily be disguised at the distress of their fellow-beings. perhaps a mother's heart is now wrung with anguish in the prospect that either the partner of her life or the sons of her care and sorrow, or both, are about to be called into the bloody field of battle. perhaps the decrepit parent views his darling son leaving his peaceful abode to enter the ensanguined field, never more to return. how soon are these joyful little circles turned into mourning and sorrow! who can describe the distress of a happy village suddenly encompassed by two contending armies--perhaps so early and suddenly that its inhabitants are aroused from their peaceful slumbers by the confused noise of the warriors more ferocious than the beasts that prowl in the forest? were it not for the tumult of the battle, shrieks of distress from innocent women and children might be heard from almost every abode. children run to the arms of their distracted mothers, who are as unable to find a refuge for themselves as for their offspring. if they fly to the streets they are in the midst of death: hundreds of cannon are vomiting destruction in every quarter; the hoofs of horses trampling down everything in their way; bullets, stones, bricks, and splinters flying in every direction; houses pierced with cannon shot and shells which carry desolation in their course; without, multitudes of men rushing with deadly weapons upon each other with all the rage of tigers, plunging each other into eternity, until the streets are literally drenched with the blood of men. to increase the distress, the village is taken and retaken several times at the point of the bayonet. if the inhabitants fly to their cellars to escape the fury of the storm, their buildings may soon be wrapt in flames over their heads. and for what, it may be asked, is all this inhuman sacrifice made? probably to gain the empty bubble called honor,--a standard of right and wrong without form or dimensions. let no one say that the writer's imagination is heated while it is not in the power of his feeble pen to half describe the horror and distress of the scenes which are by no means uncommon in a state of war. if such are some of the effects of war, then it must be a very inhuman employment, and wrong for christians to engage in it. v. war is inhuman, as it involves men in fatigue, famine, and all the pains of mutilated bodies to describe the fatigues and hardships of a soldier's life would require the experience of a soldier, so that only some of their common sufferings can be touched upon by a person who is a stranger to the miseries of a camp. a great majority of those who enter the ranks of an army are persons unaccustomed to great privations and severe fatigues; hence the great proportion of mortality among fresh recruits. their habits and strength are unable to endure the hard fare, rapid and constant marches generally imposed upon them in active service. the young soldier commonly exchanges a wholesome table, a comfortable dwelling, an easy bed, for bad food, the field for his house, the cold earth for his bed, and the heavens over him for his covering. he must stand at his post day and night, summer and winter; face the scorching sun, the chilling tempest, and be exposed to all the storms of the season, without any comfortable repose; perhaps during most of the time with a scanty allowance of the coarsest food, and often destitute of any, except the miserable supply he may have chance to plunder,--not enough to satisfy but only to keep alive the craving demands of nature; often compelled to march and countermarch several days and nights in succession, without a moment to prepare his provisions to nourish him and glad to get a little raw to sustain his life. frequently this hardship is endured in the cold and inclement season, while his tattered clothing is only the remains of his summer dress. barefooted and half naked, fatigued and chilled, he becomes a prey to disease, and is often left to perish without a human being to administer to him the least comfort. if he is carried to a hospital, he is there surrounded by the pestilential breath of hundreds of his poor fellow-sufferers, where the best comforts that can be afforded are but scanty and dismal. but all this is comparatively trifling to the sufferings of the wounded on the field of battle. there thousands of mangled bodies lie on the cold ground hours, and sometimes days, without a friendly hand to bind up a wound; not a voice is heard except the dying groans of their fellow-sufferers around them. no one can describe the horrors of the scene: here lies one with a fractured skull, there another with a severed limb, and a third with a lacerated body; some fainting with the loss of blood, others distracted, and others again crying for help. if such are some of the faint outlines of the fatigues and sufferings of soldiers, then their occupation must be an inhuman employment, for they are instrumental in bringing the same calamities on others which they suffer themselves; and of course it is unfriendly to the spirit of the gospel, and wrong for christians to engage in it. vi. war is inhuman, as it destroys the youth and cuts off the hope of gray hairs mankind are speedily hastening into eternity, and it might be supposed sufficiently fast without the aid of all the ingenuity and strength of man to hurry them forward; yet it is a melancholy truth that a great proportion of the wealth, talents, and labors of men are actually employed in inventing and using means for the premature destruction of their fellow-beings. one generation passes away, and another follows in quick succession. the young are always the stay and hope of the aged; parents labor and toil for their children to supply their wants and to educate them to be happy, respectable, and useful, and then depend upon them to be their stay and comfort in their declining years. alas, how many expectations of fond parents are blasted! their sons are taken away from them and hurried into the field of slaughter. in times of war the youth--the flower, strength, and beauty of the country--are called from their sober, honest, and useful employments, to the field of battle; and if they do not lose their lives or limbs, they generally lose their habits of morality and industry. alas! few ever return again to the bosom of their friends. though from their mistaken and fascinating views of a soldier's life and honor they may be delighted in enlisting, and merry in their departure from their peaceful homes, yet their joy is soon turned into pain and sorrow. unthinking youth, like the horse, rushes thoughtlessly into the battle. repentance is then too late; to shrink back is death, and to go forward is only a faint hope of life. here on the dreadful field are thousands and hundreds of thousands driven together to slaughter each other by a few ambitious men, perhaps none of whom are present. a large proportion are probably the youth of their country, the delight and comfort of their parents. all these opposing numbers are most likely persons who never knew or heard of each other, having no personal ill-will, most of whom would in any other circumstances not only not injure each other but be ready to aid in any kind office; yet by the act of war they are ranged against each other in all the hellish rage of revenge and slaughter. no pen, much less that of the writer's, can describe the inhumanity and horrors of a battle. all is confusion and dismay, dust and smoke arising, horses running, trumpets blasting, cannon roaring, bullets whistling, and the shrieks of the wounded and dying vibrating from every quarter. column after column of men charge upon each other in furious onset, with the awful crash of bayonets and sabers, with eyes flashing and visages frightfully distorted with rage, rushing upon each other with the violence of brutish monsters; and when these are literally cut to pieces others march in quick succession, only to share the same cruel and bloody tragedy. hundreds are parrying the blows; hundreds more are thrusting their bayonets into the bowels of their fellow-mortals, and many, while extricating them, have their own heads cleft asunder by swords and sabers; and all are hurried together before the tribunal of their judge, with hearts full of rage and hands dyed in the blood of their brethren. o horrid and debasing scene! my heart melts at the contemplation, and i forbear to dwell upon the inhuman employment. vii. war is inhuman, as it multiplies widows and orphans, and clothes the land in mourning the widow and fatherless are special objects of divine compassion, and christianity binds men under the strongest obligation to be kind and merciful towards them, as their situation is peculiarly tender and afflicting. "a father of the fatherless, and a judge of the widow, is god in his holy habitation." "pure religion and undefiled before god and the father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction." to be active in any measure which has a natural tendency to wantonly multiply widows and orphans in a land is the height of inhumanity as well as daring impiety. i will venture to say that no one circumstance in our world has so greatly multiplied widows and fatherless children as that of war. what has humanity ever gained by war to counterbalance simply the afflictions of the widow and fatherless? i verily believe nothing comparatively. i am well aware that a very popular plea for war is to defend, as it is styled, "our firesides, our wives and children"; but this generally is only a specious address to the feelings, to rouse up a martial spirit which makes thousands of women and children wretched where one is made happy. i am sensible that those will sneer at my opinion who regard more the honor that comes from men than they do the consolation of the widow and the fatherless. in times of war thousands of virtuous women are deprived of their husbands and ten thousands of helpless children of their fathers. the little tender children may now gather round their disconsolate mothers, anxiously inquiring about their fathers, remembering their kind visages, recollecting how they used fondly to dandle them on their knees and affectionately instruct them; but now they are torn from their embraces by the cruelty of war, and they have no fathers left them but their father in heaven. it is probably no exaggeration to suppose that in europe there are now two hundred thousand widows and a million fatherless children occasioned by war. what a mass of affliction! humanity bleeds at the thought! these children must now roam about without a father to provide for, protect, or instruct them. they now become an easy prey to all kinds of vice; many probably will be trained up for ignominious death, and most of them fit only for a soldier's life, to slaughter and to be slaughtered, unless some humane hand kindly takes them under its protection. and here i cannot help admiring the spirit of christianity. it is owing to the blessed spirit and temper of the gospel of peace that many of the evils of war are so much ameliorated at the present day as well as the inhuman slavery of men. the numerous asylums that now exist for the relief of the needy, the widow, and the fatherless are some of the precious fruits of christianity; and if this spirit were universal the bow would soon be broken to pieces, the spear cut asunder, and the chariots of war burnt with fire, and wars would cease to the ends of the earth. and is it not the duty of all who name the name of christ to do all in their power to counteract this destroying evil? war not only multiplies widows and orphans but clothes the land in mourning. in times of war multitudes of people are clothed with ensigns of mourning. here are gray-headed parents shrouded in blackness, weeping for the loss of darling sons; there are widows covered with veils mourning the loss of husbands, and refusing to be comforted; children crying because their fathers are no more. cities and villages are covered in darkness and desolation; weeping and mourning arise from almost every abode. and it may be asked, what inhuman hand is the cause of all this sorrow? perhaps some rash man, in the impetuosity of his spirit, has taken some unjust, high ground, and is too proud to retrace a step, and had rather see millions wretched than to nobly confess that he had been in the wrong. surely christians cannot be active in such measures without incurring the displeasure of god, who styles himself the father of the fatherless and the judge and avenger of the widow. thus i have shown that war is inhuman and therefore wholly inconsistent with christianity, by proving that it tends to destroy humane dispositions; that it hardens the hearts and blunts the tender feelings of men; that it involves the abuse of god's animal creation; that it oppresses the poor; that it spreads terror and distress among mankind; that it subjects soldiers to cruel privations and sufferings; that it destroys the youth and cuts off the hope of the aged; and that it multiplies widows and orphans and occasions mourning and sorrow. the fact that war is inhuman is indeed one of those obvious truths which it is difficult to render more plain by argument; those who know in what war consists cannot help knowing that it is inhuman. what mr. windham said with reference to the inhumanity of slavery may be said of the inhumanity of war. in one of his speeches in the house of commons against the slave trade he stated his difficulty in arguing against such a trade to be of that kind which is felt in arguing in favor of a self-evident proposition. "if it were denied that two and two made four, it would not be a very easy task," he said, "to find arguments to support the affirmative side of the question. precisely similar was his embarrassment in having to prove that the slave trade was unjust and inhuman." whoever admits that the slave trade is inhuman must admit that war is inhuman in a greater variety of ways and on a much larger scale. the inhumanity of the slave trade was the great and, finally, triumphant argument by which it was proved to be inconsistent with christianity. the advocates of slavery, like the advocates of war, resorted to the old testament for support; but it appeared that slavery, as it appears that war, was permitted and approved of for reasons and on principles peculiar to the ancient economy. this is apparent as well from the difference between the general design of the old and new dispensations as from the whole genius and spirit of the gospel. hence those who opposed the slave trade argued from the general nature and spirit of christianity as the strongest ground which could be taken. if slavery was inconsistent with this, it ought not to be tolerated; but slavery is inhuman and is therefore inconsistent with christianity. exactly the same is true of war, nor can anything short of an express revelation from god, commanding war or slavery, render either of them justifiable. it deserves to be distinctly considered that the gospel contains little or nothing directly by way of precept against slavery; but slavery is inconsistent with its general requirements and inculcations and is therefore wrong. but war, besides being inconsistent with the genius and spirit of the gospel, is prohibited by those precepts which forbid retaliation and revenge and those which require forgiveness and good will. it is plain, then, that he who does not advocate and defend the slave trade, to be consistent, must grant that war is incompatible with christianity, and that it is a violation of the gospel to countenance it. war is unwise that the principles and practice of war are unwise i argue: i. because, instead of preventing, they provoke insult and mischief the maxim, that in order to preserve peace, mankind must be prepared for war, has become so common, and sanctioned by such high authority, that few question its wisdom or policy; but if stripped of its specious garb, it may appear to proceed not from that wisdom which came down from above, which is "first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy"; and if it is not the wisdom from above, then it must be the wisdom from beneath. are not pride, avarice, and revenge the seeds of all kinds of carnal warfare? from these grow all the quarreling among children, the discord among families, the bickerings, law suits, and broils among neighbors, the boxing among bullies, the dueling among modern gentlemen, and wars among nations. they all originate from one and the same spirit. now, is the mild, meek, and peaceable man, unarmed, more liable to inspire jealousy in others that he is about to insult and abuse them than the high-toned duelist who constantly carries with him deathly weapons? does he, in fact, so often get into difficulty, quarreling and fighting? the respectable society of friends stands a living monument to answer the question. on the principles of self-defense, as they are styled, if one man suspects an injury from another, unless he is naturally a more powerful man, he must take a cane, as the principles of self-defense require a superior power in your own hand, either by art or muscular strength. when the other learns the suspicions and sees the preparation, he in his turn must take a bludgeon to preserve the balance of power and proclaim a threatening to awe his antagonist, who must now take a sword and return a threatening in order to maintain his dignity; for it will not do for men of honor to retract, however much they may be in the wrong. the other, again, must take a deathly weapon for his defense, and nothing is now wanting but an unhappy meeting to set each other's blood a flowing. much in the same way do nations often get into desperate warfare. one nation is busily increasing its military strength on the plausible maxim of preserving peace and maintaining its rights. another nation views the preparations with a jealous eye, and also goes to work on the same principle to make formidable preparations. all the nations around take the alarm, and on the same principle begin active preparations, all vying with each other to become the most formidable. if one sends an ambassador to inquire the cause of the great preparations, the answer always is, let the motive be what it may, _for their own defense_. then the other makes new exertions and begins to fortify towns on the confines of his neighbor, who must not only do the same but march a large army for the defense of his frontier; and the other must do likewise. by this time, if no old quarrel remained unsettled, perhaps one charges the other with encroachment on territory; the other denies the charge, and contends sharply for his pretended rights. ministers may be interchanged, and while negotiations are pending a high tone must be taken by both parties, for this is an essential principle in the doctrine of self-defense; the contrary would betray weakness and fear. newspapers must be ushered forth with flaming pieces to rouse, as it is called, the spirit of the countries, so as to impress upon the populace the idea that the approaching war is just and necessary, for all wars must be just and necessary on both sides. in the meantime envoys extraordinary may be sent to other powers by each party to enlist their aid,--most of whom are already prepared for war,--and each one selects his side according to his interests and feelings. at length the _ultimatum_ is given and refused, and the dreadful conflict commences. few wars, however, begin in this slow and progressive mode; a trifling aggression is sufficient to blow up the flame with nations already prepared. thus, we see, nations resemble bulldogs who happen to meet. they will first raise their hairs, show their teeth, then growl, and then seize upon each other with all their strength and fury; and bulldogs have something of the same kind of honor, for they scorn to retreat. hence we see that the acknowledged principles of defensive war are the vital springs of most of the wars that agitate and desolate our world. the pretended distinction between offensive and defensive war is but a name. all parties engaged in war proclaim to the world that they only are fighting in defense of their rights, and that their enemies are the aggressors; while it may be impossible for man to decide which are most in the wrong. the popular maxim of being prepared for war in order to be at peace may be seen to be erroneous in fact, for the history of nations abundantly shows that few nations ever made great preparations for war and remained long in peace. when nations prepare for war they actually go to war, and tell the world that their preparations were not a mere show. thus we may see that the principles and preparations of war actually engender war instead of promoting peace; and of course they are unwise, and, if unwise, then it is folly for christians to engage in them. ii. war is unwise, for instead of diminishing, it increases difficulties as the principles and preparations of war have a natural tendency to generate war and are actually the cause of a great proportion of the wars which do exist, so actual hostilities have a natural tendency to increase difficulties and to spread abroad the destroying evil. it is almost impossible for any two nations to be long engaged in war without interfering with the rights and privileges of other nations, which generally awakes their jealousy and resentment, so that most of the surrounding nations are drawn into the destructive vortex, which is the more easily done, as war inflames the martial spirit in other nations not engaged, and rouses up the desperate passions of men. besides, the belligerent nations are not content with suffering themselves, but use every art and persuasion to get the neighboring nations to join them; and they are generally too successful, for it seldom happens that two nations engage in war for a length of time and conclude a peace before they have involved other nations in their difficulties and distresses, and often a great proportion of the world is in arms. moreover, the nations who first engage in the contest always widen the breach between themselves by war. it is much easier settling difficulties between individuals or nations before actual hostilities commence than afterwards. mankind are not apt to be any more mild and accommodating in a state of actual warfare. besides, new difficulties constantly arise. the passions become inflamed, and charges are often made of violating the established laws of civilized warfare, which laws, however, are generally bounded only by the strength of power. if one party makes an incursion into the other's territory and storms a fortified place and burns the town, the other party must then make a desperate effort to retaliate the same kind of destruction, to a double degree, on the towns of their enemy. retaliation, or "rendering evil for evil," is not only allowed by mahometans and pagans, but is an open and avowed principle in the doctrine of self-defense among professed christian nations; not only is it sanctioned by the laity, but too often by the priests who minister in the name of jesus christ. both of the contending parties generally seize on each other's possessions wherever they can get hold of them, whether on the seas or on the land. the barbarous spoliations on each other stir up the passions of the great mass of their inhabitants, until they esteem it a virtue to view each other as natural and perpetual enemies, and then their rulers can prosecute the war with what they call vigor. can the wound now be so easily healed as it could have been before it became thus lacerated and inflamed? facts speak to the contrary, and nations seldom attempt negotiations for peace under such circumstances. they generally prosecute the war with all their power until one party or the other is overcome, or until both have exhausted their strength, and then they may mutually agree to a temporary peace to gain a little respite, when perhaps the original matter of dispute has become comparatively so trifling that it is almost left out of the account. with a small spirit of forbearance and accommodation how easily might the difficulties have been settled before such an immense loss of blood and treasure! if war does actually increase, instead of diminishing, difficulties, then it must be very unwise to engage in it. iii. war is unwise, because it destroys property property is what a great proportion of mankind are struggling to obtain, and many at the hazard of their lives. though in some instances they may misuse it, yet it is the gift of god, and when made subservient to more important things, it may be a blessing to individuals and communities. it has in it, therefore, a real value, and ought not to be wantonly destroyed while it may be used as an instrument for benefiting mankind. it is a notorious fact that war does make a great destruction of property. thousands of individuals on sea and on land lose their all, for the acquisition of which they may have spent the prime of their lives. ships on the high seas are taken, often burnt or scuttled, and valuable cargoes sent to the bottom of the deep, some possibly laden with the necessaries of life and bound to ports where the innocent inhabitants were in a state of famine. whole countries are laid waste by only the passing of an immense army: houses are defaced, furniture broken to pieces, the stores of families eaten up, cornfields trodden down, fences torn away and used for fuel, and everything swept in its train as with the besom of destruction more terrible to the inhabitants than the storms of heaven when sent in judgment. beautiful towns are often literally torn to pieces with shot and shells. venerable cities, the labor and pride of ages, are buried in ashes amid devouring flames, while in melancholy grandeur the fire and smoke rise to heaven and seem to cry for vengeance on the destroyers. notwithstanding an avaricious individual or nation may occasionally in war acquire by plunder from their brethren a little wealth, yet they usually lose on the whole more than they gain. on the general scale the loss is incalculable. it is not my object to examine the subject in relation to any particular nation or war, but upon the general scale in application to all warlike nations and all wars under the light of the gospel. if war does destroy property, reduce individuals to beggary, and impoverish nations, then it is unwise to engage in it. iv. war is unwise, as it is dangerous to the liberties of men liberty is the gift of god, and ought to be dear to every man; not, however, that licentious liberty which is not in subordination to his commands. men are not independent of god. he is their creator, preserver, and benefactor. in his hand their breath is, and he has a right to do what he will with his own; and the judge of all the earth will do right. as man is not the creator and proprietor of man, he has no right to infringe on his liberty or life without his express divine command; and then he acts only as the executor of god. man, therefore, bears a very different relation to god from what he does to his fellow-man. the whole system of war is tyrannical and subversive of the fundamental principles of liberty. it often brings the great mass of community under the severe bondage of military despotism, so that their lives and fortunes are at the sport of a tyrant. where martial law is proclaimed, liberty is cast down, and despotism raises her horrid ensign in its place and fills the dungeons and scaffolds with her victims. soldiers in actual service are reduced to the most abject slavery, not able to command their time for a moment, and are constantly driven about like beasts by petty tyrants. in them is exhibited the ridiculous absurdity of men rushing into bondage and destruction to preserve or acquire their liberty and save their lives. when the inhabitants of a country are cruelly oppressed by a despotic government, and they rise in mass to throw off the yoke, they are as often as otherwise crushed beneath the weight of the power under which they groaned, and then their sufferings are greatly increased; and if they gain their object after a long and sanguinary struggle, they actually suffer more on the whole than they would have suffered had they remained in peace. it is generally the providence of god, too, to make a people who have thrown off the yoke of their oppressor smart more severely under the government of their own choice than they did under the government which they destroyed. this fact ought well to be considered by every one of a revolutionary spirit. war actually generates a spirit of anarchy and rebellion which is destructive to liberty. when the inhabitants of a country are engaged in the peaceable employments of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, anarchy and rebellion seldom happen. when these useful employments flourish, abundance flows in on every side, gentleness and humanity cast a smile over the land, and pleasure beams in almost every countenance. to turn the attention of a nation from these honest employments to _that of war_ is an evil of unspeakable magnitude. the great object in times of war is to rouse up what is styled the spirit of the country,--which, in fact, is nothing but inflaming the most destructive passions against its own peace and safety. if you infuse into a nation the spirit of war for the sake of fighting a foreign enemy, you do that which is often most dangerous to its own liberties; for if you make peace with the common enemy, you do not destroy the spirit of war among your own inhabitants; pride, discontent, and revenge will generally agitate the whole body, so that anarchy and confusion will fill the land, and nothing but a despotic power can restrain it; and often absolute despotism is too feeble to withstand it, and the only remedy is again to seek a common enemy. nations have sometimes waged war against other nations because there was such a spirit of war among their own inhabitants that they could not be restrained from fighting, and if they had not a common foe they would fight one another. so when a nation once unsheathes the sword, it cannot easily return the sword again to the scabbard, but must keep it crimsoned with the blood of man until "they who take the sword shall perish with the sword," agreeably to the denunciation of heaven. to inflame a mild republic with the _spirit of war_ is putting all its liberties to the utmost hazard, and is an evil that few appear to understand or appreciate. no person can calculate the greatness of the evil to transform the citizens of a peaceful, industrious republic into a band of furious soldiers; and yet the unhappy policy of nations is to cultivate a martial spirit that they may appear grand, powerful, and terrific, when in fact they are kindling flames that will eventually burn them up root and branch. in confirmation of what has been said, if we examine the history of nations we shall find that they have generally lost their liberties in consequence of the spirit and practice of war. thus have republics who have boasted of their freedom lost their liberty one after another, and that this has resulted from the very nature of war and its inseparable evils is evident from the fact that so violent and deadly is this current of ruin, republics have generally sunk down to the lowest abyss of tyranny and despotism, or have been annihilated and their inhabitants scattered to the four winds of heaven. indeed, what nation that has become extinct did not first lose its liberty by war, and then hasten to its end under the dominion of those passions which war inflames? do nations ever enjoy so much liberty as when most free from the spirit of war? are their liberties ever so little endangered as when this spirit is allayed and all its foreign excitements removed? do not nations that have partially lost their civil liberties gradually regain them in proportion as they continue long without war? is it not a common sentiment that the liberties of a people are in danger when war engrosses their attention? on the whole, is it not undeniable that peace is favorable to liberty, and that war is its enemy and its ruin? if so, what can be more unwise, what more opposite to every dictate of sound wisdom and policy, than the spirit and practice of war? v. war is unwise, as it diminishes the happiness of mankind happiness is the professed object which most men are striving to obtain. alas! few, comparatively, seek it where it is alone to be found. but that happiness which flows from the benevolent spirit of the gospel is to be prized far above rubies; it is a treasure infinitely surpassing anything that can be found merely in riches, honors, and pleasures. but war always diminishes the aggregate of happiness in the world. when nations wage war upon each other, all classes of their inhabitants are more or less oppressed. they are subjected to various privations; prosperity declines; external sources of happiness are mostly dried up; anxiety for friends, loss of relations, loss of property, the fear of pillage, severe services, great privations, and the dread of conquest keep them constantly distressed. they are like the troubled sea that cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt. those actually engaged in war generally suffer privations and hardships of the severest kind. even the sage counselors who declare wars are often in so great anxiety and pain as to the result of their enterprises as to be unable quietly to refresh themselves with food or sleep. all the rejoicings occasioned by military success are fully counterbalanced by the pain and mortification of the vanquished; and, in short, all the interest and happiness resulting from war to individuals and nations are dearly bought, and are at the expense of other individuals and nations. it is because war has no tendency to increase, but does in fact greatly diminish, happiness that it is so universally regarded and lamented as the greatest evil that visits our world. hence fasting has generally been practiced by warlike christian nations to deplore the calamity, to humble themselves before god, and to supplicate his mercy in turning away the judgment. though fasting and deep humility before god is highly suitable for sinners, with a hearty turning away from their sins and humble supplication for god's mercy through the mediation of christ, yet those fasts of nations who have voluntarily engaged in war and are determined to prosecute it until their lusts and passions are gratified do not appear to be such fasts as god requires. does it not appear absurd for nations voluntarily to engage in war, and then to proclaim a fast to humble themselves before god for its evils, while they have no desire to turn away from them, but, on the contrary, make it an express object to seek the divine aid in assisting them successfully to perpetuate it? we often see contending nations, all of whom cannot be right, on any principle, proclaiming fasts, and chanting forth their solemn _te deums_ as each may occasionally be victorious. though such clashing hymns cannot mingle in the golden censer, yet few christians seem to question the propriety of quarreling and fighting nations each in their turn supplicating aid in their unhallowed undertakings and returning thanks in case of success. doubtless many would consider it as solemn mockery to see two duelists before their meeting supplicating god's blessing and protection in the hour of conflict, and then to see the victor returning thanks for his success in shedding the blood of his brother; and yet, when nations carry on the business by wholesale (if i may be allowed the expression) it is considered a very pious employment. the lord has said, "and when ye spread forth your hands, i will hide mine eyes from you: yea, when ye make many prayers, i will not hear; your hands are full of blood." penitent christians may weep and mourn with propriety for their own sins and the sins of the nations, with a hearty desire not only to forsake their own iniquities, but that the nations may be brought to confess and forsake their sins and turn from them to the living god. it is true that war is a judgment in god's providence. it is also a sin of the highest magnitude and ought to be repented of. it is a crime so provoking to heaven that other calamities generally attend it. the famine, fire, and pestilence often attend its horrors and spread distress through a land. war with its attending evils unquestionably diminishes the aggregate of happiness in the world, and is therefore unwise. vi. war is unwise, as it does not mend, but injures, the morals of society the strength, defense, and glory of a country consists primarily in the good moral character of its inhabitants. the virtuous and the good are the salt that preserve it from ruin. says the rev. dr. miller in his sermon on the death of dr. rogers (pages and of the memoirs), "it is manifest from the whole tenor of his word that god is slow to inflict heavy judgments upon a nation in which many of his people dwell; that he often spares it, spreads over it the protection of his providence, and finally delivers it for their sake; and, of course, that the presence of his beloved children, speaking after the manner of men, is a better defense than chariots and horsemen, a better defense than all the plans of _mere_ politicians, than all the skill, courage, and activity of _mere_ warriors." again, "i have no doubt that it is as great and precious a truth at this day as it ever was, that a praying people are, under god, the greatest security of a nation." when the inhabitants of a country become generally profane and dissolute in their manners, slaves to dissipation and vice, it is usually god's providence soon to visit them in his wrath and let loose the instruments of his destroying vengeance; how important, therefore, in a temporal point of view, is the preservation of good morals to a nation. but no event has so powerful a tendency to destroy the morals of a people as that of actual war. it draws the attention of the inhabitants from useful employments; it generates curiosity, dissipation, and idleness, and awakes all the furious passions of men. war occasions a great profanation of the sabbath. under god's providence the sabbath has always been a great barrier against vice, and the observance of it is indispensable to good morals. in time of war the sabbath among soldiers is often a day of parade. in the streets of the best-regulated cities may be seen soldiers marching, flags flying, drums and fifes playing, and a rabble of children following in the train. now all this is not only calculated to dissipate all reverential respect for the solemnities of the day among the soldiers, but is calculated to destroy the respect and observance of the day with which the children and youth have been inspired. add to this, flags are suspended from the windows of taverns and grogshops to entice in the youth by the intoxicating cup. in the camp the sabbath is almost forgotten and rendered a common day. armies from professing christian nations as often begin offensive operations on the sabbath as on any other day; and professing christians not only tolerate all this but approve of it as a work of necessity and mercy. war occasions dishonesty. in countries where armies are raised by voluntary enlistment all kinds of deception and art are practiced by recruiting officers, and connived at by their governments, to induce the heedless youth to enlist. the honor and glory of the employment is held up to view in false colors; the importance of their bounty and wages are magnified; the lightness of the duty and opportunities for amusements and recreation are held out; and probably one half have the assurances of being noncommissioned officers, with a flattering prospect of a speedy advancement; and prospects of plunder are also held out to their cupidity. these deceptive motives are daily urged under the stimulating power of ardent spirits and the fascinating charms of martial music and military finery. many a young man who has entered the rendezvous from curiosity or for the sake of a dram, without the least idea of joining the army, has been entrapped into intoxication, and his hand then grasped the pen to seal his fate. recruits after joining the army find from experience that most of the allurements held out to them to enlist were but a deception, and from lust and want they often become petty thieves and plunderers to repay them for their great privations, fatigues, and sufferings. war occasions drunkenness,--one of the greatest evils and most destructive to morality, as a multitude of other vices necessarily follow in its train. many a young man has entered the military ranks _temperate_, and has returned from them a _sot_. all the enticements of liquor are exhibited in the most inviting forms to youth in the streets by the recruiting officer, to tempt them to enlist; and while those who have enrolled themselves remain at the rendezvous, they are probably every day intoxicated with the inebriating poison, soul and body, and soon the habit becomes confirmed. while in actual service their fatigues are so great that they greedily lay hold on the destroying liquor wherever they can find it to exhilarate their languid frames, even if they had not before acquired an insatiable thirst; and soon this detestable evil will become so enchanting that they will not only barter away their wages for it but their necessary clothing. if they survive the campaign and return to their homes, they are often the visitors of grogshops and taverns, and by their marvelous stories attract the populace around them, who must join them in circulating the cup; and thus they spread this destroying evil all around. war occasions profaneness. profaneness is an abomination in the sight of god: "for the lord will not hold him guiltless who taketh his name in vain." profaneness draws down the judgments of heaven, "for because of swearing the land mourneth." that soldiers are generally considered more profane than other men is evident, because it has become a proverb that "such a person is as profane as a soldier, or a man-of-war's man." young men who have been taught to revere the name of the god of their fathers may shudder at the awful profanations that fill their ears when they first enter an army; but if destitute of grace in the heart, the sound will soon cease to offend, and they will eagerly inhale the blasphemous breath and become champions in impiety. for want of habit they may not swear with so easy a grace as the older soldiers; they will for that reason make great exertions and invent new oaths, which will stimulate their fellows again to exceed in daring impiety. seldom does a soldier return from the camp without the foul mouth of profanity. astonishing to think that those who are most exposed to death should be most daring in wickedness! war occasions gambling. a great proportion of the amusements of the camp are petty plays at chance, and the stake usually a drink of grog. the play is fascinating. multitudes of soldiers become established gamblers to the extent of their ability, and often, if they return to society, spread the evil among their neighbors. war begets a spirit of quarreling, boxing, and dueling; and no wonder that it should, for the whole business of war is nothing else but quarreling and fighting. the soldier's ambition is to be a bully, a hero, and to be careless of his own life and the lives of others. he is therefore impatient in contradiction, receives an insult where none was intended, and is ready to redress the supposed injury with the valor of his own arms; for it will not do for soldiers to shrink from the contest and be cowards. war destroys the habits of industry and produces idleness. industry is necessary to good morals as well as to the wealth and happiness of a country, and every wise government will take all laudable means to encourage it; but a large proportion of common soldiers who may return from the armies have lost the relish and habits of manual labor and are often found loitering about in public places, and if they engage in any kinds of labor, it is with a heavy hand and generally to little purpose. they therefore make bad husbands, unhappy neighbors, and are worse than a dead weight in society. their children are badly educated and provided for, and trained up to demoralizing habits, which are handed down from generation to generation. these immoralities, and many more that might be named, are not confined to soldiers in time of war, but they are diffused more or less through the whole mass of community; and war produces a general corruption in a nation, and is therefore unwise, even in a temporal point of view. but when we consider the natural effects of these immoralities on the souls of men, all temporal advantages are in comparison annihilated. in this school of vice millions are ripening for eternal woe. the destroying influence will spread and diffuse itself through the whole mass of society unless the spirit of the lord lifts up a standard against it. the state of morals, so much depressed by the american revolution, was only raised by the blessed effusions of god's holy spirit. if war does actually demoralize a people, then no wise person can consistently engage in it. vii. war is unwise, as it is hazarding eternal things for only the chance of defending temporal things says our blessed saviour: "for what is a man profited, if he should gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" the loss of a soul infinitely exceeds all finite calculations. it is not only deprived forever and ever of all good but is plunged into misery inexpressible and everlasting. all temporal things dwindle to nothing when placed in comparison with eternal realities. the rights, liberties, and wealth of nations are of little value compared with one immortal soul. but astonishing to think that millions and millions have been put at everlasting hazard only for the chance of defending temporal things! the habits and manners of a soldier's life are calculated, as we have already seen, to demoralize them, to obliterate all early serious impressions, to introduce and confirm them in the most daring wickedness and fit them for everlasting destruction. and notwithstanding god may have occasionally, to display his sovereign power, snatched some soldiers from the ranks of rebellion and made them the heirs of his grace, yet no sober christian will say that the army is a likely place to promote their salvation; but, on the contrary, must acknowledge that it is a dangerous place for the souls of men. it may be assumed as an undeniable fact that the great mass of soldiers are notoriously depraved and wicked. with but few exceptions their impiety grows more daring the longer they practice war; and when it is considered that thousands and thousands of such are hurried by war prematurely into eternity, with all their sins unpardoned, what an amazing sacrifice appears only for some supposed temporal good. but when it is remembered that this infinite sacrifice is made merely for the chance of obtaining some temporal advantage, the folly of war appears in more glaring colors, as the battle is not always to the strong. those who are contending for their rights, and are least in the wrong, are about as often unsuccessful as otherwise, and then they very much increase their evils in a temporal point of view. a wise man would not engage in a lawsuit to recover a cent, admitting that it was his just due, if the trial put to the hazard his whole estate. but this bears no comparison with _one soul_ in competition with all temporal things; and yet men, professing to be _wise_, not only put one soul at hazard but millions, not for the _chance_ of defending all temporal good, but often for a mere bubble, the hollow sound of honor; and many of those who are watching for souls, and must give an account, instead of sounding the alarm, approve of it. all who engage in war, either in the field or otherwise, practically regard _time_ more than eternity, and _temporal_ more than _eternal_ things. if souls are of more value than temporal things, and eternity of more consequence than time, it must be _unwise_ to engage in a war and put souls to immediate hazard of everlasting ruin, and totally wrong for christians to engage in it. viii. war is unwise, as it does not answer the professed end for which it is intended the professed object of war generally is to preserve liberty and produce a lasting peace; but war never did and never will preserve liberty and produce a lasting peace, for it is a divine decree that all nations who take the sword shall perish with the sword. war is no more adapted to preserve liberty and produce a lasting peace than midnight darkness is to produce noonday light. the principles of war and the principles of the gospel are as unlike as heaven and hell. the principles of war are terror and force, but the principles of the gospel are mildness and persuasion. overcome a man by the former and you subdue only his natural power, but not his spirit; overcome a man by the latter, and you conquer his spirit and render his natural power harmless. evil can never be subdued by evil. it is returning good for evil that overcomes evil effectually. it is, therefore, alone the spirit of the gospel that can preserve liberty and produce a lasting peace. wars can never cease until the principles and spirit of war are abolished. mankind have been making the experiment with war for ages to secure liberty and a lasting peace; or, rather, they have ostensibly held out these objects as a cover to their lusts and passions. and what has been the result? generally the loss of liberty, the overturning of empires, the destruction of human happiness, and the drenching of the earth with the blood of man. in most other pursuits mankind generally gain wisdom by experience; but the experiment of war has not been undertaken to acquire wisdom. it has, in fact, been undertaken and perpetuated for ages to gratify the corrupt desires of men. the worst of men have delighted in the honors of military fame and it is what they have a strong propensity for; and how can a christian take pleasure in that employment which is the highest ambition of ungodly men? the things that are highly esteemed among men are an abomination in the sight of god. is it not, therefore, important that every one naming the name of christ should bear open testimony against the spirit and practice of war and exhibit the spirit and temper of the gospel before the world that lieth in wickedness, and let their lights shine before men? but what can the men of the world think of such christians as are daily praying that wars may cease to the ends of the earth, while they have done nothing and are doing nothing to counteract its destructive tendency? alas! too many are doing much by their lives and conversation to support its spirit and principles. can unbelievers rationally suppose such prayers to be sincere? will they not rather conclude that they are perfect mockery? what would be thought of a man daily praying that the means used for his sick child might be blessed for his recovery, when he was constantly administering to him known poison? with the same propriety do those christians pray that war may come to a final end, while they are supporting its vital principles. it is contrary to fact that war is calculated to preserve liberty and secure a lasting peace; for it has done little else but destroy liberty and peace and make the earth groan under the weight of its terror and distress. it is contrary to the word of god that war is calculated to promote peace on earth and good will toward men. the law that is to produce this happy effect will not be emitted from the council of war or the smoke of a camp; but the law shall go forth out of zion, and the lord shall rebuke the strong nations and they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; then nations shall no more lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn the art of war any more; then shall the earth be filled with the abundance of peace and there shall be nothing to hurt or destroy. it is reserved alone for the triumph of the gospel to produce peace on earth and good will to men. if war does actually provoke insult and mischief; if it increases difficulties, destroys property and liberty; if it diminishes happiness, injures the morals of society, hazards eternal for only the chance of defending temporal things, and, finally, does not answer the end for which it was intended, then it must be _very unwise_ to engage in it, and it must be wrong for christians to do anything to promote it, and right to do all in their power to prevent it. war is criminal i am now to show that war, when judged of on the principles of the gospel, is highly criminal. i. going to war is not keeping from the appearance of evil, but is running into temptation ... i would have it understood that i consider every act of mankind which is palpably contrary to the spirit and precepts of the gospel _criminal_. it is an express precept of the gospel to abstain from all appearance of evil. "watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation" is also an express command of christ. a person desiring not only to abstain from evil, but from the very appearance of it, will suffer wrong rather than hazard that conduct which may involve doing wrong. he will be so guarded that if he errs at all he will be likely to give up his right when he might retain it without injuring others. no person, it is believed, will attempt to maintain that there is no appearance of evil in carnal warfare, or that it is not a scene of great temptation. one great object of the gospel is to produce good morals, to subdue the irascible passions of men and bring them into sweet subjection to the gospel of peace. but war cannot be prosecuted without rousing the corrupt passions of mankind. in fact, it is altogether the effect of lust and passion. in times of war almost every measure is taken for the express purpose of inflaming the passions of men, because they are the vital springs of war, and it would not exist without them. those who are engaged in war, both in the council and in the field, have a feverish passion, which varies as circumstances may happen to change. those who are actually engaged in the heat of battle are usually intoxicated with rage. should this be denied by any one, i would appeal to the general approbation bestowed on the artist who displays most skill in painting scenes of this kind. he who can represent the muscular powers most strongly exerted, the passions most inflamed, and the visage most distorted with rage, will gain the highest applause. the truth of the assertion is, therefore, generally admitted. some men, perhaps, may be so much under the influence of pride as to have the appearance of stoical indifference when their antagonists are at some distance, but let them meet sword in hand and the scene is at once changed. the temptations for those who constitute, or those who encourage and support, armies to commit or to connive at immorality are too various and too multiplied to be distinctly mentioned. who can deny that war is altogether a business of strife? but, says an inspired apostle, "where envying and strife is, there is confusion and every evil work." now, if war is a scene of confusion and strife and every evil work, it is impossible for any one to engage in it and avoid the appearance of evil or be out of the way of temptation; those who are armed with deathly weapons and thirsting for the blood of their fellow-mortals surely cannot be said to exhibit no appearance of evil. but if engaging in wars is putting on the appearance of evil and running into temptation, then it is highly criminal to engage in it. ii. war is criminal, as it naturally inflames the pride of man one of the abominable things which proceed out of the corrupt heart of man, as represented by our saviour, is pride. "god resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble." "the lord hates a proud look." "every one that is proud in heart is an abomination to the lord." that pride is criminal and that humility is commendable will doubtless be admitted by all who believe the scriptures. pride, however, is one of the chief sources of war. it is pride that makes men glory in their strength and prowess; it is pride that hinders them from confessing their faults and repairing the injury done to others. although pride is commonly condemned in the abstract, yet it is generally commended in soldiers and fanned by every species of art and adulation, not only by men of the world but too often by those who bear the christian name. and why is it necessary to inflame the pride of soldiers? because it is well understood that soldiers without pride are not fit for their business. if war is a christian duty, why should not the example and precepts of christ, instead of the example of the heroes of this world, be exhibited to those who fight to stimulate them? is not christ as worthy of imitation as the cæsars and alexanders of this world? he was a triumphant conqueror; he vanquished death and hell, and purchased eternal redemption for his people; but he conquered by resignation and triumphed by his death. here is an example worthy of the highest emulation. and why not animate soldiers by it? only because it would unnerve their arms for war and render them harmless to their foes. it is so common to compliment the pride of soldiers that, instead of considering it that abominable thing which the lord hates, they consider it a virtue. we frequently hear "gentlemen of the sword," as they are styled, in reply to the flattery bestowed upon them, frankly declare that it is their highest ambition to obtain the praise of their fellow-citizens; and, of course, they confess that they are seeking the praise of men more than the praise of god. these gentlemen, however, are far less criminal than those who lavish flattery on them; for doubtless most of them are sincere and think themselves in the way of their duty, while their profession often leads them, necessarily, from the means of knowing correctly what is duty. while professing christians have been taught from their cradles that the profession of arms is not merely an allowable but a noble employment, it is easy for them to slide into the current and go with the multitude to celebrate victories and to eulogize heroes, without once reflecting whether they are imitating their lord and master. but is it not time for christians to examine and ascertain if war is tolerated in the gospel of peace before they join in festivities to celebrate its bloody feats? how would a pagan be astonished if he had been taught the meek, lowly, and forgiving spirit and principles of the gospel, without knowing the practice of christians, to see a host of men, professing to be influenced by these blessed principles, marshaled in all the pomp of military parade, threatening destruction to their fellow-mortals! would he not conclude that either he or they had mistaken the genius of the gospel, or that they believed it to be but a fable? it is a notorious fact, which requires no confirmation, that military men, decorated with finery and clad in the glitter of arms, instead of being meek and lowly in their temper and deportment, are generally flushed with pride and haughtiness; and, indeed, what purpose do their decorations and pageantry answer but that of swelling their vanity? their employment is not soft and delicate. other men who follow rough employments wear rough clothing; but the soldier's occupation is not less rough than the butcher's, though, in the world's opinion, it is more honorable to kill men than to kill cattle. but if war has a natural tendency to inflame, and does inflame and increase the pride of men, it is criminal; it does that which the lord hates, and it must be highly criminal to engage in it. iii. war necessarily infringes on the consciences of men, and therefore is criminal liberty of conscience is a sacred right delegated to man by his creator, who has given no authority to man to infringe in the least on the conscience of his fellow-man. though a man, by following the dictates of his conscience, may be injured by men, yet they have no authority to deprive him of the rights of conscience. to control the conscience is alone the prerogative of god. that man has no right to violate the conscience of his fellow-man is a truth which few, under the light of the gospel, since the days of ignorance and superstition, have ventured to call in question. but military governments, from their very nature, necessarily infringe on the consciences of men. though the word of god requires implicit obedience to rulers in all things not contrary to the scriptures, it utterly forbids compliance with such commands as are inconsistent with the gospel. we must obey god rather than man, and fear god as well as honor the king. but governments, whether monarchial or republican, make laws as they please, and compel obedience at the point of the sword. they declare wars, and call upon all their subjects to support them. offensive war, by all professing christians, is considered a violation of the laws of heaven; but offensive war is openly prosecuted by professing christians under the specious name of self-defense. france invaded spain, germany, and russia; england invaded holland and denmark; and the united states invaded canada, under the pretense of defensive war. the fact is, however, that no man can, on gospel principles, draw a line of distinction between offensive and defensive war so as to make the former a crime and the latter a duty, simply because the gospel has made no such distinction. but while many christians profess to make the distinction, and to consider offensive war criminal, they ought to have the liberty to judge, when war is waged, whether it is offensive or defensive, and to give or withhold their aid accordingly; otherwise they are not permitted the free exercise of their consciences. but suppose this principle adopted by governments. could they prosecute war while they left every individual in the free exercise of his conscience to judge whether such war was offensive or defensive and to regulate his conduct accordingly? would it be possible for governments to carry on war if they depended for support on the uncertain opinion of every individual? no; such a procedure would extinguish the vital strength of war and lay the sword in the dust. the fact is well known, and monarchs declare war and force their subjects to support it. the majority in republican governments declare war and demand and enforce obedience from the minority. though the constitutions of governments may, in the most solemn manner, guarantee to citizens the free exercise of their consciences, yet governments find it necessary practically to make an exception in relation to war, and a man may plead conscientious motives in vain to free himself from contributing to the support of war. i think it proper here to notice what has appeared to me a gross absurdity among some christians in this land. they have openly declared that in their opinion the late war was offensive; that it was contrary to the laws of god, and that they were opposed to it; but though they wished not to support it because it was criminal, yet they said, if they were called on in a constitutional way, they would support it. thus did they publicly declare that they would, under certain circumstances, obey man rather than god. but soldiers actually resign up their consciences to their commanders, without reserving any right to obey only in such cases as they may judge not contrary to the laws of god. were they at liberty to judge whether commands were morally right or not, before they yielded obedience, it would be totally impracticable for nations to prosecute war. ask a general if his soldiers have the privilege of determining whether his commands are right or not, and he will tell you it is their duty only to obey. suppose that a general and his army are shut up in a city in their own country, and that provisions are failing; that an army is advancing for their relief, but cannot reach the place until all means of sustenance will be consumed; that the inhabitants cannot be let out without admitting the besiegers; and that in this extremity, to preserve his army for the defense of his country, the commander orders his men to slay the inhabitants, doing this evil that good may come. but some conscientious soldiers refuse to obey a command to put the innocent to the sword for any supposed good. what must be the consequence? their lives must answer for their disobedience. nor is this contrary to the usages of war. and christians satisfy their consciences upon the false principle that soldiers are not accountable for their conduct, be it ever so criminal, if they obey their commanders; all the blame must fall on the officers, which involves the absurdity of obeying man rather than god. thus soldiers must be metamorphosed into something besides moral and accountable beings in order to prosecute war; and, in fact, they are treated generally not as moral agents but as a sort of machinery to execute the worst of purposes. the only plausible method of which i can conceive to avoid the above consequences requires that soldiers should not practically resign their consciences, but, when commands which are morally wrong are given, that they should refuse obedience and die as martyrs. but to enter an army with such views would be to belie the very oath of obedience which they take. besides, who could execute the martyrs and be innocent? in this way all might become martyrs, and the army be annihilated. but if war does not admit the free exercise of conscience on christian principles, then it is criminal for christians to become soldiers, and the principles of war must be inconsistent with the principles of christianity. iv. war is criminal, as it is opposed to patient suffering under unjust and cruel treatment that patient suffering under unjust and cruel treatment from mankind is everywhere in the gospel held up to view as the highest christian virtue probably few professing christians will deny. but notwithstanding this truth is generally admitted, there is very commonly introduced a carnal, sophistical mode of reasoning to limit, or explain away, this precious doctrine, which is peculiar to the gospel and which distinguishes it from all other kinds of morality and religion on earth. it has relation, it is said, only to matters of religion and religious persecution,--as if the gospel required mankind actually to regard a little wealth and a few temporal things more than all religious privileges and life itself; for, by this human maxim, men may fight to defend the former, but not the latter. and this maxim is built on the supposition that christians are not bound strictly by gospel precepts in relation to temporal things, but only in relation to spiritual things. hence it is said that the martyrs conducted nobly in refusing to fight for the privilege of worshiping the true god, but if christians now refuse to fight to defend their money and their political freedom they act in a dastardly manner and violate the first principles of nature. thus are temporal regarded more than spiritual and everlasting things. the precepts of the gospel, however, unequivocally forbid returning evil for evil, and enjoin patient sufferings under injurious and cruel treatment. a few instances shall be quoted: "now we exhort you, brethren, warn them that are unruly, comfort the feeble-minded, support the weak, be patient towards all men. see that none render evil for evil to any man; but ever follow that which is good, both among yourselves, and unto all men." "if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with god." the apostle james, in his solemn denunciation against oppressors, says, "ye have condemned and killed the just, and he doth not resist you"; he then immediately exhorts the christians, saying, "be patient therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the lord." "finally, be ye all of one mind, having compassion one for another, love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous, not rendering evil for evil, railing for railing; but contrariwise blessings, knowing that ye are thereunto called, that ye should inherit a blessing." "for the eyes of the lord are over the righteous, and his ears are open to their prayers; but the face of the lord is against them that do evil. and who is he that will harm you, if ye be followers of that which is good?" a patient, forbearing, suffering disposition is peculiar to the lamblike temper of the gospel, and is wholly opposed to the bold, contending, daring spirit of the world which leads mankind into quarreling and fighting. it is generally admitted, i believe, that it is the duty of christians patiently to suffer the loss of all temporal things, and even life itself, rather than willfully violate any of god's commands. if, then, it is the duty of a christian patiently to suffer death rather than bear false witness against his neighbor, be he friend or foe, is it not equally his duty patiently to suffer death rather than kill his neighbor, whether friend or foe? not merely taking away the life of our neighbor is forbidden, but every exercise of heart and hand which may have a natural tendency to injure him. but which is the greatest evil,--telling a lie, or killing a man? by human maxims you may do the latter to save your life, but not the former; though the former might injure no one but yourself, while the latter, besides injuring yourself, might send your neighbor to eternal destruction. the spirit of martyrdom is the true spirit of christianity. christ himself meekly and submissively died by the hands of his enemies, and instead of resistance, even by words, he prayed, "father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." stephen, when expiring under a shower of stones from his infuriate murderers, prayed, "lord, lay not this sin to their charge." st. paul testified that he was not only ready to be bound but to die for the lord jesus. the early martyrs resigned up their lives with patient submission as witnesses for jesus,--and this at a time, when, sir henry moncrief wellwood in his sermons, page , says, "tertullian has told us that christians were sufficiently numerous to have defended themselves against the persecutions excited against them by the heathen, if their religion had permitted them to have recourse to the sword." the spirit of martyrdom is the crowning test of christianity. the martyr takes joyfully the spoiling of his goods, and counts not his life dear to himself. but how opposite is the spirit of war to the spirit of martyrdom! the former is bold and vindictive, ready to defend property and honor at the hazard of life, ready to shed the blood of an enemy. the latter is meek and submissive, ready to resign property and life rather than injure even an enemy. surely patient submission under cruel and unjust treatment is not only the highest christian virtue but the most extreme contrast to the spirit of war. now if it is a duty required by the gospel not to return evil for evil, but to overcome evil with good; to suffer injustice and to receive injury with a mild, patient, and forgiving disposition,--not only in words but in actions,--then all kinds of carnal contention and warfare are criminal and totally repugnant to the gospel, whether engaged in by individuals or by communities. can it be right for christians to attempt to defend with hostile weapons the things which they profess but little to regard? they profess to have their treasure not in this world but in heaven above, which is beyond the reach of earthly invaders, so that it is not in the power of earth or hell to take away their dearest interests. there may be a propriety in the men of the world exclaiming that their dearest rights are invaded when their property and political interests are infringed upon; but it is a shame for christians to make this exclamation, while they profess to believe that their dearest interest is in the hand of omnipotence, and that the lord god of hosts is their defense. whoever, without divine command, dares to lift his hand with a deathly weapon against the life of his fellow-man for any supposed injury denies the christian character in the very act, and relies on his own arm instead of relying on god for defense. v. war is criminal, as it is not doing to others as we should wish them to do to us says our blessed saviour, "all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets." now if we wish men to be kind and forbearing to us, we must be kind and forbearing to them; if we wish them to return love for hatred and good for evil, then we must return love for hatred and good for evil; if we wish not to be injured by men, then we must not injure them; if we wish not to be killed, then we must not kill. but what is the practical language of war? does the man who is fighting his fellow-man and exerting all his strength to overcome him really wish to be overcome himself and to be treated as he is striving to treat his enemy? can it be believed that england, in the late war, wished france to do to her what she endeavored to do to france; or that the latter really desired in return what she endeavored to inflict on england? if not, both violated this express precept of christ. none can say, consistently with the principles of the gospel, that they wish to be killed by their enemies; therefore none can, consistently with those principles, kill their enemies. but professing christians do kill their enemies, and, notwithstanding all they may say to the contrary, their actions speak louder than their words. it is folly for a man to say he does not wish to do a thing while he is voluntarily exerting all his powers to accomplish it. but if the act of war does violate this express precept of christ, then it must be exceedingly criminal to engage in it. vi. war is inconsistent with mercy, and is therefore criminal mercy is the grand characteristic of the gospel, and the practice of mercy is the indispensable duty of man. "be ye merciful, as your father also is merciful"; "for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust"; "blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy"; "for he shall have judgment without mercy, that hath showed no mercy." mercy is that disposition which inclines us to relieve distress, to forgive injuries, and to promote the best good of those who are ill deserving. mercy in us towards our enemies implies seeking and pursuing their best good for time and eternity. it is sinful to exercise any affection towards enemies short of that benevolence or mercy which involves the advancement of their best good, and christians may not suspend this disposition, or do evil that any supposed good may come; for no law can be of higher authority than the express precept of christ which requires this disposition towards enemies, and of course no other consideration can be paramount to this, for nations are as much bound as individuals. it is surely too grossly absurd for any to pretend that destroying the property and lives of enemies is treating them mercifully, or pursuing their best good for time and eternity. nor can any so impose upon their imaginations as to think that injuring mankind is treating them with benevolence or mercy. but the direct object of war is injury to enemies; and the conduct of soldiers generally speaks a language not easily to be misunderstood. though soldiers are not always as bad as they might be, their tender mercies are often but cruelty. when they storm a fortified place and do not put all the captives to the sword, they are complimented for exercising mercy, merely because they were not so cruel as they might have been. but shall a highway robber be called an honest man because he takes but half the money of him whom he robs? is it an act of mercy, when a man encroaches on your property, to take away his life? do nations exercise mercy towards each other when they enter into bloody wars in consequence of a dispute which shall govern a small portion of territory? or does a nation show mercy to another that has actually invaded its rights by falling upon the aggressor and doing all the injury in its power? this surely is not forgiving injuries. and when two contending armies come in contact and rush on each other with all the frightful engines of death and cut each other to pieces they do not appear to me as merciful, kind, and tender-hearted, forgiving one another in love, even as god for christ's sake forgives his children. yet this is the rule by which they should act and by which they will at last be judged. but the whole system of war is opposed to mercy, and is therefore altogether unlike the spirit of the gospel, and must be criminal. vii. war is criminal, as the practice of it is inconsistent with forgiving trespasses as we wish to be forgiven by the final judge our saviour says: "if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly father will also forgive you; but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your heavenly father forgive your trespasses"; "forgive, and ye shall be forgiven." here it is evident that the everlasting salvation of men depends on their exercising forgiveness towards their enemies; for if they forgive not, they will not be forgiven of god, and with what measure they mete to others, it will be measured to them again. to forgive is to pass by an offense, treating the offender not according to his desert, but as though he had done nothing amiss. but do the principles of war lead individuals or nations to pass by offenses and to treat offenders as if they were innocent? do they not, on the contrary, require justice and exact the very last mite? has it the aspect of forgiveness for us, when an enemy trespasses on our rights, to arm with weapons of slaughter and meet him on the field of battle? who, while piercing the heart of his enemy with a sword, can consistently utter this prayer: "father, forgive my trespasses, as i have forgiven the trespasses of this my enemy"? but this, in reference to this subject, is the only prayer the gospel warrants him to make. and professing christian nations, while at war and bathing their swords in each other's blood to redress mutual trespasses, are daily in their public litanies offering this prayer; but is it not obvious that either their prayers are perfect mockery, or they desire not to be forgiven but to be punished to the extent of their deserts? if individuals or nations desire that god would forgive their trespasses, then they must not only pray for it, but actually exercise forgiveness towards those who trespass against them; and then they may beat their useless swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks and learn war no more. but it must be very criminal to engage in war, or to tolerate it in any way, if it is inconsistent with the forgiveness of injuries as we hope to be forgiven, and in this respect violates the precepts of the gospel. viii. engaging in war is not manifesting love to enemies or returning good for evil returning good for evil and manifesting benevolence to enemies is, perhaps, the most elevated and noble part of christian practice,--the inculcation of which in the gospel exalts christianity far above any other form of religion and proves it to be not only divine but efficacious to subdue the turbulent and corrupt passions of men; and for these reasons this part of duty ought to be zealously advocated and diligently performed by every one who bears the christian name. the ablest writers who have defended the divine origin of the scriptures against infidels have urged this topic as constituting conclusive evidence in their favor; and unbelievers, instead of attempting to meet the argument fairly, have urged the inconsistency of christians in acting contrary to so conspicuous a rule of duty; and such is and ever has been the most powerful weapon that infidels can wield against christianity. but it is the will of god that by welldoing we should put to silence the ignorance of foolish men. let christians act in strict conformity to this part of christian practice, and they will wrest from the infidel's hand his strongest weapon. that exercising benevolence towards enemies and returning good for evil is inculcated as one of the most important doctrines of the gospel is evident as well from the whole tenor of the new testament as from the express commands of the son of god: "i say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you, that ye may be the children of your father in heaven"; "if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head"; "be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." such are some of the divine precepts on this subject. so different, however, are the laws of war among christian nations, that rendering comfort or relief to enemies is considered high treason, and they punish with death the performance of the very duty which god commands as a condition of eternal life! the common sense of every man revolts from the idea that resisting an enemy by war is returning good for evil. who would receive the thrust of a sword as an act of kindness? was it ever considered that killing a man was doing good to him? has not death always been considered the greatest evil which could be returned for capital crimes? but the principles of war not only allow enemies to return evil for evil by killing one another, but secure the highest praise to him who kills the most. it is often said of those who distinguish themselves in butchering their fellow-men, that "they cover themselves with glory!" nations, when they go to war, do not so much as pretend to be actuated by love to their enemies; they do not hesitate to declare in the face of heaven that their object is to _avenge_ their wrongs. but, says an inspired apostle, "dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, vengeance is mine; i will repay, saith the lord." retributive judgment, the execution of strict justice, or vengeance, god declares often, belongs to him. he has reserved it in his own hand as his sovereign prerogative. it is not very surprising that savage pagans should glory in revenge, but that those should do so who have the bible in their hands, and profess to take it as the rule of their faith and practice, is truly astonishing. still more astonishing is it that some ministers of the gospel not only connive at but approve of the spirit and practice of revenge by war. but though the whole tenor of the gospel absolutely enjoins returning good for evil and blessing for cursing; yet the open and avowed principles of war are to return evil for evil, violence for violence. now if the principles of war are so directly opposed to the principles of the gospel, if the practice of war is so perfectly contrary to christian practice, then it must be very criminal for christians not to bear open testimony against war, and much more criminal to do anything to promote it. ix. war is criminal, because it is actually rendering evil for evil it is a fact which can neither be disguised nor controverted that the whole trade of war is returning evil for evil. this is a fundamental principle in the system of self-defense. therefore every exertion in the power of contending nations is made to inflict mutual injury, not merely upon persons in public employment and upon public property, but indiscriminately upon all persons and property. hence it is an established rule of what is styled "civilized warfare" that if one party takes a person suspected of being a spy, they put him to death; which act is retaliated by the other the first opportunity. if one party storms a fortified place and puts the garrison or the inhabitants to the sword, the other, in their defense, must retaliate the same thing, and, if possible, to a greater degree. if one side executes a number of captives for some alleged extraordinary act, the other, on the principles of self-defense, may execute double the number; the first may then, on the same principles, double this number; and so they may proceed to return evil for evil, till one or the other yields. the principles of self-defense require not merely an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but for one eye two eyes, for one tooth two teeth. they require the retaliation of an injury to a double degree,--otherwise, there would be no balance in favor of the defensive side; but as both parties must always be on the defense, both must, of course, retaliate to a double degree. thus war is aggravated and inflamed, and its criminality raised to the highest pitch. the doctrine of retaliation is not only openly avowed and practiced by professing christian nations, but is sometimes defended before national councils by professing christians of high standing in churches. "o! tell it not in gath! publish it not in the streets of askelon! lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph!" that the retaliation of injury, of whatever kind it may be and to whomsoever it may be offered, is most absolutely and unequivocally forbidden by the whole spirit of the gospel dispensation, as well as by its positive precepts, surely can never be fairly controverted. says the great author and finisher of our faith, "ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but i say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." whether the literal import of these words be contended for or not, they cannot fairly be construed as teaching anything short of a positive and unconditional prohibition of the retaliation of injury. had our lord added to these words the maxim of the world, "if any man assaults you with deathly weapons, you may repel him with deathly weapons," it would have directly contradicted the spirit of this command and made his sayings like a house divided against itself. the apostles largely insist upon this doctrine of their divine master, thus: "recompense to no man evil for evil"; "be ye all of one mind, not rendering evil for evil, or railing for railing"; "see that none render evil for evil to any man." these comprehensive passages make no conditions or limitations, and are, therefore, applicable to all men and binding upon all in all situations and circumstances under the light of the gospel; but had they added, "if any man injures you, you may return him an injury and repel violence with violence," it would have been most palpably absurd, and the precepts of the gospel would have been truly what infidels have asserted they are,--a series of gross contradictions. but i repeat that the open and avowed principles of war, even among christian nations, are those of returning evil for evil. surely, nations neither aim nor pretend to aim at the best good of their enemies; but, on the contrary, their real and professed object in the sight of god and man is to do them, while at war, all the injury in their power. what means that language which conveys instructions to those who command ships of war, to _sink_, _burn_, and _destroy_, if it does not mean evil to enemies? why do nations encourage the cupidity of men by licensing and letting loose swarms of picaroons on their enemies, if it is not to inflict evil on them? but all this is sanctioned under the notion of self-defense, and, as though it were a light thing for men thus publicly to trample on the laws of the gospel, they lift up their daring hands to heaven and supplicate god's help to assist them in violating his own commands! no apology can be made for such proceedings until it is shown that war is not returning evil for evil. but what is it to return evil for evil? when one man is injured by another and returns injury, he returns evil for evil and violates those precepts of the gospel which have been quoted. when one association of men is injured by another association and the injured returns an injury, evil is returned for evil and those precepts are violated. when one nation infringes on the rights of another and they in return infringe on the aggressor's rights, they return evil for evil and violate those precepts. when one nation declares war against another and is repelled by war, evil is returned for evil and those precepts are violated. but these things are constantly practiced, without a blush or a question as to their propriety; and god is supplicated to aid in the business. to what a state has sin reduced our world? is not the church covered with darkness and the people with gross darkness? a man may now engage in war with his fellow-man and openly return evil for evil, and still remain in respectable standing in most of the churches, being at the same time highly applauded and caressed by the world lying in wickedness! but if we are here to be directed and at last to be judged by the gospel, no man can return evil for evil, in war or otherwise, without aggravated guilt. x. war is criminal, as it is actually doing evil that good may come; and this is the best apology that can be made for it that it is an evil to spread distress, desolation, and misery through a land and to stain it with the blood of men probably none will deny. war, with its attending horrors, is considered by all, even those who advocate and prosecute it, to be the greatest evil that ever befalls this wicked, bleeding, suffering world. though men go to war primarily to gratify their corrupt passions,--for they can never propose the attainment of any good by war which shall be commensurate with the natural and moral evils that will be occasioned by the acquisition,--yet the prospect of attaining some supposed good must be held out as a lure to the multitude and a means of self-justification. usually the object of war is pompously represented to be to preserve liberty, to produce honorable and lasting peace, and promote the happiness of mankind; to accomplish which, liberty, property, and honor--that honor which comes from men--must be defended, though war is the very thing that generally destroys liberty, property, and happiness, and prevents lasting peace. such is the good proposed to be attained by the certain and overwhelming evil of war. but no maxim is more corrupt, more false in its nature, or more ruinous in its results than that which tolerates doing evil that good may come. nor can any defend this maxim without taking the part of infidels and atheists, to whom it appropriately belongs, and with whose principles and practice alone it is consistent. the apostle paul reprobates this maxim in the severest terms, and he considered it the greatest scandal of christian character to be accused of approving it: "as we be slanderously reported," says he, "and as some affirm that we say, let us do evil that good may come; whose damnation is just." now if war is in fact an evil, and it is prosecuted with a view to attain some good, then going to war is doing evil that good may come. it is therefore doing that which scandalizes christian character; that which is wholly irreconcilable with the principles of the gospel, and which it is highly criminal for any man or nation to do. xi. war is opposed to the example of the son of god, and is therefore criminal the example of the son of god is the only perfect model of moral excellence, and his moral conduct, so far as he acted as man, remains a perfect example for christians. but did he appear in this world as a great military character, wearing a sword of steel, clothed with military finery, and surrounded by glittering soldiers, marching in the pomp and parade of a warrior? no; he was the meek and lowly jesus, despised and rejected of men. he was king of kings and lord of lords, but his kingdom was not of this world. had his kingdom been of this world, then would he have appeared as an earthly conqueror, and his servants would have been warriors. though a prince, he was the prince of peace. at his advent the angels sang, "glory to god in the highest, on earth peace, good will to men." "he came not to destroy men's lives, but to save them." he was the lamb of god, meek and lowly. he followed peace with all men; he returned good for evil and blessing for cursing, and "when he was reviled he reviled not again." finally, he was "brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth." that he did this as a necessary part of his mediatorial work need not be denied; but that he intended it also as an example to his followers is fully confirmed by an inspired apostle, who says, "if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with god. for hereunto were ye called: because christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow his steps: who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth: who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, threatened not; but committed himself to him who judgeth righteously." christ taught his disciples the doctrines of peace, and commanded them to take up the cross and follow him; to live in peace and to follow peace with all men. his last gift to them was peace. he said to them, when about to send them into the world, "behold i send you forth as lambs among wolves"; thus teaching them what treatment they might expect and what character they must maintain among wicked men. the nature of lambs and wolves is too well known for any one to mistake this figurative representation. wolves are fierce, bloody, and ravenous beasts; but lambs are mild, inoffensive, and unresisting, having no means of relief but by flight. now if a host of professing christian warriors, marshaled under the ensign of a preying eagle or a prowling lion, clothed in all the splendor of deathly armor, and rushing forward to destroy their fellow-creatures, are in figurative language but _lambs_, i confess i am at a loss where to look for the _wolves_! do these warlike christians appear mild as lambs and harmless as doves, kind and tender-hearted, doing good to all, to friends and foes, as they have opportunity? can fighting be living peaceably with all men? is it returning good for evil, and overcoming evil with good? if not, it is not imitating the example of christ. if christians were like christ, their warfare would not be carnal, but spiritual, corresponding with the armor which he has provided. they would conquer by faith and overcome by the blood of the lamb, not counting their lives dear to themselves. on the whole, if to engage in war is not avoiding the appearance of evil, but is running into temptation; if it inflates the pride of men; if it infringes on the rights of conscience; if it is not forgiving trespasses as we wish to be forgiven; if it is not patient suffering under unjust and cruel treatment; if it is not doing to others as we would have them do to us; if it is not manifesting love to enemies and returning good for evil; if it is rendering evil for evil; if it is doing evil that good may come; and if it is inconsistent with the example of christ, then it is altogether contrary to the spirit and precepts of the gospel and is highly criminal. then christians cannot engage in war or approve of it without incurring the displeasure of heaven. * * * * * in view of the subject, if what has been said is in substance correct, and of this i desire the reader conscientiously to judge, then the criminality of war and its inconsistency with the gospel are undeniable. it is admitted by all that war cannot exist without criminality somewhere, and generally where quarreling and strife are, there is blame on both sides. and how it is that many christians who manifest a laudable zeal to expose and counteract vice and wickedness in various other forms are silent on the subject of war, silent as to those parts or practices of war which are manifestly and undisputably criminal, is to me mysterious. there has been a noble and persevering opposition against the inhuman and cruel practice of the slave trade; and by the blessing of god the efforts against it have been successful, probably, for the time, beyond the most sanguine expectations. when the lawfulness of this practice was first called in question, it was violently defended as well by professing christians as by others. comparatively few christians fifty years ago doubted the propriety of buying and holding slaves; but now a man advocating the slave trade could hardly hold in this vicinity a charitable standing in any of the churches. but whence has arisen so great a revolution in the minds of the mass of professing christians on this subject? it has happened not because the spirit or precepts of the gospel have changed, but because they are better understood. christians who have been early educated to believe that a doctrine is correct, and who cherish a respect for the instructions of their parents and teachers, seldom inquire for themselves, after arriving at years of maturity, unless something special calls up their attention; and then they are too apt to defend the doctrine they have imbibed before they examine it, and to exert themselves only to find evidence in its favor. thus error is perpetuated from generation to generation until god, in his providence, raises up some to bear open testimony against it; and as it becomes a subject of controversy, one after another gains light, and truth is at length disclosed and established. hence it is the solemn duty of every one, however feeble his powers, to bear open testimony against whatever error prevails, for god is able from small means to produce great effects. there is at present in many of our churches a noble standard lifted up against the abominable sin of intemperance, the greatest evil, perhaps, war excepted, in the land, and this destructive vice has already received a check from which it will never recover unless christians relax their exertions. but if war is a greater evil than drunkenness, how can christians remain silent respecting it and be innocent? public teachers consider it to be their duty boldly and openly to oppose vice. from the press and from the pulpit they denounce theft, profaneness, sabbath breaking, and intemperance; but war is a greater evil than all these, for these and many other evils follow in its train. most christians believe that in the millennial day all weapons of war will be converted into harmless utensils of use, that wars will cease to the ends of the earth, and that the benign spirit of peace will cover the earth as the waters do the seas. but there will be then no new gospel, no new doctrines of peace; the same blessed gospel which we enjoy will produce "peace on earth and good will to men." and is it not the duty of every christian now to exhibit the same spirit and temper which will be then manifested? if so, let every one "follow the things that make for peace," and the god of peace shall bless him. objections answered as was proposed, a number of objections to the general sentiments that have been advocated shall be stated and answered. _objection first._ shall we stand still and suffer an assassin to enter our houses without resistance and let him murder ourselves and families? _answer._ i begin with this because it is generally the first objection that is made to the doctrine of peace by all persons, high and low, learned and unlearned; notwithstanding it is an objection derived from a fear of consequences and not from a conviction of duty, and might with the same propriety have been made to the martyrs who, for conscience' sake, refused to repel their murderers with carnal weapons, as to christians who, for conscience' sake, refuse at this day to resist evil. no christian will pretend that defense with carnal weapons is not criminal, if the gospel really forbids it, let the consequences of nonresistance be what they may. for the requisitions of the gospel are the rule of duty. but i presume the objection above stated arises altogether from an apprehension of consequences rather than from regard to duty. every candid person must admit that this objection is of no force, until the question whether the gospel does or does not prohibit resistance with deathly weapons is first settled. it might, therefore, justly be dismissed without further remark; but as mankind are often more influenced by supposed consequences than by considerations of duty, and as the objection is very popular, it may deserve a more particular reply. in the first place, i would observe that the supposition of the objector relates to a very extreme case, a case which has very rarely, if ever, occurred to christians holding to nonresistance with deathly weapons, and it bears little or no resemblance to the general principles or practices of war which are openly advocated and promoted by professing christians. should an event like that supposed in the objection take place, it would be a moment of surprise and agitation in which few could act collectedly from principle. what was done would probably be done in perturbation of mind. but war between nations is a business of calculation and debate, affording so much time for reflection that men need not act from sudden and violent impulse, but may act from fixed principle. in this respect, therefore, war is a very different thing from what is involved in the objection which does not in the least affect the principles or practice of systematic warfare. it is not uncommon to hear persons who are hopefully pious, when pressed by the example and the precepts of christ against war, acknowledge that most of the wars which have existed since the gospel dispensation cannot be justified on christian principles; yet these very persons are never heard to disapprove of the common principles of war, or to counteract them by their lives and conversation before a wicked world; but, on the contrary, they will often eulogize heroes, join in the celebration of victories, and take as deep an interest in the result of battles as the warriors of this world; and if their conduct is called in question, they will attempt to justify it by pleading the necessity of self-defense, and immediately introduce the above objection which is by no means parallel with the general principles and practices of all wars. the truth is, war is a very popular thing among mankind, because it is so congenial to their natural dispositions; and, however gravely some men may, at times, profess to deplore its calamity and wickedness, it is too evident that they take a secret pleasure in the approbation of the multitude and in the fascinating glory of arms; and we have reason to believe that this objection is often made merely to ward off the arrows of conviction which would otherwise pierce their consciences. the objection, however, wholly overlooks the providence and promise of god. assassins do not stroll out of the circle of god's providence. not only is their breath in his hand, but the weapons they hold are under his control. besides, god's children are dear to him, and he shields them by his protecting care, not suffering any event to befall them except such as shall be for his glory and their good. whoever touches them touches the apple of his eye. he has promised to be a very present help to them in every time of need, and to deliver them that trust in him out of all their trouble. he will make even their enemies to be at peace with them. for the eyes of the lord are over the righteous and his ears are open to their prayers, but the face of the lord is against them that do evil; and who is he that will harm you if ye be followers of that which is good? but if ye suffer for righteousness' sake, happy are ye, and be not afraid of their terror, neither be troubled. if god be thus for his children, who can be against them? is not the arm of the lord powerful to save, and a better defense to all who trust in him than swords and guns? whoever found him unfaithful to his promises or feeble to save? are not the hosts of heaven at his command? are not his angels swift to do his will? "are they not all ministering spirits sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?" "the angel of the lord encampeth round about them that fear him, and delivereth them." if the lord is on their side, christians have no cause to fear what man can do unto them. says the blessed saviour, "whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." if consequences are rightly examined, they may prove to be of more importance than at first supposed. if the gospel does forbid resistance with deathly weapons, then he who saves his temporal life by killing his enemy may lose his eternal life; while he who loses his life for christ's sake is sure of everlasting life. thus the christian, if he is killed, goes to heaven; but the assassin, if he is killed, goes to hell, and the soul of the slayer is in danger of following. whoever kills another to prevent being killed himself, does it on presumption; for, whatever may be the appearances, god only can know whether one man will assassinate another, before the event has taken place. men, however, seem to think little of killing or being killed by fighting, whether in single combat or on the field of general battle, though they shudder at the idea of being put to death by an assassin, unless they can inflict or attempt to inflict on him the same evil. but the objection is usually made on the supposition that the doctrine in question requires christians to stand still and rather court the dagger than otherwise. this is an unfair statement, for it would be presumption to stand still when there was a chance of escape. besides, the christian must act on the defensive, not with carnal, but with spiritual weapons, which are more powerful when exercised in faith than swords or spears. probably no instance can be found of robbers murdering such as conscientiously held to nonresistance. it is resistance that provokes violence; forbearance and good will repress it. but if instances of this kind may be found, it is no evidence against the doctrine in question any more than against the principles of the martyrs. god may, for wise reasons, call away some of his children by the hands of murderers; if so, instead of losing, they save their lives. _objection second._ self-defense, and, if necessary, with deathly weapons, is the first law of nature. all the animal creation are armed with means of defense, and the principles of the gospel are not contrary to the principles of nature; therefore self-defense is not inconsistent with christianity. _answer._ it is admitted that the laws of the gospel are not contrary to the primitive laws of nature; but it is by no means granted that they are consistent with the laws of corrupt nature. in consequence of the revolt of man the earth was cursed for his sake. it appears probable that before the fall of man animals were harmless and docile; and it is not improbable that when the curse shall be removed, when the earth shall be filled with righteousness and peace, the lion and the lamb may literally lie down together. at present, indeed, the dove, the lamb, and some other animals have no means of defense, unless flight be considered such. and while warriors are figuratively represented by ferocious beasts, real christians are represented by lambs and doves. so far as nature is made to speak fairly on the subject, it speaks in favor of the doctrine which has been advocated. but corrupt nature strongly dictates many things quite contrary to the precepts of the gospel; and no doctrine will be given up more reluctantly by corrupt nature than that of the lawfulness of war, because no doctrine is more congenial with the depraved feelings and propensities of unsanctified men, for their "feet are swift to shed blood; destruction and misery are in their ways, and the way of peace have they not known; there is no fear of god before their eyes." _objection third._ the precepts of the gospel are consistent with the moral law, or the eternal nature of things, which is forever the standard of right and wrong to all moral beings in the universe; and war has been prosecuted consistently with this rule of right and wrong; therefore war cannot be contrary to the precepts of the gospel. _answer._ this is an objection founded on an undefinable something aside from divine precept; yet as some terms in it have been much used in polemic divinity by men of eminent talents and piety, whose praise is in the churches, i think it neither proper nor modest to dissent from so high authority without offering some reasons. i shall, therefore, make a few general observations on what is called the moral law, the eternal rule of right and wrong, or the nature of things; all of which phrases, i believe, have been occasionally used by eminent writers as conveying the same ideas. i cannot agree with such as suppose that a moral law or nature of things exists independently of the will of god and is the common law of god and man. it appears to me as inconsistent to suppose a law to exist without a lawgiver as to suppose a world to exist without a creator. if god is the only eternal and independent being in the universe, and if all things are the work of his power and goodness, then the supposition that an eternal law exists independently of him appears to me to be absurd, as on this supposition there exists a law without a lawgiver and an effect without a cause. if god is not the author of all things, then there must be more than one eternal cause of things. to suppose that the reason and fitness of things independently of the will of god, either in his works, his providence, or word, can be a rule of man's duty appears to me as inconsistent as to suppose that men might institute divine worship from such fitness of things independently of the existence of god; for the will of god to man seems as necessary to lay a foundation of moral obligation and to direct man's obedience as the existence of god is necessary to lay a foundation of religious worship. should it be asked whether the laws of god are not founded on the eternal nature and fitness of things, i would answer that such a supposition appears to me no more reasonable than to suppose that his power is founded on the eternal capacity of things; for the capacity of things has just as much reality and eternity in it to found the omnipotence of god upon, as the reason and nature of things have to found his infinite wisdom or justice upon. i therefore dissent from all standard of moral obligation which are supposed to exist aside from, and independently of, the divine will; and fully agree with the assembly's shorter catechism, in the answer to this question: "what is the duty which god requires of man? answer: the duty which god requires of man is obedience to his revealed will." should it, however, be said that things do exist aside from the divine will, that it does not depend on the divine will, but on the nature of things, that two and two make four, or that a thing cannot be in motion and at rest at the same time, it is by no means admitted that this order or constitution of things exists independently of god; but it is believed to be as much the effect of his power and goodness as anything else. and if god is not the author of all the laws both in the natural and moral world, it may reasonably be inquired, who is? if god is the moral governor of the world, then all his laws over men, as moral beings, must be moral laws; and to make a distinction between the laws designed to regulate the moral conduct of men, and to call some of them moral and others by different names, seems to me not necessary, while i find no such distinction in the scriptures. because some of god's laws were intended to be temporary, under certain circumstances, they were no less of a moral nature on that account; neither was it any less criminal to violate them. as created things are in some respects constantly changing, and as the relations of things are often varied, so a law may be relatively right at one time and relatively wrong at another. but as man is frail and short-sighted, and is incapable of seeing the end from the beginning, he is totally unable of himself to judge what is and what is not right, all things considered; hence the necessity of a revelation from god to direct his steps. that there is a fitness of things and a standard of moral right and wrong cannot be denied; but, instead of being founded in a supposed nature of things independent of god, it originates in the very nature and perfections of god himself, and can never be known by man any farther than the nature and perfections of god are known. a standard of right and wrong independent of god, whether by the name of moral law or nature of things, is what never has been and never can be intelligibly defined. it is like a form without dimensions, like a foundation resting on nothing. it is, therefore, in my opinion, as extravagant to talk of an eternal nature of things, without reference to the laws of god, as it would be to talk of an eternal wisdom or an eternal omnipotence, independent of the existence of god. but if the statement of the objector is meant only to imply a rule of right and wrong emanating from the nature and perfections of god, and coincident with his laws, then, admitting the propriety of the terms moral law, nature of things, etc., the objection, if it proves anything, may prove quite too much for its advocates; for under certain circumstances it has been consistent with this rule of moral right and wrong utterly to exterminate nations, to destroy men, women, and children, and show them no mercy. besides, the whole force of the objection rests on the supposition that no laws which have existed, and which were not contrary to the moral law, can be abrogated under the christian dispensation or be inconsistent with the precepts of the gospel. it hence follows that whatever has been morally right and lawful for men to do must forever remain right and lawful to be done. this is a necessary result from the premises; but no christian can consistently subscribe to this. the premises must, therefore, be unsound and the objection of no force. if literal sacrifices, slavery, and many other practices which are totally abolished under the christian dispensation were not contrary to the moral law under the old testament economy, why may not the same be true of war? why may not the gospel forbid war as consistently as it can forbid slavery? _objection fourth._ the nature of religion and morality under the ancient dispensation was the same as under the new. love to god and man was the substance of the law and the prophets; and though truth under the former was inculcated more by types and ceremonies, yet the essence of religion was the same under that as under the present dispensation; and as war was not inconsistent with the nature and precepts of religion then, it cannot be inconsistent with the nature and precepts of religion now, under like circumstances. _answer._ it is readily admitted that the essence of religion is the same under the present as under the former dispensation, both requiring at all times and in all actions holy exercises of heart in cordial obedience to divine command; yet the laws for external conduct under the two dispensations differ widely, and the practice of war involves much of the external conduct of men. it was never right for men to indulge unholy feelings in the act of war, but the external act was required as a means of executing the divine vengeance; the gospel does not command, but seems plainly to forbid, the external act of war. but to suppose that saints under the gospel can ever be placed in circumstances like those of the ancient church is to suppose that they may be put under the same typical economy which has vanished away, given place to the substance, and ceased to be binding even on the natural israelites. to be in like circumstances they must also be made the executors of god's wrath, to inflict vengeance, by his particular command, on idolatrous and rebellious nations. the israelites had the same high authority to exterminate the canaanites and subdue the idolatrous nations about palestine that the holy angels had to destroy sodom and gomorrah. it is perfectly plain that if god should positively command christians to take the weapons of war and not only repel invasion but actually exterminate nations, it would be their duty to obey, and a refusal would be open rebellion against god. the old testament saints received such commands, but christians have no such authority, which makes a material difference in circumstances. some general observations relative to the different dispensations of the church of god may illustrate this topic more fully. the old testament economy has sometimes, perhaps without reason, been divided into the adamic, patriarchal, and mosaic dispensations of the church; but as the latter was more full and complete, and as the distinction between the mosaic and christian dispensations is common, i shall confine my remarks chiefly to that distinction, though i consider the great distinction to be between the old and new testament economies. the old testament economy, in general, was typical of the new. under the former dispensation literal and temporal things typified spiritual and everlasting things under the latter. the nation of israel, chosen and separated from all other nations, typified the true israel of god, who are chosen out of every nation and sanctified and set apart as a holy nation and peculiar people, to offer up spiritual sacrifices to god. the land of canaan was a type of the heavenly canaan. jerusalem was a type of the new jerusalem from above. mount zion and the royal throne of israel, which were in jerusalem, typified the heavenly zion and the throne of the true david who now reigns in glory. the sacrifices were types of spiritual offerings. the israelites had enemies within and foes without, literal weapons of war and literal warfare, typical of spiritual foes, spiritual armor, and spiritual warfare.[ ] their kings were seated on the throne of the lord (see chron. xxix. ). at the command of god they judged and made war and conquered their enemies and thus typified the son of god who is now on the throne of his father david, and who in righteousness judges and makes war and rides forth conquering and to conquer. the ancient promises and threatenings were mostly temporal, but typical of spiritual and everlasting promises and threatenings. doubtless the gospel was preached by types and figures under the old testament economy, and the saints of old looked upon those temporal things merely as shadows representing a more enduring substance. when they looked upon canaan, the land of promise, they viewed it as a type of the heavenly canaan, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on earth seeking a better country. when they looked on the bleeding lamb they beheld, by the eye of faith, the lamb of god who taketh away the sins of the world. thus we may see that almost the whole of the old testament economy was typical and temporary, and not intended to be perfect and everlasting. but under the gospel dispensation we have a new covenant and better promises which are intended to be perfect and everlasting. it is therefore more proper for those who live under this new and perfect dispensation to look at the substance than at the shadow for a rule of duty. errors are often and easily propagated by reasoning from analogy and introducing it as proof of sentiments instead of illustration. this is frequently done in relation to the old testament economy and common political government. it is not uncommon to hear ministers, in their political sermons, reason and infer just as if there were a perfect parallel between the jewish theocracy and political governments, when at the head of one was the lord of hosts and at the head of the others are but men; when one was the church of the living god, and the others are but human institutions. they not unfrequently speak of god's driving out the heathen before his american israel and planting them in a goodly land, as though there were a perfect parallel between the americans driving the indians from their native soil and taking possession of it themselves, without divine commission, and the israelites going at the express command of god and taking possession of canaan. thus they endeavor to keep up a parallel between god's ancient church and civil governments. the economy of god's ancient covenant people was by no means a political institution in the popular sense, but it was a dispensation of the church of god, and in its rites, ceremonies, and government was typical of the kingdom of messiah under his mediatorial reign, and differed widely in its nature, origin, and design from mere political governments; therefore all reasoning drawn from a supposed analogy between them is specious and false. the israelites had no authority to enact laws or to alter god's laws one iota; their duty was implicitly to obey them. but if christians take their authority for going to war from the practice of the old testament saints, their example will prove too much; it will not only allow war, but _offensive war_ in its most dreadful forms. _objection fifth._ abraham went to war, not like the israelites at the command of god, yet he met with the divine approbation when he returned from the slaughter of the kings; he, therefore, must have acted on a universal law still in force; and as christians are called the children of abraham they ought, of course, to imitate his example in such things as god approved. _answer._ abraham, like the israelites, was under a typical dispensation and practiced rites and ceremonies which were a shadow of good things to come. that he acted without divine command, in the war referred to, is more than we are warranted to say. he was a prophet and the friend of god and probably was acquainted with the divine will on this subject. christians are not called the children of abraham because they imitate his example in war, but because they exercise like precious faith with him. if christians are warranted to imitate the example of abraham in all things which were tolerated by god, then they may sacrifice cattle, practice polygamy, and buy and hold slaves. but if they object to his example as a rule of duty in these instances, why not object to his example as a rule of duty in the case of war? but to say that he acted from some universal law still in force is taking for granted the question in dispute, and cannot be admitted without evidence. the war waged by abraham against the kings was, i apprehend, offensive rather than defensive; for lot, his brother's son, whom he rescued, did not then belong to his family or kingdom, but was separated from him and was also a patriarch, a father of nations, and a prince or head over his own house or kingdom. it appears very evident that offensive as well as defensive war was tolerated under the patriarchal economy, as may be seen from the words of the inspired jacob when blessing his sons (gen. xlviii. ). that, as well as the mosaic dispensation, was typical, and doubtless war was allowed under both for the same reasons. but there can be no doubt that whoever attempts to justify war by the example of abraham may equally justify the slavery of our fellow-men; and whoever depends on his example for authority for engaging in war, to be consistent, must advocate and defend the doctrine of slavery. _objection sixth._ it appears to be a universal law of god that "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." if one man, or one nation, attacks another and sheds his blood, his own must be shed in return. hence this precept not only authorizes taking away the life of a murderer, but authorizes nations to repel by war nations that wage war against them. _answer._ whether this was a precept given to man as a rule of duty or not is very questionable, though it has generally been so construed, at least since the dark ages of the church; and it is still more questionable whether it is a universal and perpetual law. if we attend to the phraseology of this decree of god, we shall find it to be very different from that of the precepts, generally, delivered to moses. god did not say to noah, as he often did to moses, thou shalt do this, or that, but he said, "_i will require the life of man_," etc. if god had designed to delegate executive authority to noah and his descendants to execute retributive judgment on the manslayer, the connection of the whole language must have been altered, for god declared what he would do himself. it appears, therefore, to have been god's _decree_, and the promulgation of _his_ law by which he would inflict righteous judgment on the guilty; the penalty was intended as a warning to deter mankind from violence, the sin for which the old world was swept away. and i see no reason why this threatening should not be considered parallel with the decrees of christ,--that "all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword; he that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity; he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword; here is the faith and the patience of the saints." why the former should be considered as a rule of obedience for man, and these latter passages not so, i am unable to say. "he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword" is as positive as "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." it may be observed that the faith and patience of the saints is here spoken of in such a way as to imply that they exercised and manifested their faith and patience when they were put to death by violence or carried into captivity. and, indeed, how could their faith and patience appear if they, like the wicked world, returned evil for evil, carried into captivity, and killed with the sword? the original threatening has been fulfilled by the providence, and sometimes by the express command, of god. as noah was the head of the new world and the father of nations, it seems to have had reference to nations rather than to individuals; and all nations that have shed blood in war must, in their turn, have their own blood shed; so that all they that take the sword may perish with the sword agreeably to the threatening made known to noah, and to those announced by christ. but, admitting that the law quoted in the objection was intended as a rule of duty for man, it does not appear that it was designed to be universal and perpetual. before the flood no authority appears in any sense to have been delegated to man to shed the blood of man. so far from executing the penalty of death or causing it to be executed upon cain, who was of the wicked one and slew his brother, notwithstanding his guilty forebodings, god threatened a sevenfold vengeance on him who should presume to do it. under the mosaic dispensation many crimes were punishable with death according to positive precept; but god, for wise reasons, did not always have the penalty executed. david was guilty of murder and adultery, both capital crimes; yet he was permitted to live. all kinds of vindictive punishment under the christian dispensation appear to be absolutely forbidden. by vindictive i mean that which is intended to vindicate the law, as executing strict justice, and prevent offenses only, as taking away life, but which is not designed to promote the individual good of the person punished. that punishment which is designed and which has a tendency to promote the good of the punished, as well as to deter offenders, i consider to be strictly disciplinary or corrective, and consistent with the spirit and precepts of the gospel. says an apostle, "dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, vengeance is mine; i will repay, saith the lord." "for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of god." it has been said that this only forbids a revengeful temper, but this evasion will not do; for christians are here forbidden to do the very thing which god declares he will do himself, and he does nothing but what is holy. "render to no man evil for evil," is a positive precept without any limitation, and which admits of no evasion; and it must plainly rescind the law of shedding man's blood because he had shed the blood of man. but the exclamation is often made, what, not punish a murderer with death! little do those who make this exclamation think that they themselves also are sinners and that every sin deserves not only temporal death but god's wrath and curse forever, and that they are in like condemnation unless redeemed by the blood of the lamb. for such, it might be well to inquire if they know "what manner of spirit they are of." the most prominent characteristic of messiah's reign over men in this world is mercy, since he has secured the rights and honor of the divine government by the sacrifice of himself so that the guilty may live. he has given his life as a ransom and taken the world into his hands as the ruler, judge, and rewarder, and offers the chief of sinners mercy; and the merits of his blood are sufficient to cleanse from all sin as well against man as against god. and who can help being astonished at the amazing difference between his laws and his dealings with men, and those sanguinary laws of men according to which under the light of the gospel they punish with death. the professed principle and design of these laws is strict justice; but were men dealt with according to strict justice by him who rules above, who would be able to stand? these laws of men accept no atonement for capital offenses; no mercy is offered, for none is provided for those who incur their penalty; but the gospel offers mercy to the chief of sinners while it condemns those who reject the offers. capital offenders will never be condemned by civil governments for the rejection of offered mercy, for no mercy is provided for them. how unlike the divine government! but christians are commanded to be merciful, as their father in heaven is merciful, who showers down blessings on the evil and unthankful. our master has told us that with what judgment we judge we shall be judged; and with what measure we mete it shall be measured to us again; that if we forgive we shall be forgiven; and if we forgive not we shall not be forgiven; and that if we show no mercy we shall have judgment without mercy. christians ought to ponder the subject well before they advocate the consistency and safety of dispensing justice without mercy. let them learn what that meaneth, "i will have mercy and not sacrifice." _objection seventh._ "every purpose is established by counsel, and with good advice make war"; "for by wise counsel thou shalt make war," etc. here war is recognized as a duty under certain circumstances, and the manner in which it is to be undertaken is pointed out, viz., by wise counsel. _answer._ the inspired proverbs are maxims of wisdom illustrated, for the most part, by some familiar subject that existed at the time they were delivered. the object here is not to inculcate the lawfulness of war but the necessity of sound wisdom in relation to the actions of men; and the subject of war appears to be introduced merely to illustrate this idea. the counsel and wisdom of men in relation to their temporal and worldly concerns are often worthy of imitation in reference to spiritual things; for the children of this world are, in some sense, wiser in their generation than the children of light, and the conduct of worldly men is often very appropriately introduced to illustrate christian duty. our lord says, "what king, going to war with another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand?" doubtless our lord's design was to warn people to count the cost before they professed to be followers of him, that they might not be deceived and discouraged, and that they might act from principle and not from hypocrisy. but he inculcated these things by referring to the example of kings in their consultations about war. and it is believed that the passages before cited are of similar import. these references to war, being introduced merely for the illustration of other subjects, will no more prove the lawfulness of war than the reference of the apostle to the olympic games, for illustration, will prove the lawfulness of those heathen feats. but if this explanation should not be satisfactory, it may be observed that the proverbs were written under the old testament economy which tolerated offensive as well as defensive war; whence it does not appear that any war can be undertaken under the present dispensation, "by wise counsel," except that which is spiritual; so that if the ancient was typical of the new dispensation, then the passages quoted will now apply only to spiritual warfare. _objection eighth._ when the soldiers demanded of john the baptist what they should do, one of the directions which he gave them was to be content with their wages. if their occupation had been unlawful, then he would not have directed them to be contented with the wages of wickedness. _answer._ john the baptist was under the mosaic economy, the new dispensation not having commenced. he was but the forerunner of the lord, a herald to sound his approach. but he gave the soldiers another direction, viz., to "do violence to no man," obedience to which is totally incompatible with war, as that is nothing else but violence. only hinder soldiers from doing violence to any man and you stop at once the whole progress of war; therefore, if the directions of john are insisted on as gospel authority, they will prove, probably, much more against the lawfulness of war than in favor of it. _objection ninth._ the centurion and cornelius were christians and soldiers and highly approved of god for their faith and piety; nor were they directed by christ or his apostles to renounce their profession; therefore the profession of arms is not inconsistent with christian duty. _answer._ they were first soldiers and then christians; and we have no evidence that they continued in the profession of arms; nor are we warranted to say that they were not directed to renounce that profession, as the scriptures are silent on the subject. peter, it appears, tarried a number of days with cornelius, and he doubtless explained to him the spirit and precepts of the gospel; and it is very probable that neither cornelius nor the centurion continued soldiers in any other sense than they were soldiers of christ, as the idolatrous rites enjoined on the roman soldiers were totally inconsistent with the christian character, aside from the unlawfulness of war itself. besides, the roman soldiers were as often engaged in offensive as in defensive war; therefore, if the argument has any force on the question, it will tolerate not only defensive but offensive war, and also the idolatrous rites of the roman armies. _objection tenth._ our lord paid tribute money, which went to support military power, but he would not contribute to the support of a wicked thing, therefore war is not inconsistent with christianity. _answer._ a distinguished trait of the christian religion is peace. the command is, "follow peace with all men." "blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of god." our lord set the example of giving no just cause of offense to any. tribute was demanded of him unjustly according to the existing laws, but lest fault should be found, he wrought a miracle and paid it. money is a temporal thing, and belongs to the governments of this world, as the various coins bear the ensign of the nation by whom they were made; but the christian's treasure is not in this world, and when the rulers of this world call for that which bears their own image and superscription, christians have no right to withhold from them their dues, for they must "render to cæsar the things that are cæsar's." for this cause they ought to pay tribute and resign up temporal things without a murmur to temporal governments, and leave it with cæsar to manage the things of cæsar. thus far are christians warranted to act, from the example of christ and the precepts of the gospel; but how does the lawfulness of war follow from christians rendering to cæsar his due? is it because some of the money goes to support war? probably, of the money which our lord paid as much went to the support of idolatry and the games of the day as to the support of war. now if the argument is sound, we may not only prove by it the lawfulness of war but the lawfulness of idolatry and many other abominable things practiced by the heathen governments. _objection eleventh._ our lord, just before his crucifixion, commanded his disciples to take swords, and, if any were destitute, to sell their garments and procure them, as they would no longer have his personal presence to protect them; and as they were to encounter great trials and difficulties, they must, besides relying on providence, take all prudent means for their defense and preservation. _answer._ that our lord did not direct them to take swords for self-defense is evident because he told them that two were enough, and because the disciples never made any use of them after their master directed peter to put up his and pronounced a penalty on all who should have recourse to swords afterwards. but the design seems to have been to show by example in the most trying situation where self-defense was justifiable, if in any case, that the use of the sword was utterly prohibited under the gospel economy, and to show the criminality and danger of ever using deathly weapons against mankind afterwards. if christ's kingdom had been of this world, then, he tells us, his servants would have fought; but his kingdom being not of this world, the weapons of their warfare were not carnal but spiritual. he therefore rebuked them for their mistaken zeal, healed the wound they made, and forbade the use of the sword. _objection twelfth._ christians are commanded to be in subjection to civil rulers who are god's ministers to execute wrath on the wicked and are ministers of good to the church; therefore christians are bound to take the sword at their command; for civil government is ordained of god and civil rulers are not to bear the sword in vain, and christians may lawfully do what god ordains to be done. _answer._ that civil government, so called in distinction from religious government, is ordained by god is fully admitted, and also that god ordains whatsoever comes to pass. but there is a great difference between his decretive and his preceptive will. the former is not a rule of duty for man without the latter; the latter is always a rule of duty. this fact might be proved by a multitude of instances from scripture. persons therefore may be very wicked in doing what god ordains to be done, if they act without his command. that civil governments and civil rulers exist only by god's decretive will, which is fulfilled by his providence and not by his preceptive will, is evident because god has never authorized the appointment of them or given any precepts or any commands as a code of laws to any denomination or class of people as such, distinct from his own covenant people or church; and this fact i beg leave to submit as a conclusive evidence that civil governments and civil rulers exist only by god's decretive will and not by his preceptive will. under the ancient dispensation no laws or directions were given to any class of men, as such, other than god's own covenant people or church, unless some special commands on singular occasions, or the general command to repent and turn to god, be excepted. the king on the throne of israel was as truly an officer in the church of god as the high priest who entered into the holy of holies. both were set apart and anointed with the holy oil, at the command of god, and both were types of the son of god. the king as much typified his kingly office as the priest did his priestly office. both were necessary parts of that complete shadow of good things then to come. under the gospel dispensation no authority from god is to be found for appointing and setting apart civil rulers, nor are there any directions given to civil rulers, _as such_, how to conduct in their office, unless those who rule in the church are called civil rulers. all the precepts and directions in the gospel, excepting such as were special (as those which related only to the apostles) or such as are universal (relating alike to all men), are given to the disciples as members of christ's kingdom, who are not of this world, even as he was not of this world. the son of god came into the world to set up the kingdom of heaven, which is a perfect and everlasting kingdom and distinct from all other kingdoms which are to be destroyed to give place to his divine and heavenly reign. he came in the likeness of men, sin excepted, and laid down his life a ransom for the world, and then rose a triumphant conqueror, and in the complex character of god and man, as mediator, he took the universe, his purchased possession, into his hands as a lawgiver, judge, and rewarder. he took the scepter when it departed from judah, and is exalted far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and has a name above every name, all executive power in heaven and earth being given to him as mediator. thus, as mediator, the kingdom of heaven is his kingdom. he reigns not only as king of kings and lord of lords but seated on the throne of his father david, he is forever king in zion and is head over all things to his church. his kingdom is not of this world, neither are his subjects of this world, though some of them are in it. he sent out his disciples to appear in a distinct character from the world and to be a light to it by imitating his example and by exhibiting his spirit and temper. they ought not to say, as the jews did, that they have no king but cæsar, for they have an everlasting king and kingdom and laws perfect and eternal. they should, therefore, set their affections on things above and not on things beneath. while the kingdoms of this world exist, christians must remain in captivity to them and must obey all their laws which are not contrary to the laws of the gospel; otherwise they cannot remain peaceful, harmless, and blameless in the midst of a wicked world before whom they must shine as lights. though the church is now in captivity, yet her redemption draweth nigh, for god will soon "overthrow the throne of kingdoms," and the thrones will be cast down and the princes of this world will come to naught. the stone which was cut out of the mountain without hands will dash them to pieces, as the potter's vessel is shivered, and will become a great mountain and fill the whole earth; then the kingdom and the dominion and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven shall be given to the people of the saints of the most high god whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom and of whose dominion there shall be no end. though god, by his decree, has ordained civil governments and established kingdoms, and will by his providence make them subservient to the good of his church and people, and notwithstanding it is the duty of christians to be in subjection to them and pay tribute, yet it does not follow that their genius and laws may not often be contrary to the genius and laws of the gospel, and when they are so christians must not obey them nor count their lives dear to themselves. it should be distinctly remembered that when christians were exhorted and commanded to be obedient to civil rulers, they were under heathen, idolatrous, civil governments, and those civil governments were by no means congenial with the spirit and precepts of the gospel; still christians were commanded to be in subjection to them; not, however, without limitation, for they utterly refused obedience in many instances and nobly suffered or died as martyrs. thus civil government may be an ordinance of god, may be subservient to the good of the church, may be an instrument in god's hands of executing his wrath, and christians may be bound to obey magistrates in all things not contrary to the gospel; and yet it will not follow that christians may consistently with the gospel take up the sword or do anything to countenance war. if it be the duty of christians to take the sword and enter the field of battle at the command of their civil rulers, then there could be no impropriety in having armies wholly made up of real christians, especially since it is the duty of every man to become a christian; and as professing christian nations are almost constantly fighting each other, it would be perfectly proper for hosts of pious saints to be daily engaged in shedding each other's blood. but how would it appear, how does it appear, for those who have drunk into the same peaceful and heavenly spirit, who are united together by the tender ties of the redeemer's blood, who are all members of the same family, and who hope through divine grace to dwell together in everlasting love and blessedness, to be fighting one another here with relentless fury? let us contemplate the subject, in this point of view, a little further. suppose an english and an american frigate in the time of war, both manned entirely with real christians, should meet in a neutral port. ought they not then to conduct towards each other as brethren of one common lord? as they are all members of the same family and have all been redeemed by the same blood, and sanctified by the same divine spirit, they surely must have the most tender affection for each other, and it would be highly proper for them to meet together for christian fellowship, worship, and communion. suppose, then, that they occasionally go on board each other's ships for religious worship; that their chaplains lead in their devotions, using such petitions as these--praying that they may be all of one heart and one mind in the knowledge of christ, knit together in the bonds of christian love; that they may have much of the wisdom from above which is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated; that they may do good to all as they have opportunity, especially to the household of faith; that they may be meek and gentle as lambs and harmless as doves; that they may be kind and forgiving and that, like their divine master, they may return good for evil and have their affections on things above and not on things beneath; after which they unitedly partake of the symbols of christ's broken body and shed blood, and then part with the tenderest tokens of christian fellowship and love. they leave the port and meet again at sea. it now becomes their duty, on the principles of war, instead of meeting as christian brethren, to meet as raging tigers and discharge the flaming engines of death on each other; and in order to perform "their duty to their god and country," they must exert all their power and skill to destroy one another. the dreadful struggle and carnage must be continued by both parties as long as both can fight. when half of their crews are wallowing in their blood and expiring in agonies, a violent effort must be made by one or both to board the other and end the contest sword in hand. those hands which recently saluted each other with christian love now plunge the envenomed steel into their brethren's bosoms. at length one is vanquished and yields to the other. those who remain alive after the conflict again unite in prayer and give thanks to god that he has given them courage and strength to fight so nobly, and that he has shielded their lives in the hour of battle. thus they again resume their christian fellowship and communion. this mutual fellowship, communion, and love are perfectly consistent with christian character and are required by it. the conduct which has been supposed as enemies when fighting is also entirely consistent with the principles of war and with the character of warriors, and is such as would be highly applauded and admired by the world. but is it not obviously and perfectly absurd and perfectly incompatible with the principles of the gospel for christians to act in this twofold character? if, however, it is the duty of christians to obey the command of their rulers and engage in war, then it would be perfectly proper for what has been supposed to take place. christians may one day surround the table of the lord together, and the next kill and destroy each other. the god of this world, not being yet chained down to hell, deceives the nations and gathers them together to battle; but the children of peace, the citizens of zion, ought not to mingle with them or listen to the deceiver. they should take to themselves not carnal weapons but the whole armor of god, that they may be able to stand in an evil day and to quench all the fiery darts of satan. _objection thirteenth._ to deny the right of the magistrate to call on his subjects to take the sword is to deny that he is an avenger to execute wrath, though the gospel expressly declares that he is. _answer._ this conclusion does not follow unless it is a fact that god cannot and does not actually make him the instrument of doing it, by his providence, without his command; for, as we have already observed, men may fulfill the decrees of god under his providence, without his command, and be very criminal in the deed. god raised up the king of assyria and made him the rod of his anger, to chastise his people and to execute wrath upon the ungodly nations around. "howbeit he meant not so, but it was in his heart to _cut off_ nations not a few." and god declared, with reference to him, "that when he had performed his whole work he would punish the fruit of his stout heart and the glory of his high looks." it will not be contended that warlike nations are commanded by god to destroy and trample down the nations of the earth as the dust of their feet; yet, when they do so, they doubtless fulfill his high decree and are avengers to execute his wrath on a wicked world. the beast represented in the revelation with seven heads and ten horns has generally been considered as an emblem of nations. these ten horns, or powers, are to hate the great harlot of babylon; to eat her flesh and burn her with fire; and though they destroy the greatest enemy of the church, and in this way are ministers of good to her, yet they receive their power and their seat and their authority from the old serpent, the dragon. and a magistrate or king may be a minister of good to the church and an avenger to execute wrath, and still be very wicked in the deed and use very unlawful means to accomplish the end. while he fulfills the decree of heaven, he acts not in obedience to the command of god, but to the dictates of his own lusts and passions. _objection fourteenth._ the passages of scripture which have been quoted against retaliation and which inculcate love to enemies and the returning of good for evil have reference to individuals in their conduct towards each other, but have no relation to civil government and are not intended as a rule of duty for one nation towards another; they therefore have no bearing on the subject of war. _answer._ those precepts of the gospel appear to be binding universally without any limitation, and men have no right to limit that which god has not limited. if the commands of the gospel are binding upon every one in his individual capacity, then they must be binding upon every one in any collective body, so that whatever is morally wrong for every individual must be equally wrong for a collective body; and a nation is only a large number of individuals united so as to act collectively as one person. therefore, if it is criminal for an individual to lie, steal, quarrel, and fight, it is also criminal for nations to lie, steal, quarrel, and fight. if it is the duty of an individual to be kind and tender-hearted and to have a forgiving and merciful disposition, it is likewise the duty of nations to be kind, forgiving, and merciful. if it is the duty of an individual to return good for evil, then it is the duty of nations to return good for evil. it is self-evident that individuals cannot delegate power to communities which they do not possess themselves. therefore, if every individual is bound to obey the precepts of the gospel and cannot as an individual be released from the obligation, then individuals have no power to release any collective body from that obligation. to say that god has given to nations a right to return evil for evil is begging the question, for it does not appear and cannot be shown that god has restricted the precepts of the gospel to individuals, or that he has given any precepts to nations as such, or to any other community than his own covenant people or church. this objection makes government an abstraction according with the common saying, "government is without a soul." no practice has a more corrupt tendency than that of attempting to limit the scriptures so as to make them trim with the corrupt practices of mankind. whoever, for the sake of supporting war, attempts to limit these precepts of the gospel to individuals and denies that they are binding upon nations destroys one of the main pillars by which the lawfulness of war is upheld. the right of nations to defend themselves with the sword is argued on the supposed right of individual self-preservation; as it is said to be right for individuals to defend themselves with deathly weapons, so it is lawful for nations to have recourse to the sword for defense of their rights. but if these passages are applicable to individuals and prohibit them from acts of retaliation, and if the rights of nations are founded on the rights of individuals, then nations have no right to retaliate injury. _objection fifteenth._ christians, with comparatively few exceptions, have not doubted the lawfulness of war, and many have actually fought and bled on the field of battle and considered themselves in the way of their duty. and shall all our pious forefathers be condemned for engaging in war? _answer._ it is admitted that many pious people have engaged in war, but they might have been in an error on this subject as well as on many other subjects. many of our pious forefathers engaged in the slavery of their fellow-men, and thought themselves in the way of their duty; but does it follow that they were not in an error? the circumstance that multitudes defend a sentiment is no certain evidence of its truth. some of the reformers were objected to because the multitude were against them. popularity, however, ever has influenced and ever will influence mankind more than plain gospel duty, until the earth shall be filled with the abundance of peace. but notwithstanding this, it is not right to follow the multitude to do evil. all ought to remember that they have no right to follow the example of any one any further than that example coincides with the example of christ or the precepts of the gospel; all other standards are fallible and dangerous. if real christians have, from mistaken zeal, prayed against each other and fought each other and shed each other's blood, this does not justify war. _objection sixteenth._ if christians generally should adopt these sentiments, it would be impossible for them to subsist in this world in its present state, and if they did continue it must be in abject slavery. they would become hewers of wood and drawers of water to the tyrannical and oppressive, and would only encourage them in their deeds of wickedness. the injustice of men must be restrained or the earth will again be filled with violence. the necessity of the case is such that mankind would be warranted to take up arms to maintain their rights and repel oppressors, if the scriptures were silent on the subject.[ ] _answer._ we have the history of the heathen world to teach us what mankind are without the light of revelation. they are full of all unrighteousness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of enmity, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; they are proud, boasters, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful. now the very design of the gospel is to subdue and overcome these abominable passions and dispositions; not however by returning violence for violence but by producing virtues directly contrary. the great duty of christians is to be a light to this wicked world by exhibiting in their conduct and conversation the spirit and temper of the gospel. if such were the practice of christians, we have reason to believe that wicked men would be overawed and deterred from their violence in a great measure. besides, if all real christians should utterly refuse to bear arms for the destruction of their fellow-men, it would greatly diminish the strength and boldness of warlike nations, so that it would be impracticable for them to prosecute war with the vigor and fury that they now do. but if the gospel prohibits war, then to urge the necessity of the case against the commands of god is open rebellion against his government as well as total distrust of his word and providence. if christians live in habitual obedience to god's commands, they have the promise that all things shall work together for their good, and they have no reason to fear them that kill the body and after that "have no more that they can do." it is strange that christians should have so great a reluctance to suffer inconvenience in worldly things for the sake of the gospel. the scoffs and persecutions of the world and the fear of the loss of worldly things are powerful barriers against _christian_ warfare. the gospel teaches us that all who live godly in christ jesus shall suffer persecution, and that through much tribulation the saints must enter into the kingdom of heaven; and is it not plainly owing wholly to their conformity to the world that they now suffer so little persecution and practice so little self-denial? if there is reserved for them an eternal weight of glory, what if they, like their divine master, should not have where to lay their heads? if they are to inherit a crown of immortal glory, what if they are called to suffer the loss of earthly things? if they are hereafter to reign as kings and priests unto god, what if they are not ranked among the great and honorable of the earth? if they suffer with christ, then will they also reign with him; but if they deny him, he also will deny them; and if they are ashamed of him, he will also be ashamed of them before his father and the holy angels. let christians then obey his commands and trust to his protection while they resolutely abstain from the wicked practices of the world. _objection seventeenth._ it is the duty of mankind to use means for the preservation of life and liberty; they must till the ground, if they expect a crop. it would be presumptuous for them to pray for and to expect their daily bread without using such means as god has put in their power to obtain it; and it would be equally presumptuous to expect the preservation of their lives and liberties without using such means to preserve and defend them as god has put into their hand; they must act as well as pray. _answer._ that using means is the duty of christians, there can be no doubt; but they must be such as god has appointed, and not such as human wisdom may dictate. there is no dispute as to the propriety of using means, but only as to the kind of means which christians ought to use. the weapons of their warfare are not carnal, but spiritual, and they are mighty through god to the pulling down the strongholds of sin and satan. it is often said, if you wish to put a stop to war, spread the gospel through the world. we would inquire, if the gospel tolerates war, how will its universal diffusion put a stop to war? as has already been observed, it would be open rebellion to do what god has forbidden, and high-handed presumption to ask his aid in the things which he has prohibited. _objection eighteenth._ some ecclesiastical historians inform us that christians in the early ages of the church, though they contended so firmly for the faith as to suffer martyrdom rather than submit to idolatry, yet did not refuse to bear arms in defense of their country, even when called upon by heathen magistrates, and their example ought to have weight with us. _answer._ the testimony of the early fathers is entitled to regard, but must not be considered as infallible authority, for they were men of like passions with others and cannot be followed safely any farther than they followed christ. but the weight of their testimony on the subject, i apprehend, will be found to stand directly against the lawfulness of war on christian principles. erasmus, who was an eminent scholar, and who was probably as well acquainted with the sentiments of the primitive fathers as any modern writer, in his _antipolemus, or plea against war_, replies to the advocates of war as follows: "they further object those opinions or decrees of the fathers in which war seems to be approved. of this sort there are some, but they are only late writers, who appeared when the true spirit of christianity began to languish, and they are very few; while, on the other hand, there are innumerable ones among the writers of acknowledged sanctity which absolutely forbid war; and why should the few rather than the many intrude themselves into our mind?" barclay, who examined the writings of the fathers on this subject, says, "it is as easy to obscure the sun at midday as to deny that the primitive christians renounced all revenge and war." clarkson, who also examined the fathers, declares that "every christian writer of the second century who notices the subject makes it unlawful for christians to bear arms." clarkson has made copious extracts from the writings of the fathers against war, a few of which, as quoted by him and others, shall be inserted here. justin martyr and tatian both considered the devil the author of war. justin martyr, while speaking of the prophecies relating to the days of peace, says, "that this prophecy is fulfilled you have good reason to believe, for we who in times past killed one another do not now fight with our enemies." clarkson adds, "it is observable that the word 'fight' does not mean to strike, beat, or give a blow, but to fight in war; and the word 'enemy' does not mean a common adversary who has injured us, but an enemy of state." irenæus says that christians in his day "had changed their swords and their lances into instruments of peace, and that they knew not how to fight." maximilian and a number of others in the second century actually suffered martyrdom for refusing, on gospel principles, to bear arms. celsus made it one of his charges against the christians that they refused to bear arms for the emperor. origen, in the following century, admitted the fact and justified the christians on the ground of the unlawfulness of war itself. tertullian, in his discourse to scapula, tells us "that no christians were to be found in the roman armies." in his declaration on the worship of idols he says, "though the soldiers came to john and received a certain form to be observed, and though the centurion believed, yet jesus christ, by disarming peter disarmed every soldier afterwards; for custom can never sanction an illicit act." again, in his _soldier's garland_, he says: "can a soldier's life be lawful, when christ has pronounced that he who lives by the sword shall perish by the sword? can one who professes the peaceable doctrine of the gospel be a soldier when it is his duty not so much as to go to law? and shall he who is not to avenge his own wrongs be instrumental in bringing others into chains, imprisonment, torment, and death?" he tells us, also, that the christians in his day were sufficiently numerous to have defended themselves if their religion had permitted them to have recourse to the sword. there are some marvelous accounts of christian soldiers related by eusebius; but valesius, in his annotations on these accounts, has abundantly proved them to be fabulous, though he was not opposed to war and could have had no other object but to support the truth. eusebius, in his orations on constantine, uses such extravagant adulation, which falls but little short of idolatry, that his account of christian warriors ought to be received with great caution, especially when we recollect that church and state were, in his day, united. on the whole, it is very evident that the early christians did refuse to bear arms, and although one of their objections was the idolatrous rites connected with military service, yet they did object on account of the unlawfulness of war itself. we have no good evidence of christians being found in the armies until we have evidence of great corruption in the church. but admitting that we had good evidence that there were professing christians in the army at an early period of the church, i apprehend it would be of little importance, for the idolatrous rites and ceremonies of the heathen armies were of such a nature as to be totally inconsistent with christian character, and the example of idolatrous christians surely ought to have no weight. some objections of less importance might be stated which have from time to time been made against the sentiments here advocated; but to state and reply to everything that might be said is not necessary. specious objections have been and still are made to almost every doctrine of christianity. mankind can generally find some plausible arguments to support whatever they wish to believe. the pleas in favor of war are very congenial with the natural feelings of the human heart, and unless men will examine with a serious, candid, and prayerful disposition to ascertain the truth as it is in jesus, they will be very likely to imbibe and defend error.[ ] the writer, though far from supposing that everything he has said on a subject that has been so little discussed is free from error, is conscious of having endeavored to examine it with seriousness and candor, and feels satisfied that the general sentiments he has advanced are according to godliness. he sincerely hopes that every one who may peruse these pages will do it in the meek and unbiased spirit of the gospel, and then judge whether war can be reconciled with the lamblike example of christ; whether it is really forgiving the trespasses of enemies, loving and doing them good, and returning good for evil; for if it is not, it is unquestionably inconsistent with the spirit and the precepts of christianity. all who earnestly desire and look for the millennial glory of the church should consider that it can never arrive until the spirit and practice of war are abolished. all who love our lord jesus christ in sincerity cannot but ardently desire that wars may cease to the ends of the earth and that mankind should embrace each other as brethren. if so, is it not their duty to do all in their power to promote so benevolent an object? ought not every individual christian to conduct in such a manner that if every other person imitated his example it would be best for the whole? if so, would they not immediately renounce everything that leads to wars and fightings and embrace everything which would promote that glorious reign of righteousness and peace for which they earnestly hope, long, and pray? "the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness, quietness and assurance forever." footnotes: [ ] says the rev. dr. scott, in his essay, p. : "we ought not therefore to fear our enemies because he will be with us, and if god be for us, who can be against us? or who can doubt but he that is in us is greater than he that is in the world? this was typically intimated in the promises made to israel respecting their wars with the canaanites and other nations, which were shadows and figures of the good fight of faith." bishop horne, in his preface to the psalms, views the subject in the same light. [ ] all these objections introduced are carefully selected from some of the ablest advocates for the lawfulness of war. [ ] the last point american christians will give up is the justification of their fathers in the war of the revolution. hymn suggested by the preceding train of thought, and appended to the original edition of the essay on war great sun of glory, rise and shine, dispel the gloom of night; let the foul spirits stretch their wings, and fly before thy light. rebuke the nations, stop their rage, destroy the warrior's skill, hush all the tumults of the earth; o speak! say, "peace, be still." break, break the cruel warrior's sword, asunder cut his bow, command him by thy sovereign word to let the captives go. no more let heroes' glory sound, no more their triumphs tell, bring all the pride of nations down-- let war return to hell. then let thy blessed kingdom come, with all its heavenly train, and pour thy peaceful spirit down, like gentle showers of rain. then shall the prowling beasts of prey, like lambs be meek and mild; vipers and asps shall harmless twine around the weaned child. the happy sons of zion sit secure beneath their vines; or, shadowed by their fig-tree's tops, shall drink their cheering wines. the nations to thy scepter bow, and own "thy gentle sway"; then all the wandering tribes of men to thee their tribute pay. angelic hosts shall view the scene, delighted, spread their wings; down to the earth again they fly, and strike their lofty strings. the listening nations catch the sound, and join the heavenly choir, to swell aloud the song of praise, and vie with sacred fire. "glory to god on high!" they sound, in strains of angels' mirth; "good will and peace" to men, they sing, since heaven is brought to earth. the mediator's kingdom not of this world: but spiritual by an inquirer the writer of the following pages has, for a considerable time, doubted the propriety of some of the common practices of christians. to satisfy himself he has, if he is not deceived, candidly and diligently examined the scriptures with a view to ascertain and practice the truth. after considerable inquiry his doubts increased. he then applied to some highly respectable and pious friends, who frankly acknowledged that they had never fully examined the subject, as they had never had any doubt concerning it. they judged the matter weighty and advised him to arrange his thoughts and commit them to paper. this he has endeavored to do as well as a very infirm state of body and a press of commercial business would admit. after submitting what he had written to some of his friends, they unanimously advised him to lay it before the public, hoping that it might have a tendency to call the subject into notice and lead to a more complete and full examination. with this view he has ventured to commit the following sheets to the press. he has only to beg that the christian who may take the trouble to read them will not be so solicitous to reply to the arguments as to examine and illustrate the truth. the kingdom of our glorious mediator is but little noticed in the world, yet it is precious in the eyes of the lord. the lord hath chosen zion. she is the redeemed of the lord. he hath said, he who touches her touches the apple of his eye. she is purchased by the blood of the lamb, sanctified by the spirit of grace, and defended by the arm of omnipotence. notwithstanding she may still be covered with sackcloth, the days of her mourning have an end. the lord will raise her from the dust and make her an eternal excellency and the joy of many generations. the mystical body of christ is composed of that innumerable company which no man can number,--out of every nation and kindred and people and tongue,--which will finally stand before the throne of god and the lamb, clothed with white robes and palms in their hands. it is but one body, although composed of many members. the temple, which was a symbol of the church, was composed of many stones, although but one building. the spiritual temple is built of lively stones upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, jesus christ himself being the chief corner stone. this spiritual temple will continue to rise under different dispensations until the elect are gathered together from the four winds of heaven and the top stone is carried up with shouts of grace, grace, unto it! the mediator's kingdom is not of this world. "jesus answered, my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews" (john xviii. ). in remarking upon these words we are naturally led to consider, i. what the mediator's kingdom is. ii. its nature. iii. its laws. from which we propose to make several inferences and illustrations for improvement. agreeably to the arrangement of our subject, we shall first endeavor to ascertain what the kingdom of the mediator is; or that kingdom which he so emphatically calls "my kingdom," in distinction from all other kingdoms. "jesus answered, my kingdom----" our glorious mediator takes to himself the majesty of a sovereign and claims a kingdom. in his mediatorial character he possesses, in an extensive sense, universal empire. he is exalted far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and has a name which is above every name. he is king of kings and lord of lords. he is not only king on his holy hill of zion but rules amongst the nations. he is, however, in an appropriate sense, king of saints under the gospel dispensation, as he governs the worlds with a view to his own glory and their exaltation. that the church, under the gospel dispensation, is in a special manner the kingdom of heaven or the kingdom which christ so often called his kingdom appears evident (it is thought) from many passages of scripture. the prophet daniel, while interpreting the symbols of the four great empires which were to arise in the earth, adds that "in the days of these kings shall the god of heaven set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed." this kingdom could not be the church universal, for that was established in the family of adam and had continued without being broken in a line of holy men down to the prophet's day. it must therefore have a special reference to something future. when john the baptist came preaching, he said, "repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," fully implying that it had not then commenced. he preached repentance preparatory to ushering in that kingdom which the god of heaven was about to set up. in the days of the fourth great kingdom mentioned in the prophecy of daniel the lord jesus christ came into our world to establish his kingdom. as he entered upon his ministry he declared that the time was fulfilled and that the kingdom of god was at hand. when he first commissioned his disciples and sent them forth to preach, he directed them to say to their hearers, "the kingdom of god is come nigh unto you." in speaking of john the baptist, he says, he was the greatest of prophets; but adds, "he that is least in the kingdom of god is greater than he"; which must be conclusive evidence that john the baptist was not in the kingdom of god. at the last supper, after our lord had blessed and partaken of the bread, he said to his disciples, "i will not any more eat thereof until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of god." in like manner, after taking the cup, he said, "i will not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of god shall come." all of which seems fully to imply that the kingdom which the god of heaven was about to set up did not commence before the gospel dispensation. christ came under the mosaic dispensation, that is, under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, by the sacrifice of himself; "and being found in the fashion of a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. wherefore god hath highly exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above every name." after he arose from the dead he appeared to his disciples "by many infallible proofs, being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of god." "and jesus came and spake unto them, saying, all power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the father, and of the son, and of the holy ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever i have commanded you: and, lo, i am with you always, even unto the end of the world. amen." here we see the mediator possessing a kingdom and giving laws to his subjects and commanding obedience. although his kingdom was then small, like a little leaven, yet it had the power to leaven the whole lump. the stone which was cut out of the mountain without hands will become a great mountain and fill the whole earth. every knee must finally bow to his scepter and every tongue confess that he is lord to the glory of god the father. from this concise view of the subject we conclude that the kingdom of god, or christ's kingdom, is in a special manner the gospel dispensation which was not completely established until after the resurrection of our lord. ii. the next point of inquiry is its nature. "jesus answered, my kingdom is not of this world." by this we understand the mediator's kingdom, not being of this world, supposes that its nature, its laws, and its government are all distinct from the nature, laws, and governments of this world. that the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine, will fully appear, it is apprehended, from the following reasons. st. from the character of the king. he was not born like the kings of the earth. he was the son of the living god and heir of all things. he was conceived by the power of the holy ghost and born of a virgin. his birth was not celebrated with the earthly pomp of princes, but by a few humble shepherds and a choir of angels. his palace was a stable and his cradle a manger. when a child he was not amused with toys, but was about his father's business. when he was dedicated to his ministry, it was not by the appointment of kings, or the consecration of bishops, but by the baptism of his humble forerunner, and the descent of the holy ghost in a bodily shape like a dove, and a voice from the excellent glory, saying, "this is my beloved son, in whom i am well pleased." his companions were the despised fishermen of galilee and the angels of heaven. he was "a man of sorrow and acquainted with grief"; yet he was the eternal son of the eternal father. nature owned his voice and devils trembled at his power; but he was despised and rejected of men. when he fed the hungry multitude, they were gratified with the loaves and fishes and sought to make him a king; but he departed out of the place; for his kingdom was not of this world. when satan, the god of this world, offered him all the kingdoms of this world and the glory of them if he would only fall down and worship him, he rebuked him with holy contempt and said, get thee hence, satan; for his kingdom was not of this world. the mediator did not intermeddle with the affairs of the governments of this world; for his kingdom was not of this world. when he was solicited to command a brother to divide his earthly substance, instead of complying with the request he only gave a pointed admonition and said, "man, who made me a judge, or a divider, over you?" when his enemies endeavored to catch him in his words by extorting from him something unfavorable to the laws of cæsar, jesus answered them and said, "render to cæsar the things which are cæsar's, and to god the things which are god's." when they demanded of him tribute, and that unjustly, according to their own laws, he paid it without a murmur, to set an example of peace and quietness for his disciples. in all things he avoided interfering or meddling with the governments of this world. dly. from the representations of the bible, "the kingdom of god is righteousness, peace, and joy in the holy ghost." the mediator's kingdom is founded in right. his scepter is a right scepter. he rules in righteousness. "the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of god." righteousness is opposed to all injustice, oppression, and cruelty; it regards the rights of god and man; it requires love to the lord our god with all our heart, with all our mind, and with all our strength, and to our neighbors as ourselves. his kingdom is a kingdom of peace; he is the prince of peace. at his birth the angels sang, "peace on earth, and good will to men." peace is opposed directly to all contention, war, and tumult, whether it regards individuals, societies, or nations. it forbids all wrath, clamor, and evil speaking. it forbids the resistance of evil or retaliation, and requires good for evil, blessing for cursing, and prayer for persecution. our glorious mediator not only exhibited a pattern of peace in his life but preached peace in the great congregation. his last and richest legacy to his disciples was the gift of peace: "my peace i leave with you, my peace i give unto you: not as the world giveth, give i unto you." christ came in the power of the spirit, and was full of the holy ghost. it is the communion of the holy ghost which fills the kingdom of heaven with that joy which is unspeakable and full of glory. "except a man be born of the spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." finally, we have his own express declaration, "my kingdom is not of this world." from what has been said it may be concluded that the mediator's kingdom is, in a special sense, the gospel dispensation, or the kingdom of heaven, and that it is not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine. and this brings us to notice, iii. the laws by which it is governed. it is governed by the same laws which regulate the heavenly hosts. "be ye therefore perfect, even as your father in heaven is perfect," is the command of our divine master. it is the kingdom of heaven. "jesus said, my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews." the laws of the mediator's kingdom require supreme love to god. jesus said, "thou shalt love the lord thy god with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great commandment." this implies right apprehension of his being and perfections, and supreme love to his word and delight in his law, such as the sweet singer of israel expressed: o how i love thy law! it is my meditation day and night. it implies unlimited confidence in god and unshaken belief in the testimony he has given of his son and a spirit of filial obedience to all his precepts. the laws of the mediator's kingdom require love to man: "thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself." this prohibits rendering to any man evil for evil; but, contrariwise, it demands blessing. it utterly forbids wrath, hatred, malice, envy, pride, revenge, and fighting; but requires, on the contrary, meekness, forgiveness, long-suffering, tenderness, compassion, and mercy. the subjects of the mediator's kingdom are commanded to do good to all as they have opportunity; but especially to those of the household of faith. this command extends not only to the gentle and kind but to the disobedient and froward; to friends and to enemies. "if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink," is the command of our lord. this injunction, it is apprehended, is directly opposed to resisting the oppression of enemies by force. jesus said, "if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight"; but, instead of avenging wrongs, the explicit direction is "to overcome evil with good." the mediator is the only avenger of the wrongs done to his subjects: "for it is written, vengeance is mine, and i will repay, saith the lord." in a special manner the subjects of the mediator must love the brethren. they must visit the widow, the fatherless, and the afflicted, and live unspotted from the world. the lord accepts every act of kindness done to the brethren as done to himself, and regards every act of injustice, cruelty, and revenge towards them as expressed towards himself. he considers them his own property, the purchase of his blood. he will, therefore, not only be their portion but their defense; a wall of fire round about them and a glory in the midst. the mediator sits as king upon his holy hill of zion, and is swaying his scepter in righteousness throughout his vast dominions. * * * * * having very briefly considered what the mediator's kingdom in a special manner is, its nature and its laws, we now pass, as was proposed, to make several inferences and illustrations. st. if the mediator's kingdom is in a special manner the gospel dispensation, and its nature and laws are not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine, then we may infer that the kingdoms of this world are not united to the kingdom of our lord, but are opposed to it. if they are not for him, they are against him; and if they gather not with him, they scatter abroad. they must, therefore, be at war with the lamb; but the lamb shall overcome them, for he hath on his vesture and on his thigh a name written, king of kings and lord of lords. the great conflict in our world is between the kingdom of the mediator and the kingdom of satan; but the victory is not uncertain. although the "heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing, the kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the lord, and against his anointed, saying, let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us. he that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the lord shall have them in derision. then shall he speak to them in his wrath, and vex them in his sore displeasure." "out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword, that with it he should smite the nations; and he shall rule them with a rod of iron: and he treadeth the winepress of the fierceness and wrath of almighty god." the psalmist, by the holy ghost, says of christ, "thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them to pieces like a potter's vessel." again, "he shall cut off the spirit of princes; he is terrible to the kings of the earth." isaiah, by the revealing spirit, had the scenes of futurity opened to his view. he saw the glorious redeemer marching through the earth in the greatness of his power; for he saw, by prophetic vision, the great day of his wrath appear, and none but his redeemed were able to stand. in view of the dreadful scene his soul was filled with astonishment, and he exclaims: "who is this that cometh from edom, with dyed garments from bozrah? this that is glorious in his apparel, travelling in the greatness of his strength? i that speak in righteousness, mighty to save. wherefore art thou red in thine apparel, and thy garments like him that treadeth in the winefat? i have trodden the winepress alone; and of the people there was none with me: for i will tread them in my anger, and trample them in my fury; and their blood shall be sprinkled upon my garments. for the day of vengeance is in my heart, and the year of my redeemed is come. i looked, and there was none to help; and i wondered there was none to uphold: therefore mine arm brought salvation unto me; and my fury, it upheld me. and i will tread down the people in my anger, and make them drunk in my fury, and i will bring down their strength to the earth." from this it appears that the nations of the earth will be gathered like the grapes of a vineyard, and cast into the great wine press of the wrath of god almighty; and the great redeemer will thresh them in his anger and trample them in his fury. their destruction must be inevitable if their laws and governments are directly opposed to the mediator's kingdom. when he shall come out of his place to shake terribly the nations of the earth, then the _earth_[ ] will no longer cover the blood of the slain; for he will make inquisition for blood, and write up the nations. then he will stain the pride of all glory and bring into contempt all the honorable of the earth. the nations will be like stubble before the devouring fire, and will be chased away like chaff before the whirlwind, and no place will be found for them. the interpretation of the symbols of the four great empires by the prophet daniel fully confirms this idea. in first describing the vision to nebuchadnezzar he says: "thou sawest till that a stone was cut out without hands, which smote the image upon his feet that were of iron and clay, and brake them to pieces. then was the iron, the clay, the brass, the silver, and the gold, broken to pieces together, and became like the chaff of the summer threshingfloors; and the wind carried them away, that no place was found for them: and the stone that smote the image became a great mountain, and filled the whole earth." the prophet thus interprets the vision: "and in the days of these kings shall the god of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever. forasmuch as thou sawest that the stone was cut out of the mountain without hands, and that it brake in pieces the iron, the brass, the clay, the silver, and the gold; the great god hath made known to the king what shall come to pass hereafter." thus we see that the kingdoms of the world by not submitting to the kingdom of our lord, but by making war with the lamb, are devoted to awful destruction, for the lamb will overcome them. his kingdom will stand, for it is an everlasting kingdom; and of his dominion there shall be no end. the gospel dispensation (or the kingdom of heaven) must remain forever, as it is governed by the same spirit which prevails in the eternal fountain of blessedness himself. it is therefore emphatically called the kingdom of god not only in distinction from the kingdoms of this world but in distinction from all the other dispensations of the church. it is not of this world; it is the kingdom of heaven,--the reign of righteousness, peace, and joy in the holy ghost. . if the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine, and the kingdoms of this world are opposed to it, then we may infer that the kingdoms of this world must belong to the kingdom of satan. there are but two kingdoms in our world. at the head of one is the mediator, and at the head of the other is satan. satan is the god of this world and reigns without a rival in the hearts of the children of disobedience. he is the prince of the power of the air. all the kingdoms of this world and the glory of them are given to him[ ] until the time that god shall write up the nations and make inquisition for blood. then the great battle of god almighty will be fought, and the beast and the false prophet will be cast into a lake of fire; and satan will be bound a thousand years; and the saints will take the kingdom and possess it; and wars shall cease from under heaven. after the thousand years satan will again be let loose, "and shall go out to deceive the nations which are in the four quarters of the earth, gog and magog, to gather them together to battle: the number of whom is as the sand of the sea." "and the devil who deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever." thus it appears that satan is the mainspring of all warlike powers, and when he is bound wars will cease; but as soon as he is again let loose they will rage. the writer is sensible that this will be a very unpopular doctrine with the men of this world, and with those worldly christians who are struggling and teasing and panting for the profits and the honors of this world. if it is a fact that the nature and laws of the mediator's kingdom are diametrically opposite to the kingdoms of this world, then the inference is irresistible that the kingdoms of this world belong not to the kingdom of our lord but to the kingdom of satan; and however unsavory the truth may be, it ought not to be disguised. satan is the strong man, but the mediator is the stronger, and he will bind him and spoil his goods. the son of god was manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil. when he shall destroy the rage of the nations and the tumult of the people, then satan's goods will be spoiled. when satan is cast into the bottomless pit, tumult and war will retire with him back to hell; and instead of the blast of the trumpet and the groans of the dying will be heard the shouts of the saints and the songs of the redeemed. then will be "heard as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, alleluia, for the lord god omnipotent reigneth." . if the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, and the kingdoms of this world are under satan's dominion, then we may infer the great impropriety of the subjects of the mediator's kingdom using the weapons of this world and engaging in tumults, wars, and fightings. "jesus answered, my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews." the jews expected in their messiah a temporal prince; but because his kingdom was not of this world they crucified the lord of life and glory. had he only appeared in the pomp of this world and in the splendor of a temporal conqueror to vanquish the romans who were in possession of their earthly canaan and oppressing their nation, they would immediately have rallied round his standard and followed him to earthly conquest and glory. he was apparently too inattentive to their rights and liberties (which the patriots of this world now emphatically call their dearest interests). they said, "if we let him alone, all men will believe on him; and the romans shall take away both our place and our nation." it may be asked, why were the jews apprehensive, if all men should believe on him, the romans would take away both their place and their nation? the answer does not appear difficult. they doubtless perceived that both his life and precepts directly opposed rendering vengeance to their enemies; and, on the contrary, demanded nothing less than love to their enemies, good for evil, and blessing for cursing. this they could not endure, as it directly opposed their carnal desires and filled them with malice against the prince of peace. they might, with much greater propriety than any nation under the gospel light, have said, "shall we imbibe this pusillanimous spirit of doing good to those who oppress us and tamely bend our necks to the yoke of tyranny and suffer our dearest interests to be wrested from us without once making a struggle to defend them? rather, let us arise and fight manfully, and defend our liberties or die gloriously in their vindication." we say they might, with much greater propriety, have made these declarations than any under the light of the gospel, because they considered themselves under the mosaic dispensation which had fully tolerated them not only in defensive but offensive war. but when they perceived that the doctrines of the mediator were calculated to disannul their dispensation and extinguish their carnal hopes (notwithstanding his credentials were divine), their malice was kindled against him, and their vengeance was not satiated until they wreaked their hands in the blood of the son of god. and we may confidently expect that wherever the same spirit of christ lifts up a standard against the same carnal policy and temporal interest there will follow the same spirit of envy, persecution, and revenge which was manifested against the lord of life and glory. if any man (no matter who) will live godly in christ jesus, he shall suffer persecution. the spirit of christ is the same now that it was then, and the world is the same, the carnal heart is the same, and the great adversary of souls is the same. only let it be styled "patriotic" to persecute the followers of the lamb of god, and we should soon see the heroes of this world drunk with the blood of the martyrs of jesus; and probably many would be as conscientious as paul was while breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the meek and lowly jesus. it is not impossible that when the witnesses[ ] are slain, their crime may be a refusal to use carnal weapons in defense of their country. as it is a matter of great practical consequence to know whether the subjects of the prince of peace are authorized in any case under the gospel dispensation to use carnal weapons or not, we propose in this inference to be a little more particular. although it is supposed that the lord jesus christ acted in a threefold capacity,--as god, man, and mediator,--yet we have never heard it questioned by christians that all his conduct as man was to remain a perfect example for his brethren, and all his precepts a perfect rule for their duty. as his kingdom was not of this world, he did not intermeddle with the governments of this world; he only submitted to all their laws which were not contrary to the laws of his heavenly father. he was meek and lowly; so little did he possess of this world that he had not where to lay his head. he went about continually doing good. he was full of compassion even to his enemies. he wept over jerusalem. he was finally "brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as sheep before their shearers are dumb, so he opened not his mouth." when he was reviled he reviled not again, but committed himself to him who judges righteously. he prayed for his murderers and apologized for his persecutors, saying, "father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." as the church under a former dispensation had divine authority for engaging in war, it is important to ascertain whether this authority was abrogated under the gospel dispensation or not.[ ] that many things have been tolerated under one dispensation of the church and prohibited under another, most christians allow. that the preceptive will of god is to be our only rule of duty, few christians deny. the knowledge communicated to us of the preceptive will of god to his church, under the first dispensation, is very limited. we find, however, no authority for taking the life of man in any case, not even for murder; but, on the contrary, a sevenfold vengeance was pronounced upon him who should slay the murderer. under the patriarchal dispensation he that shed man's blood by man was his blood to be shed. in this, defensive war was tolerated. under the mosaic dispensation, not only defensive but offensive war was tolerated, and not only _war_ was permitted, but _retaliation_, as, "an eye for an eye"; "a tooth for a tooth"; "life for life," etc. the question to be decided is whether these regulations are still in force, or whether they were disannulled by the gospel dispensation. the life and precepts of our lord and his disciples while under the unerring guidance of his spirit must be our only authority in this inquiry. that many things were done away by the gospel dispensation, none will deny who believe the gospel. the ceremonial part, which was only a shadow of good things to come, vanished away when the substance appeared; and not only the ceremonial part was abolished, but many other practices. polygamy was permitted under the law, but forbidden under the gospel. divorce was allowed under the mosaic but prohibited under the gospel dispensation, except in the case of adultery. under the mosaic dispensation the penalty for whoredom was stoning to death. this penalty was not enforced under the gospel dispensation, as may be seen in john viii. . that all kinds of war, revenge, and fighting were utterly prohibited under the gospel dispensation we think appears evident not only from the life of our glorious mediator but from his express precepts. "jesus answered, my kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that i should not be delivered to the jews." no comment can add force to this passage, for it is apprehended that no language can be more explicit against defensive war. in christ's sermon on the mount he quoted a passage from exodus, "ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but i say unto you, that _ye resist not evil_: but whatsoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." the force of this passage has generally been obviated by saying that we are not to take all the words of our lord literally. although this is admitted, yet we are absolutely bound to take the spirit of every word, if we can understand them, by comparing the scriptures with the scriptures. that the spirit of this passage is directly opposed to the one our lord quoted from exodus, we think cannot fairly be denied; and, of course, it disannulled it, for he who had power to make laws under one dispensation had power to abrogate them under another. the blessed mediator did, in the most explicit manner, command his subjects to love their enemies and render good for evil. this command we are of opinion is totally incompatible with resisting them with carnal weapons. he says, "but i say unto you which hear, love your enemies, do good to them which hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you." let us for one moment compare this precept with defensive war and see if it can consistently be put into practice. suppose our country is invaded and a professed disciple of the prince of peace buckles on the harness and takes the field to repel by the point of the sword his enemy. he advances amidst the lamentations of the wounded and the shrieks of the dying to meet his foe in arms. he sees his wrath kindled and his spear uplifted, and in this trying moment he hears his lord say, "love your enemy and render to him good for evil"; and his kindness to him is like joab's to amasa; he thrusts him through the heart and hurries him to the awful tribunal of his judge, probably unprepared. dear brethren, be not deceived; for god is not mocked. who amongst our fellow-men would receive the thrust of a sword as an act of kindness? only let conscience do its office, and there will be no difficulty in deciding whether defensive war is inconsistent with the gospel dispensation or not. carnal and spiritual weapons will no more unite under the gospel dispensation than iron and miry clay. our very salvation depends on being possessed of a spirit of forgiveness to enemies. "if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your father forgive your trespasses." if men invade our rights and trespass upon our privileges, is it forgiveness to repel them at the point of the bayonet? the honest christian will find no difficulty in conscientiously deciding this question, notwithstanding he may be slow of heart in believing all that is written. all the conduct of our lord had meaning to it, and much of it was with an express view to teach his disciples by way of example. a little before he was betrayed, he ordered his disciples to take swords. the object of this must have been either to use them for defense, or for some other purpose. the event proves that they were not taken for self-defense. the question then is, for what were they taken? the event appears fully to answer the question, viz.: to prohibit, by way of example, the use of them for self-defense in the most trying situation possible. if any situation would justify self-defense with carnal weapons, it must have been the situation in which our lord and his disciples were placed at the time he was betrayed. they were in a public garden, and they were assaulted by a mob, contrary to the statutes of the romans and the laws of the jews; and the object was to take his life. this the disciples knew, and peter judged it a proper time for defense, and drew his sword and smote a servant of the high priest and cut off his ear. as our lord's kingdom was not of this world, he would not suffer his subjects to use the weapons of this world in any situation. he therefore healed the wound they made and rebuked peter for his mistaken zeal. "then said jesus unto him, put up again thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword. thinkest thou that i cannot pray to my father, and he would presently send me more than twelve legions of angels?" here we see that our lord not only forbade his disciples to use the sword in self-defense, but added a dreadful penalty to transgressors,--"all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." the disciples did not then fully understand that his kingdom was not of this world. as soon as they were prohibited using the weapons of this world they all forsook him and fled.[ ] the apostle james, in his epistle to the twelve tribes of israel which were scattered abroad, asks them this question: "from whence come wars and fighting among you? come they not even of your lusts that war in your members? ye lust, and have not: ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain: ye fight and war, and yet ye have not." "ye adulterers and adulteresses, know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with god? whosoever therefore will be a friend to the world is an enemy of god." from this we think it evidently appears that the warlike spirit of the world is directly opposed to god. the god of this world works effectually in the hearts of the children of disobedience and stirs up their lusts which war in their members and hurries them on to acts of cruelty, revenge, and fighting. this subject is of so much practical consequence that it requires a few observations in reply to some of the arguments of worldly and unenlightened christians in favor of using carnal weapons. it is said that government is an ordinance of god which exists throughout his vast dominion. in heaven above there are angels and archangels; and upon earth there are magistrates and powers; and in hell there is the prince of devils. that god in his holy providence has so disposed of events that governments of some kind or other do exist in all parts of his dominion, none but skeptics will deny. but who would pretend that the governments in heaven and hell are not diametrically opposite? one is the spirit of peace and love, and the other, rebellion and war. perhaps the manifestation of these different spirits here on earth may fairly be the dividing line amongst its inhabitants, and show to which kingdom they belong. they say all powers are ordained of god. thus far they are correct, but it is apprehended that they do not make a proper distinction between the ordination of god and his preceptive will for man. so far as the former agrees with the latter, it is a rule of duty and cannot be any further. one is the rule of god's own procedure (if the expression is proper), and the other the rule of action for his creatures; but the counsel of god and his laws for man are often diametrically opposite. it is not improbable that this is part of the mystery of god which will, by and by, be finished. the lord jesus christ was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of god; and yet, by wicked hands, he was crucified and slain. here, as in the case of pharaoh, and many other instances recorded, the divine counsel and the duty of man were directly opposite. to ascertain our duty we must look at the preceptive will of god and not to his eternal counsel. although all powers are ordained of god, yet it must not be inferred that all the laws of the heathen or civilized world are to be a rule of duty for the mediator's subjects, or that their spirit is agreeable to the spirit of the gospel dispensation. it is said, we are commanded to obey magistrates and every ordinance of man for the lord's sake. all this is admitted. but these injunctions are either limited by other precepts or they are unlimited. if they are unlimited, then all who have died martyrs fell a sacrifice to superstition instead of duty. notwithstanding these directions were intended as a rule for christians in all ages, yet they were promulgated while the disciples were under idolatrous governments, and were never intended to encourage them to worship idols. these commands must, therefore, be limited. the question is, how are they limited? we apprehend, by the spirit and other precepts of the gospel. we have already shown, we trust, that these absolutely prohibit war in every form. if so, then none of these injunctions can counteract the position we are examining. they only enjoin strict obedience to all human laws under which we live that do not contradict the spirit or precepts of the gospel; when they do, they are not binding and must be resisted; not, however, with carnal but spiritual weapons; we must take joyfully the spoiling of our goods and count not our lives dear unto ourselves. it has been often said that he who refuses to comply with the commands of the magistrate resists the powers that be, and, according to the apostle's reasoning, resists the ordinance of god and will receive to himself damnation. and, further, as all powers are the ordinance of god they ought to be supported, and if they cannot without, they must be even at the point of, the sword. here the subject of the mediator must make a distinction between resisting the "powers that be" by force of arms and refusing to obey their unlawful commands. it is not supposed that in one case he would obey and that in the other he would disobey the commands of his master. no martyr ever considered himself as violating this precept in refusing to sacrifice to an idol at the command of an earthly power; neither will any subject of the mediator view himself as violating it by refusing to use carnal weapons while he believes that his lord has utterly forbidden his using them. it is apprehended that if this proves anything upon the principles of war, that it will prove too much for its advocates. the command is to obey the powers that be and not the powers that ought to be. if it is taken in an unlimited sense, it must prohibit resisting even tyrannical powers, and would, of course, condemn every christian who engaged in the american revolution. to say that all power is in the hands of the people, and, of course, it is the people who are the powers that be, is thought to be but a quibble. we will suppose a very possible case,--that a foreign power completely overturns the government of the people and disannuls their laws and gives a new code; in that case, the command to obey the powers that be would not be annihilated. the precept originally was given while the disciples were in the midst of tyrannical governments. it is thought that it is so far from tolerating defensive war that it is opposed to it. the precepts of the gospel cannot be dependent upon the convulsions of the nations. if christians are bound to aid with carnal weapons in suppressing a rebellion, then, if the opposing power gains the predominance, they must turn directly about and fight the very power they were before supporting. such conduct would not become the citizens of zion. if it is said the powers that be are christian rulers, then we say, let them govern only by the laws of the mediator's kingdom, and we will bow with reverence before them, and not teach for commandments the doctrines of men, as we cannot receive human laws for divine precepts. it is stated that our lord paid tribute, and that we are commanded to pay tribute to whom tribute is due, and that tribute supports the governments of this world. this is granted; but the mediator's subjects are required also to lead peaceable and quiet lives; this is more promoted by paying tribute than by the refusal. our lord directs peter to pay the tribute lest they should give offense. but paying tribute for the sake of preserving peace is a very different thing from actually engaging in war. whenever the christian is called upon to pay money by way of taxes or tribute, he does not part with any spiritual treasure, but only earthly property, for which he has the example and precepts of the lord. the currency of the world generally bears the ensign of the nation which made it. if it bears the image and superscription of cæsar, then "render to cæsar the things that are cæsar's, and unto god the things which are god's." christians, however, whose hearts are upon this idol, will sooner give up their lives than their god. "the love of money is the root of all evil." the real christian's treasure is in heaven and beyond the reach of the powers of earth or hell. the things of this world are but privileges loaned him, to be resigned at the call of his lord. shall he then fear those who can only kill the body and afterwards have no more that they can do? rather, let him fear him who has power to destroy both soul and body in hell forever. it is better for him to suffer wrong than to do wrong. the permission granted to the jewish church to wage war has often been pleaded as authority for christians. if this proves anything, it proves too much, for not only defensive but offensive war was permitted under the mosaic dispensation. this the tyrants of the world have not generally contended was right since the gospel dispensation. we think, however, that we have fully shown that this was abrogated under the gospel dispensation, and that all kinds of war were prohibited; if so, it has no weight on the subject.[ ] it has been said that christians with a small exception have never questioned the propriety of defensive war. as it regards nominal christians, this statement is perhaps correct, but as it respects the real disciples of the mediator, it is to be questioned. we hear of no christians in the first ages of the church engaged in carnal warfare until we hear of great corruptions in the church. most protestants have been of opinion that those precious disciples who inhabited the dark valleys of piedmont during the great corruptions of the nominal church were the redeemer's true subjects. these disciples, of whom the world was not worthy, utterly refused to engage even in defensive war, notwithstanding they were hunted down by their bloody persecutors.[ ] it has been often said that the reformers, who were good men, did not hesitate to engage in defensive war, and that the reformation was finally supported by the sword. that the reformers were generally pious men is readily admitted, and that the reformation, under divine providence, was a glorious event to the church is also granted. but the history of the reformers, when written by their friends, abundantly manifests that they were men, subject to like passions with other men, and that all the means they employed could not be justified, either by the spirit or the precepts of the gospel. henry the eighth was a vile man, but he was very active in protesting against the pope because his holiness would not grant him a divorce. god makes the wrath of man praise him. it will not probably be a great length of time (in the opinion of the writer) before those churches which were defended with the sword will be destroyed by the sword. it has been further urged that not only the reformers but most pious protestants have prayed for the prosperity of the arms of their country, and many have actually fought in the field of battle. all this is likewise admitted. but many pious men have had a mistaken zeal. it is fully believed that protestants, generally, have been in the habit of considering the reformation so glorious an event that they have very little inquired whether the means by which it was finally defended were agreeable to the spirit of the gospel or not. they have been taught from their earliest years to consider that the weapons of warfare used by the reformers were lawful, so that they have not hesitated to follow their example. that the example and prayers of pious people ought to have weight is readily granted, but to place a blind confidence in them, we apprehend, is criminal, for their example is to be imitated no further than it agrees with the spirit and precepts of the gospel. these must forever remain a perfect standard of duty; whereas the practice of real christians, owing to their imperfect state, is constantly changing and often contradictory. during the american revolution, doubtless, real christians were praying and fighting for the success of the american arms, and real christians in the british service were praying and fighting for the success of his majesty's arms. the truth is, they ought not to pray for war in any shape, but to pray that wars may cease from under heaven, and that god's kingdom may come and his will be done on earth as it is done in heaven; and not only to pray, but endeavor to advance the kingdom of heaven and put a stop to wars and bloodshed. the opinions of pious people often vary with the increase of light which shines upon the church. one century ago most pious people believed in the propriety of the slave trade, but very few can now be found to advocate the abominable practice. the nature of the crime has not changed, nor the evidence against it, but the truth is, that the opinion of pious people has materially changed upon this subject. we ought always to remember that the example of pious people is to be of no weight any further than it agrees with the example of our lord. it is always unsafe to be looking too much to the fallible example of those whom we have esteemed pious for a rule of duty, while we have the unerring word in our hands to light our way; when any one is depending upon the example of christians not under the immediate influence of divine inspiration for evidence to support his hypothesis, it is strong presumptive evidence that he has not the word of god in his favor. by the word of god and by that _only_ ought every controversy to be tried. it is further urged that we are commanded to pray for kings and all in authority; it is true we must pray not only for kings but all men, even enemies. this, however, does by no means imply that we are commanded to pray for a blessing upon their unhallowed undertakings; but it only implies that we must pray that they may be translated out of nature's darkness into the light of the gospel, and from the power of satan unto the living god. the great difficulty with the subjects of the mediator ever has been, and still is, a want of faith in the promises of god. they are prone to be afraid of consequences. they look nearly as much at consequences as the children of israel did while journeying from egypt to canaan. the truth is, they ought to have nothing to do with consequences, but only duties. "thus saith the lord," should be their warrant and only guide. if they implicitly follow the command, consequences are all safe in god's hand. had abraham looked only at consequences, it is not probable he would ever have been styled the father of the faithful. it is not uncommon for timid and worldly christians to be alarmed at consequences and to argue in this manner: they say, "shall we stand still and suffer an assassin to enter our houses and take our lives and property without ever attempting to resist him?" all this must go upon the supposition that he who has said he will never leave nor forsake his people, and is a very present help in every time of need, will take no care of them. no assassin could stand a moment before the prayer of faith which would enter the heavens and reach the ears of the lord of sabaoth. if faithless christians cannot be persuaded to look at the precepts and the promises, but only at consequences, they ought, at least, to examine them well. suppose god, in his holy providence, should permit an assassin to take the life of one of his dear children; the consequence would be, he would immediately be translated to glory; and possibly the assassin might become a penitent; but should he take the life of the assassin in defending himself, the consequence then would be, he would hurry him into the abyss of the damned where his probation would be eternally ended. he who puts his trust in the lord shall not fear what man can do to him; he will be like mount zion which cannot be moved. remember, dear brethren, that the weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual, and mighty through god. "finally, my brethren, be strong in the lord, and in the power of his might. put on the whole armour of god, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. for we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places. wherefore take unto you the whole armour of god (here is the equipment of a soldier of jesus christ), that ye may be able to withstand in an evil day, and having done all, to stand. stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness; and your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace; above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked. and take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the spirit, which is the word of god: praying always with all prayer and supplication in the spirit, and watching thereunto with all perseverance and supplication for all saints." and the very god of peace shall be with you, and he will shortly bruise satan under your feet. for yet a little while and the almighty angel will come down with a great chain in his hand; and he will lay hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the devil and satan, and will bind him a thousand years, and cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up, and set a seal upon him, that he shall deceive the nations no more until the thousand years are fulfilled. then wars will cease from under heaven and the implements of death will be converted into the harmless utensils of husbandry, and there will be nothing to hurt nor destroy in all god's holy mountain. the stone which was cut out of the mountain without hands will become a great mountain and fill the whole earth. then will be heard "a loud voice saying in heaven, now is come salvation, and strength, and the kingdom of god, and the power of his christ: for the accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accused them before god day and night. and they overcame him by the blood of the lamb, and by the word of their testimony; and they loved not their lives unto the death. therefore rejoice, ye heavens, and ye that dwell in them." it is, however, very important, dear brethren, that we keep it constantly in mind that the nature and precepts of the gospel are the same now as they will be then, in that glorious reign of righteousness and peace, and that it is our duty constantly to be influenced by the same spirit now which will then be manifested by the followers of the lamb. the little leaven is of the same nature with whole lump when it is leavened. let us therefore gird up the loins of our mind and watch unto prayer. . if the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, but spiritual, heavenly, and divine, and if the kingdoms of this world are under the dominion of satan, and if the subjects of christ's kingdom are not permitted to use carnal weapons, then we may infer who is the "great whore that sitteth upon many waters; with whom the kings of the earth have committed fornication, and the inhabitants of the earth have been made drunk with the wine of her fornication." a virgin or chaste woman is a familiar symbol in the scriptures of the true church of god; and an unchaste woman is as familiar a symbol of an apostate or corrupt church. as a lewd woman calls herself by the name of her husband, notwithstanding she has constant intercourse with other men, so the corrupt church calls herself by the name of christ, notwithstanding she has constant illicit intercourse with the kings of the earth.[ ] to understand the true nature of spiritual whoredom will assist us in ascertaining the bounds of mystical babylon. the children of israel were separated from all the nations of the earth and set apart to be holy unto the lord. as they were in covenant with the god of israel, he addressed them in the endearing character of a husband. whenever they made any covenant or formed a confederacy with the nations around them, or imitated their idolatrous abominations, they were charged with spiritual whoredom. the church, under the gospel dispensation, is redeemed from amongst men out of every nation, and sanctified and set apart to be a peculiar people to show forth the praises of god. it is styled the bride, the lamb's wife. its members are not to be conformed to this world but to be transformed by the renewing of the spirit. they do not belong to any earthly kingdom, for our lord has said, "they are not of the world, even as i am not of the world"; but they are citizens of the heavenly zion and belong to the household of god; they are members of the same community, with the innumerable company of angels and the spirits of just men made perfect; and are to be governed by the very same spirit and temper which reigns amongst those blessed inhabitants above. god is an overflowing and unbounded ocean of blessedness and love; love is therefore the fulfilling of the law. whenever the subjects of the redeemer unite themselves to the kingdoms of this world, and engage in their political contentions and fightings, then it appears they commit spiritual whoredom, for they forsake the fountain of living waters and hew out to themselves cisterns,--broken cisterns, which can hold no water. when they thus mingle with the world and unite in its pursuits they may spiritually be styled adulterers. the apostle james, while reproving the twelve tribes, which were scattered abroad, for their wars and fightings and friendship to the world, styles them adulterers and adulteresses. in direct opposition to this representation, the first fruits of the church are styled virgins, as not being defiled with women. "these are they which were not defiled with women; for they are virgins. these are they which follow the lamb whithersoever he goeth. these were redeemed from amongst men, being the firstfruits unto god and the lamb. and in their mouth was found no guile: for they are without fault before the throne of god." as virgins are pure and undefiled, so were the disciples of christ in the first age of the church when they had no impure intercourse with the kingdoms of this world and followed the lamb in refusing to engage either in its profits, honors, or fightings. they are, therefore, called virgins, without fault, in opposition to those who mingle with the world, who are spiritually styled harlots. it evidently appears, if what has been said is true, that mystical babylon, that mother of harlots and abominations of the earth, is just as extensive as the union of the church with the kingdoms of this world; and just in that proportion in which an individual christian, or a single church, or a number of churches united in one body, engage in the honors, profits, and fightings of the kingdoms of this world, just in that proportion they may be said to be guilty of spiritual whoredom. the writer is well aware that this inference, however just, will be looked upon with contempt by worldly political christians whose dearest interest is involved in the kingdoms of this world, and especially by those who are clothed in purple and scarlet and have a golden cup in their hands. he has no expectation of being candidly heard by such, but it is god's own dear children who have ignorantly mingled with the world, having been blinded by their education, from whom he expects a candid hearing. "if any man have ears to hear, let him hear." it is not common for a lewd woman openly to avow to the world her character; neither can it be expected that the mother of harlots will own her name. the writer is of opinion that very few have understood the full dimensions of this mystical city; she appears to him in her greatest extent to be bounded but little short of the whole visible church of god. she is styled "the _great city_, which spiritually is called sodom and egypt, where also our lord was crucified." "and in her was found the blood of prophets and saints and of all that were slain upon the earth." but a dreadful judgment awaits her: "she shall utterly be burnt with fire: for strong is the lord god who judges her." being mingled with the nations and supported by their power, when they become like stubble before the devouring fire, she will be consumed with them. the whore is represented as riding upon a scarlet-colored beast, and upheld by him.[ ] when he, with all his heads, are cast into the lake of fire, she will likewise be given to the burning flame. but before this great and dreadful day of the lord shall come, which will burn as an oven, when the whore shall be consumed with the nations of the earth, god will call to his people to come out of her, saying unto them, "come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues." as god's ancient people were carried captives into literal babylon, so god's dear people will be found captives in mystical babylon, until they hear the command of their lord to come out of her that they be not partakers of her sins and that they receive not of her plagues. the captive daughters of zion are very numerous. o that they may soon arise and shake themselves from the dust! "shake thyself from the dust; arise, and sit down, o jerusalem: loose thyself from the bands of thy neck, o captive daughter of zion." . if the mediator's kingdom is not of this world, and the kingdoms of this world are under the dominion of satan, and if christ's subjects cannot unite themselves to the kingdoms of this world, without committing spiritual whoredom, then we may infer the great impropriety of the subjects of the mediator's kingdom becoming political christians and enrolling themselves with the men of this world. they cannot serve two masters: for they will either hate the one, and love the other; or else they will hold to the one, and despise the other. how humiliating is it to see subjects of the king of zion engaged in the drudgery of the prince of darkness, laboring and struggling to support his tottering throne! satan's kingdom is divided against itself and must, therefore, come to an end. but how lamentable is it to see the sons of the living god, the subjects of the prince of peace, taking sides in the cause of the adversary of souls, and actually opposing and fighting each other under his banner! they do it ignorantly and will, therefore, obtain forgiveness, for they know not what manner of spirit they are of. they are commanded to have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them. before our lord departed from this world to go to the father, he gave laws to his subjects for their rule of life until his second coming. all these laws contemplated their residing as a holy nation in the midst of a wicked and benighted world, to reflect the rays of the sun of righteousness on the thick darkness which covers the people. they were to be a city set upon a hill and a light to the world. the apostle exhorts them to "do all things without murmurings and disputings: that ye may be blameless and harmless, the sons of god, without rebuke, in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation, among whom ye shine as lights in the world." they must be a peculiar people to show forth the praises of god. how inconsistent is it, then, for the citizens of the heavenly zion to be mingling with the politicians of this world and uniting in their processions, feasts, and cabals, when they ought rather to be praying for them, that the very sins they commit in these scenes may be forgiven them! dear brethren, is it not high time to come out from the world and be separated? "be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness? and what concord hath christ with belial?" "wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and i will receive you, and will be a father to you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the lord almighty." . in view of what has been said, we finally infer that every interest which is not built upon the sure foundation stone which god has laid in zion will be swept away when the storms of divine wrath shall beat upon our guilty world. "for, behold, the day cometh, that shall burn as an oven; and all the proud, yea, and all that do wickedly, shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith the lord of hosts, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch." "for the day of the lord of hosts shall be upon every one that is proud and lofty, and upon every one that is lifted up; and he shall be brought low." "the lofty looks of man shall be humbled, and the haughtiness of men shall be bowed down; and the lord alone shall be exalted in that day." "the lord at thy right hand shall strike through kings in the day of his wrath. he shall judge among the heathen, he shall fill the places with their dead bodies; he shall wound the head over many countries." "for, behold, the lord will come with fire, and with his chariots like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of fire. for by fire and by his sword will the lord plead with all flesh: and the slain of the lord shall be many." "for the indignation of the lord is upon all nations, and his fury upon all their armies: he hath utterly destroyed them, he hath delivered them to the slaughter. their slain shall be cast out, and their stink shall come up out of their carcasses, and the mountains shall be melted with blood." "for this is the day of the lord god of hosts, a day of vengeance, that he may avenge him of his adversaries: and the sword shall devour, and it shall be satiate and be made drunk with their blood." the nations must drink of the wine of the wrath of god, which shall be poured out without mixture, into the cup of his indignation; and they will be trodden in the great wine press of the wrath of god almighty. and the great whore which has drunk the blood of the saints and the blood of the martyrs of jesus will have blood to drink; for she is worthy. the sword of the lord has two edges; it will cut off the offending limbs of the church and destroy her enemies. the fire of the lord will purify his saints but utterly burn up the wicked. he "whose fan is in his hand will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire." although the earth is thus to be desolated, and the nations destroyed, yet the saints of the most high shall "possess the kingdom for ever and ever." "and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the most high, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him." dear brethren, these events are rapidly rolling in the fiery wheels down the descent of time; and although the nations must first drink the vials of divine wrath and the battle of god almighty must first be fought, yet the time is at hand when we shall no more hear the sound of war, and of garments rolled in blood, for man will cease to be the enemy of man, and every one will sit quietly under his own vine and under his own fig tree; and there will be nothing to hurt or destroy in all god's holy mountain, and the knowledge of the lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the channels of the mighty deep. dear brethren, is it not "high time to awake out of sleep: for now is our salvation nearer than when we believed. the night is far spent, the day is at hand: let us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the armour of light." and let us pray with all prayer and supplication in the spirit for all men, not only for ourselves, our families, and our friends, and the church of god, but for a dying world, that god would in infinite compassion cut short these days of dreadful calamity for his elect's sake; and in the midst of deserved wrath remember mercy. "he that hath ears to hear, let him hear what the spirit saith unto the churches; to him that overcometh will i give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of god." footnotes: [ ] the earth, in symbolical language, is supposed by the writer to denote civilized nations, in distinction from uncivilized, which are symbolized by the agitated sea. civilized nations will no longer cover the blood of the slain, under the specious idea of defending their rights and liberties. [ ] if the kingdoms of this world do not belong to satan, then it was no temptation to our lord when he offered them to him. it is expressly said that he was "tempted of satan." [ ] the writer has for a length of time been of opinion that no event has ever yet happened to the church which answers to slaying the witnesses. it has been given as a reason by some that the witnesses have been slain, that so much light has been diffused since the art of printing was discovered, and since the reformation, that no reason can ever again be found sufficiently plausible to satisfy the consciences of mankind in again taking the lives of their fellow-men in matters of conscience. if our country was invaded and a law should be passed that every man capable of bearing arms should equip himself for its defense, on penalty of being considered as an enemy and to be publicly executed accordingly in case of refusal for conscience' sake, there would not probably be wanting patriots sufficient to execute the laws; if they could not be found in our land of liberty, they might be found amongst the tyrants of the old world. [ ] if the permission given to the church under the mosaic dispensation to engage in war has not been disannulled by the gospel dispensation (which is by no means granted), it is thought that it does not admit of the consequences which are generally drawn. the israelites were god's covenant people and were utterly prohibited from making any covenant with the nations around them, or engaging with them in their wars. it must therefore be totally improper for god's covenant people now to unite with those who are strangers to the covenant of promise, and engage with them in their tumult and fightings. it is presumed that no one who has ever read our constitution will pretend that the american nation has, in the scriptural sense, made a covenant with god. if the analogy holds good in one point, it must in another; and in that case there is no alternative left for god's covenant people but either to withdraw from those who are not in covenant with god, or adopt a national religion which must be defended by the weapons of the nation. it is believed that those who will not admit that the permission granted to the israelites to engage in war was abrogated by the gospel dispensation can never fully answer the arguments in favor of a national religion. [ ] four things are noticeable from this history. _first_, that the subjects of the mediator's kingdom have no right to use carnal weapons for defense, in the most trying situation possible. _secondly_, the promulgation of a decree of heaven; that all they (whether states, churches, or kingdoms) who take the sword shall perish with the sword. every political or ecclesiastical body which is defended with the sword will by the sword be destroyed. in confirmation of this sentiment, we see while the great destroying powers were represented to st. john in the symbols of ferocious beasts, it was added, "if any man have an ear to hear, let him hear. he that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity: he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword"; but in opposition to this it is said, "here is the faith and the patience of the saints." we would inquire how the faith and the patience of the saints appear, if they, like the nations of the earth, lead into captivity and kill with the sword? _thirdly_, the weapon which the subjects of the redeemer are to use for defense is here brought into view, viz., prayer. nothing which appears prevented our lord from using this weapon when he was betrayed, but the necessity of the scriptures being fulfilled. had he prayed to his father, more than twelve legions of ministering spirits would have appeared swift as lightning to discharge his will. at the time he shall come in all the glory of his father the holy angels will be with him. he will break through the heavens in flaming fire and descend with the shout of the archangel and the trump of god, and cleave asunder the earth beneath; and send forth his angels who will awake the sleeping millions from their tombs and gather together his elect and take them up into the air to be ever with their lord. _fourthly_, we may expect that angels will be sent to deliver the saints in the times of trouble. angels are ministering spirits and are sent forth to minister to those who shall be the heirs of salvation. what a consolation it is that the subjects of the mediator can apply for help in times of trouble to him who has the hosts of heaven at his command; and who has said he will never leave nor forsake them! the angel of the lord encampeth round about them who fear him, to deliver them out of all their trouble. if god be for them, who can be against them? [ ] although it is not expected that any intelligent and candid christian will attempt to say that the arguments which have been advanced may fairly apply to offensive but not to defensive war, yet some weak and unenlightened christians may make the assertion. in answer to such we would observe that this would be begging the question and taking for granted the very subject in dispute. we cannot be satisfied with anything short of a candid answer, drawn directly from the spirit and precepts of the gospel. when it is fairly proved that under the gospel dispensation our lord did draw a clear line of distinction between offensive and defensive war, and that he intended all such precepts as have been adduced to apply to the former and not to the latter, then we will acknowledge the weight of the argument. until this is done we shall not consider our arguments as answered. [ ] the writer perceives that he has made too unlimited a statement respecting the disciples who inhabited the valleys of piedmont. historians have generally considered those who dissented from the church of rome during the dark ages as possessing similar sentiments. it is true they did agree in renouncing the authority of the pope, but in other things they did not all agree. some courted the protection of earthly powers and united with them in defending their rights by the point of the sword, and were finally destroyed by the sword. others, instead of defending themselves with carnal weapons, fled from the face of the serpent and were, under divine providence, the seed of the church in the wilderness. it is the latter class to which the writer would be understood as referring. [ ] as the writer has been for some time studying the symbolical language of the scriptures, and intends (if the lord will, unless some person more able should attempt an explanation) to give his views to the public, he will not be so particular at present in explaining the symbol of the great whore which sitteth upon many waters, as he otherwise should. he early perceived that the heavens and the earth, with all their furniture, were used as an alphabet, in the language of things, to represent moral subjects. his object has been to learn the true meaning of each symbol by comparing scripture with scripture. no language can be read until the alphabet is first learned. symbolical language does not, like other languages, change with time and place, but represents the same idea to all nations and at all times. he is of opinion that one symbol does not represent two events, unless it first have a reference to some less event which is typical of some more important event; in that case, all together may be figurative of some great ultimate end. although one symbol is supposed never to represent two different things, yet two or more symbols generally represent one thing. he has found by tracing back a symbol to its first use, that its true meaning is generally manifest. since examining the scriptures with this view he has been irresistibly drawn into the conclusions now exhibited. [ ] the writer is fully of opinion that a ferocious beast is never used as a symbol of a corrupt church, but of a tyrannical warlike power. he has been for some time of opinion that the second apocalyptic beast is rising, and that he will possess all the power of the first beast before him, and that under him the false prophet will appear; and the witnesses will be slain; and upon his kingdom the six first vials of his divine wrath will be principally poured out; and the seventh will be poured upon satan's kingdom universally, as he is the prince of the power of the air. transcriber's notes the section in the table of contents entitled, "because, instead of preventing, it provokes insult and mischief," does not exactly match the title of the corresponding section found within the text. this has been retained. pg . the word 'antipolemos' was changed to 'antipolemus.' pg . the word 'righteousnesss' was changed to 'righteousness.' pg . a question mark was changed to a period in the following sentence, "the question to be decided is whether these regulations are still in force, or whether they were disannulled by the gospel dispensation." united states senate fundamental peace ideas _including_ the westphalian peace treaty ( ) _and_ the league of nations ( ) _in connection with_ international psychology and revolutions by arthur mac donald anthropologist: washington, d. c. (reprinted from the congressional record july , , united states senate) [illustration] washington -- [illustration] the westphalian peace treaty ( ) and the league of nations ( ) in connection with international psychology and revolutions. by arthur mac donald, anthropologist, washington, d. c, and honorary president of the international congress of criminal anthropology of europe. introduction. the league of nations may only be a first step in the direction of permanent peace, yet not a few persons seem doubtful of its utility. however, the league may be the lesser evil as compared with the old régime, which appears to have resulted in total failure after a very long and fair trial. whatever be the ultimate outcome of the league and of the problems to be solved, the one encouraging thing is that all the people are thinking seriously on the subject and longing for some way to stop war. it may be true that lasting peace can only be secured when both people and leaders (sometimes the people lead the leaders) realize the necessity of peace and the senselessness of war. but to reach such a happy realization of the truth what are we, the people, to do now? already the discussions of the league (pro and con) have fertilized the soil; the minds of the people are open as never before; and now is the supreme moment to sow peace seeds. the sooner, more thoroughly, and wider they are scattered, the better. in this way we may be able to so impress peace ideas upon everyone, as to avoid the terrible necessity of a future war, in which both sides become exhausted, as in the thirty years' war, which would be a much more horrible war than the present war. to escape such a catastrophe and make a league of nations or any kind of peace arrangements endure is preeminently an educational problem, and consists mainly in repeatedly filling the minds of the people, old and young, everywhere with fundamental peace conceptions. shall we not begin at once and persist in doing this until political wars become as impossible in the future as religious wars are now? suggestions of the peace treaty of westphalia for the league of nations.[ ] the conference of nations that has taken place around the peace table at paris is doubtless the most important of any in history. one reason is the fact that the plan the conference has decided to carry out will necessarily concern most all countries of the world. for railroads, steamships, aeroplanes, telegraphs, telephones, and wireless telegraphy, as never before, have made communication between nations so easy, quick, and direct that distance is almost eliminated, enabling the whole world to think, reason, and act at the same time, and to be influenced as one human solidarity. there seems to be a strong desire in all lands that the peace conference will make future wars not only improbable but practically impossible. but how can this be done? for years countless peace plans and theories have been proposed filling volumes of books, but they are mainly of a speculative nature. since theoretical grounds have proved inadequate, is there then any experience in the history of the world which can be made a basis for permanent peace? is there, for instance, any kind of war that has resulted in doing away with itself permanently? the answer would point to the thirty years' war, closing with the peace of westphalia ( ), which seems to have put an end to all religious wars. how, then, does it happen that the peace treaty of westphalia, of all the treaties in the world, is the only one that has succeeded in stopping all religious wars? we are certainly dealing here with a phenomenal fact in history. the writer has been unable to find any discussion of this phase of the matter. it would therefore seem of interest and importance, especially at the present time, to make a brief anthropological study of the thirty years' war which led to such an exceptional and successful treaty. new field for anthropology. from the anthropological point of view, history can be looked upon as a vast laboratory for the purpose of studying humanity and assisting in its progress. in the past anthropology has concerned itself mainly with savage and prehistoric man, but it is due time that it take up the more important and much more difficult subject of civilized man, not only as an individual but as an organization[ ] or nation, or group of nations. it is true that other departments of knowledge, such as history and political science, have pursued these fields, but unfortunately not always in the scientific sense; to use an ancient pun, it is his story, rather than all the facts. anthropology in this new field should seek to establish only those truths which can be based upon facts. there are doubtless many very important truths which can not be established by scientific methods, but perhaps they can be better treated in political science, psychology, ethics, philosophy, and theology. in the present inquiry the anthropological problem is this: as religious wars are admitted to be the most intense, most idealistic, and most sacrificial of all wars, and therefore most difficult to stop, can it be ascertained just how the thirty years' war, culminating in the peace of westphalia, brought about the end of all religious wars? this might suggest how all political wars may be made to cease. if the seventeenth century accomplished the more difficult task, the peace conference at paris ought to succeed in the less difficult one. if the twentieth century prides itself on being superior in diplomacy, practical statesmanship, and general mental caliber, it will now have an opportunity to show such superiority by formulating a treaty which will make all future political wars not only improbable but impossible. principles of a peace conference. in following the present peace conference and comparing it with the peace congress of westphalia, it may be well to mention a few of the principles of such congresses in general. in a treaty of peace there are first of all the usual articles, as, e.g., a declaration that peace is restored and amnesty clauses, including restitution of such conquests as are not intended to be retained, and of rights suspended by the war. also there are provisions to remove the causes out of which the war arose, redress grievances, and prevent their recurrence. this is the most essential thing for the congress to do. then there is the indemnity article to make satisfactory reparation for injury sustained and cost of war. but great prudence should be exercised here, otherwise the conquered power may feel deep resentment which is liable to sow seeds for a future war. as to personal attendance at the congress, one great advantage is that difficulties thought insurmountable in correspondence often disappear in an interview. half the work is done when members have come to know what each really wants. but in long discussions there is danger of becoming fatigued and making ill-advised concessions. there is also temptation for some members to interfere where they have no substantial interests nor rights, and to contract engagements in which they have no special concern. when strong enough, every nation will insist on the right to manage its own internal affairs. sometimes there are a few particularly able men, speaking several languages fluently (a very practical advantage), but representing only small countries, who may exercise undue influence and cause the congress to authorize things which may not prove of equal justice to all. members of congresses have been known to vote for things that they did not understand, to the great disadvantage of their own country, due mainly to inexperience and lack of familiarity with the language spoken in the congress. the peace of westphalia. as early as pope urban viii extorted from the powers engaged in the thirty years' war their unwilling consent to treat. in a discussion of safe conducts was begun, which lasted nearly five years, and it was not until that preliminaries as to time and place of the congress were signed, and these were not ratified, nor safe conducts exchanged, until , making six years for controversies as to mere formalities. one of the causes of this dilatoriness was that neither side really desired peace. captiousness and punctiliousness were doubtless emphasized in order to obtain delay. the labor of concluding peace was colossal; there were endless obstacles to surmount, contending interests to reconcile, a labyrinth of circumstances to cope with, difficulties to overcome besetting the congress from the very outset of the negotiations, not only of arranging the conditions of peace but still more of carrying them through the proceedings. it is therefore fair to assume that the difficulties in establishing the peace of westphalia were as great as, and probably greater than, those now confronting the peace conference at paris. for in the westphalian congress nobody desired peace, and it was not possible to agree to an armistice, so that war continued while the congress was in session, materially affecting the deliberations; this may be one reason why the congress lasted as long as four years. to avoid questions of precedence and to lessen further opportunities for disagreement, two cities in westphalia, munster for the catholics and osnabruck for the protestants, were selected. these places were a short day's ride apart. the treaty was signed at munster october , , and was called "the peace of westphalia." in addition to the disposition for delay, there was a tendency to criticize things generally. thus certain plenipotentiaries complained of their accommodations, saying that the houses assigned to them, though high and handsome externally, were in fact rat holes. the streets also were pronounced very narrow, so much so that when a certain very polite diplomat, who wore a very large hat, made from his coach an extremely low bow, his hat hit a very expensive vase in an open window, which fell and broke, causing great embarrassment. first, questions of etiquette were taken up. for instance, did the precedence belong to spain, and what marks of honor were due to the representatives of the neutral powers? then came contests for the ecclesiastical seats. the nuncio, the representative of the pope, wished to sit not only at the head of the table but wanted a canopy over him to distinguish him. the way in which the minor powers should be received was in doubt. it was finally decided to go half-way down the stairs with guests when departing. also the question of titles arose. the word "excellency" was chosen for addressing the envoys of the great powers, but it had to be extended to the lesser powers. the venetian envoy obtained the honor (to his joy) of being conducted, when he visited the french plenipotentiary, to the door of his coach, instead of to the staircase. these few of the many incidents during the congress will illustrate the human side of official matters. such disputes as to precedence and etiquette were to be expected in a proud and ceremonious age among representatives of numerous states, especially when many of them were of doubtful rank. there was also much display. a train of coaches conveyed the french envoys in their visits of ceremony. it appeared that france desired to show that she had not been impoverished by the war like germany. the papal nuncio and the venetian envoy were mediators as well as members of the congress. france and sweden were opposed to each other in religion, but in accord on political matters. the treaty was drawn up with such fullness and precision of language as is rarely found in documents of this nature, due to a large body of trained lawyers among the members. as indicating a desire for fairness in little things as well as in larger questions, the treaty contained these words: "no one of any party shall look askance at anyone on account of his creed." as an example of wise provisions, the following may be noted: the protestants demanded the year as annus normalis for the restitution of ecclesiastical estates, the catholics insisted on the year , which was much more favorable to them. the congress split the difference and made it . the medius terminus is often the wisest course in acute controversies. as to temporal affairs, all hostilities of whatever kind were to be forgotten, neither party being allowed to molest or injure the other for any purpose. in regard to spiritual affairs, complete equality was to exist (aequalitas exacta mutuaque), and every kind of violence was forever forbidden between the parties. the peace of westphalia was the first effort to reconstruct the european states' system, and it became the common law of europe. few treaties have had such influence, and europe is said for the first time to have formed a kind of commonwealth watching with anxiety over the preservation of the general peace. the thirty years' war. to have called to mind some of the principal points in the peace of westphalia is not sufficient for understanding the real significance of the treaty without some consideration of the war which it closed. as already suggested, this war, looked at from a scientific point of view, is an unconscious experiment of nations, an attempt to solve a problem in abnormal international psychology. in order to comprehend this experiment and its resultant treaty, just how it brought about permanent religious peace, some of the main events of the war must be recalled as a basis upon which to work. the protestant reformation had great influence upon almost everything political in europe, until the peace of westphalia. the religious peace of augsburg ( ) furnished no settlement to questions stirred up by the reformation. it was inevitable that such fundamental disagreements should lead to a general war. the thirty years' war marked the end of the reformation, which changed the idea of christian unity and altered the theory of a holy roman empire, replacing it by the idea of autonomy for individual states. on may , , a body of protestants entered the royal palace at prague and threw two detested representatives of the crown from the window. this act started a struggle that for years involved europe in a war which spread gradually from bohemia over southern germany, then slowly to northern germany and denmark, until country after country began to take part and the fighting became general. the war might have ended in , making it a five years' war, had it not been for the outrageous treatment of the protestant states of northern germany, resulting in a political disintegration in which germany lost half of her population and two-thirds of her wealth. her religion and morality sank low, and the intellectual damage required generations to restore. the roman catholic church, having guided christianity for centuries without a rival, naturally felt greatly wronged by protestant secession. this explains the uncompromising enmities of the thirty years' war. various parties claimed the control of the religious doctrines to be taught the people, as well as control of worship; they were fighting each other for this power, ready to sacrifice their lives for it. the lutherans were as intolerant toward the calvinists as they were toward the catholics. the catholic church, convinced of the absolute truth of its doctrines based upon centuries of growth, naturally could not tolerate some young reformers to arise and challenge its divine right, especially not since these reformers seized old monastic and ecclesiastic foundations with domains and edifices and administered them in their own interest. the resistance of the catholic hierarchy, to the last drop of blood, was a normal reaction. as so often happens, the conditions were abnormal, not the human beings. had the war stopped in the catholics would have been left with decided advantages. their own ambitions, however, prevented it. gustavus adolphus appeared, and by his efforts protestantism is said to have been saved from extinction. during of the years the lands of the protestants had been devastated; during the next years an equalization of the exhaustion of the parties developed before a lasting religious peace was made. it became clear in the end that neither catholics nor protestants could crush their opponents without perishing likewise. terrible results of the war. the terrible results of the thirty years' war may be summed up by saying that germany was the carcass, and the hosts which invaded the german soil were the vultures. the protestant invaders were swedes, finns, hollanders, frenchmen, englishmen, and scotchmen; on the catholic side there came in spaniards, italians, walloons, poles, cossacks, croats, and representatives of nearly all other slavonic tribes. there was an army never larger than , men, but the camp followers were , , consisting of gangs of gypsies, jewish camp traders, marauders, and plunderers. the soldiers robbed and tortured all alike, both friend and foe. the inhabitants would flee to the woods, taking with them or hiding everything they could. but the invaders were experts in discovering secret treasures; they would pour water on the ground, and where it sank quickly there they knew something had been recently buried. to retaliate, the peasants would watch for stragglers, for the sick and wounded who had dropped behind, putting them to death with every device of insult and cruelty known. much of the cruelty is too hideous to mention. in many districts the desolation was so great that persons were found dead with grass in their mouths. men climbed up the scaffolds and tore down the bodies of those hanged and devoured them. the supply was large. newly buried corpses were dug up for food. children were enticed away that they might be slain and eaten. the population, when plundered, would become plunderers in turn, forming into bands, and inflict on others the horrors that they themselves had suffered. men became wholly indifferent to the sufferings of others. whole countries were destroyed, towns and villages reduced to ashes, and civilization was pushed back into barbarism for half a century. the thirty years' war is said to have been so unspeakably cruel and calamitous that the like has never been known in europe. causes of the length of the war. gustavus adolphus writes in a letter that the war would be long drawn out and stop from exhaustion. the original purpose of the war was the suppression of the protestant faith, but the victories of gustavus adolphus made the catholics hopeless. also other interests of a political nature rose up, the war passed from a german to a european question. though there were times when peace might have been made, the side who had the best of it for the moment deemed it folly to stop when victory was in reach. the other side thought it base and cowardly not to continue, as some turn of fortune might repair the losses. many a war has dragged on after the purpose for which it began had become unattainable, because those who began it were too vain to admit that the objects of the war were impossible from its outset. in a long war also individuals rise up to whom fighting becomes a second nature, who know nothing else but violence and murder. thus many soldiers were indignant when the westphalian peace was signed, for they felt they had a vested right to plunder and murder, looking upon a wretched, helpless population as their just prey. a further reason for the long continuation of the war was the very exhaustion of both sides; there was not enough strength on either side to strike a decisive blow, nor sufficient energy left to make a vigorous effort for peace, making it seem useless to try. in the earlier and middle period of the war there were many cries for peace, but in the last eight years there was a terrible silence of death and such utter desperation that no one dared to speak of peace, so great was the exhaustion. the soldiers decreased as it became more and more difficult to recruit and feed them; the military operations grew feebler and more desultory, the fighting more inconclusive, though the misery did not diminish. but while the people and soldiers had become tired of the interminable struggle and wanted peace, many of the diplomats did not appear to desire it. causes of the war. the great length of the war gradually revealed its very hopelessness and uselessness, creating a general desire for rest and peace, transforming and weakening the religious movements out of which the war had arisen. the principle of private judgment, coming from the reformation, had had time to develop and undermine the ideas of temporal rights and duties common to both parties, while many ideas first conceived by the reformation but suppressed at the time, had at last commenced to grow through the long-continued tribulations. another cause of the war was the inherent incompatibility of religious views among the people. religious discord exists to-day, but it is not decided by bloody contests, because of breadth of religious insight, general indifference, and increasing skepticism. the convictions of the people of the seventeenth century, as to the truth of their own opinions and the errors of their opponents, were of such an absolute character as can not be found nowadays even among people with the most rigid beliefs. they did not know then that it was possible to live together and yet have the most varied and contradictory religious convictions. to suppose that these people were stupid is an error. the chances are that they were less stupid than the people are to-day. how many, at the present time, can look at their country, its ideals, ideas, and customs justly and without prejudice? naturally very few. but to place ourselves outside of not only our country but our generation is much more difficult. how could we then expect the people of the seventeenth century to do this? ignorance the fundamental cause of the war. the fundamental cause that brought the thirty years' war to a close was mental insight into the uselessness and hopelessness of further struggle, caused by the feeling of exhaustion due to the long continuance of the war. the reason why this war put an end to all religious wars was, that this intellectual insight became general in europe, inculcating more liberal religious views. this psychological attitude, with increasing indifference to religion and resultant skepticism, caused religious questions to be regarded less seriously, making further wars for such purposes impossible. the basal reason, therefore, was the intellectual realization of the foolishness of bloodshed on account of difference of religious convictions; that is, lack of knowledge of this fact in the past--in short, ignorance--was at the bottom of it all, as of most evils in the world. comparisons between the thirty years' war and the european war. in order to learn what suggestions from the thirty years' war may be of use for the league of nations in the future it will be well to mention the general similarities and differences between this war and the recent european war. the similarities are as follows: . the thirty years' war began with the throwing out of a window (defenestration) of detested persons; the european war started from an assassination. . the thirty years' war had been expected for some time; a general european war had been predicted for many years. . the thirty years' war, beginning with a local incident, spread from country to country, just like the european war did. . the thirty years' war was exceedingly brutal for its generation, just as the european war has been for our time. . the thirty years' war was a very long one for its generation; the european war has been a relatively long one for recent times. as to the differences between the two wars, it may be said that-- . in the thirty years' war both belligerents finally proved to be nearly equal in strength. in the european war one of the belligerents, though at first meeting with reverses, in the end completely overcame the other. . the thirty years' war ended in the exhaustion of both belligerents; the european war closed with the exhaustion of only one belligerent. . the thirty years' war was waged for religious convictions rather than for gain; the european war was not so ideal in its purposes. taking a general view of the similarities and differences between the two wars, the one great question arises: is the experience of the present european war strong enough for victors and vanquished alike to be willing to yield sufficient of their natural rights and sovereignty to submit all questions of war to some superior international court from which there is no appeal? in the thirty years' war nothing further was necessary; the exhaustion of both belligerents was sufficient to end religious wars. as the victorious party in war is much less inclined (if inclined at all) than the conquered foe to yield anything, will the allies, without the experience of defeat and exhaustion, be willing to yield enough of their sovereignty to make the future peace of the world permanent? will they be magnanimous and give up some national advantages of the present for future international benefits to all mankind? in short, are they unselfish enough to so temper their justice with mercy as to establish a world peace, the greatest boon to humanity ever known? here is a supreme opportunity. will the victorious allies arise to the occasion and make future wars improbable, if not impossible? we say "impossible," because if a nation is recalcitrant it can be punished by a general boycott, leading toward its economic ruin. as the instinct of self-preservation is the most powerful influence in nations as well as in individuals, it is a moral certainty that no nation could or would submit very long to such punishment. just after a war is ended, when the belligerents feel more keenly its effect than later on, they are much more disposed to make mutual concessions. will the victors of the european war strike at once while the iron is hot, and insist on the one paramount issue, the absolute prohibition of all wars? such a decision would radiate through all further proceedings of the league of nations and greatly facilitate its work. by thus making a certainty of the most important question of all history, no matter how difficult and delicate matters of greater or less importance may be, the league of nations will have assured its success in advance as the greatest and most beneficent influence that the world has ever experienced, just as the peace of westphalia was in its generation. in the peace treaty of westphalia were these words: "the hostilities that have taken place from the beginning of the late disturbances, in any place of whatsoever kind, by one side or the other, shall be forgotten and forgiven, so that neither party shall cherish enmity or hatred against, nor molest nor injure the other for any cause whatsoever." will the peace treaty of paris contain as generous and noble words and stop all political wars forever, just as the peace of westphalia put an end to all religious wars? will the twentieth century christianity, with its supposed greater liberality and enlightenment, be as far-seeing, unselfish, and effective as the christianity of the seventeenth century? let the league of nations answer yes. just as the spread of education and knowledge has gradually liberated the intellect so as to undermine the ideas upon which religious wars were based, so a similar process of enlightenment may be necessary to cause political wars to cease. references. the following references are only a few of those easily accessible in libraries. the cambridge modern history (vol. ) has a bibliography of some , works and brochures on the thirty years' war. bougeant. histoire des guerres et des négociations qui précédèrent le traité de westphalie. paris, . bernard, mountague. four lectures in subjects connected with diplomacy. london, , º. lecture i is entitled "the congress of westphalia" ( pp.); comparison with other congresses is made. the cambridge modern history. the thirty years' war, volume iv. cambridge, , iii, , pages. it contains a most extensive classified bibliography of the war, filling pages. freytag, gustav. bilder aus der deutschen vergangenheit. includes chapters on thirty years' war. gindely, anton. history of the thirty years' war. volumes, new york, . hausser, ludwig. the period of the reformation, to (translation). london, , º, pages. cust, edward. lives of the warriors of the thirty years' war. volumes, º. london, . the author is a military man. leclerc. négociations sécrètes touchant la paix de muenster et d'osnabrug. puetter. geist des westphalischen friedens. international psychology and peace.[ ] the history of the world would seem to indicate that international psychology is almost synonymous with international anarchy. for the last or more years, as is well known, a general european war was expected, predicated, and feared. this was the abnormal psychological condition of diplomatic and military europe until the present war caused its realization. the world appears always to have existed in a pathological condition of possible, probable, or actual war. the question is, "shall the world continue to this old way of international anarchism and political pathology, or shall it make a supreme effort to shake off this monstrous incubus of war?" it is peculiar circumstances that, while anarchism within a nation is generally detested, anarchism between nations has been palatable so long. cannibalism existed for thousands of years, slavery also, yet both have been practically abandoned, and now there seems to be a chance to do away the last and greatest enemy of humanity--war. to stop an evil that has existed so long and whose roots reach back into the beginning of history will necessarily require colossal effort and great sacrifice. such an effort has been successful only once in the history of the world. that was when the westphalian peace treaty was signed, in after the thirty years' war.[ ] this resulted in abolishing the most difficult kind of wars--religious wars. if the seventeenth century could accomplish this greater task, certainly the twentieth century should take courage and likewise put an end to political wars, the lesser task. it may not be possible to make war impossible, but this is no reason it should not be tried. it may be possible, however, to make war most improbable. scientific method in history necessary. in the writing of history a common illusion is to exaggerate the future importance of contemporary events. both sides in the french revolution thought that the end of the world had come, as no doubt it had for some. comparatively few men can get outside of their country and look at things as they are, but very few or none can separate themselves from their generation and look without prejudice into the future. the importance of every great event is usually exaggerated by those immediately interested. from the historical point of view, the degree of importance of current events can not be determined until some time afterwards when the sources are more accessible, and it is possible to consider them calmly, and from the point of view of strict truth, which is one of the main principles of scientific inquiry. history is continuous and not broken up by what the present generation may think to be a finality or cataclysm; there may be progress or retrogression, but neither is so great as they appear at the time of the events which cause enthusiasm and optimism in the victorious and despair and pessimism in the vanquished. these are temporary phenomena, being only links in the historical chain. the changes after this war back to normal conditions may be much greater and faster than in previous wars. in this connection it must be remembered that the humane spirit is now much more diffused in the world than in the past, which is indicated by the enormous extent of protests against the horrors of war.[ ] these horrors are common to all wars and were relatively as frequent in the past, if not more so. it is true that the absolute number of outrages may have been much greater in the present war than in previous wars, but this is probably due mainly to the enormous number of individuals engaged in the war. interdependence of nations a demographic law. the world has become so closely connected through modern means of communication that any war might result in a world war. the prevalent political tendencies are in the direction of combination and resultant consolidation. the question soon arises, shall combination and regulation go beyond national limits? the old-fashioned ideas of national limits do not seem to be adapted to present conditions. commercially such limits are impracticable and appear to be so in other ways.[ ] the constitution of the united states has amendments. this demographic law of interdependence of nations necessarily results in combination, which eventually may lead to international solidarity. whether we will or no, this demographic law of interdependence of nations can not be escaped. just as the states of the union are now closer together than their counties were many years ago, through the enormous development of physical means of communication, so governments are now brought more closely in contact than were the states at the time of the formation of the union. this demographic law of increasing interdependence when carefully examined appears to be almost as necessary as the law of gravity. it has been at work ever since history began and, though little noticed perhaps, it has been manifesting itself more and more as history advanced. the individual is subordinate to the community and must yield some of his sovereignty to it, the community in turn must yield to the county, the county to the state, the state to the nation, and finally the nation to the world. this last step is the one now pending in europe, and eventually, if not presently, may result in international solidarity, which will practically put an end to political wars just as the westphalian peace did with religious wars. international organizations and demographic law of interdependence of states. the tendency toward this demographic law of interdependence of states is shown by the large number of international organizations such as congresses or conferences which are held from time to time in different countries of the world. from the conference of vienna ( ) to the present time there have been some two hundred or more international congresses, the majority of which had to do with regulation of economic and sociologic affairs. thus manufacturers, merchants, and capitalists of different countries have met and made agreements to control and regulate production and distribution of merchandise. there is also the universal postal union, which is an illustration of international control or government. objections are sometimes made against international government, which were made years ago against the international postal union. it now has a constitution obeyed by all nations. refusal to obey would deprive a country of the benefits of the union. as a matter of fact, no country has done this. power of international organizations. if there were an international organization for war as well as for postage, and one or two nations should refuse to obey the decisions of a majority, or three-fourths of the organization, each of these recalcitrant nations could be boycotted economically and in many other ways by the remaining member nations. it is very doubtful if any nation would take such chances. any international organization helps toward peace by making action less precipitate, for if it were known in advance that a conference were to take place, this would tend to make nations less disposed to go to war. in fact, all international conferences, like the international congress of criminal anthropology, tend to intellectual, moral, and sociological solidarity between nations, in accordance with our demographic law of interdependence. (see equation of law later on.) this international congress of criminal anthropology, for instance, consists of some four hundred university specialists in anthropology, medicine, psychology, and sociology, who come from almost all countries of the world. in the eighteenth century international relations consisted of diplomatic conversations and were regulated by an occasional treaty, but, owing to the very inadequate means of communication, few international relations were required. in the nineteenth century the change in international conditions was very great. when international organizations represent some actual phase of life, whether educational, commercial or scientific, they really regulate their relations between nations and are often organs of international government. in short, international conferences and congresses act like legislatures between nations. if conferences had been in vogue and one had been held concerning the dispute between austria and serbia, very probably there would not have been any war, because, if for no other reason, the diplomats would have seen that it might lead to a general war in europe, and as no nation cared to take that responsibility the diplomatic procedure would doubtless have been modified. thus the conference over the morocco question killed it as a cause of war. this and other practical examples of government between nations show that the great success, convenience, and benefit to all nations encourage the further development of international organizations. the difficulties and dangers predicted have not come to pass. international administration has come in the cases of railroads, ships, and automobiles. an elaborate international government has come (through treaties) in public health and epidemics, and international notification of the presence of disease has been made obligatory. sovereignty changes according to the demographic law of interdependence of nations. the old idea of the independence of the state, mingled with that of sovereignty, prestige, and honor, and exaggerated by false patriotism, although limited more and more by conditions of civilization, is one of the main obstacles to the development of international organization and government. the habit of holding conferences or congresses would get the people to expect international government and insist on it, and any country would hesitate long before refusing to agree to a conference. the idea that sovereignty is destroyed because a nation is not absolutely independent belongs to the old régime, when many modern means of communication did not exist. in those days of comparative isolation there was reason for much independence, but now countries are so closely connected, as we have seen, that their independence and sovereignty are necessarily limited, while their interdependence has increased to such an extent that what benefits or injures one benefits or injures the other. thus it is to the advantage of each state to give up some of its sovereignty, just as it is for the individual to give up some of his freedom to the community for privileges much greater than the loss of his so-called independence. it is well known how the states of our union have gradually yielded more and more of their sovereignty to the federal government. thus sovereignty decreases according to our law of the interdependence of states. cause of war not necessarily economic. it is frequently asserted that after all the main cause of most wars is rivalry in trade and commercial friction; in short, it is economic. but it is a curious fact that commerce and industry are the most insistent on international rules or law to reduce all friction to a minimum, for peaceful trading is a general benefit to all concerned. it might be stated in this connection that in historical and political as well as physical science there is no one cause of anything, but a chain of causes; for the more we study the world, the closer we find it related; nothing is nor can be really alone. when we single out a cause we mean the predominant one, and which is the strongest link in the chain of causes becomes a matter of opinion, owing to our limited knowledge of international psychology. commercial systems of the world have brought nations closer together, but political relations have remained much the same; that is, the advances in diplomacy have been very few in comparison with the growth of economic relations which makes for peace rather than war. no international government; no lasting peace. that the lack of international government means international anarchy may be illustrated by some recent events. owing to the struggle of serbia for expansion, austria feared the seizure of its own territory and loss of some of its population, and so refused to accept mediation, because the hapsburg monarchy being reported declining, she must counteract this impression by showing vigorous action. the success of austria would be regarded by russia as a threat to herself, but a defeat of austria by russia would be a defeat for germany, and a german defeat for russia and france would be regarded as a defeat for england. thus the lack of any international government or organization made cooperation for peace almost, if not quite, impossible. england might have said to herself, among other reasons, "if i stay out of the war, germany may overrun france and belgium, resulting in a union of the french and german navies, but we are an island, and it would not do to risk the danger of such a combination." frontier questions have perhaps been the main cause of more wars in history than anything else. but in the course of events such questions have come to be settled without resort to force, which is a change from national to international government. nationalism may conflict with the peoples' interest. another nationalistic anachronism is the geographical standard in governmental matters. but intercommunications are so many and so close that geographical relations have few reasons to be considered. individual and racial interests are less geographical and more sociological. but governmental matters have not developed near so fast as sociological conditions. nationalism more often represents the interests of the few rather than the many. unfortunately it is easy to bolster up a narrow and selfish nationalism by appeal to the patriotism of the masses who fail to understand the conditions and support the interests of a few against their own vital interests. while anarchy between nations (nationalism) makes future wars probable, anarchy within nations can be easily stopped by doing justice to the masses. war worst method of settling difficulties. an egotistical, selfish, and narrow nationalism, the basis of international anarchy, has been demonstrated a partial, if not complete, failure by the condition in which europe is to-day. war, though only one of many methods for settling difficulties between nations, has, nevertheless, been the main one. there is a strong desire among the people to substitute some other method. generally a nation has two things to consider--one is what it wants; the other whether it can enforce its wants. this is the usual nationalistic dilemma, but our demographic law of the interdependence of nations assumes that each country will respect the other countries and be willing to consider their wishes at least in vital matters. where the differences between two nations have threatened the peace of europe it has been felt that such a matter was more than a national question; in fact, passed over into the international realm, and so conferences have been called which to a certain extent recognized the principle of interdependence and have enforced its decisions by blockade if not by more warlike means. if a nation adopt the methods of force, it is appealing to international anarchy, which causes nations to break international law much more readily than otherwise. in fact, military necessity knows no law. it may seem odd that conferences are so often called for war instead of for peace. but it is necessity that often rules; the wheel in the machine is not examined until it is out of order, human beings were never studied scientifically until they became lunatics or criminals. so peace seems to have been little thought of until danger of war appeared. peace is like good health, we do not know its value until we lose it. secret diplomacy insidious. all treaties between nations should be published in order to make the diplomacy of intrigue and deception impossible or at least most difficult to carry into effect. secret diplomacy enables those who want war to bring something to light suddenly and cause excitement and fear among the people and thus drive them into war before they understand what they are doing. the psychology of fear shows its power in producing apprehension by catch phrases, such as "the crisis is acute," or "there is panic on the stock exchange," or "negotiations may come to an end," or "an ultimatum has been sent." patriotic as well as fear inspiring phrases are published broadcast leading the people into war, but they must always be made to believe that it is in defense of their country, whether it is or not. but open diplomacy and international conferences prevent insidious methods of producing excitement; they also give the people time to think and avoid precipitate action; also facts are brought to light that otherwise might have been concealed by those desiring war. competitive armaments lead to war. competitive armaments, for which the masses are compelled to pay and by which they are killed, hasten the probability of future wars. great armaments lead to competitive armament, which experience shows to be no guaranty of peace, for it makes a nation feel so well prepared for war that when a dispute arises, and it is thought a few days' delay may give the enemy an advantage that might never be regained, the enemy must be attacked at once. thus austria refused to extend time to serbia nor would she take part in a conference of ambassadors nor respond to the serbian note to refer the dispute to the hague. so germany refused a similar proposal to the czar on july and allowed russia but hours to answer the ultimatum. russia had begun to mobilize and germany's fear, if the proposal for pacific settlement were accepted, russia would get the start and gain a military advantage probably caused germany to strike at once. thus such preparedness actually prevented any chance for even discussion of a peaceful settlement. also the knowledge that russia's army and navy were to be increased and strategic railroads built and that france was about to reintroduce three years' military service may have caused germany to think it imprudent to delay an inevitable war any longer. permanent peace hindered by spirit of hate. there can be no permanent peace so long as the idea of crushing this or that nation prevails. the question is not national, but international. the nationalistic spirit of hate may be temporarily useful in stirring up a country to fight better, but it does not tend toward a lasting peace. in the study of war we should seek the causes, be impersonal, and neither condone nor accuse. the scientific investigation of war comes under the head of criminal anthropology, one of the purposes of which is by knowledge gained to lessen or stop war permanently rather than discuss the ethics of war involving the spirit of hate and vengeance. no permanent peace with nationalism alone. the existing conditions between nations are somewhat like as if a state had rules and laws as to what to do when murder and riot occur, but no laws to prevent murder and riot, or, if there were laws, no power to execute them. from the theoretical point of view these irrational and abnormal conditions are evident, and yet they have been considered normal conditions for ages. this is indicated by the remark of a diplomat, who said: "things are getting back to a wholesome state again, every nation for itself and god for us all." as long as such an extreme and pathological form of nationalism exists no permanent peace is probable, if not impossible. nationalism has had a long trial with comparative freedom, and one of its grand finales is the present european war. a few suggestions for permanent peace. it would go far beyond the purpose of this article to discuss the many methods proposed for establishing permanent peace, yet one may be allowed merely to note a few points. there might be established an international high court to decide judicial issues between independent sovereign nations and an international council to secure international legislation and to settle nonjudicial issues. also, an international secretariat should be established. some fundamental principles of such international control might be to disclaim all desire or intention of aggression, to pursue no claim against any other independent state; not to send any ultimatum or threat of military or naval operations or do any act of aggression, and never to declare war or order any general mobilization or violate the territory or attack the ships of another state, except in way of repelling an attack actually made; not to do any of these until the matter in dispute has been submitted to the international high court or to the international council, and not until a year after the date of such submission. prohibitions for recalcitrant states. in order to enforce the decrees of the international high court against any recalcitrant state an embargo on her ships and forbidding her landing at any capital might be initiated. also there might be instituted prohibition of postal and telegraph communication, of payment of debts due to citizens, prohibition of all imports and exports and of all passenger traffic; to level special duties on goods to such state and blockade her ports. in short, an effort should be made to enforce complete nonintercourse with any recalcitrant state. should a state proceed to use force to go to war rather than obey the decree of the international high court all the other constituent states should make common cause against such state and enforce the order of the international high court. the psychological moment for preventing war is soon after war. if an absolute agreement among leading nations of the world never to resort to war could be obtained at the outset all other questions could be settled more justly and with fewer difficulties, for the consciousness that the supreme question was out of the way would relieve the psychological tension and afford opportunity for a more calm and careful consideration and adjudication of all other matters in dispute. it would be like the consciousness of the lawyer, when having lost his case in all other courts is content to let the united states supreme court settle it forever. this is due to the psychological power of the radiation of justice from the top downward. such an absolute and final agreement never to resort to war can be best accomplished right after the war, when all are sick of war and the very thought of it causes the suffering, wounded, and bleeding people to turn their heads significantly away with a profound instinctive feeling, crying out that anything is better than to go back to the old régime. in such a state of mind mutual concessions are much easier to make than later on. the psychological moment to prevent such suffering of the masses from ever occurring again is soon after the war. it is a sad comment that the number and untold suffering of millions of human beings seem to have been required for the nationalistic spirit of europe to be willing to follow international humanitarian ideas toward establishing permanent peace in the world. the hague rules only suggestions. the diplomats who wrote the rules at the hague convention knew well that they might be more or less disregarded; they were only suggestions. as war assumes the right to kill human beings, what rights, then, have the victims left over that are worth mentioning? as to what way they are killed there is little use of considering, probably the quicker the better, for there is less suffering. if prisoners must starve, it is a mercy to shoot them. to regulate murder of human beings is more or less humbug. the thing to do is to try to abolish international anarchy and slaughter forever, and to accomplish this the egotism, selfishness, and narrowness of nations must be so modified that they are willing to make the necessary sacrifice. if the reader believes the general ideas set forth in this study, let him or her aid the writer in a practical way and send a contribution to help circulate these ideas, not only in english and other languages but in other countries as well as the united states. the address of the author is: the congressional, east capitol street, washington, d. c. equation of the demographic law of interdependence of nations. as already noted, our demographic law of the interdependence of nations is, that increase in the means of communication between states causes increase of their interdependence but decrease in their sovereignty. just as a physical body consists of molecules of various kinds, so the state may be regarded as a psychological entity with citizens of various characteristics, and just as the density of a body is equal to its mass divided by its volume, so the density of citizenship is equal to the population divided by the land area. if, therefore, we consider the states' adult population, as its mass (m) and the resultant aggregate increase of its means of communication as its velocity (v), and (t) as the time, then the psychological force (f) or interdependence of the state can be expressed by the familiar equation in physics f=mv/t; that is to say, the interdependence of a state is equal to its adult population (mass) multiplied by the resultant aggregate increase of its means of communication (velocity) and the product divided by the time (t). the poundal unit of physical force is such a force as will move pound (mass unit) at a velocity of foot per second in one second of time. now, assuming the unit of citizenship of a state to be one citizen and the unit of the resultant aggregate increase of means of communication per annum in one year of time to be k, then the statal unit of psychological force is such a force as will give one citizen (mass unit) one k unit (for convenience the k unit of annual aggregate increase of means of communication can be expressed in per cents. taking some of the principal means of communication, and working out their annual average per cents of increase, we have for the united states during the census periods ( - ); annual average increase of passengers on railroads, per cent; on street and electric railways, per cent ( - ); of telegraph messages sent, per cent; of telephone stations, per cent. combining these, the per cent of annual average aggregate increase will be . per cent, as value of k, assuming the percentages are equally weighted) of resultant aggregate increase of means of communication per annum in one year of time. as yet there is no exact way to measure the sovereignty and means of communication of the state, but the psychological side of this physical equation may suggest a working hypothesis for our demographic law of the interdependence of states which may some time be useful in the realm of international psychology. to measure the aggregate influence upon citizens of the many means of communication in a state (also, for illustration merely, let us take one of the principal means of communication, as steam railroads, and we find that the annual average increase in passenger-train-car miles for one citizen of the united states, from to , to be . , which is the value of k for steam railroads alone for period mentioned. in a later article the author will consider in detail the practical application of the equation) as steam, street and electric railways, telegraph and telephones, will require exact detailed knowledge of the mental, moral, and physical power of the individual citizen, the unit of the social organism. such measurements might be made when psychology and sociology become sciences in the rigid sense. the underlying hypothesis in this equation is that both the psychological and physical mechanism of the world are under one fundamental law.[ ] laws of revolution.[ ] scientific history teaches that without war many revolutions could never have taken place. one of the greatest problems of future government is to reconcile democratic equality with hereditary inequality among the people. governments differ much more in form than in substance, and make progress when the resultant activities of the citizens direct and control them. with this in mind, a few principles of revolutions may be instructive in connection with the present european situation. . the causes of revolutions are summed up in the word "discontent," which must be general and accompanied with hope in order to produce results. . modern revolutions appear to be more abrupt than ancient. contrary to expectation, conservative people may have the most violent revolutions, because of not being able to adapt themselves to changes of environment. . revolution owes its power to the unchaining of the people, and does not take place without the aid of an important fraction of the army, which usually becomes disaffected by power of suggestion. . the triumphant party will organize according to whether the revolution is effected by soldiers, radicals, or conservatives. . the violence is liable to be great if a belief as well as material interests are being defended. . for ideas which cause violent contradictions are matters of faith, rather than of knowledge. . if the triumphant party go to extremes, bordering upon absurdities, they are liable to be turned down by the people. . most revolutions aim to put a new person in power, who usually tries to establish an equilibrium between the struggling factions, and not be too much dominated by any one class. . the rapidity of modern revolutions is explained by quick methods of publicity, and the slight resistance and ease with which some governments have been overturned is surprising, indicating blind confidence and inability to foresee. . governments sometimes have fallen so easily that they are said to have committed suicide. . revolutionary organizations are impulsive, though often timid, and are influenced by a few leaders, who may cause them to act contrary to the wishes of the majority. thus royal assemblies have destroyed empires and humanitarian legislatures have permitted massacres. . when all social restraints are abandoned, and instinctive impulses are allowed full sway, there is danger of return to barbarianism. for the ancestral ego (inherent in everyone) is let loose. . a country will prosper in proportion that the really superior persons rule, and this superiority is both moral and mental. . if certain social tendencies appear to lower the power of mind, they, nevertheless, may lessen injustice to the weaker classes; and if it be a choice between mentality and morality, morality should be preferred. . a financial aristocracy does not promote much jealousy in those who hope to form a part of it in the future. . science has caused many things once held to be historical to be now considered doubtful. thus it is asked-- . would not the results of the french revolution, which cost so much bloodshed, have been obtained without violence later, through gradual evolution? and were the results of the french revolution worth the cost of the terrible barbarism and suffering that took place? . to understand the people in a revolution we must know their history. . the accumulated thought, feeling, and tradition of a nation constitute its strength, which is its national spirit. this must not be too rigid, nor too malleable. for, in the first place, revolution means anarchy, and, in the second place, it results in successive revolutions. war and peace studies. by the author. peace, war, and humanity. printed by judd & detweiler, washington, d. c., pages, , º. comparative militarism. reprint from publications of the american statistical association, boston, december, , pages, º. atrocities and outrages of war. reprint from the pacific medical journal, san francisco, april, , pages, º. gives data for civil war, boer war, bulgaria, and russia and germany, pages, º. some moral evils of war. reprint from pacific medical journal, san francisco, august, , pages, º. refers especially to boer war. reasons for peace. machinists' monthly journal, washington, d. c., july, , pages - , º. choosing between war and peace. reprint from western medical times, denver, colo., pages, º. statement of european war. reprint from pacific medical journal, san francisco, calif., february, , pages, º. prevention of war. reprint from congressional record, washington, d. c., february , , pages, º; also, reprint pages, º. military training in the public schools. educational exchange, birmingham, ala., february and march, . war and criminal anthropology. published in the congressional record for february and march , . our national defense. testimony of american officers as to difficulties of invasion, and our coast defenses. congressional record for march , ; also, reprint, pages, º. identification of soldiers after death and head measurements. boston medical and surgical journal, june , ; also, reprint pages, º. revolutions. journal of education, boston, mass., december , , º. anthropometry of soldiers. medical record, new york city, december , ; also, reprint pages, º; also, in our state army and navy, philadelphia, april, . psychology of swiss soldiers. arms and the man, washington, d. c., ; also in journal of medicine and surgery, nashville, tenn., march, . international psychology and peace. chicago legal news, may , . suggestions of the peace treaty of westphalia for the peace conference in france. journal of education, boston, mass., march , ; also, in open court, april, ; also (in german) milwaukee herald, april, ; also (in norwegian) in amerika, may , madison, wis.; in "la prensa" (spanish), san antonio, tex., lunes de mayo de ; "nardoni list" (croatian), june , ; also in "rivista d'italia," milano. april. . disequilibrium of mind and nerves in war. medical record, new york city, may , ; also, reprint, pages, º. footnotes: [ ] article (by writer) in central law journal, st. louis, april , , and in open court, april, , chicago, ill. [ ] see a study of the united states senate by the writer (published in spanish) under the title "estudio del senado de los estados unidos de america." in revista argentina de ciencias politicas, de enero de . (buenos ayres, .) [ ] article (by writer) in chicago legal news for may , . [ ] see article (by author) entitled "suggestions from the westphalian peace treaty for the peace conference in france," published in the journal of education, boston, march , , and central law journal, st. louis, mo., april, ; also in open court for april, , chicago. [ ] see article (by author) in pacific medical journal, san francisco, calif., april, , entitled "atrocities and outrages of war"; also pamphlet (by author) entitled "war and criminal anthropology," reprinted from the congressional record for february and march , . washington, d. c. [ ] woolf, l. s., international government, fabian research department, london. [ ] see article (by author) entitled "anthropology of modern civilized man" in medical fortnightly and laboratory news, st. louis, mo., april, ; also chapter on "emil zola" in senate document (by author) no. , sixtieth congress, first session. [ ] article (by writer) in journal of education, boston, mass., for december , . transcriber's notes: the following misprints have been corrected: "westphalla" corrected to "westphalia" (page ) "calvanists" corrected to "calvinists" (page ) "turbulations" corrected to "tribulations" (page ) "centry" corrected to "century" (page ) "wtihout" corrected to "without" (page ) "defenstration" corrected to "defenestration" (page ) "importauce" corrected to "importance" (page ) "la prenso" corrected to "la prensa" (page ) "rivista d'ialia" corrected to "rivista d'italia" (page ) the great illusion the great illusion a study of the relation of military power to national advantage by norman angell _fourth revised and enlarged edition_ g.p. putnam's sons new york and london the knickerbocker press copyright, , by g.p. putnam's sons copyright, , by g.p. putnam's sons copyright, , by g.p. putnam's sons foreign editions of this book are now on sale in the following countries: great britain _william heinemann_ _london_ _first published, november, . reprinted, april, ; june, _ _new editions: november, ; january, ; april, ; may, ; reprinted, may, ; july, ; november, ; january, ; april, ; september, ; october, ; november, _ france _hachette et cie_ _paris_ " (_cheap popular edition_) _nelson_ _paris_ germany _dieterichsche verlags_ _leipzig_ " (_cheap popular edition_) _vita: deutsches verlag_ _berlin_ italy _associazione della stampa periodica italiana_ _rome_ " (_cheap popular edition_) _casa humanitas_ denmark _e. jespersens_ _copenhagen_ spain _nelson_ _madrid_ finland _w. soderstrom_ _borga_ holland _a.-w. sijthoff_ _leyden_ japan _hakubankwan publishing co._ _tokio_ norway _e. jespersens_ _copenhagen_ sweden _p.-a. norstedt et soner_ _stockholm_ russia _j. maiewsky_ _moscow_ in preparation: china _christian literature society for china_ _shanghai_ bohemia _english club_ _prague_ arabic _al-hillal office_ _cairo_ urdu } hindi } bengali }_brooks_ _madras_ gujerati } marathi } tamil } the knickerbocker press, new york preface to the fourth american edition if this, the fourth american edition, is bulkier than its predecessors, it is chiefly because the events of the last two years throw an interesting light upon the bearing of the book's main thesis on actual world problems. i have, therefore, added an appendix dealing with certain criticisms based upon the nature of the first balkan war, in the course of which i attempt to show just how the principles elaborated here have been working out in european politics. that american interest in the problems here discussed is hardly less vital than that of europe i am even more persuaded than when the first american edition of this book was issued in . it is certain that opinion in america will not be equipped for dealing with her own problems arising out of her relations with the spanish american states, with japan, with the philippines, unless it has some fair understanding of the principles with which this book deals. its general interest even goes farther than this: no great community like that of modern america can remain indifferent to the drift of general opinion throughout the world on matters wrapped up with issues so important as those of war and peace. that the tangible commercial and business interests of america are involved in these european events is obvious from the very factors of financial and commercial interdependence which form the basis of the argument. that the interests of americans are inextricably, if indirectly, bound up with those of europe, has become increasingly clear as can be proved by the barest investigation of the trend of political thought in this country. the thesis on its economic side is discussed in terms of the gravest problem which now faces european statesmanship, but these terms are also the living symbols of a principle of universal application, as true with reference to american conditions as to european. if i have not "localized" the discussion by using illustrations drawn from purely american cases, it is because these problems have not at present, in the united states, reached the acute stage that they have in europe, and illustrations drawn from the conditions of an actual and pressing problem give to any discussion a reality which to some extent it might lose if discussed on the basis of more supposititious cases. it so happens, however, that in the more abstract section of the discussion embraced in the second part, which i have termed the "human nature of the case," i have gone mainly to american authors for the statement of cases based on those illusions with which the book deals. for this edition i have thought it worth while thoroughly to revise the whole of the book and to re-write the chapter on the payment of the french indemnity, in order to clear up a misunderstanding to which in its first form it gave rise. part iii has also been re-written, in order to meet the changed form of criticism which has resulted from the discussion of this subject during the last year or two. it is with very great regret that i have seen this book grow in bulk; but as it constitutes the statement of a thesis still revolutionary, it has to cover the whole ground of the discussion, sometimes in great detail. i have, however, adopted an arrangement and method of presentation by which, i trust, the increase in bulk will not render it less clear. the general arrangement is as follows: the synopsis is a very brief indication of the scope of the whole argument, which is not that war is impossible, but that it is futile--useless, even when completely victorious, as a means of securing those moral or material ends which represent the needs of modern civilized peoples; and that on a general realization of this truth depends the solution of the problem of armaments and warfare. the general economic argument is summarized in chapter iii., part i. the moral, psychological, and biological argument is summarized in chapter ii., part ii. the practical outcome--what should be our policy with reference to defence, why progress depends upon the improvement of public opinion and the best general methods of securing that--is discussed in part iii. this method of treatment has involved some small repetition of fact and illustration, but the repetition is trifling in bulk--it does not amount in all to the value of more than three or four pages--and i have been more concerned to make the matter in hand clear to the reader than to observe all the literary canons. i may add that, apart from this, the process of condensation has been carried to its extreme limit for the character of data dealt with, and that those who desire to understand thoroughly the significance of the thesis with which the book deals--it is worth understanding--had really better read every line of it! one personal word may perhaps be excused as explaining certain phraseology, which would seem to indicate that the author is of english nationality. he happens to be of english birth, but to have passed his youth and early manhood in the united states, having acquired american citizenship there. this i hope entitles him to use the collective "we" on both sides of the atlantic. i may add that the last fifteen years have been passed mainly in europe studying at first hand the problems here dealt with. n.a. london, october, . preface the present volume is the outcome of a large pamphlet published in europe at the end of last year entitled _europe's optical illusion_. the interest that the pamphlet created and the character of the discussion provoked throughout europe persuaded me that its subject-matter was worth fuller and more detailed treatment than then given it. herewith the result of that conviction. the thesis on its economic side is discussed in the terms of the gravest problem which now faces european statesmanship, but these terms are also the living symbols of a principle of universal application, as true with reference to american conditions as to european. if i have not "localized" the discussion by using illustrations drawn from purely american cases, it is because these problems have not at present in the united states reached the acute stage that they have in europe, and illustrations drawn from the conditions of an actual and pressing problem give to any discussion a reality which to some extent it might lose if discussed on the basis of more suppositious cases. it so happens, however, that in the more abstract section of the discussion embraced in the second part, which i have termed the "human nature of the case," i have gone mainly to american authors for the statement of cases based on those illusions with which the book deals. n.a. paris, august, . synopsis what are the fundamental motives that explain the present rivalry of armaments in europe, notably the anglo-german? each nation pleads the need for defence; but this implies that someone is likely to attack, and has therefore a presumed interest in so doing. what are the motives which each state thus fears its neighbors may obey? they are based on the universal assumption that a nation, in order to find outlets for expanding population and increasing industry, or simply to ensure the best conditions possible for its people, is necessarily pushed to territorial expansion and the exercise of political force against others (german naval competition is assumed to be the expression of the growing need of an expanding population for a larger place in the world, a need which will find a realization in the conquest of english colonies or trade, unless these are defended); it is assumed, therefore, that a nation's relative prosperity is broadly determined by its political power; that nations being competing units, advantage, in the last resort, goes to the possessor of preponderant military force, the weaker going to the wall, as in the other forms of the struggle for life. the author challenges this whole doctrine. he attempts to show that it belongs to a stage of development out of which we have passed; that the commerce and industry of a people no longer depend upon the expansion of its political frontiers; that a nation's political and economic frontiers do not now necessarily coincide; that military power is socially and economically futile, and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; that it is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another--to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another; that, in short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive. he establishes this apparent paradox, in so far as the economic problem is concerned, by showing that wealth in the economically civilized world is founded upon credit and commercial contract (these being the outgrowth of an economic interdependence due to the increasing division of labor and greatly developed communication). if credit and commercial contract are tampered with in an attempt at confiscation, the credit-dependent wealth is undermined, and its collapse involves that of the conqueror; so that if conquest is not to be self-injurious it must respect the enemy's property, in which case it becomes economically futile. thus the wealth of conquered territory remains in the hands of the population of such territory. when germany annexed alsatia, no individual german secured a single mark's worth of alsatian property as the spoils of war. conquest in the modern world is a process of multiplying by _x_, and then obtaining the original figure by dividing by _x_. for a modern nation to add to its territory no more adds to the wealth of the people of such nation than it would add to the wealth of londoners if the city of london were to annex the county of hertford. the author also shows that international finance has become so interdependent and so interwoven with trade and industry that the intangibility of an enemy's property extends to his trade. it results that political and military power can in reality do nothing for trade; the individual merchants and manufacturers of small nations, exercising no such power, compete successfully with those of the great. swiss and belgian merchants drive english from the british colonial market; norway has, relatively to population, a greater mercantile marine than great britain; the public credit (as a rough-and-ready indication, among others, of security and wealth) of small states possessing no political power often stands higher than that of the great powers of europe, belgian three per cents. standing at , and german at ; norwegian three and a half per cents. at , and russian three and a half per cents. at . the forces which have brought about the economic futility of military power have also rendered it futile as a means of enforcing a nation's moral ideals or imposing social institutions upon a conquered people. germany could not turn canada or australia into german colonies--_i.e._, stamp out their language, law, literature, traditions, etc.--by "capturing" them. the necessary security in their material possessions enjoyed by the inhabitants of such conquered provinces, quick inter-communication by a cheap press, widely-read literature, enable even small communities to become articulate and effectively to defend their special social or moral possessions, even when military conquest has been complete. the fight for ideals can no longer take the form of fight between nations, because the lines of division on moral questions are within the nations themselves and intersect the political frontiers. there is no modern state which is completely catholic or protestant, or liberal or autocratic, or aristocratic or democratic, or socialist or individualist; the moral and spiritual struggles of the modern world go on between citizens of the same state in unconscious intellectual co-operation with corresponding groups in other states, not between the public powers of rival states. this classification by strata involves necessarily a redirection of human pugnacity, based rather on the rivalry of classes and interests than on state divisions. war has no longer the justification that it makes for the survival of the fittest; it involves the survival of the less fit. the idea that the struggle between nations is a part of the evolutionary law of man's advance involves a profound misreading of the biological analogy. the warlike nations do not inherit the earth; they represent the decaying human element. the diminishing rôle of physical force in all spheres of human activity carries with it profound psychological modifications. these tendencies, mainly the outcome of purely modern conditions (_e.g._ rapidity of communication), have rendered the problems of modern international politics profoundly and essentially different from the ancient; yet our ideas are still dominated by the principles and axioms, images and terminology of the bygone days. the author urges that these little-recognized facts may be utilized for the solution of the armament difficulty on at present untried lines--by such modification of opinion in europe that much of the present motive to aggression will cease to be operative, and by thus diminishing the risk of attack, diminishing to the same extent the need for defence. he shows how such a political reformation is within the scope of practical politics, and the methods which should be employed to bring it about. contents part i the economics of the case chapter page i. statement of the economic case for war ii. the axioms of modern statecraft iii. the great illusion iv. the impossibility of confiscation v. foreign trade and military power vi. the indemnity futility vii. how colonies are owned viii. the fight for "the place in the sun." part ii the human nature and morals of the case i. the psychological case for war ii. the psychological case for peace iii. unchanging human nature iv. do the warlike nations inherit the earth? v. the diminishing factor of physical force: psychological results vi. the state as a person: a false analogy and its consequences part iii the practical outcome i. the relation of defence to aggression ii. armament, but not alone armament iii. is the political reformation possible? iv. methods appendix on recent events in europe * * * * * part i _the economics of the case_ chapter i pages statement of the economic case for war where can the anglo-german rivalry of armaments end?--why peace advocacy fails--why it deserves to fail--the attitude of the peace advocate--the presumption that the prosperity of nations depends upon their political power, and consequent necessity of protection against aggression of other nations who would diminish our power to their advantage--these the universal axioms of international politics - chapter ii the axioms of modern statecraft are the foregoing axioms unchallengeable?--some typical statements of them--german dreams of conquest--mr. frederic harrison on results of defeat of british arms and invasion of england--forty millions starving - chapter iii the great illusion these views founded on a gross and dangerous misconception--what a german victory could and could not accomplish--what an english victory could and could not accomplish--the optical illusion of conquest--there can be no transfer of wealth--the prosperity of the little states in europe--german three per cents. at and belgian at --russian three and a half per cents. at , norwegian at --what this really means--if germany annexed holland, would any german benefit or any hollander?--the "cash value" of alsace-lorraine - chapter iv the impossibility of confiscation our present terminology of international politics an historical survival--wherein modern conditions differ from ancient--the profound change effected by division of labor--the delicate interdependence of international finance--attila and the kaiser--what would happen if a german invader looted the bank of england--german trade dependent upon english credit--confiscation of an enemy's property an economic impossibility under modern conditions--intangibility of a community's wealth - chapter v foreign trade and military power why trade cannot be destroyed or captured by a military power--what the processes of trade really are, and how a navy affects them--_dreadnoughts_ and business--while _dreadnoughts_ protect british trade from hypothetical german warships, the real german merchant is carrying it off, or the swiss or the belgian--the "commercial aggression" of switzerland--what lies at the bottom of the futility of military conquest--government brigandage becomes as profitless as private brigandage--the real basis of commercial honesty on the part of government - chapter vi the indemnity futility the real balance-sheet of the franco-german war--disregard of sir robert giffen's warning in interpreting the figures--what really happened in france and germany during the decade following the war--bismarck's disillusionment--the necessary discount to be given an indemnity--the bearing of the war and its result on german prosperity and progress - chapter vii how colonies are owned why twentieth-century methods must differ from eighteenth--the vagueness of our conceptions of statecraft--how colonies are "owned"--some little-recognized facts--why foreigners could not fight england for her self-governing colonies--she does not "own" them, since they are masters of their own destiny--the paradox of conquest: england in a worse position in regard to her own colonies than in regard to foreign nations--her experience as the oldest and most practised colonizer in history--recent french experience--could germany hope to do what england cannot do - chapter viii the fight for "the place in the sun" how germany really expands--where her real colonies are--how she exploits without conquest--what is the difference between an army and a police force?--the policing of the world--germany's share of it in the near east - part ii _the human nature and morals of the case_ chapter i the psychological case for war the non-economic motives of war--moral and psychological--the importance of these pleas--english, german, and american exponents--the biological plea - chapter ii the psychological case for peace the shifting ground of pro-war arguments--the narrowing gulf between the material and moral ideals--the non-rational causes of war--false biological analogies--the real law of man's struggles: struggle with nature, not with other men--outline sketch of man's advance and main operating factor therein--the progress towards elimination of physical force--co-operation across frontiers and its psychological result--impossible to fix limits of community--such limits irresistibly expanding--break-up of state homogeneity--state limits no longer coinciding with real conflicts between men - chapter iii unchanging human nature the progress from cannibalism to herbert spencer--the disappearance of religious oppression by government--disappearance of the duel--the crusaders and the holy sepulchre--the wail of militarist writers at man's drift away from militancy - chapter iv do the warlike nations inherit the earth? the confident dogmatism of militarist writers on this subject--the facts--the lessons of spanish america--how conquest makes for the survival of the unfit--spanish method and english method in the new world--the virtues of military training--the dreyfus case--the threatened germanization of england--"the war which made germany great and germans small" - chapter v the diminishing factor of physical force: psychological results diminishing factor of physical force--though diminishing, physical force has always had an important rôle in human affairs--what is underlying principle, determining advantageous and disadvantageous use of physical force?--force that aids co-operation in accord with law of man's advance: force that is exercised for parasitism in conflict with such law and disadvantageous for both parties--historical process of the abandonment of physical force--the khan and the london tradesman--ancient rome and modern britain--the sentimental defence of war as the purifier of human life--the facts--the redirection of human pugnacity - chapter vi the state as a person: a false analogy and its consequences why aggression upon a state does not correspond to aggression upon an individual--our changing conception of collective responsibility--psychological progress in this connection--recent growth of factors breaking down the homogeneous personality of states - part iii _the practical outcome_ chapter i the relation of defence to aggression necessity for defence arises from the existence of a motive for attack--platitudes that everyone overlooks--to attenuate the motive for aggression is to undertake a work of defence - chapter ii armament, but not alone armament not the facts, but men's belief about facts, shapes their conduct--solving a problem of two factors by ignoring one--the fatal outcome of such a method--the german navy as a "luxury"--if both sides concentrate on armament alone - chapter iii is the political reformation possible? men are little disposed to listen to reason, "therefore we should not talk reason"--are men's ideas immutable? - chapter iv methods relative failure of hague conferences and the cause--public opinion the necessary motive force of national action--that opinion only stable if informed--"friendship" between nations and its limitations--america's rôle in the coming "political reformation" - appendix on recent events in europe - index - part i the economics of the case chapter i statement of the economic case for war where can the anglo-german rivalry of armaments end?--why peace advocacy fails--why it deserves to fail--the attitude of the peace advocate--the presumption that the prosperity of nations depends upon their political power, and consequent necessity of protection against aggression of other nations who would diminish our power to their advantage--these the universal axioms of international politics. it is generally admitted that the present rivalry in armaments in europe--notably such as that now in progress between england and germany--cannot go on in its present form indefinitely. the net result of each side meeting the efforts of the other with similar efforts is that at the end of a given period the relative position of each is what it was originally, and the enormous sacrifices of both have gone for nothing. if as between england and germany it is claimed that england is in a position to maintain the lead because she has the money, germany can retort that she is in a position to maintain the lead because she has the population, which must, in the case of a highly organized european nation, in the end mean money. meanwhile, neither side can yield to the other, as the one so doing would, it is felt, be placed at the mercy of the other, a situation which neither will accept. there are two current solutions which are offered as a means of egress from this _impasse_. there is that of the smaller party, regarded in both countries for the most part as one of dreamers and doctrinaires, who hope to solve the problem by a resort to general disarmament, or, at least, a limitation of armament by agreement. and there is that of the larger, which is esteemed the more practical party, of those who are persuaded that the present state of rivalry and recurrent irritation is bound to culminate in an armed conflict, which, by definitely reducing one or other of the parties to a position of manifest inferiority, will settle the thing for at least some time, until after a longer or shorter period a state of relative equilibrium is established, and the whole process will be recommenced _da capo_. this second solution is, on the whole, accepted as one of the laws of life: one of the hard facts of existence which men of ordinary courage take as all in the day's work. and in every country those favoring the other solution are looked upon either as people who fail to realize the hard facts of the world in which they live, or as people less concerned with the security of their country than with upholding a somewhat emasculate ideal; ready to weaken the defences of their own country on no better assurance than that the prospective enemy will not be so wicked as to attack them. to this the virile man is apt to oppose the law of conflict. most of what the nineteenth century has taught us of the evolution of life on the planet is pressed into the service of this struggle-for-life philosophy. we are reminded of the survival of the fittest, that the weakest go to the wall, and that all life, sentient and non-sentient, is but a life of battle. the sacrifice involved in armament is the price which nations pay for their safety and for their political power. the power of england has been the main condition of her past industrial success; her trade has been extensive and her merchants rich, because she has been able to make her political and military force felt, and to exercise her influence among all the nations of the world. if she has dominated the commerce of the world, it is because her unconquered navy has dominated, and continues to dominate, all the avenues of commerce. this is the currently accepted argument. the fact that germany has of late come to the front as an industrial nation, making giant strides in general prosperity and well-being, is deemed also to be the result of _her_ military successes and the increasing political power which she is coming to exercise in continental europe. these things, alike in england and in germany, are accepted as the axioms of the problem, as the citations given in the next chapter sufficiently prove. i am not aware that a single authority of note, at least in the world of workaday politics, has ever challenged or disputed them. even those who have occupied prominent positions in the propaganda of peace are at one with the veriest fire-eaters on this point. mr. w.t. stead was one of the leaders of the big navy party in england. mr. frederic harrison, who all his life had been known as the philosopher protagonist of peace, declared recently that, if england allowed germany to get ahead of her in the race for armaments, "famine, social anarchy, incalculable chaos in the industrial and financial world, would be the inevitable result. britain may live on ... but before she began to live freely again she would have to lose half her population, which she could not feed, and all her overseas empire, which she could not defend.... how idle are fine words about retrenchment, peace, and brotherhood, whilst we lie open to the risk of unutterable ruin, to a deadly fight for national existence, to war in its most destructive and cruel form." on the other side we have friendly critics of england, like professor von schulze-gaevernitz, writing: "we want our [_i.e._ germany's] navy in order to confine the commercial rivalry of england within innocuous limits, and to deter the sober sense of the english people from the extremely threatening thought of attack upon us.... the german navy is a condition of our bare existence and independence, like the daily bread on which we depend not only for ourselves, but for our children." confronted by a situation of this sort, one is bound to feel that the ordinary argument of the pacifist entirely breaks down; and it breaks down for a very simple reason. he himself accepts the premise which has just been indicated--viz., that the victorious party in the struggle for political predominance gains some material advantage over the party which is conquered. the proposition even to the pacifist seems so self-evident that he makes no effort to combat it. he pleads his case otherwise. "it cannot be denied, of course," says one peace advocate, "that the thief _does_ secure some material advantage by his theft. what we plead is that if the two parties were to devote to honest labor the time and energy devoted to preying upon each other, the permanent gain would more than offset the occasional booty." some pacifists go further, and take the ground that there is a conflict between the natural law and the moral law, and that we must choose the moral even to our hurt. thus mr. edward grubb writes: self-preservation is not the final law for nations any more than for individuals.... the progress of humanity may demand the extinction (in this world) of the individual, and it may demand also the example and the inspiration of a martyr nation. so long as the divine providence has need of us, christian faith requires that we shall trust for our safety to the unseen but real forces of right dealing, truthfulness, and love; but, should the will of god demand it, we must be prepared, as jeremiah taught his nation long ago, to give up even our national life for furthering those great ends "to which the whole creation moves." this may be "fanaticism," but, if so, it is the fanaticism of christ and of the prophets, and we are willing to take our places along with them.[ ] the foregoing is really the keynote of much pacifist propaganda. in our own day, count tolstoi has even expressed anger at the suggestion that any reaction against militarism, on other than moral grounds, can be efficacious. the peace advocate pleads for "altruism" in international relationships, and in so doing admits that successful war may be to the interest, though the immoral interest, of the victorious party. that is why the "inhumanity" of war bulks so largely in his propaganda, and why he dwells so much upon its horrors and cruelties. it thus results that the workaday world and those engaged in the rough and tumble of practical politics have come to look upon the peace ideal as a counsel of perfection, which may one day be attained when human nature, as the common phrase is, has been improved out of existence, but not while human nature remains what it is. while it remains possible to seize a tangible advantage by a man's strong right arm the advantage will be seized, and woe betide the man who cannot defend himself. nor is this philosophy of force either as conscienceless, as brutal, or as ruthless as its common statement would make it appear. we know that in the world as it exists to-day, in spheres other than those of international rivalry, the race is to the strong, and the weak get scant consideration. industrialism and commercialism are as full of cruelties as war itself--cruelties, indeed, that are longer drawn out, more refined, though less apparent, and, it may be, appealing less to the common imagination than those of war. with whatever reticence we may put the philosophy into words, we all feel that conflict of interests in this world is inevitable, and that what is an incident of our daily lives should not be shirked as a condition of those occasional titanic conflicts which mould the history of the world. the virile man doubts whether he ought to be moved by the plea of the "inhumanity" of war. the masculine mind accepts suffering, death itself, as a risk which we are all prepared to run even in the most unheroic forms of money-making; none of us refuses to use the railway train because of the occasional smash, to travel because of the occasional shipwreck, and so on. indeed, peaceful industry demands a heavier toll even in blood than does a war, fact which the casualty statistics in railroading, fishing, mining and seamanship, eloquently attest; while such peaceful industries as fishing and shipping are the cause of as much brutality.[ ] the peaceful administration of the tropics takes as heavy a toll in the health and lives of good men, and much of it, as in the west of africa, involves, unhappily, a moral deterioration of human character as great as that which can be put to the account of war. beside these peace sacrifices the "price of war" is trivial, and it is felt that the trustees of a nation's interests ought not to shrink from paying that price should the efficient protection of those interests demand it. if the common man is prepared, as we know he is, to risk his life in a dozen dangerous trades and professions for no object higher than that of improving his position or increasing his income, why should the statesman shrink from such sacrifices as the average war demands, if thereby the great interests which have been confided to him can be advanced? if it be true, as even the pacifist admits that it may be true, that the tangible material interests of a nation can be advanced by warfare; if, in other words, warfare can play some large part in the protection of the interests of humanity, the rulers of a courageous people are justified in disregarding the suffering and the sacrifice that it may involve. of course, the pacifist falls back upon the moral plea: we have no right to take by force. but here again the common sense of ordinary humanity does not follow the peace advocate. if the individual manufacturer is entitled to use all the advantages which great financial and industrial resources may give him against a less powerful competitor, if he is entitled, as under our present industrial scheme he is entitled, to overcome competition by a costly and perfected organization of manufacture, of advertisement, of salesmanship, in a trade in which poorer men gain their livelihood, why should not the nation be entitled to overcome the rivalry of other nations by utilizing the force of its public services? it is a commonplace of industrial competition that the "big man" takes advantage of _all_ the weaknesses of the small man--his narrow means, his ill-health even--to undermine and to undersell. if it were true that industrial competition were always merciful, and national or political competition always cruel, the plea of the peace man might be unanswerable; but we know, as a matter of fact, that this is not the case, and, returning to our starting-point, the common man feels that he is obliged to accept the world as he finds it, that struggle and warfare, in one form or another, are among the conditions of life, conditions which he did not make. moreover he is not at all sure that the warfare of arms is necessarily either the hardest or the most cruel form of that struggle which exists throughout the universe. in any case, he is willing to take the risks, because he feels that military predominance gives him a real and tangible advantage, a material advantage translatable into terms of general social well-being, by enlarged commercial opportunities, wider markets, protection against the aggression of commercial rivals, and so on. he faces the risk of war in the same spirit as that in which a sailor or a fisherman faces the risk of drowning, or a miner that of the choke damp, or a doctor that of a fatal disease, because he would rather take the supreme risk than accept for himself and his dependents a lower situation, a narrower and meaner existence, with complete safety. he also asks whether the lower path is altogether free from risks. if he knows much of life he knows that in very many circumstances the bolder way is the safer way. that is why it is that the peace propaganda has so signally failed, and why the public opinion of the countries of europe, far from restraining the tendency of their governments to increase armaments, is pushing them into still greater expenditure. it is universally assumed that national power means national wealth, national advantage; that expanding territory means increased opportunity for industry; that the strong nation can guarantee opportunities for its citizens that the weak nation cannot. the englishman, for instance, believes that his wealth is largely the result of his political power, of his political domination, mainly of his sea power; that germany with her expanding population must feel cramped; that she must fight for elbow-room; and that if he does not defend himself he will illustrate that universal law which makes of every stomach a graveyard. he has a natural preference for being the diner rather than the dinner. as it is universally admitted that wealth and prosperity and well-being go with strength and power and national greatness, he intends, so long as he is able, to maintain that strength and power and greatness, and not to yield it even in the name of altruism. and he will not yield it, because should he do so it would be simply to replace british power and greatness by the power and greatness of some other nation, which he feels sure would do no more for the well-being of civilization as a whole than he is prepared to do. he is persuaded that he can no more yield in the competition of armaments, than as a business man or as a manufacturer he could yield in commercial competition to his rival; that he must fight out his salvation under conditions as he finds them, since he did not make them, and since he cannot change them. admitting his premises--and these premises are the universally accepted axioms of international politics the world over--who shall say that he is wrong? chapter ii the axioms of modern statecraft are the foregoing axioms unchallengeable?--some typical statements of them--german dreams of conquest--mr. frederic harrison on results of defeat of british arms and invasion of england--forty millions starving. are the axioms set out in the last chapter unchallengeable? is it true that the wealth, prosperity and well-being of a nation depend upon its military power, or have necessarily anything whatever to do therewith? can one civilized nation gain moral or material advantage by the military conquest of another? does conquered territory add to the wealth of the conquering nation? is it possible for a nation to "own" the territory of another in the way that a person or corporation would "own" an estate? could germany "take" english trade and colonies by military force? could she turn english colonies into german ones, and win an overseas empire by the sword, as england won hers in the past? does a modern nation need to expand its political boundaries in order to provide for increasing population? if england could conquer germany to-morrow, completely conquer her, reduce her nationality to so much dust, would the ordinary british subject be the better for it? if germany could conquer england, would any ordinary german subject be the better for it? the fact that all these questions have to be answered in the negative, and that a negative answer seems to outrage common sense, shows how much our political axioms are in need of revision. the literature on the subject leaves no doubt whatever that i have correctly stated the premises of the matter in the foregoing chapter. those whose special vocation is the philosophy of statecraft in the international field, from aristotle and plato, passing by machiavelli and clausewitz down to mr. roosevelt and the german emperor, have left us in no doubt whatever on the point. the whole view has been admirably summarized by two notable writers--admiral mahan, on the anglo-saxon side, and baron karl von stengel (second german delegate to the first hague conference) on the german. admiral mahan says: the old predatory instinct that he should take who has the power survives ... and moral force is not sufficient to determine issues unless supported by physical. governments are corporations, and corporations have no souls; governments, moreover, are trustees, and as such must put first the lawful interests of their wards--their own people.... more and more germany needs the assured importation of raw materials, and, where possible, control of regions productive of such materials. more and more she requires assured markets and security as to the importation of food, since less and less comparatively is produced within her own borders by her rapidly increasing population. this all means security at sea.... yet the supremacy of great britain in european seas means a perpetually latent control of german commerce.... the world has long been accustomed to the idea of a predominant naval power, coupling it with the name of great britain, and it has been noted that such power, when achieved, is commonly often associated with commercial and industrial predominance, the struggle for which is now in progress between great britain and germany. such predominance forces a nation to seek markets, and, where possible, to control them to its own advantage by preponderant force, the ultimate expression of which is possession.... from this flow two results: the attempt to possess and the organization of force by which to maintain possession already achieved.... this statement is simply a specific formulation of the general necessity stated; it is an inevitable link in the chain of logical sequences--industrial markets, control, navy bases....[ ] but in order to show that this is no special view, and that this philosophy does indeed represent the general public opinion of europe, the opinion of the great mass which prompts the actions of governments and explains their respective policies, i take the following from the current newspapers and reviews ready to my hand: it is the prowess of our navy ... our dominant position at sea ... which has built up the british empire and its commerce.--london _times_ leading article. because her commerce is infinitely vulnerable, and because her people are dependent upon that commerce for food and the wages with which to buy it.... britain wants a powerful fleet, a perfect organization behind the fleet, and an army of defence. until they are provided this country will exist under perpetual menace from the growing fleet of german _dreadnoughts_, which have made the north sea their parade-ground. all security will disappear, and british commerce and industry, when no man knows what the morrow will bring forth, must rapidly decline, thus accentuating british national degeneracy and decadence.--h.w. wilson in the _national review_, may, . sea-power is the last fact which stands between germany and the supreme position in international commerce. at present germany sends only some fifty million pounds worth, or about a seventh, of her total domestic produce to the markets of the world outside europe and the united states.... does any man who understands the subject think there is any power in germany, or, indeed, any power in the world, which can prevent germany, she having thus accomplished the first stage of her work, from now closing with great britain for her ultimate share of this millions of overseas trade? here it is that we unmask the shadow which looms like a real presence behind all the moves of present-day diplomacy, and behind all the colossal armaments that indicate the present preparations for a new struggle for sea-power.--mr. benjamin kidd in the _fortnightly review_, april , . it is idle to talk of "limitation of armaments" unless the nations of the earth will unanimously consent to lay aside all selfish ambitions.... nations, like individuals, concern themselves chiefly with their own interests, and when these clash with those of others, quarrels are apt to follow. if the aggrieved party is the weaker he usually goes to the wall, though "right" be never so much on his side; and the stronger, whether he be the aggressor or not, usually has his own way. in international politics charity begins at home, and quite properly; the duty of a statesman is to think first of the interests of his own country.--_united service magazine_, may, . why should germany attack britain? because germany and britain are commercial and political rivals; because germany covets the trade, the colonies, and the empire which britain now possesses.--robert blatchford, "germany and england," p. . great britain, with her present population, exists by virtue of her foreign trade and her control of the carrying trade of the world; defeat in war would mean the transference of both to other hands and consequent starvation for a large percentage of the wage-earners.--t.g. martin in the london _world_. we offer an enormously rich prize if we are not able to defend out shores; we may be perfectly certain that the prize which we offer will go into the mouth of somebody powerful enough to overcome our resistance and to swallow a considerable portion of us up.--the speaker of the house of commons in a speech at greystoke, reported by the london _times_. what is good for the beehive is good for the bee. whatever brings rich lands, new ports, or wealthy industrial areas to a state enriches its treasury, and therefore the nation at large, and therefore the individual.--mr. douglas owen in a letter to the _economist_, may , . do not forget that in war there is no such thing as international law, and that undefended wealth will be seized wherever it is exposed, whether through the broken pane of a jeweller's window or owing to the obsession of a humanitarian celt.--london _referee_, november , . we appear to have forgotten the fundamental truth--confirmed by all history--that the warlike races inherit the earth, and that nature decrees the survival of the fittest in the never-ending struggle for existence.... our yearning for disarmament, our respect for the tender plant of non-conformist conscience, and the parrot-like repetition of the misleading formula that the "greatest of all british interests is peace" ... must inevitably give to any people who covet our wealth and our possessions ... the ambition to strike a swift and deadly blow at the heart of the empire--undefended london.--_blackwood's magazine_, may, . these are taken from english sources, but there is not a straw to choose between them and other european opinion on the subject. admiral mahan and the other anglo-saxons of his school have their counterpart in every european country, but more especially in germany. even so "liberal" a statesman as baron karl von stengel, the german delegate to the first hague peace conference, lays it down in his book that-- every great power must employ its efforts towards exercising the largest influence possible, not only in european but in world politics, and this mainly because economic power depends in the last resort on political power, and because the largest participation possible in the trade of the world is a vital question for every nation. the writings of such classic authorities as clausewitz give full confirmation of this view, while it is the resounding note of most popular german political literature that deals with "weltpolitik." grand admiral von koster, president of the navy league, writes: the steady increase of our population compels us to devote special attention to the growth of our overseas interests. nothing but the strong fulfilment of our naval programme can create for us that importance upon the free-world-sea which it is incumbent upon us to demand. the steady increase of our population compels us to set ourselves new goals and to grow from a continental into a world power. our mighty industry must aspire to new overseas conquests. our world trade--which has more than doubled in twenty years, which has increased from million dollars to million dollars during the ten years in which our naval programme was fixed, and million dollars of which is sea-borne commerce--only can flourish if we continue honorably to bear the burdens of our armaments on land and sea alike. unless our children are to accuse us of short-sightedness, it is now our duty to secure our world power and position among other nations. we can do that only under the protection of a strong german fleet, a fleet which shall guarantee us peace with honor for the distant future. one popular german writer sees the possibility of "overthrowing the british empire" and "wiping it from the map of the world in less than twenty-four hours." (i quote his actual words, and i have heard a parallel utterance from the mouth of a serious english public man.) the author in question, in order to show how the thing could come about, deals with the matter prophetically. writing from the standpoint of ,[ ] he admits that-- at the beginning of the twentieth century great britain was a free, a rich, and a happy country, in which every citizen, from the prime minister to the dock-laborer, was proud to be a member of the world-ruling nation. at the head of the state were men possessing a general mandate to carry out their programme of government, whose actions were subject to the criticism of public opinion, represented by an independent press. educated for centuries in self-government, a race had grown up which seemed born to rule. the highest triumphs attended england's skill in the art of government, in her handling of subject peoples.... and this immense empire, which stretched from the cape to cairo, over the southern half of asia, over half of north america and the fifth continent, could be wiped from the map of the world in less than twenty-four hours! this apparently inexplicable fact will be intelligible if we keep in sight the circumstances which rendered possible the building up of england's colonial power. the true basis of her world supremacy was not her own strength, but the maritime weakness of all the other european nations. their almost complete lack of naval preparations had given the english a position of monopoly which was used by them for the annexation of all those dominions which seemed of value. had it been in england's power to keep the rest of the world as it was in the nineteenth century, the british empire might have continued for an unlimited time. the awakening of the continental states to their national possibilities and to political independence introduced quite new factors into weltpolitik, and it was only a question of time as to how long england could maintain her position in the face of the changed circumstances. and the writer tells how the trick was done, thanks to a fog, efficient espionage, the bursting of the english war balloon, and the success of the german one in dropping shells at the correct tactical moment on to the british ships in the north sea: this war, which was decided by a naval battle lasting a single hour, was of only three weeks' duration--hunger forced england into peace. in her conditions germany showed a wise moderation. in addition to a war indemnity in accordance with the wealth of the two conquered states, she contented herself with the acquisition of the african colonies, with the exception of the southern states, which had proclaimed their independence, and these possessions were divided with the other two powers of the triple alliance. nevertheless, this war was the end of england. a lost battle had sufficed to manifest to the world at large the feet of clay on which the dreaded colossus had stood. in a night the british empire had crumbled altogether; the pillars which english diplomacy had erected after years of labour had failed at the first test. a glance at any average pan-germanist organ will reveal immediately how very nearly the foregoing corresponds to a somewhat prevalent type of political aspiration in germany. one pan-germanist writer says: "the future of germany demands the absorption of austria-hungary, the balkan states, and turkey, with the north sea ports. her realms will stretch towards the east from berlin to bagdad, and to antwerp on the west." for the moment we are assured there is no immediate intention of seizing the countries in question, nor is germany's hand actually ready yet to catch belgium and holland within the net of the federated empire. "but," he says, "all these changes will happen within our epoch," and he fixes the time when the map of europe will thus be rearranged as from twenty to thirty years hence. germany, according to the writer, means to fight while she has a penny left and a man to carry arms, for she is, he says, "face to face with a crisis which is more serious than even that of jena." and, recognizing the position, she is only waiting for the moment she judges the right one to break in pieces those of her neighbors who work against her. france will be her first victim, and she will not wait to be attacked. she is, indeed, preparing for the moment when the allied powers attempt to dictate to her. germany, it would seem, has already decided to annex the grand duchy of luxemburg, and belgium, incidentally with, of course, antwerp, and will add all the northern provinces of france to her possessions, so as to secure boulogne and calais. all this is to come like a thunderbolt, and russia, spain, and the rest of the powers friendly to england will not dare to move a finger to aid her. the possession of the coasts of france and belgium will dispose of england's supremacy for ever. in a book on south africa entitled "reisen erlebnisse und beobachtungen," by dr. f. bachmar, occurs the passage: "my second object in writing this book is that it may happen to our children's children to possess that beautiful and unhappy land of whose final absorption (_gewinnung_) by our anglo-saxon cousins i have not the least belief. it may be our lot to unite this land with the german fatherland, to be equally a blessing to germany and south africa." the necessity for armament is put in other than fictional form by so serious a writer as dr. gaevernitz, pro-rector of the university of freiburg. dr. schulze-gaevernitz is not unknown in england, nor is he imbued with inimical feelings towards her. but he takes the view that the commercial prosperity of germany depends upon her political domination.[ ] after having described in an impressive way the astonishing growth of germany's trade and commerce, and shown how dangerous a competitor germany has become for england, he returns to the old question, and asks what might happen if england, unable to keep down the inconvenient upstart by economic means, should, at the eleventh hour, try to knock him down. quotations from the _national review_, the _observer_, the _outlook_, the _saturday review_, etc., facilitate the professor's thesis that this presumption is more than a mere abstract speculation. granted that they voice only the sentiments of a small minority, they are, according to our author, dangerous for germany in this--that they point to a feasible and consequently enticing solution. the old peaceful free trade, he says, shows signs of senility. a new and rising imperialism is everywhere inclined to throw the weapons of political warfare into the arena of economic rivalry. how deeply the danger is felt even by those who sincerely desire peace and can in no sense be considered jingoes may be judged by the following from the pen of mr. frederic harrison. i make no apology for giving the quotations at some length. in a letter to the london _times_ he says: whenever our empire and maritime ascendancy are challenged it will be by such an invasion in force as was once designed by philip and parma, and again by napoleon. it is this certainty which compels me to modify the anti-militarist policy which i have consistently maintained for forty years past.... to me now it is no question of loss of prestige--no question of the shrinkage of the empire; it is our existence as a foremost european power, and even as a thriving nation.... if ever our naval defence were broken through, our navy overwhelmed or even dispersed for a season, and a military occupation of our arsenals, docks, and capital were effected, the ruin would be such as modern history cannot parallel. it would not be the empire, but britain, that would be destroyed.... the occupation by a foreign invader of our arsenals, docks, cities, and capital would be to the empire what the bursting of the boilers would be to a _dreadnought_. capital would disappear with the destruction of credit.... a catastrophe so appalling cannot be left to chance, even if the probabilities against its occurring were to . but the odds are not to . no high authority ventures to assert that a successful invasion of our country is absolutely impossible if it were assisted by extraordinary conditions. and a successful invasion would mean to us the total collapse of our empire, our trade, and, with trade, the means of feeding forty millions in these islands. if it is asked, "why does invasion threaten more terrible consequences to us than it does to our neighbors?" the answer is that the british empire is an anomalous structure, without any real parallel in modern history, except in the history of portugal, venice, and holland, and in ancient history athens and carthage. our empire presents special conditions both for attack and for destruction. and its destruction by an enemy seated on the thames would have consequences so awful to contemplate that it cannot be left to be safeguarded by one sole line of defence, however good, and for the present hour however adequate.... for more than forty years i have raised my voice against every form of aggression, of imperial expansion, and continental militarism. few men have more earnestly protested against postponing social reforms and the well-being of the people to imperial conquests and asiatic and african adventures. i do not go back on a word that i have uttered thereon. but how hollow is all talk about industrial reorganization until we have secured our country against a catastrophe that would involve untold destitution and misery on the people in the mass--which would paralyze industry and raise food to famine prices, whilst closing our factories and our yards! chapter iii the great illusion these views founded on a gross and dangerous misconception--what a german victory could and could not accomplish--what an english victory could and could not accomplish--the optical illusion of conquest--there can be no transfer of wealth--the prosperity of the little states in europe--german three per cents. at and belgian at --russian three and a half per cents. at , norwegian at --what this really means--if germany annexed holland, would any german benefit or any hollander?--the "cash value" of alsace-lorraine. i think it will be admitted that there is not much chance of misunderstanding the general idea embodied in the passage quoted at the end of the last chapter. mr. harrison is especially definite. at the risk of "damnable iteration" i would again recall the fact that he is merely expressing one of the universally accepted axioms of european politics, namely, that a nation's financial and industrial stability, its security in commercial activity--in short, its prosperity and well being depend, upon its being able to defend itself against the aggression of other nations, who will, if they are able, be tempted to commit such aggression because in so doing they will increase their power, prosperity and well-being, at the cost of the weaker and vanquished. i have quoted, it is true, largely journalistic authorities because i desired to indicate real public opinion, not merely scholarly opinion. but mr. harrison has the support of other scholars of all sorts. thus mr. spenser wilkinson, chichele professor of military history at oxford, and a deservedly respected authority on the subject, confirms in almost every point in his various writings the opinions that i have quoted, and gives emphatic confirmation to all that mr. frederic harrison has expressed. in his book, "britain at bay," professor wilkinson says: "no one thought when in the american observer, captain mahan, published his volume on the influence of sea-power upon history, that other nations beside the british read from that book the lesson that victory at sea carried with it a prosperity and influence and a greatness obtainable by no other means." well, it is the object of these pages to show that this all but universal idea, of which mr. harrison's letter is a particularly vivid expression, is a gross and desperately dangerous misconception, partaking at times of the nature of an optical illusion, at times of the nature of a superstition--a misconception not only gross and universal, but so profoundly mischievous as to misdirect an immense part of the energies of mankind, and to misdirect them to such degree that unless we liberate ourselves from this superstition civilization itself will be threatened. and one of the most extraordinary features of this whole question is that the absolute demonstration of the falsity of this idea, the complete exposure of the illusion which gives it birth, is neither abstruse nor difficult. this demonstration does not repose upon any elaborately constructed theorem, but upon the simple exposition of the political facts of europe as they exist to-day. these facts, which are incontrovertible, and which i shall elaborate presently, may be summed up in a few simple propositions stated thus: . an extent of devastation, even approximating to that which mr. harrison foreshadows as the result of the conquest of great britain, could only be inflicted by an invader as a means of punishment costly to himself, or as the result of an unselfish and expensive desire to inflict misery for the mere joy of inflicting it. since trade depends upon the existence of natural wealth and a population capable of working it, an invader cannot "utterly destroy it," except by destroying the population, which is not practicable. if he could destroy the population he would thereby destroy his own market, actual or potential, which would be commercially suicidal.[ ] . if an invasion of great britain by germany did involve, as mr. harrison and those who think with him say it would, the "total collapse of the empire, our trade, and the means of feeding forty millions in these islands ... the disturbance of capital and destruction of credit," german capital would also be disturbed, because of the internationalization and delicate interdependence of our credit-built finance and industry, and german credit would also collapse, and the only means of restoring it would be for germany to put an end to the chaos in england by putting an end to the condition which had produced it. moreover, because of this delicate interdependence of our credit-built finance, the confiscation by an invader of private property, whether stocks, shares, ships, mines, or anything more valuable than jewellery or furniture--anything, in short, which is bound up with the economic life of the people--would so react upon the finance of the invader's country as to make the damage to the invader resulting from the confiscation exceed in value the property confiscated. so that germany's success in conquest would be a demonstration of the complete economic futility of conquest. . for allied reasons, in our day the exaction of tribute from a conquered people has become an economic impossibility; the exaction of a large indemnity so costly directly and indirectly as to be an extremely disadvantageous financial operation. . it is a physical and economic impossibility to capture the external or carrying trade of another nation by military conquest. large navies are impotent to create trade for the nations owning them, and can do nothing to "confine the commercial rivalry" of other nations. nor can a conqueror destroy the competition of a conquered nation by annexation; his competitors would still compete with him--_i.e._, if germany conquered holland, german merchants would still have to meet the competition of dutch merchants, and on keener terms than originally, because the dutch merchants would then be within the german's customs lines; the notion that the trade competition of rivals can be disposed of by conquering those rivals being one of the illustrations of the curious optical illusion which lies behind the misconception dominating this subject. . the wealth, prosperity, and well-being of a nation depend in no way upon its political power; otherwise we should find the commercial prosperity and social well-being of the smaller nations, which exercise no political power, manifestly below that of the great nations which control europe, whereas this is not the case. the populations of states like switzerland, holland, belgium, denmark, sweden, are in every way as prosperous as the citizens of states like germany, russia, austria, and france. the wealth _per capita_ of the small nations is in many cases in excess of that of the great nations. not only the question of the security of small states, which, it might be urged, is due to treaties of neutrality, is here involved, but the question of whether political power can be turned in a positive sense to economic advantage. . no other nation could gain any advantage by the conquest of the british colonies, and great britain could not suffer material damage by their loss, however much such loss would be regretted on sentimental grounds, and as rendering less easy a certain useful social co-operation between kindred peoples. the use, indeed, of the word "loss" is misleading. great britain does not "own" her colonies. they are, in fact, independent nations in alliance with the mother country, to whom they are no source of tribute or economic profit (except as foreign nations are a source of profit), their economic relations being settled, not by the mother country, but by the colonies. economically, england would gain by their formal separation, since she would be relieved of the cost of their defence. their "loss" involving, therefore, no change in economic fact (beyond saving the mother country the cost of their defence), could not involve the ruin of the empire, and the starvation of the mother country, as those who commonly treat of such a contingency are apt to aver. as england is not able to exact tribute or economic advantage, it is inconceivable that any other country, necessarily less experienced in colonial management, would be able to succeed where england had failed, especially in view of the past history of the spanish, portuguese, french, and british colonial empires. this history also demonstrates that the position of british crown colonies, in the respect which we are considering, is not sensibly different from that of the self-governing ones. it is _not_ to be presumed, therefore, that any european nation, realizing the facts, would attempt the desperately expensive business of the conquest of england for the purpose of making an experiment which all colonial history shows to be doomed to failure. the foregoing propositions traverse sufficiently the ground covered in the series of those typical statements of policy, both english and german, from which i have quoted. the simple statement of these propositions, based as they are upon the self-evident facts of present-day european politics, sufficiently exposes the nature of those political axioms which i have quoted. but as men even of the calibre of mr. harrison normally disregard these self-evident facts, it is necessary to elaborate them at somewhat greater length. for the purpose of presenting a due parallel to the statement of policy embodied in the quotations made from the london _times_ and mr. harrison and others, i have divided the propositions which i desire to demonstrate into seven clauses, but such a division is quite arbitrary, and made only in order to bring about the parallel in question. the whole seven can be put into one, as follows: that as the only possible policy in our day for a conqueror to pursue is to leave the wealth of a territory in the complete possession of the individuals inhabiting that territory, it is a logical fallacy and an optical illusion to regard a nation as increasing its wealth when it increases its territory; because when a province or state is annexed, the population, who are the real and only owners of the wealth therein, are also annexed, and the conqueror gets nothing. the facts of modern history abundantly demonstrate this. when germany annexed schleswig-holstein and alsatia not a single ordinary german citizen was one _pfennig_ the richer. although england "owns" canada, the english merchant is driven out of the canadian markets by the merchant of switzerland, who does not "own" canada. even where territory is not formally annexed, the conqueror is unable to take the wealth of a conquered territory, owing to the delicate interdependence of the financial world (an outcome of our credit and banking systems), which makes the financial and industrial security of the victor dependent upon financial and industrial security in all considerable civilized centres; so that widespread confiscation or destruction of trade and commerce in a conquered territory would react disastrously upon the conqueror. the conqueror is thus reduced to economic impotence, which means that political and military power is economically futile--that is to say, can do nothing for the trade and well-being of the individuals exercising such power. conversely, armies and navies cannot destroy the trade of rivals, nor can they capture it. the great nations of europe do not destroy the trade of the small nations for their own benefit, because they cannot; and the dutch citizen, whose government possesses no military power, is just as well off as the german citizen, whose government possesses an army of two million men, and a great deal better off than the russian, whose government possesses an army of something like four million. thus, as a rough-and-ready though incomplete indication of the relative wealth and security of the respective states, the three per cents. of powerless belgium are quoted at , and the three per cents. of powerful germany at ; the three and a half per cents. of the russian empire, with its hundred and twenty million souls and its four million army, are quoted at , while the three and a half per cents. of norway, which has not an army at all (or any that need be considered in this discussion), are quoted at . all of which carries with it the paradox that the more a nation's wealth is militarily protected the less secure does it become.[ ] the late lord salisbury, speaking to a delegation of business men, made this notable observation: the conduct of men of affairs acting individually in their business capacity differs radically in its principles and application from the conduct of the same men when they act collectively in political affairs. and one of the most astonishing things in politics is the little trouble business men take to bring their political creed into keeping with their daily behavior; how little, indeed, they realize the political implication of their daily work. it is a case, indeed, of the forest and the trees. but for some such phenomenon we certainly should not see the contradiction between the daily practice of the business world and the prevailing political philosophy, which the security of property in, and the high prosperity of, the smaller states involves. we are told by all the political experts that great navies and great armies are necessary to protect our wealth against the aggression of powerful neighbors, whose cupidity and voracity can be controlled by force alone; that treaties avail nothing, and that in international politics might makes right, that military and commercial security are identical, that armaments are justified by the necessity of commercial security; that our navy is an "insurance," and that a country without military power with which their diplomats can "bargain" in the council of europe is at a hopeless disadvantage economically. yet when the investor, studying the question in its purely financial and material aspect, has to decide between the great states, with all their imposing paraphernalia of colossal armies and fabulously costly navies, and the little states, possessing relatively no military power whatever, he plumps solidly, and with what is in the circumstances a tremendous difference, in favor of the small and helpless. for a difference of twenty points, which we find as between norwegian and russian, and fourteen as between belgian and german securities, is the difference between a safe and a speculative one--the difference between an american railroad bond in time of profound security and in time of widespread panic. and what is true of the government funds is true, in an only slightly less degree, of the industrial securities in the national comparison just drawn. is it a sort of altruism or quixotism which thus impels the capitalists of europe to conclude that the public funds and investments of powerless holland and sweden (any day at the mercy of their big neighbors) are to per cent. safer than those of the greatest power of continental europe. the question is, of course, absurd. the only consideration of the financier is profit and security, and he has decided that the funds of the undefended nation are more secure than the funds of one defended by colossal armaments. how does he arrive at this decision, unless it be through his knowledge as a financier, which, of course, he exercises without reference to the political implication of his decision, that modern wealth requires no defence, because it cannot be confiscated? if mr. harrison is right; if, as he implies, a nation's commerce, its very industrial existence, would disappear if it allowed neighbors who envied it that commerce to become its superiors in armaments, and to exercise political weight in the world, how does he explain the fact that the great powers of the continent are flanked by little nations far weaker than themselves having nearly always a commercial development equal to, and in most cases greater than theirs? if the common doctrines be true, the financiers would not invest a dollar in the territories of the undefended nations, and yet, far from that being the case, they consider that a swiss or a dutch investment is more secure than a german one; that industrial undertakings in a country like switzerland defended by an army of a few thousand men, are preferable in point of security to enterprises backed by two millions of the most perfectly trained soldiers in the world. the attitude of european finance in this matter is the absolute condemnation of the view commonly taken by the statesman. if a country's trade were really at the mercy of the first successful invader; if armies and navies were really necessary for the protection and promotion of trade, the small countries would be in a hopelessly inferior position, and could only exist on the sufferance of what we are told are unscrupulous aggressors. and yet norway has relatively to population a greater carrying trade than great britain,[ ] and dutch, swiss, and belgian merchants compete in all the markets of the world successfully with those of germany and france. the prosperity of the small states is thus a fact which proves a good deal more than that wealth can be secure without armaments. we have seen that the exponents of the orthodox statecraft--notably such authorities as admiral mahan--plead that armaments are a necessary part of the industrial struggle, that they are used as a means of exacting economic advantage for a nation which would be impossible without them. "the logical sequence," we are told, is "markets, control, navy, bases." the nation without political and military power is, we are assured, at a hopeless disadvantage economically and industrially.[ ] well, the relative economic situation of the small states gives the lie to this profound philosophy. it is seen to be just learned nonsense when we realize that all the might of russia or germany cannot secure for the individual citizen better general economic conditions than those prevalent in the little states. the citizens of switzerland, belgium, or holland, countries without "control," or navy, or bases, or "weight in the councils of europe," or the "prestige of a great power," are just as well off as germans, and a great deal better off than austrians or russians. thus, even if it could be argued that the security of the small states is due to the various treaties guaranteeing their neutrality, it cannot be argued that those treaties give them the political power and "control" and "weight in the councils of the nations" which admiral mahan and the other exponents of the orthodox statecraft assure us are such necessary factors in national prosperity. i want, with all possible emphasis, to indicate the limits of the argument that i am trying to enforce. that argument is not that the facts just cited show armaments or the absence of them to be the sole or even the determining factor in national wealth. it does show that the security of wealth is due to other things than armaments; that absence of political and military power is on the one hand no obstacle to, and on the other hand no guarantee of, prosperity; that the mere size of the administrative area has no relation to the wealth of those inhabiting it. those who argue that the security of the small states is due to the international treaties protecting their neutrality are precisely those who argue that treaty rights are things that can never give security! thus one british military writer says: the principle practically acted on by statesmen, though, of course, not openly admitted, is that frankly enunciated by machiavelli: "a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against his interests, and when the reasons which made him bind himself no longer exist." prince bismarck said practically the same thing, only not quite so nakedly. the european waste-paper basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way, and a thing which can any day be placed in a waste-paper basket is a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. yet there are plenty of people in this country who quote treaties to us as if we could depend on their never being torn up. very plausible and very dangerous people they are--idealists too good and innocent for a hard, cruel world, where force is the chief law. yet there are some such innocent people in parliament even at present. it is to be hoped that we shall see none of them there in future.[ ] major murray is right to this extent: the militarist view, the view of those who "believe in war," and defend it even on moral grounds as a thing without which men would be "sordid," supports this philosophy of force, which flourishes in the atmosphere which the militarist regimen engenders. but the militarist view involves a serious dilemma. if the security of a nation's wealth can only be assured by force, and treaty rights are mere waste paper, how can we explain the evident security of the wealth of states possessing relatively no force? by the mutual jealousies of those guaranteeing their neutrality? then that mutual jealousy could equally well guarantee the security of any one of the larger states against the rest. another englishman, mr. farrer, has put the case thus: if that recent agreement between england, germany, france, denmark, and holland can so effectively relieve denmark and holland from the fear of invasion that denmark can seriously consider the actual abolition of her army and navy, it seems only one further step to go, for all the powers collectively, great and small, to guarantee the territorial independence of each one of them severally. in either case, the plea of the militarist stands condemned: national safety can be secured by means other than military force. but the real truth involves a distinction which is essential to the right understanding of this phenomenon: the political security of the small states is _not_ assured; no man would take heavy odds on holland being able to maintain complete political independence if germany cared seriously to threaten it. but holland's economic security _is_ assured. every financier in europe knows that if germany conquered holland or belgium to-morrow, she would have to leave their wealth untouched; there could be no confiscation. and that is why the stocks of the lesser states, not in reality threatened by confiscation, yet relieved in part at least of the charge of armaments, stand fifteen to twenty points higher than those of the military states. belgium, politically, might disappear to-morrow; her wealth would remain practically unchanged. yet, by one of those curious contradictions we are frequently meeting in the development of ideas, while a fact like this is at least subconsciously recognized by those whom it concerns, the necessary corollary of it--the positive form of the merely negative truth that a community's wealth cannot be stolen--is not recognized. we admit that a people's wealth must remain unaffected by conquest, and yet we are quite prepared to urge that we can enrich ourselves by conquering them! but if we must leave their wealth alone, how can we take it? i do not speak merely of "loot." it is evident, even on cursory examination, that no real advantage of any kind is achieved for the mass of one people by the conquest of another. yet that end is set up in european politics as desirable beyond all others. here, for instance, are the pan-germanists of germany. this party has set before itself the object of grouping into one great power all the peoples of the germanic race or language in europe. were this aim achieved, germany would become the dominating power of the continent, and might become the dominating power of the world. and according to the commonly accepted view, such an achievement would, from the point of view of germany, be worth any sacrifice that germans could make. it would be an object so great, so desirable, that german citizens should not hesitate for an instant to give everything, life itself, in its accomplishment. very good. let us assume that at the cost of great sacrifice, the greatest sacrifice which it is possible to imagine a modern civilized nation making, this has been accomplished, and that belgium and holland and germany, switzerland and austria, have all become part of the great german hegemony: _is there one ordinary german citizen who would be able to say that his well-being had been increased by such a change_? germany would then "own" holland. _but would a single german citizen be the richer for the ownership?_ the hollander, from having been the citizen of a small and insignificant state, would become the citizen of a very great one. _would the individual hollander be any the richer or any the better?_ we know that, as a matter of fact, neither the german nor the hollander would be one whit the better; and we know also, as a matter of fact, that in all probability they would be a great deal the worse. we may, indeed, say that the hollander would be certainly the worse, in that he would have exchanged the relatively light taxation and light military service of holland for the much heavier taxation and the much longer military service of the "great" german empire. the following, which appeared in the london _daily mail_ in reply to an article in that paper, throws some further light on the points elaborated in this chapter. the _daily mail_ critic had placed alsace-lorraine as an asset in the german conquest worth $ , , "cash value," and added: "if alsace-lorraine had remained french, it would have yielded, at the present rate of french taxation, a revenue of $ , , a year to the state. that revenue is lost to france, and is placed at the disposal of germany." to which i replied: thus, if we take the interest of the "cash value" at the present price of money in germany, alsace-lorraine should be worth to the germans about $ , , a year. if we take the other figure, $ , , . suppose we split the difference, and take, say, . now, if the germans are enriched by millions a year--if alsace-lorraine is really worth that income to the german people--how much should the english people draw from their "possessions"? on the basis of population, somewhere in the region of $ , , , ; on the basis of area, still more--enough not only to pay all english taxes, wipe out the national debt, support the army and navy, but give every family in the land a fat income into the bargain. there is evidently something wrong. does not my critic really see that this whole notion of national possessions benefiting the individual is founded on mystification, upon an illusion? germany conquered france and annexed alsace-lorraine. the "germans" consequently "own" it, and enrich themselves with this newly acquired wealth. that is my critic's view, as it is the view of most european statesmen; and it is all false. alsace-lorraine is owned by its inhabitants, and nobody else; and germany, with all her ruthlessness, has not been able to dispossess them, as is proved by the fact that the matricular contribution (_matrikularbeitrag_) of the newly acquired state to the imperial treasury (which incidentally is neither millions nor , but just over five) is fixed on exactly the same scale as that of the other states of the empire. prussia, the conqueror, pays _per capita_ just as much as and no less than alsace, the conquered, who, if she were not paying this $ , , to germany, would be paying it--or, according to my critic, a much larger sum--to france; and if germany did not "own" alsace-lorraine, she would be relieved of charges that amount not to five but many more millions. the change of "ownership" does not therefore of itself change the money position (which is what we are now discussing) of either owner or owned. in examining, in the last article on this matter, my critic's balance-sheet, i remarked that were his figures as complete as they are absurdly incomplete and misleading, i should still have been unimpressed. we all know that very marvellous results are possible with figures; but one can generally find some simple fact which puts them to the supreme test without undue mathematics. i do not know whether it has ever happened to my critic, as it has happened to me, while watching the gambling in the casino of a continental watering resort, to have a financial genius present weird columns of figures, which demonstrate conclusively, irrefragably, that by the system which they embody one can break the bank and win a million. i have never examined these figures, and never shall, for this reason: the genius in question is prepared to sell his wonderful secret for twenty francs. now, in the face of that fact i am not interested in his figures. if they were worth examination they would not be for sale. and so in this matter there are certain test facts which upset the adroitest statistical legerdemain. though, really, the fallacy which regards an addition of territory as an addition of wealth to the "owning" nation is a very much simpler matter than the fallacies lying behind gambling systems, which are bound up with the laws of chance and the law of averages and much else that philosophers will quarrel about till the end of time. it requires an exceptional mathematical brain to refute those fallacies, whereas the one we are dealing with is due simply to the difficulty experienced by most of us in carrying in our heads two facts at the same time. it is so much easier to seize on one fact and forget the other. thus we realize that when germany has conquered alsace-lorraine she has "captured" a province worth, "cash value," in my critic's phrase, $ , , . what we overlook is that germany has also captured the people who own the property and who continue to own it. we have multiplied by _x_, it is true, but we have overlooked the fact that we have had to divide by _x_, and that the result is consequently, so far as the individual is concerned, exactly what it was before. my critic remembered the multiplication all right, but he forgot the division. let us apply the test fact. if a great country benefits every time it annexes a province, and her people are the richer for the widened territory, the small nations ought to be immeasurably poorer than the great, instead of which, by every test which you like to apply--public credit, amounts in savings banks, standard of living, social progress, general well-being--citizens of small states are, other things being equal, as well off as, or better off than, the citizens of great states. the citizens of countries like holland, belgium, denmark, sweden, norway are, by every possible test, just as well off as the citizens of countries like germany, austria, or russia. these are the facts which are so much more potent than any theory. if it is true that a country benefits by the acquisition of territory, and widened territory means general well-being, why do the facts so eternally deny it? there is something wrong with the theory. in every civilized state, revenues which are drawn from a territory are expended on that territory, and there is no process known to modern government by which wealth may first be drawn from a territory into the treasury and then be redistributed with a profit to the individuals who have contributed it, or to others. it would be just as reasonable to say that the citizens of london are richer than the citizens of birmingham because london has a richer treasury; or that londoners would become richer if the london county council were to annex the county of hertford; as to say that people's wealth varies according to the size of the administrative area which they inhabit. the whole thing is, as i have called it, an optical illusion, due to the hypnotism of an obsolete terminology. just as poverty may be greater in the large city than in the small one, and taxation heavier, so the citizens of a great state may be poorer than the citizens of a small one, as they very often are. modern government is mainly, and tends to become entirely, a matter of administration. a mere jugglery with the administrative entities, the absorption of small states into large ones, or the breaking up of large states into small, is not of itself going to affect the matter one way or the other. chapter iv the impossibility of confiscation our present terminology of international politics an historical survival--wherein modern conditions differ from ancient--the profound change effected by division of labor--the delicate interdependence of international finance--attila and the kaiser--what would happen if a german invader looted the bank of england--german trade dependent upon english credit--confiscation of an enemy's property an economic impossibility under modern conditions--intangibility of a community's wealth. during the victorian jubilee procession an english beggar was heard to say: i own australia, canada, new zealand, india, burmah, and the islands of the far pacific; and i am starving for want of a crust of bread. i am a citizen of the greatest power of the modern world, and all people should bow to my greatness. and yesterday i cringed for alms to a negro savage, who repulsed me with disgust. what is the meaning of this? the meaning is that, as very frequently happens in the history of ideas, our terminology is a survival of conditions no longer existing, and our mental conceptions follow at the tail of our vocabulary. international politics are still dominated by terms applicable to conditions which the processes of modern life have altogether abolished. in the roman times--indeed, in all the ancient world--it may have been true that the conquest of a territory meant a tangible advantage to the conqueror; it meant the exploitation of the conquered territory by the conquering state itself, to the advantage of that state and its citizens. it not infrequently meant the enslavement of the conquered people and the acquisition of wealth in the form of slaves as a direct result of the conquering war. in mediæval times a war of conquest meant at least immediate tangible booty in the shape of movable property, actual gold and silver, land parcelled out among the chiefs of the conquering nation, as it was at the norman conquest, and so forth. at a later period conquest at least involved an advantage to the reigning house of the conquering nation, and it was mainly the squabbles of rival sovereigns for prestige and power which produced the wars of many centuries. at a still later period, civilization, as a whole--not necessarily the conquering nation--gained (sometimes) by the conquest of savage peoples, in that order was substituted for disorder. in the period of the colonization of newly-discovered land, the preemption of territory by one particular nation secured an advantage for the citizens of that nation, in that its overflowing population found homes in conditions preferable socially, or politically, to the conditions imposed by alien nations. _but none of these considerations applies to the problem with which we are dealing._ we are concerned with the case of fully civilized rival nations in fully occupied territory or with civilizations so firmly set that conquest could not sensibly modify their character, and the fact of conquering such territory gives to the conqueror no material advantage which he could not have had without conquest. and in these conditions--the realities of the political world as we find it to-day--"domination," or "predominance of armament," or the "command of the sea," can do nothing for commerce and industry or general well-being: england may build fifty _dreadnoughts_ and not sell so much as a penknife the more in consequence. she might conquer germany to-morrow, and she would find that she could not make a single englishman a shilling's worth the richer in consequence, the war indemnity notwithstanding. how have conditions so changed that terms which were applicable to the ancient world--in one sense at least to the mediæval world, and in another sense still to the world of that political renaissance which gave to great britain its empire--are no longer applicable in _any_ sense to the conditions of the world as we find them to-day? how has it become impossible for one nation to take by conquest the wealth of another for the benefit of the people of the conqueror? how is it that we are confronted by the absurdity (which the facts of the british empire go to prove) of the conquering people being able to exact from conquered territory rather less than more advantage than it was able to do before the conquest took place? i am not at this stage going to pass in review all the factors that have contributed to this change, because it will suffice for the demonstration upon which i am now engaged to call attention to a phenomenon which is the outcome of all those factors and which is undeniable, and that is, the financial interdependence of the modern world. but i will forecast here what belongs more properly to a later stage of this work, and will give just a hint of the forces which are the result mainly of one great fact--the division of labor intensified by facility of communication. when the division of labor was so little developed that every homestead produced all that it needed, it mattered nothing if part of the community was cut off from the world for weeks and months at a time. all the neighbors of a village or homestead might be slain or harassed, and no inconvenience resulted. but if to-day an english county is by a general railroad strike cut off for so much as forty-eight hours from the rest of the economic organism, we know that whole sections of its population are threatened with famine. if in the time of the danes, england could by some magic have killed all foreigners, she would presumably have been the better off. if she could do the same thing to-day, half her population would starve to death. if on one side of the frontier a community is, say, wheat-producing, and on the other coal-producing, each is dependent for its very existence, on the fact of the other being able to carry on its labor. the miner cannot in a week set to and grow a crop of wheat; the farmer must wait for his wheat to grow, and must meantime feed his family and dependents. the exchange involved here must go on, and each party have fair expectation that he will in due course be able to reap the fruits of his labor, or both must starve; and that exchange, that expectation, is merely the expression in its simplest form of commerce and credit; and the interdependence here indicated has, by the countless developments of rapid communication, reached such a condition of complexity that the interference with any given operation affects not merely the parties directly involved, but numberless others having at first sight no connection therewith. the vital interdependence here indicated, cutting athwart frontiers, is largely the work of the last forty years; and it has, during that time, so developed as to have set up a financial interdependence of the capitals of the world, so complex that disturbance in new york involves financial and commercial disturbance in london, and, if sufficiently grave, compels financiers of london to co-operate with those of new york to put an end to the crisis, not as a matter of altruism, but as a matter of commercial self-protection. the complexity of modern finance makes new york dependent on london, london upon paris, paris upon berlin, to a greater degree than has ever yet been the case in history. this interdependence is the result of the daily use of those contrivances of civilization which date from yesterday--the rapid post, the instantaneous dissemination of financial and commercial information by means of telegraphy, and generally the incredible increase in the rapidity of communication which has put the half-dozen chief capitals of christendom in closer contact financially, and has rendered them more dependent the one upon the other than were the chief cities of great britain less than a hundred years ago. a well-known french authority, writing recently in a financial publication, makes this reflection: the very rapid development of industry has given rise to the active intervention therein of finance, which has become its _nervus rerum_, and has come to play a dominating rôle. under the influence of finance, industry is beginning to lose its exclusively national character to take on a character more and more international. the animosity of rival nationalities seems to be in process of attenuation as the result of this increasing international solidarity. this solidarity was manifested in a striking fashion in the last industrial and monetary crisis. this crisis, which appeared in its most serious form in the united states and germany, far from being any profit to rival nations, has been injurious to them. the nations competing with america and germany, such as england and france, have suffered only less than the countries directly affected. it must not be forgotten that, quite apart from the financial interests involved, directly or indirectly, in the industry of other countries, every producing country is at one and the same time, as well as being a competitor and a rival, a client and a market. financial and commercial solidarity is increasing every day at the expense of commercial and industrial competition. this was certainly one of the principal causes which a year or two ago prevented the outbreak of war between germany and france _à propos_ of morocco, and which led to the understanding of algeciras. there can be no doubt, for those who have studied the question, that the influence of this international economic solidarity is increasing despite ourselves. it has not resulted from conscious action on the part of any of us, and it certainly cannot be arrested by any conscious action on our part.[ ] a fiery patriot sent to a london paper the following letter: when the german army is looting the cellars of the bank of england, and carrying off the foundations of our whole national fortune, perhaps the twaddlers who are now screaming about the wastefulness of building four more _dreadnoughts_ will understand why sane men are regarding this opposition as treasonable nonsense. what would be the result of such an action on the part of a german army in london? the first effect, of course, would be that, as the bank of england is the banker of all other banks, there would be a run on every bank in england, and all would suspend payment. but london being the clearing-house of the world, bills drawn thereon but held by foreigners would not be met; they would be valueless; the loanable value of money in other centres would be enormously raised, and instruments of credit enormously depreciated; prices of all kinds of stocks would fall, and holders would be threatened by ruin and insolvency. german finance would represent a condition as chaotic as that of england. whatever advantage german credit might gain by holding england's gold it would certainly be more than offset by the fact that it was the ruthless action of the german government that had produced the general catastrophe. a country that could sack bank reserves would be a good one for foreign investors to avoid: the essential of credit is confidence, and those who repudiate it pay dearly for their action. the german generalissimo in london might be no more civilized than attila himself, but he would soon find the difference between himself and attila. attila, luckily for him, did not have to worry about a bank rate and such-like complications; but the german general, while trying to sack the bank of england, would find that his own balance in the bank of germany would have vanished into thin air, and the value of even the best of his investments dwindled as though by a miracle; and that for the sake of loot, amounting to a few sovereigns apiece among his soldiery, he would have sacrificed the greater part of his own personal fortune. it is as certain as anything can be that, were the german army guilty of such economic vandalism, there is no considerable institution in germany that would escape grave damage--a damage in credit and security so serious as to constitute a loss immensely greater[ ] than the value of the loot obtained. it is not putting the case too strongly to say that for every pound taken from the bank of england german trade would pay many times over. the influence of the whole finance of germany would be brought to bear on the german government to put an end to a situation ruinous to german trade, and german finance would only be saved from utter collapse by an undertaking on the part of the german government scrupulously to respect private property, and especially bank reserves. it is true the german jingoes might wonder what they had made war for, and this elementary lesson in international finance would do more than the greatness of the british navy to cool their blood. for it is a fact in human nature that men will fight more readily than they will pay, and that they will take personal risks much more readily than they will disgorge money, or, for that matter, earn it. "man," in the language of bacon, "loves danger better than travail." events which are still fresh in the memory of business men show the extraordinary interdependence of the modern financial world. a financial crisis in new york sends up the english bank rate to per cent., thus involving the ruin of many english businesses which might otherwise have weathered a difficult period. it thus happens that one section of the financial world is, against its will, compelled to come to the rescue of any other considerable section which may be in distress. from a modern and delightfully lucid treatise on international finance,[ ] i take the following very suggestive passages: banking in all countries hangs together so closely that the strength of the best may easily be that of the weakest if scandal arises owing to the mistakes of the worst.... just as a man cycling down a crowded street depends for his life not only on his skill, but more on the course of the traffic there.... banks in berlin were obliged, from motives of self-protection (on the occasion of the wall street crisis), to let some of their gold go to assuage the american craving for it.... if the crisis became so severe that london had to restrict its facilities in this respect, other centres, which habitually keep balances in london which they regard as so much gold, because a draft on london is as good as gold, would find themselves very seriously inconvenienced; and it thus follows that it is to the interest of all other centres which trade on those facilities which london alone gives to take care that london's task is not made too difficult. this is especially so in the case of foreigners, who keep a balance in london which is borrowed. in fact, london drew in the gold required for new york from seventeen other countries.... incidentally it may be mentioned in this connection that german commerce is in a special sense interested in the maintenance of english credit. the authority just quoted says: it is even contended that the rapid expansion of german trade, which pushed itself largely by its elasticity and adaptability to the wishes of its customers, could never have been achieved if it had not been assisted by the large credit furnished in london.... no one can quarrel with the germans for making use of the credit we offered for the expansion of the german trade, although their over-extension of credit facilities has had results which fall on others besides themselves.... let us hope that our german friends are duly grateful, and let us avoid the mistake of supposing that we have done ourselves any permanent harm by giving this assistance. it is to the economic interests of humanity at large that production should be stimulated, and the economic interest of humanity at large is the interest of england, with its mighty world-wide trade. germany has quickened production with the help of english credit, and so has every other economically civilized country in the world. it is a fact that all of them, including our own colonies, develop their resources with the help of british capital and credit, and then do their utmost to keep out our productions by means of tariffs, which make it appear to superficial observers that england provides capital for the destruction of its own business. but in practice the system works quite otherwise, for all these countries that develop their resources with our money aim at developing an export trade and selling goods to us, and as they have not yet reached the point of economic altruism at which they are prepared to sell goods for nothing, the increase in their production means an increasing demand for our commodities and our services. and in the meantime the interest on our capital and credit, and the profits of working the machinery of exchange, are a comfortable addition to our national income. but what is a further corollary of this situation? it is that germany is to-day in a larger sense than she ever was before england's debtor, and that her industrial success is bound up with english financial security. what would be the situation in britain, therefore, on the morrow of a conflict in which that country was successful? i have seen mentioned the possibility of the conquest and annexation of the free port of hamburg by a victorious british fleet. let us assume that the british government has done this, and is proceeding to turn the annexed and confiscated property to account. now, the property was originally of two kinds: part was private property, and part was german government, or rather hamburg government, property. the income of the latter was earmarked for the payment of interest of certain government stock, and the action of the british government, therefore, renders the stock all but valueless, and in the case of the shares of the private companies entirely so. the paper becomes unsaleable. but it is held in various forms--as collateral and otherwise--by many important banking concerns, insurance companies, and so on, and this sudden collapse of value shatters their solvency. their collapse not only involves many credit institutions in germany, but, as these in their turn are considerable debtors of london, english institutions are also involved. london is also involved in another way. as explained previously, many foreign concerns keep balances in london, and the action of the british government having precipitated a monetary crisis in germany, there is a run on london to withdraw all balances. in a double sense london is feeling the pinch, and it would be a miracle if already at this point the whole influence of british finance were not thrown against the action of the british government. assume, however, that the government, making the best of a bad job, continues its administration of the property, and proceeds to arrange for loans for the purpose of putting it once more in good condition after the ravages of war. the banks, however, finding that the original titles have through the action of the british government become waste paper, and british financiers having already burned their fingers with that particular class of property, withhold support, and money is only procurable at extortionate rates of interest--so extortionate that it becomes quite evident that as a governmental enterprise the thing could not be made to pay. an attempt is made to sell the property to british and german concerns. but the same paralyzing sense of insecurity hangs over the whole business. neither german nor british financiers can forget that the bonds and shares of this property have already been turned into waste paper by the action of the british government. the british government finds, in fact, that it can do nothing with the financial world unless first it confirms the title of the original owners to the property, and gives an assurance that titles to all property throughout the conquered territory shall be respected. in other words, confiscation has been a failure. it would really be interesting to know how those who talk as though confiscation were still an economic possibility would proceed to effect it. as material property in the form of that booty which used to constitute the spoils of victory in ancient times, the gold and silver goblets, etc., would be quite inconsiderable, and as britain cannot carry away sections of berlin and hamburg, she could only annex the paper tokens of wealth--the shares and bonds. but the value of those tokens depends upon the reliance which can be placed upon the execution of the contracts which they embody. the act of military confiscation upsets all contracts, and the courts of the country from which contracts derive their force would be paralyzed if judicial decisions were thrust aside by the sword. the value of the stocks and shares would collapse, and the credit of all those persons and institutions interested in such property would also be shaken or shattered, and the whole credit system, being thus at the mercy of alien governors only concerned to exact tribute, would collapse like a house of cards. german finance and industry would show a condition of panic and disorder beside which the worst crises of wall street would pale into insignificance. again, what would be the inevitable result? the financial influence of london itself would be thrown into the scale to prevent a panic in which london financiers would be involved. in other words, british financiers would exert their influence upon the british government to stop the process of confiscation. but the intangibility of wealth can be shown in yet another fashion. i once asked an english chartered accountant, very subject to attacks of germanophobia, how he supposed the germans would profit by the invasion of england, and he had a very simple programme. admitting the impossibility of sacking the bank of england, they would reduce the british population to practical slavery, and make them work for their foreign taskmasters, as he put it, under the rifle and lash. he had it all worked out in figures as to what the profit would be to the conqueror. very well, let us follow the process. the population of great britain are not allowed to spend their income, or at least are only allowed to spend a portion of it, on themselves. their dietary is reduced more or less to a slave dietary, and the bulk of what they earn is to be taken by their "owners." but how is this income, which so tempts the germans, created--these dividends on the railroad shares, the profits of the mills and mines and provision companies and amusement concerns? the dividends are due to the fact that the population eat heartily, clothe themselves well, travel on railroads, and go to theatres and music-halls. if they are not allowed to do these things, if, in other words, they cannot spend their money on these things, the dividends disappear. if the german taskmasters are to take these dividends, they must allow them to be earned. if they allow them to be earned, they must let the population live as it lived before--spending their income on themselves; but if they spend their income on themselves, what is there, therefore, for the taskmasters? in other words, consumption is a necessary factor of the whole thing. cut out consumption, and you cut out the profits. this glittering wealth, which so tempted the invader, has disappeared. if this is not intangibility, the word has no meaning. speaking broadly and generally, the conqueror in our day has before him two alternatives: to leave things alone, and in order to do that he need not have left his shores; or to interfere by confiscation in some form, in which case he dries up the source of the profit which tempted him. the economist may object that this does not cover the case of such profit as "economic rent," and that dividends or profits being part of exchange, a robber who obtains wealth without exchange can afford to disregard them; or that the increased consumption of the dispossessed english community would be made up by the increased consumption of the "owning" germans. if the political control of economic operations were as simple a matter as in our minds we generally make it, these objections would be sound. as it is, none of them would in practice invalidate the general proposition i have laid down. the division of labor in the modern world is so complex--the simplest operation of foreign trade involving not two nations merely, but many--that the mere military control of one party to an operation where many are concerned could ensure neither shifting of the consumption nor the monopolization of the profit within the limits of the conquering group. here is a german manufacturer selling cinematograph machines to a glasgow suburb (which, incidentally, lives by selling tools to argentine ranchers, who live by selling wheat to newcastle boiler-makers). assuming even that germany could transfer the surplus spent in cinematograph shows to germany, what assurance has the german manufacturer in question that the enriched germans will want cinematograph films? they may insist upon champagne and cigars, coffee and cognac, and the french, cubans, and brazilians, to whom this "loot" eventually goes, may not buy their machinery from germany at all, much less from the particular german manufacturer, but in the united states or switzerland. the redistribution of the industrial rôles might leave german industry in the lurch, because at best the military power would only be controlling one section of a complex operation, one party to it out of many. when wealth was corn or cattle, the transference by political or military force of the possessions of one community to another may have been possible, although even then, or in a slightly more developed period, we saw the roman peasantry ruined by the slave exploitation of foreign territory. how far this complexity of the international division of labor tends to render futile the other contrivances of conquest such as exclusive markets, tribute, money indemnity, etc., succeeding chapters may help to show. chapter v foreign trade and military power why trade cannot be destroyed or captured by a military power--what the processes of trade really are, and how a navy affects them--_dreadnoughts_ and business--while _dreadnoughts_ protect british trade from hypothetical german warships, the real german merchant is carrying it off, or the swiss or the belgian--the "commercial aggression" of switzerland--what lies at the bottom of the futility of military conquest--government brigandage becomes as profitless as private brigandage--the real basis of commercial honesty on the part of government. just as mr. harrison has declared that a "successful invasion would mean to the english the total eclipse of their commerce and trade, and with that trade the means of feeding forty millions in their islands," so i have seen it stated in a leading english paper that "if germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an englishman in the world who would not be the richer. nations have fought for years over a city or right of succession. must they not fight for million dollars of yearly commerce?" what does the "extinction" of germany mean? does it mean that britain shall slay in cold blood sixty or seventy millions of men, women, and children? otherwise, even though the fleet and army were annihilated the country's sixty millions of workers would still remain,--all the more industrious, as they would have undergone great suffering and privation--prepared to exploit their mines and workshops with as much thoroughness and thrift and industry as ever, and consequently just as much trade rivals as ever, army or no army, navy or no navy. even if the british could annihilate germany, they would annihilate such an important section of their debtors as to create hopeless panic in london, and that panic would so react on their own trade that it would be in no sort of condition to take the place which germany had previously occupied in neutral markets, leaving aside the question that by the act of annihilation a market equal to that of canada and south africa combined would be destroyed. what does this sort of thing mean? am i wrong in saying that the whole subject is overlaid and dominated by a jargon which may have had some relation to facts at one time, but from which in our day all meaning has departed? the english patriot may say that he does not mean permanent destruction, but only temporary "annihilation." (and this, of course, on the other side, would mean not permanent, but only temporary acquisition of that millions of trade.) he might, like mr. harrison, put the case conversely--that if germany could get command of the sea she could cut england off from its customers and intercept its trade for her benefit. this notion is as absurd as the other. it has already been shown that the "utter destruction of credit" and "incalculable chaos in the financial world," which mr. harrison foresees as the result of germany's invasion, could not possibly leave german finance unaffected. it is a very open question whether her chaos would not be as great as the english. in any case, it would be so great as thoroughly to disorganize her industry, and in that disorganized condition it would be out of the question for her to secure the markets left unsupplied by england's isolation. moreover, those markets would also be disorganized, because they depend upon england's ability to buy, which germany would be doing her best to destroy. from the chaos which she herself had created, germany could derive no possible benefit, and she could only terminate financial disorder, fatal to her own trade, by bringing to an end the condition which had produced it--that is, by bringing to an end the isolation of great britain. with reference to this section of the subject we can with absolute certainty say two things: ( ) that germany can only destroy british trade by destroying british population; and ( ) that if she could destroy that population, which she could not, she would destroy one of her most valuable markets, as at the present time she sells to it more than it sells to her. the whole point of view involves a fundamental misconception of the real nature of commerce and industry. commerce is simply and purely the exchange of one product for another. if the british manufacturer can make cloth, or cutlery, or machinery, or pottery, or ships cheaper or better than his rivals, he will obtain the trade; if he cannot, if his goods are inferior or dearer, or appeal less to his customers, his rivals will secure the trade, and the possession of _dreadnoughts_ will make not a whit of difference. switzerland, without a single _dreadnought_, will drive him out of the market even of his own colonies, as, indeed, she is driving him out.[ ] the factors which really constitute prosperity have not the remotest connection with military or naval power, all our political jargon notwithstanding. to destroy the commerce of forty million people germany would have to destroy britain's coal and iron mines, to destroy the energy, character, and resourcefulness of its population; to destroy, in short, the determination of forty million people to make their living by the work of their hands. were we not hypnotized by this extraordinary illusion, we should accept as a matter of course that the prosperity of a people depends upon such facts as the natural wealth of the country in which they live, their social discipline and industrial character, the result of years, of generations, of centuries, it may be, of tradition and slow, elaborate, selective processes; and, in addition to all these deep-seated elementary factors, upon countless commercial and financial ramifications--a special technical capacity for such-and-such a manufacture, a special aptitude for meeting the peculiarities of such and-such a market, the efficient equipment of elaborately constructed workshops, the existence of a population trained to given trades--a training not infrequently involving years, and even generations, of effort. all this, according to mr. harrison, is to go for nothing, and germany is to be able to replace it in the twinkling of an eye, and forty million people are to sit down helplessly because germany has been victorious at sea. on the morrow of her marvellous victory germany is by some sort of miracle to find shipyards, foundries, cotton-mills, looms, factories, coal and iron mines, and all their equipment, suddenly created in order to take the trade that the most successful manufacturers and traders in the world have been generations in building up. germany is to be able suddenly to produce three or four times what her population has hitherto been able to produce; for she must either do that or leave the markets which england has supplied heretofore still available to english effort. what has really fed these forty millions, who are to starve on the morrow of germany's naval victory, is the fact that the coal and iron exported by them have been sent in one form or another to populations which need those products. is that need suddenly to cease, or are the forty millions suddenly to be struck with some sort of paralysis, that all this vast industry is coming to an end? what has the defeat of english ships at sea to do with the fact that the canadian farmer wants to buy english manufactures and pay for them with his wheat? it may be true that germany could stop the importation of that wheat. but why should she want to do so? how would it benefit her people to do so? by what sort of miracle is she suddenly to be able to supply products which have kept forty million people busy? by what sort of miracle is she suddenly to be able to double her industrial population? and by what sort of miracle is she to be able to consume the wheat, because if she cannot take the wheat the canadian cannot buy her products? i am aware that all this is elementary, that it is economics in words of one syllable; but what are the economics of mr. harrison and those who think like him when he talks in the strain of the passage that i have just quoted? there is just one other possible meaning that the english patriot may have in his mind. he may plead that great military and naval establishments do not exist for the purpose of the conquest of territory or of destroying a rival's trade, but for "protecting" or indirectly aiding trade and industry. we are allowed to infer that in some not clearly defined way a great power can aid the trade of its citizens by the use of the prestige which a great navy and a great army bring, and by exercising bargaining power, in the matter of tariffs, with other nations. but again the condition of the small nations in europe gives the lie to this assumption. it is evident that the neutral does not buy english products and refuse germany's because england has a larger navy. if one can imagine the representatives of an english and a german firm meeting in the office of a merchant in argentina, or brazil, or bulgaria, or finland, both of them selling cutlery, the german is not going to secure the order because he is able to show the argentinian, or the brazilian, or the bulgarian, or the finn that germany has twelve _dreadnoughts_ and england only eight. the german will take the order if, on the whole, he can make a more advantageous offer to the prospective buyer, and for no other reason whatsoever, and the buyer will go to the merchant of any nation whatever, whether he be german, or swiss, or belgian, or british, irrespective of the armies and navies which may lie behind the nationality of the seller. nor does it appear that armies and navies weigh in the least when it comes to a question of a tariff bargain. switzerland wages a tariff war with germany, and wins. the whole history of the trade of the small nations shows that the political prestige of the great ones gives them practically no commercial advantage. we continually talk as though carrying trade were in some special sense the result of the growth of a great navy, but norway has a carrying trade which, relatively to her population, is nearly three times as great as britain's, and the same reasons which would make it impossible for another nation to confiscate the gold reserve of the bank of england would make it impossible for another nation to confiscate british shipping on the morrow of a british naval defeat. in what way can her carrying trade or any other trade be said to depend upon military power? as i write these lines there comes to my notice a series of articles in the london _daily mail_, written by mr. f.a. mckenzie, explaining how it is that england is losing the trade of canada. in one article he quotes a number of canadian merchants: "we buy very little direct from england," said mr. harry mcgee, one of the vice-presidents of the company, in answer to my questions. "we keep a staff in london of twenty, supervising our european purchases, but the orders go mostly to france, germany, and switzerland, and not to england." and in a further article he notes that many orders are going to belgium. now the question arises: what more can a navy do that it has not done for england in canada? and yet the trade goes to switzerland and belgium. is england going to protect herself against the commercial "aggression" of switzerland by building a dozen more _dreadnoughts_? suppose she could conquer switzerland and belgium with her _dreadnoughts_, would not the trade of switzerland and belgium go on all the same? her arms have brought her canada--but no monopoly of the canadian orders, which go, in part, to switzerland. if the traders of little nations can snap their fingers at the great war lords, why do british traders need _dreadnoughts_? if swiss commercial prosperity is secure from the aggression of a neighbor who outweighs switzerland in military power a hundred to one, how comes it that the trade and industry, the very life-bread of her children, as mr. harrison would have us believe, of the greatest nation in history is in danger of imminent annihilation the moment she loses her military predominance? if the statesmen of europe would tell us _how_ the military power of a great nation is used to advance the commercial interest of its citizens, would explain to us the _modus operandi_, and not refer us to large and vague phrases about "exercising due weight in the councils of the nations," we might accept their philosophy. but, until they do so, we are surely justified in assuming that their political terminology is simply a survival--an inheritance from a state of things which has, in fact, passed away. it is facts of the nature of those i have instanced which constitute the real protection of the small state, and which are bound as they gain in general recognition to constitute the real protection from outside aggression of all states, great or small. one financial authority from whom i have quoted noted that this elaborate financial interdependence of the modern world has grown up in spite of ourselves, "without our noticing it until we put it to some rude test." men are fundamentally just as disposed as they were at any time to take wealth that does not belong to them, which they have not earned. but their relative interest in the matter has changed. in very primitive conditions robbery is a moderately profitable enterprise. where the rewards of labor, owing to the inefficiency of the means of production, are small and uncertain, and where all wealth is portable, raiding and theft offer the best reward for the enterprise of the courageous; in such conditions the size of man's wealth depends a good deal on the size of his club and the agility with which he wields it. but to the man whose wealth so largely depends upon his credit and on his paper being "good paper" at the bank, dishonesty has become as precarious and profitless as honest toil was in more primitive times. the instincts of the business man may, at bottom, be just as predatory as those of the cattle-lifter or the robber baron, but taking property by force has become one of the least profitable and the most speculative forms of enterprise upon which he could engage. the force of commercial events has rendered the thing impossible. i know that the defender of arms will reply that it is the police who have rendered it impossible. this is not true. there were as many armed men in europe in the days when the robber baron carried on his occupation as there are in our day. to say that the policeman makes him impossible is to put the cart before the horse. what created the police and made them possible, if it was not the general recognition of the fact that disorder and aggression make trade impossible? just note what is taking place in south america. states in which repudiation was a commonplace of everyday politics have of recent years become as stable and as respectable as the city of london, and have come to discharge their obligations as regularly. these countries were during hundreds of years a slough of disorder and a never-ending sanguinary scramble for the spoils, and yet in a matter of fifteen or twenty years the conditions have radically changed. does this mean that the nature of these populations has fundamentally altered in less than a generation? in that case many a militarist claim must be rejected. there is a simpler explanation. these countries, like brazil and the argentine, have been drawn into the circle of international trade, exchange, and finance. their economic relationships have become sufficiently extensive and complex to make repudiation the least profitable form of theft. the financier will tell you "they cannot afford to repudiate." if any attempt at repudiation were made, all sorts of property, either directly or indirectly connected with the orderly execution of governmental functions, would suffer, banks would become involved, great businesses would stagger, and the whole financial community would protest. to attempt to escape the payment of a single loan would involve the business world in losses amounting to many times the value of the loan. it is only where a community has nothing to lose, no banks, no personal fortunes dependent upon public good faith, no great businesses, no industries, that the government can afford to repudiate its obligations or to disregard the general code of economic morality. this was the case with argentina and brazil a generation ago; it is still the case, to some extent, with some central american states to-day. _it is not because the armies in these states have grown_ that the public credit has improved. their armies were greater a generation ago than they are now. it is because they know that trade and finance are built upon credit--that is, confidence in the fulfilment of obligations, upon security of tenure in titles, upon the enforcement of contract according to law--and that if credit is seriously shaken, there is not a section of the elaborate fabric which is not affected. the more our commercial system gains in complication, the more does the common prosperity of all of us come to depend upon the reliance which can be placed on the due performance of all contracts. this is the real basis of "prestige," national and individual; circumstances stronger than ourselves are pushing us, despite what the cynical critics of our commercial civilization may say, towards the unvarying observance of this simple ideal. when we drop back from it--and such relapses occur as we should expect them to occur, especially in those societies which have just emerged from a more or less primitive state--punishment is generally swift and sure. what was the real origin of the bank crisis of in the united states, which had for american business men such disastrous consequences? it was the loss by american financiers and american bankers of the confidence of the american public. at bottom there was no other reason. one talks of cash reserves and currency errors; but london, which does the banking of the universe, works on the smallest cash reserve in the world, because, as an american authority has put it, english bankers work with a "psychological reserve." i quote from mr. withers: it is because they (english bankers) are so safe, so straight, so sensible, from an american point of view so unenterprising, that they are able to build up a bigger credit fabric on a smaller gold basis, and even carry this building to a height which they themselves have decided to be questionable. this "psychological reserve" is the priceless possession that has been handed down through generations of good bankers, and every individual of every generation who receives it can do something to maintain and improve it. but it was not always thus, and it is merely the many ramifications of the english commercial and financial world that have brought this about. in the end the americans will imitate it, or they will suffer from a hopeless disadvantage in their financial competition with england. commercial development is broadly illustrating one profound truth: that the real basis of social morality is self-interest. if english banks and insurance companies have become absolutely honest in their administration, it is because the dishonesty of any one of them threatened the prosperity of all. must we assume that the governments of the world, which, presumably, are directed by men as far-sighted as bankers, are permanently to fall below the banker in their conception of enlightened self-interest? must we assume that what is self-evident to the banker--namely, that the repudiation of engagements, or any attempt at financial plunder, is sheer stupidity and commercial suicide--is for ever to remain unperceived by the ruler? then, when he realizes this truth, shall we not at least have made some progress towards laying the foundations for a sane international polity? * * * * * the following correspondence, provoked by the first edition of this book, may throw light on some of the points dealt with in this chapter. a correspondent of london _public opinion_ criticized a part of the thesis here dealt with as a "series of half-truths," questioning as follows: what is "natural wealth," and how can trade be carried on with it unless there are markets for it when worked? would the writer maintain that markets cannot be permanently or seriously affected by military conquests, especially if conquest be followed by the imposition upon the vanquished of commercial conditions framed in the interests of the victor?... germany has derived, and continues to derive, great advantages from the most-favored-nation clause which she compelled france to insert in the treaty of frankfurt.... bismarck, it is true, underestimated the financial resilience of france, and was sorely disappointed when the french paid off the indemnity with such astonishing rapidity, and thus liberated themselves from the equally crushing burden of having to maintain the german army of occupation. he regretted not having demanded an indemnity twice as large. germany would not repeat the mistake, and any country having the misfortune to be vanquished by her in future will be likely to find its commercial prosperity compromised for decades. to which i replied: will your correspondent forgive my saying that while he talks of half-truths, the whole of this passage indicates the domination of that particular half-truth which lies at the bottom of the illusion with which my book deals? what is a market? your correspondent evidently conceives it as a place where things are sold. that is only half the truth. it is a place where things are bought and sold, and one operation is impossible without the other, and the notion that one nation can sell for ever and never buy is simply the theory of perpetual motion applied to economics; and international trade can no more be based upon perpetual motion than can engineering. as between economically highly-organized nations a customer must also be a competitor, a fact which bayonets cannot alter. to the extent to which they destroy him as a competitor, they destroy him, speaking generally, and largely, as a customer. the late mr. seddon conceived england as making her purchases with "a stream of golden sovereigns" flowing from a stock all the time getting smaller. that "practical" man, however, who so despised "mere theories," was himself the victim of a pure theory, and the picture which he conjured up from his inner consciousness has no existence in fact. england has hardly enough gold to pay one year's taxes, and if she paid for her imports in gold she would exhaust her stock in three months; and the process by which she really pays has been going on for sixty years. she is a buyer just as long as she is a seller, and if she is to afford a market to germany she must procure the money wherewith to pay for germany's goods by selling goods to germany or elsewhere, and if that process of sale stops, germany loses a market, not only the english market, but also those markets which depend in their turn upon england's capacity to buy--that is to say, to sell, for, again, the one operation is impossible without the other. if your correspondent had had the whole process in his mind instead of half of it, i do not think that he would have written the passages i have quoted. in his endorsement of the bismarckian conception of political economy he evidently deems that one nation's gain is the measure of another nation's loss, and that nations live by robbing their neighbors in a lesser or greater degree. this is economics in the style of tamerlane and the red indian, and, happily, has no relation to the real facts of modern commercial intercourse. the conception of one-half of the case only, dominates your correspondent's letter throughout. he says, "germany has derived, and continues to derive, great advantage from the most-favored-nation clause which she compelled france to insert in the treaty of frankfurt," which is quite true, but leaves out the other half of the truth, somewhat important to our discussion--viz., that france has also greatly benefited, in that the scope of fruitless tariff war has been by so much restricted. a further illustration: why should germany have been sorely disappointed at france's rapid recovery? the german people are not going to be the richer for having a poor neighbor--on the contrary, they are going to be the poorer, and there is not an economist with a reputation to lose, whatever his views of fiscal policy, who would challenge this for a moment. how would germany impose upon a vanquished england commercial arrangements which would impoverish the vanquished and enrich the victor? by enforcing another frankfurt treaty, by which english ports should be kept open to german goods? but that is precisely what english ports have been for sixty years, and germany has not been obliged to wage a costly war to effect it. would germany close her own markets to our goods? but, again, that is precisely what she has done--again without war, and by a right which we never dream of challenging. how is war going to affect the question one way or another? i have been asking for a detailed answer to that question from european publicists and statesmen for the last ten years, and i have never yet been answered, save by much vagueness, much fine phrasing concerning commercial supremacy, a spirited foreign policy, national prestige, and much else, which no one seems able to define, but a real policy, a _modus operandi_, a balance-sheet which one can analyze, never. and until such is forthcoming i shall continue to believe that the whole thing is based upon an illusion. the true test of fallacies of this kind is progression. imagine germany (as our jingoes seem to dream of her) absolute master of europe, and able to dictate any policy that she pleased. how would she treat such a european empire? by impoverishing its component parts? but that would be suicidal. where would her big industrial population find their markets?[ ] if she set out to develop and enrich the component parts, these would become merely efficient competitors, and she need not have undertaken the costliest war of history to arrive at that result. this is the paradox, the futility of conquest--the great illusion which the history of our own empire so well illustrates. we british "own" our empire by allowing its component parts to develop themselves in their own way, and in view of their own ends, and all the empires which have pursued any other policy have only ended by impoverishing their own populations and falling to pieces. your correspondent asks: "is mr. norman angell prepared to maintain that japan has derived no political or commercial advantages from her victories, and that russia has suffered no loss from defeat?" what i am prepared to maintain, and what the experts know to be the truth, is that the japanese people are the poorer, not the richer for their war, and that the russian people will gain more from defeat than they could possibly have gained by victory, since defeat will constitute a check on the economically sterile policy of military and territorial aggrandizement and turn russian energies to social and economic development; and it is because of this fact that russia is at the present moment, despite her desperate internal troubles, showing a capacity for economic regeneration as great as, if not greater than, that of japan. this latter country is breaking all modern records, civilized or uncivilized, in the burdensomeness of her taxation. on the average, the japanese people pay per cent.--nearly one-third--of their net income in taxation in one form or another, and so far have they been compelled to push the progressive principle that a japanese lucky enough to possess an income of ten thousand a year has to surrender over six thousand of it in taxation, a condition of things which would, of course, create a revolution in any european country in twenty-four hours. and this is quoted as a result so brilliant that those who question it cannot be doing so seriously![ ] on the other side, for the first time in twenty years the russian budget shows a surplus. this recovery of the defeated nation after wars is not even peculiar to our generation. ten years after the franco-prussian war france was in a better financial position than germany, as she is in a better financial position to-day, and though her foreign trade does not show as great expansion as that of germany--because her population remains absolutely stationary, while that of germany increases by leaps and bounds--the french people as a whole are more prosperous, more comfortable, more economically secure, with a greater reserve of savings, and all the moral and social advantages that go therewith, than are the germans. in the same way the social and industrial renaissance of modern spain dates from the day that she was defeated and lost her colonies, and it is since her defeat that spanish securities have just doubled in value.[ ] it is since england added the "gold-fields of the world" to her "possessions" that british consols have dropped twenty points. such is the outcome in terms of social well-being of military success and political prestige! chapter vi the indemnity futility the real balance-sheet of the franco-german war--disregard of sir robert giffen's warning in interpreting the figures--what really happened in france and germany during the decade following the war--bismarck's disillusionment--the necessary discount to be given an indemnity--the bearing of the war and its result on german prosperity and progress. in politics it is unfortunately true that ten dollars which can be seen bulk more largely in the public mind than a million which happen to be out of sight but are none the less real. thus, however clearly the wastefulness of war and the impossibility of effecting by its means any permanent economic or social advantage for the conqueror may be shown, the fact that germany was able to exact an indemnity of a billion dollars from france at the close of the war of - is taken as conclusive evidence that a nation can "make money by war." in , sir robert (then mr.) giffen wrote a notable article summarizing the results of the franco-german war thus: it meant to france a loss of million dollars, and to germany a total net gain of millions, a money difference in favor of germany exceeding in value the whole amount of the british national debt! an arithmetical statement of this kind seems at first sight so conclusive that those who have since discussed the financial outcome of the war of have quite overlooked the fact that, if such a balance-sheet as that indicated be sound, the whole financial history of germany and france during the forty years which have followed the war is meaningless. the truth is, of course, that such a balance-sheet is meaningless--a verdict which does not reflect upon sir robert giffen, because he drew it up in ignorance of the sequel of the war. it does, however, reflect on those who have adopted the result shown on such a balance-sheet. indeed, sir robert giffen himself made the most important reservations. he had at least an inkling of the practical difficulties of profiting by an indemnity, and indicated plainly that the nominal figures had to be very heavily discounted. a critic[ ] of an early edition of this book seems to have adopted most of sir robert giffen's figures, disregarding, however, certain of his reservations, and to this critic i replied as follows: in arriving at this balance my critic, like the company-promoting genius who promises you per cent. for your money, leaves so much out of the account. there are a few items not considered, _e.g._ the increase in the french army which took place immediately after the war, and as the direct result thereof, compelled germany to increase her army by at least one hundred thousand men, an increase which has been maintained for forty years. the expenditure throughout this time amounts to at least a billion dollars. we have already wiped out the "profit," and i have only dealt with one item yet--to this we must add,--loss of markets for germany involved in the destruction of so many french lives and so much french wealth; loss from the general disturbance throughout europe, and still greater loss from the fact that the unproductive expenditure on armaments throughout the greater part of europe which has followed the war, the diversion of energies which is the result of it, has directly deprived germany of large markets and by a general check of development indirectly deprived her of immense ones. but it is absurd to bring figures to bear on such a system of bookkeeping as that adopted by my critic. germany had several years' preparation for the war, and has had, as the direct result thereof and as an integral part of the general war system which her own policy supports, certain obligations during forty years. all this is ignored. just note how the same principle would work if applied in ordinary commercial matters; because, for instance, on an estate the actual harvest only takes a fortnight, you disregard altogether the working expenses for the remaining fifty weeks of the year, charge only the actual cost of the harvest (and not all of that), deduct this from the gross proceeds of the crops, and call the result "profit"! such "finance" is really luminous. applied by the ordinary business man, it would in an incredibly short time put his business in the bankruptcy court and himself in gaol! but were my critic's figures as complete as they are absurdly incomplete and misleading, i should still be unimpressed, because the facts which stare us in the face would not corroborate his statistical performance. we are examining what is from the money point of view the most successful war ever recorded in history, and if the general proposition that such a war is financially profitable were sound, and if the results of the war were anything like as brilliant as they are represented, money should be cheaper and more plentiful in germany than in france, and credit, public and private, should be sounder. well, it is the exact reverse which is the case. as a net result of the whole thing germany was, ten years after the war, a good deal worse off, financially, than her vanquished rival, and was at that date trying, as she is trying to-day, to borrow money from her victim. within twenty months of the payment of the last of the indemnity, the bank rate was higher in berlin than in paris, and we know that bismarck's later life was clouded by the spectacle of what he regarded as an absurd miracle: the vanquished recovering more quickly than the victor. we have the testimony of his own speeches to this fact, and to the fact that france weathered the financial storms of - a great deal better than did germany. and to-day, when germany is compelled to pay nearly per cent. for money, france can secure it for .... we are not for the moment considering anything but the money view--the advantages and disadvantages of a certain financial operation--and by any test that you care to apply, france, the vanquished, is better off than germany, the victor. the french people are as a whole more prosperous, more comfortable, more economically secure, with greater reserve of savings and all the moral and social advantages that go therewith, than are the germans, a fact expressed briefly by french rentes standing at and german consols at . there is something wrong with a financial operation that gives these results. the something wrong, of course, is that in order to arrive at any financial profit at all essential facts have to be disregarded, those facts being what necessarily precedes and what necessarily follows a war of this kind. in the case of highly organized industrial nations like england and germany, dependent for the very livelihood of great masses of their population upon the fact that neighboring nations furnish a market for their goods, a general policy of "piracy," imposing upon those neighbors an expenditure which limits their purchasing power, creates a burden of which the nation responsible for that policy of piracy pays its part. it is not france alone which has paid the greater part of the real cost of the franco-german war, it is europe--and particularly germany--in the burdensome military system and the general political situation which that war has created or intensified. but there is a more special consideration connected with the exaction of an indemnity, which demands notice, and that is the practical difficulty with regard to the transfer of an immense sum of money outside the ordinary operations of commerce. the history of the german experience with the french indemnity suggests the question whether in every case an enormous discount on the nominal value of a large money indemnity must not be allowed owing to the practical financial difficulties of its payment and receipt, difficulties unavoidable in any circumstances which we need consider. these difficulties were clearly foreseen by sir robert giffen, though his warnings, and the important reservations that he made on this point, are generally overlooked by those who wish to make use of his conclusions. these warnings he summarized as follows: as regards germany, a doubt is expressed whether the germans will gain so much as france loses, the capital of the indemnity being transferred from individuals to the german government, who cannot use it so profitably as individuals. it is doubted whether the practice of lending out large sums, though a preferable course to locking them up, will not in the end be injurious. the financial operations incidental to these great losses and expenses seriously affect the money market. they have been a fruitful cause, in the first place, of spasmodic disturbance. the outbreak of war caused a monetary panic in july, , by the anxiety of people who had money engagements to meet to provide against the chances of war, and there was another monetary crash in september, , owing to the sudden withdrawal by the german government of the money it had to receive. the war thus illustrates the tendency of wars in general to cause spasmodic disturbance in a market so delicately organized as that of london now is. and it is to be noted in this connection that the difficulties of were trifling compared to what they would necessarily be in our day. in , germany was self-sufficing, little dependent upon credit; to-day undisturbed credit in europe is the very life-blood of her industry; it is, in fact, the very food of her people, as the events of have sufficiently proved. it is not generally realized how abundantly the whole history of the german indemnity bears out sir robert giffen's warning; how this flood of gold turned indeed to dust and ashes as far as the german nation is concerned. first, anyone familiar with financial problems might have expected that the receipt of so large a sum of money by germany would cause prices to rise and so handicap export trade in competition with france, where the reverse process would cause prices to fall. this result was, in fact, produced. m. paul beaulieu and m. léon say[ ] have both shown that this factor operated through the value of commercial bills of exchange, giving to the french exporter a bonus and to the german a handicap which affected trade most perceptibly. captain bernard serrigny, who has collected in his work a wealth of evidence bearing on this subject, writes: the rise in prices influenced seriously the cost of production, and the german manufacturers fought, in consequence, at a disadvantage with england and france. finally the goods produced at this high cost were thrown upon the home market at the moment when the increase in the cost of living was diminishing seriously the purchasing power of the bulk of consumers. these goods had to compete, not only with home over-production due to the failure to sell abroad, but with foreign goods, which, despite the tariff, were by their lower price able to push their way into the german market, where relatively higher prices attracted them. in this competition france was particularly prominent. in france the lack of metallic money had engendered great financial caution, and had considerably lowered prices all around, so that there was a general financial and commercial condition very different from that in germany, where the payment of the indemnity had been followed by reckless speculation. moreover, owing to the heavy foreign payments made by france, bills drawn on foreign centres were at a premium, a premium which constituted a sensible additional profit to french exporters, so considerable in certain cases that it was worth while for french manufacturers to sell their goods at an actual loss in order to realize the profit on the bill of exchange. the german market was thus being captured by the french at the very moment when the germans supposed they would, thanks to the indemnity, be starting out to capture the world. the german economist max wirth ("geschichte der handelskrisen") expressed in his astonishment at france's financial and industrial recovery: "the most striking example of the economic force of the country is shown by the exports, which rose immediately after the signature of peace, despite a war which swallowed a hundred thousand lives and more than ten milliards (two billion dollars)." a similar conclusion is drawn by professor biermer ("fürst bismarck als volkswirt"), who indicates that the protectionist movement in was to a large extent due to the result of the payment of the indemnity. this disturbance of the balance of trade, however, was only one factor among several: the financial disorganization, a fictitious expansion of expenditure creating a morbid speculation, precipitated the worst financial crisis in germany which she has known in modern times. monsieur lavisse summarizes the experience thus: enormous sums of money were lost. if one takes the aggregate of the securities quoted on the berlin bourse, railroad, mining and industrial securities generally, it is by thousands of millions of marks that one must estimate the value of such securities in and . but a large number of enterprises were started in germany of which the berlin bourse knew nothing. cologne, hamburg, frankfurt, leipzig, breslau, stuttgart, had all their local groups of speculative securities; hundreds of millions must be added to the thousands of millions. these differences did not represent merely a transfer of wealth, for a great proportion of the capital sunk was lost altogether, having been eaten up in ill-considered and unattractive expenditure.... there can be no sort of doubt that the money lost in these worthless enterprises constitutes an absolute loss for germany. the decade from - was for france a great recuperative period, although for several other nations in europe it was one of great depression, notably, after the "boom" of , for germany. no less an authority than bismarck himself testifies to the double fact. we know that bismarck was astonished and dismayed by seeing the regeneration of france after the war taking place more rapidly and more completely than the regeneration of germany. this weighed so heavily upon his mind that in introducing his protectionist bill in he declared that germany was "slowly bleeding to death," and that if the present process were continued she would find herself ruined. speaking in the reichstag on may , , he said: we see that france manages to support the present difficult business situation of the civilized world better than we do; that her budget has increased since by a milliard and a half, and that thanks not only to loans; we see that she has more resources than germany, and that, in short, over there they complain less of bad times. and in a speech two years later (november , ) he returned to the same idea: it was towards that i was first struck with the general and growing distress in germany as compared with france. i saw furnaces banked, the standard of well-being reduced, and the general position of workmen becoming worse and business as a whole terribly bad. in the book from which these extracts are taken[ ] the author writes as an introduction to bismarck's speeches: trade and industry were in a miserable condition. thousands of workmen were without employment, and in the winter of - unemployment took great proportions, and soup-kitchens and state workshops had to be established. every author who deals with this period seems to tell broadly the same tale, however much they may differ in detail. "if only we could get back to the general position of things before the war," said m. block in . "but salaries diminish and prices go up."[ ] at the very time that the french millions were raining in upon germany ( ) she was suffering from a grave financial crisis, and so little effect did the transfer of the money have upon trade and finance in general, that twelve months after the payment of the last of the indemnity we find the bank rate higher in berlin than in paris; and, as was shown by the german economist soetbeer, by the year far more money was in circulation in france than in germany.[ ] hans blum, indeed, directly ascribed the series of crises between the years and to the indemnity: "a burst of prosperity and then ruin for thousands."[ ] throughout the year the bank rate in paris was uniformly per cent. in berlin (preussische bank, which preceded the reichs bank) it varied from to per cent. a similar difference is reflected by the fact that, between the years and , the deposits in the state savings banks in germany actually fell by roughly per cent., while in the same period the french deposits _increased_ about per cent. two tendencies plainly show the condition of germany during the decade which followed the war: the enormous growth of socialism--relatively much greater than any which we have ever since seen--and the immense stimulus given to emigration. perhaps no thesis is commoner with the defender of war than this: that, though one may not be able in a narrow economic sense to justify an enterprise like that of , the moral stimulus which victory gave to the german people is accepted as being of incalculable benefit to the race and the nation. its alleged effect in bringing about a national solidarity, in stimulating patriotic sentiment and national pride, in the wiping out of internal differences and heaven knows what, are claims i have dealt with at greater length elsewhere, and i wish only to note here that all this high-falutin does not stand the test of facts. the two phenomena just mentioned--the extraordinary progress of socialism and the enormous stimulus given to emigration during the years which immediately followed the war--give the lie to all the claims in question. in - , the very years in which the moral stimulus of victory and the economic stimulus of the indemnity should have kept at home every able-bodied german, emigration was, relatively to the population, greater than it has ever been before or since, the figures for being , and for , .[ ] and at no period since the fifties was the internal political struggle so bitter--it was a period of repression, of prescription on the one side and class-hatred on the other--"the golden age of the drill-sergeant," some german has called it. it will be replied that, after the first decade, germany's trade has shown an expansion which has not been shown by that of france. those who are hypnotized by this, quietly ignore altogether one great fact or which has affected both france and germany, not only since the war, but during the whole of the nineteenth century, and that factor is that the population of france, from causes in no way connected with the franco-prussian war, since the tendency was a pronounced one for fifty years before, is practically quite stationary; while the population of germany, also for reasons in no way connected with the war, since the tendency was also pronounced half a century previously, has shown an abounding expansion. since the population of germany has increased by twenty million souls. that of france has not increased at all. is it astonishing that the labor of twenty million souls makes some stir in the industrial world? is it not evident that the necessity of earning a livelihood for this increasing population gives to german industry an expansion outside the limits of her territory which cannot be looked for in the case of a nation whose social energies are not faced with any such problem? there is this, moreover, to be borne in mind: germany has secured her foreign trade on what are, in the terms of the relative comfort of her people, hard conditions. in other words, she has secured that trade by cutting profits, in the way that a business fighting desperately for life will cut profits, in order to secure orders, and by making sacrifices that the comfortable business man will not make. notwithstanding the fact that france has made no sensational splash in foreign trade since the war, the standard of comfort among her people has been rising steadily, and is without doubt generally higher to-day than is that of the german people. this higher standard of comfort is reflected in her financial situation. it is germany, the victor, which is to-day in the position of a suppliant in regard to france, and it is revealing no diplomatic secrets to say that, for many years now, germany has been employing all the wiles of her diplomacy to obtain the official recognition of german securities on the french bourses. france financially has, in a very real sense, the whip hand. that is not all. those who point triumphantly to german industrial expansion, as a proof of the benefits of war and conquest, ignore certain facts which cannot be ignored if that argument is to have any value, and they are these: . such progress is not peculiar to germany; it is shown in an equal or greater degree (i am speaking now of the general wealth and social progress of the average individual citizen) by states that have had no victorious war--the scandinavian states, the netherlands, switzerland. . even if it were special to germany, which it is not, we should be entitled to ask whether certain developments of german political evolution, which _preceded the war_, and which one may fairly claim have a more direct and understandable bearing upon industrial progress, are not a much more appreciable factor in that progress than the war itself--i refer particularly, of course, to the immense change involved in the fiscal union of the german states, which was completed before the franco-german war of had been declared; to say nothing of such other factors as the invention of the thomas-gilchrist process which enabled the phosphoric iron ores of germany, previously useless, to be utilized. . the very serious social difficulties (which have, of course, their economic aspect) that _do_ confront the german people--the intense class friction, the backwardness of parliamentary government, the survival of reactionary political ideas, wrapped up with the domination of the "prussian ideal"--all difficulties which states whose political development has been less marked by successful war (the lesser european states just mentioned, for instance)--are not faced with in the same degree. these difficulties, special, among the great european nations, to germany, are certainly in a large measure a legacy of the franco-german war, a part of the general system to which that war gave rise, the general character of the political union which it provoked. the general ascription of such real progress as germany has made to the effects of the war and nothing else--a conclusion which calmly ignores factors which have evidently a more direct bearing--is one of those _a priori_ judgments repeated, parrot fashion, without investigation or care even by publicists of repute; it is characteristic of the carelessness which dominates this whole subject. this more general consideration, which does not properly belong to the special problem of an indemnity, i have dealt with at greater length in the next section. the evidence bearing on the particular question, as to whether in practice the exaction of a large monetary indemnity from a conquered foe can ever be economically profitable or of real advantage to the conqueror, is of a simpler character. if we put the question in this form, "was the receipt of the indemnity, in the most characteristic and successful case in history, of advantage to the conqueror?" the reply is simple enough: all the evidence plainly and conclusively shows that it was of no advantage; that the conqueror would probably have been better without it. even if we draw from that evidence a contrary conclusion, even if we conclude that the actual payment of the indemnity was as beneficial as all the evidence would seem to show it was mischievous; even if we could set aside completely the financial and commercial difficulties which its payment seems to have involved; if we ascribe to other causes the great financial crises which followed that payment; if we deduct no discount from the nominal value of the indemnity, but assume that every mark and thaler of it represented its full face value to germany--even admitting all this, it is still inevitable that _the direct cost of preparing for a war and of guarding against a subsequent war of retribution must, from the nature of the case, exceed the value of the indemnity which can be exacted_. this is not merely a hypothetical statement, it is a commercial fact, supported by evidence which is familiar to us all. in order to avoid repaying, with interest, the indemnity drawn from france, germany has had to expend upon armaments a sum of money at least equal to that indemnity. in order to exact a still larger indemnity from great britain, germany would have to spend a still larger sum in preparations, and to guard against repayment would be led into indefinite expenditure, which has only to go on long enough inevitably to exceed the very definite indemnity. for, it must be remembered that the amount of an indemnity extractable from a modern community, of the credit era, has very definite limits: an insolvent community can pay more. if the statesmen of europe could lay on one side, for a moment, the irrelevant considerations which cloud their minds, they would see that the direct cost of acquisition by force must in these circumstances necessarily exceed in value the property acquired. when the _indirect_ costs are also considered, the balance of loss becomes incalculably greater. those who urge that through an indemnity, war can be made to "pay" (and it is for them that this chapter is written), have before them problems and difficulties--difficulties of not merely a military, but of a financial and social character--of the very deepest kind. it was precisely in this section of the subject that german science failed in . there is no evidence that much progress has been made in the study of this phase of the problem by either side since the war--indeed, there is plenty of evidence that it has been neglected. it is time that it was scientifically and systematically attacked. those who wish well for europe will encourage the study, for it can have but one result: to show that less and less can war be made to pay; that all those forces of our world which daily gain in strength make it, as a commercial venture, more and more preposterous. the study of this department of international polity will tend to the same result as the study of any of its facets: the undermining of those beliefs which have in the past so often led to, and are to-day so often claimed as the motives likely to lead to, war between civilized peoples. chapter vii how colonies are owned why twentieth-century methods must differ from eighteenth--the vagueness of our conceptions of statecraft--how colonies are "owned"--some little recognized facts--why foreigners could not fight england for her self-governing colonies--she does not "own" them, since they are masters of their own destiny--the paradox of conquest: england in a worse position in regard to her own colonies than in regard to foreign nations--her experience as the oldest and most practised colonizer in history--recent french experience--could germany hope to do what england cannot do? the foregoing chapters dispose of the first six of the seven propositions outlined in chapter iii. there remains the seventh, dealing with the notion that in some way england's security and prosperity would be threatened by a foreign nation "taking our colonies from us"--a thing which we are assured her rivals are burning to do, as it would involve the "breaking up of the british empire" to their advantage. let us try to read some meaning into a phrase which, however childish it may appear on analysis, is very commonly in the mouths of those who are responsible for british political ideas. in this connection it is necessary to point out--as, indeed, it is in every phase of this problem of the relationship of states--that the world has moved, that methods have changed. it is hardly possible to discuss this matter of the necessary futility of military force in the modern world for ten minutes without it being urged that as england has acquired her colonies by the sword, it is evident that the sword may do a like service for modern states desiring colonies. about as reasonably could one say that, as certain tribes and nations in the past enriched themselves by capturing slaves and women among neighboring tribes, the desire to capture slaves and women will always be an operative motive in warfare between nations, as though slavery had not been put economically out of court by modern industrial methods, and as though the change in social methods had not put the forcible capture of women out of court. what was the problem confronting the merchant adventurer of the sixteenth century? there were newly-discovered foreign lands containing, as he believed, precious metals and stones and spices, and inhabited by savages or semi-savages. if other traders got those stones, it was quite evident that he could not. his colonial policy, therefore, had to be directed to two ends: first, such effective political occupation of the country that he could keep the savage or semi-savage population in check, and could exploit the territory for its wealth; and, secondly, such arrangements as would prevent other nations from searching for this wealth in precious metals, spices, etc., since, if they obtained it, he could not. that is the story of the french and dutch in india, and of the spanish in south america. but as soon as there grew up in those countries an organized community living in the country itself, the whole problem changed. the colonies, in this later stage of development, have a value to the mother country mainly as a market and a source of food and raw material, and if their value in those respects is to be developed to the full, they inevitably become self-governing communities in greater or less degree, and the mother country exploits them exactly as she exploits any other community with which she may be trading. germany might acquire canada, but it could no longer be a question of her taking canada's wealth in precious metals, or in any other form, to the exclusion of other nations. could germany "own" canada, she would have to "own" it in the same way that britain does; the germans would have to pay for every sack of wheat and every pound of beef that they might buy, just as though canada "belonged" to england or to anybody else. germany could not have even the meagre satisfaction of germanizing these great communities, for one knows that they are far too firmly "set." their language, law, morals, would have to be, after german conquest, what they are now. germany would find that the german canada was pretty much the canada that it is now--a country where germans are free to go and do go; a field for germany's expanding population. as a matter of fact, germany feeds her expanding population from territories like canada and the united states and south america without sending its citizens there. the era of emigration from germany has stopped, because the compound steam-engine has rendered emigration largely unnecessary. and it is the developments which are the necessary outcome of such forces, that have made the whole colonial problem of the twentieth century radically different from that of the eighteenth or seventeenth. i have stated the case thus: no nation could gain any advantage by the conquest of the british colonies, and great britain could not suffer material damage by their "loss," however much this would be regretted on sentimental grounds, and as rendering less easy a certain useful social co-operation between kindred peoples. for the british colonies are, in fact, independent nations in alliance with the mother country, to whom they are no source of tribute or economic profit (except in the way that foreign nations are), their economic relations being settled not by the mother country, but by the colonies. economically, england would gain by their formal separation, since she would be relieved of the cost of their defence. their loss, involving, therefore, no change in economic fact (beyond saving the mother country the cost of their defence), could not involve the ruin of the empire and the starvation of the mother country, as those who commonly treat of such a contingency are apt to aver. as england is not able to exact tribute or economic advantage, it is inconceivable that any other country, necessarily less experienced in colonial management, would be able to succeed where england had failed, especially in view of the past history of the spanish, portuguese, french, and british colonial empires. this history also demonstrates that the position of british crown colonies, in the respect which we are considering, is not sensibly different from that of the self-governing ones. it is not to be presumed, therefore, that any european nation would attempt the desperately expensive business of the conquest of england, for the purpose of making an experiment with her colonies which all colonial history shows to be doomed to failure. what are the facts? great britain is the most successful colonizing nation in the world, and the policy into which her experience has driven her is that outlined by sir c.p. lucas, one of the greatest authorities on colonial questions. he writes, speaking of the history of the british colonies on the american continent, thus: it was seen--but it might not have been seen had the united states not won their independence--that english colonists, like greek colonies of old, go out on terms of being equal, not subordinate, to those who are left behind; that when they have effectively planted another and a distant land, they must, within the widest limits, be left to rule themselves; that, whether they are right, or whether they are wrong--more, perhaps, when they are wrong than when they are right--they cannot be made amenable by force; that mutual good feeling, community of interest, and abstention from pressing rightful claims to their logical conclusion, can alone hold together a true colonial empire. but what in the name of common sense is the advantage of conquering them if the only policy is to let them do as they like, "whether they are right, or whether they are wrong--more, perhaps, when they are wrong than when they are right"? and what avails it to conquer them if they cannot be made amenable to force? surely this makes the whole thing a _reductio ad absurdum_. were a power like germany to use force to conquer colonies, she would find out that they were not amenable to force, and that the only working policy was to let them do exactly as they did before she conquered them, and to allow them, if they chose--and many of the british colonies do so choose--to treat the mother country absolutely as a foreign country. there has recently been going on in canada a discussion as to the position which that dominion should hold with reference to the british in the event of war, and that discussion has made canada's position quite plain. it has been summarized thus: "we must always be free to give or refuse support."[ ] could a foreign nation say more? in what sense does england "own" canada when canadians must always be free to give or refuse their military support to england; and in what way does canada differ from a foreign nation while england may be at war when canada can be at peace? mr. asquith formally endorses this conception.[ ] this shows clearly that no dominion is held to be bound by virtue of its allegiance to the sovereign of the british empire to place its forces at his disposition, no matter how real may be the emergency. if it should not desire so to do, it is free to refuse so to do. this is to convert the british empire into a loose alliance of independent sovereign states, which are not even bound to help each other in case of war. the military alliance between austria and germany is far more stringent than the tie which unites, for purposes of war, the component parts of the british empire. one critic, commenting on this, says: whatever language is used to describe this new movement of imperial defence, it is virtually one more step towards complete national independence on the part of the colonies. for not only will the consciousness of the assumption of this task of self-defence feed with new vigor the spirit of nationality, it will entail the further power of full control over foreign relations. this has already been virtually admitted in the case of canada, now entitled to a determinant voice in all treaties or other engagements in which her interests are especially involved. the extension of this right to the other colonial nations may be taken as a matter of course. home rule in national defence thus established reduces the imperial connection to its thinnest terms.[ ] still more significant, perhaps, is the following emphatic declaration from mr. balfour himself. speaking in london, on november , , he said: we depend as an empire upon the co-operation of absolutely independent parliaments. i am not talking as a lawyer; i am talking as a politician. i believe from a legal point of view that the british parliament is supreme over the parliament of canada or australasia or the cape or south africa, but in fact they are independent parliaments, absolutely independent, and it is our business to recognize that and to frame the british empire upon the co-operation of absolutely independent parliaments.[ ] which means, of course, that england's position with regard to canada or australia is just england's position with regard to any other independent state; that she has no more "ownership" in australia than she has in argentina. indeed, facts of very recent english history have established quite incontrovertibly this ridiculous paradox: england has more influence--that is to say, a freer opportunity of enforcing her point of view--with foreign nations than with her own colonies. indeed, does not sir c. p. lucas's statement that "whether they are right or wrong--still more, perhaps, when they are wrong," they must be left alone, necessarily mean that her position with the colonies is weaker than her position with foreign nations? in the present state of international feeling an english statesman would never dream of advocating that she should submit to foreign nations when they are wrong. recent history is illuminating on this point. what were the larger motives that pushed england into war with the dutch republics? to vindicate the supremacy of the british race in south africa, to enforce british ideals as against boer ideals, to secure the rights of british indians and other british subjects, to protect the native against boer oppression, to take the government of the country generally from a people whom, at that date, she was apt to describe as "inherently incapable of civilization." what, however, is the outcome of spending a billion and a quarter of dollars upon the accomplishment of these objects? the present government of the transvaal is in the hands of the boer party.[ ] england has achieved the union of south africa in which the boer element is predominant. britain has enforced against the british indian in the transvaal and natal the same boer regulations which were one of her grievances before the war, and the houses of parliament have ratified an act of union in which the boer attitude with reference to the native is codified and made permanent. sir charles dilke, in the debate in the house of commons on the south african bill, made this quite clear. he said: "the old british principle in south africa, as distinct from the boer principle, in regard to the treatment of natives, was equal rights for all civilized men. at the beginning of the south african war the country was told that one of its main objects, and certainly that the one predominant factor in any treaty of peace, would be the assertion of the british principle as against the boer principle. now the boer principle dominates throughout the whole of south africa." mr. asquith, as representing the british government, admitted that this was the case, and that "the opinion of this country is almost unanimous in objecting to the color bar in the union parliament." he went on to say that "the opinion of the british government and the opinion of the british people must not be allowed to lead to any interference with a self-governing colony." so that, having expended in the conquest of the transvaal a greater sum than germany exacted from france at the close of the franco-prussian war, england has not even the right to enforce her views on those whose contrary views were the _casus belli_! a year or two since there was in london a deputation from the british indians in the transvaal pointing out that the regulations there deprive them of the ordinary rights of british citizens. the british government informed them that the transvaal being a self-governing colony, the imperial government could do nothing for them.[ ] now, it will not be forgotten that, at a time when britain was quarrelling with paul krüger, one of the liveliest of her grievances was the treatment of british indians. having conquered krüger, and now "owning" his country, do the british themselves act as they were trying to compel paul krüger as a foreign ruler to act? they do not. they (or rather the responsible government of the colony, with whom they dare not interfere, although they were ready enough to make representations to krüger) simply and purely enforce his own regulations. moreover, the australian commonwealth and british columbia have since taken the view with reference to british indians which president krüger took, and which view england made almost a _casus belli_. yet in the case of her colonies she does absolutely nothing. so the process is this: the government of a foreign territory does something which we ask it to cease doing. the refusal of the foreign government constitutes a _casus belli_. we fight, we conquer, and the territory in question becomes one of our colonies, and we allow the government of that colony to continue doing the very thing which constituted, in the case of a foreign nation, a _casus belli_. do we not, taking the english case as typical, arrive, therefore, at the absurdity i have already indicated--_that we are in a worse position to enforce our views in our own territory--that is to say, in our colonies--than in foreign territory_? would england submit tamely if a foreign government should exercise permanently gross oppression on an important section of her citizens? certainly she would not. but when the government exercising that oppression happens to be the government of her own colonies she does nothing, and a great british authority lays it down that, even more when the colonial government is wrong than when it is right, must she do nothing, and that, though wrong, the colonial government cannot be amenable to force. nor can it be said that crown colonies differ essentially in this matter from self-governing dominions. not only is there an irresistible tendency for crown colonies to acquire the practical rights of self-governing dominions, but it has become a practical impossibility to disregard their special interests. experience is conclusive on this point. i am not here playing with words or attempting to make paradoxes. this _reductio ad absurdum_--the fact that when she owns a territory she renounces the privilege of using force to ensure observance of her views--is becoming more and more a commonplace of british colonial government. as to the fiscal position of the colonies, that is precisely what their political relation is in all but name; they are foreign nations. they erect tariffs against great britain; they exclude large sections of british subjects absolutely (practically speaking, no british indian is allowed to set foot in australia, and yet british india constitutes the greater part of the british empire), and even against british subjects from great britain vexatious exclusion laws are enacted. again the question arises: could a foreign country do more? if fiscal preference is extended to great britain, that preference is not the result of british "ownership" of the colonies, but is the free act of the colonial legislators, and could as well be made by any foreign nation desiring to court closer fiscal relations with great britain.[ ] is it conceivable that germany, if the real relations between great britain and her colonies were understood, would undertake the costliest war of conquest in history in order to acquire an absurd and profitless position from which she could not exact even the shadow of a material advantage? it may be pleaded that germany might on the morrow of conquest attempt to enforce a policy which gave her a material advantage in the colonies, such as spain and portugal attempted to create for themselves. but in that case, is it conceivable that germany, without colonial experience, would be able to enforce a policy which great britain was obliged to abandon a hundred years ago? is it imaginable that, if great britain has been utterly unable to carry out a policy by which the colonies shall pay anything resembling tribute to the mother country, germany, without experience, and at an enormous disadvantage in the matter of language, tradition, racial tie, and the rest, would be able to make such a policy a success? surely, if the elements of this question were in the least understood in germany, such a preposterous notion could not be entertained for a moment. does anyone seriously pretend that the present system of british colony-holding is due to british philanthropy or high-mindedness? we all know, of course, that it is simply due to the fact that the older system of exploitation by monopoly broke down. it was a complete social, commercial, and political failure long before it was abolished by law. if england had persisted in the use of force to impose a disadvantageous situation on the colonies, she would have followed in the trail of spain, portugal, and france, and she would have lost her colonies, and her empire would have broken up. it took england anything from two to three centuries to learn the real colonial policy, but it would not take so long in our day for a conqueror to realize the only situation possible between one great community and another. european history, indeed, has recently furnished a striking illustration of how the forces which compel the relationship, which england has adopted towards her colonies, are operative, even in the case of quite small colonies, which could not be termed "great communities." under the méline régime in france, less than twenty years ago, a highly protectionist policy, somewhat corresponding to the old english colonial monopoly system, was enforced in the case of certain french colonies. none of these colonies was very considerable--indeed, they were all quite small--and yet the forces which they represented in the matter of the life of france have sufficed to change radically the attitude of the french government in the matter of the policy which less than twenty years ago was imposed on them. in _le temps_ of april , , appeared the following: our colonies can consider yesterday a red-letter day. the debate in the chamber gives hope that the stifling fiscal policy imposed on them heretofore is about to be very greatly modified. the tariff commission of the chamber has hitherto been a very citadel of the blindest type of protectionism in this matter. m. thierry is the present president of this commission, and yet it is from him that we learn that a new era in the colonies is about to be inaugurated. it is a very great change, and one that may have incalculable consequences in the future development of our colonial empire. the customs law of committed two injustices with regard to our possessions. the first was that it obliged the colonies to receive, free of duty, goods coming from france, while it taxed colonial goods coming into france. now, it is impossible to imagine a treaty of that kind being passed between two free countries, and if it was passed with the colonies, it was because these colonies were weak, and not in the position to defend themselves _vis-à-vis_ the mother country.... the minister of the colonies himself, animated by a newer and better spirit, which we are so happy to see appear in our treatment of colonial questions, has promised to give all his efforts towards terminating the present bad system. a further defect of the law of is that all the colonies have been subjected to the same fiscal arrangement, as though there could be anything in common between countries separated by the width of the whole globe. happily the policy was too outrageous ever to be put into full execution. certain of our african colonies[ ] were tied by international treaties at the time that the law was voted, so that the government was compelled to make exceptions. but monsieur méline's idea at this period was to bring all the colonies under one fiscal arrangement imposed by the mother country, just as soon as the international treaty should have expired. the exceptions have thus furnished a most useful demonstration as to the results which flow from the two systems; the fiscal policy imposed by the mother country in view merely of its own immediate interest, and the fiscal policy framed to some extent by the colony in view of its own special interests. well, what is the result? it is this. that those colonies which have been free to frame their own fiscal policy have enjoyed undeniable prosperity, while those which have been obliged to submit to the policy imposed by another country have been sinking into a condition of veritable ruin; they are faced by positive disaster! only one conclusion is possible. each colony must be free to make those arrangements which in its view are suited to its local conditions. that is not at all what m. méline desired, but it is what experience imposes.... it is not merely a matter of injustice. our policy has been absurd. what is it that france desires in her colonies? an addition of wealth and power to the mother country. but if we compel the colonies to submit to disadvantageous fiscal arrangements, which result in their poverty, how can they possibly be a source of wealth and power to the mother country? a colony which can sell nothing is a colony which can buy nothing: it is a customer lost to french industry. every feature of the foregoing is significant and pregnant: this change of policy is not taking place because france is unable to impose force--she is perfectly able to do so; speaking in practical terms, the colonies have no physical force whatever to oppose to her--but this change is taking place because the imposition of force, even when completely successful and unchallenged, is economically futile. the object at which france is striving can be obtained in one way only: by an arrangement which is mutually advantageous, arrived at by the free consent of both parties, the establishment of a relationship which places a colony fiscally, economically, on the footing of a foreign country. france is now in process of doing exactly what england has done in the case of her colonies: she is undoing the work of conquest, surrendering bit by bit the right to impose force, because force fails in its object. perhaps the most significant feature of all in the french experience is this: that it has taken less than twenty years for the old colonial system, even in the case of small and relatively powerless colonies, to break down entirely. how long would a power like germany be able to impose the old policy of exploitation on great and powerful communities, a hundred times greater than the french colonies, even supposing that she could ever "conquer" them?[ ] yet so little is the real relationship of modern colonies understood, that i have heard it mentioned in private conversation by an english public man, whose position was such, moreover, as to enable him to give very great effect to his opinion, that one of the motives pushing germany to war was the projected capture of south africa, in order to seize the gold-mines, and by means of a tax of per cent. on their output, secure for herself one of the chief sources of gold in the world. one heard a good deal at the outbreak of the south african war of the part that the gold-mines played in precipitating that conflict. alike in england and on the continent, it was generally assumed that great britain was "after the gold-mines." a long correspondence took place in the london _times_ as to the real value of the mines, and speculation as to the amount of money which it was worth great britain's while to spend in their "capture." well, now that england has won the war, how many gold-mines has she captured? in other words, how many shares in the gold-mines does the british government hold? how many mines have been transferred from their then owners to the british government, as the result of british victory? how much tribute does the government of westminster exact as the result of investing two hundred and fifty millions in the enterprise? the fact is, of course, that the british government does not hold a cent's worth of the property. the mines belong to the shareholders and to no one else, and in the conditions of the modern world it is not possible for a government to "capture" so much as a single dollar's worth of such property as the result of a war of conquest. supposing that germany or any other conqueror were to put on the output of the mines a duty of per cent. what would she get, and what would be the result? the output of the south african mines to-day is, roughly, $ , , a year, so that she would get about $ , , a year.[ ] the annual total income of germany is calculated at something like $ , , , , so that a tribute of $ , , would hold about the same proportion to germany's total income that, say, fifteen cents a day would to a man in receipt of $ , a year. it would represent, say, the expenditure of a man with an income of $ or $ a year upon, say, his evening cigars. could one imagine such a householder in his right mind committing burglary and murder in order to economize a dollar a week? yet that would be the position of the german empire entering upon a great and costly war for the purpose of exacting $ , , a year from the south african mines; or, rather, the situation for the german empire would be a great deal worse than that. for this householder having committed burglary and murder for the sake of his dollar a week (the german empire, that is, having entered into one of the most frightful wars of history to exact its tribute of seventy-five millions) would then find that in order to get this dollar he had to jeopardize many of the investments upon which the bulk of his income depended. on the morrow of imposing a tax of fifty per cent. on the mines there would be such a slump in a class of security now dealt in by every considerable stock exchange in the world that there would hardly be a considerable business firm in europe unaffected thereby. in england, they know of the difficulty that a relatively mild fiscal attack, delivered rather for social and moral than economic reasons, upon a class of property like the brewing trade provokes. what sort of outcry, therefore, would be raised throughout the world when every south african mining share in the world lost at one stroke half its value, and a great many of them lost all their value? who would invest money in the transvaal at all if property were to be subject to that sort of shock? investors would argue that though it be mines to-day, it might be other forms of property to-morrow, and south africa would find herself in the position of being able hardly to borrow a quarter for any purpose whatsoever, save at usurious and extortionate rates of interest. the whole of south african trade and industry would, of course, feel the effect, and south africa as a market would immediately begin to dwindle in importance. those businesses bound up with south african affairs would border on the brink of ruin, and many of them topple over. is that the way efficient germany would set about the development of her newly-acquired empire? she would soon find that she had a ruined colony on her hands. if in south africa the sturdy dutch and english stock did not produce a george washington with a better material and moral case for independence than george washington ever had, then history has no meaning. if it costs england a billion and a quarter to conquer dutch south africa, what would it cost germany to conquer anglo-dutch south africa? such a policy could not, of course, last six months, and germany would end by doing what great britain has ended by doing--she would renounce all attempt to exact a tribute or commercial advantage other than that which is the result of free co-operation with the south african people. in other words, she would learn that the policy which great britain has adopted was not adopted by philanthropy, but in the hard school of bitter experience. germany would see that the last word in colonial statesmanship is to exact nothing from your colonies, and where the greatest colonial power of history has been unable to follow any other policy, a poor intruder in the art of colonial administration would not be likely to prove more successful, and she, too, would find that the only way to treat colonies is to treat them as independent or foreign territories, and the only way to own them is to make no attempt at exercising any of the functions of ownership. all the reasons which gave force to this principle in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have been reinforced a hundredfold by the modern contrivances of credit and capital, quick communication, popular government, popular press, the conditions and cost of warfare--the whole weight, indeed, of modern progress. it is not a question here of theorizing, of the erection of an elaborate thesis, nor is it a question of arguing what the relations of colonies ought to be. the differences between the imperialist and the anti-imperialist do not enter into the discussion at all. it is simply a question of what the unmistakable outstanding facts of experience have taught, and we all know, imperialists and their opponents alike, that whatever the relations with the colonies are to be, that relationship must be fixed by the free consent of the colonies, by their choice, not ours. sir j.r. seeley notes in his book, "the expansion of england," that because the early spanish colonies were in a true sense of the word "possessions," britons acquired the habit of talking of "possessions" and "ownership," and their ideas of colonial policy were vitiated during three centuries, simply by the fatal hypnotism of an incorrect word. is it not time that we shook off the influence of those disastrous words? canada, australia, new zealand, and south africa, are not "possessions." they are no more possessions than is argentina or brazil, and the nation which conquered england, which even captured london, would be hardly nearer to the conquest of canada or australia than if it happened to occupy constantinople or st. petersburg. why, therefore, do we tolerate the loose talk which assumes that the master of london is also master of montreal, vancouver, cape town, johannesburg, melbourne, and sydney? have we not had about enough of this ignorant chatter, which is persistently blind to the simplest and most elementary facts of the case? and have not the english, of all people of the world, a most direct interest in aiding the general realization of these truths in europe? would not that general realization add immensely to the security of their so-called empire? chapter viii the fight for "the place in the sun" how germany really expands--where her real colonies are--how she exploits without conquest--what is the difference between an army and a police force?--the policing of the world--germany's share of it in the near east. what is the practical outcome of the situation which the facts detailed in the last chapter make plain? must nations like germany conclude that, because there can be no duplication of the fight for empty territory which took place between european nations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and because talk of the german conquest of british colonies is childish nonsense, germany must therefore definitely surrender any hope of expansion, and accept a secondary position because she happens to have "come too late into the world"? are germans with all their activities and scientific thoroughness, and with such a lively sense of the difficulty of finding room in the world for the additional million of germans every year quietly to accept the _status quo_? if our thoughts were not so distorted by misleading political imagery, it is doubtful whether it would ever occur to us that such a "problem" existed. when one nation, say england, occupies a territory, does it mean that that territory is "lost" to germans? we know this to be an absurdity. germany does an enormous and increasing trade with the territory that has been pre-empted by the anglo-saxon race. millions of germans in germany gain their livelihood by virtue of german enterprise and german industry in anglo-saxon countries--indeed, it is the bitter and growing complaint of englishmen that they are being driven out of these territories by the germans; that where originally british shipping was universal in the east,[ ] german shipping is now coming to occupy the prominent place; that the trade of whole territories which englishmen originally had to themselves is now being captured by germans, and this not merely where the fiscal arrangements are more or less under the control of the british government, as in the crown colonies, but in those territories originally british but now independent, like the united states, as well as in those territories which are in reality independent, though nominally still under british control, like australia and canada. moreover, why need germany occupy the extraordinary position of phantom "ownership," which england occupies, in order to enjoy all the real benefits which in our day result from a colonial empire? more germans have found homes in the united states in the last half-century than have englishmen in all their colonies. it is calculated that between ten and twelve millions of the population of the united states are of direct german descent it is true, of course, that germans do not live under their flag, but it is equally true that they do not regret that fact, but rejoice in it! the majority of german emigrants do not desire that the land to which they go shall have the political character of the land which they leave behind. the fact that in adopting the united states they have shed something of the german tradition and created a new national type, partaking in part of the english and in part of the german, is, on the whole, very much to their advantage--and incidentally to ours. of course it is urged that, despite all this, the national sentiment will always desire, for the overflow of its population, territories in which that nation's language, law, and literature reign. but how far is that aspiration one of those purely political aspirations still persisting, it is true, but really the result of the momentum of old ideas, the outcome of facts long since passed away, and destined to disappear as soon as the real facts have been absorbed by the general public? thus a german will shout patriotically, and, if needs be, embroil his country in a war for an equatorial or asiatic colony; the truth being that he does not think about the matter seriously. but if he and his family have to emigrate, he _does_ think about it seriously, and then it is another matter; he does not choose equatorial africa or china; he goes to the united states, which he knows to be a far better country in which to make his home than the cameroons or kiau chau could ever be. indeed, in england's own case, are not certain foreign countries much more her real colonies for her children of the future than certain territory under her own flag? will not her children find better and more congenial conditions, more readily build real homes, in pennsylvania, which is "foreign," than in bombay, which is "british"? of course, if by sheer military conquest it were possible to turn a united states or even a canada into a real germany--of german language, law, literature--the matter would assume another aspect. but the facts dealt with in the last chapter show that the day is past for conquest in that form. quite other means must be employed. the german conqueror of the future would have to say with napoleon: "i come too late. the nations are too firmly set." even when the english, the greatest colonizers of the world, conquer a territory like the transvaal or the orange free state, they have no resort, having conquered it, but to allow its own law, its own literature, its own language to have free play, just as though the conquest had never taken place. this was even the case with quebec more than one hundred years ago, and germany will have to be guided by a like rule. on the morrow of conquest she would have to proceed to establish her real ascendancy by other than military means--a thing she is free to do to-day, if she can. it cannot throughout this discussion be too often repeated that the world has been modified, and that what was possible to the canaanites and the romans, and even to the normans, is no longer possible to us. the edict can no longer go forth to "slay every male child" that is born into the conquered territory, in order that the race may be exterminated. conquest in this sense is impossible. the most marvellous colonial history in the world--british colonial history--demonstrates that in this field physical force is no longer of avail. and germans are beginning to realize it. "we must resign ourselves in all clearness and calm to the fact that there is no possibility of acquiring colonies suitable for emigration," writes dr. p. rohrbach. he continues: but if we cannot have such colonies, it by no means follows that we cannot obtain the advantages, if only to a limited extent, which make these colonies desirable. it is a mistake to regard the mere possession of extensive trans-oceanic territories, even when they are able to absorb a part of the national surplus of population, as necessarily a direct increase of power. australia, canada, and south africa do not increase the power of the british empire because they are british possessions, nor yet because they are peopled by a few million british emigrants and their descendants, but because by trade with them the wealth and with it the defensive strength of the mother country are increased. colonies which do not produce that result have but little value; and countries which possess this importance for a nation, even though they are not its colonies, are in this decisive point a substitute for colonial possessions in the ordinary sense.[ ] in fact the misleading political imagery to which i referred a few pages back has gone far to destroy our sense of reality and sense of proportion in the matter of political control of foreign territory, a fact which the diplomatic turmoil of most certainly illustrated. i had occasion at the time to emphasize it in the following terms: the press of europe and america is very busy discussing the lessons of the diplomatic conflict which has just ended, and the military conflict which has just begun. and the outstanding impression which one gets from most of these essays in high politics--whether french, italian, or british--is that we have been and still are witnessing part of a great world movement, the setting in motion of titanic forces "deep-set in primordial needs and impulses." for months those in the secrets of the chancelleries have spoken with bated breath--as though in the presence of some vision of armageddon. on the strength of this mere talk of war by the three nations, vast commerical interests have been embarrassed, fortunes have been lost and won on the bourses, banks have suspended payment, some thousands have been ruined; while the fact that the fourth and fifth nations have actually gone to war has raised all sorts of further possibilities of conflict, not alone in europe, but in asia, with remoter danger of religious fanaticism and all its sequelæ. international bitterness and suspicion in general have been intensified, and the one certain result of the whole thing is that immense burdens will be added in the shape of further taxation for armaments to the already heavy ones carried by the five or six nations concerned. for two or three hundred millions of people in europe, life, which with all the problems of high prices, labor wars, unsolved social difficulties, is none too easy as it is, will be made harder still. the needs, therefore, that can have provoked a conflict of these dimensions must be "primordial" indeed. in fact one authority assures us that what we have seen going on is "the struggle for life among men"--that struggle which has its parallel in the whole of sentient existence. well, i put it to you, as a matter worth just a moment or two of consideration, that this conflict is about nothing of the sort; that it is about a perfectly futile matter, one which the immense majority of the german, english, french, italian, and turkish people could afford to treat with the completest indifference. for, to the vast majority of these , , people more or less, it does not matter two straws whether morocco or some vague african swamp near the equator is administered by german, french, italian, or turkish officials, so long as it is well administered. or rather one should go further: if french, german, or italian colonization of the past is any guide, the nation which wins in the contest for territory of this sort has added a wealth-draining incubus. this, of course, is preposterous; i am losing sight of the need for making provision for the future expansion of the race, for each party to "find its place in the sun"; and heaven knows what! the european press was full of these phrases at the time, and i attempted to weigh their real meaning by a comparison of french and german history in the matter of national "expansion" during the last thirty or forty years. france has got a new empire, we are told; she has won a great victory; she is growing and expanding and is richer by something which her rivals are the poorer for not having. let us assume that she makes the same success of morocco that she has made of her other possessions, of, say, tunis, which represents one of the most successful of those operations of colonial expansion which have marked her history during the last forty years. what has been the precise effect on french prosperity? in thirty years, at a cost of many millions (it is part of successful colonial administration in france never to let it be known what the colonies really cost), france has founded in tunis a colony, in which to-day there are, excluding soldiers and officials, about , genuine french colonists; just the number by which the french population in france--the real france--is diminishing every year! and the value of tunis as a market does not even amount to the sum which france spends directly on its occupation and administration, to say nothing of the indirect extension of military burdens which its conquest involved; and, of course, the market which it represents would still exist in some form, though england--or even germany--administered the country. in other words, france loses every year in her home population a colony equivalent to tunis--if we measure colonies in terms of communities made up of the race which has sprung from the mother country. and yet, if once in a generation her rulers and diplomats can point to , frenchmen living artificially and exotically under conditions which must in the long-run be inimical to their race, it is pointed to as "expansion" and as evidence that france is maintaining her position as a great power. in a few years, as history goes, unless there is some complete change in tendencies, which at present seem as strong as ever, the french race, as we know it, will have ceased to exist, swamped without the firing, may be, of a single shot, by the germans, belgians, english, italians, and jews. there are to-day more germans in france than there are frenchmen in all the colonies that france has acquired in the last half-century, and german trade with france outweighs enormously the trade of france with all french colonies. france is to-day a better colony for the germans than they could make of any exotic colony which france owns. "they _tell_ me," said a french deputy recently (in a not quite original _mot_), "that the germans are at agadir. i _know_ they are in the champs-elysées." which, of course, is in reality a much more serious matter. on the other side we are to assume that germany has during the period of france's expansion,--since the war--not expanded at all. that she has been throttled and cramped--that she has not had her place in the sun; and that is why she must fight for it and endanger the security of her neighbors. well, i put it to you again that all this in reality is false: that germany has not been cramped or throttled; that, on the contrary, as we recognize when we get away from the mirage of the map, her expansion has been the wonder of the world. she has added twenty millions to her population--one-half the present population of france--during a period in which the french population has actually diminished. of all the nations in europe, she has cut the biggest slice in the development of world trade, industry, and influence. despite the fact that she has not "expanded" in the sense of mere political dominion, a proportion of her population, equivalent to the white population of the whole colonial british empire, make their living, or the best part of it, from the development and exploitation of territory outside her borders. these facts are not new, they have been made the text of thousands of political sermons preached in england itself during the last few years; but one side of their significance seems to have been missed. we get, then, this: on the one side a nation extending enormously its political dominion, and yet diminishing in national force--if by national force we mean the growth of a sturdy, enterprising, vigorous people. (i am not denying that france is both wealthy and comfortable, to a greater degree it may be than her rival; but that is another story.) on the other side, we get immense expansion expressed in terms of those things--a growing and vigorous population, and the possibility of feeding them--and yet the political dominion, speaking practically, has hardly been extended at all. such a condition of things, if the common jargon of high politics means anything, is preposterous. it takes nearly all meaning out of most that we hear about "primordial needs" and the rest of it. as a matter of fact, we touch here one of the vital confusions, which is at the bottom of most of the present political trouble between nations, and shows the power of the old ideas and the old phraseology. in the days of the sailing ship and the lumbering wagon dragging slowly over all but impassable roads, for one country to derive any considerable profit from another it had practically to administer it politically. but the compound steam-engine, the railway, the telegraph, have profoundly modified the elements of the whole problem. in the modern world political dominion is playing a more and more effaced rôle as a factor in commerce; the non-political factors have in practice made it all but inoperative. it is the case with every modern nation, actually, that the outside territories which it exploits most successfully are precisely those of which it does not "own" a foot. even with the most characteristically colonial of all--great britain--the greater part of her overseas trade is done with countries which she makes no attempt to "own," control, coerce, or dominate--and incidentally she has ceased to do any of those things with her colonies. millions of germans in prussia and westphalia derive profit or make their living out of countries to which their political dominion in no way extends. the modern german exploits south america by remaining at home. where, forsaking this principle, he attempts to work through political power, he approaches futility. german colonies are colonies _pour rire_. the government has to bribe germans to go to them; her trade with them is microscopic; and if the twenty millions who have been added to germany's population since the war had had to depend on their country's political conquest, they would have had to starve. what feeds them are countries which germany has never "owned," and never hopes to "own": brazil, argentina, the united states, india, australia, canada, russia, france, and england. (germany, which never spent a mark on its political conquest, to-day draws more tribute from south america than does spain, which has poured out mountains of treasure and oceans of blood in its conquest.) these are germany's real colonies. yet the immense interests which they represent, of really primordial concern to germany, without which so many of her people would be actually without food, are for the diplomats and the soldiers quite secondary ones; the immense trade which they represent owes nothing to the diplomat, to agadir incidents, to _dreadnoughts_: it is the unaided work of the merchant and the manufacturer. all this diplomatic and military conflict and rivalry, this waste of wealth, the unspeakable foulness which tripoli is revealing, are reserved for things which both sides to the quarrel could sacrifice, not merely without loss, but with profit. and italy, whose statesmen have been faithful to all the old "axioms" (heaven save the mark!) will discover it rapidly enough. even her defenders are ceasing now to urge that she can possibly derive any real benefit from this colossal ineptitude. is it not time that the man in the street--verily, i believe, less deluded by diplomatic jargon than his betters, less the slave of an obsolete phraseology--insisted that the experts in the high places acquired some sense of the reality of things, of proportions, some sense of figures, a little knowledge of industrial history, of the real processes of human co-operation? but are we to assume that the extension of a european nation's authority overseas can never be worth while; or that it could, or should, never be the occasion for conflict between nations; or that the rôle of, say, england in india or egypt, is neither useful nor profitable? in the second part of this book i have attempted to uncover the general principle--which sadly needs establishing in politics--serving to indicate clearly the advantageous and disadvantageous employment of force. because force plays an undoubted rôle in human development and co-operation, it is sweepingly concluded that military force and the struggle between groups must always be a normal feature of human society. to a critic, who maintained that the armies of the world were necessary and justifiable on the same grounds as the police forces of the world ("even in communities such as london, where, in our civic capacity, we have nearly realized all your ideals, we still maintain and are constantly improving our police force"), i replied: when we learn that london, instead of using its police for the running in of burglars and "drunks," is using them to lead an attack on birmingham for the purpose of capturing that city as part of a policy of "municipal expansion," or "civic imperialism," or "pan-londonism," or what not; or is using its force to repel an attack by the birmingham police acting as the result of a similar policy on the part of the birmingham patriots--when that happens you can safely approximate a police force to a european army. but until it does, it is quite evident that the two--the army and the police force--have in reality diametrically opposed rôles. the police exist as an instrument of social co-operation; the armies as the natural outcome of the quaint illusion that though one city could never enrich itself by "capturing" or "subjugating" another, in some unexplained way one country can enrich itself by capturing or subjugating another. in the existing condition of things in england this illustration covers the whole case; the citizens of london would have no imaginable interest in "conquering" birmingham, or _vice versa_. but suppose there arose in the cities of the north such a condition of disorder that london could not carry on its ordinary work and trade; then london, if it had the power, _would_ have an interest in sending its police into birmingham, presuming that this could be done. the citizens of london would have a tangible interest in the maintenance of order in the north--they would be the richer for it. order was just as well maintained in alsace-lorraine before the german conquest as it was after, and for that reason germany has not benefited by the conquest. but order was not maintained in california, and would not have been as well maintained under mexican as under american rule, and for that reason america has benefited by the conquest of california. france has benefited by the conquest of algeria, england by that of india, because in each case the arms were employed not, properly speaking, for conquest at all, but for police purposes, for the establishment and maintenance of order; and, so far as they achieved that object, their rôle was a useful one. how does this distinction affect the practical problem under discussion? most fundamentally. germany has no need to maintain order in england, nor england in germany, and the latent struggle therefore between these two countries is futile. it is not the result of any inherent necessity of either people; it is the result merely of that woeful confusion which dominates statecraft to-day, and it is bound, so soon as that confusion is cleared up, to come to an end. where the condition of a territory is such that the social and economic co-operation of other countries with it is impossible, we may expect the intervention of military force, not as the result of the "annexationist illusion," but as the outcome of real social forces pushing to the maintenance of order. that is the story of england in egypt, or, for that matter, in india. but foreign nations have no need to maintain order in the british colonies, nor in the united states; and though there might be some such necessity in the case of countries like venezuela, the last few years have taught us that by bringing these countries into the great economic currents of the world, and so setting up in them a whole body of interests in favor of order, more can be done than by forcible conquest. we occasionally hear rumors of german designs in brazil and elsewhere, but even the modicum of education possessed by the average european statesman makes it plain to him that these nations are, like the others, "too firmly set" for military occupation and conquest by an alien people. it is one of the humors of the whole anglo-german conflict that so much has the british public been concerned with the myths and bogies of the matter that it seems calmly to have ignored the realities. while even the wildest pan-german has never cast his eyes in the direction of canada, he has cast them, and does cast them, in the direction of asia minor; and the political activities of germany may centre on that area, for precisely the reasons which result from the distinction between policing and conquest, which i have drawn. german industry is coming to have dominating interests in the near east, and as those interests--her markets and investments--increase, the necessity for better order in, and the better organization of, those territories increases in corresponding degree. germany may need to police asia minor. what interest have we in attempting to prevent her? it may be urged that she would close the markets of those territories against us. but even if she attempted it, which she is never likely to do, a protectionist asia minor organized with german efficiency would be better from the point of view of trade than a free trade asia minor organized _à la turque_. protectionist germany is one of the best markets in europe. if a second germany were created in the near east, if turkey had a population with the german purchasing power and the german tariff, the markets would be worth some two hundred to two hundred and fifty millions instead of some fifty to seventy-five. why should we try to prevent germany increasing our trade? it is true that we touch here the whole problem of the fight for the open door in the undeveloped territories. but the real difficulty in this problem is not the open door at all, but the fact that germany is beating england--or england fears she is beating her in those territories where she has the same tariff to meet that germany has, or even a smaller one; and that she is even beating england in the territories that the english already "own"--in their colonies, in the east, in india. how, therefore, would england's final crushing of germany in the military sense change anything? suppose england crushed her so completely that she "owned" asia minor and persia as completely as she owns india or hong kong, would not the german merchant continue to beat her even then, as he is beating her now, in that part of the east over which she already holds political sway? again, how would the disappearance of the german navy affect the problem one way or the other? moreover, in this talk of the open door in the undeveloped territories, we again seem to lose all our sense of proportion. english trade is in relative importance first with the great nations--the united states, france, germany, argentina, south america generally--after that with the white colonies; after that with the organized east; and last of all, and to a very small extent, with the countries concerned in this squabble for the open door--territories in which the trade really is so small as hardly to pay for the making and upkeep of a dozen battleships. when the man in the street, or, for that matter, the journalistic pundit, talks commercial diplomacy, his arithmetic seems to fall from him. some years since the question of the relative position of the three powers in samoa exercised the minds of these wiseacres, who got fearfully warlike both in england and in the united states. yet the trade of the whole island is not worth that of an obscure massachusetts village, and the notion that naval budgets should be increased to "maintain our position," the notion that either of the countries concerned should really think it worth while to build so much as a single battleship the more for such a purpose, is not throwing away a sprat to catch a whale, but throwing away a whale to catch a sprat--and then not catching it. for even when you _have_ the predominant political position, even when you _have_ got your extra _dreadnought_ or extra dozen _dreadnoughts_, it is the more efficiently organized nation on the commercial side that will take the trade. and while england is getting excited over the trade of territories that matter very little, rivals, including germany, will be quietly walking off with the trade that _does_ matter, will be increasing their hold upon such markets as the united states, argentina, south america, and the lesser continental states. if we really examined these questions without the old meaningless prepossessions, we should see that it is more to the general interest to have an orderly and organized asia minor under german tutelage than to have an unorganized and disorderly one which should be independent. perhaps it would be best of all that great britain should do the organizing, or share it with germany, though england has her hands full in that respect--egypt and india are problems enough. why should england forbid germany to do in a small degree what she has done in a large degree? sir harry h. johnston, in the _nineteenth century_ for december, , comes a great deal nearer to touching the real kernel of the problem that is preoccupying germany than any of the writers on the anglo-german conflict of whom i know. as the result of careful investigation, he admits that germany's real objective is not, properly speaking, england or england's colonies at all, but the undeveloped lands of the balkan peninsula, asia minor, mesopotamia, down even to the mouth of the euphrates. he adds that the best informed germans use this language to him: in regard to england, we would recall a phrase dropped by ex-president roosevelt at an important public speech in london, a phrase which for some reason was not reported by the london press. roosevelt said that the best guarantee for great britain on the nile is the presence of germany on the euphrates. putting aside the usual hypocrisies of the teutonic peoples, you know that this is so. you know that we ought to make common cause in our dealing with the backward races of the world. let britain and germany once come to an agreement in regard to the question of the near east, and the world can scarcely again be disturbed by any great war in any part of the globe, if such a war is contrary to the interests of the two empires. such, declares sir harry, is german opinion. and in all human probability, so far as sixty-five million people can be said to have the same opinion, he is absolutely right. it is because the work of policing backward or disorderly populations is so often confused with the annexationist illusion that the danger of squabbles in the matter is a real one. not the fact that england is doing a real and useful work for the world at large in policing india creates jealousy of her work there, but the notion that in some way she "possesses" this territory, and draws tribute and exclusive advantage therefrom. when europe is a little more educated in these matters, the european populations will realize that they have no primordial interest in furnishing the policemen. german public opinion will see that, even if such a thing were possible, the german people would gain no advantage by replacing england in india, especially as the final result of the administrative work of europe in the near and far east will be to make populations like those of asia minor in the last resort their own policemen. should some power, acting as policeman, ignoring the lessons of history, try again the experiment tried by spain in south america and later by england in north america, should she try to create for herself exclusive privileges and monopolies, the other nations have means of retaliation apart from the military ones--in the numberless instruments which the economic and financial relationships of nations furnish. part ii the human nature and morals of the case chapter i the psychological case for war the non-economic motives of war--moral and psychological--the importance of these pleas--english, german, and american exponents--the biological plea. perhaps the commonest plea urged in objection to the case presented in the first part of this book is that the real motives of nations in going to war are not economic at all; that their conflicts arise from moral causes, using that word in its largest sense; that they are the outcome of conflicting views of rights; or that they arise from, not merely non-economic, but also non-rational causes--from vanity, rivalry, pride of place, the desire to be first, to occupy a great situation in the world, to have power or prestige; from quick resentment of insult or injury; from temper; the unreasoned desire, which comes of quarrel or disagreement, to dominate a rival at all costs; from the "inherent hostility" that exists between rival nations; from the contagion of sheer passion, the blind strife of mutually hating men; and generally because men and nations always have fought and always will, and because, like the animals in watt's doggerel, "it is their nature to." an expression of the first point of view is embodied in the criticism of an earlier edition of this book, in which the critic says: the cause of war is spiritual, not material.... the great wars arose from conflicts as to rights, and the dangerous causes of war are the existence of antagonistic ideas of rights or righteousness.... it is for moral ideas that men are most ready to make sacrifices.[ ] a similar criticism is made by admiral mahan.[ ] in the same way the london _spectator_ while admitting the truth of the principles outlined in the first part of this book, deems that such facts do not seriously affect the basic cause of war: just as individuals quarrel among themselves, and fight as bitterly as the police and the law courts will allow them, not because they think it will make them rich, but because their blood is up, and they want to stand up for what they believe to be their rights, or to revenge themselves for wrongs done to them, as they think, by their fellows, so nations will fight, even though it is demonstrable that they will get no material gain thereby.... they want sometimes freedom, sometimes power. sometimes a passion for expansion or dominion comes over them. sometimes they seem impelled to fight for fighting's sake, or, as their leaders and rhetoricians vaguely say, to fulfil their destinies.... men fight sometimes for the love of fighting, sometimes for great and noble causes, and sometimes for bad causes, but practically never with an account-book and a balance-sheet in their hands. i desire to give every possible weight to this plea, and not to shirk a detail of it, and i think that the pages that follow cover every one of the points here raised. but there is a whole school of philosophy which goes much farther than the _spectator_. the view just cited rather implies that though it is a fact that men settle their differences by force and passion, instead of by reason, it is a regrettable fact. but the school to which i refer urges that men should be encouraged to fight, and that war is the preferable solution. war, declare these philosophers, is a valuable discipline for the nations, and it is not desirable to see human conflict shifted from the plane of physical force. they urge that humanity will be permanently the poorer when, as one of them has put it, the great struggles of mankind become merely the struggles of "talk and money-bags." parenthetically, it should be pointed out that the matter has a good deal more than academic interest. this philosophy constitutes a constant element of resistance to that reform of political thought and tradition in europe which must be the necessary precedent of a sounder condition. not merely, of course, do international situations become infinitely more dangerous when you get, on both sides of the frontier, a general "belief in war for war's sake," but a tendency is directly created to discredit the use of patience, a quality as much needed in the relationship of nations as in that of individuals; and further there is a tendency to justify political action making for war as against action that might avoid it. all these pleas, biological and otherwise, are powerful factors in creating an atmosphere and temperament in europe favorable to war and unfavorable to international agreement. for, be it noted, this philosophy is not special to any one country: one finds it plentifully expressed in england and america, as well as in france and germany. it is a european doctrine, part of that "mind of europe," of which someone has spoken, that, among other factors, determines the character of european civilization generally. this particular point of view has received a notable re-statement quite recently[ ] from general bernhardi, a distinguished cavalry general, and probably the most influential german writer on current strategical and tactical problems, in his book, "deutschland und der nächste krieg."[ ] he therein gives very candid expression to the opinion that germany must, regardless of the rights and interests of other peoples, fight her way to predominance. one of the chapters is headed, "the duty to make war." he describes the peace movement in germany as "poisonous," and proclaims the doctrine that the duties and tasks of the german people cannot be fulfilled save by the sword. "the duty of self-assertion is by no means exhausted in the mere repelling of hostile attacks. it includes the need of securing to the whole people, which the state embraces, the possibility of existence and development." it is desirable, declares the author, that conquest shall be effected by war, and not by peaceful means; silesia would not have had the same value for prussia if frederick the great had obtained it from an arbitration court. the attempt to abolish war is not only "immoral and unworthy of humanity," it is an attempt to deprive man of his highest possession--the right to stake physical life for ideal ends. the german people "must learn to see that the maintenance of peace cannot be, and must never be, the goal of policy." similar efforts are being made in england by english writers to secure the acceptance of this doctrine of force. many passages almost duplicating those of bernhardi, or at least extolling the general doctrine of force, may be found in the writings of such anglo-saxon authors as admiral mahan and professor spenser wilkinson.[ ] a scientific color is often given to the philosophy of force, as expressed by the authors just referred to, by an appeal to evolutionary and biological laws. it is urged that the condition of man's advance in the past has been the survival of the fit by struggle and warfare, and that in that struggle it is precisely those endowed with combativeness and readiness to fight who have survived. thus the tendency to combat is not a mere human perversity, but is part of the self-protective instinct rooted in a profound biological law--the struggle of nations for survival. this point of view is expressed by s.r. steinmetz in his "philosophie des krieges." war, according to this author, is an ordeal instituted by god, who weighs the nations in its balance. it is the essential function of the state, and the only function in which peoples can employ all their powers at once and convergently. no victory is possible save as the resultant of a totality of virtues; no defeat for which some vice or weakness is not responsible. fidelity, cohesiveness, tenacity, heroism, conscience, education, inventiveness, economy, wealth, physical health and vigor--there is no moral or intellectual point of superiority that does not tell when "god holds his assizes, and hurls the peoples one upon another" (die weltgeschichte ist das weltgericht); and dr. steinmetz does not believe that in the long-run chance and luck play any part in apportioning the issues. it is urged that international hostility is merely the psychological stimulus to that combativeness which is a necessary element of existence, and that though, like other elemental instincts--our animal appetites, for instance--it may in some of its manifestations be ugly enough, it makes for survival, and is to that extent a part of the great plan. too great a readiness to accept the "friendly assurances" of another nation and an undue absence of distrust would, in accordance with a sort of gresham's law in international relationships, make steadily for the disappearance of the humane and friendly communities in favor of the truculent and brutal. if friendliness and good-feeling towards other nations led us to relax our self-defensive efforts, the quarrelsome communities would see, in this slackening, an opportunity to commit aggression, and there would be a tendency, therefore, for the least civilized to wipe out the most. animosity and hostility between nations is a corrective of this sentimental slackness, and to that extent it plays a useful rôle, however ugly it may appear--"not pretty, but useful, like the dustman." though the material and economic motives which prompt conflict may no longer obtain, other than economic motives will be found for collision, so profound is the psychological stimulus thereto. some such view as this has found lurid expression in the recent work of an american soldier, homer lea.[ ] the author urges not only that war is inevitable, but that any systematic attempt to prevent it is merely an unwise meddling with the universal law. national entities, in their birth, activities, and death, are controlled by the same laws that govern all life--plant, animal, or national--the law of struggle, the law of survival. these laws, so universal as regards life and time, so unalterable in causation and consummation, are only variable in the duration of national existence as the knowledge of and obedience to them is proportionately true or false. plans to thwart them, to shortcut them, to circumvent, to cozen, to deny, to scorn and violate them, is folly such as man's conceit alone makes possible. never has this been tried--and man is ever at it--but what the end has been gangrenous and fatal. in theory international arbitration denies the inexorability of natural laws, and would substitute for them the veriest cagliostroic formulas, or would, with the vanity of canute, sit down on the ocean-side of life and command the ebb and flow of its tides to cease. the idea of international arbitration as a substitute for natural laws that govern the existence of political entities arises not only from a denial of their fiats and an ignorance of their application, but from a total misconception of war, its causes, and its meaning. homer lea's thesis is emphasized in the introduction to his work, written by another american soldier, general john p. storey: a few idealists may have visions that with advancing civilization war and its dread horrors will cease. civilization has not changed human nature. the nature of man makes war inevitable. armed strife will not disappear from the earth until human nature changes. "weltstadt und friedensproblem," the book of professor baron karl von stengel, a jurist who was one of germany's delegates at the first hague peace conference, contains a chapter entitled "the significance of war for development of humanity," in which the author says: war has more often facilitated than hindered progress. athens and rome, not only in spite of, but just because of their many wars, rose to the zenith of civilization. great states like germany and italy are welded into nationalities only through blood and iron. storm purifies the air and destroys the frail trees, leaving the sturdy oaks standing. war is the test of a nation's political, physical, and intellectual worth. the state in which there is much that is rotten may vegetate for a while in peace, but in war its weakness is revealed. germany's preparations for war have not resulted in economic disaster, but in unexampled economic expansion, unquestionably because of our demonstrated superiority over france. it is better to spend money on armaments and battleships than luxury, motormania, and other sensual living. we know that moltke expressed a similar view in his famous letter to bluntschli. "a perpetual peace," declared the field-marshal, "is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream. war is one of the elements of order in the world, established by god. the noblest virtues of men are developed therein. without war the world would degenerate and disappear in a morass of materialism."[ ] at the very time that moltke was voicing this sentiment, a precisely similar one was being voiced by no less a person than ernest renan. in his "la réforme intellectuelle et morale" (paris: lévy, , p. ) he writes: if the foolishness, negligence, idleness, and short-sightedness of states did not involve their occasional collision, it is difficult to imagine the degree of degeneracy to which the human race would descend. war is one of the conditions of progress, the sting which prevents a country from going to sleep, and compels satisfied mediocrity itself to awaken from its apathy. man is only sustained by effort and struggle. the day that humanity achieves a great pacific roman empire, having no external enemies, that day its morality and its intelligence will be placed in the very greatest peril. in our own times a philosophy not very dissimilar has been voiced in the public declarations of ex-president roosevelt. i choose a few phrases from his speeches and writings, at random: we despise a nation, just as we despise a man, who submits to insult. what is true of a man ought to be true of a nation.[ ] we must play a great part in the world, and especially ... perform those deeds of blood, of valor, which above everything else bring national renown. we do not admire a man of timid peace. by war alone can we acquire those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life. in this world the nation that is trained to a career of unwarlike and isolated ease is bound to go down in the end before other nations which have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities.[ ] professor william james covers the whole ground of these claims in the following passage: the war party is assuredly right in affirming that the martial virtues, although originally gained by the race through war, are absolute and permanent human goods. patriotic pride and ambition in their military form are, after all, only specifications of a more universal and enduring competitive passion.... pacifism makes no converts from the military party. the military party denies neither the bestiality, nor the horror, nor the expense; it only says that these things tell but half the story. it only says that war is worth these things; that, taking human nature as a whole, war is its best protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that mankind cannot afford to adopt a peace economy.... militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life without hardihood would be contemptible.... this natural feeling forms, i think, the innermost soul of army writings. without any exception known to me, militarist authors take a highly mystical view of their subject, and regard war as a biological or sociological necessity.... our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us.[ ] even famous english clergymen have voiced the same view. charles kingsley, in his defence of the crimean war as a "just war against tyrants and oppressors," wrote: "for the lord jesus christ is not only the prince of peace, he is the prince of war, too. he is the lord of hosts, the god of armies, and whoever fights in a just war against tyrants and oppressors is fighting on christ's side, and christ is fighting on his side. christ is his captain and his leader, and he can be in no better service. be sure of it, for the bible tells you so."[ ] canon newbolt, dean farrar, and the archbishop of armagh, have all written not dissimilarly. the whole case may be summarized thus: . nations fight for opposing conceptions of right: it is the moral conflict of men. . they fight from non-rational causes of a lower kind: from vanity, rivalry, pride of place, the desire to occupy a great situation in the world, or from sheer hostility to dissimilar people--the blind strife of mutually hating men. . these causes justify war, or render it inevitable. the first is admirable in itself, the second is inevitable, in that the peoples readiest to fight, and showing most energy in fighting, replace the more peacefully inclined, and the warlike type tends thus permanently to survive; "the warlike nations inherit the earth." or it may be put deductively, thus: since struggle is the law of life, and a condition of survival as much with nations as with other organisms, pugnacity, which is merely intense energy in struggle, a readiness to accept struggle in its acutest form, must necessarily be a quality marking those individuals successful in the vital contests. it is this deep-seated, biological law which renders impossible the acceptance by mankind of the literal injunction to turn the other cheek to the smiter, or for human nature ever to conform to the ideal implied in that injunction; since, were it accepted, the best men and nations--in the sense of the kindliest and most humane--would be placed at the mercy of the most brutal, who, eliminating the least brutal, would stamp the survivors with their own brutality and re-establish the militarist virtues. for this reason a readiness to fight, which means the qualities of rivalry and pride and combativeness, hardihood, tenacity, and heroism--what we know as the manly qualities--must in any case survive as the race survives, and, since this stands in the way of the predominance of the purely brutal, it is a necessary part of the highest morality. despite the apparent force of these propositions, they are founded upon a gross misreading of certain facts, and especially upon a gross misapplication of a certain biological analogy. chapter ii the psychological case for peace the shifting ground of pro-war arguments--the narrowing gulf between the material and moral ideals--the non-rational causes of war--false biological analogies--the real law of man's struggle: struggle with nature, not with other men--outline sketch of man's advance and main operating factor therein--the progress towards elimination of physical force--co-operation across frontiers and its psychological result--impossible to fix limits of community--such limits irresistibly expanding--break up of state homogeneity--state limits no longer coinciding with real conflicts between men. those who have followed at all closely the peace advocacy of the last few years will have observed a curious shifting of ground on the part of its opponents. until quite recently, most peace advocacy being based on moral, not material grounds, pacifists were generally criticized as unduly idealistic, sentimental, oblivious to the hard necessities of men in a hard world of struggle, and disposed to ask too much of human nature in the way of altruistic self-sacrifice on behalf of an idealistic dogma. we were given to understand that while peace might represent a great moral ideal, man's evil passions and cupidity would always stand in the way of its achievement. the citations i have given in chapter ii. of the first part of this book prove sufficiently, i think, that this was, until quite recently, overwhelmingly the point of view of those who defended war as an unavoidable part of human struggle. during the last few years, however, the defence of war has been made for the most part on very different grounds. peace, we are told by those who oppose the pacifist movement, may embody the material interests of men, but the spiritual nature of mankind will stand in the way of its ever being achieved! pacifism, far from being branded as too idealistic and sentimental, is now scorned as "sordidly material." i do not desire, in calling attention to this fact, merely to score a cheap jibe. i want, on the contrary, to do every justice to the point of view of those who urge that moral motives push men into war. i have never, indeed, taken the ground that the defender of war is morally inferior to the defender of peace, or that much is to be gained by emphasizing the moral superiority of the peace ideal. too often has it been assumed in pacifist advocacy that what is needed in order to clear up the difficulties in the international field, is a better moral tone, a greater kindliness, and so forth--for that assumption ignores the fact that the emotion of humanity repelling it from war may be more than counteracted by the equally strong moral emotion that we connect with patriotism. the patriot admits that war may occasion suffering, but urges that men should be prepared to endure suffering for their country. as i pointed out in the first chapter of this book, the pacifist appeal to humanity so often fails because the militarist pleads that he too is working and suffering for humanity. my object in calling attention to this unconscious shifting of ground, on the part of the advocate of war, is merely to suggest that the growth of events during the last generation has rendered the economic case for war practically untenable, and has consequently compelled those who defend war to shift their defence. nor, of course, am i urging that the sentimental defence of war is a modern doctrine--the quotations made in the last chapter show that not to be the case--but merely that greater emphasis is now placed upon the moral case. thus, writing in , admiral mahan criticizes this book as follows: the purpose of armaments, in the minds of those maintaining them, is not primarily an economical advantage, in the sense of depriving a neighboring state of its own, or fear of such consequences to itself through the deliberate aggression of a rival having that particular end in view.... the fundamental proposition of the book is a mistake. nations are under no illusion as to the unprofitableness of war in itself.... the entire conception of the work is itself an illusion, based upon a profound misreading of human action. to regard the world as governed by self-interest only is to live in a non-existent world, an ideal world, a world possessed by an idea much less worthy than those which mankind, to do it bare justice, persistently entertains.[ ] yet hardly four years previously admiral mahan had himself outlined the elements of international politics as follows: it is as true now as when washington penned the words, and will always be true, that it is vain to expect nations to act consistently from any motive other than that of interest. this under the name of realism is the frankly avowed motive of german statecraft. it follows from this directly that the study of interests--international interest--is the one basis of sound, of provident, policy for statesmen.... the old predatory instinct, that he should take who has the power, survives ... and moral force is not sufficient to determine issues unless supported by physical. governments are corporations, and corporations have no souls ... they must put first the rival interests of their own wards ... their own people. commercial and industrial predominance forces a nation to seek markets, and, where possible, to control them to its own advantage by preponderating force, the ultimate expression of which is possession ... an inevitable link in a chain of logical sequences: industry, markets, control, navy bases.[ ] admiral mahan, it is true, anticipates this criticism by pleading the complex character of human nature (which no one denies). he says: "bronze is copper, and bronze is tin." but he entirely overlooks the fact that if one withholds copper or one withholds tin it is no longer bronze. the present author has never taken the ground that all international action can be explained in the terms of one narrow motive, but he does take the ground that if you can profoundly modify the bearing of a constituent, as important as the one to which admiral mahan has himself, in his own work, attributed such weight, you will profoundly modify the whole texture and character of international relations. thus, even though it were true that the thesis here elaborated were as narrowly economic as the criticism i have quoted would imply, it would, nevertheless, have, on admiral mahan's own showing, a very profound bearing on the problems of international statecraft. not only do the principles elaborated here postulate no such narrow conception of human motive, but it is essential to realize that you cannot separate a problem of interest from a problem of right or morality in the absolute fashion that admiral mahan would imply, because right and morality connote the protection and promotion of the general interest. a nation, a people, we are given to understand, have higher motives than money or "self-interest." what do we mean when we speak of the money of a nation, or the self-interest of a community? we mean--and in such a discussion as this can mean nothing else--better conditions for the great mass of the people, the fullest possible lives, the abolition or attenuation of poverty and of narrow circumstances; that the millions shall be better housed and clothed and fed, more capable of making provision for sickness and old age, with lives prolonged and cheered--and not merely this, but also that they shall be better educated, with character disciplined by steady labor and a better use of leisure; a general social atmosphere which shall make possible family affection, individual dignity and courtesy and the graces of life, not only among the few, but among the many. now, do these things constitute, as a national policy, an inspiring aim, or not? they are, speaking in terms of communities, pure self-interest--bound up with economic problems, with money. does admiral mahan mean us to take him at his word when he would attach to such efforts the same discredit that one implies in talking of a mercenary individual? would he have us believe that the typical great movements of our time--socialism, trades unionism, syndicalism, insurance acts, land reforms, old age pensions, charity organization, improved education--bound up as they all are with economic problems--are not the objects which, more and more, are absorbing the best activities of christendom? in the pages which follow, i have attempted to show that the activities which lie outside the range of these things--the religious wars, movements like those which promoted the crusades, or the sort of tradition which we associate with the duel (which has, in fact, disappeared from anglo-saxon society)--do not, and cannot, any longer form part of the impulse creating the long-sustained conflicts between large groups which a european war implies. i have attempted roughly to indicate certain processes at work; to show, among other things, that in the changing character of men's ideals there is a distinct narrowing of the gulf which is supposed to separate ideal and material aims. early ideals, whether in the field of politics or religion, are generally dissociated from any aim of general well-being. in early politics, ideals are concerned simply with personal allegiance to some dynastic chief, a feudal lord, or a monarch; the well-being of a community does not enter into the matter at all. later the chief must embody in his person that well-being, or he does not obtain the allegiance of a community of any enlightenment; later, the well-being of the community becomes the end in itself, without being embodied in the person of an hereditary chief, so that the people realize that their efforts, instead of being directed to the protection of the personal interests of some chief, are as a matter of fact directed to the protection of their own interests, and their altruism has become communal self-interest, since the self-sacrifice of the community for the sake of the community is a contradiction in terms. in the religious sphere a similar development has occurred. early religious ideals have no relation to the material betterment of mankind. the early christian thought it meritorious to live a sterile life at the top of a pillar, eaten by vermin, just as the hindoo saint to-day thinks it meritorious to live an equally sterile life upon a bed of spikes. but as the early christian ideal progressed, sacrifices having no end connected with the betterment of mankind lost their appeal. our admiration now goes, not to the recluse who does nothing for mankind, but rather to the priest who gives his life to bring a ray of comfort to a leper settlement. the christian saint who would allow the nails of his fingers to grow through the palms of his clasped hands would excite, not our admiration, but our revolt. more and more is religious effort being subjected to this test: does it make for the improvement of society? if not, it stands condemned. political ideals are inevitably undergoing a similar development, and will be more and more subjected to a similar test.[ ] i am aware that very often at present they are not thus tested. dominated as our political thought is by roman and feudal imagery--hypnotized by symbols and analogies which the necessary development of organized society has rendered obsolete--the ideals even of democracies are still often pure abstractions, divorced from any aim calculated to advance the moral or material betterment of mankind. the craze for sheer size of territory, the mere extent of administrative area, is still deemed a thing deserving immense, incalculable sacrifices. even these ideals, however, firmly set as they are in our language and tradition, are rapidly yielding to the necessary force of events. a generation ago it would have been inconceivable that a people or a monarch should calmly see part of its country secede and establish itself as a separate political entity without attempting to prevent it by force of arms. yet this is what happened, a year or two ago, in the scandinavian peninsula. for forty years germany has added to her own difficulties and to those of the european situation for the purpose of including alsace and lorraine in its federation, but even there, obeying the tendency which is world-wide, an attempt has been made to create a constitutional and autonomous government. the history of the british empire for fifty years has been a process of undoing the work of conquest. colonies are now neither colonies nor possessions; they are independent states. england, which for centuries has made such sacrifices to retain ireland, is now making great sacrifices in order to make her secession workable. to each political arrangement, to each political ideal, the final test will be applied: does it, or does it not, make for the widest interests of the mass of the people involved? it is true that those who emphasize the psychological causes of war might rejoin with another distinction. they might urge that, though the questions dividing nations had more or less their origin in an economic problem, the economic question becomes itself a moral question, a question of right. it was not the few pence of the tax on tea that the colonies fought about, but the question of right which its payment involved. so with nations. war, ineffective to achieve an economic end, unprofitable in the sense that the cost involved in the defence of a given economic point exceeds the monetary value of that point, will still be fought because a point, trifling in the economic sense, is all important from the point of view of right; and though there is no real division of interests between nations, though those interests are in reality interdependent, minor differences provoking a sudden and uncontrolled flash of temper suffice to provoke war. war is the outcome of the "hot fits" of men, "of the devil that is in them." although militarist literature on this, as on most similar points, shows flagrant contradictions, even that literature is against the view that war is the outcome of the sheer sudden temper of nations. most of the popular, and all of the scientific, militarist writers take the contrary view. mr. blatchford and his school normally represent a typical militarist policy, like that of germany, as actuated by a cold, deep, machiavellian, unsentimental, calculated opportunism, as diverse from a wild, irrational explosion of feeling as possible. mr. blatchford writes: german policy, based upon the teachings of clausewitz, may be expressed in two questions, the questions laid down by clausewitz: "is it expedient to do this? have we the power to do it?" if it will benefit the fatherland to break up the british empire, then it is expedient to break up the british empire. clausewitz taught germany that "war is a part of policy." he taught that policy is a system of bargaining or negotiating, backed by arms. clausewitz does not discuss the moral aspect of war; he deals with power and expediency. his pupils take his lead. they do not read poems on the blessings of peace; they do not spend ink on philanthropic theories. all the more scientific writers, without an exception, so far as i am aware, repudiate its "accidental" character. they one and all, from grotius to von der goltz, take the view that it results from definite and determinable laws, like all the great processes of human development. von der goltz ("on the conduct of war") says: one must never lose sight of the fact that war is the consequence and continuation of policy. one will act on the defensive strategically or rest on the defensive according as the policy has been offensive or defensive. an offensive and defensive policy is in its turn indicated by the line of conduct dictated historically. we see this very clearly in antiquity by the example furnished us in the persians and romans. in their wars we see the strategical rôle following the bend of the historical rôle. the people which in its historical development has arrived at the stage of inertia, or even retrogression, will not carry on a policy of offence, but merely one of defence; a nation in that situation will wait to be attacked, and its strategy will consequently be defensive, and from a defensive strategy will follow necessarily a defensive tactic. lord esher has expressed a like thought.[ ] but whether wars result from sheer temper, national "hot fits," or not, it is quite certain that the lengthy preparation for war, the condition of armed peace, the burden of armaments which is almost worse than an occasional war, does not result therefrom. the paraphernalia of war in the modern world cannot be improvised on the spur of the moment to meet each gust of ill-feeling, and be dropped when it is over. the building of battleships, the discussion of budgets and the voting of them, the training of armies, the preparation of a campaign, are a long business, and more and more in our day does each distinctive campaign involve a special and distinctive preparation. the pundits declare that the german battleships have been especially built with a view to work in the north sea. in any case, we know that the conflict with germany has been going on for ten years. this is surely a rather prolonged "hot fit." the truth is that war in the modern world is the outcome of armed peace, and involves, with all its elaborate machinery of yearly budgets, and slowly built warships and forts, and slowly trained armies, fixity of policy and purpose extending over years, and sometimes generations. men do not make these sacrifices month after month, year after year, pay taxes, and upset governments and fight in parliament for a mere passing whim; and as conflicts necessarily become more scientific, we shall in the nature of things be forced to prepare everything more thoroughly, and have clearer and sounder ideas as to their essence, their cause, and their effects, and to watch more closely their relation to national motive and policy. the final justification for all these immense, humdrum, workaday sacrifices must be more and more national well-being. this does not imply, as some critics allege, the conclusion that an englishman is to say: "since i might be just as well off under the germans, let them come"; but that the german will say: "since i shall be no better off for the going, i will not go." indeed, the case of the authorities cited in the preceding chapter is marked by a false form of statement. those who plead for war on moral grounds say: "war will go on because men will defend their ideals, moral, political, social, and religious." it should be stated thus: "war will go on because men will always attack the spiritual possessions of other men," because, of course, the necessity for defence arises from the fact that these possessions are in danger of attack. put in the second form, however, the case breaks down almost of itself. the least informed of us realizes that the whole trend of history is against the tendency for men to attack the ideals and the beliefs of other men. in the religious domain that tendency is plain, so much so that the imposition of religious ideals or beliefs by force has practically been abandoned in europe, and the causes which have wrought this change of attitude in the european mind are just as operative in the field of politics. those causes have been, in the religious field, of a twofold nature, both having direct bearing on the problem with which we are dealing. the first cause is that at which i have already hinted, the general shifting of the ideals from sterile aims to those concerned with the improvement of society; the second one being that development of communication which has destroyed the spiritual homogeneity of states. a given movement of religious opinion is not confined to one state, transforming it completely, while another current of opinion transforms completely in another sense another state; but it goes on piecemeal, _pari passu_, in the various states. very early in the religious development of europe there ceased to be such a thing as a purely catholic or a purely protestant state: the religious struggle went on inside the political frontiers--between the people of the same state. the struggle of political and social ideas must take a like course. those struggles of ideas will be carried out, not between states, but between different groups in the same state, those groups acting in intellectual co-operation with corresponding groups in other states. this intellectual co-operation across frontiers is a necessary outcome of the similar economic co-operation athwart frontiers which the physical division of labor, owing to the development of communication, has set up. it has become impossible for the army of a state to embody the fight for an ideal, for the simple reason that the great moral questions of our time can no longer be postulated in national terms. what follows will make this plain. there remains a final moral claim for war: that it is a needed moral discipline for nations, the supreme test for the survival of the fittest. in the first chapter of this section, i have pointed out the importance of this plea in determining the general character of european public opinion, on which alone depends the survival or the disappearance of the militarist regimen. yet in strict logic there is no need to rebut this claim in detail at all, for only a small fraction of those who believe in it have the courage of their convictions. the defender of large armaments always justifies his position on the ground that such armaments ensure peace. _si vis pacem_, etc. as between war and peace he has made his choice, and he has chosen, as the definite object of his endeavors, peace. having directed his efforts to secure peace, he must accept whatever disadvantages there may lie in that state. he is prepared to admit that, of the two states, peace is preferable, and it is peace towards which our efforts should be directed. having decided on that aim, what utility is there in showing that it is an undesirable one? we must, as a matter of fact, be honest for our opponent. we must assume that in an alternative, where his action would determine the issue of war or peace, he will allow that action to be influenced by the general consideration that war might make for the moral advantage of his country. more important even than this consideration is that of the general national temper, to which his philosophy, however little in keeping with his professed policy and desire, necessarily gives rise. for these reasons it is worth while to consider in detail the biological case which he presents. the illusion underlying that case arises from the indiscriminate application of scientific formulæ. struggle is the law of survival with man, as elsewhere, but it is the struggle of man with the universe, not man with man. dog does not eat dog--even tigers do not live on one another. both dogs and tigers live upon their prey. it is true that as against this it is argued that dogs struggle with one another for the same prey--if the supply of food runs short the weakest dog, or the weakest tiger, starves. but an analogy between this state and one in which co-operation is a direct means of increasing the supply of food, obviously breaks down. if dogs and tigers were groups, organized on the basis of the division of labor, even the weak dogs and tigers could, conceivably, perform functions which would increase the food supply of the group as a whole, and, conceivably, their existence would render the security of that supply greater than would their elimination. if to-day a territory like england supports in comfort, a population of , , , where in other times rival groups, numbering at most two or three millions, found themselves struggling with one another for a bare subsistence, the greater quantity of food and the greater security of the supply is not due to any process of elimination of wessex men by northumbrian men, but is due precisely to the fact that this rivalry has been replaced by common action against their prey, the forces of nature. the obvious facts of the development of communities show that there is a progressive replacement of rivalry by co-operation, and that the vitality of the social organism increases in direct ratio to the efficiency of the co-operation, and to the abandonment of the rivalry, between its parts.[ ] all crude analogies between the processes of plant and animal survival and social survival are vitiated, therefore, by disregarding the dynamic element of conscious co-operation. that mankind as a whole represents the organism and the planet the environment, to which he is more and more adapting himself, is the only conclusion that consorts with the facts. if struggle between men is the true reading of the law of life, those facts are absolutely inexplicable, for he is drifting away from conflict, from the use of physical force, and towards co-operation. this much is unchallengeable, as the facts which follow will show. but in that case, if struggle for extermination of rivals between men is the law of life, mankind is setting at naught the natural law, and must be on the way to extinction. happily the natural law in this matter has been misread. the individual in his sociological aspect is not the complete organism. he who attempts to live without association with his fellows dies. nor is the nation the complete organism. if britain attempted to live without co-operation with other nations, half the population would starve. the completer the co-operation the greater the vitality; the more imperfect the co-operation the less the vitality. now, a body, the various parts of which are so interdependent that without co-ordination vitality is reduced or death ensures, must be regarded, in so far as the functions in question are concerned, not as a collection of rival organisms, but as one. this is in accord with what we know of the character of living organisms in their conflict with environment. the higher the organism, the greater the elaboration and interdependence of its part, the greater the need for co-ordination.[ ] if we take this as the reading of the biological law, the whole thing becomes plain; man's irresistible drift away from conflict and towards co-operation is but the completer adaptation of the organism (man) to its environment (the planet, wild nature), resulting in a more intense vitality. the psychological development involved in man's struggle along these lines may best be stated by an outline sketch of the character of his advance. when i kill my prisoner (cannibalism was a very common characteristic of early man), it is in "human nature" to keep him for my own larder without sharing him. it is the extreme form of the use of force, the extreme form of human individualism. but putrefaction sets in before i can consume him (it is as well to recall these real difficulties of the early man, because, of course, "human nature does not change"), and i am left without food. but my two neighbors, each with his butchered prisoner, are in a similar difficulty, and though i could quite easily defend my larder, we deem it better on the next occasion to join forces and kill one prisoner at a time. i share mine with the other two; they share theirs with me. there is no waste through putrefaction. it is the earliest form of the surrender of the use of force in favor of co-operation--the first attenuation of the tendency to act on impulse. but when the three prisoners are consumed, and no more happen to be available, it strikes us that on the whole we should have done better to make them catch game and dig roots for us. the next prisoners that are caught are not killed--a further diminution of impulse and the factor of physical force--they are only enslaved, and the pugnacity which in the first case went to kill them is now diverted to keeping them at work. but the pugnacity is so little controlled by rationalism that the slaves starve, and prove incapable of useful work. they are better treated; there is a diminution of pugnacity. they become sufficiently manageable for the masters themselves, while the slaves are digging roots, to do a little hunting. the pugnacity recently expended on the slaves is redirected to keeping hostile tribes from capturing them--a difficult matter, because the slaves themselves show a disposition to try a change of mastership. they are bribed into good behavior by better treatment: a further diminution of force, a further drift towards co-operation; they give labor, we give food and protection. as the tribes enlarge, it is found that those have most cohesion where the position of slaves is recognized by definite rights and privileges. slavery becomes serfdom or villeiny. the lord gives land and protection, the serf labor and military service: a further drift from force, a further drift towards co-operation, exchange. with the introduction of money even the form of force disappears: the laborer pays rent and the lord pays his soldiers. it is free exchange on both sides, and economic force has replaced physical force. the further the drift from force towards simple economic interest the better the result for the effort expended. the tartar khan, who seizes by force the wealth in his state, giving no adequate return, soon has none to seize. men will not work to create what they cannot enjoy, so that, finally, the khan has to kill a man by torture in order to obtain a sum which is the thousandth part of what a london tradesman will spend to secure a title carrying no right to the exercise of force from a sovereign who has lost all right to the use or exercise of physical force, the head of the wealthiest country in the world, the sources of whose wealth are the most removed from any process involving the exercise of physical force. but while this process is going on inside the tribe, or group, or nation, force and hostility as between differing tribes or nations remain; but not undiminished. at first it suffices for the fuzzy head of a rival tradesman to appear above the bushes for primitive man to want to hit it. he is a foreigner: kill him. later, he only wants to kill him if he is at war with his tribe. there are periods of peace: diminution of hostility. in the first conflicts all of the other tribe are killed--men, women, and children. force and pugnacity are absolute. but the use of slaves, both as laborers and as concubines, attentuates this; there is a diminution of force. the women of the hostile tribe bear children by the conqueror: there is a diminution of pugnacity. at the next raid into the hostile territory it is found that there is nothing to take, because everything has been killed or carried off. so on later raids the conqueror kills the chiefs only (a further diminution of pugnacity, a further drift from mere impulse), or merely dispossesses them of their lands, which he divides among his followers (norman conquest type). we have already passed the stage of extermination.[ ] the conqueror simply absorbs the conquered--or the conquered absorbs the conqueror, whichever you like. it is no longer the case of one gobbling up the other. neither is gobbled. in the next stage we do not even dispossess the chiefs--a further sacrifice of physical force--we merely impose tribute. but the conquering nation soon finds itself in the position of the khan in his own state--the more he squeezes the less he gets, until, finally, the cost of getting the money by military means exceeds what is obtained. it was the case of spain in spanish america--the more territory she "owned" the poorer she became. the wise conqueror, then, finds that better than the exaction of tribute is an exclusive market--old english colonial type. but in the process of ensuring exclusiveness more is lost than is gained: the colonies are allowed to choose their own system--further drift from the use of force, further drift from hostility and pugnacity. final result: complete abandonment of physical force, co-operation on basis of mutual profit the only relationship, with reference not merely to colonies which have become in fact foreign states, but also to states foreign in name as well as in fact. we have arrived not at the intensification of the struggle between men, but at a condition of vital dependence upon the prosperity of foreigners. could england by some magic kill all foreigners, half the british population would starve. this is not a condition making indefinitely for hostility to foreigners; still less is it a condition in which such hostility finds its justification in any real instinct of self-preservation or in any deep-seated biological law. with each new intensification of dependence between the parts of the organism must go that psychological development which has marked every stage of the progress in the past, from the day that we killed our prisoner in order to eat him, and refused to share him with our fellow, to the day that the telegraph and the bank have rendered military force economically futile. but the foregoing does not include all the facts, or all the factors. if russia does england an injury--sinks a fishing fleet in time of peace, for instance--it is no satisfaction to englishmen to go out and kill a lot of frenchmen or irishmen. they want to kill russians. if, however, they knew a little less geography--if, for instance, they were chinese boxers, it would not matter in the least which they killed, because to the chinaman all alike are "foreign devils"; his knowledge of the case does not enable him to differentiate between the various nationalities of europeans. in the case of a wronged negro in the congo the collective responsibility is still wider; for a wrong inflicted by one white man he will avenge himself on any other--american, german, english, french, dutch, belgian, or chinese. as our knowledge increases, our sense of the collective responsibility of outside groups narrows. but immediately we start on this differentiation there is no stopping. the english yokel is satisfied if he can "get a whack at them foreigners"--germans will do if russians are not available. the more educated man wants russians; but if he stops a moment longer, he will see that in killing russian peasants he might as well be killing so many hindoos, for all they had to do with the matter. he then wants to get at the russian government. but so do a great many russians--liberals, reformers, etc. he then sees that the real conflict is not english against russians at all, but the interest of all law-abiding folk--russian and english alike--against oppression, corruption, and incompetence. to give the russian government an opportunity of going to war would only strengthen its hands against those with whom he was in sympathy--the reformers. as war would increase the influence of the reactionary party in russia, it would do nothing to prevent the recurrence of such incidents, and so quite the wrong party would suffer. were the real facts and the real responsibilities understood, a liberal people would reply to such an aggression by taking every means which the social and economic relationship of the two states afforded to enable russian liberals to hang a few russian admirals and establish a russian liberal government. in any case, the realization of the fact attenuates hostility. in the same way, as they become more familiar with the facts, the english will attenuate their hostility to "germans." an english patriot recently said, "we must smash prussianism." the majority of germans are in cordial agreement with him, and are working to that end. but if england went to war for that purpose, germans would be compelled to fight for prussianism. war between states for a political ideal of this kind is not only futile, it is the sure means of perpetuating the very condition which it would bring to an end. international hostilities repose for the most part upon our conception of the foreign state, with which we are quarrelling, as a homogeneous personality, having the same character of responsibility as an individual, whereas the variety of interests, both material and moral, regardless of state boundaries, renders the analogy between nations and individuals an utterly false one. indeed, when the co-operation between the parts of the social organism is as complete as our mechanical development has recently made it, it is impossible to fix the limits not merely of the economic interests, but of the moral interest of the community, and to say what is one community and what is another. certainly the state limits no longer define the limits of the community; and yet it is only the state limits which international antagonism predicates. if the louisiana cotton crop fails, a part of lancashire starves. there is closer community of interest in a vital matter between lancashire and louisiana than between louisiana and, say, iowa, parts of the same state. there is much closer intercommunication between britain and the united states in all that touches social and moral development than between britain and, say, bengal, part of the same state. an english nobleman has more community of thought and feeling with a european continental aristocrat (will marry his daughter, for instance) than he would think of claiming with such "fellow" british countrymen as a bengal babu, a jamaica negro, or even a dorset yokel. a professor at oxford will have closer community of feeling with a member of the french academy than with, say, a whitechapel publican. one may go further, and say that a british subject of quebec has closer contact with paris than with london; the british subject of dutch-speaking africa with holland than with england; the british subject of hong kong with pekin than with london; of egypt, with constantinople than with london, and so on. in a thousand respects, association cuts across state boundaries, which are purely conventional, and renders the biological division of mankind into independent and warring states a scientific ineptitude. allied factors, introduced by the character of modern intercourse, have already gone far to render territorial conquest futile for the satisfaction of natural human pride and vanity. just as in the economic sphere, factors peculiar to our generation have rendered the old analogy between states and persons a false one, so do these factors render the analogy in the sentimental sphere a false one. while the individual of great possessions does in fact obtain, by reason of his wealth, a deference which satisfies his pride and vanity, the individual of the great nation has no such sentimental advantage as against the citizen of the small nation. no one thinks of respecting the russian mujik because he belongs to a great nation, or despising a scandinavian or belgian gentleman because he belongs to a small one; and any society will accord prestige to the nobleman of norway, holland, belgium, spain, or even portugal, which it refuses to an american "climber." the nobleman of any country will marry the noblewoman of another more readily than a woman from a lower class of his own country. the prestige of the foreign country rarely counts for anything in the matter, when it comes to the real facts of everyday life, so shallow is the real sentiment which now divides states. just as in material things community of interest and relationship cut clear across state boundaries, so inevitably will the psychic community of interest come so to do. just as, in the material domain, the real biological law, which is association and co-operation between individuals of the same species in the struggle with their environment, has pushed men in their material struggle to conform with that law, so will it do so in the sentimental sphere. we shall come to realize that the real psychic and moral divisions are not as between nations, but as between opposing conceptions of life. even admitting that man's nature will never lose the combativeness, hostility, and animosity which are so large a part of it (although the manifestations of such feelings have so greatly changed within the historical period as almost to have changed in character), what we shall see is the diversion of those psychological qualities to the real, instead of the artificial, conflict of mankind. we shall see that at the bottom of any conflict between the armies or governments of germany and england lies not the opposition of "german" interests to "english" interests, but the conflict in both states between democracy and autocracy, or between socialism and individualism, or reaction and progress, however one's sociological sympathies may classify it. that is the real division in both countries, and for germans to conquer english, or english germans, would not advance the solution of such a conflict one iota; and as such conflict becomes more acute, the german individualist will see that it is more important to protect his freedom and property against the socialist and trade unionist, who can and do attack them, than against the british army, which cannot. in the same way the british tory will be more concerned with what mr. lloyd george's budgets can do than with what the germans can do.[ ] from the realization of these things to the realization on the part of the british democrat that what stands in the way of his securing for social expenditure enormous sums, that now go to armaments, is mainly a lack of co-operation between himself and the democrats of a hostile nation who are in a like case, is but a step, and a step that, if history has any meaning, is bound shortly to be taken. when it is taken, property, capital, individualism will have to give to its international organization, already far-reaching, a still more definite form, in which international differences will play no part. and when that condition is reached, both peoples will find inconceivable the idea that artificial state divisions (which are coming more and more to approximate to mere administrative divisions, leaving free scope within them or across them for the development of genuine nationality) could ever in any way define the real conflicts of mankind. there remains, of course, the question of time; that these developments will take "thousands" or "hundreds" of years. yet the interdependence of modern nations is the growth of little more than fifty years. a century ago england could have been self-supporting, and little the worse for it. one must not overlook the law of acceleration. the age of man on the earth is placed variously at from thirty thousand to three hundred thousand years. he has in some respects developed more in the last two hundred years than in all the preceding ages. we see more change now in ten years than originally in ten thousand. who shall foretell the developments of a generation? chapter iii unchanging human nature the progress from cannibalism to herbert spencer--the disappearance of religious oppression by government--disappearance of the duel--the crusaders and the holy sepulchre--the wail of militarist writers at man's drift away from militancy. all of us who have had occasion to discuss this subject are familiar with the catch-phrases with which the whole matter is so often dismissed. "you cannot change human nature," "what man always has been during thousands of years, he always will be," are the sort of dicta generally delivered as self-evident propositions that do not need discussion. or if, in deference to the fact that very profound changes, in which human nature is involved, _have_ taken place in the habits of mankind, the statement of the proposition is somewhat less dogmatic, we are given to understand that any serious modification of the tendency to go to war can only be looked for in "thousands of years." what are the facts? they are these: that the alleged unchangeability of human nature in this matter is not borne out; that man's pugnacity though not disappearing, is very visibly, under the forces of mechanical and social development, being transformed and diverted from ends that are wasteful and destructive to ends that are less wasteful, which render easier that co-operation between men in the struggle with their environment which is the condition of their survival and advance; that changes which, in the historical period, have been extraordinarily rapid are necessarily quickening--quickening in geometrical rather than in arithmetical ratio. with very great courtesy, one is impelled to ask those who argue that human nature in all its manifestations must remain unchanged how they interpret history. we have seen man progress from the mere animal fighting with other animals, seizing his food by force, seizing also by force his females, eating his own kind, the sons of the family struggling with the father for the possession of the father's wives; we have seen this incoherent welter of animal struggle at least partly abandoned for settled industry, and partly surviving as a more organized tribal warfare or a more ordered pillaging, like that of the vikings and the huns; we have seen even these pillagers abandon in part their pillaging for ordered industry, and in part for the more ceremonial conflict of feudal struggle; we have seen even the feudal conflict abandoned in favor of dynastic and religious and territorial conflict, and then dynastic and religious conflict abandoned. there remains now only the conflict of states, and that, too, at a time when the character and conception of the state are being profoundly modified. human nature may not change, whatever that vague phrase may mean; but human nature is a complex factor. it includes numberless motives, many of which are modified in relation to the rest as circumstances change; so that the manifestations of human nature change out of all recognition. do we mean by the phrase that "human nature does not change" that the feelings of the paleolithic man who ate the bodies of his enemies and of his own children are the same as those of a herbert spencer, or even of the modern new yorker who catches his subway train to business in the morning? if human nature does not change, may we therefore expect the city clerk to brain his mother and serve her up for dinner, or suppose that lord roberts or lord kitchener is in the habit, while on campaign, of catching the babies of his enemies on spear-heads, or driving his motor-car over the bodies of young girls, like the leaders of the old northmen in their ox-wagons. what _do_ these phrases mean? these, and many like them, are repeated in a knowing way with an air of great wisdom and profundity by journalists and writers of repute, and one may find them blatant any day in our newspapers and reviews; yet the most cursory examination proves them to be neither wise nor profound, but simply parrot-like catch-phrases which lack common sense, and fly in the face of facts of everyday experience. the truth is that the facts of the world as they stare us in the face show that, in our common attitude, we not only overlook the modifications in human nature, which have occurred historically since yesterday--occurred even in our generation--but we also ignore the modification of human nature which mere differences of social habit and custom and outlook effect. take the case of the duel. even educated people in germany, france, and italy, will tell you that it is "not in human nature" to expect a man of gentle birth to abandon the habit of the duel; the notion that honorable people should ever so place their honor at the mercy of whoever may care to insult them is, they assure you, both childish and sordid. with them the matter will not bear discussion. yet the great societies which exist in england, north america, australia--the whole anglo-saxon world, in fact--have abandoned the duel, and we cannot lump the whole anglo-saxon race as either sordid or childish. that such a change as this, which must have conflicted with human pugnacity in its most insidious form,--pride and personal vanity, the traditions of an aristocratic status, every one of the psychological factors now involved in international conflict--has been effected in our own generation should surely give pause to those who dismiss as chimerical any hope that rationalism will ever dominate the conduct of nations. discussing the impossibility of allowing arbitration to cover all causes of difference, mr. roosevelt remarked, in justification of large armaments: "we despise a nation, just as we despise a man, who fails to resent an insult."[ ] mr. roosevelt seems to forget that the duel with us is extinct. do _we_, the english-speaking people of the world, to whom presumably mr. roosevelt must have been referring, despise a man who fails to resent an insult by arms? would we not, on the contrary, despise the man who should do so? yet so recent is this charge that it has not yet reached the majority of europeans. the vague talk of national honor, as a quality under the especial protection of the soldier, shows, perhaps more clearly than aught else, how much our notions concerning international politics have fallen behind the notions that dominate us in everyday life. when an individual begins to rave about his honor, we may be pretty sure he is about to do some irrational, most likely some disreputable deed. the word is like an oath, serving with its vague yet large meaning to intoxicate the fancy. its vagueness and elasticity make it possible to regard a given incident, at will, as either harmless or a _casus belli_. our sense of proportion in these matters approximates to that of the schoolboy. the passing jeer of a foreign journalist, a foolish cartoon, is sufficient to start the dogs of war baying up and down the land.[ ] we call it "maintaining the national prestige," "enforcing respect," and i know not what other high-sounding name. it amounts to the same thing in the end. the one distinctive advance in civil society achieved by the anglo-saxon world is fairly betokened by the passing away of this old notion of a peculiar possession in the way of honor, which has to be guarded by arms. it stands out as the one clear moral gain of the nineteenth century; and, when we observe the notion resurging in the minds of men, we may reasonably expect to find that it marks one of those reversions in development which so often occur in the realm of mind as well as in that of organic forms. two or three generations since, this progress, even among anglo-saxons, towards a rational standard of conduct in this matter, as between individuals, would have seemed as unreasonable as do the hopes of international peace in our day. even to-day the continental officer is as firmly convinced as ever that the maintenance of personal dignity is impossible save by the help of the duel. he will ask in triumph, "what will you do if one of your own order openly insults you? can you preserve your self-respect by summoning him to the police-court?" and the question is taken as settling the matter offhand. the survival, where national prestige is concerned, of the standards of the _code duello_ is daily brought before us by the rhetoric of the patriots. our army and our navy, not the good faith of our statesmen, are the "guardians of our national honor." like the duellist, the patriot would have us believe that a dishonorable act is made honorable if the party suffering by the dishonor be killed. the patriot is careful to withdraw from the operation of possible arbitration all questions which could affect the "national honor." an "insult to the flag" must be "wiped out in blood." small nations, which in the nature of the case cannot so resent the insults of great empires, have apparently no right to such a possession as "honor." it is the peculiar prerogative of world-wide empires. the patriots who would thus resent "insults to the flag" may well be asked whether they would condemn the conduct of the german lieutenant who kills the unarmed civilian in cold blood "for the honor of the uniform." it does not seem to have struck the patriot that, as personal dignity and conduct have not suffered but been improved by the abandonment of the principle of the duel, there is little reason to suppose that international conduct, or national dignity, would suffer by a similar change of standards. the whole philosophy underlying the duel, where personal relations are concerned, excites in our day the infinite derision of all anglo-saxons. yet these same anglo-saxons maintain it as rigorously as ever in the relations of states. profound as is the change involved in the anglo-saxon abandonment of the duel, a still more universal change, affecting still more nearly our psychological impulses, has been effected within a relatively recent historical period. i refer to the abandonment, by the governments of europe, of their right to prescribe the religious belief of their citizens. for hundreds of years, generation after generation, it was regarded as an evident part of a ruler's right and duty to dictate what his subjects should believe. as lecky has pointed out, the preoccupation which, for numberless generations, was the centre round which all other interests revolved has simply and purely disappeared; coalitions which were once the most serious occupation of statesmen now exist only in the speculations of the expounders of prophecy. among all the elements of affinity and repulsion that regulate the combinations of nations, dogmatic influences which were once supreme can scarcely be said to exist. there is a change here reaching down into the most fundamental impulses of the human mind. "until the seventeenth century every mental discussion, which philosophy pronounces to be essential to legitimate research, was almost uniformly branded as a sin, and a large proportion of the most deadly intellectual vices were deliberately inculcated as virtues." anyone who argued that the differences between catholics and protestants were not such as force could settle, and that the time would come when man would realize this truth, and regard a religious war between european states as a wild and unimaginable anachronism, would have been put down as a futile doctrinaire, completely ignoring the most elementary facts of "unchanging human nature." there is one striking incident of the religious struggle of states which illustrates vividly the change which has come over the spirit of man. for nearly two hundred years christians fought the infidel for the conquest of the holy sepulchre. all the nations of europe joined in this great endeavor. it seemed to be the one thing which could unite them, and for generations, so profound was the impulse which produced the movement, the struggle went on. there is nothing in history, perhaps, quite comparable to it. suppose that during this struggle one had told a european statesman of that age that the time would come when, assembled in a room, the representatives of a europe, which had made itself the absolute master of the infidel, could by a single stroke of the pen secure the holy sepulchre for all time to christendom, but that, having discussed the matter cursorily twenty minutes or so, they would decide that on the whole it was not worth while! had such a thing been told to a mediæval statesman, he would certainly have regarded the prophecy as that of a madman. yet this, of course, is precisely what has taken place.[ ] a glance over the common incidents of europe's history will show the profound change which has visibly taken place, not only in the minds, but in the hearts of men. things which even in our stage of civilization would no longer be possible, owing to that change in human nature which the military dogmatist denies, were commonplace incidents with our grandfathers. indeed, the modifications in the religious attitude just touched on assuredly arise from an emotional as much as from an intellectual change. a theology which could declare that the unborn child would suffer eternal torment in the fires of hell for no crime, other than that of its conception, would be in our day impossible on merely emotional grounds.[ ] what was once deemed a mere truism would now be viewed with horror and indignation. again, as lecky says, "for a great change has silently swept over christendom. without disturbance, an old doctrine has passed away from among the realizations of mankind." not only in the religious sphere do we see this progress. in a civilization, which was in many respects an admirable one, it was possible for slaves to be slaughtered because one of them had committed some offence; for a lady of fashion to gratify a momentary caprice by ordering a slave to be crucified; and, a generation or two since, for whole populations to turn torture into a public amusement[ ] and a public festival; for kings, historically yesterday, to assist personally at the tortures of persons accused of witchcraft. it is related by pitcairn, in his "criminal trials of scotland," that james i. of scotland personally presided over the tortures of one, dr. fian, accused of having caused a storm at sea. the bones of the prisoner's legs were broken into small pieces in the boot, and it was the king himself who suggested the following variation and witnessed the execution of it: the nails of both hands were seized by a pair of pincers and torn from the fingers, and into the bleeding stump of each finger two needles were thrust up to their heads! does anyone seriously contend that the conditions of modern life have not modified psychology in these matters? does anyone seriously deny that our wider outlook, which is the result of somewhat larger conceptions and wider reading, has wrought such a change that the repetition of things like these in london, or in edinburgh, or in berlin, has become impossible? or, is it seriously argued that we may witness a repetition of these events, that we are quite capable at any moment of taking pleasure in burning alive a beautiful child? does the catholic or the protestant really stand in danger of such things from his religious rival? if human nature is unchanged by the progress of ideas, then he does, and europe's general adoption of religious freedom is a mistake, and each sect should arm against the other in the old way, and the only real hope of religious peace and safety is in the domination of an absolutely universal church. this was, indeed, the plea of the old inquisitor, just as it is the plea of the _spectator_ to-day, that the only hope of political peace is in the domination of an absolutely universal power: there is only one way to end war and preparation for war, and that is, as we have said, by a universal monarchy. if we can imagine one country--let us say russia for the sake of argument--so powerful that she could disarm the rest of the world, and then maintain a force big enough to forbid any power to invade the rights of any other power ... no doubt we should have universal peace.[ ] this dictum recalls one, equally emphatic, once voiced by a colleague of the late procurator of the holy synod in russia, who said: there is only one way to ensure religious peace in the state, to compel all in that state to conform to the state religion. those that will not conform must, in the interests of peace, be driven out. mr. lecky, who of all authors has written most suggestively, perhaps, on the disappearance of religious persecution, has pointed out that the strife between opposing religious bodies arose out of a religious spirit which, though often high-minded and disinterested (he protests with energy against the notion that persecution as a whole was dictated by interested motives), was unpurified by rationalism; and he adds that the irrationality which once characterized the religious sentiment has now been replaced by the irrationality of patriotism. mr. lecky says: if we take a broad view of the course of history, and examine the relations of great bodies of men, we find that religion and patriotism are the chief moral influences to which they have been subjected, and that the separate modifications and mutual interaction of these two agents may almost be said to constitute the moral history of mankind. is it to be expected that the rationalization and humanization which have taken place in the more complex domain of religious doctrine and belief will not also take place in the domain of patriotism? more especially, as the same author points out, since it was the necessities of material interest which brought about the reform in the first domain, and since "not only does interest, as distinct from passion, gain a greater empire with advancing civilization, but passion itself is mainly guided by its power." have we not abundant evidence, indeed, that the passion of patriotism, as divorced from material interest, is being modified by the pressure of material interest? are not the numberless facts of national interdependence, which i have indicated here, pushing inevitably to that result? and are we not justified in concluding that, just as the progress of rationalism has made it possible for the various religious groups to live together, to exist side by side without physical conflict; just as there has been in that domain no necessary choice between universal domination or unending strife, so in like manner will the progress of political rationalism mark the evolution of the relationship of political groups; that the struggle for domination will cease because it will be realized that physical domination is futile, and that instead of either universal strife or universal domination there will come, without formal treaties or holy alliances, the general determination for each to go his way undisturbed in his political allegiance, as he is now undisturbed in his religious allegiance? perhaps the very strongest evidence that the whole drift of human tendencies is away from such conflict as is represented by war between states is to be found in the writings of those who declare war to be inevitable. among the writers quoted in the first chapter of this section, there is not one who, if his arguments are examined carefully, does not show that he realizes, consciously, or subconsciously, that man's disposition to fight, far from being unchanged, is becoming rapidly enfeebled. take, for instance, one of the latest works voicing the philosophy that war is inevitable; that, indeed, it is both wicked and childish to try to prevent it.[ ] notwithstanding that the inevitability of war is the thesis of his book, homer lea entitles the first section "the decline of militancy," and shows clearly, in fact, that the commercial activities of the world lead directly away from war. trade, ducats, and mortgages are regarded as far greater assets and sources of power than armies or navies. they produce national effeminacy and effeteness. now, as this tendency is common to all nations of christendom--indeed, of the world--since commercial and industrial development is world-wide, it necessarily means, if it is true of any one nation, that the world as a whole is drifting away from the tendency to warfare. a large part of homer lea's book is a sort of carlylean girding at what he terms "protoplasmic gourmandizing and retching" (otherwise the busy american industrial and social life of his countrymen). he declares that, when a country makes wealth, production, and industries its sole aim, it becomes "a glutton among nations, vulgar, swinish, arrogant"; "commercialism, having seized hold of the american people, overshadows it, and tends to destroy not only the aspirations and world-wide career open to the nation, but the republic itself." "patriotism in the true sense" (_i.e._, the desire to go and kill other people) homer lea declares almost dead in the united states. the national ideals, even of the native-born american, are deplorably low: there exists not only individual prejudice against military ideals, but public antipathy; antagonism of politicians, newspapers, churches, colleges, labor unions, theorists, and organized societies. they combat the military spirit as if it were a public evil and a national crime. in that case, what, in the name of all that is muddleheaded, becomes of the "unchanging tendency towards warfare"? what is all this curious rhetoric of homer lea's (and i have dealt with him at some length, because his principles if not his language are those which characterize much similar literature in england, france, germany, and the continent of europe generally) but an admission that the whole tendency is not, as he would have us believe, towards war, but away from it? here is an author who tells us that war is to be forever inevitable, and in the same breath that men are rapidly conceiving not only a "slothful indifference" to fighting, but a profound antipathy to the military ideal. of course, homer lea implies that this tendency is peculiar to the american republic, and is for that reason dangerous to his country; but, as a matter of fact, homer lea's book might be a free translation of much nationalist literature of either france or germany.[ ] i cannot recall a single author of either of the four great countries who, treating of the inevitability of war, does not bewail the falling away of his own country from the military ideal, or, at least, the tendency so to fall away. thus the english journalist reviewing in the _daily mail_ homer lea's book cannot refrain from saying: is it necessary to point out that there is a moral in all this for us as well as for the american? surely almost all that mr. lea says applies to great britain as forcibly as to the united states. we too have lain dreaming. we have let our ideals tarnish. we have grown gluttonous, also.... shame and folly are upon us as well as upon our brethren. let us hasten with all our energy to cleanse ourselves of them, that we can look the future in the face without fear. exactly the same note dominates the literature of an english protagonist like mr. blatchford, the militarist socialist. he talks of the "fatal apathy" of the british people. "the people," he says, breaking out in anger at the small disposition they show to kill other people, "are conceited, self-indulgent, decadent, and greedy. they will shout for the empire, but they will not fight for it."[ ] a glance at such publications as _blackwood's_, the _national review_, the london _spectator_, the london _world_, will reveal precisely similar outbursts. of course, mr. blatchford declares that the germans are very different, and that what mr. lea (in talking of _his_ country) calls the "gourmandizing and retching" is not at all true of germany. as a matter of fact, however, the phrase i have quoted might have been "lifted" from the work of any average pan-german, or even from more responsible quarters. have mr. blatchford and mr. lea forgotten that no less a person than prince von bülow, in a speech made in the prussian diet, used almost the words i have quoted from mr. blatchford, and dwelt at length on the self-indulgence and degeneracy, the rage for luxury, etc., which possess modern germany, and told how the old qualities which had marked the founders of the empire were disappearing?[ ] indeed, do not a great part of the governing classes of germany almost daily bewail the infiltration of anti-militarist doctrines among the german people, and does not the extraordinary increase in the socialist vote justify the complaint? a precisely analogous plea is made by the nationalist writer in france when he rails at the pacifist tendencies of _his_ country, and points to the contrasting warlike activities of neighbouring nations. a glance at a copy of practically any nationalist or conservative paper in france will furnish ample evidence of this. hardly a day passes but that the _echo de paris_, _gaulois_, _figaro_, _journal des débats_, _patrie_, or _presse_, sounds this note, while one may find it rampant in the works of such serious writers as paul bourget, faguet, le bon, barrès, brunetière, paul adam, to say nothing of more popular publicists like deroulède, millevoye, drumont, etc. all these advocates of war, therefore--american, english, german, french--are at one in declaring that foreign countries are very warlike, but that their own country, "sunk in sloth," is drifting away from war. as presumably they know more of their own country than of others, their own testimony involves mutual destruction of their own theories. they are thus unwilling witnesses to the truth, which is that we are all alike--english, americans, germans, french--losing the psychological impulse to war, just as we have lost the psychological impulse to kill our neighbors on account of religious differences, and (at least in the case of the anglo-saxon) to kill our neighbors in duels for some cause of wounded vanity. how, indeed, could it be otherwise? how can modern life, with its overpowering proportion of industrial activities and its infinitesimal proportion of military ones, keep alive the instincts associated with war as against those developed by peace? not only evolution, but common sense and common observation, teaches us that we develop most those qualities which we exercise most, which serve us best in the occupation in which we are most engaged. a race of seamen is not developed by agricultural pursuits, carried on hundreds of miles from the sea. take the case of what is reputed (quite wrongly, incidentally) to be the most military nation in europe--germany. the immense majority of adult germans--practically, all who make up what we know as germany--have never seen a battle, and in all human probability never will see one. in forty years eight thousand germans have been in the field about twelve months--against naked blacks.[ ] so that the proportion of warlike activities to peaceful activities works out at one to hundreds of thousands. i wish it were possible to illustrate this diagrammatically; but it could not be done in this book, because, if a single dot the size of a full-stop were to be used to illustrate the expenditure of time in actual war, i should have to fill most of the book with dots to illustrate the time spent by the balance of the population in peace activities.[ ] in that case, how can we possibly expect to keep alive warlike qualities, when all our interests and activities--all our environments, in short--are peace-like? in other words, the occupations which develop the qualities of industry and peace are so much in excess of those which would develop the qualities we associate with war that that excess has almost now passed beyond any ordinary means of visual illustration, and has entirely passed beyond any ordinary human capacity fully to appreciate. peace is with us now nearly always; war is with us rarely, yet we are told that it is the qualities of war which will survive, and the qualities of peace which will be subsidiary. i am not forgetting, of course, the military training, the barrack life which is to keep alive the military tradition. i have dealt with that question in the next chapter. it suffices for the moment to note that that training is defended on the grounds (notably among those who would introduce it into england)--( ) that it ensures peace; ( ) that it renders a population more efficient in the arts of peace--that is to say, perpetuates that condition of "slothful ease" which we are told is so dangerous to our characters, in which we are bound to lose the "warlike qualities," and which renders society still more "gourmandizing" in mr. lea's contemptuous phrase, still more "cobdenite" in mr. leo maxse's. one cannot have it both ways. if long-continued peace is enervating, it is mere self-stultification to plead for conscription on the ground that it will still further prolong that enervating condition. if mr. leo maxse sneers at industrial society and the peace ideal--"the cobdenite ideal of buying cheap and selling dear"--he must not defend german conscription (though he does) on the ground that it renders german commerce more efficient--that, in other words, it advances that "cobdenite ideal." in that case, the drift away from war will be stronger than ever. perhaps some of all this inconsistency was in mr. roosevelt's mind when he declared that by "war alone" can man develop those manly qualities, etc. if conscription really does prolong peace and increase our aptitude for the arts of peace, then conscription itself is but a factor in man's temperamental drift away from war, in the change of his nature towards peace. it is not because man is degenerate or swinish or gluttonous (such language, indeed, applied as it is by mr. lea to the larger and better part of the human race, suggests a not very high-minded ill-temper at the stubbornness of facts which rhetoric does not affect) that he is showing less and less disposition to fight, but because he is condemned by the real "primordial law" to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and his nature in consequence develops those qualities which the bulk of his interests and capacities demand and favor. finally, of course, we are told that even though these forces are at work, they must take "thousands of years" to operate. this dogmatism ignores the law of acceleration, as true in the domain of sociology as in that of physics, which i have touched on at the close of the preceding chapter. the most recent evidence would seem to show that man as a fire-using animal dates back to the tertiary epoch--say, three hundred thousand years. now, in all that touches this discussion, man in northern europe (in great britain, say) remained unchanged for two hundred and ninety-eight thousand of those years. in the last two thousand years he changed more than in the two hundred and ninety-eight thousand preceding, and in one hundred he has changed more, perhaps, than in the preceding two thousand. the comparison becomes more understandable if we resolve it into hours. for, say, fifty years the man was a cannibal savage or a wild animal, hunting other wild animals, and then in the space of three months he became john smith of des moines, attending church, passing laws, using the telephone, and so on. that is the history of european mankind. and in the face of it, the wiseacres talk sapiently, and lay it down as a self-evident and demonstrable fact that inter-state war, which, by reason of the mechanics of our civilization, accomplishes nothing and can accomplish nothing, will forever be unassailable because, once man has got the habit of doing a thing, he will go on doing it, although the reason which in the first instance prompted it has long since disappeared--because, in short, of the "unchangeability of human nature." chapter iv do the warlike nations inherit the earth? the confident dogmatism of militarist writers on this subject--the facts--the lessons of spanish america--how conquest makes for the survival of the unfit--spanish method and english method in the new world--the virtues of military training--the dreyfus case--the threatened germanization of england--"the war which made germany great and germans small." the militarist authorities i have quoted in the preceding chapter admit, therefore, and admit very largely, man's drift, in a sentimental sense, away from war. but that drift, they declare, is degeneration; without those qualities which "war alone," in mr. roosevelt's phrase, can develop, man will "rot and decay." this plea is, of course, directly germane to our subject. to say that the qualities which we associate with war, and nothing else but war, are necessary to assure a nation success in its struggles with other nations is equivalent to saying that those who drift away from war will go down before those whose warlike activity can conserve those qualities essential to survival; and this is but another way of saying that men must always remain warlike if they are to survive, that the warlike nations inherit the earth; that men's pugnacity, therefore, is the outcome of the great natural law of survival, and that a decline of pugnacity marks in any nation a retrogression and not an advance in its struggle for survival. i have already indicated (chapter ii., part ii.) the outlines of the proposition, which leaves no escape from this conclusion. this is the scientific basis of the proposition voiced by the authorities i have quoted--mr. roosevelt, von moltke, renan, nietzsche, and various of the warlike clergy[ ]--and it lies at the very bottom of the plea that man's nature, in so far as it touches the tendency of men as a whole to go to war, does not change; that the warlike qualities are a necessary part of human vitality in the struggle for existence; that, in short, all that we know of the law of evolution forbids the conclusion that man will ever lose this warlike pugnacity, or that nations will survive other than by the struggle of physical force. the view is best voiced, perhaps, by homer lea, whom i have already quoted. he says, in his "valor of ignorance": as physical vigor represents the strength of man in his struggle for existence, in the same sense military vigor constitutes the strength of nations; ideals, laws, constitutions are but temporary effulgences [p. ]. the deterioration of the military force and the consequent destruction of the militant spirit have been concurrent with national decay [p. ]. international disagreements are ... the result of the primordial conditions that sooner or later cause war ... the law of struggle, the law of survival, universal, unalterable ... to thwart them, to short-cut them, to circumvent them, to cozen, to deny, to scorn, to violate them, is folly such as man's conceit alone makes possible.... arbitration denies the inexorability of natural laws ... that govern the existence of political entities [pp. , ]. laws that govern the militancy of a people are not of man's framing, but follow the primitive ordinances of nature that govern all forms of life, from simple protozoa, awash in the sea, to the empires of man.[ ] i have already indicated the grave misconception which lies at the bottom of the interpretation of the evolutionary law here indicated. what we are concerned with now is to deal with the facts on which this alleged general principle is inductively based. we have seen from the foregoing chapter that man's nature certainly does change; the next step is to show, from the facts of the present-day world, that the warlike qualities do not make for survival, that the warlike nations do not inherit the earth. which are the military nations? we generally think of them in europe as germany and france, or perhaps also russia, austria, and italy. admittedly (_vide_ all the english and american military pundits and economists) england is the least militarized nation in europe, the united states perhaps in the world. it is, above all, germany that appeals to us as the type of the military nation, one in which the stern school of war makes for the preservation of the "manly and adventurous qualities." the facts want a little closer examination. what is a career of unwarlike ease, in mr. roosevelt's phrase? in the last chapter we saw that during the last forty years eight thousand out of sixty million germans have been engaged in warfare during a trifle over a year, and that against hottentots or hereros--a proportion of war days per german to peace days per german which is as one to some hundreds of thousands. so that if we are to take germany as the type of the military nation, and if we are to accept mr. roosevelt's dictum that by war alone can we acquire "those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life," we shall nevertheless be doomed to lose them, for under conditions like those of germany how many of us can ever see war, or can pretend to fall under its influence? as already pointed out, the men who really give the tone to the german nation, to german life and conduct--that is to say, the majority of adult germans--have never seen a battle and never will see one. france has done much better. not only has she seen infinitely more actual fighting, but her population is much more militarized than that of germany, per cent. more, in fact, since, in order to maintain from a population of forty millions the same effective military force as germany does with sixty millions, - / per cent. of the french population is under arms as against per cent. of the german.[ ] still more military in organization and in recent practical experience is russia, and more military than russia is turkey, and more military than turkey as a whole are the semi-independent sections of turkey, arabia, and albania, and then, perhaps, comes morocco. on the western hemisphere we can draw a like table as to the "warlike, adventurous, manly, and progressive peoples" as compared with the "peaceful, craven, slothful, and decadent." the least warlike of all, the nation which has had the least training in war, the least experience of it, which has been the least purified by it, is canada. after that comes the united states, and after that the best--(excuse me, i mean, of course, the worst--_i.e._, the least warlike)--of the spanish american republics like brazil and argentina; while the most warlike of all, and consequently the most "manly and progressive," are the "sambo" republics, like san domingo, nicaragua, colombia, and venezuela. they are always fighting. if they cannot manage to get up a fight between one another, the various parties in each republic will fight between themselves. here we get the real thing. the soldiers do not pass their lives in practising the goose-step, cleaning harness, pipeclaying belts, but in giving and taking hard pounding. several of these progressive republics have never known a year since they declared their independence from spain in which they have not had a war. and quite a considerable proportion of the populations spend their lives in fighting. during the first twenty years of venezuela's independent existence she fought no less than one hundred and twenty important battles, either with her neighbors or with herself, and she has maintained the average pretty well ever since. every election is a fight--none of your "mouth-fighting," none of your craven talking-shops for them. good, honest, hard, manly knocks, with anything from one to five thousand dead and wounded left on the field. the presidents of these strenuous republics are not poltroons of politicians, but soldiers--men of blood and iron with a vengeance, men after mr. roosevelt's own heart, all following "the good old rule, the simple plan." these are the people who have taken carlyle's advice to "shut up the talking-shops." _they_ fight it out like men; _they_ talk with gatling-guns and mausers. oh, they are a very fine, manly, military lot! if fighting makes for survival, they should completely oust from the field canada and the united states, one of which has never had a real battle for the best part of its hundred years of craven, sordid, peaceful life, and the other of which homer lea assures us is surely dying, because of its tendency to avoid fighting. mr. lea does not make any secret of the fact (and if he did, some of his rhetoric would display it) that he is out of sympathy with predominant american ideals. he might emigrate to venezuela, or colombia, or nicaragua. he would be able to prove to each military dictator in turn that, in converting the country into a shambles, far from committing a foul crime for which such dictators should be, and are, held in execration by civilized men the world over, they are, on the contrary, but obeying one of god's commands in tune with all the immutable laws of the universe. i desire to write in all seriousness, but, to one who happens to have seen at first hand something of the conditions which arise from a real military conception of civilization, it is very difficult. how does mr. roosevelt, who declares that "by war alone can we acquire those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life"; how does von stengel, who declares that "war is a test of a nation's health, political, physical, and moral"; how do our militarists, who infer that the military state is so much finer than the cobdenite one of commercial pursuits; how does m. ernest renan, who declares that war is the condition of progress, and that under peace we should sink to a degree of degeneracy difficult to realize; and how do the various english clergymen who voice a like philosophy reconcile their creed with military spanish america? how can they urge that non-military industrialism, which, with all its shortcomings, has on the western continent given us canada and the united states, makes for decadence and degeneration, while militarism and the qualities and instincts that go with it have given us venezuela and san domingo? do we not all recognize that industrialism--mr. lea's "gourmandizing and retching" notwithstanding--is the one thing which will save these military republics; that the one condition of their advance is that they shall give up the stupid and sordid gold-braid militarism and turn to honest work? if ever there was a justification for herbert spencer's sweeping generalization that "advance to the highest forms of man and society depends on the decline of militancy and the growth of industrialism," it is to be found in the history of the south and central american republics. indeed, spanish america at the present moment affords more lessons than we seem to be drawing, and, if militancy makes for advance and survival, it is a most extraordinary thing that all who are in any way concerned with those countries, all who live in them and whose future is wrapped up in them, can never sufficiently express their thankfulness that at last there seems to be a tendency with some of them to get away from the blood and valor nonsense which has been their curse for three centuries, and to exchange the military ideal for the cobdenite one of buying cheap and selling dear which excites so much contempt. some years ago an italian lawyer, a certain tomasso caivano, wrote a letter detailing his experiences and memories of twenty years' life in venezuela and the neighboring republics, and his general conclusions have for this discussion a direct relevancy. as a sort of farewell exhortation to the venezuelans, he wrote: the curse of your civilization is the soldier and the soldier's temper. it is impossible for two of you, still less for two parties, to carry on a discussion without one wanting to fight the other about the matter in hand. you regard it as a derogation of dignity to consider the point of view of the other side, and to attempt to meet it, if it is possible to fight about it. you deem that personal valor atones for all defects. the soldier of evil character is more considered amongst you than the civilian of good character, and military adventure is deemed more honorable than honest labor. you overlook the worst corruption, the worst oppression, in your leaders if only they gild it with military fanfaronade and declamation about bravery and destiny and patriotism. not until there is a change in this spirit will you cease to be the victims of evil oppression. not until your general populace--your peasantry and your workers--refuse thus to be led to slaughter in quarrels of which they know and care nothing, but into which they are led because they also prefer fighting to work--not until all this happens will those beautiful lands which are among the most fertile on god's earth support a happy and prosperous people living in contentment and secure possession of the fruits of their labor.[ ] spanish america seems at last in a fair way to throwing off the domination of the soldier and awakening from these nightmares of successive military despotisms tempered by assassination, though, in abandoning, in signor caivano's words, "military adventure for honest labor," she will necessarily have less to do with those deeds of blood and valor of which her history has been so full. but those in south america who matter are not mourning. really they are not.[ ] the situation can be duplicated absolutely on the other side of the hemisphere. change a few names, and you get arabia or morocco. listen to this from a recent london _times_ article:[ ] the fact is that for many years past turkey has almost invariably been at war in some part or other of arabia.... at the present moment turkey is actually conducting three separate small campaigns within arabia or upon its borders, and a fourth series of minor operations in mesopotamia. the last-named movement is against the kurdish tribes of the mosul district.... another, and more important, advance is against the truculent muntefik arabs of the euphrates delta.... the fourth, and by far the largest, campaign is the unending warfare in the province of yemen, north of aden, where the turks have been fighting intermittently for more than a decade. the peoples of arabia are also indulging in conflict on their own account. the interminable feud between the rival potentates of nedjd, ibn saud of riadh and ibn rashid of hail, has broken out afresh, and the tribes of the coastal province of el katar are supposed to have plunged into the fray. the muntefik arabs, not content with worrying the turks, are harrying the territories of sheikh murbarak of koweit. in the far south the sultan of shehr and mokalla, a feudatory of the british government, is conducting a tiny war against a hostile tribe in the mysterious hadramaut. in the west the beduin are spasmodically menacing certain sections of the hedjaz railway, which they very much dislike.... ten years ago the ibn rashids were nominally masters of a great deal of arabia, and grew so aggressive that they tried to seize koweit. the fiery old sheikh of koweit marched against them, and alternately won and lost. he had his revenge. he sent an audacious scion of the ibn sauds to the old wahabi capital of riadh, and by a remarkable stratagem the youth captured the stronghold with only fifty men. the rival parties have been fighting at intervals ever since. and so on and so on to the extent of a column. so that what venezuela and nicaragua are to the american continent, arabia, albania, armenia, montenegro, and morocco are to the eastern hemisphere. we find exactly the same rule--that just as one gets away from militancy one gets towards advance and civilization; as men lose the tendency to fight they gain the tendency to work, and it is by working with one another, and not by fighting against each other, that men advance. take the progression away from militancy, and it gives us a table something like this: arabia and morocco. turkish territory as a whole. the more unruly balkan states. montenegro. russia. spain. italy. austria. france. germany. scandinavia. holland. belgium. england. the united states. canada. do mr. roosevelt, admiral mahan, baron von stengel, marshal von moltke, mr. homer lea, and the english clergymen seriously argue that this list should be reversed, and that arabia and turkey should be taken as the types of progressive nations, and england and germany and scandinavia as the decadent? it may be urged that my list is not absolutely accurate, in that england, having fought more little wars (though the conflict with the boers, waged with a small, pastoral people, shows how a little war may drain a great country), is more militarized than germany, which has not been fighting at all. but i have tried in a very rough fashion to arrive at the degree of militancy in each state, and the absence of actual fighting in the case of germany (as in that of the smaller states) is balanced by the fact of the military training of her people. as i have indicated, france is more military than germany, both in the extent to which her people are put through the mill of universal military training, and by virtue of the fact that she has done so much more small fighting than germany (madagascar, tonkin, africa, etc.); while, of course, turkey and the balkan states are still more military in both senses--more actual fighting, more military training. perhaps the militarist will argue that, while useless and unjust wars make for degeneration, just wars are a moral regeneration. but did a nation, group, tribe, family, or individual ever yet enter into a war which he did not think just? the british, or most of them, believed the war against the boers just, but most of the authorities in favor of war in general, outside of great britain, believed it unjust. nowhere do you find such deathless, absolute, unwavering belief in the justice of war as in those conflicts which all christendom knows to be at once unjust and unnecessary. i refer to the religious wars of mohammedan fanaticism. do you suppose that when nicaragua goes to war with san salvador, or costa rica or colombia with peru, or peru with chili, or chili with argentina, they do not each and every one of them believe that they are fighting for immutable and deathless principles? the civilization of most of them is, of course, as like as two peas, and there is no more reason, except their dislike of rational thought and hard work, why they should fight with one another, than that illinois should fight with indiana, despite homer lea's fine words as to the primordial character of national differences; to one another they are as alike, and whether san salvador beats costa rica or costa rica, san salvador, does not, so far as essentials are concerned, matter a continental. but their rhetoric of patriotism--the sacrifice, and the deathless glory, and the rest of it--is often just as sincere as ours. that is the tragedy of it, and it is that which gives to the solution of the problem in spanish america its real difficulty. but even if we admit that warfare _à l'espagnole_ may be degrading, and that just wars are ennobling and necessary to our moral welfare, we should nevertheless be condemned to degeneracy and decline. a just war implies that someone must act unjustly towards us, but as the general condition improves--as it is improving in europe as compared with central and south america, or morocco, or arabia--we shall get less and less "moral purification"; as men become less and less disposed to make unjustifiable attacks, they will become more and more degenerate. in such incoherence are we landed by the pessimistic and impossible philosophy that men will decay and die unless they go on killing each other. what is the fundamental error at the base of the theory that war makes for the survival of the fit--that warfare is any necessary expression of the law of survival? it is the illusion induced by the hypnotism of a terminology which is obsolete. the same factor which leads us so astray in the economic domain leads us astray in this also. conquest does not make for the elimination of the conquered; the weakest do not go to the wall, though that is the process which those who adopt the formula of evolution in this matter have in their minds. great britain has conquered india. does that mean that the inferior race is replaced by the superior? not the least in the world; the inferior race not only survives, but is given an extra lease of life by virtue of the conquest. if ever the asiatic threatens the white race, it will be thanks in no small part to the work of race conservation which england's conquests in the east have involved. war, therefore, does not make for the elimination of the unfit and the survival of the fit. it would be truer to say that it makes for the survival of the unfit. what is the real process of war? you carefully select from the general population on both sides the healthiest, sturdiest, the physically and mentally soundest, those possessing precisely the virile and manly qualities which you desire to preserve, and, having thus selected the élite of the two populations, you exterminate them by battle and disease, and leave the worst of both sides to amalgamate in the process of conquest or defeat--because, in so far as the final amalgamation is concerned, both processes have the same result--and from this amalgam of the worst of both sides you create the new nation or the new society which is to carry on the race. even supposing the better nation wins, the fact of conquest results only in the absorption of the inferior qualities of the beaten nation--inferior presumably because beaten, and inferior because we have killed off their selected best and absorbed the rest, since we no longer exterminate the women, the children, the old men, and those too weak or too feeble to go into the army.[ ] you have only to carry on this process long enough and persistently enough to weed out completely from both sides the type of man to whom alone we can look for the conservation of virility, physical vigor, and hardihood. that such a process did play no small rôle in the degeneration of rome and the populations on which the crux of the empire reposed there can hardly be any reasonable doubt. and the process of degeneration on the part of the conqueror is aided by this additional factor: if the conqueror profits much by his conquest, as the romans in one sense did, it is the conqueror who is threatened by the enervating effect of the soft and luxurious life; while it is the conquered who is forced to labor for the conqueror, and learns in consequence those qualities of steady industry which are certainly a better moral training than living upon the fruits of others, upon labor extorted at the sword's point. it is the conqueror who becomes effete, and it is the conquered who learns discipline and the qualities making for a well-ordered state. to say of war, therefore, as does baron von stengel, that it destroys the frail trees, leaving the sturdy oaks standing, is merely to state with absolute confidence the exact reverse of the truth; to take advantage of loose catch-phrases, which by inattention not only distort common thought in these matters, but often turn the truth upside down. our everyday ideas are full of illustrations of the same thing. for hundreds of years we talked of the "riper wisdom of the ancients," implying that this generation is the youth in experience, and that the early ages had the accumulated experience--the exact reverse, of course, of the truth. yet "the learning of the ancients" and "the wisdom of our forefathers" was a common catch-phrase, even in the british parliament, until an english country parson killed this nonsense by ridicule.[ ] i do not urge that the somewhat simple, elementary, selective process which i have described accounts in itself for the decadence of military powers. that is only a part of the process; the whole of it is somewhat more complicated, in that the process of elimination of the good in favor of the bad is quite as much sociological as biological; that is to say, if during long periods a nation gives itself up to war, trade languishes, the population loses the habit of steady industry, government and administration become corrupt, abuses escape punishment, and the real sources of a people's strength and expansion dwindle. what has caused the relative failure and decline of spanish, portuguese, and french expansion in asia and the new world, and the relative success of english expansion therein? was it the mere hazards of war which gave to great britain the domination of india and half of the new world? that is surely a superficial reading of history. it was, rather, that the methods and processes of spain, portugal, and france were military, while those of the anglo-saxon world were commercial and peaceful. is it not a commonplace that in india, quite as much as in the new world, the trader and the settler drove out the soldier and the conqueror? the difference between the two methods was that one was a process of conquest, and the other of colonizing, or non-military administration for commercial purposes. the one embodied the sordid cobdenite idea, which so excites the scorn of the militarists, and the other the lofty military ideal. the one was parasitism; the other co-operation.[ ] those who confound the power of a nation with the size of its army and navy are mistaking the check-book for the money. a child, seeing its father paying bills in checks, assumes that you need only plenty of check-books in order to have plenty of money; it does not see that for the check-book to have power there must be unseen resources on which to draw. of what use is domination unless there be individual capacity, social training, industrial resources, to profit thereby? how can you have these things if energy is wasted in military adventure? is not the failure of spain explicable by the fact that she failed to realize this truth? for three centuries she attempted to live upon conquest, upon the force of her arms, and year after year got poorer in the process and her modern social renaissance dates from the time when she lost the last of her american colonies. it is since the loss of cuba and the philippines that spanish national securities have doubled in value. (at the outbreak of the hispano-american war spanish fours were at ; they have since touched par.) if spain has shown in the last decade a social renaissance, not shown perhaps for a hundred and fifty years, it is because a nation still less military than germany, and still more purely industrial, has compelled spain once and for all to surrender all dreams of empire and conquest. the circumstances of the last surrender are eloquent in this connection as showing how even in warfare itself the industrial training and the industrial tradition--the cobdenite ideal of militarist scorn--are more than a match for the training of a society in which military activities are predominant. if it be true that it was the german schoolmaster who conquered at sedan, it was the chicago merchant who conquered at manila. the writer happens to have been in touch both with spaniards and americans at the time of the war, and well remembers the scorn with which the spaniards referred to the notion that the yankee pork-butchers could possibly conquer a nation of their military tradition, and to the idea that tradesmen would ever be a match for the soldiery and pride of old spain. and french opinion was not so very different.[ ] shortly after the war i wrote in an american journal as follows: spain represents the outcome of some centuries devoted mainly to military activity. no one can say that she has been unmilitary or at all deficient in those qualities which we associate with soldiers and soldiering. yet, if such qualities in any way make for national efficiency, for the conservation of national force, the history of spain is absolutely inexplicable. in their late contest with america, spaniards showed no lack of the distinctive military virtues. spain's inferiority--apart from deficiency of men and money--was precisely in those qualities which industrialism has bred in the unmilitary american. authentic stories of wretched equipment, inadequate supplies, and bad leadership show to what depths of inefficiency the spanish service, military and naval, had fallen. we are justified in believing that a much smaller nation than spain, but one possessing a more industrial and less military training, would have done much better, both as regards resistance to america and the defence of her own colonies. the present position of holland in asia seems to prove this. the dutch, whose traditions are industrial and non-military for the most part, have shown greater power and efficiency as a nation than the spanish, who are more numerous. here, as always, it is shown that, in considering national efficiency, even as expressed in military power, the economic problem cannot be divorced from the military, and that it is a fatal mistake to suppose that the power of a nation depends solely upon the power of its public bodies, or that it can be judged simply from the size of its army. a large army may, indeed, be a sign of a national--that is, military--weakness. warfare in these days is a business like other activities, and no courage, no heroism, no "glorious past," no "immortal traditions," will atone for deficient rations and fraudulent administration. good civilian qualities are the ones that will in the end win a nation's battles. the spaniard is the last one in the world to see this. he talks and dreams of castilian bravery and spanish honor, and is above shopkeeping details.... a writer on contemporary spain remarks that any intelligent middle-class spaniard will admit every charge of incompetence which can be brought against the conduct of public affairs. "yes, we have a wretched government. in any other country somebody would be shot." this is the hopeless military creed: killing somebody is the only remedy. here we see a trace of that intellectual legacy which spain has left to the new world, and which has stamped itself so indelibly on the history of spanish america. on a later occasion in this connection i wrote as follows: to appreciate the outcome of much soldiering, the condition in which persistent military training may leave a race, one should study spanish america. here we have a collection of some score of states, all very much alike in social and political make-up. most of the south american states so resemble one another in language, laws, institutions, that to an outsider it would seem not to matter a straw under which particular six-months-old republic one should live; whether one be under the government of the pronunciamento-created president of colombia, or under that of the president of venezuela, one's condition would appear to be much the same. apparently no particular country has anything which differentiates it from another, and, consequently, anything to protect against the other. actually, the governments might all change places and the people be none the wiser. yet, so hypnotized, are these little states by the "necessity for self-protection," by the glamour of armaments, that there is not one without a relatively elaborate and expensive military establishment to protect it from the rest. no conditions seem so propitious for a practical confederation as those of spanish america; with a few exceptions, the virtual unity of language, laws, general race-ideals, would seem to render protection of frontiers supererogatory. yet the citizens give untold wealth, service, life, and suffering to be protected against a government exactly like their own. all this waste of life and energy has gone on without it ever occurring to one of these states that it would be preferable to be annexed a thousand times over, so trifling would be the resulting change in their condition, than continue the everlasting and futile tribute of blood and treasure. over some absolutely unimportant matter--like that of the patagonian roads, which nearly brought argentina and chili to grips the other day--as much patriotic devotion will be expended as ever the old guard lavished in protecting the honor of the tricolor. battles will be fought which will make all the struggles in south africa appear mean in comparison. actions in which the dead are counted in thousands will excite no more comment in the world than that produced by a skirmish in natal, in which a score of yeomen are captured and released.[ ] in the decade since the foregoing was written things have enormously improved in south america. why? for the simple reason, as pointed out in chapter v. of the first part of this book, that spanish america is being brought more and more into the economic movement of the world; and with the establishment of factories, in which large capital has been sunk, banks, businesses, etc., the whole attitude of mind of those interested in these ventures is changed. the jingo, the military adventurer, the fomentor of trouble, are seen for what they are--not as patriots, but as representing exceedingly mischievous and maleficent forces. this general truth has two facets: if long warfare diverts a people from the capacity for industry, so in the long run economic pressure--the influences, that is, which turn the energies of people to preoccupation with social well-being--is fatal to the military tradition. neither tendency is constant; warfare produces poverty; poverty pushes to thrift and work, which result in wealth; wealth creates leisure and pride and pushes to warfare. where nature does not respond readily to industrial effort, where it is, at least apparently, more profitable to plunder than to work, the military tradition survives. the beduin has been a bandit since the time of abraham, for the simple reason that the desert does not support industrial life nor respond to industrial effort. the only career offering a fair apparent return for effort is plunder. in morocco, in arabia, in all very poor pastoral countries, the same phenomenon is exhibited; in mountainous countries which are arid and are removed from the economic centres, _idem_. the same may have been to some extent the case in prussia before the era of coal and iron; but the fact that to-day per cent. of the population is normally engaged in trade and industry, and per cent. only in military preparation, and some fraction too small to be properly estimated engaged in actual war, shows how far she has outgrown such a state--shows, incidentally, what little chance the ideal and tradition represented by per cent. or some fractional percentage has against interests and activities represented by per cent. the recent history of south and central america, because it is recent, and because the factors are less complicated, illustrates best the tendency with which we are dealing. spanish america inherited the military tradition in all its vigor. as i have already pointed out, the spanish occupation of the american continent was a process of conquest rather than of colonizing; and while the mother country got poorer and poorer by the process of conquest, the new countries also impoverished themselves in adherence to the same fatal illusion. the glamour of conquest was, of course, spain's ruin. so long as it was possible for her to live on extorted bullion, neither social nor industrial development seemed possible. despite the common idea to the contrary, germany has known how to keep this fatal hypnotism at bay, and, far from allowing her military activities to absorb her industrial, it is precisely the military activities which are in a fair way now to being absorbed by the industrial and commercial, and her world commerce has its foundation, not in tribute or bullion exacted at the sword's point, but in sound and honest exchange. so that to-day the legitimate commercial tribute which germany, who never sent a soldier there, exacts from spanish america is immensely greater than that which goes to spain, who poured out blood and treasure during three centuries on these territories. in this way, again, do the warlike nations inherit the earth! if germany is never to duplicate spain's decadence, it is precisely because ( ) she has never had, historically, spain's temptation to live by conquest, and ( ) because, having to live by honest industry, her commercial hold, even upon the territories conquered by spain, is more firmly set than that of spain herself. how may we sum up the whole case, keeping in mind every empire that ever existed--the assyrian, the babylonian, the mede and persian, the macedonian, the roman, the frank, the saxon, the spanish, the portuguese, the bourbon, the napoleonic? in all and every one of them we may see the same process, which is this: if it remains military it decays; if it prospers and takes its share of the work of the world it ceases to be military. there is no other reading of history. that history furnishes no justification for the plea that pugnacity and antagonism between nations is bound up in any way with the real process of national survival, shows clearly enough that nations nurtured normally in peace are more than a match for nations nurtured normally in war; that communities of non-military tradition and instincts, like the anglo-saxon communities of the new world, show elements of survival stronger than those possessed by communities animated by the military tradition, like the spanish and portuguese nations of the new world; that the position of the industrial nations in europe as compared with the military gives no justification for the plea that the warlike qualities make for survival. it is clearly evident that there is no biological justification in the terms of man's political evolution for the perpetuation of antagonism between nations, nor any justification for the plea that the diminution of such antagonism runs counter to the teachings of the "natural law." there is no such natural law; in accordance with natural laws, men are being thrust irresistibly towards co-operation between communities and not towards conflict. there remains the argument that, though the conflict itself may make for degeneration, the preparation for that conflict makes for survival, for the improvement of human nature. i have already touched upon the hopeless confusion which comes of the plea that, while long-continued peace is bad, military preparations find justification in that they insure peace. almost every defence of militarism includes a sneer at the ideal of peace because it involves the cobdenite state of buying cheap and selling dear. but, with equal regularity, the advocate of the military system goes on to argue for great armaments, not as a means of promoting war, that valuable school, etc., but as the best means of securing peace; in other words, that condition of "buying cheap and selling dear" which but a moment before he has condemned as so defective. as though to make the stultification complete, he pleads for the peace value of military training, on the ground that german commerce has benefited from it--that, in other words, it has promoted the "cobdenite ideal." the analysis of the reasoning, as has been brilliantly shown by mr. john m. robertson,[ ] gives a result something like this: ( ) war is a great school of morals, therefore we must have great armaments to insure peace; ( ) to secure peace engenders the cobdenite ideal, which is bad, therefore we should adopt conscription, (_a_) because it is the best safeguard of peace, (_b_) because it is a training for commerce--the cobdenite ideal. is it true that barrack training--the sort of school which the competition of armaments during the last generation has imposed on the people of continental europe--makes for moral health? is it likely that a "perpetual rehearsal for something never likely to come off, and when it comes off is not like the rehearsal," should be a training for life's realities? is it likely that such a process would have the stamp and touch of closeness to real things? is it likely that the mechanical routine of artificial occupations, artificial crimes, artificial virtues, artificial punishments should form any training for the battle of real life?[ ] what of the dreyfus case? what of the abominable scandals that have marked german military life of late years? if peace military training is such a fine school, how could the london _times_ write thus of france after she had submitted to a generation of a very severe form of it: a thrill of horror and shame ran through the whole civilized world outside france when the result of the rennes court-martial became known.... by their (the officers') own admission, whether flung defiantly at the judges, their inferiors, or wrung from them under cross-examination, dreyfus's chief accusers were convicted of gross and fraudulent illegalities which, anywhere, would have sufficed, not only to discredit their testimony--had they any serious testimony to offer--but to transfer them speedily from the witness-box to the prisoner's dock.... their vaunted honor "rooted in dishonor stood." ... five judges out of the seven have once more demonstrated the truth of the astounding axiom first propounded during the zola trial, that "military justice is not as other justice." ... we have no hesitation in saying that the rennes court-martial constitutes in itself the grossest, and, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, the most appalling prostitution of justice which the world has witnessed in modern times.... flagrantly, deliberately, mercilessly trampled justice underfoot.... the verdict, which is a slap in the face to the public opinion of the civilized world, to the conscience of humanity.... france is henceforth on her trial before history. arraigned at the bar of a tribunal far higher than that before which dreyfus stood, it rests with her to show whether she will undo this great wrong and rehabilitate her fair name, or whether she will stand irrevocably condemned and disgraced by allowing it to be consummated. we can less than ever afford to underrate the forces against truth and justice.... hypnotized by the wild tales perpetually dinned into all credulous ears of an international "syndicate of treason," conspiring against the honor of the army and the safety of france, the conscience of the french nation has been numbed, and its intelligence atrophied.... amongst those statesmen who are in touch with the outside world in the senate and chamber there must be some that will remind her that nations, no more than individuals, cannot bear the burden of universal scorn and live.... france cannot close her ears to the voice of the civilized world, for that voice is the voice of history.[ ] and what the _times_ said then all england was saying, and not only all england, but all america. and has germany escaped a like condemnation? we commonly assume that the dreyfus case could not be duplicated in germany. but this is not the opinion of very many germans themselves. indeed, just before the dreyfus case reached its crisis, the kotze scandal--in its way just as grave as the dreyfus affair, and revealing a moral condition just as serious--prompted the london _times_ to declare that "certain features of german civilization are such as to make it difficult for englishmen to understand how the whole state does not collapse from sheer rottenness." if that could be said of the kotze affair, what shall be said of the state of things which has been revealed by maximilien harden among others? need it be said that the writer of these lines does not desire to represent germans as a whole as more corrupt than their neighbors? but impartial observers are not of opinion, and very many germans are not of opinion, that there has been either economic, social, or moral advantage to the german people from the victories of and the state of regimentation which the sequel has imposed. this is surely evidenced by the actual position of affairs in the german empire, the complex difficulty with which the german people are now struggling, the growing discontent, the growing influence of those elements which are nurtured in discontent, the growth on one side of radical intransigence and on the other of almost feudal autocracy, the failure to effect normally and easily those democratic developments which have been effected in almost every other european state, the danger for the future which such a situation represents, the precariousness of german finance, the relatively small profit which her population as a whole has received from the greatly increased foreign trade--all this, and much more, confirms that view. england has of late seemed to have been affected with the german superstition. with the curious perversity that marks "patriotic" judgments, the whole tendency of the english has been to make comparisons with germany to the disadvantage of themselves and of other european countries. yet if germans themselves are to be believed, much of that superiority which the english see in germany is as purely non-existent as the phantom german war-balloon to which the british press devoted serious columns, to the phantom army corps in epping forest, to the phantom stories of arms in london cellars, and to the german spy which english patriots see in every italian waiter.[ ] despite the hypnotism which german "progress" seems to exercise on the minds of english jingoes, the german people themselves, as distinct from the small group of prussian junkers, are not in the least enamored of it, as is proved by the unparalleled growth of the social-democratic element, which is the negation of military imperialism, and which, as the figures in prussia prove, receives support not from one class of the population merely, but from the mercantile, industrial, and professional classes as well. the agitation for electoral reform in prussia shows how acute the conflict has become; on the one side the increasing democratic element showing more and more of a revolutionary tendency, and on the other side the prussian autocracy showing less and less disposition to yield. does anyone really believe that the situation will remain there, that the democratic parties will continue to grow in numbers and be content for ever to be ridden down by the "booted prussian," and that german democracy will indefinitely accept a situation in which it will be always possible--in the words of the junker, von oldenburg, member of the reichstag--for the german emperor to say to a lieutenant, "take ten men and close the reichstag"? what must be the german's appreciation of the value of military victory and militarization when, mainly because of it, he finds himself engaged in a struggle which elsewhere less militarized nations settled a generation since? and what has the english defender of the militarist regimen, who holds the german system up for imitation, to say of it as a school of national discipline, when the imperial chancellor himself defends the refusal of democratic suffrage like that obtaining in england on the ground that the prussian people have not yet acquired those qualities of public discipline which make it workable in england?[ ] yet what prussia, in the opinion of the chancellor, is not yet fit for, scandinavian nations, switzerland, holland, belgium, have fitted themselves for without the aid of military victory and subsequent regimentation. did not someone once say that the war had made germany great and germans small? when we ascribe so large a measure of germany's social progress (which no one, so far as i know, is concerned to deny) to the victories and regimentation, why do we conveniently overlook the social progress of the small states which i have just mentioned, where such progress on the material side has certainly been as great as, and on the moral side greater than, in germany? why do we overlook the fact that, if germany has done well in certain social organizations, scandinavia and switzerland have done better? and why do we overlook the fact that, if regimentation is of such social value, it has been so completely inoperative in states which are more highly militarized even than germany--in spain, italy, austria, turkey, and russia? but even assuming--a very large assumption--that regimentation has played the rôle in german progress which english germano-maniacs would have us believe, is there any justification for supposing that a like process would be in any way adaptable to english conditions social, moral, material, and historical? the position of germany since the war of --what it has stood for in the generation since victory, and what it stood for in the generations that followed defeat--furnishes a much-needed lesson as to the outcome of the philosophy of force. practically all impartial observers of germany are in agreement with mr. harbutt dawson when he writes as follows: it is questionable whether unified germany counts as much to-day as an intellectual and moral agent in the world as when it was little better than a geographical expression.... germany has at command an apparently inexhaustible reserve of physical and material force, but the real influence and power which it exerts is disproportionately small. the history of civilization is full of proofs that the two things are not synonymous. a nation's mere force is, on ultimate analysis, its sum of brute strength. this force may, indeed, go with intrinsic power, yet such power can never depend permanently on force, and the test is easy to apply.... no one who genuinely admires the best in the german character, and who wishes well to the german people, will seek to minimize the extent of the loss which would appear to have befallen the old national ideals; hence the discontent of the enlightened classes with the political laws under which they live--a discontent often vague and indefinite, the discontent of men who do not know clearly what is wrong or what they want, but feel that a free play is denied them which belongs to the dignity and worth and essence of human personality. "is there a german culture to-day?" asks fuchs.[ ] "we germans are able to perfect all works of civilizing power as well as, and indeed better than, the best in other nations. yet nothing that the heroes of labor execute goes beyond our own border." and the most extraordinary thing is that those who do not in the least deny this condition to which germany has fallen--who, indeed, exaggerate it, and ask us with triumph to look upon the brutality of german method and german conception--ask us to go and follow germany's example! most british pro-armament agitation is based upon the plea that germany is dominated by a philosophy of force. they point to books like those of general bernhardi, idealizing the employment of force, and then urge a policy of replying by force--and force only--which would, of course, justify in germany the bernhardi school, and by the reaction of opposing forces stereotype the philosophy in europe and make it part of the general european tradition. england stands in danger of becoming prussianized by virtue of the fact of fighting prussianism, or rather by virtue of the fact that, instead of fighting it with the intellectual tools that won religious freedom in europe, she insists upon confining her efforts to the tools of physical force. some of the acutest foreign students of english progress--men like edmond demolins--ascribe it to the very range of qualities which the german system is bound to crush; their aptitude for initiative, their reliance upon their own efforts, their sturdy resistance to state interference (already weakening), their impatience with bureaucracy and red tape (also weakening), all of which is wrapped up with general rebelliousness to regimentation. though the english base part of the defence of armaments on the plea that, economic interest apart, they desire to live their own life in their own way, to develop in their own fashion, do they not run some danger that with this mania for the imitation of german method they may germanize england, though never a german soldier land on their soil? of course, it is always assumed that, though the english may adopt the french and german system of conscription, they could never fall a victim to the defects of those systems, and that the scandals which break out from time to time in france and germany could never be duplicated by _their_ barrack system, and that the military atmosphere of their own barracks, the training in their own army, would always be wholesome. but what do even its defenders say? mr. blatchford himself says:[ ] barrack life is bad. barrack life will always be bad. it is never good for a lot of men to live together apart from home influences and feminine. it is not good for women to live or work in communities of women. the sexes react upon each other; each provides for the other a natural restraint, a wholesome incentive.... the barracks and the garrison town are not good for young men. the young soldier, fenced and hemmed in by a discipline unnecessarily severe, and often stupid, has at the same time an amount of license which is dangerous to all but those of strong good sense and strong will. i have seen clean, good, nice boys come into the army and go to the devil in less than a year. i am no puritan. i am a man of the world; but any sensible and honest man who has been in the army will know at once that what i am saying is entirely true, and is the truth expressed with much restraint and moderation. a few hours in a barrack-room would teach a civilian more than all the soldier stories ever written. when i joined the army i was unusually unsophisticated for a boy of twenty. i had been brought up by a mother. i had attended sunday-school and chapel. i had lived a quiet, sheltered life, and i had an astonishing amount to learn. the language of the barrack-room shocked me, appalled me. i could not understand half i heard; i could not credit much that i saw. when i began to realize the truth, i took my courage in both hands and went about the world i had come into with open eyes. so i learnt the facts, but i must not tell them.[ ] chapter v the diminishing factor of physical force: psychological results diminishing factor of physical force--though diminishing, physical force has always had an important rôle in human affairs--what is underlying principle, determining advantageous and disadvantageous use of physical force?--force that aids co-operation in accord with law of man's advance: force that is exercised for parasitism in conflict with such law and disadvantageous for both parties--historical process of the abandonment of physical force--the khan and the london tradesman--ancient rome and modern britain--the sentimental defence of war as the purifier of human life--the facts--the redirection of human pugnacity. despite the general tendency indicated by the facts dealt with in the preceding chapter, it will be urged (with perfect justice) that, though the methods of anglo-saxondom as compared with those of the spanish, portuguese, and french empires, may have been mainly commercial and industrial rather than military, war was a necessary part of expansion; that but for some fighting the anglo-saxons would have been ousted from north america or asia, or would never have gained a footing there. does this, however, prevent us establishing, on the basis of the facts exposed in the preceding chapter, a general principle sufficiently definite to serve as a practical guide in policy, and to indicate reliably a general tendency in human affairs? assuredly not. the principle which explains the uselessness of much of the force exerted by the military type of empire, and justifies in large part that employed by britain, is neither obscure nor uncertain, although empiricism, rule of thumb (which is the curse of political thinking in our days, and more than anything else stands in the way of real progress), gets over the difficulty by declaring that no principle in human affairs can be pushed to its logical or theoretical conclusion; that what may be "right in theory" is wrong in practice. thus mr. roosevelt, who expresses with such admirable force and vigor the average thoughts of his hearers or readers, takes generally this line: we must be peaceful, but not too peaceful; warlike, but not too warlike; moral, but not too moral.[ ] by such verbal mystification we are encouraged to shirk the rough and stony places along the hard road of thinking. if we cannot carry a principle to its logical conclusion, at what point are we to stop? one will fix one and another will fix another with equal justice. what is it to be "moderately" peaceful, or "moderately" warlike? temperament and predilection can stretch such limitations indefinitely. this sort of thing only darkens counsel. if a theory is right, it can be pushed to its logical conclusion; indeed, the only real test of its value is that it _can_ be pushed to its logical conclusion. if it is wrong in practice, it is wrong in theory, for the right theory will take cognizance of all the facts, not only of one set. in chapter ii. of this part (pp. - ), i have very broadly indicated the process by which the employment of physical force in the affairs of the world has been a constantly diminishing factor since the day that primitive man killed his fellow-man in order to eat him. yet throughout the whole process the employment of force has been an integral part of progress, until even to-day in the most advanced nations force--the police-force--is an integral part of their civilization. what, then, is the principle determining the advantageous and the disadvantageous employment of force? preceding the outline sketch just referred to is another sketch indicating the real biological law of man's survival and advance; the key to that law is found in co-operation between men and struggle with nature. mankind as a whole is the organism which needs to co-ordinate its parts in order to insure greater vitality by better adaptation to its environment. here, then, we get the key: force employed to secure completer co-operation between the parts, to facilitate exchange, makes for advance; force which runs counter to such co-operation, which attempts to replace the mutual benefit of exchange by compulsion, which is in any way a form of parasitism, makes for retrogression. why is the employment of force by the police justified? because the bandit refuses to co-operate. he does not offer an exchange; he wants to live as a parasite, to take by force, and give nothing in exchange. if he increased in numbers, co-operation between the various parts of the organism would be impossible; he makes for disintegration. he must be restrained, and so long as the police use their force in such restraint they are merely insuring co-operation. the police are not attempting to settle things by force; they are preventing things from being settled in that way. now, suppose that this police-force becomes the army of a political power, and the diplomats of that power say to a smaller one: "we outnumber you; we are going to annex your territory, and you are going to pay us tribute." and the smaller power says: "what are you going to give us for that tribute?" and the larger replies: "nothing. you are weak; we are strong; we gobble you up. it is the law of life; always has been--always will be to the end." now that police-force, become an army, is no longer making for co-operation; it has simply and purely taken the place of the bandits; and to approximate such an army to a police-force, and to say that because both operations involve the employment of force they both stand equally justified, is to ignore half the facts, and to be guilty of those lazy generalizations which we associate with savagery.[ ] but the difference is more than a moral one. if the reader will again return to the little sketch referred to above, he will probably agree that the diplomats of the larger power are acting in an extraordinarily stupid fashion. i say nothing of their sham philosophy (which happens, however, to be that of european statecraft to-day), by which this aggression is made to appear in keeping with the law of man's struggle for life, when, as a matter of fact, it is the very negation of that law; but we know _now_ that they are taking a course which gives the least result, even from _their_ point of view, for the effort expended. here we get the key also to the difference between the respective histories of the military empires, like spain, france, and portugal, and the more industrial type, like england, which has been touched upon in the preceding chapter. not the mere hazard of war, not a question of mere efficiency in the employment of force, has given to great britain influence in half a world, and taken it from spain, but a radical, fundamental difference in underlying principles however imperfectly realized. england's exercise of force has approximated on the whole to the rôle of police; spain's to that of the diplomats of the supposititious power just referred to. england's has made for co-operation; spain's for the embarrassment of co-operation. england's has been in keeping with the real law of man's struggle; spain's in keeping with the sham law which the "blood and iron" empiricists are forever throwing at our heads. for what has happened to all attempts to live on extorted tribute? they have all failed--failed miserably and utterly[ ]--to such an extent that to-day the exaction of tribute has become an economic impossibility. if, however, our supposititious diplomats, instead of asking for tribute, had said: "your country is in disorder; your police-force is insufficient; our merchants are robbed and killed; we will lend you police and help you to maintain order; you will pay the police their just wage, and that is all;" and had honestly kept to this office, their exercise of force would have aided human co-operation, not checked it. again, it would have been a struggle, not against man, but against the use of force; the "predominant power" would have been living, not on other men, but by more efficient organization of man's fight with nature. that is why, in the first section of this book, i have laid emphasis on the truth that the justification of past wars has no bearing on the problem which confronts us: the precise degree of fighting which was necessary a hundred and fifty years ago is a somewhat academic problem. the degree of fighting which is necessary to-day is the problem which confronts us, and a great many factors have been introduced into it since england won india and lost part of north america. the face of the world has changed, and the factors of conflict have changed radically: to ignore that is to ignore facts and to be guided by the worst form of theorizing and sentimentalism--the theorizing that will not recognize the facts. england does not need to maintain order in germany, nor germany in france; and the struggle between those nations is no part of man's struggle with nature--has no justification in the real law of human struggle; it is an anachronism; it finds its justification in a sham philosophy that will not bear the test of facts, and, responding to no real need and achieving no real purpose, is bound with increasing enlightenment to come to an end. i wish it were not everlastingly necessary to reiterate the fact that the world has moved. yet for the purposes of this discussion it is necessary. if to-day an italian warship were suddenly to bombard liverpool without warning, the bourse in rome would present a condition, and the bank-rate in rome would take a drop that would ruin tens of thousands of italians--do far more injury, probably, to italy than to england. yet if five hundred years ago italian pirates had landed from the thames and sacked london itself, not an italian in italy would have been a penny the worse for it. is it seriously urged that in the matter of the exercise of physical force, therefore, there is no difference in these two conditions: and is it seriously urged that the psychological phenomena which go with the exercise of physical force are to remain unaffected? the preceding chapter is, indeed, the historical justification of the economic truths established in the first section of this book in the terms of the facts of the present-day world, which show that the predominating factor in survival is shifting from the physical to the intellectual plane. this evolutionary process has now reached a point in international affairs which involves the complete economic futility of military force. in the last chapter but one i dealt with the psychological consequence of this profound change in the nature of man's normal activities, showing that his nature is coming more and more to adapt itself to what he normally and for the greater part of his life--in most cases all his life--is engaged in, and is losing the impulses concerned with an abnormal and unusual occupation. why have i presented the facts in this order, and dealt with the psychological result involved in this change before the change itself? i have adopted this order of treatment because the believer in war justifies his dogmatism for the most part by an appeal to what he alleges is the one dominating fact of the situation--_i.e._, that human nature is unchanging. well, as will be seen from the chapter on that subject, that alleged fact does not bear investigation. human nature is changing out of all recognition. not only is man fighting less, but he is using all forms of physical compulsion less, and as a very natural result is losing those psychological attributes that go with the employment of physical force. and he is coming to employ physical force less because accumulated evidence is pushing him more and more to the conclusion that he can accomplish more easily that which he strives for by other means. few of us realize to what extent economic pressure--and i use that term in its just sense, as meaning, not only the struggle for money, but everything implied therein, well-being, social consideration, and the rest--has replaced physical force in human affairs. the primitive mind could not conceive a world in which everything was not regulated by force: even the great minds of antiquity could not believe the world would be an industrious one unless the great mass were made industrious by the use of physical force--_i.e._, by slavery. three-fourths of those who peopled what is now italy in rome's palmiest days were slaves, chained in the fields when at work, chained at night in their dormitories, with those who were porters chained to the doorways. it was a society of slavery--fighting slaves, working slaves, cultivating slaves, official slaves, and gibbon adds that the emperor himself was a slave, "the first slave to the ceremonies he imposed." great and penetrating as were many of the minds of antiquity, none of them show much conception of any condition of society in which the economic impulse could replace physical compulsion.[ ] had they been told that the time would come when the world would work very much harder under the impulse of an abstract thing known as economic interest, they would have regarded such a statement as that of a mere sentimental theorist. indeed, one need not go so far: if one had told an american slaveholder of sixty years ago that the time would come when the south would produce more cotton under the free pressure of economic forces than under slavery, he would have made a like reply. he would probably have declared that "a good cowhide whip beats all economic pressure"--pretty much the sort of thing that one may hear from the mouth of the average militarist to-day. very "practical" and virile, of course, but it has the disadvantage of not being true. the presumed necessity for physical compulsion did not stop at slavery. as we have already seen, it was accepted as an axiom in statecraft that men's religious beliefs had to be forcibly restrained, and not merely their religious belief, but their very clothing; and we have hundreds of years of complicated sumptuary laws, hundreds of years, also, of forcible control or, rather, the attempted forcible control of prices and trade, the elaborate system of monopolies, absolute prohibition of the entrance into the country of certain foreign goods, the violation of which prohibition was treated as a penal offence. we had even the use of forced money, the refusal to accept which was treated as a penal offence. in many countries for years it was a crime to send gold abroad, all indicating the domination of the mind of man by the same curious obsession that man's life must be ruled by physical force, and it is only very slowly and very painfully that we have arrived at the truth that men will work best when left to unseen and invisible forces. a world in which physical force was withdrawn from the regulation of men's labor, faith, clothes, trade, language, travel, would have been absolutely inconceivable to even the best minds during the three or four thousand years of history which mainly concern us. what is the central explanation of the profound change involved here--the shifting of the pivot in all human affairs, in so far as they touch both the individual and the community, from physical ponderable forces to economic imponderable forces? it is surely that, strange as it may seem, the latter forces accomplish the desired result more efficiently and more readily than do the former, which even when they are not completely futile are in comparison wasteful and stultifying. it is the law of the economy of effort. indeed, the use of physical force usually involves in those employing it the same limitation of freedom (even if in lesser degree) as that which it is desired to impose. herbert spencer illustrates the process in the following suggestive passage: the exercise of mastery inevitably entails on the master himself some sort of slavery more or less pronounced. the uncultured masses and even the greater part of the cultured will regard this statement as absurd, and though many who have read history with an eye to essentials rather than to trivialities know that this is a paradox in the right sense--that is, true in fact though not seeming true--even they are not fully conscious of the mass of evidence establishing it, and will be all the better for having illustrations recalled. let me begin with the earliest and simplest which serves to symbolize the whole. here is a prisoner, with his hands tied and a cord round his neck (as suggested by figures in assyrian bas-reliefs), being led home by his savage conqueror, who intends to make him a slave. the one you say is captive and the other free. are you quite sure the other is free? he holds one end of the cord and, unless he means his captive to escape, he must continue to be fastened by keeping hold of the cord in such way that it cannot easily be detached. he must be himself tied to the captive while the captive is tied to him. in other ways his activities are impeded and certain burdens are imposed on him. a wild animal crosses the track and he cannot pursue. if he wishes to drink of the adjacent stream he must tie up his captive, lest advantage be taken of his defenceless position. moreover, he has to provide food for both. in various ways he is no longer, then, completely at liberty; and these worries adumbrate in a simple manner the universal truth that the instrumentalities by which the subordination of others is effected themselves subordinate the victor, the master, or the ruler.[ ] thus it comes that all nations attempting to live by conquest end by being themselves the victims of a military tyranny precisely similar to that which they hope to inflict; or, in other terms, that the attempt to impose by force of arms a disadvantageous commercial situation to the advantage of the conqueror ends in the conqueror's falling a victim to the very disadvantages from which he hoped by a process of spoliation to profit. but the truth that economic force always in the long run outweighs physical or military force is illustrated by the simple fact of the universal use of money--the fact that the use of money is not a thing which we choose or can shake off, but a thing imposed by the operation of forces stronger than our volition, stronger than the tyranny of the cruellest tyrant who ever reigned by blood and iron. i think it is one of the most astounding things, to the man who takes a fairly fresh mind to the study of history, that the most absolute despots--men who can command the lives of their subjects with a completeness and a nonchalance of which the modern western world furnishes no parallel--cannot command money. one asks oneself, indeed, why such an absolute ruler, able as he is by the sheer might of his position and by the sheer force of his power to take everything that exists in his kingdom, and able as he is to exact every sort and character of service, needs money, which is the means of obtaining goods or services by a freely consented exchange. yet, as we know, it is precisely, in ancient as in modern times, the most absolute despot who is often the most financially embarrassed.[ ] is not this a demonstration that in reality physical force is operative in only very narrow limits? it is no mere rhetoric, but the cold truth, to say that under absolutism it is a simple thing to get men's lives, but often impossible to get money. and the more, apparently, that physical force was exercised, the more difficult did the command of money become. and for a very simple reason--a reason which reveals in rudimentary form that principle of the economic futility of military power with which we are dealing. the phenomenon is best illustrated by a concrete case. if one go to-day into one of the independent despotisms of central asia one will find generally a picture of the most abject poverty. why? because the ruler has absolute power to take wealth whenever he sees it, to take it by any means whatever--torture, death--up to the completest limit of uncontrolled physical force. what is the result? the wealth is not created, and torture itself cannot produce a thing which is non-existent. step across the frontier into a state under british or russian protection, where the khan has some sort of limits imposed on his powers. the difference is immediately perceptible: evidence of wealth and comfort in relative profusion, and, other things being equal, the ruler, whose physical force over his subjects is limited, is a great deal richer than the ruler whose physical force over his subjects is unlimited. in other words, the farther one gets away from physical force, in the acquisition of wealth, the greater is the result for the effort expended. at the one end of the scale you get the despot in rags, exercising sway over what is probably a potentially rich territory, reduced to having to kill a man by torture in order to obtain a sum which at the other end of the scale a london tradesman will spend on a restaurant dinner for the purpose of sitting at table with a duke--or the thousandth part of the sum which the same tradesman will spend in philanthropy or otherwise, for the sake of acquiring an empty title from a monarch who has lost all power of exercising any physical force whatsoever. which process, judged by all things that men desire, gives the better result, the physical force of blood and iron which we see, or the intellectual or psychic force which we cannot see? the principle which operates in the limited fashion which i have indicated, operates with no less force in the larger domain of modern international politics. the wealth of the world is not represented by a fixed amount of gold or money now in the possession of one power, and now in the possession of another, but depends on all the unchecked multiple activities of a community for the time being. check that activity, whether by imposing tribute, or disadvantageous commercial conditions, or an unwelcome administration which sets up sterile political agitation, and you get less wealth--less wealth for the conqueror, as well as less for the conquered. the broadest statement of the case is that all experience--especially the experience indicated in the last chapter--shows that in trade by free consent, carrying mutual benefit, we get larger results for effort expended than in the exercise of physical force, which attempts to exact advantage for one party at the expense of the other. i am not arguing over again the thesis of the first part of this book; but, as we shall see presently, the general principle of the diminishing factor of physical force in the affairs of the world carries with it a psychological change in human nature which modifies radically our impulses to sheer physical conflict. what it is important just now to keep in mind, is the incalculable intensification of this diminution of physical force by our mechanical development. the principle was obviously less true for rome than it is for great britain or america: rome, however imperfectly, lived largely by tribute. the sheer mechanical development of the modern world has rendered tribute in the roman sense impossible. rome did not have to create markets and find a field for the employment of her capital. we do. what result does this carry? rome could afford to be relatively indifferent to the prosperity of her subject territory. we cannot. if the territory is not prosperous we have no market, and we have no field for our investments, and that is why we are checked at every point from doing what rome was able to do. you can to some extent exact tribute by force; you cannot compel a man to buy your goods by force if he does not want them, and has not got the money to pay for them. now, the difference which we see here has been brought about by the interaction of a whole series of mechanical changes--printing, gunpowder, steam, electricity, improved means of communication. it is the last-named which has mainly created the fact of credit. now, credit is merely an extension of the use of money, and we can no more shake off the domination of the one than we can that of the other. we have seen that the bloodiest despot is himself the slave of money, in the sense that he is compelled to employ it. in the same way no physical force can, in the modern world, set at nought the force of credit.[ ] it is no more possible for a great people of the modern world to live without credit than without money, of which it is a part. do we not here get an illustration of the fact that intangible economic forces are setting at nought the force of arms? one of the curiosities of this mechanical development, with its deep-seated psychological results, is the general failure to realize the real bearings of each step therein. printing was regarded, in the first instance, as merely a new-fangled process which threw a great many copying scribes and monks out of employment. who realized that in the simple invention of printing there was the liberation of a force greater than the power of kings? it is only here and there that we find an isolated thinker having a glimmering of the political bearing of such inventions of the conception of the great truth that the more man succeeds in his struggle with nature, the less must be the rôle of physical force between men, for the reason that human society has become, with each success in the struggle against nature, a completer organism. that is to say, that the interdependence of the parts has been increased, and that the possibility of one part injuring another without injury to itself, has been diminished. each part is more dependent on the other parts, and the impulses to injury, therefore, must in the nature of things be diminished. and that fact must, and does, daily redirect human pugnacity. and it is noteworthy that perhaps the best service which the improvement of the instruments of man's struggle with nature performs is the improvement of human relations. machinery and the steam-engine have done something more than make fortunes for manufacturers: they have abolished human slavery, as aristotle foresaw they would. it was impossible for men in the mass to be other than superstitious and irrational until they had the printed book.[ ] "roads that are formed for the circulation of wealth become channels for the circulation of ideas, and render possible that simultaneous action upon which all liberty depends." banking done by telegraphy concerns much more than the stockbroker: it demonstrates clearly and dramatically the real interdependence of nations, and is destined to transform the mind of the statesman. our struggle is with our environment, not with one another; and those who talk as though struggle between the parts of the same organism must necessarily go on, and as though impulses which are redirected every day can never receive the particular redirection involved in abandoning the struggle between states, ignorantly adopt the formula of science, but leave half the facts out of consideration. and just as the direction of the impulses will be changed, so will the character of the struggle be changed; the force which we shall use for our needs will be the force of intelligence, of hard work, of character, of patience, self-control, and a developed brain, and pugnacity and combativeness which, instead of being used up and wasted in world conflicts of futile destructiveness, will be, and are being, diverted into the steady stream of rationally-directed effort. the virile impulses become, not the tyrant and master, but the tool and servant of the controlling brain. the conception of abstract imponderable forces by the human mind is a very slow process. all man's history reveals this. the theologian has always felt this difficulty. for thousands of years men could only conceive of evil as an animal with horns and a tail, going about the world devouring folk; abstract conceptions had to be made understandable by a crude anthropomorphism. perhaps it is better that humanity should have some glimmering of the great facts of the universe, even though interpreted by legends of demons, and goblins, and fairies, and the rest; but we cannot overlook the truth that the facts are distorted in the process, and our advance in the conception of morals is marked largely by the extent to which we can form an abstract conception of the fact of evil--none the less a fact because unembodied--without having to translate it into a non-existent person or animal with a forked tail. as our advance in the understanding of morality is marked by our dropping these crude physical conceptions, is it not likely that our advance in the understanding of those social problems, which so nearly affect our general well-being, will be marked in like manner? is it not somewhat childish and elementary to conceive of force only as the firing off of guns and the launching of _dreadnoughts_, of struggle as the physical struggle between men, instead of the application of man's energies to his contest with the planet? is not the time coming when the real struggle will inspire us with the same respect and even the same thrill as that now inspired by a charge in battle; especially as the charges in battle are getting very out of date, and are shortly to disappear from our warfare? the mind which can only conceive of struggle as bombardment and charges is, of course, the dervish mind. not that fuzzy-wuzzy is not a fine fellow. he is manly, sturdy, hardy, with a courage, and warlike qualities generally, which no european can equal. but the frail and spectacled english official is his master, and a few score of such will make themselves the masters of teeming thousands of sudanese; the relatively unwarlike englishman is doing the same thing all over asia, and he is doing it simply by virtue of superior brain and character, more thought, more rationalism, more steady and controlled hard work. the american is doing the same in the philippines. it may be said that it is superior armament which does it. but what is the superior armament but the result of superior thought and work? and even without the superior armament the larger intelligence would still do it; for what the englishman and american do, the roman did of old, with the same arms as the inhabitants of his vassal worlds. force is indeed the master, but it is the force of intelligence, character, and rationalism. i can imagine the contempt with which the man of physical force greets the foregoing. to fight with words, to fight with talk! no, not words, but ideas. and something more than ideas. their translation into practical effort, into organization, into the direction and administration of organization, into the strategy and tactics of human life. what, indeed, is modern warfare in its highest phases but this? is it not altogether out of date and ignorant to picture soldiering as riding about on horseback, bivouacking in forests, sleeping in tents, and dashing gallantly at the head of shining regiments in plumes and breastplates, and pounding in serried ranks against the equally serried ranks of the cruel foe, storming breaches as the "war," in short, of mr. henty's books for boys? how far does such a conception correspond to the reality--to the german conception? even if the whole picture were not out of date, what proportion of the most military nation would ever be destined to witness it or to take part in it? not one in ten thousand. what is the character even of military conflict but, for the most part, years of hard and steady work, somewhat mechanical, somewhat divorced from real life, but not a whit more exciting? that is true of all ranks; and in the higher ranks of the directing mind war has become an almost purely intellectual process. was it not the late w.h. steevens who painted lord kitchener as the sort of man who would have made an admirable manager of harrod's stores; who fought all his battles in his study, and regarded the actual fighting as the mere culminating incident in the whole process, the dirty and noisy part of it, which he would have been glad to get away from? the real soldiers of our time--those who represent the brain of the armies--have a life not very different from that of men of any intellectual calling; much less of physical strife than is called for in many civil occupations; less than falls to the lot of engineers, ranchers, sailors, miners, and so on. even with armies the pugnacity must be translated into intellectual and not into physical effort.[ ] the very fact that war was long an activity which was in some sense a change and relaxation from the more intellectual strife of peaceful life, in which work was replaced by danger, thought by adventure, accounted in no small part for its attraction for men. but, as we have seen, war is becoming as hopelessly intellectual and scientific as any other form of work: officers are scientists, the men are workmen, the army is a machine, battles are "tactical operations," the charge is becoming out of date; a little while and war will become the least romantic of all professions. in this domain, as in all others, intellectual force is replacing sheer physical force, and we are being pushed by the necessities even of this struggle to be more rational in our attitude to war, to rationalize our study of it; and as our attitude generally becomes more scientific, so will the purely impulsive element lose its empire over us. that is one factor; but, of course, there is the greater one. our respect and admiration goes in the long run, despite momentary setbacks, to those qualities which achieve the results at which we are all, in common, aiming. if those results are mainly intellectual, it is the intellectual qualities that will receive the tribute of our admiration. we do not make a man president because he holds the light-weight boxing championship, and nobody knows or cares whether mr. wilson or mr. taft would be the better man at golf. but in a condition of society in which physical force was still the determining factor it would matter all in the world, and even when other factors had obtained considerable weight, as during the middle ages, physical combat went for a great deal: the knight in his shining armor established his prestige by his prowess in arms, and the vestige of this still remains in those countries that retain the duel. to some small extent--a very small extent--a man's dexterity with sword and pistol will affect his political prestige in paris, rome, budapest, or berlin. but these are just interesting vestiges, which in the case of anglo-saxon societies have disappeared entirely. my commercial friend who declares that he works fifteen hours a day mainly for the purpose of going one better than his commercial rival across the street, must beat that rival in commerce, not in arms; it would satisfy no pride of either to "have it out" in the back garden in their shirt-sleeves. nor is there the least danger that one will stick a knife into the other. are all these factors to leave the national relationship unaffected? have they left it unaffected? does the military prowess of russia or of turkey inspire any particular satisfaction in the minds of the individual russian or of the individual turk? does it inspire europe with any especial respect? would not most of us just as soon be a non-military american as a military turk? do not, in short, all the factors show that sheer physical force is losing its prestige as much in the national as in the personal relationship? i am not overlooking the case of germany. does the history of germany, during the last half-century, show the blind instinctive pugnacity which is supposed to be so overpowering an element in international relationship as to outweigh all question of material interest? does the commonly accepted history of the trickery and negotiation which preceded the conflict, the cool calculation of those who swayed germany's policy during those years, show that subordination to the blind lust for battle which the militarist would persuade us is always to be an element in our international conflict? does it not, on the contrary, show that german destinies were swayed by very cool and calculating motives of interest, though interest interpreted in terms of political and economic doctrines which the development of the last thirty years or so has demonstrated to be obsolete? nor am i overlooking the "prussian tradition," the fact of a firmly entrenched, aristocratic status, the intellectual legacy of pagan knighthood and heaven knows what else. but even a prussian junker becomes less of an energumen as he becomes more of a scientist,[ ] and although german science has of late spent its energies in somewhat arid specialization, the influence of more enlightened conceptions in sociology and statecraft must sooner or later emerge from any thoroughgoing study of political and economic problems. of course, there are survivals of the old temper, but can it seriously be argued that, when the futility of physical force to accomplish those ends towards which we are all striving is fully demonstrated, we shall go on maintaining war as a sort of theatrical entertainment? has such a thing ever happened in the past, when our impulses and "sporting" instincts came into conflict with our larger social and economic interests? all this, in other words, involves a great deal more than the mere change in the character of warfare. it involves a fundamental change in our psychological attitude thereto. not only does it show that on every side, even the military side, conflict must become less impulsive and instinctive, more rational and sustained, less the blind strife of mutually hating men, and more and more the calculated effort to a definite end; but it will affect the very well-springs of much of the present defence of war. why is it that the authorities i have quoted in the first chapter of this section--mr. roosevelt, von moltke, renan, and the english clergymen--sing the praises of war as such a valuable school of morals?[ ] do these war advocates urge that war itself is desirable? would they urge going to war unnecessarily or unjustly merely because it is good for us? emphatically no. their argument, in the last analysis, resolves itself into this: that war, though bad, has redeeming qualities, as teaching staunchness, courage, and the rest. well, so has cutting our legs off, or an operation for appendicitis. whoever composed epics on typhoid fever or cancer? such advocates might object to the efficient policing of a town because, if it was full of cut-throats, the inhabitants would be taught courage. one can almost imagine this sort of teacher pouring scorn upon those weaklings who want to call upon the police for protection, and saying, "police are for sentimentalists and cowards and men of slothful ease. what will become of the strenuous life if you introduce police?"[ ] the whole thing falls to the ground; and if we do not compose poems about typhoid it is because typhoid does not attract us and war does. that is the bottom of the whole matter, and it simplifies things a great deal to admit honestly that while no one is thrilled by the spectacle of disease, most of us are thrilled by the spectacle of war--that while none of us are fascinated by the spectacle of a man struggling with a disease, most of us are by the spectacle of men struggling with one another in war. there is something in warfare, in its story and in its paraphernalia, which profoundly stirs the emotions and sends the blood tingling through the veins of the most peaceable of us, and appeals to i know not what remote instincts, to say nothing of our natural admiration for courage, our love of adventure, of intense movement and action. but this romantic fascination resides to no small extent in that very spectacular quality of which modern conditions are depriving war. as we become a little more educated, we realize that human psychology is a complex and not a simple thing; that because we yield ourselves to the thrill of the battle spectacle we are not bound to conclude that the processes behind it, and the nature behind it, are necessarily all admirable; that the readiness to die is not the only test of virility or a fine or noble nature. in the book to which i have just referred (mr. steevens' "with kitchener to khartoum") one may read the following: and the dervishes? the honor of the fight must still go with the men who died. our men were perfect, but the dervishes were superb--beyond perfection. it was their largest, best, and bravest army that ever fought against us for mahdism, and it died worthily for the huge empire that mahdism won and kept so long. their riflemen, mangled by every kind of death and torment that man can devise, clung round the black flag and the green, emptying their poor, rotten home-made cartridges dauntlessly. their spearmen charged death every minute hopelessly. their horsemen led each attack, riding into the bullets till nothing was left.... not one rush, or two, or ten, but rush on rush, company on company, never stopping, though all their view that was not unshaken enemy was the bodies of the men who had rushed before them. a dusky line got up and stormed forward: it bent, broke up, fell apart, and disappeared. before the smoke had cleared another line was bending and storming forward in the same track.... from the green army there now came only death-enamored desperadoes, strolling one by one towards the rifles, pausing to take a spear, turning aside to recognize a corpse, then, caught by a sudden jet of fury, bounding forward, checking, sinking limply to the ground. now under the black flag in a ring of bodies stood only three men, facing the three thousand of the third brigade. they folded their arms about the staff and gazed steadily forward. two fell. the last dervish stood up and filled his chest; he shouted the name of his god and hurled his spear. then he stood quite still, waiting. it took him full; he quivered, gave at the knees, and toppled with his head on his arms and his face towards the legions of his conquerors." let us be honest. is there anything in european history--cambronne, the light brigade, anything you like--more magnificent than this? if we are honest we shall say, no. but note what follows in mr. steevens' narrative. what sort of nature should we expect those savage heroes to display? cruel, perhaps; but at least loyal. they will stand by their chief. men who can die like that will not betray him for gain. they are uncorrupted by commercialism. well, a few chapters after the scene just described, one may read this: as a ruler the khalifa finished when he rode out of omdurman. his own pampered baggara horsemen killed his herdsmen and looted the cattle that were to feed them. somebody betrayed the position of the reserve camels.... his followers took to killing one another.... the whole population of the khalifa's capital was now racing to pilfer the khalifa's grain.... wonderful workings of the savage mind! six hours before they were dying in regiments for their master; now they were looting his corn. six hours before they were slashing our wounded to pieces; now they were asking us for coppers. this difficulty with the soldier's psychology is not special to dervishes or to savages. an able and cultivated british officer writes: soldiers as a class are men who have disregarded the civil standard of morality altogether. they simply ignore it. it is no doubt why civilians fight shy of them. in the game of life they do not play the same rules, and the consequence is a good deal of misunderstanding, until finally the civilian says he will not play with tommy any more. in soldiers' eyes lying, theft, drunkenness, bad language, etc., are not evils at all. they steal like jackdaws. as to language, i used to think the language of a merchant ship's forecastle pretty bad, but the language of tommies, in point of profanity and in point of obscenity, beats it hollow. this department is a speciality of his. lying he treats with the same large charity. to lie like a trooper is quite a sound metaphor. he invents all sorts of elaborate lies for the mere pleasure of inventing them. looting, again, is one of his preferred joys, not merely looting for profit, but looting for the sheer fun of the destruction.[ ] (please, please, dear reader, do not say that i am slandering the british soldier. i am quoting a british officer, and a british officer, moreover, who is keenly in sympathy with the person that he has just been describing.) he adds: are thieving, and lying, and looting, and bestial talk very bad things? if they are, tommy is a bad man. but for some reason or other, since i got to know him, i have thought rather less of the iniquity of these things than i did before. i do not know which of the two passages that i have quoted is the more striking commentary on the moral influence of military training; that such training should have the effect which captain march phillips describes, or (as mr. j.a. hobson in his "psychology of jingoism" says) that the second judgment should be given by a man of sterling character and culture--the judgment, that thieving, and lying, and looting, and bestial talk do not matter. which fact constitutes the severer condemnation of the ethical atmosphere of militarism and military training? which is the more convincing testimony to the corrupting influences of war?[ ] to do the soldiers justice, they very rarely raise this plea of war being a moral training-school. "war itself," said an officer on one occasion, "is an infernally dirty business. but somebody has got to do the dirty work of the world, and i am glad to think that it is the business of the soldier to prevent rather than to make war." not that i am concerned to deny that we owe a great deal to the soldier. i do not know even why we should deny that we owe a great deal to the viking. neither the one nor the other was in every aspect despicable. both have bequeathed a heritage of courage, sturdiness, hardihood, and a spirit of ordered adventure; the capacity to take hard knocks and to give them; comradeship and rough discipline--all this and much more. it is not true to say of any emotion that it is wholly and absolutely good, or wholly and absolutely bad. the same psychological force which made the vikings destructive and cruel pillagers made their descendants sturdy and resolute pioneers and colonists; and the same emotional force which turns so much of africa into a sordid and bloody shambles would, with a different direction and distribution, turn it into a garden. is it for nothing that the splendid scandinavian race, who have converted their rugged and rock-strewn peninsula into a group of prosperous and stable states, which are an example to europe, and have infused the great anglo-saxon stock with something of their sane but noble idealism, have the blood of vikings in their veins? is there no place for the free play of all the best qualities of the viking and the soldier in a world still sadly in need of men with courage enough, for instance, to face the truth, however difficult it may seem, however unkind to our pet prejudices? there is not the least necessity for the peace advocate to ignore facts in this matter. the race of man loves a soldier just as boys love the pirate, and many of us, perhaps to our great advantage, remain in part boys our lives through. but as, growing out of boyhood, we regretfully discover the sad fact that we cannot be pirates, that we cannot even hunt indians, nor be scouts, nor even trappers, so surely the time has come to realize that we have grown out of soldiering. the romantic appeal of the ventures of the old vikings, and even later of piracy,[ ] was as great as that of war. yet we superseded the viking, and we hanged the pirate, though i doubt not we loved him while we hanged him; and i am not aware that those who urged the suppression of piracy were vilified, except by the pirates, as maudlin sentimentalists, who ignored human nature, or, in homer lea's phrase, as "half-educated, sick-brained visionaries, denying the inexorability of the primordial law of struggle." piracy interfered seriously with the trade and industry of those who desired to earn for themselves as good a living as they could get, and to obtain from this imperfect world all that it had to offer. piracy was magnificent, doubtless, but it was not business. we are prepared to sing about the viking, but not to tolerate him on the high seas; and some of us who are quite prepared to give the soldier his due place in poetry and legend and romance, quite prepared to admit, with mr. roosevelt and von moltke and the rest, the qualities which perhaps we owe to him, and without which we should be poor folk indeed, are nevertheless inquiring whether the time has not come to place him (or a good portion of him) gently on the poetic shelf with the viking; or at least to find other fields for those activities which, however much we may be attracted by them, have in their present form little place in a world in which, though, as bacon has said, men like danger better than travail, travail is bound, alas!--despite ourselves--to be our lot. chapter vi the state as a person: a false analogy and its consequences why aggression upon a state does not correspond to aggression upon an individual--our changing conception of collective responsibility--psychological progress in this connection--recent growth of factors breaking down the homogeneous personality of states. despite the common idea to the contrary, we dearly love an abstraction--especially, apparently, an abstraction which is based on half the facts. whatever the foregoing chapters may have proved, they have at least proved this: that the character of the modern state, by virtue of a multitude of new factors which are special to our age, is essentially and fundamentally different from that of the ancient. yet even those who have great and justified authority in this matter will still appeal to aristotle's conception of the state as final, with the implication that everything which has happened since aristotle's time should be calmly disregarded. what some of those things are, the preceding chapters have indicated: first, there is the fact of the change in human nature itself, bound up with the general drift away from the use of physical force--a drift explained by the unromantic fact that physical force does not give so much response to expended effort as do other forms of energy. there is an interconnection of psychological and purely mechanical development in all this which it is not necessary to disentangle here. the results are evident enough. very rarely, and to an infinitesimal extent, do we now employ force for the achievement of our ends. there is still a factor, however, which remains to be considered, and which has perhaps a more direct bearing on the question of continued conflict between nations than any of the other factors. conflicts between nations and international pugnacity generally imply a conception of a state as a homogeneous whole, having the same sort of responsibility that we attach to a person who, hitting us, provokes us to hit back. now only to a very small and rapidly diminishing extent can a state be regarded as such a person. there may have been a time--aristotle's time--when this was possible; but it is now impossible. yet the fine-spun theories on which are based the necessity for the use of force, as between nations, and the proposition that the relationship of nations can only be determined by force, and that international pugnacity will always be expressed by a physical struggle between nations, all arise from this fatal analogy, which in truth corresponds to very few of the facts. thus professor spenser wilkinson, whose contributions to this subject have such deserved weight, implies that what will permanently render the abandonment of force between nations impossible is the principle that "the employment of force for the maintenance of right is the foundation of all civilized human life, for it is the fundamental function of the state, and apart from the state there is no civilization, no life worth living.... the mark of the state is sovereignty, or the identification of force and right, and the measure of the perfection of the state is furnished by the completeness of this identification." this, whether true or not, is irrelevant to the matter in hand. professor spenser wilkinson attempts to illustrate his thesis by quoting a case which would seem to imply that those who take their stand against the necessity of armaments do so on the ground that the employment of force is wicked. there may be those who do this, but it is not necessary to introduce the question of right. if means other than force give the same result more easily, with less effort to ourselves, why discuss the abstract right? when professor spenser wilkinson reinforces the appeal to this irrelevant abstract principle by a case which, while apparently relevant, is in truth irrelevant, he has successfully confused the whole issue. after quoting three verses from the fifth chapter of matthew, he says:[ ] there are those who believe, or fancy they believe, that the words i have quoted involve the principle that the use of force or violence between man and man or between nation and nation is wicked. to the man who thinks it right to submit to any violence or be killed rather than use violence in resistance i have no reply to make; the world cannot conquer him, and fear has no hold upon him. but even he can carry out his doctrine only to the extent of allowing himself to be ill-treated, as i will now convince him. many years ago the people of lancashire were horrified by the facts reported in a trial for murder. in a village on the outskirts of bolton lived a young woman, much liked and respected as a teacher in one of the board-schools. on her way home from school she was accustomed to follow a footpath through a lonely wood, and here one evening her body was found. she had been strangled by a ruffian who had thought in this lonely place to have his wicked will of her. she had resisted successfully, and he had killed her in the struggle. fortunately the murderer was caught, and the facts ascertained from circumstantial evidence were confirmed by his confession. now the question i have to ask the man who takes his stand on the passage quoted from the gospel is this: "what would have been your duty had you been walking through that wood and came upon the girl struggling with the man who killed her?" this is the crucial factor which, i submit, utterly destroys the doctrine that the use of violence is in itself wrong. the right or wrong is not in the employment of force, but simply in the purpose for which it is used. what the case establishes, i think, is that to use violence in resistance to violent wrong is not only right, but necessary. the above presents, very cleverly, the utterly false analogy with which we are dealing. professor spenser wilkinson's cleverness, indeed, is a little machiavellian, because he approximates non-resisters of a very extreme type to those who advocate agreement among nations in the matter of armaments--a false approximation, for the proportion of those who advocate the reduction of armaments on such grounds is so small that they can be disregarded in this discussion. a movement which is identified with some of the acutest minds in european affairs cannot be disposed of by associating it with such a theory. but the basis of the fallacy is in the approximation of a state to a person. now a state is not a person, and is becoming less so every day, and the difficulty, which professor spenser wilkinson indicates, is a doctrinaire difficulty, not a real one. professor wilkinson would have us infer that a state can be injured or killed in the same simple way in which it is possible to kill or injure a person, and that because there must be physical force to restrain aggression upon persons, there must be physical force to restrain aggression upon states; and because there must be physical force to execute the judgment of a court of law in the case of individuals, there must be physical force to execute the judgment rendered by a decision as to differences between states. all of which is false, and arrived at by approximating a person to a state, and disregarding the numberless facts which render a person different from a state. how do we know that these difficulties are doctrinaire ones? it is the british empire which supplies the answer. the british empire is made up in large part of practically independent states, and great britain not only exercises no control over their acts, but has surrendered in advance any intention of employing force concerning them.[ ] the british states have disagreements among themselves. they may or may not refer their differences to the british government, but if they do, is great britain going to send an army to canada, say, to enforce her judgment? everyone knows that that is impossible. even when one state commits what is in reality a serious breach of international comity on another, not only does great britain refrain from using force herself, but so far as she interferes at all, it is to prevent the employment of physical force. for years now british indians have been subjected to most cruel and unjust treatment in the state of natal.[ ] the british government makes no secret of the fact that she regards this treatment as unjust and cruel; were natal a foreign state, it is conceivable that she would employ force, but, following the principle laid down by sir c.p. lucas, "whether they are right or whether they are wrong, more perhaps when they are wrong than when they are right, they cannot be made amenable by force," the two states are left to adjust the difficulty as best they may, without resort to force. in the last resort the british empire reposes upon the expectation that its colonies will behave as civilized communities, and in the long run the expectation is, of course, a well-founded one, because, if they do not so behave, retribution will come more surely by the ordinary operation of social and economic forces than it could come by any force of arms. the case of the british empire is not an isolated one. the fact is that most of the states of the world maintain their relations one with another without any possibility of a resort to force; half the states of the world have no means of enforcing by arms such wrongs as they may suffer at the hands of other states. thousands of englishmen, for instance, make their homes in switzerland, and it has happened that wrongs have been suffered by englishmen at the hands of the swiss government. would, however, the relations between the two states, or the practical standard of protection of british subjects in switzerland, be any the better were switzerland the whole time threatened by the might of great britain? switzerland knows that she is practically free from the possibility of the exercise of that force, but this has not prevented her from behaving as a civilized community towards british subjects. what is the real guarantee of the good behavior of one state to another? it is the elaborate interdependence which, not only in the economic sense, but in every sense, makes an unwarrantable aggression of one state upon another react upon the interests of the aggressor. switzerland has every interest in affording an absolutely secure asylum to british subjects; that fact, and not the might of the british empire, gives protection to british subjects in switzerland. where, indeed, the british subject has to depend upon the force of his government for protection it is a very frail protection indeed, because in practice the use of that force is so cumbersome, so difficult, so costly, that any other means are to be preferred to it. when the traveller in greece had to depend upon british arms, great as was relatively the force of those arms, it proved but a very frail protection. in the same way, when physical force was used to impose on the south american and central american states the observance of their financial obligations, such efforts failed utterly and miserably--so miserably that great britain finally surrendered any attempt at such enforcement. what other means have succeeded? the bringing of those countries under the influence of the great economic currents of our time, so that now property is infinitely more secure in argentina than it was when british gunboats were bombarding her ports. more and more in international relationship is the purely economic motive--and the economic motive is only one of several possible ones--being employed to replace the use of physical force. austria, the other day, was untouched by any threat of the employment of the turkish army when the annexation of bosnia and herzegovina was consummated, but when the turkish population enforced a very successful commercial boycott of austrian goods and austrian ships, austrian merchants and public opinion made it quickly plain to the austrian government that pressure of this nature could not be disregarded. i anticipate the plea that while the elaborate interconnection of economic relations renders the employment of force as between nations unnecessary in so far as their material interests are concerned, those forces cannot cover a case of aggression upon what may be termed the moral property of nations. a critic of the first edition of this book[ ] writes: the state is the only complete form in which human society exists, and there are a multitude of phenomena which will be found only as manifestations of human life in the form of a society united by the political bond into a state. the products of such society are law, literature, art, and science, and it has yet to be shown that apart from that form of society known as the state, the family or education or development of character is possible. the state, in short, is an organism or living thing which can be wounded and can be killed, and like every other living thing requires protection against wounding and destruction.... conscience and morals are products of social and not of individual life, and to say that the sole purpose of the state is to make possible a decent livelihood is as though a man should say that the sole object of human life is to satisfy the interests of existence. a man cannot live any kind of life without food, clothing, and shelter, but that condition does not abolish or diminish the value of the life industrial, the life intellectual, or the life artistic. the state is the condition of all these lives, and its purpose is to sustain them. that is why the state must defend itself. in the ideal, the state represents and embodies the whole people's conception of what is true, of what is beautiful, and of what is right, and it is the sublime quality of human nature that every great nation has produced citizens ready to sacrifice themselves rather than submit to an external force attempting to dictate to them a conception other than their own of what is right. one is, of course, surprised to see the foregoing in the london _morning post_; the concluding phrase would justify the present agitation in india or in egypt or ireland against british rule. what is that agitation but an attempt on the part of the peoples of those provinces to resist "an external force attempting to dictate to them a conception other than their own of what is right"? fortunately, however, for british imperialism, a people's conception of "what is true, of what is beautiful, and of what is right," and their maintenance of that conception, need not necessarily have anything whatever to do with the particular administrative conditions under which they may live--the only thing that a conception of a "state" predicates. the fallacy which runs through the whole passage just quoted, and which makes it, in fact, nonsense, is the same fallacy which dominates the quotation that i have made from professor spenser wilkinson's book, "britain at bay"--namely, the approximation of a state to a person, the assumption that the political delimitation coincides with the economic and moral delimitation, that in short a state is the embodiment of "the whole people's conception of what is true, etc." a state is nothing of the sort. take the british empire. this state embodies not a homogeneous conception, but a series of often absolutely contradictory conceptions of "what is true, etc."; it embodies the mohammedan, the buddhist, the copt, the catholic, the protestant, the pagan conceptions of right and truth. the fact which vitiates the whole of this conception of a state is that the frontiers which define the state do not coincide with the conception of any of those things which the london _morning post_ critic has enumerated; there is no such thing as british morality as opposed to french or german morality, or art or industry. one may, indeed, talk of an english conception of life, because that is a conception of life peculiar to england, but it would be opposed to the conception of life in other parts of the same state, in ireland, in scotland, in india, in egypt, in jamaica. and what is true of england is true of all the great modern states. every one of them includes conceptions absolutely opposed to other conceptions in the same state, but many of them absolutely agree with conceptions in foreign states. the british state includes, in ireland, a catholic conception in cordial agreement with the catholic conception in italy, but in cordial disagreement with the protestant conception in scotland, or the mohammedan conception in bengal. the real divisions of all those ideals, which the critic enumerates, cut right across state divisions, disregarding them entirely. yet, again, it is only the state divisions which military conflict has in view. what was one of the reasons leading to the cessation of religious wars between states? it was that religious conceptions cut across the state frontiers, so that the state ceased to coincide with the religious divisions of europe, and a condition of things was brought about in which a protestant sweden was allied with a catholic france. this rendered the conflict absurd, and religious wars became an anachronism. is not precisely the same thing taking place with reference to the conflicting conceptions of life which now separate men in christendom? have not we in america the same doctrinal struggle which is going on in france and germany and great britain? to take one instance--social conflict. on the one side in each case are all the interests bound up with order, authority, individual freedom, without reference to the comfort of the weak, and on the other the reconstruction of human society along hitherto untried lines. these problems are for most men probably--are certainly coming to be, if they are not now--much more profound and fundamental than any conception which coincides with or can be identified with state divisions. indeed, what are the conceptions of which the divisions coincide with the political frontiers of the british empire, in view of the fact that that empire includes nearly every race and nearly every religion under the sun? it may be said, of course, that in the case of germany and russia we have an autocratic conception of social organization as compared with a conception based on individual freedom in england and america. both mr. hyndman and mr. blatchford seem to take this view. "to me," says the former, "it is quite evident that if we socialists were to achieve success we should at once be liable to attack from without by the military powers," an opinion which calmly overlooks the fact that socialism and anti-militarism have gone much farther and are far better organized in the "military" states than they are in england, and that the military governments have all their work cut out as it is to keep those tendencies in check within their own borders, without quixotically undertaking to perform the same service in other states. this conception of the state as the political embodiment of homogeneous doctrine is due in large part not only to the distortion produced by false analogy, but to the survival of a terminology which has become obsolete, and, indeed, the whole of this subject is vitiated by those two things. the state in ancient times was much more a personality than it is to-day, and it is mainly quite modern tendencies which have broken up its doctrinal homogeneity, and that break-up has results which are of the very first importance in their bearing upon international pugnacity. the matter deserves careful examination. professor william mcdougal, in his fascinating work, "an introduction to social psychology," says in the chapter on the instinct of pugnacity: the replacement of individual by collective pugnacity is most clearly illustrated by barbarous peoples living in small, strongly organized communities. within such communities individual combat and even expressions of personal anger may be almost completely suppressed, while the pugnacious instinct finds itself in perpetual warfare between communities whose relations remain subject to no law. as a rule no material benefit is gained, and often none is sought, in these tribal wars.... all are kept in constant fear of attack, whole villages are often exterminated, and the population is in this way kept down very far below the limit at which any pressure on the means of subsistence could arise. this perpetual warfare, like the squabbles of a roomful of quarrelsome children, seems to be almost wholly and directly due to the uncomplicated operation of the instinct of pugnacity. no material benefits are sought; a few heads and sometimes a slave or two are the only trophies gained, and if one asks an intelligent chief why he keeps up this senseless practice, the best reason he can give is that unless he does so his neighbors will not respect him and his people, and will fall upon them and exterminate them. now, how does such hostility as that indicated in this passage differ from the hostility which marks international differences in our day? in certain very evident respects. it does not suffice that the foreigner should be merely a foreigner for us to want to kill him: there must be some conflict of interest. the english are completely indifferent to the scandinavian, the belgian, the dutchman, the spaniard, the austrian, and the italian, and are supposed for the moment to be greatly in love with the french. the german is the enemy. but ten years ago it was the frenchman who was the enemy, and mr. chamberlain was talking of an alliance with the germans--england's natural allies, he called them--while it was for france that he reserved his attacks.[ ] it cannot be, therefore, that there is any inherent racial hostility in english national character, because the germans have not changed their nature in ten years, nor the french theirs. if to-day the french are england's quasi-allies and the germans her enemies, it is simply because their respective interests or apparent interests have modified in the last ten years, and their political preferences have modified with them. in other words, national hostilities follow the exigencies of real or imagined political interests. surely the point need not be labored, seeing that england has boxed the compass of the whole of europe in her likes and dislikes, and poured her hatred upon the spaniards, the dutch, the americans, the danes, the russians, the germans, the french, and again the germans, all in turn. the phenomenon is a commonplace of individual relationship: "i never noticed his collars were dirty till he got in my way," said someone of a rival. the second point of difference with professor mcdougal's savage is that when we get to grips our conflict does not include the whole tribe; we do not, in the biblical fashion, exterminate men, women, children, and cattle. enough of the old adam remains for us to detest the women and children, so that an english poet could write of the "whelps and dams of murderous foes"; but we no longer slaughter them.[ ] but there is a third fact which we must note--that professor mcdougal's nation was made up of a single tribe entirely homogeneous. even the fact of living across a river was sufficient to turn another tribe into foreigners and to involve a desire to kill them. the development from that stage to the present has involved, in addition to the two factors just enumerated, this: we now include as fellow-countrymen many who would under the old conception necessarily be foreigners, and the process of our development, economic and otherwise, has made of foreigners, between whom, in homer lea's philosophy, there should exist this "primordial hostility leading inevitably to war," one state from which all conflict of interest has disappeared entirely. the modern state of france includes what were, even in historical times, eighty separate and warring states, since each of the old gallic cities represented a different state. in england people have come to regard as fellow-citizens between whom there can be no sort of conflict of interest scores of tribes that spent their time mutually throat-cutting at no very distant period, as history goes. anyone, particularly americans, can recognize, indeed, that profound national differences like those which exist between the welshman and the englishman, or the scotsman and the irishman, need involve not only no conflict of interest, but even no separate political existence. one has heard in recent times of the gradual revival of nationalism, and it is commonly argued that the principle of nationality must stand in the way of co-operation between states. but the facts do not justify that conclusion for a moment. the formation of states has disregarded national divisions altogether. if conflicts are to coincide with national divisions, wales should co-operate with brittany and ireland against normandy and england; provence and savoy with sardinia against--i do not know what french province, because in the final rearrangement of european frontiers races and provinces have become so inextricably mixed, and have paid so little regard to "natural" and "inherent" divisions, that it is no longer possible to disentangle them. in the beginning the state is a homogeneous tribe or family, and in the process of economic and social development these divisions so far break down that a state may include, as the british state does, not only half a dozen different races in the mother country, but a thousand different races scattered over various parts of the earth--white, black, yellow, brown, copper-colored. this, surely, is one of the great sweeping tendencies of history--a tendency which operates immediately any complicated economic life is set up. what justification have we, therefore, for saying dogmatically that a tendency to co-operation, which has swept before it profound ethnic differences, social and political divisions, which has been constant from the dawn of men's attempts to live and labor together, is to stop at the wall of modern state divisions, which represent none of the profound divisions of the human race, but mainly mere administrative convenience, and embody a conception which is being every day profoundly modified? some indication of the processes involved in this development has already been given in the outline sketch in chapter ii. of this section, to which the reader may be referred. i have there attempted to make plain that _pari passu_ with the drift from physical force towards economic inducement goes a corresponding diminution of pugnacity, until the psychological factor which is the exact reverse of pugnacity comes to have more force even than the economic one. quite apart from any economic question, it is no longer possible for any government to order the extermination of a whole population, of the women and children, in the old biblical style. in the same way, the greater economic interdependence which improved means of communication have provoked must carry with it a greater moral interdependence, and a tendency which has broken down profound national divisions, like those which separated the celt and the saxon, will certainly break down on the psychological side divisions which are obviously more artificial. among the multiple factors which have entered into the great sweeping tendency just mentioned are one or two which stand out as most likely to have immediate effect on the breakdown of a purely psychological hostility embodied by merely state divisions. one is that lessening of the reciprocal sentiment of collective responsibility which the complex heterogeneity of the modern state involves. what do i mean by this sense of collective responsibility? to the chinese boxer all europeans are "foreign devils"; between germans, english, russians, there is little distinction, just as to the black in africa there is little differentiation between the various white races. even the yokel in england talks of "them foreigners." if a chinese boxer is injured by a frenchman, he kills a german, and feels himself avenged--they are all "foreign devils." when an african tribe suffers from the depredations of a belgian trader, the next white man who comes into its territory, whether he happens to be an englishman or a frenchman, loses his life; the tribesmen also feel themselves avenged. but if the chinese boxer had our clear conception of the different european nations, he would feel no psychological satisfaction in killing a german because a frenchman had injured him. there must be in the boxer's mind some collective responsibility as between the two europeans, or in the negro's mind between the two white men, in order to obtain this psychological satisfaction. if that collective responsibility does not exist, the hostility to the second white man, in each case, is not even raised. now, our international hostilities are largely based on the notion of a collective responsibility in each of the various states against which our hostility is directed, which does not, in fact, exist. there is at the present moment great ill-feeling in england against "the german." now, "the german" is a non-existent abstraction. englishmen are angry with the german because he is building warships, conceivably directed against them; but a great many germans are as much opposed to that increase of armament as are the english, and the desire of the yokel to "have a go at them germans" depends absolutely upon a confusion just as great as--indeed, greater than--that which exists in the mind of the boxer, who cannot differentiate between the various european peoples. mr. blatchford commenced that series of articles which has done so much to accentuate this ill-feeling with this phrase: germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the british empire; and later in the articles he added: britain is disunited; germany is homogeneous. we are quarrelling about the lords' veto, home rule, and a dozen other questions of domestic politics. we have a little navy party, an anti-militarist party; germany is unanimous upon the question of naval expansion. it would be difficult to pack a more dangerous untruth into so few lines. what are the facts? if "germany" means the bulk of the german people, mr. blatchford is perfectly aware that he is not telling the truth. it is not true to say of the bulk of the german people that they are deliberately preparing to destroy the british empire. the bulk of the german people, if they are represented by any one party at all, are represented by the social democrats, who have stood from the first resolutely against any such intention. now the facts have to be misstated in this way in order to produce that temper which makes for war. if the facts are correctly stated, no such temper arises. what has a particularly competent german to say to mr. blatchford's generalization? mr. fried, the editor of _die friedenswarte_, writes: there is no one german people, no single germany.... there are more abrupt contrasts between germans and germans than between germans and indians. nay, the contradistinctions within germany are greater than those between germans and the units of any other foreign nation whatever. it might be possible to make efforts to promote good understanding between germans and englishmen, between germans and frenchmen, to organize visits between nation and nation; but it will be forever impossible to set on foot any such efforts at an understanding between german social democrats and prussian junkers, between german anti-semites and german jews.[ ] the disappearance of most international hostility depends upon nothing more intricate than the realization of facts which are little more complex than the geographical knowledge which enables us to see that the anger of the yokel is absurd when he pummels a frenchman because an italian has swindled him. it may be argued that there never has existed in the past this identification between a people and the acts of its government which rendered the hatred of one country for another logical, yet that hatred has arisen. that is true; but certain new factors have entered recently to modify this problem. one is that never in the history of the world have nations been so complex as they are to-day; and the second is that never before have the dominating interests of mankind so completely cut across state divisions as they do to-day. the third factor is that never before has it been possible, as it is possible by our means of communication to-day, to offset a solidarity of classes and ideas against a presumed state solidarity. never at any stage of the world's development has there existed, as exists to-day, the machinery for embodying these interests and class ideas and ideals which cut across frontiers. it is not generally understood how many of our activities have become international. two great forces have become internationalized: capital on the one hand, labor and socialism on the other. the labor and socialist movements have always been international, and become more so every year. few considerable strikes take place in any one country without the labor organizations of other countries furnishing help, and very large sums have been contributed by the labor organizations of various countries in this way. with reference to capital, it may almost be said that it is organized so naturally internationally that formal organization is not necessary. when the bank of england is in danger, it is the bank of france which comes automatically to its aid, even in a time of acute political hostility. it has been my good fortune in the last ten years to discuss these matters with financiers on one side and labor leaders on the other, and i have always been particularly struck by the fact that i have found in these two classes precisely the same attitude of internationalization. in no department of human activity is internationalization so complete as in finance. the capitalist has no country, and he knows, if he be of the modern type, that arms and conquests and jugglery with frontiers serve no ends of his, and may very well defeat them. but employers, as apart from capitalists, are also developing a strong international cohesive organization. among the berlin despatches in the london _times_ of april , , i find the following concerning a big strike in the building trade, in which nearly a quarter of a million men went out. quoting a writer in the _north german gazette_, the correspondent says: the writer lays stress upon the efficiency of the employers' arrangements. he says, in particular, that it will probably be possible to extend the lock-out to industries associated with the building industry, especially the cement industry, and that the employers are completing a ring of cartel treaties, which will prevent german workmen from finding employment in neighboring countries, and will insure for german employers all possible support from abroad. it is said that switzerland and austria were to conclude treaties yesterday on the same conditions as sweden, norway, denmark, holland, and france, and that belgium and italy would come in, so that there will be complete co-operation on the part of all germany's neighbors except russia. in the circumstances the men's organs rather overlabor the point when they produce elaborate evidence of premeditation. the _vorwärts_ proves that the employers have long been preparing for "a trial of strength," but that is admitted. the official organ of the employers says, in so many words, that any intervention is useless until "the forces have been measured in open battle." have not these forces begun already to affect the psychological domain with which we are now especially dealing? do we place national vanity, for instance, on the same plane as individual vanity? have we not already realized the absurdity involved? i have quoted admiral mahan as follows: that extension of national authority over alien communities, which is the dominant note in the world politics of to-day, dignifies and enlarges each state and each citizen that enters its fold.... sentiment, imagination, aspiration, the satisfaction of the rational and moral faculties in some object better than bread alone, all must find a part in a worthy motive. like individuals, nations and empires have souls as well as bodies. great and beneficent achievement ministers to worthier contentment than the filling of the pocket. whatever we may think of the individuals who work disinterestedly for the benefit of backward and alien peoples, and however their lives may be "dignified and enlarged" by their activities, it is surely absurd to suppose that other individuals, who take no part in their work and who remain thousands of miles from the scene of action, can possibly be credited with "great and beneficent achievement." a man who boasts of his possessions is not a very pleasant or admirable type, but at least his possessions are for his own use and do bring a tangible satisfaction, materially as well as sentimentally. his is the object of a certain social deference by reason of his wealth--a deference which has not a very high motive, if you will, but the outward and visible signs of which are pleasing to a vain man. but is the same in any sense true, despite admiral mahan, of the individual of a big state as compared to the individual of a small one? does anyone think of paying deference to the russian _mujik_ because he happens to belong to one of the biggest empires territorially? does anyone think of despising an ibsen or a björnsen, or any educated scandinavian or belgian or hollander, because they happen to belong to the smallest nations in europe? the thing is absurd, and the notion is simply due to inattention. just as we commonly overlook the fact that the individual citizen is quite unaffected materially by the extent of his nation's territory, that the material position of the individual dutchman as a citizen of a small state will not be improved by the mere fact of the absorption of his state by the german empire, in which case he will become the citizen of a great nation, so in the same way his moral position remains unchanged; and the notion that an individual russian is "dignified and enlarged" each time that russia conquers some new asiatic outpost, or russifies a state like finland, or that the norwegian would be "dignified" were his state conquered by russia and he became a russian, is, of course, sheer sentimental fustian of a very mischievous order. this is the more emphasized when we remember that the best men of russia are looking forward wistfully, not to the enlargement, but to the dissolution, of the unwieldy giant--"stupid with the stupidity of giants, ferocious with their ferocity"--and the rise in its stead of a multiplicity of self-contained, self-knowing communities, "whose members will be united together by organic and vital sympathies, and not by their common submission to a common policeman." how small and thin a pretence is all the talk of national prestige when the matter is tested by its relation to the individual is shown by the commonplaces of our everyday social intercourse. in social consideration everything else takes precedence of nationality, even in those circles where chauvinism is a cult. british royalty is so impressed with the dignity which attaches to membership of the british empire that its princes will marry into the royal houses of the smallest and meanest states in europe, while they would regard marriage with a british commoner as an unheard-of _mésalliance_. this standard of social judgment so marks all the european royalties that at the present time not one ruler in europe belongs, properly speaking, to the race which he rules. in all social associations an analogous rule is followed. in our "selectest" circles an italian, rumanian, portuguese, or even turkish noble, is received where an american tradesman would be taboo. this tendency has struck almost all authorities who have investigated scientifically modern international relations. thus mr. t. baty, the well-known authority on international law, writes as follows: all over the world society is organizing itself by strata. the english merchant goes on business to warsaw, hamburg, or leghorn; he finds in the merchants of italy, germany, and russia the ideas, the standard of living, the sympathies, and the aversions which are familiar to him at home. printing and the locomotive have enormously reduced the importance of locality. it is the mental atmosphere of its fellows, and not of its neighborhood, which the child of the younger generation is beginning to breathe. whether he reads the _revue des deux mondes_ or _tit-bits_, the modern citizen is becoming at once cosmopolitan and class-centred. let the process work for a few more years; we shall see the common interests of cosmopolitan classes revealing themselves as far more potent factors than the shadowy common interests of the subjects of states. the argentine merchant and the british capitalist alike regard the trade union as a possible enemy--whether british or argentine matters to them less than nothing. the hamburg docker and his brother of london do not put national interests before the primary claims of caste. international class feeling is a reality, and not even a nebulous reality; the nebula has developed centres of condensation. only the other day sir w. runciman, who is certainly not a conservative, presided over a meeting at which there were laid the foundations of an international shipping union, which is intended to unite ship-owners of whatever country in a common organization. when it is once recognized that the real interests of modern people are not national, but social, the results may be surprising.[ ] as mr. baty points out, this tendency, which he calls "stratification," extends to all classes: it is impossible to ignore the significance of the international congresses, not only of socialism, but of pacificism, of esperantism, of feminism, of every kind of art and science, that so conspicuously set their seal upon the holiday season. nationality as a limiting force is breaking down before cosmopolitanism. in directing its forces into an international channel, socialism will have no difficulty whatever[ ].... we are, therefore, confronted with a coming condition of affairs in which the force of nationality will be distinctly inferior to the force of class-cohesion, and in which classes will be internationally organized so as to wield their force with effect. the prospect induces some curious reflections. we have here, at present in merely embryonic form, a group of motives otherwise opposed, but meeting and agreeing upon one point: the organization of society on other than territorial and national divisions. when motives of such breadth as these give force to a tendency, it may be said that the very stars in their courses are working to the same end. part iii the practical outcome chapter i the relation of defence to aggression necessity for defence arises from the existence of a motive for attack--platitudes that everyone overlooks--to attenuate the motive for aggression is to undertake a work of defence. the general proposition embodied in this book--that the world has passed out of that stage of development in which it is possible for one civilized group to advance its well-being by the military domination of another--is either broadly true or broadly false. if it is false, it can, of course, have no bearing upon the actual problems of our time, and can have no practical outcome; huge armaments tempered by warfare are the logical and natural condition. but the commonest criticism this book has had to meet is that, though its central proposition is in essence sound, it has, nevertheless, no practical value, because-- . armaments are for defence, not for aggression. . however true these principles may be, the world does not recognize them and never will, because men are not guided by reason. as to the first point. it is probable that, if we really understood truths which we are apt to dismiss as platitudes, many of our problems would disappear. to say, "we must take measures for defence" is equivalent to saying, "someone is likely to attack us," which is equivalent to saying, "someone has a motive for attacking us." in other words, the basic fact from which arises the necessity for armaments, the ultimate explanation of european militarism, is _the force of the motive making for aggression_. (and in the word "aggression," of course, i include the imposition of superior force by the _threat_, or implied threat, of its use, as well as by its actual use.) that motive may be material or moral; it may arise from real conflict of interest, or a purely imaginary one; but with the disappearance of prospective aggression disappears also the need for defence. the reader deems these platitudes beside the mark? i will take a few sample criticisms directed at this book. here is the london _daily mail_: the bigger nations are armed, not so much because they look for the spoils of war, as because they wish to prevent the horrors of it; arms are for defence.[ ] and here is the london _times_: no doubt the victor suffers, but who suffers most, he or the vanquished?"[ ] the criticism of the _daily mail_ was made within three months of a "raging and tearing" big navy campaign, all of it based on the assumption that germany _was_ "looking for the spoils of war," the english naval increase being thus a direct outcome of such motives. without it, the question of english increase would not have arisen.[ ] the only justification for the clamor for increase was that england was liable to _attack_; every nation in europe justifies its armaments in the same way; every nation consequently believes in the universal existence of this motive for attack. the _times_ has been hardly less insistent than the _mail_ as to the danger from german aggression; but its criticism would imply that the motive behind that prospective aggression is not a desire for any political advantage or gain of any sort. germany apparently recognizes aggression to be, not merely barren of any useful result whatsoever, but burdensome and costly into the bargain; she is, nevertheless, determined to enter upon it in order that though she suffer, someone else will suffer more![ ] in common with the london _daily mail_ and the london _times_, admiral mahan fails to understand this "platitude," which underlies the relation of defence to aggression. thus in his criticism of this book, he cites the position of great britain during the napoleonic era as proof that commercial advantage goes with the possession of preponderant military power in the following passage: great britain owed her commercial superiority then to the armed control of the sea, which had sheltered her commerce and industrial fabric from molestation by the enemy. _ergo_, military force has commercial value, a result which is arrived at by this method: in deciding a case made up of two parties you ignore one. england's superiority was not due to the employment of military force, but to the fact that she was able to prevent the employment of military force against her; and the necessity for so doing arose from napoleon's motive in threatening her. but for the existence of this motive to aggression--moral or material, just or mistaken--great britain, without any force whatsoever, would have been more secure and more prosperous than she was; she would not have been spending a third of her income in war, and her peasantry would not have been starving. of a like character to the remark of the _times_ is the criticism of the _spectator_, as follows: mr. angell's main point is that the advantages customarily associated with national independence and security have no existence outside the popular imagination.... he holds that englishmen would be equally happy if they were under german rule, and that germans would be equally happy if they were under english rule. it is irrational, therefore, to take any measures for perpetuating the existing european order, since only a sentimentalist can set any value on its maintenance.... probably in private life mr. angell is less consistent and less inclined to preach the burglar's gospel that to the wise man _meum_ and _tuum_ are but two names for the same thing. if he is anxious to make converts, he will do well to apply his reasoning to subjects that come nearer home, and convince the average man that marriage and private property are as much illusions as patriotism. if sentiment is to be banished from politics, it cannot reasonably be retained in morals. as the reply to this somewhat extraordinary criticism is directly germane to what it is important to make clear, i may, perhaps, be excused for reproducing my letter to the _spectator_, which was in part as follows: how far the foregoing is a correct description of the scope and character of the book under review may be gathered from the following statement of fact. my pamphlet does _not_ attack the sentiment of patriotism (unless a criticism of the duellist's conception of dignity be considered as such); it simply does not deal with it, as being outside the limits of the main thesis. i do _not_ hold, and there is not one line to which your reviewer can point as justifying such a conclusion, that englishmen would be equally happy if they were under german rule. i do not conclude that it is irrational to take measures for perpetuating the existing european order. i do _not_ "expose the folly of self-defence in nations." i do _not_ object to spending money on armaments at this juncture. on the contrary, i am particularly emphatic in declaring that while the present philosophy is what it is, we are bound to maintain our relative position with other powers. i admit that so long as there is danger, as i believe there is, from german aggression, we must arm. i do _not_ preach a burglar's gospel, that _meum_ and _tuum_ are the same thing, and the whole tendency of my book is the exact reverse: it is to show that the burglar's gospel--which is the gospel of statecraft as it now stands--is no longer possible among nations, and that the difference between _meum_ and _tuum_ must necessarily, as society gains in complication, be given a stricter observance than it has ever heretofore been given in history. i do _not_ urge that sentiment should be banished from politics, if by sentiment is meant the common morality that guides us in our treatment of marriage and of private property. the whole tone of my book is to urge with all possible emphasis the exact reverse of such a doctrine; to urge that the morality which has been by our necessities developed in the society of individuals must also be applied to the society of nations as that society becomes by virtue of our development more interdependent. i have only taken a small portion of your reviewer's article (which runs to a whole page), and i do not think i am exaggerating when i say that nearly all of it is as untrue and as much a distortion of what i really say as the passage from which i have quoted. what i do attempt to make plain is that the necessity for defence measures (which i completely recognize and emphatically counsel) implies on the part of someone a motive for aggression, and that the motive arises from the (at present) universal belief in the social and economic advantages accruing from successful conquest. i challenged this universal axiom of statecraft and attempted to show that the mechanical development of the last thirty or forty years, especially in the means of communication, had given rise to certain economic phenomena--of which re-acting bourses and the financial interdependence of the great economic centres of the world are perhaps the most characteristic--which render modern wealth and trade intangible in the sense that they cannot be seized or interfered with to the advantage of a military aggressor, the moral being, not that self-defence is out of date, but that aggression is, and that when aggression ceases, self-defence will be no longer necessary. i urged, therefore, that in these little-recognized truths might possibly be found a way out of the armament _impasse_; that if the accepted motive for aggression could be shown to have no solid basis, the tension in europe would be immensely relieved, and the risk of attack become immeasurably less by reason of the slackening of the motive for aggression. i asked whether this series of economic facts--so little realized by the average politician in europe, and yet so familiar to at least a few of the ablest financiers--did not go far to change the axioms of statecraft, and i urged re-consideration of such in the light of these facts. your reviewer, instead of dealing with the questions thus raised, accuses me of "attacking patriotism," of arguing that "englishmen would be equally happy under german rule," and much nonsense of the same sort, for which there is not a shadow of justification. is this serious criticism? is it worthy of the _spectator_? to the foregoing letter the _spectator_ critic rejoins as follows: if mr. angell's book had given me the same impression as that which i gain from his letter, i should have reviewed it in a different spirit. i can only plead that i wrote under the impression which the book actually made on me. in reply to his "statement of fact," i must ask your leave to make the following corrections: ( ) instead of saying that, on mr. angell's showing, englishmen would be "equally happy" under german rule, i ought to have said that they would be equally well off. but on his doctrine that material well-being is "the very highest" aim of a politician, the two terms seem to be interchangeable. ( ) the "existing european order" rests on the supposed economic value of political force. in opposition to this mr. angell maintains "the economic futility of political force." to take measures for perpetuating an order founded on a futility does seem to me "irrational." ( ) i never said that mr. angell objects to spending money on armaments "while the present philosophy is what it is." ( ) the stress laid in the book on the economic folly of patriotism, as commonly understood, does seem to me to suggest that "sentiment should be banished from politics." but i admit that this was only an inference, though, as i still think, a fair inference. ( ) i apologize for the words "the burglar's gospel." they have the fault, incident to rhetorical phrases, of being more telling than exact. this rejoinder, as a matter of fact, still reveals the confusion which prompted the first criticism. because i urged that germany could do england relatively little harm, since the harm which she inflicted would immediately react on german prosperity, my critic assumes that this is equivalent to saying that englishmen would be as happy or as prosperous under german rule. he quite overlooks the fact that if germans are convinced that they will obtain no benefit by the conquest of the english they will not attempt that conquest, and there will be no question of the english living under german rule either less or more happily or prosperously. it is not a question of englishmen saying, "let the german come," but of the german saying, "why should we go?" as to the critic's second point, i have expressly explained that not the rival's real interest but what he deems to be his real interest must be the guide to conduct. military force is certainly economically futile, but so long as german policy rests on the assumption of the supposed economic value of military force, england must meet that force by the only force that can reply to it. some years ago the bank in a western mining town was frequently subjected to "hold-ups," because it was known that the great mining company owning the town kept large quantities of gold there for the payment of its workmen. the company, therefore, took to paying its wages mainly by check on a san francisco bank, and by a simple system of clearances practically abolished the use of gold in considerable quantities in the mining town in question. the bank was never attacked again. now, the demonstration that gold had been replaced by books in that bank was as much a work of defence as though the bank had spent tens of thousands of dollars in constructing forts and earthworks, and mounting gatling guns around the town. of the two methods of defence, that of substituting checks for gold was infinitely cheaper, and more effective. even if the inferences which the _spectator_ reviewer draws were true ones, which for the most part they are not, he still overlooks one important element. if it were true that the book involves the "folly of patriotism," how is that in any way relevant to the discussion, since i also urge that nations are justified in protecting even their follies against the attack of other nations? i may regard the christian scientists, or the seventh day adventists, or the spiritualists, as very foolish people, and to some extent mischievous people; but were an act of parliament introduced for their suppression by physical force, i should resist such an act with all the energy of which i was capable. in what way are the two attitudes contradictory? they are the attitudes, i take it, of educated men the world over. the fact has no importance, and it hardly bears on this subject, but i regard certain english conceptions of life bearing on matters of law, and social habit, and political philosophy, as infinitely preferable to the german, and if i thought that such conceptions demanded defence indefinitely by great armaments this book would never have been written. but i take the view that the idea of such necessity is based on a complete illusion, not only because as a matter of present-day fact, and even in the present state of political philosophy, germany has not the least intention of going to war with us to change our notions in law or literature, art or social organization, but also because if she had any such notion it would be founded upon illusions which she would be bound sooner or later to shed, because german policy could not indefinitely resist the influence of a general european attitude on such matters any more than it has been possible for any great and active european state to stand outside the european movement which has condemned the policy of attempting to impose religious belief by the physical force of the state. and i should regard it as an essential part of the work of defence to aid in the firm establishment of such a european doctrine, as much a part of the work of defence as it would be to go on building battleships until germany had subscribed to it. a great part of the misconception just dealt with arises from a hazily conceived fear that ideas like those embodied in this book must attenuate our energy of defence, and that we shall be in a weaker position relatively to our rivals than we were before. but this overlooks the fact that if the progress of ideas weakens our energies of defence, it also weakens our rival's energy of attack, and the strength of our relative positions is just what it was originally, with this exception: that we have taken a step towards peace instead of a step towards war, to which the mere piling up of armaments, unchecked by any other factor, must in the end inevitably lead. but there is one aspect of this failure to realize the relation of defence to aggression, which brings us nearer to considering the bearing of these principles upon the question of practical policy. chapter ii armament, but not alone armament not the facts, but men's belief about facts, shapes their conduct--solving a problem of two factors by ignoring one--the fatal outcome of such a method--the german navy as a "luxury"--if both sides concentrate on armament alone. "not the facts, but men's opinions about the facts, are what matter," one thinker has remarked. and this is because men's conduct is determined, not necessarily by the right conclusion from facts, but the conclusion they believe to be right. when men burned witches, their conduct was exactly what it would have been if what they believed to be true _had_ been true. the truth made no difference to their behavior, so long as they could not see the truth. and so in politics. as long as europe is dominated by the old beliefs, those beliefs will have virtually the same effect in politics as though they were intrinsically sound. and just as in the matter of burning witches a change of behavior was the outcome of a change of opinion, in its turn the result of a more scientific investigation of the facts, so in the same way a change in the political conduct of europe can only come about as the result of a change of thought; and that change of thought will not come about so long as the energies of men in this matter are centred only upon perfecting instruments of warfare. it is not merely that better ideas can only result from more attention being given to the real meaning of facts, but that the direct tendency of war preparation--with the suspicion it necessarily engenders and the ill-temper to which it almost always gives rise--is to create both mechanical and psychological checks to improvement of opinion and understanding. here, for instance, is general von bernhardi, who has just published his book in favor of war as the regenerator of nations, urging that germany should attack certain of her enemies before they are ready to attack her. suppose the others reply by increasing their military force? it suits bernhardi entirely. for what is the effect of this increase on the minds of germans possibly disposed to disagree with bernhardi? it is to silence them and to strengthen bernhardi's hands. his policy, originally wrong, has become relatively right, because his arguments have been answered by force. for the silence of his might-be critics will still further encourage those of other nations who deem themselves threatened by this kind of opinion in germany to increase their armaments; and these increases will still further tend to strengthen bernhardi's school, and still further silence his critics. the process by which force tends to crush reason is, unhappily, cumulative and progressive. the vicious circle can only be broken by the introduction somewhere of the factor of reason. and this is precisely, my critics urge, why we need do nothing but concentrate on the instruments of force! the all but invariable attitude adopted by the man in the street in this whole discussion is about as follows: "what, as practical men, we have to do, is to be stronger than our enemy; the rest is theory, and does not matter." well, the inevitable outcome of such an attitude is catastrophe. it leads us not toward, but away from, solution. in the first edition of this book i wrote: are we immediately to cease preparation for war, since our defeat cannot advantage our enemy nor do us in the long run much harm? no such conclusion results from a study of the considerations elaborated here. it is evident that so long as the misconception we are dealing with is all but universal in europe, so long as the nations believe that in some way the military and political subjugation of others will bring with it a tangible material advantage to the conqueror, we all do, in fact, stand in danger from such aggression. not his interest, but what he deems to be his interest, will furnish the real motive of our prospective enemy's action. and as the illusion with which we are dealing does, indeed, dominate all those minds most active in european politics, we (in england) must, while this remains the case, regard an aggression, even such as that which mr. harrison foresees, as within the bounds of practical politics. (what is not within the bounds of possibility is the extent of devastation which he foresees as the result of such attack, which, i think, the foregoing pages sufficiently demonstrate.) on this ground alone i deem that england, or any other nation, is justified in taking means of self-defence to prevent such aggression. this is not, therefore, a plea for disarmament irrespective of the action of other nations. so long as current political philosophy in europe remains what it is, i would not urge the reduction of the british war budget by a single sovereign. i see no reason to alter a word of this. but if preparation of the machinery of war is to be the only form of energy in this matter--if national effort is to neglect all other factors whatsoever--more and more will sincere and patriotic men have doubts as to whether they are justified in co-operating in further piling up the armaments of any country. of the two risks involved--the risk of attack arising from a possible superiority of armament on the part of a rival, and the risk of drifting into conflict because, concentrating all our energies on the mere instrument of combat, we have taken no adequate trouble to understand the facts of this case--it is at least an arguable proposition that the second risk is the greater. and i am prompted to this expression of opinion without surrendering one iota of a lifelong and passionate belief that a nation attacked should defend itself to the last penny and to the last man. in this matter it seems fatally easy to secure either one of two kinds of action: that of the "practical man" who limits his energies to securing a policy which will perfect the machinery of war and disregard anything else; or that of the pacifist, who, persuaded of the brutality or immorality of war, is apt to deprecate effort directed at self-defence. what is needed is the type of activity which will include both halves of the problem: provision for education, for a political reformation in this matter, _as well as_ such means of defence as will meantime counterbalance the existing impulse to aggression. to concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the other half is to render the whole problem insoluble. what must inevitably happen if the nations take the line of the "practical man," and limit their energies simply and purely to piling up armaments? a british critic once put to me what he evidently deemed a poser: "do you urge that we shall be stronger than our enemy, or weaker?" to which i replied: "the last time that question was asked me was in berlin, by germans. what would you have had me reply to those germans?"--a reply which, of course, meant this: in attempting to find the solution of this question in terms of one party, you are attempting the impossible. the outcome will be war, and war would not settle it. it would all have to be begun over again. the british navy league catechism says: "defence consists in being so strong that it will be dangerous for your enemy to attack you."[ ] mr. churchill, even, goes farther than the navy league, and says: "the way to make war impossible is to make victory certain." the navy league definition is at least possible of application to practical politics, because rough equality of the two parties would make attack by either dangerous. mr. churchill's principle is impossible of application to practical politics, because it could only be applied by one party, and would, in the terms of the navy league principle, deprive the other party of the right of defence. as a matter of simple fact, both the british navy league, by its demand for two ships to one, and mr. churchill, by his demand for certain victory, deny in this matter germany's right to defend herself; and such denial is bound, on the part of a people animated by like motives to themselves, to provoke a challenge. when the british navy league says, as it does, that a self-respecting nation should not depend upon the goodwill of foreigners for its safety, but upon its own strength, it recommends germany to maintain her efforts to arrive at some sort of equality with england. when mr. churchill goes farther, and says that a nation is entitled to be so strong as to make victory over its rivals certain, he knows that if germany were to adopt his own doctrine, its certain outcome would be war. in anticipation of such an objection, mr. churchill says that preponderant power at sea is a luxury to germany, a necessity to britain; that these efforts of germany are, as it were, a mere whim in no way dictated by the real necessities of her people, and having behind them no impulse wrapped up with national needs.[ ] if that be the truth, then it is the strongest argument imaginable for the settlement of this anglo-german rivalry by agreement: by bringing about that political reformation of europe which it is the object of these pages to urge. here are those of the school of mr. churchill who say: the danger of aggression from germany is so great that england must have an enormous preponderance of force--two to one; so great are the risks germany is prepared to take, that unless victory on the english side is certain she will attack. and yet, explain this same school, the impulse which creates these immense burdens and involves these immense risks is a mere whim, a luxury; the whole thing is dissociated from any real national need. if that really be the case, then, indeed, is it time for a campaign of education in europe; time that the sixty-five millions, more or less, of hard-working and not very rich people, whose money support alone makes this rivalry possible, learned what it is all about. this "whim" has cost the two nations, in the last ten years, a sum larger than the indemnity france paid to germany. does mr. churchill suppose that these millions know, or think, this struggle one for a mere luxury, or whim? and if they did know, would it be quite a simple matter for the german government to keep up the game? but those who, during the last decade in england, have in and out of season carried on this active campaign for the increase of british armaments, do _not_ believe that germany's action is the result of a mere whim. they, being part of the public opinion of europe, subscribe to the general european doctrine that germany is pushed to do these things by real national necessities, by her need for expansion, for finding food and livelihood for all these increasing millions. and if this is so, the english are asking germany, in surrendering this contest, to betray future german generations--wilfully to withhold from them those fields which the strength and fortitude of this generation might win. if this common doctrine is true, the english are asking germany to commit national suicide.[ ] why should it be assumed that germany will do it? that she will be less persistent in protecting her national interest, her posterity, be less faithful than the british themselves to great national impulses? has not the day gone by when educated men can calmly assume that any englishman is worth three foreigners? and yet such an assumption, ignorant and provincial as we are bound to admit it to be, is the only one that can possibly justify this policy of concentrating upon armament alone. even admiral fisher can write: the supremacy of the british navy is the best security for the peace of the world.... if you rub it in, both at home and abroad, that you are ready for instant war, with every unit of your strength in the first line and waiting to be first in, and hit your enemy in the belly and kick him when he is down, and boil your prisoners in oil (if you take any), and torture his women and children, then people will keep clear of you. would admiral fisher refrain from taking a given line merely because, if he took it, someone would "hit him in the belly," etc.? he would repudiate the idea with the utmost scorn, and probably reply that the threat would give him an added incentive to take the line in question. but why should admiral fisher suppose that he has a monopoly of courage, and that a german admiral would act otherwise than he? is it not about time that each nation abandoned the somewhat childish assumption that it has a monopoly of the courage and the persistence in the world, and that things which would never frighten or deter it will frighten and deter its rivals? yet in this matter the english assume either that the germans will be less persistent than they, or that in this contest their backs will break first. a coadjutor of lord roberts is calmly talking of a naval budget of or million dollars, and universal service as well, as a possibility of the all but immediate future.[ ] if england can stand that now, why should not germany, who is, we are told, growing industrially more rapidly than the english, be able to stand as much? but when she has arrived at that point, the english, at the same rate, must have a naval budget of anything from to million dollars, a total armament budget of something in the region of millions. the longer it goes on, the worse will be england's relative position, because she has imposed on herself a progressive handicap. the end can only be conflict, and already the policy of precipitating that conflict is raising its head. sir edmund c. cox writes in the premier english review, the _nineteenth century_, for april, : is there no alternative to this endless yet futile competition in shipbuilding? yes, there is. it is one which a cromwell, a william pitt, a palmerston, a disraeli, would have adopted long ago. this is that alternative--the only possible conclusion. it is to say to germany: "all that you have been doing constitutes a series of unfriendly acts. your fair words go for nothing. once for all, you must put an end to your warlike preparations. if we are not satisfied that you do so, we shall forthwith sink every battleship and cruiser which you possess. the situation which you have created is intolerable. if you determine to fight us, if you insist upon war, war you shall have; but the time shall be of our choosing and not of yours, and that time shall be now." and that is where the present policy, the sheer bulldog piling up of armaments without reference to or effort towards a better political doctrine in europe, inevitably leads. chapter iii is the political reformation possible? men are little disposed to listen to reason, "therefore we should not talk reason"--are men's ideas immutable? we have seen, therefore-- . that the need for defence arises from the existence of a motive for attack. . that that motive is, consequently, part of the problem of defence. . that, since as between the advanced peoples we are dealing with in this matter, one party is as able in the long run to pile up armaments as the other, we cannot get nearer to solution by armaments alone; we must get at the original provoking cause--the motive making for aggression. . that if that motive results from a true judgment of the facts; if the determining factor in a nation's well-being and progress is really its power to obtain by force advantage over others, the present situation of armament rivalry tempered by war is a natural and inevitable one. . that if, however, the view is a false one, our progress towards solution will be marked by the extent to which the error becomes generally recognized in international public opinion. that brings me to the last entrenchment of those who actively or passively oppose propaganda looking towards reform in this matter. as already pointed out, the last year or two has revealed a suggestive shifting of position on the part of such opposition. the original position of the defenders of the old political creeds was that the economic thesis here outlined was just simply wrong; then, that the principles themselves were sound enough, but that they were irrelevant, because not interests, but ideals, constituted the cause of conflict between nations. in reply to which, of course, came the query, what ideals, apart from questions of interest, lie at the bottom of the conflict which is the most typical of our time--what ideal motive is germany, for instance, pursuing in its presumed aggression upon england? consequently that position has generally been abandoned. then we were told that men don't act by logic, but passion. then the critics were asked how they explained the general character of _la haute politique_, its cold intrigues and expediency, the extraordinary rapid changes in alliances and _ententes_, all following exactly a line of passionless interest reasoned, though from false premises, with very great logic indeed; and were asked whether all experience does not show that, while passion may determine the energy with which a given line of conduct is pursued, the direction of that line of conduct is determined by processes of another kind: john, seeing james, his life-long and long-sought enemy, in the distance, has his hatred passionately stirred, and harbors thoughts of murder. as he comes near he sees that it is not james at all, but a quiet and inoffensive neighbor, peter. john's thoughts of murder are appeased, not because he has changed his nature, but because the recognition of a simple fact has changed the direction of his passion. what we in this matter hope to do is to show that the nations are mistaking peter for james. well, the last entrenchment of those who oppose the work is the dogmatic assertion that though we are right as to the material fact, its demonstration can never be made; that this political reformation of europe the political rationalists talk about is a hopeless matter; it implies a change of opinion so vast that it can only be looked for as the result of whole generations of educative processes. suppose this were true. what then? will you leave everything severely alone, and leave wrong and dangerous ideas in undisturbed possession of the political field? this conclusion is not a policy; it is oriental fatalism--"kismet," "the will of allah." such an attitude is not possible among men dominated by the traditions and the impulses of the western world. we do not let things slide in this way; we do not assume that as men are not guided by reason in politics, therefore we shall not reason about politics. the time of statesmen is absorbed in the discussion of these things. our press and literature are deeply concerned in them. the talk and thought of men are about them. however little they may deem reason to affect the conduct of men, they go on reasoning. and progress in conduct is determined by the degree of understanding which results. it is true that physical conflict marks the point at which the reason has failed; men fight when they have not been able to "come to an understanding" in the common phrase, which is for once correct. but is this a cause for deprecating the importance of clear understanding? is it not, on the contrary, precisely why our energies should be devoted to improving our capacity for dealing with these things by reason, rather than by physical force? do we not inevitably arrive at the destination to which every road in this discussion leads? however we may start, with whatever plan, however elaborated or varied, the end is always the same--the progress of man in this matter depends upon the degree to which his ideas are just; man advances by the victories of his mind and character. again we have arrived at the region of platitude. but also again it is one of those platitudes which most people deny. thus the london _spectator_: for ourselves, as far as the main economic proposition goes, he preaches to the converted.... if nations were perfectly wise and held perfectly sound economic theories, they would recognize that exchange is the union of forces, and that it is very foolish to hate or be jealous of your co-operators.... men are savage, bloodthirsty creatures ... and when their blood is up will fight for a word or a sign, or, as mr. angell would put it, for an illusion. criticism at the other end of the journalistic scale--that, for instance, from mr. blatchford--is of an exactly similar character. mr. blatchford says: mr. angell may be right in his contention that modern war is unprofitable to both belligerents. i do not believe it, but he may be right. but he is wrong if he imagines that his theory will prevent european war. to prevent european wars it needs more than the truth of his theory: it needs that the war lords and diplomatists and financiers and workers of europe shall believe the theory.... so long as the rulers of nations believe that war may be expedient (see clausewitz), and so long as they believe they have the power, war will continue.... it will continue until these men are fully convinced that it will bring no advantage. therefore, argues mr. blatchford, the demonstration that war will not bring advantage is futile. i am not here, for the purpose of controversy, putting an imaginary conclusion into mr. blatchford's mouth. it is the conclusion that he actually does draw. the article from which i have quoted was intended to demonstrate the futility of books like this. it was by way of reply to an early edition of this one. in common with the other critics, he must have known that this is not a plea for the impossibility of war (i have always urged with emphasis that our ignorance on this matter makes war not only possible, but extremely likely), but for its futility. and the demonstration of its futility is, i am now told, in itself futile! i have expanded the arguments of this and others of my critics thus: the war lords and diplomats are still wedded to the old false theories; _therefore_ we shall leave those theories undisturbed, and generally deprecate discussion of them. nations do not realize the facts; _therefore_ we should attach no importance to the work of making them known. these facts profoundly affect the well-being of european peoples; _therefore_ we shall not systematically encourage the efficient study of them. if they were generally known, the practical outcome would be that most of our difficulties herein would disappear; _therefore_ anyone who attempts to make them known is an amiable sentimentalist, a theorist, and so on, and so on. "things do not matter so much as people's opinions about things"[ ]; _therefore_ no effort shall be directed to a modification of opinion. the only way for these truths to affect policy, to become operative in the conduct of nations, is to make them operative in the minds of men; _therefore_ discussion of them is futile. our troubles arise from the wrong ideas of nations; _therefore_ ideas do not count--they are "theories." general conception and insight in this matter is vague and ill-defined, so that action is always in danger of being decided by sheer passion and irrationalism; _therefore_ we shall do nothing to render insight clear and well-defined. the empire of sheer impulse, of the non-rational, is strongest when associated with ignorance (_e.g._, mohammedan fanaticism, chinese boxerism), and only yields to the general progress of ideas (_e.g._, sounder religious notions sweeping away the hate and horrors of religious persecution); _therefore_ the best way to maintain peace is to pay no attention to the progress of political ideas. the progress of ideas has completely transformed religious feeling in so far as it settles the policy of one religious group in relation to another; _therefore_ the progress of ideas will never transform patriotic feeling, which settles the policy of one political group in relation to another. what, in short, does the argument of my critics amount to? this: that so slow, so stupid is the world that, though the facts may be unassailable, they will never be learned within any period that need concern us. without in the least desiring to score off my critics, and still less to be discourteous, i sometimes wonder it has never struck them that in the eyes of the profane this attitude of theirs must appear really as a most colossal vanity. "we" who write in newspapers and reviews understand these things; "we" can be guided by reason and wisdom, but the common clay will not see these truths for "thousands of years." i talk to the converted (so i am told) when my book is read by the editors and reviewers. _they_, of course, can understand; but the notion that mere diplomats and statesmen, the men who make up governments and nations, should ever do so is, of course, quite too preposterous. personally, however flattering this notion might be, i have never been able to feel its soundness. i have always strongly felt the precise opposite--namely, that what is plain to me will very soon be equally plain to my neighbor. possessing, presumably, as much vanity as most, i am, nevertheless, absolutely convinced that simple facts which stare an ordinary busy man of affairs in the face are not going to be for ever hid from the multitude. depend upon it, if "we" can see these things, so can the mere statesmen and diplomats and those who do the work of the world. moreover, if what "we" write in reviews and books does not touch men's reasons, does not affect their conduct, why do we write at all? we do _not_ believe it impossible to change or form men's ideas; such a plea would doom us all to silence, and would kill religious and political literature. "public opinion" is not external to men; it is made by men; by what they hear and read and have suggested to them by their daily tasks, and talk and contact. if it _were_ true, therefore, that the difficulties in the way of modifying political opinion were as vast as my critics would have us believe, that would not affect our conduct; the more they emphasize those difficulties, the more they emphasize the need for effort on our part. but it is not true that a change such as that involved here necessarily "takes thousands of years." i have already dealt with the plea, but would recall only one incident that i have cited: a scene painted by a spanish artist of the court and nobles and populace in a great european city, gathered on a public holiday as for a festival to see a beautiful child burned to death for a faith that, as it plaintively said, it had sucked in with its mother's milk. how long separates us from that scene? why, not the lives of three ordinarily elderly people. and how long after that scene--which was not an isolated incident of uncommon kind, but a very everyday matter, typical of the ideas and feelings of the time at which it was enacted--was it before the renewal of such became a practical impossibility? it was not a hundred years. it was enacted in , and within the space of a short lifetime the world knew that never again would a child be burned alive as the result of a legal condemnation by a duly constituted court, and as a public festival, witnessed by the king and the nobles and the populace, in one of the great cities of europe. or, do those who talk of "unchanging human nature" and "thousands of years" really plead that we are in danger of a repetition of such a scene? in that case our religious toleration is a mistake. protestants stand in danger of such tortures, and should arm themselves with the old armory of religious combat--the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron maiden, and the rest--as a matter of sheer protection. "men are savage, bloodthirsty creatures, and will fight for a word or a sign," the _spectator_ tells us, when their patriotism is involved. well, until yesterday, it was as true to say that of them when their religion was involved. patriotism is the religion of politics. and as one of the greatest historians of religious ideas has pointed out, religion and patriotism are the chief moral influences moving great bodies of men, and "the separate modifications and mutual interaction of these two agents may almost be said to constitute the moral history of mankind."[ ] but is it likely that a general progress which has transformed religion is going to leave patriotism unaffected; that the rationalization and humanization which have taken place in the more complex domain of religious doctrine and belief will not also take place in the domain of politics? the problem of religious toleration was beset with difficulties incalculably greater than any which confront us in this problem. then, as now, the old order was defended with real disinterestedness; then it was called religious fervor; now it is called patriotism. the best of the old inquisitors were as disinterested, as sincere, as single-minded, as are doubtless the best of the prussian junkers, the french nationalists, the english militarists. then, as now, the progress towards peace and security seemed to them a dangerous degeneration, the break-up of faiths, the undermining of most that holds society together. then, as now, the old order pinned its faith to the tangible and visible instruments of protection--i mean the instruments of physical force. and the catholic, in protecting himself by the inquisition against what he regarded as the dangerous intrigues of the protestant, was protecting what he regarded not merely as his own social and political security, but the eternal salvation, he believed, of unborn millions of men. yet he surrendered such instruments of defence, and finally catholic and protestant alike came to see that the peace and security of both were far better assured by this intangible thing--the right thinking of men--than by all the mechanical ingenuity of prisons and tortures and burnings which it was possible to devise. in like manner will the patriot come finally to see that better than _dreadnoughts_ will be the recognition on his part and on the part of his prospective enemy, that there is no interest, material or moral, in conquest and military domination. and that hundred years which i have mentioned as representing an apparently impassable gulf in the progress of european ideas, a period which marked an evolution so great that the very mind and nature of men seemed to change, was a hundred years without newspapers--a time in which books were such a rarity that it took a generation for one to travel from madrid to london; in which the steam printing-press did not exist, nor the railroad, nor the telegraph, nor any of those thousand contrivances which now make it possible for the words of an american statesman spoken to-day to be read by the millions of europe to-morrow morning--to do, in short, more in the way of the dissemination of ideas in ten months than was possible then in a century. when things moved so slowly, a generation or two sufficed to transform the mind of europe on the religious side. why should it be impossible to change that mind on the political side in a generation, or half a generation, when things move so much more quickly? are men less disposed to change their political than their religious opinions? we all know that _not_ to be the case. in every country in europe we find political parties advocating, or at least acquiescing in, policies which they strenuously opposed ten years ago. does the evidence available go to show that the particular side of politics with which we are dealing is notably more impervious to change and development than the rest--less within the reach and influence of new ideas? i must risk here the reproach of egotism and bad taste to call attention to a fact which bears more directly on that point, perhaps, than any other that could be cited. it is some fifteen years since it first struck me that certain economic facts of our civilization--facts of such visible and mechanical nature as reacting bourses and bank rate-movements, in all the economic capitals of the world, and so on--would soon force upon the attention of men a principle which, though existing for long past in some degree in human affairs, had not become operative to any extent. was there any doubt as to the reality of the material facts involved? circumstances of my occupation happily furnished opportunities of discussing the matter thoroughly with bankers and statesmen of world-wide authority. there was no doubt on that score. had we yet arrived at the point at which it was possible to make the matter plain to general opinion? were politicians too ill-educated on the real facts of the world, too much absorbed in the rough-and-tumble of workaday politics to change old ideas? were they, and the rank and file, still too enslaved by the hypnotism of an obsolete terminology to accept a new view? one could only put it to a practical test. a brief exposition of the cardinal principles was embodied in a brief pamphlet and published obscurely without advertisement, and bearing, necessarily, an unknown name. the result was, under the circumstances, startling, and certainly did not justify in the least the plea that there exists universal hostility to the advance of political rationalism. encouragement came from most unlooked-for quarters: public men whose interests have been mainly military, alleged jingoes, and even from soldiers. the more considerable edition has appeared in english, german, french, dutch, danish, swedish, spanish, italian, russian, japanese, erdu, persian, and hindustani, and nowhere has the press completely ignored the book. papers of liberal tendencies have welcomed it everywhere. those of more reactionary tendencies have been much less hostile than one could have expected.[ ] does such an experience justify that universal rebelliousness to political rationalism on which my critics for the most part found their case? my object in calling attention to it is evident. if this is possible as the result of the effort of a single obscure person working without means and without leisure, what could not be accomplished by an organization adequately equipped and financed? mr. augustine birrell says somewhere: "some opinions, bold and erect as they may still stand, are in reality but empty shells. one shove would be fatal. why is it not given?" if little apparently has been done in the modification of ideas in this matter, it is because little relatively has been attempted. millions of us are prepared to throw ourselves with energy into that part of national defence which, after all, is a makeshift, into agitation for the building of _dreadnoughts_ and the raising of armies, the things in fact which can be seen, where barely dozens will throw themselves with equal ardor into that other department of national defence, the only department which will really guarantee security, but by means which are invisible--the rationalization of ideas. chapter iv methods relative failure of hague conferences and the cause--public opinion the necessary motive force of national action--that opinion only stable if informed--"friendship" between nations and its limitations--america's rôle in the coming "political reformation." much of the pessimism as to the possibility of any progress in this matter is based on the failure of such efforts as hague conferences. never has the contest of armament been so keen as when europe began to indulge in peace conferences. speaking roughly and generally, the era of great armament expansion dates from the first hague conference. well, the reader who has appreciated the emphasis laid in the preceding pages on working through the reform of ideas will not feel much astonishment at the failure of efforts such as these. the hague conferences represented an attempt not to work through the reform of ideas, but to modify by mechanical means the political machinery of europe, without reference to the ideas which had brought it into existence. arbitration treaties, hague conferences, international federation involve a new conception of relationship between nations. but the ideals--political, economical, and social--on which the old conceptions are based, our terminology, our political literature, our old habits of thought, diplomatic inertia, which all combine to perpetuate the old notions, have been left serenely undisturbed. and surprise is expressed that such schemes do not succeed. french politics have given us this proverb, "i am the leader, therefore i follow." this is not mere cynicism, but expresses in reality a profound truth. what is a leader or a ruler in a modern parliamentary sense? he is a man who holds office by virtue of the fact that he represents the mean of opinion in his party. initiative, therefore, cannot come from him until he can be sure of the support of his party--that is, until the initiative in question represents the common opinion of his party. the author happened to discuss the views embodied in this book with a french parliamentary chief, who said in effect: "of course you are talking to the converted, but i am helpless. suppose that i attempted to embody these views before they were ready for acceptance by my party. i should simply lose my leadership in favor of a man less open to new ideas, and the prospect of their acceptance would not be increased, but diminished. even if i were not already converted, it would be no good trying to convert me. convert the body of the party and its leaders will not need conversion." and this is the position of every civilized government, parliamentary or not. the struggle for religious freedom was not gained by agreements drawn up between catholic states and protestant states, or even between catholic bodies and protestant bodies. no such process was possible, for in the last resort there was no such thing as an absolutely catholic state or an absolutely protestant one. our security from persecution is due simply to the general recognition of the futility of the employment of physical force in a matter of religious belief. our progress towards political rationalism will take place in like manner. there is no royal road of this kind to a better state. it seems decreed that we shall not permanently achieve improvement which we as individuals have not paid for in the coin of hard thinking. nothing is easier to achieve in international politics than academic declarations in favor of peace. but governments being trustees have a first duty in the interests of their wards, or what they conceive to be such interests, and they disregard what is still looked upon as a conception having its origin in altruistic and self-sacrificing motives. "self-sacrifice" is the last motive governments can allow themselves to consider. they are created to protect, not to sacrifice, the interests of which they are placed in charge. it is impossible for governments to base their normal policies on conceptions which are in advance of the general standard of the political opinion of the people from whom they derive their power. the average man will, it is true, quite readily subscribe abstractly to a peace ideal, just as he will subscribe abstractly to certain religious ideals--to take no thought for the morrow, not to save up treasure upon earth--without the faintest notion of making them a guide of conduct, or, indeed, of seeing how they _can_ be a guide of conduct. at peace meetings he will cheer lustily and sign petitions, because he believes peace to be a great moral idea, and that armies, like the police, are destined to disappear one day--on about the same day in his belief--when the nature of man shall have been altered. one may be able fully to appreciate this attitude of the "average sensual man" without doubting the least in the world the sincerity, genuineness, wholeheartedness of these emotional movements in favor of peace, which from time to time sweep over a country (as on the occasion of the taft-grey exchange of views on arbitration). but what it is necessary to emphasize, what cannot be too often reiterated, is that these movements, however emotional and sincere, are not movements which can lead to breaking up the intellectual basis of the policy which produces armaments in the western world. these movements embrace only one section of the factors making for peace--the moral and the emotional. and while those factors have immense power, they are uncertain and erratic in their operation, and when the shouting dies and there is a natural reaction from emotion, and it is a question once more of doing the humdrum week-day work of the world, of pushing our interests, of finding markets, of achieving the best possible generally for our nation as against other nations, of preparing for the future, of organizing one's efforts, the old code of compromise between the ideal and the necessary will be as operative as ever. so long as his notions of what war can accomplish in an economic or commercial sense remain what they are, the average man will not deem that his prospective enemy is likely to make the peace ideal a guide of conduct. incidentally he would be right. at the bottom of his mind--and i say this not lightly and as a guess, but as an absolute conviction after very close observation--the ideal of peace is conceived as a demand that he weaken his own defences on no better assurance than that his prospective rival or enemy will be well-behaved and not wicked enough to attack him. it appeals to him as about equivalent to asking that he shall not lock his doors because to suppose people will rob him is to have a low view of human nature! though he believes his own position in the world (as a colonial power, etc.) to be the result of the use of force by himself, of his readiness to seize what could be seized, he is asked to believe that foreigners will not do in the future what he himself has done in the past. he finds this difficult to swallow. save in his sunday moods, the whole thing makes him angry. it appeals to him as "unfair," in that he is asked by his own countrymen to do something that they apparently do not ask of foreigners; it appears to him as unmanly, in that he is asked to surrender the advantage which his strength has secured him in favor of a somewhat emasculate ideal. the patriot feels that his moral intention is every bit as sincere as that of the pacifist--that, indeed, patriotism is a finer moral ideal than pacifism. the difference between the pacifist and the advocate of _real-politik_ is an intellectual and not a moral one at all, and the assumption of superior morality which the former sometimes makes does the cause which he has at heart infinite harm. until the pacifist can show that the employment of military force fails to secure material advantage, the common man will, in ordinary times, continue to believe that the militarist has a moral sanction as great as that underlying pacifism. it may seem gratuitously ungracious to suggest that the very elevation which has marked peace propaganda in the past should have been the very thing that has sometimes stood in the way of its success. but such a phenomenon is not new in human development. there was as much good intention in the world of religious warfare and oppression as there is in ours. indeed, the very earnestness of the men who burnt, tortured, and imprisoned and stamped out human thought with the very best motives, was precisely the factor which stood in the way of improvement. improvement came finally, not from better intention, but from an acuter use of the intelligence of men, from hard mental work. so long as we assume that high motive, a better moral tone is all that is needed in international relations, and that an understanding of these problems will in some wonderful way come of itself, without hard and systematic intellectual effort, we shall make little headway. good feeling and kindliness and a ready emotion are among the most precious things in life, but they are qualities possessed by some of the most retrograde nations in the world, because in them they are not coupled with the homely quality of hard work, in which one may include hard thinking. this last is the real price of progress, and we shall make none of worth unless we pay it. a word or two as to the rôle of "friendship" in international relations. courtesy and a certain measure of good faith are essential elements wherever civilized men come in direct contact; without them organized society would go to pieces. but these invaluable elements never yet of themselves settled real differences; they merely render the other factors of adjustment possible. why should one expect courtesy and good-fellowship to settle grave political differences between english and germans when they altogether fail to settle such differences between english and english? what should we say of a statesman professing to be serious who suggested that all would be well between president wilson and the lobbyists concerning the tariff, between the democrats and republicans on protection, between the millionaire and the day laborer on the question of the income tax, and a thousand and one other things--that all these knotty problems would disappear, if only the respective protagonists could be persuaded to take lunch together? is it not a little childish? yet i am bound to admit that a whole school of persons who deal with international problems would have us believe that all international differences would disappear if only we could have enough junketings, dinner-parties, exchange visits of clergymen, and what not. these things have immense use in so far as they facilitate discussion and the elucidation of the policy in which the rivalry has its birth, and to that extent only. but if they are not vehicles of intellectual comprehension, if the parties go away with as little understanding of the factors and nature of international relationship as they had before such meetings took place, they have served no purpose whatsoever. the work of the world does not get done merely by being good friends with everybody; the problems of international diplomacy are not to be solved merely by a sort of international picnic; that would make the world too easy a place to live in. however ungracious it may seem, it is nevertheless dangerous to allow to go unchallenged the notion that the cultivation of "friendship and affection" between nations, irrespective of the other factors affecting their relationship, can ever seriously modify international politics. the matter is of grave importance, because so much good effort is spent in putting the cart before the horse, and attempting to create an operative factor out of a sentiment that can never be constant and positive one way or the other, since it must in the nature of things be largely artificial. it is a psychological impossibility in any ordinary workaday circumstances to have any special feeling of affection for a hundred or sixty or forty millions of people, composed of infinitely diverse elements, good, bad, and indifferent, noble and mean, pleasing and unpleasing, whom, moreover, we have never seen and never shall see. it is too large an order. we might as well be asked to entertain feelings of affection for the tropic of capricorn. as i have already hinted, we have no particular affection for the great mass of our own countrymen--your lobbyist enthusiast for mr. wilson, your railroad striker for the employer of labor, your suffragette for your anti-suffragette, and so on _ad infinitum_. patriotism has nothing to do with it. the patriot is often the person who had the heartiest detestation for a large mass of his fellow-countrymen. consider any anti-administration literature. as an english instance a glance at mr. leo maxse's monthly masterpieces of epithet-making, or at what the pan-germans have to say of their own empire and government ("poltroons in the pay of the english" is a choice tit-bit i select from one german newspaper), will soon convince one. why, therefore, should we be asked to entertain for foreigners a sentiment we do not give to our own people? and not only to entertain that sentiment, but to make (always in the terms of the present political beliefs) great sacrifices on behalf of it! need it be said that i have not the least desire to deprecate sincere emotion as a factor in progress? emotion and enthusiasm form the divine stimulus without which no great things would be achieved; but emotion divorced from mental and moral discipline is not the kind on which wise men will place a very high value. some of the intensest emotion of the world has been given to some of the worst possible objects. just as in the physical world, the same forces--steam, gunpowder, what you will--which, controlled and directed may do an infinitely useful work--may, uncontrolled, cause accidents and catastrophes of the gravest kind. nor is it true that the better understanding of this matter is beyond the great mass of men, that sounder ideas depend upon the comprehension of complex and abstruse points, correct judgment in intricate matters of finance or economics. things which seem in one stage of thought obscure and difficult are cleared up merely by setting one or two crooked facts straight. the rationalists, who a generation or two ago struggled with such things as the prevalent belief in witchcraft, may have deemed that the abolition of superstitions of this kind would take "thousands of years." lecky has pointed out that during the eighteenth century many judges in europe--not ignorant men, but, on the contrary, exceedingly well-educated men, trained to sift evidence--were condemning people to death by hundreds for witchcraft. acute and educated men still believed in it; its disproof demanded a large acquaintance with the forces and processes of physical nature, and it was generally thought that, while a few exceptional intelligences here and there would shake off these beliefs, they would remain indefinitely the possessions of the great mass of mankind. what has happened? a schoolboy to-day would scout the evidence which, on the judgment of very learned men, sent thousands of poor wretches to their doom in the eighteenth century. would the schoolboy necessarily be more learned or more acute than those judges? they probably knew a great deal about the science of witchcraft, were more familiar with its literature, with the arguments which supported it, and they would have hopelessly worsted any nineteenth-century schoolboy in any argument on the subject. the point is, however, that the schoolboy would have two or three essential facts straight, instead of getting them crooked. all the fine theories about the advantages of conquest, of territorial aggrandizement, so learnedly advanced by the mahans and the von stengels; the immense value which the present-day politician attaches to foreign conquest, all these absurd rivalries aiming at "stealing" one another's territory, will be recognized as the preposterous illusions that they are by the younger mind, which really sees the quite plain fact that the citizen of a small state is just as well off as the citizen of a great. from that fact, which is not complex or difficult in the least, will emerge the truth that modern government is a matter of administration, and that it can no more profit a community to annex other communities, than it could profit london to annex manchester. these things will not need argument to be clear to the schoolboy of the future--they will be self-evident, like the improbability of an old woman causing a storm at sea. of course, it is true that many of the factors bearing on this improvement will be indirect. as our education becomes more rational in other fields, it will make for understanding in this; as the visible factors of our civilization make plain--as they are making plainer every day--the unity and interdependence of the modern world, the attempt to separate those interdependent activities by irrelevant divisions must more and more break down. all improvement in human co-operation--and human co-operation is a synonym for civilization--must help the work of those laboring in the field of international relationship. but again i would reiterate that the work of the world does not get itself done. it is done by men; ideas do not improve themselves, they are improved by the thought of men; and it is the efficiency of the conscious effort which will mainly determine progress. when all nations realize that if england can no longer exert force towards her colonies, others certainly could not; that if a great modern empire cannot usefully employ force as against communities that it "owns," still less can we employ it usefully against communities that we do not "own"; when the world as a whole has learned the real lesson of british imperial development, not only will that empire have achieved greater security than it can achieve by battleships, but it will have played a part in human affairs incomparably greater and more useful than could be played by any military "leadership of the human race," that futile duplication of the napoleonic rôle, which imperialists of a certain school seem to dream for us. it is to anglo-saxon practice, and to anglo-saxon experience, that the world will look as a guide in this matter. the extension of the dominating principle of the british empire to european society as a whole is the solution of the international problem which this book urges. that extension cannot be made by military means. the english conquest of great military nations is a physical impossibility, and it would involve the collapse of the principle upon which the empire is based if it were. the day for progress by force has passed; it will be progress by ideas or not at all. because these principles of free human co-operation between communities are, in a special sense, an anglo-saxon development, it is upon us that there falls the responsibility of giving a lead. if it does not come from us, who have developed these principles as between all the communities which have sprung from the anglo-saxon race, can we ask to have it given elsewhere? if we have not faith in our own principles, to whom shall we look? english thought gave us the science of political economy; anglo-saxon thought and practice must give us another science, that of international polity--the science of the political relationship of human groups. we have the beginnings of it, but it sadly needs systemization--recognition by those intellectually equipped to develop it and enlarge it. the developments of such a work would be in keeping with the contributions which the practical genius and the positive spirit of the anglo-saxon race have already made to human progress. i believe that, if the matter were put efficiently before them with the force of that sane, practical, disinterested labor and organization which have been so serviceable in the past in other forms of propaganda--not only would they prove particularly responsive to the labor, but anglo-saxon tradition would once more be associated with the leadership in one of those great moral and intellectual movements which would be so fitting a sequel to our leadership in such things as human freedom and parliamentary government. failing such effort and such response, what are we to look for? are we, in blind obedience to primitive instinct and old prejudices, enslaved by the old catchwords and that curious indolence which makes the revision of old ideas unpleasant, to duplicate indefinitely on the political and economic side a condition from which we have liberated ourselves on the religious side? are we to continue to struggle, as so many good men struggled in the first dozen centuries of christendom--spilling oceans of blood, wasting mountains of treasure--to achieve what is at bottom a logical absurdity; to accomplish something which, when accomplished, can avail us nothing, and which, if it could avail us anything, would condemn the nations of the world to never-ending bloodshed and the constant defeat of all those aims which men, in their sober hours, know to be alone worthy of sustained endeavor? appendix on recent events in europe appendix on recent events in europe at the outbreak of the balkan war "the great illusion" was subjected to much criticism, on the ground that the war tended to disprove its theses. the following quotations, one from mr. churchill, the first lord of the admiralty, and the other from the english _review of reviews_, are typical of many others. mr. churchill said, in a speech at sheffield: whether we blame the belligerents or criticise the powers, or sit in sackcloth and ashes ourselves is absolutely of no consequence at the present moment.... we have sometimes been assured by persons who profess to know that the danger of war has become an illusion.... well, here is a war which has broken out in spite of all that rulers and diplomatists could do to prevent it, a war in which the press has had no part, a war which the whole force of the money power has been subtly and steadfastly directed to prevent, which has come upon us, not through the ignorance or credulity of the people, but, on the contrary, through their knowledge of their history and their destiny, and through their intense realization of their wrongs and of their duties, as they conceived them, a war which from all these causes has burst upon us with all the force of a spontaneous explosion, and which in strife and destruction has carried all before it. face to face with this manifestation, who is the man bold enough to say that force is never a remedy? who is the man who is foolish enough to say that martial virtues do not play a vital part in the health and honor of every people? (cheers.) who is the man who is vain enough to suppose that the long antagonisms of history and of time can in all circumstances be adjusted by the smooth and superficial conventions of politicians and ambassadors? the london _review of reviews_ said in an article on "the débâcle of norman angell": mr. norman angell's theory was one to enable the citizens of this country to sleep quietly, and to lull into false security the citizens of all great countries. that is undoubtedly the reason why he met with so much success.... it was a very comfortable theory for those nations which have grown rich and whose ideals and initiative have been sapped by overmuch prosperity. but the great delusion of norman angell, which led to the writing of "the great illusion," has been dispelled for ever by the balkan league. in this connection it is of value to quote the words of mr. winston churchill, which give very adequately the reality as opposed to theory. in reply to these and similar criticisms i wrote several articles in the london press, from which the following few pages are selected. what has pacifism, old or new, to say now? is war impossible? is it unlikely? is it futile? is not force a remedy, and at times the only remedy? could any remedy have been devised on the whole as conclusive and complete as that used by the balkan peoples? have not the balkan peoples redeemed war from the charges too readily brought against it as simply an instrument of barbarism? have questions of profit and loss, economic considerations, anything whatever to do with this war? would the demonstration of its economic futility have kept the peace? are theories and logic of the slightest use, since force alone can determine the issue? is not war therefore inevitable and must we not prepare diligently for it? i will answer all these quite simply and directly without casuistry or logic-chopping and honestly desiring to avoid paradox and "cleverness." nor will these quite simple answers be in contradiction to anything that i have written, nor will they invalidate any of the principles i have attempted to explain. my answers may be summarized thus: ( ) this war has justified both the old pacifism and the new. by universal admission events have proved that the pacifists who opposed the crimean war were right and their opponents wrong. had public opinion given more consideration to those pacifist principles, this country would not have "backed the wrong horse" and this war, two wars which have preceded it and many of the abominations of which the balkan peninsula has been the scene during the last years might have been avoided. in any case great britain would not now carry upon her shoulders the responsibility of having during half a century supported the turk against the christian and of having tried uselessly to prevent what has now taken place--the break-up of the turk's rule in europe. ( ) war is not impossible, and no responsible pacifist ever said it was; it is not the likelihood of war which is the illusion, but its benefits. ( ) it is likely or unlikely according as the parties to a dispute are guided by wisdom or folly. ( ) it _is_ futile and force is no remedy. ( ) its futility is proven by the war waged daily by the turks as conquerors, during the last years. and if the balkan peoples choose the less evil of two kinds of war and will use their victory to bring a system based on force and conquest to an end, we who do not believe in force and conquest will rejoice in their action and believe it will achieve immense benefits. but if instead of using their victory to eliminate force, they in their turn pin their faith to it, continue to use it the one against the other and to exploit by its means the populations they rule; if they become not the organizers of social co-operation among the balkan populations, but merely, like the turks, their conquerors and "owners," then they in their turn will share the fate of the turks. ( ) the fundamental causes of this war are economic in the narrower, as well as in the larger sense of the term; in the first because conquest was the turk's only trade--he desired to live out of taxes wrung from a conquered people, to exploit them as a means of livelihood, and this conception was at the root of most of turkish misgovernment. and in the larger sense its cause is economic because in the balkans, remote geographically from the main drift of european economic development, there has not grown up that interdependent social life, the innumerable contacts which in the rest of europe have done so much to attenuate primitive religious and racial hatreds. ( ) a better understanding by the turk of the real nature of civilized government, of the economic futility of conquest, of the fact that a means of livelihood (an economic system) based upon having more force than someone else and using it ruthlessly against him is an impossible form of human relationship bound to break down, _would_ have kept the peace. ( ) if european statecraft had not been animated by false conceptions, largely economic in origin, based upon a belief in the necessary rivalry of states, the advantages of preponderant force and conquest, the western nations could have composed their quarrels and ended the abominations of the balkan peninsula long ago--even in the opinion of the _times_. and it is our own false statecraft--that of great britain--which has a large part of the responsibility for this failure of european civilization. it has caused us to sustain the turk in europe, to fight a great and popular war with that aim, and led us into treaties which, had they been kept, would have obliged us to fight to-day on the side of the turk against the balkan states. ( ) if by "theories" and "logic" is meant the discussion of and interest in principles, the ideas that govern human relationship, they are the only things that can prevent future wars, just as they were the only things that brought religious wars to an end--a preponderant power "imposing" peace playing no rôle therein. just as it was false religious theories which made the religious wars, so it is false political theories which make the political wars. ( ) war is only inevitable in the sense that other forms of error and passion--religious persecution for instance--are inevitable; they cease with better understanding, as the attempt to impose religious belief by force has ceased in europe. ( ) we should not prepare for war; we should prepare to prevent war; and though that preparation may include battleships and conscription, those elements will quite obviously make the tension and danger greater unless there is also a better european opinion. these summarized replies need a little expansion. had we thrashed out the question of war and peace as we must finally, it would hardly be necessary to explain that the apparent paradox in answer no. (that war is futile, and that this war will have immense benefits) is due to the inadequacy of our language, which compels us to use the same word for two opposed purposes, not to any real contradiction of fact. we called the condition of the balkan peninsula "peace" until the attack was made on turkey merely because the respective ambassadors still happened to be resident in the capitals to which they were accredited. let us see what "peace" under turkish rule really meant and who is the real invader in this war. here is a very friendly and impartial witness--sir charles elliot--who paints for us the character of the turk as an "administrator": the turk in europe has an overweening sense of his superiority, and remains a nation apart, mixing little with the conquered populations, whose customs and ideas he tolerates, but makes little effort to understand. the expression, indeed, "turkey in europe" means indeed no more than "england in asia," if used as a designation for india.... the turks have done little to assimilate the people whom they have conquered, and still less, been assimilated by them. in the larger part of the turkish dominions, the turks themselves are in a minority.... the turks certainly resent the dismemberment of their empire, but not in the sense in which the french resent the conquest of alsace-lorraine by germany. they would never use the word "turkey" or even its oriental equivalent, "the high country" in ordinary conversation. they would never say that syria and greece are parts of turkey which have been detached, but merely that they are tributaries which have become independent, provinces once occupied by turks where there are no turks now. as soon as a province passes under another government, the turks find it the most natural thing in the world to leave it and go somewhere else. in the same spirit the turk talks quite pleasantly of leaving constantinople some day, he will go over to asia and found another capital. one can hardly imagine englishmen speaking like that of london, but they might conceivably speak so of calcutta.... the turk is a conqueror and nothing else. the history of the turk is a catalogue of battles. his contributions to art, literature, science, and religion, are practically nil. their desire has not been to instruct, to improve, hardly even to govern, but simply to conquer.... the turk makes nothing at all; he takes whatever he can get, as plunder or pillage. he lives in the houses which he finds, or which he orders to be built for him. in unfavorable circumstances he is a marauder. in favorable, a _grand seigneur_ who thinks it his right to enjoy with grace and dignity all that the world can hold, but who will not lower himself by engaging in art, literature, trade, or manufacture. why should he, when there are other people to do these things for him. indeed, it may be said that he takes from others even his religion, clothes, language, customs; there is hardly anything which is turkish and not borrowed. the religion is arabic; the language half arabic and persian; the literature almost entirely imitative; the art persian or byzantine; the costumes, in the upper classes and army mostly european. there is nothing characteristic in manufacture or commerce, except an aversion to such pursuits. in fact, all occupations, except agriculture and military service are distasteful to the true osmanli. he is not much of a merchant. he may keep a stall in a bazaar, but his operations are rarely undertaken on a scale which merits the name of commerce or finance. it is strange to observe how, when trade becomes active in any seaport, or upon the railway lines, the osmanli retires and disappears, while greeks, armenians, and levantines thrive in his place. neither does he much affect law, medicine or the learned professions. such callings are followed by moslems but they are apt to be of non-turkish race. but though he does none of these things ... the turk is a soldier. the moment a sword or rifle is put into his hands, he instinctively knows how to use it with effect, and feels at home in the ranks or on a horse. the turkish army is not so much a profession or an institution necessitated by the fears and aims of the government as the quite normal state of the turkish nation.... every turk is a born soldier, and adopts other pursuits chiefly because times are bad. when there is a question of fighting, if only in a riot, the stolid peasant wakes up and shows surprising power of finding organization and expedients, and alas! a surprising ferocity. the ordinary turk is an honest and good-humored soul, kind to children and animals, and very patient; but when the fighting spirit comes on him, he becomes like the terrible warriors of the huns or genghis khan, and slays, burns, and ravages without mercy or discrimination.[ ] such is the verdict of an instructed, travelled, and observant english author and diplomatist, who lived among these people for many years and who learned to like them, who studied them and their history. it does not differ, of course, appreciably, from what practically every student of the turk has discovered: the turk is the typical conqueror. his nation has lived by the sword and to-day he is dying by the sword, because the sword, the mere exercise of force by one man or group of men upon another, conquest in other words, is an impossible form of human relationship. in order to maintain this evil form of relationship--its evil and futility constitute the whole basis of the principles i have attempted to illustrate--he has not even observed the rough chivalry of the brigand. the brigand, though he might knock men on the head, will refrain from having his force take the form of butchering women and disembowelling children. not so the turk. his attempt at government will take the form of the obscene torture of children, of a bestial ferocity which is not a matter of dispute or exaggeration, but a thing to which scores, hundreds, thousands even of credible european witnesses have testified. "the finest gentleman, sir, that ever butchered a woman or burned a village," is the phrase that _punch_ most justly puts into the mouth of the defender of our traditional turcophil policy. this condition is "peace" and the act which would put a stop to it is "war"! it is the inexactitude and inadequacy of our language which create much of the confusion of thought in this matter; we have the same term for action destined to achieve a given end and for counter-action destined to prevent it. yet we manage in other than the international field, in civil matters, to make the thing clear enough. once an american town was set on fire by incendiaries and was threatened with destruction. in order to save at least a part of it the authorities deliberately burned down a block of buildings in the pathway of the fire. would those incendiaries be entitled to say that the town authorities were incendiaries also and "believed in setting fire to towns"? yet this is precisely the point of view of those who tax pacifists with approving war because they approve the measure aimed at bringing it to an end. put it another way. you do not believe that force should determine the transfer of property or conformity to a creed, and i say to you: "hand me your purse and conform to my creed or i kill you." you say: "because i do not believe that force should settle these matters, i shall try to prevent it settling them; therefore if you attack i shall resist; if i did not i should be allowing force to settle them." i attack; you resist and disarm me and say: "my force having neutralized yours and, the equilibrium being now established, i will hear any reasons you may have to urge for my paying you money or any argument in favor of your creed. reason, understanding, adjustment shall settle it." you would be a pacifist. or, if you deem that that word connotes non-resistance, though to the immense bulk of pacifists it does not, you would be an anti-bellicist, to use a dreadful word coined by m. emile faguet in the discussion of this matter. if however you said: "having disarmed you and established the equilibrium, i shall now upset it in my favor by taking your weapon and using it against you unless you hand me _your_ purse and subscribe to _my_ creed. i do this because force alone can determine issues and because it is a law of life that the strong should eat up the weak," you would then be a bellicist. in the same way, when we prevent the brigand from carrying on his trade--taking wealth by force--it is not because we believe in force as a means of livelihood, but precisely because we do not. and if, in preventing the brigand from knocking out brains, we are compelled to knock out his brains, is it because we believe in knocking out people's brains? or would we urge that to do so is the way to carry on a trade or to govern a nation or that it could be the basis of human relationship? in every civilized country, the basis of the relationship on which the community rests is this: no individual is allowed to settle his differences with another by force. but does this mean that if one threatens to take my purse, i am not allowed to use force to prevent it? that if he threatens to kill me, i am not to defend myself, because "the individual citizens are not allowed to settle their differences by force"? it is _because_ of that, because the act of self-defence is an attempt to prevent the settlement of a difference by force, that the law justifies it.[ ] but the law would not justify me if, having disarmed my opponent, having neutralized his force by my own and re-established the social equilibrium, i immediately proceeded to upset it by asking him for his purse on pain of murder. i should then be settling the matter by force--i should then have ceased to be a pacifist and have become a bellicist. for that is the difference between the two conceptions; the bellicist says: "force alone can settle these matters; it is the final appeal, therefore fight it out; let the best man win. when you have preponderant strength, impose your view; force the other man to your will; not because it is right, but because you are able to do so." it is the "excellent policy" which lord roberts attributes to germany and approves. we anti-bellicists take an exactly contrary view. we say: "to fight it out settles nothing, since it is not a question of who is stronger, but of whose view is best and, as that is not always easy to establish, it is of the utmost importance in the interest of all parties, in the long run, to keep force out of it." the former is the policy of the turks. they have been obsessed with the idea that, if only they had enough of physical force ruthlessly exercised, they could solve the whole question of government, of existence for that matter, without troubling about social adjustment, understanding, equity, law, commerce; that "blood and iron" were all that was needed. the success of that policy can now be judged. good or evil will come of the present war according as the balkan states are on the whole guided by the bellicist or by the opposed principle. if, having now momentarily eliminated force as between themselves, they re-introduce it; if the strongest, presumably bulgaria,[ ] adopts lord roberts's "excellent policy" of striking because she has the preponderant force, enters upon a career of conquest of other members of the balkan league and of the populations of the conquered territories and uses them for exploitation by military force--why then there will be no settlement and this war will have accomplished nothing save futile waste and slaughter. for they will have taken under a new flag, the pathway of the turk to savagery, degeneration, death. if on the other hand they are guided more by the pacifist principle, if they believe that co-operation among states is better than conflict, if they believe that the common interest of all in good government is greater than the special interest of anyone in conquest, that the understanding of human relationships, the capacity for the organization of society are the means by which men progress and not the imposition of force by one man or group upon another, why, they will have taken the pathway to better civilization. but then they will have disregarded lord roberts's advice. this distinction between the two systems, far from being a matter of abstract theory of metaphysics or logic-chopping, is just the difference which distinguishes the anglo-saxon from the turk, which distinguishes america from turkey. the turk has as much physical vigor as the american, is as virile, manly, and military. the turk has the same raw materials of nature, soil, and water. there is no difference in the capacity for the exercise of physical force--or if there is, the difference is in favor of the turk. the real difference is a difference of ideas, of mind, outlook on the part of the individuals composing the respective societies; the turk has one general conception of human society and the code and principles upon which it is founded, mainly a militarist one; the american has another, mainly a pacifist one. and whether the european society as a whole is to drift towards the turkish ideal or towards the anglo-saxon ideal will depend upon whether it is animated mainly by the pacifist or mainly by the bellicist doctrine; if the former, it will stagger blindly like the turk along the path to barbarism; if the latter, it will take a better road. in dealing with answer no. i have shown how the ambiguity of terms[ ] used leads us so much astray in our notions of the real rôle of force in human relationships. but there is a curious phenomenon of thought which explains perhaps still more how misconceptions grow up on this subject and that is the habit of thinking of a war which, of course, must include two parties in terms solely of one party at a time. thus one critic[ ] is quite sure that because the balkan peoples "recked nothing of financial disaster," economic considerations have had nothing to do with their war--a conclusion which seems to be arrived at by the process of judgment just indicated: to find the cause of conditions produced by two parties you shall rigorously ignore one. for there is a great deal of internal evidence for believing that the writer of the article in question would admit very readily that the efforts of the turk to wring taxes out of the conquered peoples--not in return for a civilized administration, but simply as the means of livelihood, of turning conquest into a trade--had a very great deal to do in explaining the turk's presence there at all and the christian's desire to get rid of him; while the same article specifically states that the mutual jealousies of the great powers, based on a desire to "grab" (an economic motive), had a great deal to do with preventing a peaceful settlement of the difficulties. yet "economics" have nothing to do with it! i have attempted elsewhere to make these two points--that it is on the one hand the false economics of the turks and on the other hand the false economics of the powers of europe, coloring the policy and statecraft of both, which have played an enormous, in all human probability, a determining rôle in the immediate cause of the war; and, of course, a further and more remote cause of the whole difficulty is the fact that the balkan peoples, never having been subjected to the discipline of that complex social life which arises from trade and commerce have not, or at least not so completely, outgrown those primitive racial and religious hostilities which at one time in europe as a whole provoked conflicts like that now raging in the balkans. the following article which appeared[ ] at the outbreak of the war may summarise some of the points with which we have been dealing:-- "polite and good-natured people think it rude to say 'balkans' if a pacifist be present. yet i never understood why, and i understand now less than ever. it carries the implication that because war has broken out that fact disposes of all objection to it. the armies are at grips, therefore peace is a mistake. passion reigns in the balkans, therefore passion is preferable to reason. "i suppose cannibalism and infanticide, polygamy, judicial torture, religious persecution, witchcraft, during all the years we did these 'inevitable' things, were defended in the same way, and those who resented all criticism of them pointed in triumph to the cannibal feast, the dead child, the maimed witness, the slain heretic, or the burned witch. but the fact did not prove the wisdom of those habits, still less their inevitability; for we have them no more. "we are all agreed as to the fundamental cause of the balkan trouble: the hate born of religious, racial, national, and linguistic differences; the attempt of an alien conqueror to live parasitically upon the conquered, and the desire of conqueror and conquered alike to satisfy in massacre and bloodshed the rancor of fanaticism and hatred. "well, in these islands, not so very long ago, those things were causes of bloodshed; indeed, they were a common feature of european life. but if they are inevitable in human relationship, how comes it that adana is no longer duplicated by st. bartholomew; the bulgarian bands by the vendetta of the highlander and the lowlander; the struggle of the slav and turk, serb and bulgar, by that of scots and english, and english and welsh? the fanaticism of the moslem to-day is no more intense than that of catholic and heretic in rome, madrid, paris, and geneva at a time which is only separated from us by the lives of three or four elderly men. the heretic or infidel was then in europe also a thing unclean and horrifying, exciting in the mind of the orthodox a sincere and honest hatred and a (very largely satisfied) desire to kill. the catholic of the th century was apt to tell you that he could not sit at table with a heretic because the latter carried with him a distinctive and overpoweringly repulsive odor. if you would measure the distance europe has travelled, think what this means: all the nations of christendom united in a war lasting years for the capture of the holy sepulchre; and yet, when in our day their representatives, seated round a table, could have had it for the asking, they did not deem it worth the asking, so little of the ancient passion was there left. the very nature of man seemed to be transformed. for, wonderful though it be that orthodox should cease killing heretic, infinitely more wonderful still is it that he should cease wanting to kill him. "just as most of us are certain that the underlying causes of this conflict are 'inevitable' and 'inherent in unchanging human nature,' so are we certain that so _un_-human a thing as economics can have no bearing on it. "well, i will suggest that the transformation of the heretic-hating and heretic-killing european is due mainly to economic forces; that it is because the drift of those forces has to so great a degree left the balkans, where until yesterday the people lived a life little different from that which they lived in the time of abraham, unaffected that war is now raging; that economic factors of a more immediate kind form a large part of the provoking cause of that war; and that a better comprehension by great nations of europe of certain economic facts of their international relationship is essential before much progress towards solution can be made. "but then by 'economics' of course i mean, not a merchant's profit or a money-lender's interest, but the method by which men earn their bread, which must also mean the kind of life they lead. "we generally think of the primitive life of man--that of the herdsman or the tent liver--as something idyllic. the picture is as far as possible from the truth. those into whose lives economics do not enter, or enter very little--that is to say, those who, like the congo cannibal, or the red indian, or the bedouin, do not cultivate, or divide their labor, or trade, or save, or look to the future, have shed little of the primitive passions of other animals of prey, the tigers and the wolves, who have no economics at all, and have no need to check an impulse or a hate. but industry, even of the more primitive kind, means that men must divide their labor, which means that they must put some sort of reliance upon one another; the thing of prey becomes a partner, and the attitude towards it changes. and as this life becomes more complex, as the daily needs and desires push men to trade and barter, that means building up a social organization, rules and codes and courts to enforce them; as the interdependence widens and deepens it necessarily means the cessation of certain hostilities. if the neighboring tribe wants to trade with you it must not kill you; if you want the services of the heretic you must not kill him, you must keep your obligation towards him, and mutual good faith is death to long-sustained hatreds. "you cannot separate the moral from the social and economic development of a people. the great service of a complex social and industrial organization, which is built up by the desire of men for better material conditions, is not that it 'pays,' but that it makes a more interdependent human society, and that it leads men to recognize what is the best relationship among them. the fact of recognizing that some act of aggression is causing stocks to fall is not important because it may save oppenheim's or solomon's money but because it is a demonstration that we are dependent upon some community on the other side of the world, that their damage is our damage, and that we have an interest in preventing it. it teaches us, as only some such simple and mechanical means can teach, the lesson of human fellowship. "it is by such means as this that western europe has in some measure, within its respective political frontiers, learned that lesson. each nation has learned, within its own confines at least, that wealth is made by work, not robbery; that, indeed, general robbery is fatal to prosperity; that government consists not merely in having the power of the sword but in organizing society--in 'knowing how,' which means the development of ideas; in maintaining courts; in making it possible to run railways, post-offices, and all the contrivances of a complex society. "now rulers did not create these things; it was the daily activities of the people, born of their desires and made possible by the circumstances in which they lived, by the trading and the mining and the shipping which they carried on, that made them. but the balkans have been geographically outside the influence of european industrial and commercial life. the turk has hardly felt it at all. he has learned none of the social and moral lessons which interdependence and improved communications have taught the western european, and it is because he had not learned these lessons, because he is a soldier and a conqueror to an extent and completeness that other nations of europe lost a generation or two since, that the balkanese are fighting and that war is raging. "not merely in this larger sense, but in the more immediate, narrower sense, are the fundamental causes of this war economic. "this war arises, as the past wars against the turkish conqueror have arisen, from the desire of the christian peoples on whom he lives to shake off this burden. "to live upon their subjects is the turks' only means of livelihood," says one authority. the turk is an economic parasite and the healthy economic organism must end by rejecting him. "the management of society, simple and primitive even as that of the balkan mountains, needs some effort and work and capacity for administration; otherwise even rudimentary economic life cannot be carried on. the turkish system, founded on the sword and nothing else ('the finest soldier in europe'), cannot give that small modicum of energy or administrative capacity. the one thing he knows is brute force; but it is not by the strength of his muscles that an engineer runs a machine, but by knowing how. the turk cannot build a road or make a bridge or administer a post-office or found a court of law. and these things are necessary. he will not let them be done by the christian, who, because he did not belong to the conquering class, has had to work and has consequently come to possess whatever capacity for work and administration the country can show, because to do so would be to threaten the turk's only trade. in the turk granted the christians equal political rights they would inevitably 'run the country.' and yet the turk himself cannot do it; and he will not let others do it, because to do so would be to threaten his supremacy. "the more the use of force fails, the more, of course, does he resort to it and that is why many of us who do not believe in force and desire to see it disappear from the relationship not merely of religious but of political groups, might conceivably welcome this war of the balkan christians, in so far as it is an attempt to resist the use of force in those relationships. of course, i do not try to estimate the 'balance of criminality.' right is not all on one side--it never is. but the broad issue is clear and plain. and only those concerned with the name rather than the thing, with nominal and verbal consistency rather than realities, will see anything paradoxical or contradictory in pacifist approval of christian resistance to the use of turkish force. "one fact stands out incontrovertibly from the whole weary muddle. it is quite clear that the inability to act in concert arises from the fact that in the international sphere the european is still dominated by illusions which he has dropped when he deals with home politics. the political faith of the turk, which he would never think of applying at home as among the individuals of his nation, he applies pure and unalloyed when he comes to deal with foreigners as nations. the economic conception--using the term in that wider sense which i have indicated earlier in this article--which guides his individual conduct is the antithesis of that which guides his national conduct. "while the christian does not believe in robbery inside the frontier, he does without; while within the state he realizes that it is better for each to observe the general code, so that civilized society can exist, than for each to disregard it, so that society goes to pieces; while within the state he realizes that government is a matter of administration, not the seizure of property; that one town does not add to its wealth by 'capturing' another, that indeed one community cannot 'own' another--while, i say, he believes all these things in his daily life at home, he disregards them all when he comes to the field of international relationship, _la haute politique_. to annex some province by a cynical breach of treaty obligation (austria in bosnia, italy in tripoli) is regarded as better politics than to act loyally with the community of nations to enforce their common interest in order and good government. in fact, we do not believe that there can be a community of nations, because, in fact, we do not believe that their interests are common, but rival; like the turk, we believe that if you do not exercise force upon your 'rival' he will exercise it upon you; that nations live upon one another, not by co-operation with one another--and it is for this reason presumably that you must 'own' as much of your neighbors as possible. it is the turkish conception from beginning to end. "it is because these false beliefs prevent the nations of christendom acting loyally the one to the other, because each is playing for its own hand, that the turk, with hint of some sordid bribe, has been able to play off each against the other. "this is the crux of the matter. when europe can honestly act in common on behalf of common interests some solution can be found. and the capacity of europe to act in harmony will not be found as long as the accepted doctrines of european statecraft remain unchanged, as long as they are dominated by existing illusions." footnotes: [ ] "the true way of life" (headley brothers, london), p. . i am aware that many modern pacifists, even of the english school, to which these remarks mainly apply, are more objective in their advocacy than mr. grubb, but in the eyes of the "average sensual man" pacificism is still deeply tainted with this self-sacrificing altruism (see chapter iii., part iii.), notwithstanding the admirable work of the french pacifist school. [ ] the _matin_ newspaper recently made a series of revelations, in which it was shown that the master of a french cod-fishing vessel had, for some trivial insubordinations, disembowelled his cabin-boy alive, and put salt into the intestines, and then thrown the quivering body into the hold with the cod-fish. so inured were the crew to brutality that they did not effectively protest, and the incident was only brought to light months later by wine-shop chatter. the _matin_ quotes this as the sort of brutality that marks the newfoundland cod-fishing industry in french ships. again, the german socialist papers have recently been dealing with what they term "the casualties of the industrial battlefield," showing that the losses from industrial accidents since --the loss of life during peace, that is--have been enormously greater than the losses due to the franco-prussian war. [ ] "the interest of america in international conditions." new york: harper & brothers. [ ] that is to say, all this was to have taken place before (the book appeared some years ago). this has its counterpart in the english newspaper feuilleton which appeared some years ago entitled, "the german invasion of ." [ ] see letter to the _matin_, august , . [ ] in this self-seeking world, it is not reasonable to assume the existence of an inverted altruism of this kind. [ ] this is not the only basis of comparison, of course. everyone who knows europe at all is aware of the high standard of comfort in all the small countries--scandinavia, holland, belgium, switzerland. mulhall, in "industries and wealth of nations" (p. ), puts the small states of europe with france and england at the top of the list, germany _sixth_, and russia, territorially and militarily the greatest of all, at the very end. dr. bertillon, the french statistician, has made an elaborate calculation of the relative wealth of the individuals of each country. the middle-aged german possesses (on the established average) nine thousand francs ($ ); the hollander _sixteen thousand_ ($ ). (see _journal_, paris, august , ). [ ] the figures given in the "statesman's year-book" show that, proportionately to population, norway has nearly three times the carrying trade of england. [ ] see citation, pp. - . [ ] major stewart murray, "future peace of the anglo-saxons." london: watts and co. [ ] _l'information_, august , . [ ] very many times greater, because the bullion reserve in the bank of england is relatively small. [ ] hartley withers, "the meaning of money." smith, elder and co., london. [ ] see pp. - . [ ] see note concerning french colonial policy, pp. - . [ ] summarizing an article in the _oriental economic review_, the san francisco _bulletin_ says: "japan at this moment seems to be finding out that 'conquered' korea in every real sense belongs to the koreans, and that all that japan is getting out of her war is an additional burden of statesmanship and an additional expense of administration, and an increased percentage of international complication due to the extension of the japanese frontier dangerously close to her continental rivals, china and russia. japan as 'owner' of korea is in a worse position economically and politically than she was when she was compelled to treat with korea as an independent nation." the _oriental economic review_ notes that "the japanese hope to ameliorate the korean situation through the general intermarriage of the two peoples; but this means a racial advance, and through it closer social and economic relations than were possible before annexation, and would probably have been easier of accomplishment had not the destruction of korean independence embittered the people." [ ] spanish four per cents. were - / during the war, and just prior to the moroccan trouble, in , had a free market at per cent. f.c. penfold writes in the december ( ) _north american review_ as follows: "the new spain, whose motive force springs not from the windmills of dreamy fiction, but from honest toil, is materially better off this year than it has been for generations. since the war spanish bonds have practically doubled in value, and exchange with foreign money markets has improved in corresponding ratio. spanish seaports on the atlantic and mediterranean teem with shipping. indeed, the nature of the people seems changing from a _dolce far niente_ indolence to enterprising thrift." [ ] london _daily mail_, december , . [ ] "traité de science des finances," vol. ii., p. . [ ] "die wirtschafts finanz und sozialreform im deutschen reich." leipzig, . [ ] "la crise Économique," _revue des deux mondes_, march , . [ ] maurice block, "la crise Économique," _revue des deux mondes_, march , . see also "les conséquences Économiques de la prochaine guerre," captaine bernard serrigny. paris, . the author says (p. ): "it was evidently the disastrous financial position of germany, which had compelled prussia at the outbreak of the war to borrow money at the unheard-of price of per cent., that caused bismarck to make the indemnity so large a one. he hoped thus to repair his country's financial situation. events cruelly deceived him, however. a few months after the last payment of the indemnity the gold despatched by france had already returned to her territory, while germany, poorer than ever, was at grips with a crisis which was to a large extent the direct result of her temporary wealth." [ ] "das deutsche reich zur zeit bismarcks." [ ] the figures of german emigration are most suggestive in this connection. although they show great fluctuation, indicating their reaction to many factors, they always appear to rise after the wars. thus, after the wars of the duchies they doubled, for the five years preceding the campaigns of they averaged , , and after those campaigns rose suddenly to over , . they had fallen to , in , and then rose to , in , and what is more remarkable still, the emigration did not come from the conquered provinces, from schleswig-holstein, alsace or lorraine, but from prussia! while not for a moment claiming that the effect of the wars is the sole factor in this fluctuation, the fact of emigration as bearing on the general claim made for successful war demands the most careful examination. see particularly, "l'Émigration allemande," _revue des deux mondes_, january, . [ ] the montreal _presse_, march , . [ ] speech, house of commons, august , . the new york papers of november , , report the following from sir wilfrid laurier in the dominion parliament during the debate on the canadian navy: "if now we have to organize a naval force, it is because we are growing as a nation--it is the penalty of being a nation. i know of no nation having a sea-coast of its own which has no navy, except norway, but norway will never tempt the invader. canada has its coal-mines, its gold-mines, its wheat-fields, and its vast wealth may offer a temptation to the invader." [ ] the recent tariff negotiations between canada and the united states were carried on directly between ottawa and washington, without the intervention of london. canada regularly conducts her tariff negotiations, even with other members of the british empire. south africa takes a like attitude. the _volkstein_ of july , , says: "the union constitution is in full accord with the principle that neutrality is permissible in the case of a war in which england and other independent states of the empire are involved.... england, as well as south africa, would best be served by south africa's neutrality" (quoted in _times_, july , ). note the phrase "independent states of the empire." [ ] _times_, november , . [ ] the london _world_, an imperialist organ, puts it thus: "the electoral process of reversing the results of the war is completed in south africa. by the result of last week's contests mr. merriman has secured a strong working majority in both houses. the triumph of the bond at cape town is no less sweeping than was that of het volk at pretoria. the three territories upon which the future of the subcontinent depends are linked together under boer supremacy ... the future federated or uniformed system will be raised upon a dutch basis. if this was what we wanted, we might have bought it cheaper than with two hundred and fifty millions of money and twenty thousand lives." [ ] a bill has been introduced into the indian legislative council enabling the government to prohibit emigration to any country where the treatment accorded to british indian subjects was not such as met with the approval of the governor-general. "as just treatment for free indians has not been secured," says the london _times_, "prohibition will undoubtedly be applied against natal unless the position of free indians there is ameliorated." [ ] britain's total overseas trade for was $ , , , , of which $ , , , was with foreigners, and $ , , , with her own possessions. and while it is true that with some of her colonies britain has as much as per cent. of their trade--_e.g._, australia--it also happens that some absolutely foreign countries do a greater percentage even of their trade with britain than do her colonies. britain possesses per cent. of argentina's foreign trade, but only per cent. of canada's, although canada has recently given her a considerable preference. [ ] west africa and madagascar. [ ] it is a little encouraging, perhaps, for those of us who are doing what we may towards the dissemination of saner ideas, that an early edition of this book seems to have played some part in bringing about the change in french colonial policy here indicated. the french colonial ministry, for the purpose of emphasizing the point of view mentioned in _le temps_ article, on two or three occasions called pointed attention to the first french edition of this book. in the official report of the colonial budget for , a large part of this chapter is reprinted. in the senate (see _journal officiel de la république française_, july , ) the rapporteur again quoted from this book at length, and devoted a great part of his speech towards emphasizing the thesis here set out. [ ] a financier to whom i showed the proofs of this chapter notes here: "if such a tax were imposed the output would be _nil_." [ ] a correspondent sent me some interesting and significant details of the rapid strides made by germany in egypt. it had already been stated that a german newspaper would appear in october, , and that the official notices of the mixed courts have been transferred from the local french newspapers to the german _egyptischer nachrichten_. during the years - , german residents in egypt increased by per cent., while british residents increased by only per cent. germany's share of the egyptian imports during the period - was $ , , , but by this figure reached $ , , . the latest german undertaking in egypt was the foundation of the egyptische hypotheken bank, in which all the principal joint-stock banks of germany were interested. its capital was to be $ , , and the six directors included three germans, one austrian, and two italians. writing of "home sickness among the emigrants" (the _london world_, july , ), mr. f.g. aflalo said: "the germans are, of all nations, the least troubled with this weakness. though far more warmly attached to the hearth than their neighbors across the rhine, they feel exile less. their one idea is to evade conscription, and this offers to all continental nations a compensation for exile, which to the englishman means nothing. i remember a colony of german fishermen on lake tahoe, the loveliest water in california, where the pines of the sierra nevada must have vividly recalled their native harz. yet they rejoiced in the freedom of their adopted country, and never knew a moment's regret for the fatherland." [ ] according to a recent estimate, the germans in brazil now number some four hundred thousand, the great majority being settled in the southern states of rio grande do sul, paraná, and santa catharina, while a small number are found in sao paulo and espirito santo in the north. this population is, for the most part, the result of natural increase, for of late years emigration thither has greatly declined. in near asia, too, german colonization is by no means of recent origin. there are in transcaucasia agricultural settlements established by würtemberg farmers, whose descendants in the third generation live in their own villages and still speak their native language. in palestine, there are the german templar colonies on the coast, which have prospered so well as to excite the resentment of the natives. [ ] london _morning post_, february , . [ ] _north american review_, march, . see also citation, p. . [ ] april, . [ ] "germany and the next war," by gen. friedrich von bernhardi. london: edwin arnold, . [ ] see, notably, the article from admiral mahan, "the place of power in international relations," in the _north american review_ for january, ; and such books of professor wilkinson's as "the great alternative," "britain at bay," "war and policy." [ ] "the valor of ignorance." harpers. [ ] for an expression of these views in a more definite form, see ratzenhofer's "die sociologische erkenntniss," pp. , . leipzig: brockhaus, . [ ] speech at stationer's hall, london, june , . [ ] "the strenuous life." century co. [ ] _mcclure's magazine_, august, . [ ] thomas hughes, in his preface to the first english edition of "the bigelow papers," refers to the opponents of the crimean war as a "vain and mischievous clique, who amongst us have raised the cry of peace." see also mr. j.a. hobson's "psychology of jingoism," p. . london: grant richards. [ ] _north american review_, march, . [ ] "the interest of america in international conditions." new york: harper & brothers. [ ] it is related by critchfield, in his work on the south american republics, that during all the welter of blood and disorder which for a century or more marked the history of those countries, the roman catholic priesthood on the whole maintained a high standard of life and character, and continued, against all discouragement, to preach consistently the beauties of peace and order. however much one may be touched by such a spectacle, and pay the tribute of one's admiration to these good men, one cannot but feel that the preaching of these high ideals did not have any very immediate effect on the social progress of south america. what has effected this change? it is that those countries have been brought into the economic current of the world; the bank and factory and railroad have introduced factors and motives of a quite different order from those urged by the priest, and are slowly winning those countries from military adventure to honest work, a thing which the preaching of high ideals failed to do. [ ] "to-day and to-morrow," p. . john murray. [ ] since the publication of the first edition of this book there has appeared in france an admirable work by m.j. novikow, "le darwinisme social" (felix alcan, paris), in which this application of the darwinian theory to sociology is discussed with great ability, and at great length and in full detail, and the biological presentation of the case, as just outlined, has been inspired in no small part by m. novikow's work. m. novikow has established in biological terms what, previous to the publication of his book, i attempted to establish in economic terms. [ ] co-operation does not exclude competition. if a rival beats me in business, it is because he furnishes more efficient co-operation than i do; if a thief steals from me, he is not co-operating at all, and if he steals much will prevent my co-operation. the organism (society) has every interest in encouraging the competitor and suppressing the parasite. [ ] without going to the somewhat obscure analogies of biological science, it is evident from the simple facts of the world that, if at any stage of human development warfare ever did make for the survival of the fit, we have long since passed out of that stage. when we conquer a nation in these days, we do not exterminate it: we leave it where it was. when we "overcome" the servile races, far from eliminating them, we give them added chances of life by introducing order, etc., so that the lower human quality tends to be perpetuated by conquest by the higher. if ever it happens that the asiatic races challenge the white in the industrial or military field, it will be in large part thanks to the work of race conservation, which has been the result of england's conquest in india, egypt, and asia generally, and her action in china when she imposed commerical contact on the chinese by virtue of military power. war between people of roughly equal development makes also for the survival of the unfit, since we no longer exterminate and massacre a conquered race, but only their best elements (those carrying on the war), and because the conqueror uses up _his_ best elements in the process, so that the less fit of both sides are left to perpetuate the species. nor do the facts of the modern world lend any support to the theory that preparation for war under modern conditions tends to preserve virility, since those conditions involve an artificial barrack life, a highly mechanical training favorable to the destruction of initiative, and a mechanical uniformity and centralization tending to crush individuality, and to hasten the drift towards a centralized bureaucracy, already too great. [ ] one might doubt, indeed, whether the british patriot has really the feeling against the german that he has against his own countrymen of contrary views. mr. leo maxse, in the _national review_ for february, , indulges in the following expressions, applied, not to germans, but to english statesmen elected by a majority of the english people: mr. lloyd george is a "fervid celt animated by passionate hatred of all things english"; mr. churchill is simply a "tammany hall politician, without, however, a tammany man's patriotism." mr. harcourt belongs to "that particular type of society demagogue who slangs peers in public and fawns upon them in private." mr. leo maxse suggests that some of the ministers should be impeached and hanged. mr. mckenna is lord fisher's "poll-parrot," and the house of commons is the "poisonous parliament of infamous memory," in which ministers were supported by a vast _posse comitatus_ of german jackals. [ ] speech at stationers' hall, london, june , . [ ] i have in mind here the ridiculous furore that was made by the british jingo press over some french cartoons that appeared at the outbreak of the boer war. it will be remembered that at that time france was the "enemy," and germany was, on the strength of a speech by mr. chamberlain, a quasi-ally. britain was at that time as warlike towards france as she is now towards germany. and this is only ten years ago! [ ] in his "history of the rise and influence of the spirit of rationalism in europe," lecky says: "it was no political anxiety about the balance of power, but an intense religious enthusiasm that impelled the inhabitants of christendom towards the site which was at once the cradle and the symbol of their faith. all interests were then absorbed, all classes were governed, all passions subdued or colored, by religious fervor. national animosities that had raged for centuries were pacified by its power. the intrigues of statesmen and the jealousies of kings disappeared beneath its influence. nearly two million lives are said to have been sacrificed in the cause. neglected governments, exhausted finances, depopulated countries, were cheerfully accepted as the price of success. no wars the world had ever before seen were so popular as these, which were at the same time the most disastrous and the most unselfish." [ ] "be assured," writes st. augustine, "and doubt not that not only men who have obtained the use of their reason, but also little children who have begun to live in their mother's womb and there died, or who, having been just born, have passed away from the world without the sacrament of holy baptism, must be punished by the eternal torture of undying fire." to make the doctrine clearer, he illustrates it by the case of a mother who has two children. each of these is but a lump of perdition. neither has ever performed a moral or immoral act. the mother overlies one, and it perishes unbaptized. it goes to eternal torment. the other is baptized and saved. [ ] this appears sufficiently from the seasons in which, for instance, _autos da fé_ in spain took place. in the gallery of madrid there is a painting by francisco rizzi representing the execution, or rather the procession to the stake, of a number of heretics during the fêtes that followed the marriage of charles ii., and before the king, his bride, and the court and clergy of madrid. the great square was arranged like a theatre, and thronged with ladies in court dress. the king sat on an elevated platform, surrounded by the chief members of the aristocracy. limborch, in his "history of the inquisition," relates that among the victims of one _auto da fé_ was a girl of sixteen, whose singular beauty struck all who saw her with admiration. as she passed to the stake she cried to the queen: "great queen, is not your presence able to bring me some comfort under my misery? consider my youth, and that i am condemned for a religion which i have sucked in with my mother's milk." [ ] _spectator_, december , . [ ] see quotations, pp. - , from homer lea's book, "the valor of ignorance." [ ] thus captain d'arbeux ("l'officier contemporaine," grasset, paris, ) laments "la disparition progressive de l'idéal de revanche," a military deterioration which is, he declares, working the country's ruin. the general truth of all this is not affected by the fact that , owing to the moroccan conflict and other matters, saw a revival of chauvinism, which is already spending itself. the _matin_, december, , remarks: "the number of candidates at st. cyr and st. maixent is decreasing to a terrifying degree. it is hardly a fourth of what it was a few years ago.... the profession of arms has no longer the attraction that it had." [ ] "germany and england," p. . [ ] see the first chapter of mr. harbutt dawson's admirable work, "the evolution of modern germany." t. fisher unwin, london. [ ] i have excluded the "operations" with the allies in china. but they only lasted a few weeks. and were they war? this illustration appears in m. novikow's "le darwinisme social." [ ] the most recent opinion on evolution would go to show that environment plays an even larger rôle in the formation of character than selection (see prince kropotkin's article, _nineteenth century_, july, , in which he shows that experiment reveals the direct action of surroundings as the main factor of evolution). how immensely, therefore, must our industrial environment modify the pugnacious impulse of our nature! [ ] see citations, pp. - , notably mr. roosevelt's dictum: "in this world the nation that is trained to a career of unwarlike and isolated ease is bound to go down in the end before other nations which have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities." this view is even emphasized in the speech which mr. roosevelt recently delivered at the university of berlin (see london _times_, may , ). "the roman civilization," declared mr. roosevelt--perhaps, as the _times_ remarks, to the surprise of those who have been taught to believe that _latifundia perditere romam_--"went down primarily because the roman citizen would not fight, because rome had lost the fighting edge." (see footnote, p. .) [ ] "the valor of ignorance." harpers. [ ] see m. messimy's report on the war budget for (annexe , p. ). the importance of these figures is not generally realized. astonishing as the assertion may sound, conscription in germany is not universal, while it is in france. in the latter country every man of every class actually goes through the barracks, and is subjected to the real discipline of military training; the whole training of the nation is purely military. this is not the case in germany. very nearly half of the young men of the country are not soldiers. another important point is that the part of the german nation which makes up the country's intellectual life escapes the barracks. to all practical purposes very nearly all young men of the better class enter the army as one year volunteers, by which they escape more than a few weeks of barracks, and even then escape its worst features. it cannot be too often pointed out that intellectual germany has never been subjected to real barrack influence. as one critic says: "the german system does not put this class through the mill," and is deliberately designed to save them from the grind of the mill. france's military activities since have, of course, been much greater than those of germany--tonkin, madagascar, algeria, morocco. as against these, germany has had only the hereros campaign. the percentages of population given above, in the text, require modification as the army laws are modified, but the relative positions in germany and france remain about the same. [ ] _vox de la naçión_, caracas, april , . [ ] even mr. roosevelt calls south american history mean and bloody. it is noteworthy that, in his article published in the _bachelor of arts_ for march, , mr. roosevelt, who lectured englishmen so vigorously on their duty at all costs not to be guided by sentimentalism in the government of egypt, should write thus at the time of mr. cleveland's venezuelan message to england: "mean and bloody though the history of the south american republics has been, it is distinctly in the interest of civilization that ... they should be left to develop along their own lines.... under the best of circumstances, a colony is in a false position; but if a colony is a region where the colonizing race has to do its work by means of other and inferior races, the condition is much worse. there is no chance for any tropical colony owned by a northern race." [ ] june , . [ ] see an article by mr. vernon kellogg in the _atlantic monthly_, july, . seeley says: "the roman empire perished for want of men." one historian of greece, discussing the end of the peloponnesian wars, said: "only cowards remain, and from their broods came the new generations." three million men--the élite of europe--perished in the napoleonic wars. it is said that after those wars the height standard of the french adult population fell abruptly inch. however that may be, it is quite certain that the physical fitness of the french people was immensely worsened by the drain of the napoleonic wars, since, as the result of a century of militarism, france is compelled every few years to reduce the standard of physical fitness in order to keep up her military strength, so that now even three-feet dwarfs are impressed. [ ] i think one may say fairly that it _was_ sydney smith's wit rather than bacon's or bentham's wisdom which killed this curious illusion. [ ] see the distinction established at the beginning of the next chapter. [ ] m. pierre loti, who happened to be at madrid when the troops were leaving to fight the americans, wrote: "they are, indeed, still the solid and splendid spanish troops, heroic in every epoch; one needs only to look at them to divine the woe that awaits the american shopkeepers when brought face to face with such soldiers." he prophesied _des surprises sanglantes_. m. loti is a member of the french academy. [ ] see also letter quoted, pp. - . [ ] "patriotism and empire." grant richards. [ ] "for permanent work the soldier is worse than useless; his whole training tends to make him a weakling. he has the easiest of lives; he has no freedom and no responsibility. he is, politically and socially, a child, with rations instead of rights--treated like a child, punished like a child, dressed prettily and washed and combed like a child, excused for outbreaks of naughtiness like a child, forbidden to marry like a child, and called "tommy" like a child. he has no real work to keep him from going mad except housemaid's work" ("john bull's other island"). all those familiar with the large body of french literature, dealing with the evils of barrack-life, know how strongly that criticism confirms mr. bernard shaw's generalization. [ ] september , . [ ] things must have reached a pretty pass in england when the owner of the _daily mail_ and the patron of mr. blatchford can devote a column and a half over his own signature to reproaching in vigorous terms the hysteria and sensationalism, of his own readers. [ ] the _berliner tageblatt_ of march , , says: "one must admire the consistent fidelity and patriotism of the english race, as compared with the uncertain and erratic methods of the german people, their mistrust, and suspicion. in spite of numerous wars, bloodshed, and disaster, england always emerges smoothly and easily from her military crises and settles down to new conditions and surroundings in her usual cool and deliberate manner.... nor can one refrain from paying one's tribute to the sound qualities and character of the english aristocracy, which is always open to the ambitious and worthy of other classes, and thus slowly but surely widens the sphere of the middle classes by whom they are in consequence honored and respected--a state of affairs practically unknown in germany, but which would be to our immense advantage." [ ] "der kaiser und die zukunft des deutschen volkes." [ ] see also the confirmatory verdict of captain march phillips, quoted on p. . [ ] "my life in the army," p. . [ ] i do not think this last generalization does any injustice to the essay, "latitude and longitude among reformers" ("strenuous life," pp. - . the century company). [ ] see for further illustration of the difference and its bearing in practical politics chapter viii., part i., "the fight for the place in the sun." [ ] see chapter vii., part i. [ ] aristotle did, however, have a flash of the truth. he said: "if the hammer and the shuttle could move themselves, slavery would be unnecessary." [ ] "facts and comments," p. . [ ] buckle ("history of civilization") points out that philip ii., who ruled half the world and drew tribute from the whole of south america, was so poor that he could not pay his personal servants or meet the daily expenses of the court! [ ] i mean by credit all the mechanism of exchange which replaces the actual use or metal, or notes representing it. [ ] lecky ("rationalism in europe," p. ) says: "protestantism could not possibly have existed without a general diffusion of the bible, and that diffusion was impossible until after the two inventions of paper and printing.... before those inventions, pictures and material images were the chief means of religious instruction." and thus religious belief became necessarily material, crude, anthropomorphic. [ ] "battles are no longer the spectacular heroics of the past. the army of to-day and to-morrow is a sombre gigantic machine devoid of melodramatic heroics ... a machine that it requires years to form in separate parts, years to assemble them together, and other years to make them work smoothly and irresistibly" (homer lea in "the valor of ignorance," p. ). [ ] general von bernhardi, in his work on cavalry, deals with this very question of the bad influence on tactics of the "pomp of war," which he admits must disappear, adding very wisely: "the spirit of tradition consists not in the retention of antiquated forms, but in acting in that spirit which in the past led to such glorious success." the plea for the retention of the soldier because of his "spirit" could not be more neatly disposed of. see p. of the english edition of bernhardi's work (hugh rees, london). [ ] see quotations, pp. - . [ ] the following letter to the _manchester guardian_, which appeared at the time of the boer war, is worth reproduction in this connection: "sir,--i see that 'the church's duty in regard to war' is to be discussed at the church congress. this is right. for a year the heads of our church have been telling us what war is and does--that it is a school of character; that it sobers men, cleans them, strengthens them, knits their hearts; makes them brave, patient, humble, tender, prone to self-sacrifice. watered by 'war's red rain,' one bishop tells us, virtue grows; a cannonade, he points out, is an 'oratorio'--almost a form of worship. true; and to the church men look for help to save their souls from starving for lack of this good school, this kindly rain, this sacred music. congresses are apt to lose themselves in wastes of words. this one must not, surely cannot, so straight is the way to the goal. it has simply to draft and submit a new collect for war in our time, and to call for the reverent but firm emendation, in the spirit of the best modern thought, of those passages in bible and prayer-book by which even the truest of christians and the best of men have at times been blinded to the duty of seeking war and ensuing it. still, man's moral nature cannot, i admit, live by war alone; nor do i say with some that peace is wholly bad. even amid the horrors of peace you will find little shoots of character fed by the gentle and timely rains of plague and famine, tempest and fire; simple lessons of patience and courage conned in the schools of typhus, gout, and stone; not oratorios, perhaps, but homely anthems and rude hymns played on knife and probe in the long winter nights. far from me to 'sin our mercies,' or to call mere twilight dark. yet dark it may become; for remember that even these poor makeshift schools of character, these second-bests, these halting substitutes for war--remember that the efficiency of every one of them, be it hunger, accident, ignorance, sickness, or pain, is menaced by the intolerable strain of its struggles with secular doctors, plumbers, inventors, schoolmasters, and policemen. every year thousands who would once have been braced and steeled by manly tussles with small-pox or diphtheria are robbed of that blessing by the great changes made in our drains. every year thousands of women and children must go their way bereft of the rich spiritual experience of the widow and the orphan." [ ] captain march phillips, "with remington." methuen. see pp. - for mr. blatchford's confirmation of this verdict. [ ] and here as to the officers--again not from me but from a very imperialist and militarist quarter--the london _spectator_ (november , ), says: "soldiers might be supposed to be free from pettiness because they are men of action. but we all know that there is no profession in which the leaders are more depreciated by one another than in the profession of arms." [ ] professor william james says: "greek history is a panorama of war for war's sake ... of the utter ruin of a civilization which in intellectual respects was perhaps the highest the earth has ever seen. the wars were purely piratical. pride, gold, women, slaves, excitement were their only motives."--_mcclure's magazine_, august, . [ ] "britain at bay." constable and co. [ ] see quotation from sir c.p. lucas, p. - . [ ] see details on this matter given in chapter vii., part i. [ ] london _morning post_, april , . i pass over the fact that to cite all this as a reason for armaments is absurd. does the _morning post_ really suggest that the germans are going to attack england because they don't like the english taste in art, or music, or cooking? the notion that preferences of this sort need the protection of _dreadnoughts_ is surely to bring the whole thing within the domain of the grotesque. [ ] i refer to the remarkable speech in which mr. chamberlain notified france that she must "mend her manners or take the consequences" (see london daily papers between november and december , ). [ ] not that a very great period separates us from such methods. froude quotes maltby's report to government as follows: "i burned all their corn and houses, and committed to the sword all that could be found. in like manner i assailed a castle. when the garrison surrendered, i put them to the misericordia of my soldiers. they were all slain. thence i went on, sparing none which came in my way, which cruelty did so amaze their fellows that they could not tell where to bestow themselves." of the commander of the english forces at munster we read: "he diverted his forces into east clanwilliam, and harassed the country; killed all mankind that were found therein ... not leaving behind us man or beast, corn or cattle ... sparing none of what quality, age, or sex soever. beside many burned to death, we killed man, woman, child, horse, or beast or whatever we could find." [ ] in "the evolution of modern germany" (fisher unwin, london) the same author says: "germany implies not one people, but many peoples ... of different culture, different political and social institutions ... diversity of intellectual and economic life.... when the average englishman speaks of germany he really means prussia, and consciously or not he ignores the fact that in but few things can prussia be regarded as typical of the whole empire." [ ] "international law." john murray, london. [ ] lord sanderson, dealing with the development of international intercourse in an address to the royal society of arts (november , ), said: "the most notable feature of recent international intercourse, he thought, was the great increase in international exhibitions, associations, and conferences of every description and on every conceivable subject. when he first joined the foreign office, rather more than fifty years ago, conferences were confined almost entirely to formal diplomatic meetings to settle some urgent territorial or political question in which several states were interested. but as time had passed, not only were the number and frequency of political conferences increased, but a host of meetings of persons more or less official, termed indiscriminately conferences and congresses, had come into being." [ ] january , . [ ] march , . [ ] "the german government is straining every nerve, with the zealous support of its people, to get ready for a fight with this country" (_morning post_, march , ). "the unsatiated will of the armed state will, when an opportunity offers, attack most likely its most satiated neighbors without scruple, and despoil them without ruth" (dr. dillon, _contemporary review_, october, ). [ ] i have shown in a former chapter (chapter vi., part ii.) how these international hatreds are not the cause of conflict, but the outcome of conflicts or presumed conflicts of policy. if difference of national psychology--national "incompatibility of temper"--were the cause, how can we explain the fact that ten years since the english were still "hating all frenchmen like the devil," and talking of alliance with the germans? if diplomatic shuffling had pushed england into alliance with the germans against the french, it would never have occurred to the people that they had to "detest the germans." [ ] the german navy law in its preamble might have filched this from the british navy league catechism. [ ] in an article published in (january ) the london _spectator_ pointed out the hopeless position germany would occupy if england cared to threaten her. the organ, which is now apt to resent the increased german navy as implying aggression upon england, then wrote as follows: "germany has a mercantile marine of vast proportions. the german flag is everywhere. but on the declaration of war the whole of germany's trading ships would be at our mercy. throughout the seas of the world our cruisers would seize and confiscate german ships. within the first week of the declaration of war germany would have suffered a loss of many million pounds by the capture of her ships. nor is that all. our colonies are dotted with german trading-houses, who, in spite of a keen competition, do a great deal of business.... we should not, of course, want to treat them harshly; but war must mean for them the selling of their businesses for what they would fetch and going home to germany. in this way germany would lose a hold upon the trade of the world which it has taken her many years of toil to create.... again, think of the effect upon germany's trade of the closing of all her ports. hamburg is one of the greatest ports of the world. what would be its condition if practically not a single ship could leave or enter it? blockades are no doubt very difficult things to maintain strictly, but hamburg is so placed that the operation would be comparatively easy. in truth the blockade of all the german ports on the baltic or the north sea would present little difficulty.... consider the effect on germany if her flag were swept from the high seas and her ports blockaded. she might not miss her colonies, for they are only a burden, but the loss of her sea-borne trade would be an equivalent to an immediate fine of at least a hundred million sterling. in plain words, a war with germany, even when conducted by her with the utmost wisdom and prudence, must mean for her a direct loss of a terribly heavy kind, and for us virtually no loss at all." this article is full of the fallacies which i have endeavored to expose in this book, but it logically develops the notions which are prevalent in both england and germany; and yet germans have to listen to an english minister of marine describing their navy as a luxury! [ ] here is the real english belief in this matter: "why should germany attack britain? because germany and britain are commercial and political rivals; because germany covets the trade, the colonies, and the empire which britain now possesses.... as to arbitration, limitation of armament, it does not require a very great effort of the imagination to enable us to see that proposal with german eyes. were i a german, i should say: 'these islanders are cool customers. they have fenced in all the best parts of the globe, they have bought or captured fortresses and ports in five continents, they have gained the lead in commerce, they have a virtual monopoly of the carrying trade of the world, they hold command of the seas, and now they propose that we shall all be brothers, and that nobody shall fight or steal any more,'" (robert blatchford, "germany and england," pp. - ). [ ] "facts and fallacies." an answer to "compulsory service," by field-marshal earl roberts, v.c., k.g. [ ] discussing the first edition of this book, sir edward grey said: "true as the statement in that book may be, it does not become an operative motive in the minds and conduct of nations until they are convinced of its truth and it has become a commonplace to them" (argentine centenary banquet, may , ). [ ] lecky, "history of the progress of rationalism in europe." [ ] i do not desire in the least, of course, to create the impression that i regard the truths here elaborated as my "discovery," as though no one had worked in this field before. properly speaking, there is no such thing as priority in ideas. the interdependence of peoples was proclaimed by philosophers three thousand years ago. the french school of pacifists--passy, follin, yves guyot, de molinari, and estournelles de constant--have done splendid work in this field; but no one of them, so far as i know, has undertaken the work of testing in detail the politico-economic orthodoxy by the principle of the economic futility of military force; by bringing that principle to bear on the everyday problems of european statecraft. if there is such an one--presenting the precise notes of interrogation which i have attempted to present here--i am not aware of it. this does not prevent, i trust, the very highest appreciation of earlier and better work done in the cause of peace generally. the work of jean de bloch, among others, though covering different ground from this, possesses an erudition and bulk of statistical evidence to which this can make no claim. the work of j. novikow, to my mind the greatest of all, has already been touched upon. [ ] "turkey in europe," pp. - and - . it is significant, by the way, that the "born soldier" has now been crushed by a non-military race whom he has always despised as having no military tradition. capt. f.w. von herbert ("bye paths in the balkans") wrote (some years before the present war): "the bulgars, as christian subjects of turkey exempt from military service, have tilled the ground under stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions, and the profession of arms is new to them." "stagnant and enfeebling peace conditions" is, in view of subsequent events, distinctly good. [ ] i dislike to weary the reader with such damnable iteration, but when a british cabinet minister is unable in this discussion to distinguish between the folly of a thing and its possibility, one _must_ make the fundamental point clear. [ ] this appendix was written before the balkan states fell to fighting one another. it is scarcely necessary to point out that the events of the last few days (early summer ) lend significance to the argument in the text. [ ] see p. . [ ] _review of reviews_, november, . [ ] in the _daily mail_, to whose editor i am indebted for permission to reprint it. index acceleration, law of, relation to sociology, , adam, paul, advocate of war, aflalo, f.g., home-sickness among emigrants, , africa, south: gold-mines of, as motive of boer war, ; position of trade in, in event of war, alsace-lorraine, annexation of, - america. _see_ united states america, south: financial development of, , ; folly of aggression in states of, ; british methods of enforcing financial obligations in, annexation: of alsace-lorraine and value of, to germany, - ; alsace-lorraine, financial aspect, ; bosnia and herzegovina, effect on austria, arabia and internal wars, argentine international trade, aristotle: on slavery, ; the state, armagh, archbishop of, advocate of war, armament, armaments: _united service magazine_ quoted on limitations of, ; bernhardi school, ; motives of, ; justification of, asia minor: protection of german interest in, ; benefit of, to britain if under german tutelage, asquith, mr.: on canadian navy, ; "color problem," , austria, annexation of bosnia and herzegovina, _autos da fé_ in spain, bachmar, dr. f., on union of germany and south africa, bacon on nature of man, balfour, mr. a.j., on independence of the colonies, - bank of england: position of, if germany invaded england, - ; helped by bank of france, banking: withers on interdependence necessary in, - . _see also_ finance barracks, mr. r. blatchford on moral influence of, - barrès, m., advocate of war, baty, mr. t., social "stratification" and business, - beaulieu, paul, on french indemnity, belgium economic security, - _berliner tageblatt_, bernhardi: on defence of war, - ; war advocates and school of, ; on tactics and "pomp of war," ; policy of, bertillon, dr., on relative individual wealth in nations, biermer, professor, on protectionist movement in germany, birrell, mr. augustine, bismarck: and machiavelli's dictum as to policy of a prudent ruler, ; and the french indemnity, ; his surprise at the recuperation of france after the war, - blatchford, mr. robert, , , , , , - , , , block, maurice, on french indemnity, blum, hans, boer war: motives of, ; results of, ; cost of, bosnia and herzegovina. _see_ austria bourget, paul, advocate of war, brazil, international trade of, britain: possibility of being "wiped out" in twenty-four hours, - ; conquest of, a physical impossibility, ; sir c.p. lucas's policy of colonial government, ; position of, with regard to "ownership" of colonies, ; attitude of, with regard to german trade in asia minor, - ; prussianization of, ; contrast between, and ancient rome, ; position of, with regard to her independent states, - ; cause of hostility towards germany, ; what the world has to learn from imperial development of, - ; the real exemplar of the nations, - brunetière, advocate of war, bülow, prince von, on germany's "rage for luxury," etc., - caivano, tomasso, - canada: english merchant in, ; england's trade with, ; effect of acquisition of, by germany, ; the question of "ownership" of, ; sir wilfrid laurier on canadian navy, ; war record, capital. _see_ finance catholics and protestants, chamberlain, mr. joseph, charles ii. of spain, churchill, mr. winston; dictum of, on war, - ; on german navy "luxury," - colonies: no advantage gained by conquest of, - , - ; commercial value of, ; sir c.p. lucas on britain's policy of colonial government, - ; and national independence, ; _volkstein_ on colonial neutrality in warfare, ; britain's "ownership" of, ; administrative weaknesses of, - ; fiscal position of, - ; false policy of conquest of, ; méline régime and advantages of independent administration of french, - ; impossibility of "possession" of, ; how germany exploits her, ; economic retribution on, - colonies, crown, , - commerce: definition of, ; deterioration of international incident to war, . _see also_ trade community, what constitutes well-being of a, - competition: methods of industrial, ; impossibility of destruction of, - ; and co-operation, confiscation, the impossibility of, - conqueror, policy of, in regard to wealth and territory, - conquest: _blackwood's magazine_ in defence of, - ; impossibility of, from point of view of trade, - ; of colonies, no advantages gained by, - ; alleged benefits of, disproved by prosperity of small states, - ; no advantage gained by, in modern warfare, - , ; advantage of, in ancient and medieval times, - ; alleged benefits of, disproved, - ; unable to change national character of conquered territory, - ; inadequate value of present methods of, ; lessening rôle of, in commerce, - ; paradox of london police force applied in relation to, ; where it has benefited nations, ; effect of co-operation as a factor against, ; enervating effects of, on romans, ; spain ruined by glamour of, - ; co-operation taking place of, - ; changed nature of, ; warlike nations the victims of, ; logical absurdity of, summed up, - . _see also_ war conscription: and the peace ideal, ; in france and germany, comparison between, - ; how it might work in england, - co-operation and competition, - ; the effects of, in international relations, ; taking place of conquest, - ; advantages of, allied to force, - ; of states and nationalism, courtesy in international relations, cox, sir edmund c., credit: in its relation to war, - ; definition of, critics, arguments of, against "the great illusion," - cuba, war of, financial effect of, to spain, _daily mail_, - , - , , d'arbeux, captain, dawson, harbutt, defence: navy league on, ; the necessity of, ; problem of, considered, demolins, edmond, déroulède, advocate of war, dervishes, appreciation of, as fighters, ; w.h. steevens quoted on, - despot, financial embarrassment of the, - despotism, the reasons for poverty of, dilke, sir charles, domination. _see_ conquest dreyfus case, _times_ quoted on, - duel, survival and abandonment of, - economics. _see_ finance emigration, statistics of, for germany, emotion, need for the control of, empiricism the curse of political thinking, england. _see_ britain environment, the rôle of, in the formation of character, faguet, advocate of war, farrar, dean, advocate of war, farrer, fian, dr., finance: interdependence of credit-built position of, on german invasion, ; investment secure in small states, , , , , , ; in its relation to industry, - ; position of bank of england on german invasion, - ; effect on bank rate of financial crisis in new york, - ; effect of repudiation in south american states, - ; why repudiation is unprofitable, - ; cause of bank crisis in united states, ; withers's appreciation of english bankers, ; lavisse on germany's financial crisis, ; the meaning of "the money of a nation," ; physical force replaced by economic pressure, ; economic and physical force in their relation to money, ; british methods of enforcing financial obligations in south america, ; organization of capital, ; bank of england helped by bank of france, ; internationalization of, - ; why a western bank ceased to be robbed, - ; _spectator_ quoted on economic interdependence, - . _see also_ wealth fisher, admiral, fleet. _see_ navy force: the diminishing factor of, , ; co-operation and the advantage of, ; justification of, by police, - ; replaced by economic pressure, ; in its relation to slavery, - ; the general domination of, - ; herbert spencer quoted on limitation implied by physical, - ; difference between economic and physical, - france: max wirth on her position ftper franco-german war, ; bismarck on, - ; standard of comfort in, higher than in germany, ; financial superiority of, ; colonial administration of the méline régime, - ; supposed benefit of "expansion" to, - ; a more military nation than germany, - ; conscription in, ; physical results of napoleonic wars in, ; cause of failure of expansion in asia, ; stigmatized by _times_ in dreyfus case, - ; mr. chamberlain on, ; position of the statesman in, franco-german war: position of france after, - ; bismarck on, - ; alleged benefit of, to germany, ; some difficulties resulting from, in germany, - ; no advantage gained by, to germany, - fried, a., - friendship in international relations, ; general question of, - froude, gaevernitz. _see_ schulze-gaevernitz germany: mr. harrison on effect of military predominance of, ; dr. schulze-gaevernitz on german navy, ; r. blatchford on german attack, ; admiral von koster on overseas interest of, - ; future demands of, with regard to europe, ; aims of pan-germanists, - ; the position of german citizen if germany "owned" holland, ; value of alsace-lorraine to, - ; withers quoted on commerce of, and english credit, ; false theory of annihilation of, explained, ; lavisse on financial crisis in, ; economic effect of aforesaid crisis, - ; progress of socialism in, after war of , ; emigration statistics in, ; financial position in regard to france, ; political evolution of, before the war, ; social difficulties in, resulting from franco-german war, ; failure of war from point of view of annexation and indemnity, ; and the acquisition of canada, - ; the case of colonial conquest, - ; if germany had conducted the boer war, - ; trade of, with occupied territory, ; trade in egypt, statistics of, ; benefits of "ownership," fallacy of, ; growth and expansion of, - ; methods of colonial exploitation, - ; protection of interests in asia minor, ; commercial supremacy of, in undeveloped territory, - ; sir h. johnston on germany's real object of conquest, ; burden of alsace-lorraine, ; r. blatchford on policy of, ; r. blatchford in defence of, ; "rage for luxury" in, ; reputed military character of, disproved on investigation, - ; as type of a military nation, - ; conscription in, - ; wisdom of, in avoiding war, ; kotze scandal in, ; no advantage gained by war of , ; growth of social democratic movement in, ; _berliner tageblatt_ in praise of england as compared with, ; progress owing to regimentation, - ; mr. harbutt dawson on unified, - ; false idea of british hostility to, ; cause of british hostility towards, ; r. blatchford on warlike preparations of, to destroy britain, ; mr. fried on heterogeneous nature of, - ; _north german gazette_ on strikes in, and effects of co-operation, - ; _morning post_ on german aggression, ; mr. churchill and german defence, ; _spectator_ on position of, if attacked by britain, ; mr. blatchford on reasons for attack by, ; sir e.c. cox on british policy with regard to, ; anglo-german banquets, futility of, towards mutual understanding, giffen, sir robert, on cost of franco-german war, , , goltz, von der, - "great illusion, the," history of, - grey, sir edward, grubb, mr. edward, hague conferences, cause of failures of, hamburg, annexation of, by britain and probable result, - harrison, mr. frederic: quoted on effect of germany's predominance in military power, ; quoted on naval defence and effect of invasion by germany, - ; theories challenged, - holland: economic security of, on invasion, - ; the case of the hollander if germany "owned" holland, ; greatness of, compared to prussia, holy sepulchre, fights between infidels and christians for, honour: mr. roosevelt on national, ; consideration of general question of, - human nature: alleged unchangeability of, - ; changes of manifestations in, , , , , , , - hyndman, mr. h.m., ideas, rationalization of, indemnity; sir r. giffen quoted on, from franco-german war, ; cost of same considered in detail, - ; practical difficulties of, - ; doubtful advantage of, to conqueror, - ; problems of, not sufficiently studied, individual, false analogy between nation and, , - industrialism, cruelties of, , industry, relation of, to finance, - _l'information_, intercommunication of states, - interdependence: plea of, against war, - ; theory of, explained, - ; development of, - ; evolution of, - ; diminution of physical force owing to, - ; the vital necessity of, international politics, obsolete conception of, admiral mahan on elements of, , , investment. _see_ finance james i. of scotland, james, professor william, , japan, position of, as "owner" of korea, johnston, sir harry h., kidd, benjamin, , kingsley, charles, kitchener, lord, ; w.h. steevens' description of, korea, position of japan as "owner" of, koster, admiral von, , kotze scandal, the, and "rottenness" of german civilization, _times_ on, kropotkin, prince, labour: division of, explained from point of view of conquest, ; in the modern world, laurier, sir wilfrid, lavisse, law of acceleration. _see_ acceleration, law of law, natural, of man in relation to strife, lea, general homer, , , , , lecky, , , , limborch, loti, pierre, lucas, sir c.p., machiavelli, mcdougal, professor w., , mckenzie, f.a., mahan, admiral: quoted on international relations, , ; quoted in criticism of "the great illusion," ; quoted on elements of international politics, ; quoted on world-politics, _manchester guardian_ and peace, - mankind: biological development of, ; progress of, from barbarity to civilization, ; psychological change in, ; reasons for indisposition to fight in, ; process of civilization of, - ; attitude of "average sensual man" towards peace, - martin, t.g., _matin, le_, , , maxse, leo, , méline régime, the, in french colonies, merchant adventurer, the case of, in sixteenth century, - militarists, views of, on war, - military force: when and where it may be necessary, ; not essential to national efficiency, military support of colonies. _see_ colonies military training, its influence on peace, - moltke, von, money. _see_ finance _morning post_, , mulhall on comparative standard of comfort in european countries, murray, major, napoleonic wars, results of, nation, nations: falseness of analogy between individual and a, , - ; honour of, ; why warlike, do not inherit the earth, ; warlike and unwarlike, , , ; canada least warlike, ; power of a, not dependent on its army and navy, - ; reason for decay of military, - ; complexity of, - ; _spectator_ on economic theories of, national efficiency, relation to military power, nationalism and the co-operation of states, - navy, british: _times_ on powers of, ; h.w. wilson on necessity for powerful, ; admiral fisher on supremacy of, northmen methods, norway: the carrying trade of, ; no temptation to invade, sir wilfrid laurier on, novikow, j., darwinian theory of, owen, mr. douglas, "ownership." _see_ possession pacifists: pleas of, , , - ; case of, ; patriots and, pan-germanists, aims of, patriots: patriotism, national honour and, ; modification of aims of, owing to interdependence, ; general lea on extinction of, in united states, ; the religion of politics, ; pacifists and, , peace: why propaganda has given small results, - ; psychological case for, - ; qualities necessary to preserve, ; occupations which tend towards, - ; military training and, ; attitude of "average sensual man" towards, - penfold, f. c, philippines, financial effect of loss of, to spain, phillips, captain march, pitcairn, police force, london, paradox of, applied in relation to conquest, , , politics, obsolete terminology of, portugal, cause of failure of expansion in asia, - possession: sir j.r. seeley on, ; fallacious theory considered from german point of view, - printing: results of invention of, - ; power of, prussia: cause of prosperity of, ; agitation for electoral reform in, _public opinion_, - pugnacity: irrational nature of, - ; professor william mcdougal on, - _referee_, regimentation, germany's progress owing to, - religion: early ideals of, - ; critchfield on influence of catholic priests in south american republics, ; struggles of, and the state, - , - , ; beliefs no longer enforced by government, ; lecky on wars of, - ; freedom of opinion in, ; reason of cessation of wars of, ; relation to politics of, - renan, ernest, - repudiation. _see_ finance revenue, state, what becomes of, rizzi, francisco, robertson, john m., rohrbach, dr. p., roman civilization: mr. roosevelt on, ; sir j.r. seeley on downfall and decay of, rome, ancient: sir j.r. seeley on downfall and decay of, ; slave society of, ; contrast between, and britain, roosevelt, mr., , , , , , , , salisbury, lord, samoa, the case of the powers, sanderson, lord, schulze-gaevernitz, prof. von, sea-power, overseas trade, benjamin kidd on, - . _see also_ british navy seeley, sir j.r., , shaw, g.b., slavery, slaves: society of, in rome, ; its relation to physical force, - socialism, progress of, in germany after war of , soetbeer, soldier: r. blatchford on character of, - ; captain march phillips on, - ; _spectator_ on, ; our debt to the, ; boyish appeal of the, - ; the "poetic shelf" for the, spain: f.c. penfold on progress of, since war, ; failure of expansion of, in asia, - ; pierre loti quoted in praise of troops, ; military virtues of, ; ruin of, by conquest, spanish american. _see_ america, south _spectator_, , , , , - , , spencer, herbert, - state, states: analogy between individuals in, - ; division of, in relation to conflict, ; ancient and modern, character of, ; false analogy between, and a person, - ; independent nature of, - ; _morning post_ on the organism of, ; heterogeneous elements of, ; professor mcdougal on pugnacity of barbarous, - ; definition of, ; reasons for lessening "rôle" of hostility among, - ; position of citizen of small, if he became citizen of a large, - states small: as prosperous as the great powers, , ; investments secure in, , , ; cause of prosperity of, - statesmen: major murray on methods of, with regard to treaties, ; leo maxse on character of english, steevens, w.h., , , , steinmetz, s.r., stengel, baron von, , , story, general john p., switzerland: the commercial power of, ; compared to prussia, ; position of british subject in, if threatened by britain, _temps, le_, territorial independence, farrer on, _times_, the, , , , , , trade: t.g. martin on britain's carrying, ; admiral von koster quoted on german overseas, - ; impossible to capture, by military conquest, - ; statistics of britain's overseas, ; diminishing factor of physical force in, - . _see also_ competition, commerce, industry transvaal: treatment of british indian in, before and after the war, - ; gold-mines of, as motives for boer war, - ; national character of, still unchanged, treasury, mr. d. owen on what enriches, treaties, major stuart murray on futility of, tribute, exaction of, an economic impossibility, tripoli, ineptitude of italy in, united states: germans in, ; general lea and _daily mail_ on national ideals in, _united service magazine_, venezuela: warlike character of, ; caivano on natives of, - viking, the, our debt to, _volkstein_, war: the case of, from militarist point of view, ; cost of franco-german war, - ; bernhardi in defence of, ; s.r. steinmetz on the nature of, ; general homer lee in defence of, - ; general storey in defence of, ; baron von stengel in defence of, ; moltke in defence of, ; roosevelt in defence of, - ; professor james in defence of, ; famous clergyman in defence of, - ; defence of, summarized, - ; the reason for, ; von der goltz on nature of, ; result of armed peace, ; justification of defender of, ; and the natural law of man, ; the irrational aspect of, ; _spectator_ on means to an end, - ; procurator of russian holy synod on, ; general lea on its relation to commercial activities, ; captain d'arbeux on military deterioration, ; prominent advocates of, ; pleas of military authorities, ; general homer lea on military spirit, - ; advocates of, criticized, - ; the curse of, in south american republics, ; the question of just and unjust, - ; fundamental error of, ; real process of, ; baron von stengel's dictum, - ; national deterioration owing to, ; effects of prolonged warfare, ; changed nature of, ; not now a physical but an intellectual pursuit, - ; general homer lea on nature of modern battles, ; bernhardi on tactics and "pomp of war," ; radical change in methods of, - ; pleas of militarists analyzed, - ; _manchester guardian_ on moral influence of, ; emotional appeal of, ; mr. churchill on, . _see also_ conquest wealth: _referee_ on, in time of war, ; national, not dependent on its political power, ; policy of conqueror with regard to, - ; the question of, in international politics, - , intangibility of, . _see also_ finance wilkinson, professor, , - wilson, h.w., wirth, max, witchcraft: belief in, ; lecky on, - ; folly of, from modern point of view, withers, hartley, _world_, the, * * * * * _by the same author_ the great illusion a study of the relation of military power in nations to their economic and social advantages. mo. $ . _net_ arms and industry a study of the foundations of international polity _in preparation:_ the citizen and society first principles of their relationship * * * * * "the great illusion" and public opinion america ="new york times," march , .= "a book which has compelled thought; a book full of real ideas deserves the welcome it has received. the author is enjoying the almost unlimited praise of his contemporaries, expressed or indicated by many men of eminence and influence, by countless reviewers who have lately hungered for a hero to worship. "moreover ... it certainly makes for genuine æsthetic pleasure, and that is all most of us ask of a book." ="the evening post," chicago (mr. floyd dell), february , .= "the book, being read, does not simply satisfy curiosity; it disturbs and amazes. it is not, as one would expect, a striking expression of some familiar objections to war. it is instead--it appears to be--a new contribution to thought, a revolutionary work of the first importance, a complete shattering of conventional ideas about international politics; something corresponding to the epoch-making 'origin of species' in the realm of biology. "all of this it appears to be. one says 'appears,' not because the book fails completely to convince, but because it convinces so fully. the paradox is so perfect there must be something wrong about it!... "at first glance the statement which forms the basis of the book looks rather absurd, but before it is finished it seems a self-evident proposition. it is certainly a proposition which, if proved, will provide a materialistic common-sense basis for disarmament.... "there is subject-matter here for ironic contemplation. mr. angell gives the reader no chance to imagine that these things 'just happened.' he shows why they happened and had to happen.... "one returns again and again to the arguments, looking to find some fallacy in them. not finding them, one stares wonderingly ahead into the future, where the book seems to cast its portentous shadow." ="boston herald," january , .= "this is an epoch-making book, which should be in the hands of everyone who has even the slightest interest in human progress.... his criticism is not only masterly--it is overwhelming; for though controversy will arise on some of the details, the main argument is irrefutable. he has worked it out with a grasp of the evidence and a relentlessness of logic that will give life and meaning to his book for many a year to come." ="life" (new york).= "an inquiry into the nature and history of the forces that have shaped and are shaping our social development that throws more light upon the meaning and the probable outcome of the so-called 'war upon war' than all that has been written and published upon both sides put together. the incontrovertible service that mr. angell has rendered us in 'the great illusion' is to have introduced intellectual order into an emotional chaos." great britain. ="daily mail."= "no book has attracted wider attention or has done more to stimulate thought in the present century than 'the great illusion.' published obscurely, and the work of an unknown writer, it gradually forced its way to the front.... has become a significant factor in the present discussion of armaments and arbitration." ="nation."= "no piece of political thinking has in recent years more stirred the world which controls the movement of politics.... a fervour, a simplicity, and a force which no political writer of our generation has equalled ... rank its author, with cobden, among the greatest of our pamphleteers, perhaps the greatest since swift." ="edinburgh review."= "mr. angell's main thesis cannot be disputed, and when the facts ... are fully realized, there will be another diplomatic revolution more fundamental than that of ." ="daily news."= "so simple were the questions he asked, so unshakable the facts of his reply, so enormous and dangerous the popular illusion which he exposed, that the book not only caused a sensation in reading circles, but also, as we know, greatly moved certain persons high-placed in the political world. "the critics have failed to find a serious flaw in norman angell's logical, coherent, masterly analysis." =sir frank lascelles (formerly british ambassador at berlin) in speech at glasgow, january , .= "while i was staying with the late king, his majesty referred me to a book which had then been published by norman angell, entitled 'the great illusion.' i read the book, and while i think that at present it is not a question of practical politics, i am convinced that it will change the thought of the world in the future." =r.a. scott james in "the influence of the press."= "norman angel in recent years has done more probably than any other european to frustrate war, to prove that it is unprofitable. he was probably the guiding spirit behind the diplomacy which checked the great powers from rushing into the balkan conflict." =j.w. graham, m.a., in "evolution and empire."= "norman angell has placed the world in his debt and initiated a new epoch of thought.... it is doubtful whether since the 'origin of species' so many bubbles have been burst, and so definitely plain a step in thought been made, by any single book." =mr. harold begbie in the "daily chronicle."= "a new idea is suddenly thrust upon the minds of men.... it is hardly an exaggeration to say that this book does more to fill the mind with the intolerable weight of war, to convince the reasonable mind ... than all the moral and eloquent appeals of tolstoy.... the wisest piece of writing on the side of peace extant in the world to-day." ="birmingham post."= "'the great illusion,' by sheer force, originality, and indisputable logic, has won its way steadily forward, and made its author a person to be quoted by statesmen and diplomatists not only in england, but in france, germany, and america." ="glasgow news."= "if only for the daring with which mr. angell's extraordinary book declares that the accepted ideas are so much moonshine, it would be a work to attract attention. when we add that mr. angell makes out a decidedly brilliant and arresting case for his contention, we have said sufficient to indicate that it is worth perusal by the most serious type of reader." british colonial opinion. =w.m. hughes, acting premier of australia, in a letter to the "sydney telegraph."= "it is a great book, a glorious book to read. it is a book pregnant with the brightest promise to the future of civilized man. peace--not the timid, shrinking figure of the hague, cowering under the sinister shadow of six million bayonets--appears at length as an ideal possible of realization in our own time." =sir george reid, australian high commissioner in london (sphinx club banquet, may , ).= "i regard the author of this book as having rendered one of the greatest services ever rendered by the writer of a book to the human race. well, i will be very cautious indeed--one of the greatest services which any author has rendered during the past hundred years." france and belgium. =m. anatole france in "the english review," august, .= "one cannot weigh too deeply the reflections of this ably reasoned work." ="la petite république" (m. henri turot), décembre, .= "j'estime, pour ma part, 'la grande illusion' doit avoir, au point de vue de la conception moderne de l'économie politique internationale, un retentissement égal à celui qu'eut, en matière biologique, la publication, par darwin, de 'l'origine des espèces.' "c'est que m. norman angell joint à l'originalité de la pensée le courage de toutes les franchises, qu'il unit à une prodigieuse érudition la lucidité d'esprit et la méthode qui font jaillir la loi scientifique de l'ensemble des événements observés." ="revue bleu," mai, .= "fortement étayées, ses propositions émanent d'un esprit singulièrement réaliste, également informé et clairvoyant, qui met une connaissance des affaires et une dialectique concise au service d'une conviction, aussi passionnée que généreuse." =m. jean jaurès, during debate in french chamber of deputies, january , ; see journal officiel, janvier, .= "il a paru, il y a peu de temps, un livre anglais de m. norman angell, 'la grande illusion,' qui a produit un grand effet en angleterre. dans les quelques jours que j'ai passés de l'autre côté du détroit, j'ai vu, dans les réunions populaires, toutes les fois qu'il était fait mention de ce livre, les applaudissements éclater." germany and austria. ="kölnische zeitung."= "never before has the peace question been dealt with by so bold, novel, and clear a method; never before has the financial interdependence of nations been shown with such precision.... it is refreshing to have demonstrated in this unsentimental, practical way the fact that as our financial interdependence increases war as a business venture necessarily becomes more and more unprofitable." ="der turmer" (stuttgart).= "this demonstration should clear the air like a thunderstorm.... it is not because the book brilliantly expresses what are in many respects our own views that we urge its importance, but because of its unanswerable demonstration of the futility of military power in the economic field." ="königsberger allgemeine zeitung."= "this book proves absolutely that conquest as a means of material gain has become an impossibility.... the author shows that the factors of the whole problem have been profoundly modified within the past forty years." ="ethische kultur" (berlin).= "never has militarism been combated by economic weapons with the skill shown by norman angell.... so broad and comprehensive a grasp of the moral as well as the economic force, that the book is a real pleasure to read.... the time was ripe for a man with this keenness of vision to come forward and prove in this flawless way that military power has nothing to do with national prosperity." =professor karl von bar, the authority on international and criminal law, privy councillor, etc.= "particularly do i agree with the author in these two points: ( ) that in the present condition of organized society the attempt of one nation to destroy the commerce or industry of another must damage the victor more perhaps than the vanquished; and ( ) that physical force is a constantly diminishing factor in human affairs. the rising generation seems to be realizing this more and more." =dr. friedrich curtius.= "the book will, i hope, convince everyone that in our time the attempt to settle industrial and commercial conflicts by arms is an absurdity.... i doubt, indeed, whether educated folks in germany entertain this 'illusion' ... or the idea that colonies or wealth can be 'captured.' ... a war dictated by a moral idea, the only one we can justify, is inconceivable as between england and germany." =dr. wilhelm ostwald, who has occupied chairs in several german universities, as well as at harvard and columbia.= "from the first line to the last 'the great illusion' expresses my own opinions." =dr. sommer, member of the reichstag.= "a most timely work, and one which everyone, be he statesman or political economist, should study ... especially if he desires to understand a peace ideal which is practical and realizable.... without agreeing on all points, i admit gladly the force and suggestiveness of the thesis.... we on our side should make it our business, as you should on yours, to render it operative, to use the means, heretofore unrealized, of joint work for civilization. in rendering possible such joint work, norman angell's book must take a foremost place." =dr. max nordau.= "if the destiny of people were settled by reason and interest, the influence of such a book would be decisive.... the book will convince the far-seeing minority, who will spread the truth, and thus slowly conquer the world." =dr. albert suedekum, member of the reichstag, author of several works on municipal government, editor of municipal year-books, etc.= "i consider the book an invaluable contribution to the better understanding of the real basis of international peace." =dr. otto mugdan, member of the reichstag, member of the national loan commission, chairman of the audit commission, etc.= "the demonstration of the financial interdependence of modern civilized nations, and the economic futility of conquest, could not be made more irrefutably." =professor a. von harder.= "i agree that it is a mistake to wait for action as between governments; far better, as jaurès proved the other day in the french chamber, for the peoples to co-operate.... the book should be widely circulated in germany, where so many are still of opinion that heavy armaments are an absolute necessity for self-defence." financial and economic authorities. ="american journal of political economy."= "the best treatise yet written on the economic aspect of war." ="american political science review."= "it may be doubted whether within its entire range the peace literature of the anglo-saxon world has ever produced a more fascinating or significant study." ="economist" (london).= "nothing has ever been put in the same space so well calculated to set plain men thinking usefully on the subject of expenditure on armaments, scare and war.... the result of the publication of this book has been within the past month or two quite a number of rather unlikely conversions to the cause of retrenchment." ="investors' review" (london), november , .= "no book we have read for years has so interested and delighted us.... he proceeds to argue, and to prove, that conquests do not enrich the conqueror under modern conditions of life.... the style in which the book is written--sincere, transparent, simple, and now and then charged with fine touches of ironic humour--make it very easy to read." ="economic review" (london).= "civilization will some day acknowledge a deep debt of gratitude to mr. norman angell for the bold and searching criticism of the fundamental assumptions of modern diplomacy contained in his remarkable book.... he has laid his fingers upon some very vital facts, to which even educated opinion has hitherto been blind." ="journal des economistes."= "son livre sera beaucoup lu, car il est aussi agréable que profond, et il donnera beaucoup à réfléchir." ="export" (organ des centralvereins für handelsgeographie).= "by reason of its statement of the case against war in terms of practical politics and commercial advantage (=real-und handelspolitikers=), the keenness and the mercilessness of the logic by which the author explodes the errors and the illusions of the war phantasists ... the sense of reality, the force with which he settles accounts point by point with the militarists, this book stands alone. it is unique." ="the western mail."= "a novel, bold, and startling theory." military opinion. ="army and navy journal" (n.y.), october , .= "if all anti-militarists could argue for their cause with the candour and fairness of norman angell we should welcome them, not with 'bloody hands to hospitable graves,' but to a warm and cheery intellectual comradeship. mr. angell has packed away in his book more common sense than peace societies have given birth to in all the years of their existence...." ="united service magazine" (london), may, .= "it is an extraordinarily clearly written treatise upon an absorbingly interesting subject, and it is one which no thinking soldier should neglect to study.... mr. angell's book is much to be commended in this respect. it contains none of the nauseating sentiment which is normally parasitic to 'peace' literature. the author is evidently careful to take things exactly as he conceives them to be, and to work out his conclusions without 'cleverness' and unobscured by technical language. his method is to state the case for the defence (of present-day 'militarist' statecraft), to the best of his ability in one chapter, calling the best witnesses he can find and putting their views from every standpoint so clearly that even one who was beforehand quite ignorant of the subject cannot fail to understand. mr. angell's book is one which all citizens would do well to read, and read right through. it has the clearness of vision and the sparkling conciseness which one associates with swift at his best." ="the army service corps quarterly" (aldershot, england), april, .= "the ideas are so original and clever, and in places are argued with so much force and common sense, that they cannot be pushed aside at once as preposterous.... there is food here for profound study.... above all, we should encourage the sale of 'the great illusion' abroad, among nations likely to attack us, as much as possible." ="war office times" (london).= "should be read by everyone who desires to comprehend both the strength and the weakness of this country." * * * * * transcriber's notes: punctuation has been normalized. on page "be yond" changed to "beyond." "... beyond saving the mother country...." on page "such and-such" changed to "such-and-such." on page "reationship" changed to "relationship." "... on basis of mutual profit the only relationship...." on page "porportion" changed to "proportion." "our sense of proportion in these matters...." on page "real ze" changed to "realize." "... by the fact that she failed to realize this truth...." on page "anchronism" changed to "anachronism." "... it is an anachronism; it finds its justification in...." on page "indentification" changed to "identification." "... identification between a people and the acts...." on page "orginally" changed to "originally." "... our relative positions is just what it was originally...." on page "fanticism" changed to "fanaticism." "... mohammedan fanaticism, chinese boxerism...." generously made available by the internet archive/american libraries.) international incidents cambridge university press london: fetter lane, e.c. c. f. clay, manager _edinburgh_: , princes street _london_: stevens and sons, ltd., and , chancery lane _berlin_: a. asher and co. _leipzig_: f. a. brockhaus _new york_: g. p. putnam's sons _bombay and calcutta_: macmillan and co., ltd. [_all rights reserved_] international incidents for discussion in conversation classes by l. oppenheim, m.a., ll.d. whewell professor of international law in the university of cambridge associate of the institute of international law cambridge: at the university press _cambridge:_ printed by john clay, m.a. at the university press. transcribers' note: inconsistent punctuation printed in the original text has been retained. preface for many years i have pursued the practice of holding conversation classes following my lectures on international law. the chief characteristic of these classes is the discussion of international incidents as they occur in everyday life. i did not formerly possess any collection, but brought before the class such incidents as had occurred during the preceding week. of late i have found it more useful to preserve a record of some of these incidents and to add to this nucleus a small number of typical cases from the past as well as some problem cases, which were invented for the purpose of drawing the attention of the class to certain salient points of international law. as i was often asked by my students and others to bring out a collection of incidents suitable for discussion, and as the printing of such a little book frees me from the necessity of dictating the cases to my students, i have, although somewhat reluctantly, made up my mind to publish the present collection. i need hardly emphasise the fact that this collection is not intended to compete either with scott's _cases on international law, selected from decisions of english and american courts_, or with pitt cobbett's _leading cases and opinions on international law_, both of which are collections of standard value, but intended for quite other purposes than my own. i have spent much thought in the endeavour to class my incidents into a number of groups, but having found all such efforts at grouping futile, i therefore present them in twenty-five sections, each containing four cases of a different character. experience has shewn me that in a class lasting two hours i am able to discuss the four cases contained in these sections. i have taken special care not to have two similar cases within the same section, for although there are no two cases exactly alike in the collection, there are several possessing certain characteristics in common. it is one of the tasks of the teacher and the students themselves to group together such of my cases as they may think are related to each other by one or more of these traits. it has been suggested that notes and hints should be appended to each case, but the purpose for which the collection is published is better served by giving the incidents devoid of any explanatory matter. should this book induce other teachers of international law to adopt my method of seminar work, it must be left to them to stimulate their classes in such a way as to enable the students to discover on their own initiative the solution of the problems. i gladly accepted the suggestion of the publishers that the cases should be printed on writing paper and on one side of the page only, so that notes may be taken and additional cases added. i am greatly indebted to mr dudley ward, of st john's college, cambridge, my assistant, who has prepared the cases for the press and read the proofs. in deciding upon the final form of each case so many of his suggestions have been adopted that in many instances i do not know what is my own and what is his work. l. o. whewell house, cambridge, _june th, _. table of contents page section i. . a councillor of legation in difficulties . neutral goods on enemy merchantman . american coasting trade . a german balloon in antwerp section ii. . use of the white flag . a south american "pseudo-republic" . a tavern brawl . a threatened diplomatic rupture section iii. . death sentence on russian terrorists . the case of de jager . a kidnapped chinaman . a case of bigamy section iv. . a shot across the frontier . a revolted prize . investments abroad . russian coasting trade section v. . exceeding the speed limit . a new-born island . an irate queen . an incident in the black sea section vi. . the case of the _trent_ . a double murderer . a masterful customs official . russian refugees and foreign asylum section vii. . a conversion at sea . a frontier affray . general vukotitch . an anglo-french burglar section viii. . signals of distress . a change of parts . violation of a foreign flag . a pickpocket at sea section ix. . gypsies in straits . a question of annexation . disputed fisheries . imperial coasting trade section x. . a russian crime tried in austria . stratagem or perfidy . murder of a german consul in mexico . cossacks at large section xi. . islanders in revolt . seizure of ambassadors . an envoy in debt . treaty bargaining section xii. . a fallen president . a murder in monaco . a question of interpretation . the island of santa lucia section xiii. . an attaché's chauffeur . in quest of balata . a "sujet mixte" . koreans at the hague peace conference section xiv. . the adventures of a south american physician . extradition of a british subject . the case of the _oldhamia_ . an ambassador's estate section xv. . dangers of ballooning . family honour . an ocean chase . the _maori king_ section xvi. . the island of rakahanga . a complaint against the police . a man with two wives . a murder on a mail boat section xvii. . persian disorders . the expulsion of monsieur de reus . the case of mcleod . a thwarted suicide section xviii. . an insult to an ambassador . a question of legitimacy . the coachman of an envoy . the case of schnaebelé section xix. . amelia island . representation to china . exemption from rates . errant balloons section xx. . sully in england . homicide by an attaché . a disputed capture . the punishment for murder section xxi. . a traitor's fate . an interrupted armistice . shooting affray in a legation . the surrender of port arthur section xxii. . an ambassador's brother . a detained steamer . prussia and the poles . a charmed life section xxiii. . a daring robbery . the fall of abdul hamid . a president abroad . a rejected ambassador section xxiv. . revictualling of a fortress . dutch reprisals . birth on the high seas . a high-handed action section xxv. . the _southern queen_ . a three-cornered dispute . russian revolutionary outrage in paris . the detention of napoleon i. section i . _a councillor of legation in difficulties._ in the french journalist léonce dupont, the owner of the parisian newspaper _la nation_, became bankrupt. it was discovered that this paper was really founded by the councillor of the russian legation in paris, tchitchérine, who had supplied the funds necessary to start it, for the purpose of influencing public opinion in russian interests. the creditors claimed that tchitchérine was liable for the debts of dupont, and brought an action against him. . _neutral goods on enemy merchantman._ a belligerent man-of-war sinks his prize, an enemy merchantman, on account of the impossibility of sparing a prize crew. part of the cargo belongs to neutral owners, who claim compensation for the loss of their goods. . _american coasting trade._ in , after having acquired the philippines and the island of puerto rico from spain by the peace treaty of paris, and in , after having acquired the hawaiian islands, the united states declared trade between any of her ports and these islands to be coasting trade, and reserved it exclusively for american vessels. . _a german balloon in antwerp._ the following telegram appeared in the _morning post_ of april th, , dated brussels, april th: "an incident which is regarded with some seriousness by belgians has occurred at antwerp. a balloon which for a time was observed to be more or less stationary over the forts finally came to earth in close proximity to them. it proved to be a german balloon, the _dusseldorf no. _, controlled by two men, who, on being interrogated by the commander of the fortifications, declared themselves to be merely a banker and a farmer interested in ballooning in an amateur fashion, who had been obliged to descend. the general commanding the territorial division adjoining antwerp was informed of the incident. on an inquiry being opened it was found that the aeronauts were none other than two german officers, and that the balloon forms part of the german army _matériel_. the minister for war was immediately informed, and he has communicated the facts of the case to his colleagues. the inquiry is being continued. in the balloon was found a quantity of photographic apparatus." section ii . _the use of the white flag._ during war between states a and b, an outlying fort of a harbour of state a is being bombarded by the fleet of state b, and is in danger of capture. suddenly the white flag is hoisted on the fort, and a boat flying a white flag and carrying an officer and some men leaves the fort and makes for the flagship of the bombarding fleet. thereupon the fleet receives the order to cease firing. shortly after this has been carried out, the boat flying the white flag, instead of continuing its course, returns to the fort. under cover of this manoeuvre the bombarded garrison succeeds in abandoning the fort and withdrawing in safety. . _a south american "pseudo-republic."_ the following appeared in the _times_ of april th, : "the utility for the practical politician of the study of that branch of sociology to which m. lebon has given the non-classical name of the psychology of crowds is amusingly demonstrated in the fact of the efforts of the still nebulous state of counany to materialize and to attain a separate and independent existence among the south american republics. what is taking place would seem to be a simple phenomenon of suggestion, induced by the example of panama. the fate of the vague territory known as counany had been settled, as every one supposed, by the arbitral sentence of the swiss tribunal by which this region, with which france and brazil had played diplomatic battledore and shuttlecock for more than years, was finally handed over to the latter power. "brazil has never, it appears, taken effective possession of counany, and the population, whose flag, if ethnographic differences were to be symbolized in it, ought to be a sort of joseph's coat of many colours, are now apparently once more appealing to the civilized world to aid them to secure a separate existence. what recently occurred on the isthmus of panama, when a new state sprang full fledged into being, would seem to have been an object lesson acting automatically on the nerves of these indians, whites, negroes, and half-castes, welding them into a compact whole and giving them a self-consciousness craving european sanction. hypnotized by panama, and, it may be, counting upon the eventual support of one of the continental powers which has already shown the world that brazilian affairs are not beyond the range of its diplomatic vigilance, counany steps once more to the fore. "a paris morning paper, the _journal_, plays the _rôle_ of introducer of the new counany ambassador. this ambassador is a certain m. brezet, who comes to france, in spite of the sentence of the arbitral tribunal, as president of a state which is described by all competent authorities as a _pseudo_-republic, summarily wiped off the map as an independent state. m. brezet, moreover, is a parisian who has served, it is said, in the french forces in guiana. he is now for the second time enjoying the confidence of the counanians, strong in the prestige won by his success in having repulsed the brazilians who sought dutifully to carry out the terms of the clauses of the berne decree. 'after having prepared the military and administrative reorganization of counany, he has come on a mission to europe to defend the interests entrusted to him.' such is the story reported by the _journal_. "counany, now described as the vast territory between the amazon and the two guianas, is not merely a relatively accessible stretch of coast-line and _hinterland_ for a certain enterprising european colonial power, which has already prospected in brazil, venezuela, and the unknown world between the amazon and the orinoco. counany is likewise on the high road of sea communication between the south of south america and the eventual link between the atlantic and the pacific, known as the panama canal. the counany coast-line is a covetable strip of the south american coast which at more favourable moments might even distract our attention from morocco." . _a tavern brawl._ in , in an inn on the german side of the german-french frontier, an altercation arises between franz heller, an austrian subject, and a frenchman. they leave the inn together, still quarrelling. the frenchman hits heller with his stick and runs away across the frontier. heller, however, draws a revolver and shoots the frenchman dead. the french government demands his extradition for murder. . _a threatened diplomatic rupture._ the following appeared in the _times_ of feb. nd, , dated sofia, feb. st: "a diplomatic rupture between servia and montenegro is threatened. the servian minister has been instructed to leave cettigne should satisfaction not be accorded for certain injurious observations made by m. tomanovich, the montenegrin premier, in the course of a recent speech. relations between the two dynasties and countries have long been strained, and the quarrel has become acute since the refusal of the servian government to take the measures demanded by montenegro against refugees and others accused of participation in the recent plot against the life of prince nicholas." section iii . _death sentence on russian terrorists._ the following appeared in the _times_ of feb. th, : "st petersburg, _feb._ . "a court-martial sitting in the fortress of st peter and st paul to-day tried the terrorists who were recently arrested. seven, including two women and the italian calvino, were condemned to death. "rome, _feb._ . "a most painful impression has been created throughout italy by the confirmation to-day of the report that a young italian journalist, mario calvino, has been condemned to death by court-martial in st petersburg. all that is known is that calvino was arrested on a charge of complicity in a plot for the assassination of the grand duke nicholas, that he was condemned with a batch of six other prisoners after a very brief trial held within closed doors, and that he will be hanged next saturday. many friends and colleagues of calvino in italy, as well as in russia, assert the impossibility of his complicity in a nihilist plot, and there prevails a general belief that his condemnation has been due to a judicial error. in answer to representations made to signor tittoni from milan, the foreign minister has stated that the italian ambassador at st petersburg has received instructions to do his utmost on behalf of the condemned man. up to the present moment it would appear that no result of his exertions has yet been reported." . _the case of de jager._ de jager, a burgher of the south african republic, but a settled resident in washbank in natal when the war broke out, joined, in october, , the boer forces, which had occupied washbank and held that town for about six months. he served with them in different capacities until march, , when he went to the transvaal, and took no further part in the war. in march, , he was prosecuted for high treason, but endeavoured to exculpate himself by maintaining that, as the boers had occupied washbank when he joined their forces, he was not then living on english territory. . _a kidnapped chinaman._ sun yat sen, a political refugee from china, living in london, was induced, in , to enter the house of the chinese legation in london. he was kept under arrest there in order to be conveyed as a prisoner to china, the chinese envoy contending that, as the house of the legation was chinese territory, the english government had no right to interfere. . _a case of bigamy._ in alfred ungar, a german by birth, who is naturalised in england without having ceased to be a german subject, goes over to germany and there marries his niece, whom he brings back to london as his wife. in he deserts her, settles down in bristol, and in that town goes through the form of marriage with another woman. in his german wife, being informed of his whereabouts and of his second marriage, has him arrested for bigamy. section iv . _a shot across the frontier._ on sept. th, , a german soldier, on sentry duty at the frontier near vexaincourt, fired a shot from the german side and killed an individual who was on french territory. . _a revolted prize._ an enemy merchantman having been captured during war, a prize crew is put on board and she is navigated in the direction of a port of the state which made the capture. during the voyage the original crew succeed in overpowering the prize crew. the master again takes command, has the prize crew put in irons, and steers for a friendly port. before the vessel gets there, however, she is again captured. can the crew be punished? . _investments abroad._ armand brunetière, a french merchant in paris, who has never been in england, instructs a broker on the london stock exchange to buy £ , worth of consols, and to keep the stock at his disposal. the order is carried out, and six months afterwards brunetière dies. his heirs claim the stock, but the english brokers refuse to hand it over unless the english estate duty, which is claimed by the officials of the inland revenue, has first been paid. . _russian coasting trade._ russia declared, by a ukase of , operating from , that trade between any of her ports and that of vladivostok should be considered as coasting trade and therefore exclusively reserved for russian vessels. section v . _exceeding the speed limit._ in mr. gurney, secretary of the british legation at washington, was brought before the police magistrate at lee, massachusetts, on the charge of having driven a motor car to the public danger. the charge being proved, he was fined. . _a new-born island._ an island rises in the sea on the boundary line of the territorial maritime belt of another island in the possession of state a. a portion of the new-born island stretches into the maritime belt surrounding the previously existing island, and the remainder into the open sea. a man-of-war of state b lands a non-commissioned officer and three men on the part of the island which stretches into the open sea, with the order to hoist the flag of state b and to take possession of it by occupation. is this occupation valid? . _an irate queen._ queen christina of sweden abdicated her throne in , and, after having spent some time first in brussels and later in rome, where she embraced the roman catholic faith, in took up her residence in france. here she discovered that her grand equerry and favourite, monaldeschi, was betraying her personal secrets. she therefore on the th november sentenced him to death, and caused the execution to be carried out on the spot by soldiers of her bodyguard, under the command of count lentinelli, the captain of the guard. . _an incident in the black sea._ the following appeared in the papers dated st petersburg, august th, : "a telegram from sochi, in the caucasus, states that last night the steamer _tchernomor_, while on a trip from tchubgia to tuapse on the black sea, was plundered on the high seas by robbers, who forced the passengers to deliver up their money and valuables. one passenger was wounded by a revolver shot. the robbers, who numbered , took possession of the ship's safe and forced the captain to stop the ship and to land them. they further ordered him not to stop at tuapse, but to proceed direct to sochi, threatening him with murder if he disobeyed. "a later telegram from sochi states that the passengers were robbed of , roubles (£ , ), and that , roubles (£ ) were stolen from the ship's safe." section vi . _the case of the trent._ on nov. th, , during the american civil war, the federal cruiser _san jacinto_ stopped the british mail steam _trent_ on her voyage from havana to the british port of nassau in the bahamas, forcibly took off messrs. mason and slidell, political agents sent by the confederate states to great britain and france, together with their secretaries, and then allowed the vessel to continue her voyage. . _a double murderer._ in james smith, an english subject, commits a murder in london, but succeeds in escaping. in he appears in rome under the name of edward fox, and commits a murder there also. he is tried in rome and condemned to penal servitude for life. in , after having served years and exhibited exemplary conduct, his sentence is remitted by the king of italy. his real identity having been established during the trial, on his release the question of the possibility of his extradition for the previous murder is discussed in the english press. . _a masterful customs official._ on dec. th, , the following appeared in the morning papers, dated winnipeg, dec. rd: "an american customs official, suspecting two canadian farmers of smuggling barley, surprised them near the boundary, and, threatening them with a revolver, compelled them to cross into american territory. the official had no warrant, and the farmers returned into canada. the matter has been laid before the british ambassador in washington and the canadian government. ten thousand dollars damages are claimed." . _russian refugees and foreign asylum._ the following appeared in the _times_ of march th, , dated paris, march th: "signatures are being collected in paris for an address 'to the swiss people,' which already bears the names of mm. anatole france, octave mirbeau, painlevé, jaurès, seignobos, and others, urging them to refuse the extradition of the russian socialist revolutionary bromar vassilieff, who killed the prefect of police of penza in january, . the address declares the deed of bromar vassilieff to have been purely political. france, it contends, refused to surrender hartmann, who had taken part in the attempt against alexander ii. italy refused to extradite michel gotz, a member of the organization that assassinated m. sipiagin and m. plehve. sweden refused to give up tcherniak, accused of having participated in the attempt against m. stolypin. only a few days ago, says this address, an austrian jury acquitted wanda kraguelska, who boasted of having thrown a bomb at the governor-general of poland. the swiss republic, it adds, will not do what monarchies and empires have not done. it was deceived when it handed over to the russian authorities belentsoff, who before his trial died from flogging in prison. free switzerland having always done itself honour by defending the political refugees of all nations against the largest powers, the signatories to the address feel certain that she will not be false to this noble tradition by allowing bromar vassilieff to be extradited." section vii . _a conversion at sea._ on july th and th, , during the russo-japanese war, the _peterburg_ and the _smolensk_, vessels belonging to the russian volunteer fleet in the black sea, passed the turkish straits, flying the russian commercial flag. they likewise passed the suez canal under their commercial flag, but after leaving suez they converted themselves into men-of-war by hoisting the russian war flag, and began to exercise the right of visit and search over neutral merchantmen. on july th the _peterburg_ captured the british p. and o. steamer _malacca_, for alleged carriage of contraband, and put a prize crew on board for the purpose of navigating her to libau. . _a frontier affray._ on may th, , the _petite république_ published a telegram from lisbon announcing that a collision between portuguese and spanish troops had occurred at porto allegro. it appeared that several spanish smugglers were surprised while attempting to smuggle quantities of tobacco and silk across the frontier into portugal, and resisted the portuguese guards. a detachment of spanish troops arrived on the scene during the fight and crossed over on to portuguese territory. here they were fired upon by the portuguese, who, in the darkness, mistook them for a second band of smugglers. the spaniards together with the smugglers now opened fire and a terrible fight ensued in which even women took part. before long, however, the spaniards, who were evidently under the impression that they, too, had to deal with smugglers, discovered their error, and ceased fire, and the smugglers immediately fled to the mountains leaving several dead, including two women. several of the soldiers on both sides were either killed or wounded. . _general vukotitch._ on oct. th, , during the state of tension in the balkan peninsula resulting from the declaration by austria-hungary of her sovereignty over the provinces of bosnia-herzegovina, general vukotitch, a montenegrin envoy, was charged with a special mission for belgrade by prince nicholas. he travelled to his destination by way of fiume, but, on arriving at agram, he was ordered from the train by gendarmes and conducted to the prefecture of police. there he was searched, and his purse and everything else he had in his possession were taken from him. at the same time his baggage was completely ransacked. he told the _gendarmerie_ officers his name, explained his _status_, and showed them the passport and the permit delivered to him by the austro-hungarian legation at cettigne, but all without any effect. he was, however, allowed to send a telegram to baron von aehrenthal, complaining of the treatment he had received as a violation of international usage, and, after some time, an order came from vienna for his release. . _an anglo-french burglar._ françois lebrun, having committed a burglary in paris, is sentenced to ten years' hard labour, but after one year's imprisonment succeeds in escaping to england. on the request of the french police he is arrested in london and brought before the magistrate in order that he may be extradited. his counsel however objects to his extradition on the ground that lebrun was born in london and was therefore, although his parents were french, an english subject. section viii . _signals of distress._ vattel (iii. § ) relates the following case: in , during war between great britain and france, a british man-of-war appeared off calais, made signals of distress for the purpose of soliciting french vessels to approach to her succour, and then seized a sloop and some sailors who came out to bring her help. . _a change of parts._ aaron nietitsch, a native of one of the balkan states, while residing in london for two years for the purpose of learning english, contracted heavy debts which he did not pay on leaving the country. shortly afterwards he came again to england as he was appointed secretary to the diplomatic envoy of his home state in this country. his creditors, who knew quite well that they could not sue a member of a foreign legation for debts contracted during the time of his mission, thought that they could proceed against aaron nietitsch, because he had contracted his debts while staying in this country as a private individual. how would the case have to be decided if aaron nietitsch had contracted debts while in england as an attaché, had left the country at the end of his mission, and had afterwards returned as a private individual? . _violation of a foreign flag._ a political criminal, imprisoned in port-au-prince, in hayti, escapes from the prison and makes for the harbour, with the intention of taking refuge on board a foreign man-of-war lying there. on his way he meets the diplomatic envoy of the state to which the man-of-war belongs, and as the haytian police are on his heels he asks for the envoy's protection and safe conduct to the vessel. the latter calls a passing fly and enters it with the fugitive, but is overtaken by the police. thereupon he takes the flag of his home state out of his pocket and throws the folds of it over the fugitive for the purpose of protecting him. the police nevertheless arrest the man. the envoy sends a report of the affair to his government, which requests from hayti not only severe punishment of the police for the violation of the envoy's privileges and the insult to its flag, but also the release of the rearrested political criminal and his safe conduct to its man-of-war lying in the harbour of port-au-prince. . _a pickpocket at sea._ an italian passenger on board the french mail-boat _le nord_, plying between calais and dover, picks the pocket of an englishman while the boat is two miles out on her way from dover to calais. the thief is arrested in calais. can england claim his extradition? section ix . _gypsies in straits._ in march, , the _westminster gazette_ contained the following paragraph: "on the first day of october last a gipsy van containing a family of eight was escorted by belgian gendarmes to the french frontier. on attempting to cross the boundary the wanderers were stopped by french gendarmes, who forbade any further advance. thus beset behind and before by the authorities, the van-dwellers perforce made the best of a bad job, and resigned themselves to a long stay. on the whole, they have had the best of it; for they, at any rate, had a comfortable roof over their heads, while the four policemen who were on constant guard by day and night, keeping the unwelcome travellers at bay, were exposed to all the chances of the weather. days, weeks, and months rolled slowly by. february commenced, and still the gipsy-van stood on no-man's-land, guarded by weary gendarmes, each drawing a franc and a half a day, and wondering when the other side was going to give in, and allow the gipsies to resume their wanderings. as far as is known the van is there to-day, and nobody appears to care very much about its fate. perhaps in future years when the six gipsy children are grown up and leave the old home, and its paintwork has grown still more shabby, and the wheels have sunk up to their hubs into the soil, somebody will come across it and the patient gendarmes, and begin asking questions. meantime the little comedy has already cost the french municipality of mont saint-martin more than , fr., while the local police force has had to be helped by the neighbouring brigade to perform its ordinary duties. "it is true that negotiations are going on with a view to settling the matter, but as four months have already passed since the van reached the frontier, there seems no particular reason for expecting a speedy conclusion to the farce." . _a question of annexation._ karl abel, born in nassau in , left that country in for england for the purpose of settling there in business. in nassau is conquered by prussia and subjugated. has abel become a prussian subject? what would the decision be in the case of the native of a province transferred by cession to another state, who was domiciled abroad at the time of cession? . _disputed fisheries._ an island rises in the open sea three and a half miles from the shore of state a and is acquired through occupation by state b, which establishes a fishing-station there. very soon a conflict arises between states a and b on account of the fisheries in the waters between the new-born island and the continent. how is the controversy to be settled? . _imperial coasting trade._ at the colonial conferences in and australian statesmen brought before the imperial government the question whether the term "coasting trade," as used in british commercial treaties, could not be given such an extension of definition as would allow the entire exclusion of foreign shipping from the carrying trade between the united kingdom and australia. section x . _a russian crime tried in austria._ the following appeared in the _westminster gazette_ on feb. th, : "wadowice (galicia), _feb._ . "judgment was pronounced to-day in the trial, which began in the district court here yesterday, of wanda dobrodzicka, a young russian woman charged with having thrown a bomb at general skallon, governor-general of warsaw, on may th, . "the indictment set forth the existence of a very skilfully devised plot to kill the governor-general. as he very seldom left the castle it was necessary to do something to compel him to come out. accordingly one of the conspirators, in the uniform of a russian officer, grossly insulted the german vice-consul. it became necessary, therefore, for the governor-general to pay a personal visit to the vice-consul to express his regret, officially, at such an occurrence. this was exactly what the conspirators had reckoned upon, and they laid their plans accordingly. wanda dobrodzicka, who was only twenty years of age, was, it was alleged, entrusted with the task of killing the governor. according to the prosecution, she took up her position on a balcony which he would pass, and when his carriage came she hurled a bomb at it. the bomb, however, failed to explode. in the confusion the woman escaped and succeeded in making her way to trieste, going thence to italy and switzerland, and afterwards coming to galicia, where she married and settled down. "she was arrested on october th, , and the russian government demanded her extradition. as, however, through her marriage, she had become an austrian subject, the galician authorities decided that she must be tried in galicia. the jury returned a verdict of 'not guilty' on both counts of the indictment. the accused was acquitted, and was immediately released, as no notice of appeal was given by the public prosecutor. the prisoner having been declared 'not guilty' by the polish jury, notwithstanding her full admission of having thrown the bombs, was accorded a great ovation by the crowd, who presented her with flowers." . _stratagem or perfidy?_ in , during war between great britain and france, the _sybille_, a french frigate, enticed the _hussar_, a british man-of-war, by displaying the british flag and intimating herself to be a distressed prize of a british captor. the _hussar_ approached to succour her, but the latter at once attacked the _hussar_ without shewing the french flag. she was, however, overpowered and captured. . _murder of a german consul in mexico._ in the german consul in oaxaca, a town in the mexican state of puebla, was murdered while in the house of a mexican named conttolene, with whom he had had a dispute. conttolene was arrested and prosecuted, but acquitted. however his nephew, a mexican named rangel, gave himself up for the crime and was condemned to two years' imprisonment. as this punishment was considered too light the prosecuting counsel appealed, but withdrew his appeal by order of the public prosecutor; and the light sentence on rangel was therefore allowed to stand. the german government considered the punishment meted out to rangel insufficient, and made representations to the mexican government complaining of the fact that the appeal was withdrawn by order of the public prosecutor. the mexican government answered that it disapproved of the action of the public prosecutor, because it recognised its international duty sufficiently to protect the lives of foreigners in mexico and to punish adequately any murder of a foreign resident. on its recommendation the governor of the state of puebla deprived the public prosecutor concerned of his office. . _cossacks at large._ on june th, , a telegram from brody, in eastern galicia, stated that a party of cossacks crossed the frontier into austria, plundered a house near radziwilloff, shot dead the owner and his wife, and cut off his daughter's hands and carried them away. they also mutilated two other persons who were returning across the frontier. austrian gendarmes captured two of the cossacks. section xi . _islanders in revolt._ the natives of a small island in the possession of england rise and, after murdering the majority of the whites, imprison the remainder. no english man-of-war is on the spot, but the commander of a french war vessel in the neighbourhood, who is informed of the insurrection by a fugitive, resolves to interfere to save the lives of the surviving whites. he therefore sails at once for the island, shells the harbour, disembarks a number of men, relieves the white prisoners, and remains in command of the island until an english man-of-war arrives on the spot. . _seizure of ambassadors._ the marquis de monti, the french envoy in poland during a war between poland and russia, being in dantzic when, in , that town capitulated to the russians, was seized and made prisoner because he had taken an active part in the war; he was not released until , although france protested against his captivity. when the maréchal de belle isle, the french ambassador to prussia, passed, in , on his way to berlin, through hanover, he was seized, made a prisoner, and sent to england, which country, together with hanover, was then at war with france. . _an envoy in debt._ baron de wrech, who had for some time been minister plenipotentiary of the landgraf of hesse-cassel at paris, was recalled in . when he asked for his passports, the duc d'aiguillon, the french foreign secretary, refused to deliver them to him before he had paid debts due to the marquis de bezons and other creditors. . _treaty bargaining._ states a and b enter into a new commercial treaty in which, among other stipulations, it is agreed that state a should lower by per cent. its general import duty on manufactured cotton goods coming from state b, and that, in return for this reduction, the latter should reduce by per cent. its general import duty on manufactured leather goods coming from state a. some of the other states possessing commercial treaties with a and b, which embody the most favoured nation clause, at once demand from a and b that the reduction of per cent. of import duty on manufactured cotton and leather goods should also be granted to the imports from their respective territories. section xii . _a fallen president._ the following appeared in the papers on dec. th, , during a revolution in hayti, when the president alexis had fled to a french training ship in the harbour of port-au-prince: "port-au-prince, _dec._ . "president nord alexis is safe on board the french training ship _duguay trouin_. at the last moment the president yielded to the pleas of those about him, and precisely at five o'clock a salute of guns announced his departure from the palace. "previously to his departure the french minister and other foreign representatives, with a specially-formed committee, forced themselves on the president, who finally consented to withdraw. shouts and jeers of derision greeted president nord alexis as he entered his carriage. the french minister sat beside him, and threw the folds of the tricolor over the shoulder of the president to protect him. along the route the people lining the streets greeted the president with curses. when he arrived at the wharf the mob lost all restraint. infuriated women penetrated the cordon of troops, and shrieked the coarsest insults in the face of president alexis. the people tried to hurl themselves upon him, fighting with hands and feet with the soldiers, who, in order to disengage the president, discharged their muskets, and the crowd then fell back. president alexis, still draped in the tricolor, boarded a skiff, his suite tumbling in after him. haitian, french, and american warships fired a salute to the fallen president. as he was embarking a woman aimed a blow at his side with a knife, but missed him. a man, however, succeeded in striking the president a glancing blow on the neck with his fist." . _a murder in monaco._ in august, , mr. and mrs. goold, the monte carlo murderers, were arrested in marseilles, to which town they had succeeded in escaping before the murder became known. the monacan government demanded their extradition and france was ready to comply with the request. mrs. goold, however, was by birth of french nationality, and it was doubtful whether she had been legally married to mr. goold. under these circumstances the french government refused to extradite mrs. goold, before it had been proved by inquiries in england whether or not a legal marriage had taken place between herself and goold. . _a question of interpretation._ according to article xiii of the treaty of july th, ,--confirmed by article xii of the treaty of may st, ,--between the united states of america and prussia which is now valid for the whole german empire, in case one of the contracting parties is a belligerent, no articles carried by vessels of the other contracting party shall be considered contraband, but nevertheless the belligerent party shall have the right to seize any military stores carried by vessels of the other party on payment of their full value. has the declaration of london, , any influence on the validity of this old treaty stipulation? if not, in the event of war between germany and another power, can powers possessing most favoured nation treaties with germany claim the same treatment with regard to contraband for their own vessels as germany must grant to vessels of the united states? . _the island of santa lucia._ in the island of santa lucia, in the antilles, was occupied by england, but in the following year the english settlers were massacred by the natives, and no attempt was made by england to re-establish the colony. in france, considering the island no man's land, took possession of it. england, however, contended for many years that she had not abandoned the island. after the treaty of aix-la-chapelle in , the question of ownership was referred to the decision of certain commissioners, and england claimed that having been driven out by force she had not abandoned the island _sine spe redeundi_, and that therefore france, in , had no right to consider the island as no man's land. finally, by the peace treaty of paris of , england resigned her claims. section xiii . _an attaché's chauffeur._ in november, , the driver to the military attaché at the united states embassy was summoned at huntingdon for driving a motor-car at little stukeley at a speed dangerous to the public, and which was stated to be miles an hour. the solicitor for the defendant, who did not appear, claimed that he was exempt from proceedings such as these, but admitted that he was not in a position to prove it. a letter of explanation was read, which stated that it was very embarrassing to have a servant charged with an offence against english law, and asking that the charge be withdrawn. the bench decided to go on with the case, and imposed a fine of £ and costs. . _in quest of balata._ the following notices appeared in the papers in the latter part of august, , concerning a frontier incident between british guiana and venezuela: "georgetown, _aug._ . "captain calder, with a small armed force, went down the barima river and, crossing the boundary, invaded venezuelan territory. he then demanded at the point of the revolver that , pounds of balata, said to have been won in a british forest, should be given up. the incident has been reported to president castro. excitement prevails at morawhanna, the british frontier head-quarters, the people fearing measures of retaliation. trouble has been experienced for the past few months in connexion with the balata trade, and british officers have been keenly alert to prevent illicit trading. the governor is now at lama, two days' journey from the capital. he is expected to arrive here on tuesday." "georgetown, british guiana, _aug._ . "the governor has informed the legislature that captain calder, who recently crossed the venezuelan frontier and seized a quantity of balata which was alleged to have been collected in british guiana, violated the frontier to the extent of yards. the balata has been returned to its owner and regret has been expressed to president castro." "new york, _aug._ . "a message from caracas states that the venezuelan government considers that the incident which arose out of the invasion of venezuelan territory by captain calder, district inspector of police in british guiana, and the seizure of a quantity of balata said to have been collected on british soil has been satisfactorily closed. president castro has received a note of apology from the governor of british guiana with the announcement that inspector calder has been relieved of his post." . _a "sujet mixte."_ felix brown was born in london of german parents in . he was brought up in english schools and considered himself an englishman, although he knew that he was of german parentage and frequently went to germany to see his grandparents. in he was a passenger on an english vessel destined for riga. this vessel called on her way at stettin. while in that harbour the german police boarded the vessel and arrested brown for having evaded military service in germany. brown telegraphed to the english ambassador in berlin and asked for his intervention. . _koreans at the hague peace conference._ during the second hague peace conference the emperor of korea, although he had signed in a treaty according to which japan exercised a protectorate over his country, dispatched an envoy and two secretaries to the hague for the purpose of bringing some complaints before the congress. one of the secretaries had been in holland two years previously, and had left the country without paying his debts. when his creditors heard of his return, they asked an advocate whether they could sue him, or whether he was exempted from dutch jurisdiction, since he now appeared as the secretary of the korean envoy. section xiv . _the adventures of a south american physician._ in the president of a south american republic visited london with the intention of undergoing an operation by a famous surgeon. he was accompanied, among others, by doctor alcorta, his physician-in-ordinary, who was watching the case. after dining with friends one evening at a well-known restaurant, during which he drank very freely of wine and liqueurs, doctor alcorta proceeded to the empire theatre. he at first listened quietly, but, being displeased by the song of one of the performers, he became noisy, had to be removed, and on proving violent was handed over to the police. next morning he was brought up before a magistrate on the charge of having been drunk and disorderly. . _extradition of a british subject._ the following is a cutting from the police court reports of a daily paper: "at bow-street, julius kuhliger, _alias_ nollier, , of field-road, forest-gate, was again brought up before sir a. de rutzen for extradition on the charge of obtaining money by false pretences in belgium. mr h. lewis defended. in consequence of certain complaints detective-sergeant brogden kept observation upon a newsagent's shop in shoreditch, and on the nd inst. he saw the prisoner call there and receive several letters. he followed the prisoner and saw him examine the contents, and then arrested him. the letters were found to contain four money orders of the total value of £ . _s._ _d._, and the prisoner was brought up at the old-street police-court and charged with being in the unlawful possession of them. it was afterwards discovered that the orders were the proceeds of an alleged swindle in belgium which had been carried on from this country, and the original charge was abandoned in favour of the extradition proceedings. detective-sergeant brogden now gave evidence that the prisoner claimed to be a british subject, alleging that his mother was english, though his father was a swiss. since his arrest he had made a statement to the effect that about three months ago, finding himself in financial difficulties, he thought he would embark upon a system of fraud. he advertised in the german newspapers, he continued, stating that an english lady wished to send her two daughters to germany for the purpose of learning the language of the country. several persons replied offering to take the children, and he wrote to each of them accepting their offer, and stating that the luggage had already been sent on. he followed this by another letter purporting to come from a firm of railway carriers, saying that they had been instructed to forward certain trunks, and would do so on the receipt of their fees in advance. he arranged for the replies to these letters to be sent to five or six different newsagents' shops in various parts of london, and each place brought him in an average of about £ . the prisoner, on oath, now said that he was a british subject, and mr lewis asked the magistrate to say that this was not a case in which he ought to surrender the prisoner to a foreign power. the magistrate said that with regard to the point raised as to the accused's being a british subject, the article in the treaty with belgium dealing with that matter said that 'in no case or on any consideration whatever shall the high contracting parties be bound to surrender their own subjects whether by birth or naturalization.' it had been held that such provision implied that the high contracting parties might surrender their own subjects, and that such surrender must be left to the discretion of the secretary of state. he ordered the prisoner to be committed for extradition, and it would be for the home secretary to decide whether it was a case in which he ought not to sanction the surrender." . _the case of the "oldhamia."_ the following appeared in the _times_ of dec. th, , dated st petersburg, dec. th: "the admiralty appeal court yesterday confirmed the judgment of the libau prize court justifying the capture and destruction of the british steamer _oldhamia_, bound fur hong-kong with american oil. she was taken by the cruiser _oleg_ of admiral rozhdestvensky's fleet off formosa on the night of may , , and a fortnight later, while proceeding to vladivostok, struck on the kurile reef and was burned by the prize crew to prevent her from falling into the hands of the japanese. the court disallowed a claim for damages by the captain and crew for the loss of their personal effects on the formal grounds that the claim had not been presented at the first hearing of the case. it allowed a claim of the standard oil company to recover the cost of empty kerosene cases. it confirmed the libau verdict disallowing the claims of the manchester and salford company, the owners of the vessel, for £ , , and those of the standard oil company for cargo consisting of , cases of kerosene, valued at $ , (£ , ). "the circumstances of the capture were fully detailed at the trial before the libau prize court on june , . the arguments presented by mr. berlin, counsel for the plaintiffs, and the law officers of the crown, bore first upon the _prima facie_ evidence of the _oldhamia's_ destination and cargo, and secondly, on the point whether kerosene rightly came under the russian declaration of contraband of war. it was admitted that the cargo was intended for japan, but solely for commercial purposes. the principal legal adviser to the admiralty submitted, however, that kerosene was now used also as a fuel for warships. moreover, the vessel was considerably out of her course. the captain was unable to produce the charter-party or bills of lading, and one of the seamen declared that she carried guns at the bottom of the hold. admiral rozhdestvensky sent sailors to displace the cargo in order to verity this statement, but they worked for two days without getting lower than the main deck. mr. berlin invoked the fact that the procurator at libau declined to recognize kerosene as contraband within the meaning of the russian declaration, which specifically mentions naphtha. he argued at length on the question of conditional and absolute contraband of war. upon these points the russian and british views have been, and remain, at variance, as exemplified in all the prize cases connected with the late war. "the result of the present appeal, however onerous to the owners, cannot be regarded as unexpected. a member of the embassy staff attended the proceedings in behalf of the british government." . _an ambassadors estate._ musurus pasha, the turkish ambassador in london, died there in december . in february, , mme musurus took out letters of administration in england, and proceeded to pay the debts and the death duties payable in respect of the property in this country. the greater part of the ambassador's estate was situated in turkey and thessaly, and the only property in england was certain shares in companies. two of the next-of-kin of the ambassador brought (in december ) an action to obtain the administration of his estate and also an injunction restraining mme musurus from removing any of the assets out of the jurisdiction of the english courts, or from dealing with them otherwise than in due course of administration. section xv . _dangers of ballooning._ on nov. th, , the following paragraph appeared in the morning papers, dated from breslau: "while a balloon, belonging to the silesian aeronautic club, was sailing along at about mètres distance from the russo-german frontier on saturday over krotoschin, sarotschin, and zockow, shots were fired at it from russian territory, probably by frontier cossacks. the weather was fine and the german flag hung from the envelope. nobody was hurt, only one shot striking a sandbag, and the balloon landed safely on german soil." . _family honour._ in february, , carlo waddington, the son of the chilian envoy at brussels, shot at and killed balmaceda, the secretary of the chilian legation. the cause of this action was that balmaceda refused to marry waddington's sister, whom he had previously seduced. . _an ocean chase._ recently in the firth of clyde the fishery board's cruiser _vigilant_ observed a foreign trawler operating, it was alleged, within the three-mile limit of ailsa craig. the trawler made off, and a stern chase of over miles, lasting about two hours, followed. the _vigilant_ fired several shots, to which the trawler paid no heed, but ultimately the cruiser caught up the fugitive and compelled her to stop. the mate of the _vigilant_ boarded the trawler, the captain of which refused to accompany the _vigilant_ to campbeltown, and, after the officer had obtained particulars of the boat and the crew, the trawler left for fleetwood with the week's catch. the _vigilant_ proceeded to campbeltown and reported the matter to the crown authorities. . _the "maori king."_ the vessel, the _maori king_, was purchased in march, , by messrs. ginsburg and co., a russian firm. to enable the vessel to sail under the british flag, all the shares in her were nominally transferred to a british subject named dow, who registered her in shanghai as a british-owned vessel. subsequently she sailed under the british flag from vladivostok to guaymos, in mexico, carrying chinese coolies and russians. in january, , the british consul-general in shanghai seized the vessel as liable to forfeiture under §§ and of the merchant shipping act, . section xvi . _the island of rakahanga._ on nov. th, , the following paragraph appeared in the papers: "news has reached here that on july last the natives of rakahanga, in the cook group, hauled down the british flag, and, after ejecting the island council, appointed their own government, judges and police. the ringleader of the movement is a dismissed teacher of the london missionary society." . _a complaint against the police._ a policeman, stationed at the corner of bond street and oxford street for the purpose of regulating traffic, raises his hand as a sign for carriages coming from bond street to stop. one of the drivers ignores this sign and drives on. the policeman seizes the horse's head and stops the carriage, whereupon a gentleman within complains, maintaining that he is an ambassador to the english court and that the police have no right to stop him. as the policeman does not give way the ambassador leaves his carriage and, going immediately to the foreign office, complains of the violation of his privileges and demands the punishment of the policeman. . _a man with two wives._ in oscar meyer, a german by birth, who is naturalised in england without having ceased to be a german subject, marries an englishwoman in london. in the following year he obtains a judicial separation from his wife. as his marriage was never known in germany, he succeeds in , while staying in berlin, in marrying his niece, whom he brings back to england as his wife. in the niece finds out that meyer was already a married man when he married her, and has him arrested for bigamy. . _murder on a mail boat._ the _marie henriette_ is one of those mail boats plying between ostend and dover which are the property of the belgian government and are commanded by belgian naval officers. on the th july, , an italian on board murdered an english fellow-passenger on the voyage between ostend and dover, within three miles of the latter port. on the arrival of the vessel the captain handed over the murderer to the english police authorities, but a few days later the belgian government claimed the extradition of the criminal. section xvii . _persian disorders._ the following telegrams, dated from bushire, appeared in the papers on april th, : "_april th._ "in view of the sense of insecurity caused by the looting of the tangistani tribesmen, who will not submit to any control, his majesty's cruiser _fox_ to-day landed a party of bluejackets who are guarding the place. the tangistanis are now leaving the district." "_april th._ "before the bluejackets landed from the cruiser _fox_ yesterday, the british resident in the persian gulf issued a proclamation informing the public that the measure had been forced upon the british authorities in the absence of any authority able to control the tangistanis or guarantee the safety of british and other foreign subjects. the proclamation added that the bluejackets were being landed solely for the purpose of protecting foreigners and would be withdrawn as soon as security was assured." on april th the following appeared in the _times_ from teheran: "the advance guard of the russian expedition to tabriz left the frontier yesterday. the main body marched this morning. the force numbers , , and consists of four squadrons of cossacks, two batteries of horse artillery, three battalions of infantry, and a company of pioneers, escorting a large train of provisions. "the commander of the troops has stringent orders to preserve a pacific attitude, and it is expected that he will halt some distance outside tabriz, which he will not enter except in case of necessity. "the russian and british legations will to-morrow jointly notify the persian government of the action taken and of the motives which prompted the despatch of an armed force into persian territory." . _the expulsion of monsieur de reus._ the following appeared in the papers of july nd, , dated caracas, july st: "president castro has expelled m. j. h. de reus, the dutch minister resident here. dr. paul, minister for foreign affairs, sent his passports to m. de reus with a note informing him that, in view of the opinions expressed by m. de reus in a letter written on april th, president castro declares him to be incompetent to serve as a friendly medium in the relations between venezuela and the netherlands. "the letter referred to is probably m. de reus's reply to president castro's demand that holland should exercise more effectual vigilance over dutch vessels plying between la guaira and curaçao, in which venezuelan revolutionaries frequently effect their escape under assumed names. this preceded the trouble caused by the closing of the port of curaçao to venezuelan shipping on account of plague at la guaira." . _the case of mcleod._ alexander mcleod was a member of the british force sent by the canadian government in into the territory of the united states for the purpose of capturing the _caroline_, which vessel had been equipped for crossing into canadian territory and taking help to the canadian insurgents. in mcleod came on business into the state of new york, and was arrested and indicted for the killing of one amos durfee, a citizen of the united states, on the occasion of the capture of the _caroline_. . _a thwarted suicide._ while the _frau elizabeth_, a german tramp steamer, is on the high seas during a voyage between new york and hamburg, a sailor, heinrich kalke, jumps overboard with the intention of drowning himself. another sailor leaps into the sea after him in the hope of saving kalke's life. he succeeds in getting hold of the man, but kalke struggles and, being unable to free himself, draws a knife and stabs the sailor, who thereupon sinks. while the struggle is in progress the vessel slackens speed, a boat is lowered, and its occupants succeed in securing kalke. he is taken on board, conveyed to hamburg, and there put on his trial for murder. counsel for defence asserts that germany does not possess jurisdiction, as the act was committed, not on a vessel sailing under the german flag, but in the sea itself, and as, according to § , no. of the german criminal code, a german can only be punished in germany for an act committed abroad, if the act concerned is punishable both by the law of germany and by that of the country where the act was committed. section xviii . _an insult to an ambassador._ the following appeared in the papers, dated st petersburg, feb. th, : "m. bompard, the french ambassador, regarding a recent paragraph in the _grazhdanin_ as insulting, has addressed himself to m. isvolsky, minister for foreign affairs, complaining that the statement in question was directed against himself in his capacity of representative of the french republic in russia. he therefore asks for the protection of the imperial government. since the press laws contain no provision for the criminal prosecution of newspapers for insults offered to representatives of friendly powers, a decree has been issued whereby the prefect of st petersburg, in virtue of the powers conferred upon him under the law on 'extraordinary protection,' has inflicted upon the editor of the _grazhdanin_ a fine of , roubles (£ )." . _a question of legitimacy._ edward wolff, a german subject, domiciled in england since , goes to germany in for the purpose of there marrying his niece. he at once returns to england with his bride, and becomes naturalized in . his wife dies in in giving birth to a son. in he marries an englishwoman in london. as the result of this marriage a second son is born in . in wolff dies without leaving a will, six months after the death of his second wife. the son of the second wife claims the whole of his father's estate, maintaining that the first marriage of his father was invalid and that therefore his step-brother, being illegitimate, could not inherit. . _the coachman of an envoy._ in a coachman of mr. gallatin, the american minister in london, committed an assault outside the embassy. he was arrested in the stable of the embassy and charged before a local magistrate. the british foreign office refused to recognise the exemption of the coachman from the local jurisdiction. . _the case of schnaebelé._ on april st, , schnaebelé, the commissionary of police of pagny-sur-moselle, crossed the german frontier on official business, for the settlement of which he was invited to a meeting by the local german functionaries. he was, however, at once arrested on a warrant for being concerned with the organization of espionage. section xix . _amelia island._ amelia island, at the mouth of st mary's river, in florida, was, in , seized by a number of adventurers under the command of one mcgregor, who, in the name of the insurgent colonies of buenos ayres and venezuela, preyed not only on the commerce of spain but also on that of the united states. the island was, at that time, part of spanish territory; and as the spanish government was not able to put an end to the nuisance created to the united states by the seizure, the latter ordered a man-of-war to expel mcgregor and his men from amelia island, to destroy their works and vessels, and to take possession of the island for the purpose of preventing the recurrence of the nuisance. . _representation to china._ on jan. th, , after the dismissal of yuan-shih-kai, the british and the american diplomatic envoys at peking called by appointment on prince ching, who, as president of the grand council and the wai-wu-pu, is the highest official of the chinese empire. the purpose of the appointment was to make a joint representation on the part of the two powers regarding the dismissal, without any given reason, of yuan-shih-kai, whose services to the cause of order, stability, and progress in china had inspired such confidence in their two governments. . _exemption from rates._ the following appeared in the _times_, dec. th, : "the claim of herr von bethmann-hollweg, a german embassy official, to be exempt from rates in respect of his residence at walton-on-thames was before the urban council last night. "a letter was read from the rating of government property department of the treasury stating that houses occupied by representatives of foreign powers and the accredited members of their suites were liable to assessment in common with other property of the country, but as their persons and personal effects were by international law exempt from seizure if they refused to pay rates these could not be enforced against them by process of law. reciprocal arrangements had, however, been entered into with certain powers, germany being one of them, under which a contribution in lieu of rates was given by the government to local authorities in respect of such occupations. "the walton council, in common, it is believed, with many other local authorities in the country, had held the view that it was impossible to recover rates under such circumstances, but their attention was drawn to the present case by the local government board auditor, at whose suggestion they wrote to the treasury, with the above result." . _errant balloons._ the following notice from berlin appeared in the morning papers of november th, : "the french ambassador has drawn the attention of the imperial government to the repeated landing of german balloons on french territory in view of the possibility of unpleasant incidents arising therefrom. the german military authorities are accordingly taking the necessary measures to prevent as far as possible the future landing of german balloons across the frontier." section xx . _sully in england._ in sully, who was sent by henri iv of france on a special mission to the english court, called together a french jury in london, and had a member of his retinue condemned to death for murder. the convicted man was handed over for execution to the english authorities, but james i granted him a reprieve. . _homicide by an attaché._ the attaché of an embassy in paris during a dispute with his servant draws a revolver and shoots him dead. his government orders him home, but he refuses to obey, leaves the embassy, and settles down in paris. thereupon his government demands his extradition from france. how would the case have to be decided if the murderer has fled to england and ( ) his home state requires his extradition, ( ) both france and his home state require his extradition? . _a disputed capture._ on july th, , during the war between great britain and spain, the british privateer _minerva_ captured the spanish vessel _anna_, near the mouth of the river mississippi. when brought before the british prize court in november, , the united states claimed the captured vessel, on the ground that the capture was effected within the american territorial maritime belt. from the evidence brought forward it appeared that the _anna_ was captured at a spot five miles from the mainland, but that there were several small mud islands composed of earth and trees, which had drifted down the river and had fixed themselves more than two miles off the shore. . _the punishment for murder._ in henry johnson, an english subject, commits a murder in london but succeeds in escaping. in he appears in rome under the name of charles waiter and commits a murder there also. during his trial at rome his real name and antecedents are disclosed and reported in england. as the italian penal code does not provide capital punishment and he is therefore only condemned to penal servitude for life, the question is raised in the english press whether england could not demand the extradition of the murderer, so that he might be tried and executed in england for the murder committed there. section xxi . _a traitor's fate._ in frederick william, the great elector of brandenburg, ordered his diplomatic envoy at warsaw, the capital of poland, to obtain possession of the person of one colonel von kalkstein, a prussian subject, who had fled to poland for political reasons, as he was accused of high treason. von kalkstein having been seized secretly on november th, , was wrapped up in a carpet and in this way carried across the frontier and beheaded at memel. . _an interrupted armistice._ during a war between states a and b, a general armistice is concluded, without detailed stipulations. the commander of the forces of state a is informed through spies that the enemy is throwing up defences within the line where the forces face each other and is concentrating twice as many troops in that place as had been there before the conclusion of the armistice. this he considers a violation of the armistice, and, fearing an attack, at once recommences hostilities, without any previous denunciation of the armistice. . _shooting affray in a legation._ in nikitschenkow, a russian subject not belonging to the russian legation, attacked and wounded a member of that legation within the precincts of the embassy in paris. the french police were called in and arrested the criminal. the russian government requested his extradition, maintaining that, as the crime was committed inside the russian embassy, it fell exclusively within russian jurisdiction. . _the surrender of port arthur._ in january, , the russian general stössel, the commander of port arthur, while negotiating with the japanese for the surrender of that fortress, ordered some fortifications to be blown up and certain russian men-of-war in the harbour to be sunk. section xxii . _an ambassador's brother._ in don pantaleon sà, the brother of the portuguese ambassador in london and a member of his suite, killed an englishman named greenway. he was arrested by the english authorities, tried, found guilty, and executed. . _a detained steamer._ in , during the russo-japanese war, the _captain w. menzel_, a german steamer, took in welsh coal at cardiff, with the intention of carrying it to the russian fleet en route for the far east. the english government detained the steamer. could germany have complained and asked for damages? . _prussia and the poles._ the following appeared in the _times_ of dec. nd, , dated vienna, dec. st and nd respectively: "a mass meeting took place to-day at lemberg, the capital of galicia, to protest against the polish policy of prussia and prince bülow's expropriation bill. some , persons were present. in a much applauded address, the vice-burgomaster condemned prince bülow's action and called upon the polish representatives in the forthcoming austro-hungarian delegations to vote against the foreign office estimates. after the meeting, the police prevented an attempt to make a demonstration against the german imperial consulate. the demonstrators carried large caricatures of the emperor william, prince bülow, and baron von aehrenthal." "to-day's reports show yesterday's anti-prussian demonstration at lemberg to have been accompanied by some excesses. after the meeting a number of demonstrators succeeded in breaking through the cordon of police and in reaching the hotel where the german consul has hitherto lived. several windows were smashed, and, in order to avoid an attack upon the hotel, the hotel-keeper declared that he had already given the consul notice to quit and that the consul had departed. the proposal of a student that no inhabitant of lemberg should give the german consul shelter on pain of being considered a traitor to the polish cause was enthusiastically acclaimed. a caricature of the emperor william was attached to the end of a rod and burned." . _a charmed life._ the following appeared in a london evening paper: "in the list dealt with by mr plowden yesterday at marylebone was a charge against an italian footman named pito conziani, aged twenty-four, giving an address in grosvenor-square, who was accused of being found drunk and disorderly and using bad language the previous night in old quebec-street. "when the case was reached the accused came forward from a seat at the back of the court and was placed in front of the dock. "a consultation immediately took place between the clerk and the magistrate, and as a result mr plowden inquired who the accused was. "inspector grace replied that he was, as he represented, in the service of the italian ambassador, and he claimed privilege. "mr plowden told the accused he bore a charmed life in this country in certain respects, and ordered him to be discharged." section xxiii . _a daring robbery._ on july th, , the papers published the following: "last night the steamer _sophia_ was seized by armed robbers miles from odessa, while on a voyage from this port to korthion. at o'clock three young men appeared on the deck, where the captain and the passengers were at supper, and held them in check while two others seized the man at the wheel and ordered him, under threat of death, to set the ship's course for odessa. some of the robbers, who appear to have numbered in all, then went into the first-class saloon, where they took possession of an iron cash-box containing , roubles (£ , ), which was in charge of a cashier of the russian bank for foreign trade. they also took , roubles (£ ) belonging to the passengers. the robbers then proceeded to disable the engines, and let off all the steam, and finally made their escape in two of the _sophia_'s boats after destroying the third. the police are seeking to trace the band, but hitherto without success." . _the fall of abdul hamid._ on april th, , after the fall of abdul hamid and the enthronement of mohammed v, the president of the united states of america sent the following telegram to the new ruler of turkey: "i offer your majesty my congratulations on your accession to the throne with such universal acclaim voiced by the people's representatives and at a time so propitious to the highest aspirations of the great nation over which you rule as the august head of a constitutional government. i assure you of the friendship of the government and people of the united states, who earnestly wish for your majesty's happiness and for that of the people within your dominions, and i add my own wishes for your majesty's health and welfare." . _a president abroad._ the _times_ of dec. th, , contained the following telegram, dated paris, dec. rd: "the french government will come to a decision at the cabinet council to be held on saturday as to the conditions upon which president castro, the despot of venezuela, will be allowed to land in france. at the moment of his departure for europe it was reported that the object of the president's journey was to see a distinguished specialist with a view to a surgical operation. since then, however, trustworthy information has reached the quai d'orsay to the effect that his state of health is not so precarious as it had been reported to be, and that he looks forward to receiving in paris the hospitality to which south americans are accustomed. if that be the case, there are serious reasons for believing that he will meet with disappointment. the relations between france and venezuela have been suspended now for several years, and the french representative at caracas, it will be remembered, was expelled from venezuela. the french foreign office is at present engaged in preparing a statement of its grievances against president castro, to serve as a basis for the discussion in the next cabinet council of the delicate questions raised by the dictator's decision to visit this country." again, the _times_ of dec. th contained the following, dated paris, dec. th: "president castro landed in france this morning from the steamer _guadeloupe_ at pauillac, where he was met by the venezuelan consul at genoa and a dozen or more friends. he took a special train from bordeaux, and on arriving with his wife, brother, three doctors, and six servants, he allowed himself to be photographed, subsequently driving to the hôtel de france. on reaching the hotel he received a visit from m. gout, a high official at the quai d'orsay, who had been specially despatched by the minister for foreign affairs to inform president castro of the conditions on which the government has allowed him to land in france, and on which he will be permitted to stay here. the government has refused to reveal the details of the decision at which it arrived in the cabinet council of last saturday as to its treatment of the venezuelan president. he declared to the representative of the french foreign office that he had come to europe as a mere private individual to see a doctor, but a semi-official note communicated this evening states that 'it is believed that he will take advantage of his stay to try to settle his affairs with the various powers which no longer have agents accredited to his government.' "there is reason to believe that this very guarded and somewhat enigmatical statement marks the definite decision of the french government to demand from president castro a complete settlement of all the questions outstanding between him and this country. it is felt that while france cannot repudiate her traditions of hospitality, she has nevertheless seized this opportunity to make it quite clear to the president that any prolongation of his sojourn here must depend on his meeting the views of the french government." . _a rejected ambassador._ in italy refused to receive mr. keilly as ambassador of the united states of america, because he had, in , protested against the annexation of the papal states. and when the united states sent the same gentleman as ambassador to austria, the latter refused him reception, on the ground that his wife was said to be a jewess. section xxiv . _revictualling of a fortress._ during a war between states a and b, a general armistice is concluded for thirty days, without any detailed stipulations. the commander of a besieged fortress claims the right of re-victualling, but the commander of the besieging forces refuses this. the besieged commander considers this refusal a violation of the armistice and threatens to denounce it unless the besieging commander complies with his request. . _dutch reprisals._ in consequence of the dispute which had arisen between holland and venezuela in --see the case of the expulsion of m. de reus, above p. --the dutch government sent some cruisers into venezuelan waters with the intention of resorting to reprisals. accordingly the dutch cruiser _gelderland_ captured on saturday, dec. th, , the venezuelan coastguard ship _alexis_ outside puerto cabello. the captain of the _alexis_ was put ashore at puerto cabello, and he forwarded to his government at caracas the following communication handed to him by the officer of the _gelderland_ who boarded his vessel: "_december ._ "her majesty the queen of holland has given orders to her warships temporarily to sequestrate and place an embargo upon all vessels of the venezuelan government. this is a retaliatory measure. we demand that you lower your flag and surrender your ship and your persons to the commander of the _gelderland_. all resistance will be useless. if you resist the result will be the loss of your vessel and the death of many of you. "second lieutenant boinar." . _birth on the high seas._ an englishwoman gives birth to an illegitimate child on board a german liner while on the high seas on a voyage to new york. the child's father is german. what is the nationality of the child? . _a high-handed action._ on the th of march, , napoleon, though at peace with baden, sent a body of troops into the territory of this state for the purpose of surprising the castle of ettenheim and of carrying off the duke of enghien. the duke was brought to the castle of vincennes, near paris, and the same night was tried by court martial on the charge of high treason for having borne arms against france. he was convicted, and was shot on the following morning. section xxv . _"the southern queen."_ during an insurrection on an island belonging to state a, the _southern queen_, a vessel sailing under the flag of state b with a cargo of ammunition and carrying a number of individuals desirous of joining the insurgents, is on her way to a port in the island concerned. state a, receiving information of the matter, orders a man-of-war to be on the look out for the vessel and to seize her. the order is carried out on the high seas, miles away from the island. . _a three-cornered dispute._ in april, , the viceroy li hung chang granted the exclusive right of the free importation of grain into tien-tsin to the china merchants steamship navigation company. england protested against this monopoly, because it was contrary to article of the treaty of commerce between china and the united states, the benefits of which england could claim in consequence of the most favoured nation clause in her own treaties with china. the chinese government answered that the united states had, by passing the chinese exclusion act, broken the commercial treaty concerned, that therefore the treaty had come to an end, and that no one could, under the most favoured nation clause, claim any longer the benefits of a treaty which had ceased to exist. (see lehr, in the _revue de droit international et de législation comparée_, vol. xxv. ( ), p. .) . _russian revolutionary outrage in paris._ the following appeared in the _times_ of may th, : "a russian, who described himself as colonel von kotten, chief of the moscow secret police, was shot at yesterday by an escaped russian convict, michael vitkoff, at an hotel in the rue bolivar, where the two men met by appointment. according to the police officer's story, vitkoff was a polish revolutionary who had been sentenced to deportation to siberia, but who had been reprieved upon volunteering to act as a police spy on the movements of his revolutionary comrades. vitkoff subsequently came to paris, and upon the arrival of the police officer in the french capital a few days ago he induced colonel von kotten to visit him upon the pretext that he had important information to communicate. no sooner had the officer entered vitkoff's room than the latter fired several shots at him with a revolver, none of which, however, took effect. a hand-to-hand struggle followed, in which vitkoff was worsted. the man succeeded in making his escape, but gave himself up at the nearest police station, where he told his story, which was confirmed by colonel von kotten, who arrived shortly afterwards little the worse for his experience. vitkoff was taken into custody and will be charged with attempted murder. "minute details of the attack upon colonel von kotten are published, but they shed little or no light upon the motives of the aggression. in some quarters it is suggested that, unless vitkoff's action was purely personal, it may have been dictated by a desire on the part of the russian revolutionaries to secure by means of a judicial trial in france the publicity which even the azeff and feodoroff cases have failed to gain for their efforts to expose the activity of the russian secret police." . _the detention of napoleon i._ the question is frequently discussed whether the detention of napoleon i at st helena was or was not in accordance with international law. the facts of the case are as follows: after having abdicated the throne of france in favour of his son, napoleon thought of taking refuge in america, and therefore set out for the port of rochefort. arriving there on july rd, , he found the harbour watched by a british fleet. after some days of deliberation he made up his mind to throw himself on the mercy of the english people, and therefore on july th he wrote to the prince regent that he came to take his seat at the hearth of the british people and that he placed himself under the protection of the british laws. on july th he went on board the english ship the _bellerophon_ and gave himself into the charge of her captain, by whom he was conveyed to england. on august th napoleon was removed to h.m.s. _northumberland_, and the commander was instructed to convey him, together with a suite of twenty-five persons, to the island of st helena. he arrived on oct. th and remained there a prisoner of state up to the day of his death on may th, . in transporting and detaining napoleon great britain carried out a mandate of the allied powers, for three identical conventions concerning the detention of napoleon were signed at paris on august nd, , by the representatives of austria, great britain, prussia, and russia. the important stipulations of the conventions--see martens, _n.r._ ii. p. --are the two following: "_art. i._ napoléon bonaparte est regardé par les puissances qui ont signé le traité du mars dernier comme leur prisonnier. "_art. ii._ son garde est spécialement confiée au gouvernement britannique. le choix du lieu et celui des mesures qui peuvent le mieux assurer le but de la présente stipulation sont réservés à sa majesté britannique." produced from scanned images of public domain material from the google print project.) the humanists' library edited by lewis einstein ii erasmus against war erasmus against war [illustration] with an introduction by j·w·mackail the merrymount press boston, mdccccvii copyright, , by d. b. updike contents introduction ix against war introduction the treatise on war, of which the earliest english translation is here reprinted, was among the most famous writings of the most illustrious writer of his age. few people now read erasmus; he has become for the world in general a somewhat vague name. only by some effort of the historical imagination is it possible for those who are not professed scholars and students to realize the enormous force which he was at a critical period in the history of civilization. the free institutions and the material progress of the modern world have alike their roots in humanism. humanism as a movement of the human mind culminated in the age, and even in a sense in the person, of erasmus. its brilliant flower was of an earlier period; its fruits developed and matured later; but it was in his time, and in him, that the fruit set! the earlier sixteenth century is not so romantic as its predecessors, nor so rich in solid achievement as others that have followed it. as in some orchard when spring is over, the blossom lies withered on the grass, and the fruit has long to wait before it can ripen on the boughs. yet here, in the dull, hot midsummer days, is the central and critical period of the year's growth. the life of erasmus is accessible in many popular forms as well as in more learned and formal works. to recapitulate it here would fall beyond the scope of a preface. but in order to appreciate this treatise fully it is necessary to realize the time and circumstances in which it appeared, and to recall some of the main features of its author's life and work up to the date of its composition. that date can be fixed with certainty, from a combination of external and internal evidence, between the years and ; in all probability it was the winter of - . it was printed in the latter year, in the "editio princeps" of the enlarged and rewritten adagia then issued from froben's great printing-works at basel. the stormy decennate of pope julius ii had ended in february, . to his successor, giovanni de' medici, who succeeded to the papal throne under the name of leo x, the treatise is particularly addressed. the years which ensued were a time singularly momentous in the history of religion, of letters, and of the whole life of the civilized world. the eulogy of leo with which erasmus ends indicates the hopes then entertained of a new augustan age of peace and reconciliation. the reformation was still capable of being regarded as an internal and constructive force, within the framework of the society built up by the middle ages. the final divorce between humanism and the church had not yet been made. the long and disastrous epoch of the wars of religion was still only a dark cloud on the horizon. the renaissance was really dead, but few yet realized the fact. the new head of the church was a lover of peace, a friend of scholars, a munificent patron of the arts. this treatise shows that erasmus, to a certain extent, shared or strove to share in an illusion widely spread among the educated classes of europe. with a far keener instinct for that which the souls of men required, an augustinian monk from wittenberg, who had visited rome two years earlier, had turned away from the temple where a corpse lay swathed in gold and half hid in the steam of incense. with a far keener insight into the real state of things, machiavelli was, at just this time, composing the prince. in one form or another, the subject of his impassioned pleading for peace among beings human, civilized, and christian, had been long in erasmus's mind. in his most celebrated single work, the praise of folly, he had bitterly attacked the attitude towards war habitual, and evilly consecrated by usage, among kings and popes. the same argument had formed the substance of a document addressed by him, under the title of anti-polemus, to pope julius in . much of the substance, much even of the phraseology of that earlier work is doubtless repeated here. beyond the specific reference to pope leo, the other notes of time in the treatise now before us are few and faint. allusions to louis xii of france ( - ), to ferdinand the catholic ( - ), to philip, king of aragon ( - ), and sigismund, king of poland ( - ), are all consistent with the composition of the treatise some years earlier. at the end of it he promises to treat of the matter more largely when he publishes the anti-polemus. but this intention was never carried into effect. perhaps erasmus had become convinced of its futility; for the events of the years which followed soon showed that the new augustan age was but a false dawn over which night settled more stormily and profoundly than before. for ten or a dozen years erasmus had stood at the head of european scholarship. his name was as famous in france and england as in the low countries and germany. the age was indeed one of those in which the much-abused term of the republic of letters had a real and vital meaning. the nationalities of modern europe had already formed themselves; the notion of the empire had become obsolete, and if the imperial title was still coveted by princes, it was under no illusion as to the amount of effective supremacy which it carried with it, or as to any life yet remaining in the mediaeval doctrine of the unity of christendom whether as a church or as a state. the discovery of the new world near the end of the previous century precipitated a revolution in european politics towards which events had long been moving, and finally broke up the political framework of the middle ages. but the other great event of the same period, the invention and diffusion of the art of printing, had created a new european commonwealth of the mind. the history of the century which followed it is a history in which the landmarks are found less in battles and treaties than in books. the earlier life of the man who occupies the central place in the literary and spiritual movement of his time in no important way differs from the youth of many contemporary scholars and writers. even the illegitimacy of his birth was an accident shared with so many others that it does not mark him out in any way from his fellows. his early education at utrecht, at deventer, at herzogenbosch; his enforced and unhappy novitiate in a house of augustinian canons near gouda; his secretaryship to the bishop of cambray, the grudging patron who allowed rather than assisted him to complete his training at the university of paris--all this was at the time mere matter of common form. it is with his arrival in england in , at the age of thirty-one, that his effective life really begins. for the next twenty years that life was one of restless movement and incessant production. in england, france, the low countries, on the upper rhine, and in italy, he flitted about gathering up the whole intellectual movement of the age, and pouring forth the results in that admirable latin which was not only the common language of scholars in every country, but the single language in which he himself thought instinctively and wrote freely. between the adagia of and the colloquia of comes a mass of writings equivalent to the total product of many fertile and industrious pens. he worked in the cause of humanism with a sacred fury, striving with all his might to connect it with all that was living in the old and all that was developing in the newer world. in his travels no less than in his studies the aspect of war must have perpetually met him as at once the cause and the effect of barbarism; it was the symbol of everything to which humanism in its broader as well as in its narrower aspect was utterly opposed and repugnant. he was a student at paris in the ominous year of the first french invasion of italy, in which the death of pico della mirandola and politian came like a symbol of the death of the italian renaissance itself. charles viii, as has often been said, brought back the renaissance to france from that expedition; but he brought her back a captive chained to the wheels of his cannon. the epoch of the italian wars began. a little later ( ) sandro botticelli painted that amazing nativity which is one of the chief treasures of the london national gallery. over it in mystical greek may still be read the painter's own words: "this picture was painted by me alexander amid the confusions of italy at the time prophesied in the second woe of the apocalypse, when satan shall be loosed upon the earth." in november, , erasmus was at bologna, and saw the triumphal entry of pope julius into the city at the head of a great mercenary army. two years later the league of cambray, a combination of folly, treachery and shame which filled even hardened politicians with horror, plunged half europe into a war in which no one was a gainer and which finally ruined italy: "bellum quo nullum," says the historian, "vel atrocius vel diuturnius in italia post exactos gothos majores nostri meminerunt." in england erasmus found, on his first visit, a country exhausted by the long and desperate struggle of the wars of the roses, out of which she had emerged with half her ruling class killed in battle or on the scaffold, and the whole fabric of society to reconstruct. the empire was in a state of confusion and turmoil no less deplorable and much more extensive. the diet of had indeed, by an expiring effort towards the suppression of absolute anarchy, decreed the abolition of private war. but in a society where every owner of a castle, every lord of a few square miles of territory, could conduct public war on his own account, the prohibition was of little more than formal value. humanism had been introduced by the end of the fifteenth century in some of the german universities, but too late to have much effect on the rising fury of religious controversy. the very year in which this treatise against war was published gave to the world another work of even wider circulation and more profound consequences. the famous epistolae obscurorum virorum, first published in , and circulated rapidly among all the educated readers of europe, made an open breach between the humanists and the church. that breach was never closed; nor on the other hand could the efforts of well-intentioned reformers like melancthon bring humanism into any organic relation with the reformed movement. when mutual exhaustion concluded the european struggle, civilization had to start afresh; it took a century more to recover the lost ground. the very idea of humanism had long before then disappeared. war, pestilence, the theologians: these were the three great enemies with which erasmus says he had throughout life to contend. it was during the years he spent in england that he was perhaps least harassed by them. his three periods of residence there--a fourth, in , appears to have been of short duration and not marked by any very notable incident--were of the utmost importance in his life. during the first, in his residence between the years and at london and oxford, the english renaissance, if the name be fully applicable to so partial and inconclusive a movement, was in the promise and ardour of its brief spring. it was then that erasmus made the acquaintance of those great englishmen whose names cannot be mentioned with too much reverence: colet, grocyn, latimer, linacre. these men were the makers of modern england to a degree hardly realized. they carried the future in their hands. peace had descended upon a weary country; and the younger generation was full of new hopes. the enchiridion militis christiani, written soon after erasmus returned to france, breathes the spirit of one who had not lost hope in the reconciliation of the church and the world, of the old and new. when erasmus made his second visit to england, in , that fair promise had grown and spread. colet had become dean of saint paul's; and through him, as it would appear, erasmus now made the acquaintance of another great man with whom he soon formed as close an intimacy, thomas more. his italian journey followed: he was in italy nearly three years, at turin, bologna, venice, padua, siena, rome. it was in the first of these years that albert dürer was also in italy, where he met bellini and was recognized by the italian masters as the head of a new transalpine art in no way inferior to their own. the year after erasmus left italy, botticelli, the last survivor of the ancient world, died at florence. meanwhile, henry viii, a prince, young, handsome, generous, pious, had succeeded to the throne of england. a golden age was thought to have dawned. lord mountjoy, who had been the pupil of erasmus at paris, and with whom he had first come to england, lost no time in urging henry to send for the most brilliant and famous of european scholars, and attach him to his court. the king, who had already met and admired him, needed no pressing. in the letter which henry himself wrote to erasmus entreating him to take up his residence in england, the language employed was that of sincere admiration; nor was there any conscious insincerity in the main motive which he urged. "it is my earnest wish," wrote the king, "to restore christ's religion to its primitive purity." the history of the english reformation supplies a strange commentary on these words. but the first few years of the new reign ( - ), which coincide with the third and longest sojourn of erasmus in england, were a time in which high hopes might not seem unreasonable. while italy was ravaged by war and the rest of europe was in uneasy ferment, england remained peaceful and prosperous. the lust of the eyes and the pride of life were indeed the motive forces of the court; but alongside of these was a real desire for reform, and a real if very imperfect attempt to cultivate the nobler arts of peace, to establish learning, and to purify religion. colet's great foundation of saint paul's school in is one of the landmarks of english history. erasmus joined the founder and the first high master, colet and lily, in composing the schoolbooks to be used in it. he had already written, in more's house at chelsea, where pure religion reigned alongside of high culture, the encomium moriae, in which all his immense gifts of eloquence and wit were lavished on the cause of humanism and the larger cause of humanity. that war was at once a sin, a scandal, and a folly was one of the central doctrines of the group of eminent englishmen with whom he was now associated. it was a doctrine held by them with some ambiguity and in varying degrees. in the utopia ( ) more condemns wars of aggression, while taking the common view as to wars of so-called self-defence. in , when henry, swept into the seductive scheme for a partition of france by a european confederacy, was preparing for the first of his many useless and inglorious continental campaigns, colet spoke out more freely. he preached before the court against war itself as barbarous and unchristian, and did not spare either kings or popes who dealt otherwise. henry was disturbed; he sent for colet, and pressed him hard on the point whether he meant that all wars were unjustifiable. colet was in advance of his age, but not so far in advance of it as this. he gave some kind of answer which satisfied the king. the preparations for war went forward; the battle of spurs plunged the court and all the nation into the intoxication of victory; while at flodden-edge, in the same autumn, the ancestral allies of france sustained the most crushing defeat recorded in scottish history. when both sides in a war have invoked god's favour, the successful side is ready enough to believe that its prayers have been answered and its action accepted by god. erasmus was now reader in greek and professor of divinity at cambridge; but cambridge was far away from the centre of european thought and of literary activities. he left england before the end of the year for basel, where the greater part of his life thenceforth was passed. froben had made basel the chief literary centre of production for the whole of europe. through froben's printing-presses erasmus could reach a wider audience than was allowed him at any court, however favourable to pure religion and the new learning. it was at this juncture that he made an eloquent and far-reaching appeal, on a matter which lay very near his heart, to the conscience of christendom. the adagia, that vast work which was, at least to his own generation, erasmus's foremost title to fame, has long ago passed into the rank of those monuments of literature "dont la reputation s'affermira toujours parcequ'on ne les lit guère." so far as erasmus is more than a name for most modern readers, it is on slighter and more popular works that any direct knowledge of him is grounded on the colloquies, which only ceased to be a schoolbook within living memory, on the praise of folly, and on selections from the enormous masses of his letters. an oxford scholar of the last generation, whose profound knowledge of humanistic literature was accompanied by a gift of terse and pointed expression, describes the adagia in a single sentence, as "a manual of the wit and wisdom of the ancient world for the use of the modern, enlivened by commentary in erasmus's finest vein." in its first form, the adagiorum collectanea, it was published by him at paris in , just after his return from england. in the author's epistle dedicatory to mountjoy he ascribes to him and to richard charnock, the prior of saint mary's college in oxford, the inspiration of the work. it consists of a series of between eight and nine hundred comments in brief essays, each suggested by some terse or proverbial phrase from an ancient latin author. the work gave full scope for the display, not only of the immense treasures of his learning, but of those other qualities, the combination of which raised their author far above all other contemporary writers, his keen wit, his copiousness and facility, his complete control of latin as a living language. it met with an enthusiastic reception, and placed him at once at the head of european men of letters. edition after edition poured from the press. it was ten times reissued at paris within a generation. eleven editions were published at strasburg between and . within the same years it was reprinted at erfurt, the hague, cologne, mayence, leyden, and elsewhere. the rhine valley was the great nursery of letters north of the alps, and along the rhine from source to sea the book spread and was multiplied. this success induced erasmus to enlarge and complete his labours. the adagiorum chiliades, the title of the work in its new form, was part of the work of his residence in italy in the years - , and was published at venice by aldus in september, . the enlarged collection, to all intents and purposes a new work, consists of no less than three thousand two hundred and sixty heads. in a preface, erasmus speaks slightingly of the adagiorum collectanea, with that affectation from which few authors are free, as a little collection carelessly made. "some people got hold of it," he adds, (and here the affectation becomes absolute untruth,) "and had it printed very incorrectly." in the new work, however, much of the old disappears, much more is partially or wholly recast; and such of the old matter as is retained is dispersed at random among the new. in the collectanea the commentaries had all been brief: here many are expanded into substantial treatises covering four or five pages of closely printed folio. the aldine edition had been reprinted at basel by froben in . shortly afterwards erasmus himself took up his permanent residence there. under his immediate supervision there presently appeared what was to all intents and purposes the definitive edition of . it is a book of nearly seven hundred folio pages, and contains, besides the introductory matter, three thousand four hundred and eleven headings. in his preface erasmus gives some details with regard to its composition. of the original paris work he now says, no doubt with truth, that it was undertaken by him hastily and without enough method. when preparing the venice edition he had better realized the magnitude of the enterprise, and was better fitted for it by reading and learning, more especially by the mass of greek manuscripts, and of newly printed greek first editions, to which he had access at venice and in other parts of italy. in england also, owing very largely to the kindness of archbishop warham, more leisure and an ampler library had been available. among several important additions made in the edition of , this essay, the text of which is the proverbial phrase "dulce bellum inexpertis," is at once the longest and the most remarkable. the adage itself, with a few lines of commentary, had indeed been in the original collection; but the treatise, in itself a substantial work, now appeared for the first time. it occupied a conspicuous place as the first heading in the fourth chiliad of the complete work; and it was at once singled out from the rest as of special note and profound import. froben was soon called upon for a separate edition. this appeared in april, , in a quarto of twenty pages. this little book, the bellum erasmi as it was called for the sake of brevity, ran like wildfire from reader to reader. half the scholarly presses of europe were soon employed in reprinting it. within ten years it had been reissued at louvain, twice at strasburg, twice at mayence, at leipsic, twice at paris, twice at cologne, at antwerp, and at venice. german translations of it were published at basel and at strasburg in and . it soon made its way to england, and the translation here utilized was issued by berthelet, the king's printer, in the winter of - . whether the translation be by richard taverner, the translator and editor, a few years later, of an epitome or selection of the chiliades, or by some other hand, there are no direct means of ascertaining; nor except for purposes of curiosity is the question an important one. the version wholly lacks distinction. it is a work of adequate scholarship but of no independent literary merit. english prose was then hardly formed. the revival of letters had reached the country, but for political and social reasons which are readily to be found in any handbook of english history, it had found a soil, fertile indeed, but not yet broken up. since chaucer, english poetry had practically stood still, and except where poetry has cleared the way, prose does not in ordinary circumstances advance. a few adventurers in setting forth had appeared. more's utopia, one of the earliest of english prose classics, is a classic in virtue of its style as well as of its matter. berners's translation of froissart, published in , was the first and one of the finest of that magnificent series of translations which from this time onwards for about a century were produced in an almost continuous stream, and through which the secret of prose was slowly wrung from older and more accomplished languages. latimer, about the same time, showed his countrymen how a vernacular prose, flexible, well knit, and nervous, might be written without its lines being traced on any ancient or foreign model. coverdale, the greatest master of english prose whom the century produced, whose name has just missed the immortality that is secure for his work, must have substantially completed that magnificent version of the bible which appeared in , and to which the authorized version of the seventeenth century owes all that one work of genius can owe to another. it is not with these great men that the translator of this treatise can be compared. but he wrought, after his measure, on the same structure as they. it is then to the original latin, not to this rude and stammering version, that scholars must turn now, as still more certainly they turned then, for the mind of erasmus; for with him, even more eminently than with other authors, the style is the man, and his latin is the substance, not merely the dress, of his thought. when he wrote it he was about forty-eight years of age. he was still in the fullness of his power. if he was often crippled by delicate health, that was no more than he had habitually been from boyhood. in this treatise we come very near the real man, with his strange mixture of liberalism and orthodoxy, of clear-sighted courage and a delicacy which nearly always might be mistaken for timidity. his text is that (in the translator's words) "nothing is either more wicked or more wretched, nothing doth worse become a man (i will not say a christian man) than war." war was shocking to erasmus alike on every side of his remarkably complex and sensitive nature. it was impious; it was inhuman; it was ugly; it was in every sense of the word barbarous, to one who before all things and in the full sense of the word was civilized and a lover of civilization. all these varied aspects of the case, seen by others singly and partially, were to him facets of one truth, rays of one light. his argument circles and flickers among them, hardly pausing to enforce one before passing insensibly to another. in the splendid vindication of the nature of man with which the treatise opens, the tone is rather that of cicero than of the new testament. the majesty of man resides above all in his capacity to "behold the very pure strength and nature of things;" in essence he is no fallen and corrupt creature, but a piece of workmanship such as shakespeare describes him through the mouth of hamlet. he was shaped to this heroic mould "by nature, or rather god," so the tudor translation reads, and the use of capital letters, though only a freak of the printer, brings out with a singular suggestiveness the latent pantheism which underlies the thought of all the humanists. to this wonderful creature strife and warfare are naturally repugnant. not only is his frame "weak and tender," but he is "born to love and amity." his chief end, the object to which all his highest and most distinctively human powers are directed, is coöperant labour in the pursuit of knowledge. war comes out of ignorance, and into ignorance it leads; of war comes contempt of virtue and of godly living. in the age of machiavelli the word "virtue" had a double and sinister meaning; but here it is taken in its nobler sense. yet, the argument continues, for "virtue," even in the florentine statesman's sense, war gives but little room. it is waged mainly for "vain titles or childish wrath;" it does not foster, in those responsible for it, any one of the nobler excellences. the argument throughout this part of the treatise is, both in its substance and in its ornament, wholly apart from the dogmas of religion. the furies of war are described as rising out of a very pagan hell. the apostrophe of nature to mankind immediately suggests the spirit as well as the language of lucretius. erasmus had clearly been reading the de rerum natura, and borrows some of his finest touches from that miraculous description of the growth of civilization in the fifth book, which is one of the noblest contributions of antiquity towards a real conception of the nature of the world and of man. the progressive degeneration of morality, because, as its scope becomes higher, practice falls further and further short of it, is insisted upon by both these great thinkers in much the same spirit and with much the same illustrations. the rise of empires, "of which there was never none yet in any nation, but it was gotten with the great shedding of man's blood," is seen by both in the same light. but erasmus passes on to the more expressly religious aspect of the whole matter in the great double climax with which he crowns his argument, the wickedness of a christian fighting against another man, the horror of a christian fighting against another christian. "yea, and with a thing so devilish," he breaks out in a mingling of intense scorn and profound pity, "we mingle christ." from this passionate appeal he passes to the praises of peace. why should men add the horrors of war to all the other miseries and dangers of life? why should one man's gain be sought only through another's loss? all victories in war are cadmean; not only from their cost in blood and treasure, but because we are in very truth "the members of one body," "redeemed with christ's blood." such was the clear, unmistakable teaching of our lord himself, such of his apostles. but the doctrine of christ has been "plied to worldly opinion." worldly men, philosophers following "the sophistries of aristotle," worst of all, divines and theologians themselves, have corrupted the gospel to the heathenish doctrine that "every man must first provide for himself." the very words of scripture are wrested to this abuse. self-defence is held to excuse any violence. "peter fought," they say, "in the garden,"--yes, and that same night he denied his master! "but punishment of wrong is a divine ordinance." in war the punishment falls on the innocent. "but the law of nature bids us repel violence by violence." what is the law of christ? "but may not a prince go to war justly for his right?" did any war ever lack a title? "but what of wars against the turk?" such wars are of turk against turk; let us overcome evil with good, let us spread the gospel by doing what the gospel commands: did christ say, hate them that hate you? then, with the tact of an accomplished orator, he lets the tension relax, and drops to a lower tone. even apart from all that has been urged, even if war were ever justifiable, think of the price that has to be paid for it. on this ground alone an unjust peace is far preferable to a just war. (these had been the very words of colet to the king of england.) men go to war under fine pretexts, but really to get riches, to satisfy hatred, or to win the poor glory of destroying. the hatred is but exasperated; the glory is won by and for the dregs of mankind; the riches are in the most prosperous event swallowed up ten times over. yet if it be impossible but war should be, if there may be sometimes a "colour of equity" in it, and if the tyrant's plea, necessity, be ever well-founded, at least, so erasmus ends, let it be conducted mercifully. let us live in fervent desire of the peace that we may not fully attain. let princes restrain their peoples; let churchmen above all be peacemakers. so the treatise passes to its conclusion with that eulogy of the medicean pope already mentioned, which perhaps was not wholly undeserved. to the modern world the name of leo x has come down marked with a note of censure or even of ignominy. it is fair to remember that it did not bear quite the same aspect to its contemporaries, nor to the ages which immediately followed. under rodrigo borgia it might well seem to others than to the florentine mystic that antichrist was enthroned, and satan let loose upon earth. the eight years of leo's pontificate ( - ) were at least a period of outward splendour and of a refinement hitherto unknown. the corruption, half veiled by that refinement and splendour, was deep and mortal, but the collapse did not come till later. by comparison with the disastrous reign of clement vii, his bastard cousin, that of giovanni de' medici seemed a last gleam of light before blackness descended on the world. even the licence of a dissolute age was contrasted to its favour with the gloom, "tristitia," that settled down over europe with the great catholic reaction. the age of leo x has descended to history as the age of bembo, sannazaro, lascaris, of the stanze of the vatican, of raphael's sistine madonna and titian's assumption; of the conquest of mexico and the circumnavigation of magellan; of magdalen tower and king's college chapel. it was an interval of comparative peace before a long epoch of wars more cruel and more devastating than any within the memory of men. the general european conflagration did not break out until ten years after erasmus's death; though it had then long been foreseen as inevitable. but he lived to see the conquest of rhodes by soliman, the sack of rome, the breach between england and the papacy, the ill-omened marriage of catherine de' medici to the heir of the french throne. humanism had done all that it could, and failed. in the sanguinary era of one hundred years between the outbreak of the civil war in the empire and the peace of westphalia, the renaissance followed the middle ages to the grave, and the modern world was born. the mere fact of this treatise having been translated into english and published by the king's printer shows, in an age when the literary product of england was as yet scanty, that it had some vogue and exercised some influence. but only a few copies of the work are known to exist; and it was never reprinted. it was not until nearly three centuries later, amid the throes of an european revolution equally vast, that the work was again presented in an english dress. vicesimus knox, a whig essayist, compiler, and publicist of some reputation at the time, was the author of a book which was published anonymously in and found some readers in a year filled with great events in both the history and the literature of england. it was entitled "anti-polemus: or the plea of reason, religion, and humanity against war: a fragment translated from erasmus and addressed to aggressors." that was the year when the final breach took place in the whig party, and when pitt initiated his brief and ill-fated policy of conciliation in ireland. it was also the year of two works of enormous influence over thought, paley's evidences and paine's age of reason. among these great movements knox's work had but little chance of appealing to a wide audience. "sed quid ad nos?" the bitter motto on the title-page, probably expressed the feelings with which it was generally regarded. a version of the treatise against war, made from the latin text of the adagia with some omissions, is the main substance of the volume; and knox added a few extracts from other writings of erasmus on the same subject. it does not appear to have been reprinted in england, except in a collected edition of knox's works which may be found on the dustiest shelves of old-fashioned libraries, until, after the close of the napoleonic wars, it was again published as a tract by the society for the promotion of permanent and universal peace. some half dozen impressions of this tract appeared at intervals up to the middle of the century; its publication passed into the hands of the society of friends, and the last issue of which any record can be found was made just before the outbreak of the crimean war. but in an abridged edition was printed at new york, and was one of the books which influenced the great movement towards humanity then stirring in the young republic. at the present day, the reactionary wave which has overspread the world has led, both in england and america, to a new glorification of war. peace is on the lips of governments and of individuals, but beneath the smooth surface the same passions, draped as they always have been under fine names, are a menace to progress and to the higher life of mankind. the increase of armaments, the glorification of the military life, the fanaticism which regards organized robbery and murder as a sacred imperial mission, are the fruits of a spirit which has fallen as far below the standard of humanism as it has left behind it the precepts of a still outwardly acknowledged religion. at such a time the noble pleading of erasmus has more than a merely literary or antiquarian interest. for the appeal of humanism still is, as it was then, to the dignity of human nature itself. j. w. mackail against war dulce bellum inexpertis it is both an elegant proverb, and among all others, by the writings of many excellent authors, full often and solemnly used, dulce bellum inexpertis, that is to say, war is sweet to them that know it not. there be some things among mortal men's businesses, in the which how great danger and hurt there is, a man cannot perceive till he make a proof. the love and friendship of a great man is sweet to them that be not expert: he that hath had thereof experience, is afraid. it seemeth to be a gay and a glorious thing, to strut up and down among the nobles of the court, and to be occupied in the king's business; but old men, to whom that thing by long experience is well known, do gladly abstain themselves from such felicity. it seemeth a pleasant thing to be in love with a young damsel; but that is unto them that have not yet perceived how much grief and bitterness is in such love. so after this manner of fashion, this proverb may be applied to every business that is adjoined with great peril and with many evils: the which no man will take on hand, but he that is young and wanteth experience of things. aristotle, in his book of rhetoric, showeth the cause why youth is more bold, and contrariwise old age more fearful: for unto young men lack of experience is cause of great boldness, and to the other, experience of many griefs engendereth fear and doubting. then if there be anything in the world that should be taken in hand with fear and doubting, yea, that ought by all manner of means to be fled, to be withstood with prayer, and to be clean avoided, verily it is war; than which nothing is either more wicked, or more wretched, or that more farther destroyeth, or that never hand cleaveth sorer to, or doth more hurt, or is more horrible, and briefly to speak, nothing doth worse become a man (i will not say a christian man) than war. and yet it is a wonder to speak of, how nowadays in every place, how lightly, and how for every trifling matter, it is taken in hand, how outrageously and barbarously it is gested and done, not only of heathen people, but also of christian men; not only of secular men, but also of priests and bishops; not only of young men and of them that have no experience, but also of old men and of those that so often have had experience; not only of the common and movable vulgar people, but most specially of the princes, whose duty had been, by wisdom and reason, to set in a good order and to pacify the light and hasty movings of the foolish multitude. nor there lack neither lawyers, nor yet divines, the which are ready with their firebrands to kindle these things so abominable, and they encourage them that else were cold, and they privily provoke those to it that were weary thereof. and by these means it is come to that pass that war is a thing now so well accepted, that men wonder at him that is not pleased therewith. it is so much approved, that it is counted a wicked thing (and i had almost said heresy) to reprove this one thing, the which as it is above all other things most mischievous, so it is most wretched. but how more justly should this be wondered at, what evil spirit, what pestilence, what mischief, and what madness put first in man's mind a thing so beyond measure beastly, that this most pleasant and reasonable creature man, the which nature hath brought forth to peace and benevolence, which one alone she hath brought forth to the help and succour of all other, should with so wild wilfulness, with so mad rages, run headlong one to destroy another? at the which thing he shall also much more marvel, whosoever would withdraw his mind from the opinions of the common people, and will turn it to behold the very pure strength and nature of things; and will apart behold with philosophical eyes the image of man on the one side, and the picture of war on the other side. then first of all if one would consider well but the behaviour and shape of man's body shall he not forthwith perceive that nature, or rather god, hath shaped this creature, not to war, but to friendship, not to destruction, but to health, not to wrong, but to kindness and benevolence? for whereas nature hath armed all other beasts with their own armour, as the violence of the bulls she hath armed with horns, the ramping lion with claws; to the boar she hath given the gnashing tusks; she hath armed the elephant with a long trump snout, besides his great huge body and hardness of the skin; she hath fenced the crocodile with a skin as hard as a plate; to the dolphin fish she hath given fins instead of a dart; the porcupine she defendeth with thorns; the ray and thornback with sharp prickles; to the cock she hath given strong spurs; some she fenceth with a shell, some with a hard hide, as it were thick leather, or bark of a tree; some she provideth to save by swiftness of flight, as doves; and to some she hath given venom instead of a weapon; to some she hath given a much horrible and ugly look, she hath given terrible eyes and grunting voice; and she hath also set among some of them continual dissension and debate--man alone she hath brought forth all naked, weak, tender, and without any armour, with most soft flesh and smooth skin. there is nothing at all in all his members that may seem to be ordained to war, or to any violence. i will not say at this time, that where all other beasts, anon as they are brought forth, they are able of themselves to get their food. man alone cometh so forth, that a long season after he is born, he dependeth altogether on the help of others. he can neither speak nor go, nor yet take meat; he desireth help only by his infant crying: so that a man may, at the least way, by this conject, that this creature alone was born all to love and amity, which specially increaseth and is fast knit together by good turns done eftsoons of one to another. and for this cause nature would, that a man should not so much thank her, for the gift of life, which she hath given unto him, as he should thank kindness and benevolence, whereby he might evidently understand himself, that he was altogether dedicate and bounden to the gods of graces, that is to say, to kindness, benevolence, and amity. and besides this nature hath given unto man a countenance not terrible and loathly, as unto other brute beasts; but meek and demure, representing the very tokens of love and benevolence. she hath given him amiable eyes, and in them assured marks of the inward mind. she hath ordained him arms to clip and embrace. she hath given him the wit and understanding to kiss: whereby the very minds and hearts of men should be coupled together, even as though they touched each other. unto man alone she hath given laughing, a token of good cheer and gladness. to man alone she hath given weeping tears, as it were a pledge or token of meekness and mercy. yea, and she hath given him a voice not threatening and horrible, as unto other brute beasts, but amiable and pleasant. nature not yet content with all this, she hath given unto man alone the commodity of speech and reasoning: the which things verily may specially both get and nourish benevolence, so that nothing at all should be done among men by violence. she hath endued man with hatred of solitariness, and with love of company. she hath utterly sown in man the very seeds of benevolence. she hath so done, that the selfsame thing, that is most wholesome, should be most sweet and delectable. for what is more delectable than a friend? and again, what thing is more necessary? moreover, if a man might lead all his life most profitably without any meddling with other men, yet nothing would seem pleasant without a fellow: except a man would cast off all humanity, and forsaking his own kind would become a beast. besides all this, nature hath endued man with knowledge of liberal sciences and a fervent desire of knowledge: which thing as it doth most specially withdraw man's wit from all beastly wildness, so hath it a special grace to get and knit together love and friendship. for i dare boldly say, that neither affinity nor yet kindred doth bind the minds of men together with straiter and surer bands of amity, than doth the fellowship of them that be learned in good letters and honest studies. and above all this, nature hath divided among men by a marvellous variety the gifts, as well of the soul as of the body, to the intent truly that every man might find in every singular person one thing or other, which they should either love or praise for the excellency thereof; or else greatly desire and make much of it, for the need and profit that cometh thereof. finally she hath endowed man with a spark of a godly mind: so that though he see no reward, yet of his own courage he delighteth to do every man good: for unto god it is most proper and natural, by his benefit, to do everybody good. else what meaneth it, that we rejoice and conceive in our minds no little pleasure when we perceive that any creature is by our means preserved. moreover god hath ordained man in this world, as it were the very image of himself, to the intent, that he, as it were a god on earth, should provide for the wealth of all creatures. and this thing the very brute beasts do also perceive, for we may see, that not only the tame beasts, but also the leopards, lions, and other more fierce and wild, when they be in any great jeopardy, they flee to man for succour. so man is, when all things fail, the last refuge to all manner of creatures. he is unto them all the very assured altar and sanctuary. i have here painted out to you the image of man as well as i can. on the other side (if it like you) against the figure of man, let us portray the fashion and shape of war. now, then, imagine in thy mind, that thou dost behold two hosts of barbarous people, of whom the look is fierce and cruel, and the voice horrible; the terrible and fearful rustling and glistering of their harness and weapons; the unlovely murmur of so huge a multitude; the eyes sternly menacing; the bloody blasts and terrible sounds of trumpets and clarions; the thundering of the guns, no less fearful than thunder indeed, but much more hurtful; the frenzied cry and clamour, the furious and mad running together, the outrageous slaughter, the cruel chances of them that flee and of those that are stricken down and slain, the heaps of slaughters, the fields overflowed with blood, the rivers dyed red with man's blood. and it chanceth oftentimes, that the brother fighteth with the brother, one kinsman with another, friend against friend; and in that common furious desire ofttimes one thrusteth his weapon quite through the body of another that never gave him so much as a foul word. verily, this tragedy containeth so many mischiefs, that it would abhor any man's heart to speak thereof. i will let pass to speak of the hurts which are in comparison of the other but light and common, as the treading down and destroying of the corn all about, the burning of towns, the villages fired, the driving away of cattle, the ravishing of maidens, the old men led forth in captivity, the robbing of churches, and all things confounded and full of thefts, pillages, and violence. neither i will not speak now of those things which are wont to follow the most happy and most just war of all. the poor commons pillaged, the nobles overcharged; so many old men of their children bereaved, yea, and slain also in the slaughter of their children; so many old women destitute, whom sorrow more cruelly slayeth than the weapon itself; so many honest wives become widows, so many children fatherless, so many lamentable houses, so many rich men brought to extreme poverty. and what needeth it here to speak of the destruction of good manners, since there is no man but knoweth right well that the universal pestilence of all mischievous living proceedeth at once from war. thereof cometh despising of virtue and godly living; thereof cometh, that the laws are neglected and not regarded; thereof cometh a prompt and a ready stomach, boldly to do every mischievous deed. out of this fountain spring so huge great companies of thieves, robbers, sacrilegers, and murderers. and what is most grievous of all, this mischievous pestilence cannot keep herself within her bounds; but after it is begun in some one corner, it doth not only (as a contagious disease) spread abroad and infect the countries near adjoining to it, but also it draweth into that common tumult and troublous business the countries that be very far off, either for need, or by reason of affinity, or else by occasion of some league made. yea and moreover, one war springeth of another: of a dissembled war there cometh war indeed, and of a very small, a right great war hath risen. nor it chanceth oftentimes none otherwise in these things than it is feigned of the monster, which lay in the lake or pond called lerna. for these causes, i trow, the old poets, the which most sagely perceived the power and nature of things, and with most meet feignings covertly shadowed the same, have left in writing, that war was sent out of hell: nor every one of the furies was not meet and convenient to bring about this business, but the most pestilent and mischievous of them all was chosen out for the nonce, which hath a thousand names, and a thousand crafts to do hurt. she being armed with a thousand serpents, bloweth before her her fiendish trumpet. pan with furious ruffling encumbereth every place. bellona shaketh her furious flail. and then the wicked furiousness himself, when he hath undone all knots and broken all bonds, rusheth out with bloody mouth horrible to behold. the grammarians perceived right well these things, of the which some will, that war have his name by contrary meaning of the word bellum, that is to say fair, because it hath nothing good nor fair. nor bellum, that is for to say war, is none otherwise called bellum, that is to say fair, than the furies are called eumenides, that is to say meek, because they are wilful and contrary to all meekness. and some grammarians think rather, that bellum, war, should be derived out of this word belva, that is for to say, a brute beast: forasmuch as it belongeth to brute beasts, and not unto men, to run together, each to destroy each other. but it seemeth to me far to pass all wild and all brute beastliness, to fight together with weapons. first, for there are many of the brute beasts, each in his kind, that agree and live in a gentle fashion together, and they go together in herds and flocks, and each helpeth to defend the other. nor is it the nature of all wild beasts to fight, for some are harmless, as does and hares. but they that are the most fierce of all, as lions, wolves, and tigers, do not make war among themselves as we do. one dog eateth not another. the lions, though they be fierce and cruel, yet they fight not among themselves. one dragon is in peace with another. and there is agreement among poisonous serpents. but unto man there is no wild or cruel beast more hurtful than man. again, when the brute beasts fight, they fight with their own natural armour: we men, above nature, to the destruction of men, arm ourselves with armour, invented by craft of the devil. nor the wild beasts are not cruel for every cause; but either when hunger maketh them fierce, or else when they perceive themselves to be hunted and pursued to the death, or else when they fear lest their younglings should take any harm or be stolen from them. but (o good lord) for what trifling causes what tragedies of war do we stir up? for most vain titles, for childish wrath, for a wench, yea, and for causes much more scornful than these, we be inflamed to fight. moreover, when the brute beasts fight, then war is one for one, yea, and that is very short. and when the battle is sorest fought, yet is there not past one or two, that goeth away sore wounded. when was it ever heard that an hundred thousand brute beasts were slain at one time fighting and tearing one another: which thing men do full oft and in many places? and besides this, whereas some wild beasts have natural debate with some other that be of a contrary kind, so again there be some with which they lovingly agree in a sure amity. but man with man, and each with other, have among them continual war; nor is there league sure enough among any men. so that whatsoever it be, that hath gone out of kind, it hath gone out of kind into a worse fashion, than if nature herself had engendered therein a malice at the beginning. will ye see how beastly, how foul, and how unworthy a thing war is for man? did ye never behold a lion let loose unto a bear? what gapings, what roarings, what grisly gnashing, what tearing of their flesh, is there? he trembleth that beholdeth them, yea, though he stand sure and safe enough from them. but how much more grisly a sight is it, how much more outrageous and cruel, to behold man to fight with man, arrayed with so much armour, and with so many weapons? i beseech you, who would believe that they were men, if it were not because war is a thing so much in custom that no man marvelleth at it? their eyes glow like fire, their faces be pale, their marching forth is like men in a fury, their voice screeching and grunting, their cry and frenzied clamour; all is iron, their harness and weapons jingling and clattering, and the guns thundering. it might have been better suffered, if man, for lack of meat and drink, should have fought with man, to the intent he might devour his flesh and drink his blood: albeit, it is come also now to that pass, that some there be that do it more of hatred than either for hunger or for thirst. but now this same thing is done more cruelly, with weapons envenomed, and with devilish engines. so that nowhere may be perceived any token of man. trow ye that nature could here know it was the same thing, that she sometime had wrought with her own hands? and if any man would inform her, that it were man that she beheld in such array, might she not well, with great wondering, say these words? "what new manner of pageant is this that i behold? what devil of hell hath brought us forth this monster. there be some that call me a stepmother, because that among so great heaps of things of my making i have brought forth some venomous things (and yet have i ordained the selfsame venomous things for man's behoof); and because i have made some beasts very fierce and perilous: and yet is there no beast so wild nor so perilous, but that by craft and diligence he may be made tame and gentle. by man's diligent labour the lions have been made tame, the dragons meek, and the bears obedient. but what is this, that worse is than any stepmother, which hath brought us forth this new unreasonable brute beast, the pestilence and mischief of all this world? one beast alone i brought forth wholly dedicate to be benevolent, pleasant, friendly, and wholesome to all other. what hath chanced, that this creature is changed into such a brute beast? i perceive nothing of the creature man, which i myself made. what evil spirit hath thus defiled my work? what witch hath bewitched the mind of man, and transformed it into such brutishness? what sorceress hath thus turned him out of his kindly shape? i command and would that the wretched creature should behold himself in a glass. but, alas, what shall the eyes see, where the mind is away? yet behold thyself (if thou canst), thou furious warrior, and see if thou mayst by any means recover thyself again. from whence hast thou that threatening crest upon thy head? from whence hast thou that shining helmet? from whence are those iron horns? whence cometh it, that thine elbows are so sharp and piked? where hadst thou those scales? where hadst thou those brazen teeth? of whence are those hard plates? whence are those deadly weapons? from whence cometh to thee this voice more horrible than of a wild beast? what a look and countenance hast thou more terrible than of a brute beast? where hast thou gotten this thunder and lightning, both more fearful and hurtful than is the very thunder and lightning itself? i formed thee a goodly creature; what came into thy mind, that thou wouldst thus transform thyself into so cruel and so beastly fashion, that there is no brute beast so unreasonable in comparison unto man?" these words, and many other such like, i suppose, the dame nature, the worker of all things, would say. then since man is such as is showed before that he is, and that war is such a thing, like as too oft we have felt and known, it seemeth to me no small wonder, what ill spirit, what disease, or what mishap, first put into man's mind, that he would bathe his mortal weapon in the blood of man. it must needs be, that men mounted up to so great madness by divers degrees. for there was never man yet (as juvenal saith) that was suddenly most graceless of all. and always things the worst have crept in among men's manners of living, under the shadow and shape of goodness. for some time those men that were in the beginning of the world led their lives in woods; they went naked, they had no walled towns, nor houses to put their heads in: it happened otherwhile that they were sore grieved and destroyed with wild beasts. wherefore with them first of all, men made war, and he was esteemed a mighty strong man, and a captain, that could best defend mankind from the violence of wild beasts. yea, and it seemed to them a thing most equable to strangle the stranglers, and to slay the slayers, namely, when the wild beast, not provoked by us for any hurt to them done, would wilfully set upon us. and so by reason that this was counted a thing most worthy of praise (for hereof it rose that hercules was made a god), the lusty-stomached young men began all about to hunt and chase the wild beasts, and as a token of their valiant victory the skins of such beasts as they slew were set up in such places as the people might behold them. besides this they were not contented to slay the wild beasts, but they used to wear their skins to keep them from the cold in winter. these were the first slaughters that men used: these were their spoils and robberies. after this, they went so farforth, that they were bold to do a thing which pythagoras thought to be very wicked; and it might seem to us also a thing monstrous, if custom were not, which hath so great strength in every place: that by custom it was reputed in some countries a much charitable deed if a man would, when his father was very old, first sore beat him, and after thrust him headlong into a pit, and so bereave him of his life, by whom it chanced him to have the gift of life. it was counted a holy thing for a man to feed on the flesh of his own kinsmen and friends. they thought it a goodly thing, that a virgin should be made common to the people in the temple of venus. and many other things, more abominable than these: of which if a man should now but only speak, every man would abhor to hear him. surely there is nothing so ungracious, nor nothing so cruel, but men will hold therewith, if it be once approved by custom. then will ye hear, what a deed they durst at the last do? they were not abashed to eat the carcases of the wild beasts that were slain, to tear the unsavoury flesh with their teeth, to drink the blood, to suck out the matter of them, and (as ovid saith) to hide the beasts' bowels within their own. and although at that time it seemed to be an outrageous deed unto them that were of a more mild and gentle courage: yet was it generally allowed, and all by reason of custom and commodity. yet were they not so content. for they went from the slaying of noisome wild beasts, to kill the harmless beasts, and such as did no hurt at all. they waxed cruel everywhere upon the poor sheep, a beast without fraud or guile. they slew the hare, for none other offence, but because he was a good fat dish of meat to feed upon. nor they forbare not to kill the tame ox, which had a long season, with his sore labour, nourished the unkind household. they spared no kind of beasts, of fowls, nor of fishes. yea, and the tyranny of gluttony went so farforth that there was no beast anywhere that could be sure from the cruelty of man. yea, and custom persuaded this also, that it seemed no cruelty at all to slay any manner of beast, whatsoever it was, so they abstained from manslaughter. now peradventure it lieth in our power to keep out vices, that they enter not upon the manners of men, in like manner as it lieth in our power to keep out the sea, that it break not in upon us; but when the sea is once broken in, it passeth our power to restrain it within any bounds. so either of them both once let in, they will not be ruled, as we would, but run forth headlong whithersoever their own rage carrieth them. and so after that men had been exercised with such beginnings to slaughter, wrath anon enticed man to set upon man, either with staff, or with stone, or else with his fist. for as yet, i think they used no other weapons. and now had they learned by the killing of beasts, that man also might soon and easily be slain with little labour. but this cruelty remained betwixt singular persons, so that yet there was no great number of men that fought together, but as it chanced one man against another. and besides this, there was no small colour of equity, if a man slew his enemy; yea, and shortly after, it was a great praise to a man to slay a violent and a mischievous man, and to rid him out of the world, such devilish and cruel caitiffs, as men say cacus and busiris were. for we see plainly, that for such causes, hercules was greatly praised. and in process of time, many assembled to take part together, either as affinity, or as neighbourhood, or kindred bound them. and what is now robbery was then war. and they fought then with stones, or with stakes, a little burned at the ends. a little river, a rock, or such other like thing, chancing to be between them, made an end of their battle. in the mean season, while fierceness by use increaseth, while wrath is grown great, and ambition hot and vehement, by ingenious craft they arm their furious violence. they devise harness, such as it is, to fence them with. they invent weapons to destroy their enemies with. thus now by few and few, now with greater company, and now armed they begin to fight. nor to this manifest madness they forget not to give honour. for they call it bellum, that is to say, a fair thing; yea, and they repute it a virtuous deed, if a man, with the jeopardy of his own life, manly resist and defend from the violence of his enemies, his wife, children, beasts, and household. and by little and little, malice grew so great, with the high esteeming of other things, that one city began to send defiance and make war to another, country against country, and realm against realm. and though the thing of itself was then most cruel, yet all this while there remained in them certain tokens, whereby they might be known for men: for such goods as by violence were taken away were asked and required again by an herald at arms; the gods were called to witness; yea, and when they were ranged in battle, they would reason the matter ere they fought. and in the battle they used but homely weapons, nor they used neither guile nor deceit, but only strength. it was not lawful for a man to strike his enemy till the sign of battle was given; nor was it not lawful to fight after the sounding of the retreat. and for conclusion, they fought more to show their manliness and for praise, than they coveted to slay. nor all this while they armed them not, but against strangers, the which they called hostes, as they had been hospites, their guests. of this rose empires, of the which there was never none yet in any nation, but it was gotten with the great shedding of man's blood. and since that time there hath followed continual course of war, while one eftsoons laboureth to put another out of his empire, and to set himself in. after all this, when the empires came once into their hands that were most ungracious of all other, they made war upon whosoever pleased them; nor were they not in greatest peril and danger of war that had most deserved to be punished, but they that by fortune had gotten great riches. and now they made not war to get praise and fame, but to get the vile muck of the world, or else some other thing far worse than that. i think not the contrary, but that the great, wise man pythagoras meant these things when he by a proper device of philosophy frightened the unlearned multitude of people from the slaying of silly beasts. for he perceived, it should at length come to pass, that he which (by no injury provoked) was accustomed to spill the blood of a harmless beast, would in his anger, being provoked by injury, not fear to slay a man. war, what other thing else is it than a common manslaughter of many men together, and a robbery, the which, the farther it sprawleth abroad, the more mischievous it is? but many gross gentlemen nowadays laugh merrily at these things, as though they were the dreams and dotings of schoolmen, the which, saving the shape, have no point of manhood, yet seem they in their own conceit to be gods. and yet of those beginnings, we see we be run so far in madness, that we do naught else all our life-days. we war continually, city with city, prince with prince, people with people, yea, and (it that the heathen people confess to be a wicked thing) cousin with cousin, alliance with alliance, brother with brother, the son with the father, yea, and that i esteem more cruel than all these things, a christian man against another man; and yet furthermore, i will say that i am very loath to do, which is a thing most cruel of all, one christian man with another christian man. oh, blindness of man's mind! at those things no man marvelleth, no man abhorreth them. there be some that rejoice at them, and praise them above the moon: and the thing which is more than devilish, they call a holy thing. old men, crooked for age, make war, priests make war, monks go forth to war; yea, and with a thing so devilish we mingle christ. the battles ranged, they encounter the one the other, bearing before them the sign of the cross, which thing alone might at the leastwise admonish us by what means it should become christian men to overcome. but we run headlong each to destroy other, even from that heavenly sacrifice of the altar, whereby is represented that perfect and ineffable knitting together of all christian men. and of so wicked a thing, we make christ both author and witness. where is the kingdom of the devil, if it be not in war? why draw we christ into war, with whom a brothel-house agreeth more than war? saint paul disdaineth, that there should be any so great discord among christian men, that they should need any judge to discuss the matter between them. what if he should come and behold us now through all the world, warring for every light and trifling cause, striving more cruelly than ever did any heathen people, and more cruelly than any barbarous people? yea, and ye shall see it done by the authority, exhortations, and furtherings of those that represent christ, the prince of peace and very bishop that all things knitteth together by peace and of those that salute the people with good luck of peace. nor is it not unknown to me what these unlearned people say (a good while since) against me in this matter, whose winnings arise of the common evils. they say thus: we make war against our wills: for we be constrained by the ungracious deeds of other. we make war but for our right. and if there come any hurt thereof, thank them that be causers of it. but let these men hold their tongues awhile, and i shall after, in place convenient, avoid all their cavillations, and pluck off that false visor wherewith we hide all our malice. but first as i have above compared man with war, that is to say, the creature most demure with a thing most outrageous, to the intent that cruelty might the better be perceived: so will i compare war and peace together, the thing most wretched, and most mischievous, with the best and most wealthy thing that is. and so at last shall appear, how great madness it is, with so great tumult, with so great labours, with such intolerable expenses, with so many calamities, affectionately to desire war: whereas agreement might be bought with a far less price. first of all, what in all this world is more sweet or better than amity or love? truly nothing. and i pray you, what other thing is peace than amity and love among men, like as war on the other side is naught else but dissension and debate of many men together? and surely the property of good things is such, that the broader they be spread, the more profit and commodity cometh of them. farther, if the love of one singular person with another be so sweet and delectable, how great should the felicity be if realm with realm, and nation with nation, were coupled together, with the band of amity and love? on the other side, the nature of evil things is such, that the farther they sprawl abroad, the more worthy they are to be called evil, as they be indeed. then if it be a wretched thing, if it be an ungracious thing, that one man armed should fight with another, how much more miserable, how much more mischievous is it, that the selfsame thing should be done with so many thousands together? by love and peace the small things increase and wax great, by discord and debate the great things decay and come to naught. peace is the mother and nurse of all good things. war suddenly and at once overthroweth, destroyeth, and utterly fordoeth everything that is pleasant and fair, and bringeth in among men a monster of all mischievous things. in the time of peace (none otherwise than as if the lusty springtime should show and shine in men's businesses) the fields are tilled, the gardens and orchards freshly flourish, the beasts pasture merrily; gay manours in the country are edified, the towns are builded, where as need is reparations are done, the buildings are heightened and augmented, riches increase, pleasures are nourished, the laws are executed, the common wealth flourisheth, religion is fervent, right reigneth, gentleness is used, craftsmen are busily exercised, the poor men's gain is more plentiful, the wealthiness of the rich men is more gay and goodly, the studies of most honest learnings flourish, youth is well taught, the aged folks have quiet and rest, maidens are luckily married, mothers are praised for bringing forth of children like to their progenitors, the good men prosper and do well, and the evil men do less offence. but as soon as the cruel tempest of war cometh on us, good lord, how great a flood of mischiefs occupieth, overfloweth, and drowneth all together. the fair herds of beasts are driven away, the goodly corn is trodden down and destroyed, the good husbandmen are slain, the villages are burned up, the most wealthy cities, that have flourished so many winters, with that one storm are overthrown, destroyed, and brought to naught: so much readier and prompter men are to do hurt than good. the good citizens are robbed and spoiled of their goods by cursed thieves and murderers. every place is full of fear, of wailing, complaining, and lamenting. the craftsmen stand idle; the poor men must either die for hunger, or fall to stealing. the rich men either stand and sorrow for their goods, that be plucked and snatched from them, or else they stand in great doubt to lose such goods as they have left them: so that they be on every side woebegone. the maidens, either they be not married at all, or else if they be married, their marriages are sorrowful and lamentable. wives, being destitute of their husbands, lie at home without any fruit of children, the laws are laid aside, gentleness is laughed to scorn, right is clean exiled, religion is set at naught, hallowed and unhallowed things all are one, youth is corrupted with all manner of vices, the old folk wail and weep, and wish themselves out of the world, there is no honour given unto the study of good letters. finally, there is no tongue can tell the harm and mischief that we feel in war. perchance war might be the better suffered, if it made us but only wretched and needy; but it maketh us ungracious, and also full of unhappiness. and i think peace likewise should be much made of, if it were but only because it maketh us more wealthy and better in our living. alas, there be too many already, yea, and more than too many mischiefs and evils, with the which the wretched life of man (whether he will or no) is continually vexed, tormented, and utterly consumed. it is near hand two thousand years since the physicians had knowledge of three hundred divers notable sicknesses by name, besides other small sicknesses and new, as daily spring among us, and besides age also, which is of itself a sickness inevitable. we read that in one place whole cities have been destroyed with earthquakes. we read, also, that in another place there have been cities altogether burnt with lightning; how in another place whole regions have been swallowed up with opening of the earth, towns by undermining have fallen to the ground; so that i need not here to remember what a great multitude of men are daily destroyed by divers chances, which be not regarded because they happen so often: as sudden breaking out of the sea and of great floods, falling down of hills and houses, poison, wild beasts, meat, drink, and sleep. one hath been strangled with drinking of a hair in a draught of milk, another hath been choked with a little grapestone, another with a fishbone sticking in his throat. there hath been, that sudden joy hath killed out of hand: for it is less wonder of them that die for vehement sorrow. besides all this, what mortal pestilence see we in every place. there is no part of the world, that is not subject to peril and danger of man's life, which life of itself also is most fugitive. so manifold mischances and evils assail man on every side that not without cause homer did say: man was the most wretched of all creatures living. but forasmuch these mischances cannot lightly be eschewed, nor they happen not through our fault, they make us but only wretched, and not ungracious withal. what pleasure is it then for them that be subject already to so many miserable chances, willingly to seek and procure themselves another mischief more than they had before, as though they yet wanted misery? yea, they procure not a light evil, but such an evil that is worse than all the others, so mischievous, that it alone passeth all the others; so abundant, that in itself alone is comprehended all ungraciousness; so pestilent, that it maketh us all alike wicked as wretched, it maketh us full of all misery, and yet not worthy to be pitied. now go farther, and with all these things consider, that the commodities of peace spread themselves most far and wide, and pertain unto many men. in war if there happen anything luckily (but, o good lord, what may we say happeneth well and luckily in war?), it pertaineth to very few, and to them that are unworthy to have it. the prosperity of one is the destruction of another. the enriching of one is the spoil and robbing of another. the triumph of one is the lamentable mourning of another, so that as the infelicity is bitter and sharp, the felicity is cruel and bloody. howbeit otherwhile both parties wept according to the proverb, victoria cadmaea, cadmus victorie, where both parties repented. and i wot not whether it came ever so happily to pass in war, that he that had victory did not repent him of his enterprise, if he were a good man. then seeing peace is the thing above all other most best and most pleasant, and, contrariwise, war the thing most ungracious and wretched of all other, shall we think those men to be in their right minds, the which when they may obtain peace with little business and labour will rather procure war with so great labour and most difficulty? first of all consider, how loathly a thing the rumour of war is, when it is first spoken of. then how envious a thing it is unto a prince, while with often tithes and taxes he pillageth his subjects. what a business hath he to make and entertain friends to help him? what a business to procure bands of strangers and to hire soldiers? what expenses and labours must he make in setting forth his navy of ships, in building and repairing of castles and fortresses, in preparing and apparelling of his tents and pavilions, in framing, making, and carrying of engines, guns, armour, weapons, baggage, carts, and victual? what great labour is spent in making of bulwarks, in casting of ditches, in digging of mines, in keeping of watches, in keeping of arrays, and in exercising of weapons? i pass over the fear they be in; i speak not of the imminent danger and peril that hangeth over their heads: for what thing in war is not to be feared? what is he that can reckon all the incommodious life that the most foolish soldiers suffer in the field? and for that worthy to endure worse, in that they will suffer it willingly. their meat is so ill that an ox of cyprus would be loath to eat it; they have but little sleep, nor yet that at their own pleasure. their tents on every side are open on the wind. what, a tent? no, no; they must all the day long, be it hot or cold, wet or dry, stand in the open air, sleep on the bare ground, stand in their harness. they must suffer hunger, thirst, cold, heat, dust, showers; they must be obedient to their captains; sometimes they be clapped on the pate with a warder or a truncheon: so that there is no bondage so vile as the bondage of soldiers. besides all this, at the sorrowful sign given to fight, they must run headlong to death: for either they must slay cruelly, or be slain wretchedly. so many sorrowful labours must they take in hand, that they may bring to pass that thing which is most wretched of all other. with so many great miseries we must first afflict and grieve our own self, that we may afflict and grieve other! now if we would call this matter to account, and justly reckon how much war will cost, and how much peace, surely we shall find that peace may be got and obtained with the tenth part of the cares, labours, griefs, perils, expenses, and spilling of blood, with which the war is procured. so great a company of men, to their extreme perils, ye lead out of the realm to overthrow and destroy some one town: and with the labour of the selfsame men, and without any peril at all, another town, much more noble and goodly, might be new edified and builded. but you say, you will hurt and grieve your enemy: so even that doing is against humanity. nevertheless, this i would ye should consider, that ye cannot hurt and grieve your enemies, but ye must first greatly hurt your own people. and it seemeth a point of a madman, to enterprise where he is sure and certain of so great hurt and damage, and is uncertain which way the chance of war will turn. but admit, that either foolishness, or wrath, or ambition, or covetousness, or outrageous cruelty, or else (which i think more like) the furies sent from hell, should ravish and draw the heathen people to this madness. yet from whence cometh it into our minds, that one christian man should draw his weapon to bathe it in another christian man's blood? it is called parricide, if the one brother slay the other. and yet is a christian man nearer joined to another than is one brother to another: except the bonds of nature be stronger than the bonds of christ. what abominable thing, then, is it to see them almost continually fighting among themselves, the which are the inhabitants of one house the church, which rejoice and say, that they all be the members of one body, and that have one head, which truly is christ; they have all one father in heaven; they are all taught and comforted by one holy spirit; they profess the religion of christ all under one manner; they are all redeemed with christ's blood; they are all newborn at the holy font; they use alike sacraments; they be all soldiers under one captain; they are all fed with one heavenly bread; they drink all of one spiritual cup; they have one common enemy the devil; finally, they be all called to one inheritance. where be they so many sacraments of perfect concord? where be the innumerable teachings of peace? there is one special precept, which christ called his, that is, charity. and what thing is so repugnant to charity as war? christ saluted his disciples with the blessed luck of peace. unto his disciples he gave nothing save peace, saving peace he left them nothing. in those holy prayers, he specially prayed the father of heaven, that in like manner as he was one with the father, so all his, that is to say, christian men, should be one with him. lo, here you may perceive a thing more than peace, more than amity, more than concord. solomon bare the figure of christ: for solomon in the hebrew tongue signifieth peaceable or peaceful. him god would have to build his temple. at the birth of christ the angels proclaimed neither war nor triumphs, but peace they sang. and before his birth the prophet david prophesied thus of him: et factus est in pace locus ejus, that is to say, his dwelling place is made in peace. search all the whole life of christ, and ye shall never find thing that breathes not of peace, that signifieth not amity, that savoureth not of charity. and because he perceived peace could not well be kept, except men would utterly despise all those things for which the world so greedily fighteth, he commanded that we should of him learn to be meek. he calleth them blessed and happy that setteth naught by riches, for those he calleth poor in spirit. blessed be they that despise the pleasures of this world, the which he calleth mourners. and them blessed he calleth that patiently suffer themselves, to be put out of their possessions, knowing that here in this world they are but as outlaws; and the very true country and possession of godly creatures is in heaven. he calleth them blessed which, deserving well of all men, are wrongfully blamed and ill afflicted. he forbade that any man should resist evil. briefly, as all his doctrine commandeth sufferance and love, so all his life teacheth nothing else but meekness. so he reigned, so he warred, so he overcame, so he triumphed. now the apostles, that had sucked into them the pure spirit of christ, and were blessedly drunk with that new must of the holy ghost, preached nothing but meekness and peace. what do all the epistles of paul sound in every place but peace, but long-suffering, but charity? what speaketh saint john, what rehearseth he so oft, but love? what other thing did peter? what other thing did all the true christian writers? from whence then cometh all this tumult of wars amongst the children of peace? think ye it a fable, that christ calleth himself a vine tree, and his own the branches? who did ever see one branch fight with another? is it in vain that paul so oft wrote, the church to be none other thing, than one body compact together of divers members, cleaving to one head, christ? whoever saw the eye fight with the hand, or the belly with the foot? in this universal body, compact of all those unlike things, there is agreement. in the body of a beast, one member is in peace with another, and each member useth not the property thereto given for itself alone, but for the profit of all the other members. so that if there come any good to any one member alone, it helpeth all the whole body. and may the compaction or knitting of nature do more in the body of a beast, that shortly must perish, than the coupling of the holy ghost in the mystical and immortal body of the church? do we to no purpose pray as taught by christ: good lord, even as thy will is fulfilled in heaven, so let it be fulfilled in the earth? in that city of heaven is concord and peace most perfect. and christ would have his church to be none other than a heavenly people in earth, as near as might be after the manner of them that are in heaven, ever labouring and making haste to go thither, and always having their mind thereon. now go to, let us imagine, that there should come some new guest out of the lunar cities, where empedocles dwelleth, or else out of the innumerable worlds, that democritus fabricated, into this world, desiring to know what the inhabitants do here. and when he was instructed of everything, it should at last be told him that, besides all other, there is one creature marvellously mingled, of body like to brute beasts and of soul like unto god. and it should also be told him, that this creature is so noble, that though he be here an outlaw out of his own country, yet are all other beasts at his commandment, the which creature through his heavenly beginning inclineth alway to things heavenly and immortal. and that god eternal loved this creature so well, that whereas he could neither by the gifts of nature, nor by the strong reasons of philosophy attain unto that which he so fervently desired, he sent hither his only begotten son, to the intent to teach this creature a new kind of learning. then as soon as this new guest had perceived well the whole manner of christ's life and precepts, would desire to stand in some high place, from whence he might behold that which he had heard. and when he should see all other creatures soberly live according to their kind, and, being led by the laws and course of nature, desire nothing but even as nature would; and should see this one special creature man given riotously to tavern haunting, to vile lucre, to buying and selling, chopping and changing, to brawling and fighting one with another, trow ye that he would not think that any of the other creatures were man, of whom he heard so much of before, rather than he that is indeed man? then if he that had instructed him afore would show him which creature is man, now would he look about to see if he could spy the christian flock and company, the which, following the ordinance of that heavenly teacher christ, should exhibit to him a figure or shape of the evangelical city. think ye he would not rather judge christians to dwell in any other place than in those countries, wherein we see so great superfluity, riot, voluptuousness, pride, tyranny, discord, brawlings, fightings, wars, tumults, yea, and briefly to speak, a greater puddle of all those things that christ reproveth than among turks or saracens? from whence, then, creepeth this pestilence in among christian people? doubtless this mischief also is come in by little and little, like as many more other be, ere men be aware of them. for truly every mischief creepeth by little and little upon the good manners of men, or else under the colour of goodness it is suddenly received. so then first of all, learning and cunning crept in as a thing very meet to confound heretics, which defend their opinions with the doctrine of philosophers, poets, and orators. and surely at the beginning of our faith, christian men did not learn those things; but such as peradventure had learned them, before they knew what christ meant, they turned the thing that they had learned already, into good use. eloquence of tongue was at the beginning dissembled more than despised, but at length it was openly approved. after that, under colour of confounding heretics, came in an ambitious pleasure of brawling disputations, which hath brought into the church of christ no small mischief. at length the matter went so farforth that aristotle was altogether received into the middle of divinity, and so received, that his authority is almost reputed holier than the authority of christ. for if christ spake anything that did little agree with our life, by interpretation of aristotle it was lawful to make it serve their purpose. but if any do never so little repugn against the high divinity of aristotle, he is quickly with clapping of hands driven out of the place. for of him we have learned, that the felicity of man is imperfect, except he have both the good gifts of body and of fortune. of him we have learned, that no commonweal may flourish, in which all things are common. and we endeavour ourselves to glue fast together the decrees of this man and the doctrine of christ--which is as likely a thing as to mingle fire and water together. and a gobbet we have received of the civil laws, because of the equity that seemeth to be in them. and to the end they should the better serve our purpose, we have, as near as may be, writhed and plied the doctrine of the gospel to them. now by the civil law it is lawful for a man to defend violence with violence, and each to pursue for his right. those laws approve buying and selling; they allow usury, so it be measurable; they praise war as a noble thing, so, it be just. finally all the doctrine of christ is so defiled with the learning of logicians, sophisters, astronomers, orators, poets, philosophers, lawyers, and gentles, that a man shall spend the most part of his life, ere he may have any leisure to search holy scripture, to the which when a man at last cometh, he must come infected with so many worldly opinions, that either he must be offended with christ's doctrines, or else he must apply them to the mind and of them that he hath learned before. and this thing is so much approved, that it is now a heinous deed, if a man presume to study holy scripture, which hath not buried himself up to the hard ears in those trifles, or rather sophistries of aristotle. as though christ's doctrine were such, that it were not lawful for all men to know it, or else that it could by any means agree with the wisdom of philosophers. besides this we admitted at the beginning of our faith some honour, which afterward we claimed as of duty. then we received riches, but that was to distribute to relieve poor men, which afterwards we turned to our own use. and why not, since we have learned by the law civil, that the very order of charity is, that every man must first provide for himself? nor lack there colours to cloak this mischief: first it is a good deed to provide for our children, and it is right that we foresee how to live in age; finally, why should we, say they, give our goods away, if we come by them without fraud? by these degrees it is by little and little come to pass, that he is taken for the best man that hath most riches: nor never was there more honour given to riches among the heathen people, than is at this day among the christian people. for what thing is there, either spiritual or temporal, that is not done with great show of riches? and it seemed a thing agreeable with those ornaments, if christian men had some great jurisdiction under them. nor there wanted not such as gladly submitted themselves. albeit at the beginning it was against their wills, and scantly would they receive it. and yet with much work, they received it so, that they were content with the name and title only: the profit thereof they gladly gave unto other men. at the last, little by little it came to pass, that a bishop thought himself no bishop, except he had some temporal lordship withal; an abbot thought himself of small authority, if he had not wherewith to play the lordly sire. and in conclusion, we blushed never a deal at the matter, we wiped away all shamefastness, and shoved aside all the bars of comeliness. and whatever abuse was used among the heathen people, were it covetousness, ambition, riot, pomp, or pride, or tyranny, the same we follow, in the same we match them, yea, and far pass them. and to pass over the lighter things for the while, i pray you, was there ever war among the heathen people so long continually, or more cruelly, than among christian people? what stormy rumblings, what violent brays of war, what tearing of leagues, and what piteous slaughters of men have we seen ourselves within these few years? what nation hath not fought and skirmished with another? and then we go and curse the turk; and what can be a more pleasant sight to the turks, than to behold us daily each slaying other? xerxes doted, when he led out of his own country that huge multitude of people to make war upon the greeks. trow ye, was he not mad, when he wrote letters to the mountain called athos, threatening that the hill should repent except it obeyed his lust? and the same xerxes commanded also the sea to be beaten, because it was somewhat rough when he should have sailed over. who will deny but alexander the great was mad also? he, the young god, wished that there were many worlds, the which he might conquer--so great a fever of vainglory had embraced his young lusty courage. and yet these same men, the which seneca doubted not to call mad thieves, warred after a gentler fashion than we do; they were more faithful of their promise in war, nor they used not so mischievous engines in war, nor such crafts and subtleties, nor they warred not for so light causes as we christian men do. they rejoiced to advance and enrich such provinces as they had conquered by war; and the rude people, that lived like wild beasts without laws, learning, or good manners, they taught them both civil conditions and crafts, whereby they might live like men. in countries that were not inhabited with people, they builded cities, and made them both fair and profitable. and the places that were not very sure, they fenced, for safeguard of the people, with bridges, banks, bulwarks; and with a thousand other such commodities they helped the life of man. so that then it was right expedient to be overcome. yea, and how many things read we, that were either wisely done, or soberly spoken of them in the midst of their wars. as for those things that are done in christian men's wars they are more filthy and cruel than is convenient here to rehearse. moreover, look what was worst in the heathen peoples' wars, in that we follow them, yea, we pass them. but now it is worth while to hear, by what means we maintain this our so great madness. thus they reason: if it had not been lawful by no means to make war, surely god would never have been the author to the jews to make war against their enemies. well said, but we must add hereunto, that the jews never made war among themselves, but against strangers and wicked men. we, christian men, fight with christian men. diversity of religion caused the jews to fight against their enemies: for their enemies worshipped not god as they did. we make war oftentimes for a little childish anger, or for hunger of money, or for thirst of glory, or else for filthy meed. the jews fought by the commandment of god; we make war to avenge the grief and displeasure of our mind. and nevertheless if men will so much lean to the example of the jews, why do we not then in like manner use circumcision? why do we not sacrifice with the blood of sheep and other beasts? why do we not abstain from swine's flesh? why doth not each of us wed many wives? since we abhor those things, why doth the example of war please us so much? why do we here follow the bare letter that killeth? it was permitted the jews to make war, but so likewise as they were suffered to depart from their wives, doubtless because of their hard and froward manners. but after christ commanded the sword to be put up, it is unlawful for christian men to make any other war but that which is the fairest war of all, with the most eager and fierce enemies of the church, with affection of money, with wrath, with ambition, with dread of death. these be our philistines, these be our nabuchodonosors, these be our moabites and ammonites, with the which it behooveth us to have no truce. with these we must continually fight, until (our enemies being utterly vanquished) we may be in quiet, for except we may overcome them, there is no man that may attain to any true peace, neither with himself, nor yet with no other. for this war alone is cause of true peace. he that overcometh in this battle, will make war with no man living. nor i regard not the interpretation that some men make of the two swords, to signify either power spiritual or temporal. when christ suffered peter to err purposely, yea, after he was commanded to put up his sword, no man should doubt but that war was forbidden, which before seemed to be lawful. but peter (say they) fought. true it is, peter fought; he was yet but a jew, and had not the spirit of a very christian man. he fought not for his lands, or for any such titles of lands as we do, nor yet for his own life, but for his master's life. and finally, he fought, the which within a while after forsook his master. now if men will needs follow the example of peter that fought, why might they not as well follow the example of him forsaking his master? and though peter through simple affection erred, yet did his master rebuke him. for else, if christ did allow such manner of defence, as some most foolishly do interpret, why doth both all the life and doctrine of christ preach no other thing but sufferance? why sent he forth his disciples again tyrants, armed with nothing else but with a walking-staff and a scrip? if that sword, which christ commanded his disciples to sell their coats to buy, be moderate defence against persecutors, like as some men do not only wickedly but also blindly interpret, why did the martyrs never use that defence? but (say they) the law of nature commandeth, it is approved by the laws, and allowed by custom, that we ought to put off from us violence by violence, and that each of us should defend his life, and eke his money, when the money (as hesiod saith) is as lief as the life. all this i grant, but yet grace, the law of christ, that is of more effect than all these things, commandeth us, that we should not speak ill to them that speak shrewdly to us; that we should do well to them that do ill to us, and to them that take away part of our possessions, we should give the whole; and that we should also pray for them that imagine our death. but these things (say they) appertain to the apostles; yea, they appertain to the universal people of christ, and to the whole body of christ's church, that must needs be a whole and a perfect body, although in its gifts one member is more excellent than another. to them the doctrine of christ appertaineth not, that hope not to have reward with christ. let them fight for money and for lordships, that laugh to scorn the saying of christ: blessed be the poor men in spirit; that is to say, be they poor or rich, blessed be they that covet no riches in this world. they that put all their felicity in these riches, they fight gladly to defend their life; but they be those that understand not this life to be rather a death, nor they perceive not that everlasting life is prepared for good men. now they lay against us divers bishops of rome, the which have been both authors and abettors of warring. true it is, some such there have been, but they were of late, and in such time as the doctrine of christ waxed cold. yea, and they be very few in comparison of the holy fathers that were before them, which with their writings persuade us to flee war. why are these few examples most in mind? why turn we our eyes from christ to men? and why had we rather follow the uncertain examples, than the authority that is sure and certain? for doubtless the bishops of rome were men. and it may be right well, that they were either fools or ungracious caitiffs. and yet we find not that any of them approved that we should still continually war after this fashion as we do, which thing i could with arguments prove, if i listed to digress and tarry thereupon. saint bernard praised warriors, but he so praised them, that he condemned all the manner of our warfare. and yet why should the saying of saint bernard, or the disputation of thomas the alquine, move me rather than the doctrine of christ, which commandeth, that we should in no wise resist evil, specially under such manner as the common people do resist. but it is lawful (say they) that a transgressor be punished and put to death according to the laws: then is it not lawful for a whole country or city to be revenged by war? what may be answered in this place, is longer than is convenient to reply. but this much will i say, there is a great difference. for the evil-doer, found faulty and convicted, is by authority of the laws put to death. in war there is neither part without fault. whereas one singular man doth offend, the punishment falleth only on himself; and the example of the punishment doth good unto all others. in war the most part of the punishment and harm falls upon them that least deserve to be punished; that is, upon husbandmen, old men, honest wives, young children, and virgins. but if there may any commodity at all be gathered of this most mischievous thing, that altogether goeth to the behoof of certain most vengeable thieves, hired soldiers, and strong robbers, and perhaps to a few captains, by whose craft war was raised for that intent, and with which the matter goeth never better than when the commonweal is in most high jeopardy and peril to be lost. whereas one is for his offence grievously punished, it is the wealthy warning of all other: but in war to the end to revenge the quarrel of one, or else peradventure of a few, we cruelly afflict and grieve many thousands of them that nothing deserved. it were better to leave the offence of a few unpunished than while we seek occasion to punish one or two, to bring into assured peril and danger, both our neighbours and innocent enemies (we call them our enemies, though they never did us hurt); and yet are we uncertain, whether it shall fall on them or not, that we would have punished. it is better to let a wound alone, that cannot be cured without grievous hurt and danger of all the whole body, than go about to heal it. now if any man will cry out and say: it were against all right, that he that offendeth should not be punished; hereunto i answer, that it is much more against all right and reason, that so many thousands of innocents should be brought into extreme calamity and mischief without deserving. albeit nowadays we see, that almost all wars spring up i cannot tell of what titles, and of leagues between princes, that while they go about to subdue to their dominion some one town, they put in jeopardy all their whole empire. and yet within a while after, they sell or give away the same town again, that they got with shedding of so much blood. peradventure some man will say: wouldst not have princes fight for their right? i know right well, it is not meet for such a man as i am, to dispute overboldly of princes' matters, and though i might do it without any danger, yet is it longer than is convenient for this place. but this much will i say: if each whatsoever title be a cause convenient to go in hand with war, there is no man that in so great alterations of men's affairs, and in so great variety and changes, can want a title. what nation is there that hath not sometime been put out of their own country, and also have put other out? how oft have people gone from one country to another? how oft have whole empires been translated from one to another either by chance or by league. let the citizens of padua claim now again in god's name the country of troy for theirs, because antenor was sometime a trojan. let the romans now hardily claim again africa and spain, because those provinces were sometime under the romans. we call that a dominion, which is but an administration. the power and authority over men, which be free by nature, and over brute beasts, is not all one. what power and sovereignty soever you have, you have it by the consent of the people. and if i be not deceived, he that hath authority to give, hath authority to take away again. will ye see how small a matter it is that we make all this tumult for? the strife is not, whether this city or that should be obeisant to a good prince, and not in bondage of a tyrant; but whether ferdinand or sigismund hath the better title to it, whether that city ought to pay tribute to philip or to king louis. this is that noble right, for the which all the world is thus vexed and troubled with wars and manslaughter. yet go to, suppose that this right or title be as strong and of as great authority as may be; suppose also there be no difference between a private field and a whole city; and admit there be no difference between the beasts that you have bought with your money and men, which be not only free, but also true christians: yet is it a point for a wise man to cast in his mind, whether the thing that you will war for, be of so great value, that it will recompense the exceedingly great harms and loss of your own people. if ye cannot do in every point as becometh a prince, yet at the leastways do as the merchantman doeth: he setteth naught by that loss, which he well perceiveth cannot be avoided without a greater loss, and he reckoneth it a winning, that fortune hath been against him with his so little loss. or else at the leastwise follow him, of whom there is a merry tale commonly told. there were two kinsmen at variance about dividing of certain goods, and when they could by no means agree, they must go to law together, that in conclusion the matter might be ended by sentence of the judges. they got them attorneys, the pleas were drawn, men of law had the matter in hand, they came before the judges, the complaint was entered, the cause was pleaded, and so was the war begun between them. anon one of them remembering himself, called aside his adversary to him and said on this wise: "first it were a great shame, that a little money should dissever us twain, whom nature hath knit so near together. secondly, the end of our strife is uncertain, no less than of war. it is in our hands to begin when we will, but not to make an end. all our strife is but for an hundred crowns, and we shall spend the double thereof upon notaries, upon promoters, upon advocates, upon attorneys, upon judges, and upon judges' friends, if we try the law to the uttermost. we must wait upon these men, we must flatter and speak them fair, we must give them rewards. and yet i speak not of the care and thought, nor of the great labour and travail, that we must take to run about here and there to make friends; and which of us two that winneth the victory, shall be sure of more incommodity than profit. wherefore if we be wise, let us rather see to our own profit, and the money that shall be evil bestowed upon these bribers, let us divide it between us twain. and forgive you the half of that ye think should be your due, and i will forgive as much of mine. and so shall we keep and preserve our friendship, which else is like to perish, and we shall also eschew this great business, cost, and charge. if you be not content to forgo anything of your part, i commit the whole matter into your own hands; do with it as you will. for i had liefer my friend had this money, than those insatiable thieves. methinks i have gained enough, if i may save my good name, keep my friend, and avoid this unquiet and chargeable business." thus partly the telling of the truth, and partly the merry conceit of his kinsman, moved the other man to agree. so they ended the matter between themselves, to the great displeasure of the judges and servants, for they, like a sort of gaping ravens, were deluded and put beside their prey. let a prince therefore follow the wisdom of these two men, specially in a matter of much more danger. nor let him not regard what thing it is that he would obtain, but what great loss of good things he shall have, in what great jeopardies he shall be, and what miseries he must endure, to come thereby. now if a man will weigh, as it were in a pair of balances, the commodities of war on the one side and the incommodities on the other side, he shall find that unjust peace is far better than righteous war. why had we rather have war than peace? who but a madman will angle with a golden fish-hook? if ye see that the charges and expenses shall amount far above your gain, yea, though all things go according to your mind, is it not better that ye forgo part of your right than to buy so little commodity with so innumerable mischiefs? i had liefer that any other man had the title, than i should win it with so great effusion of christian men's blood. he (whosoever he be) hath now been many years in possession; he is accustomed to rule, his subjects know him, he behaveth him like a prince; and one shall come forth, who, finding an old title in some histories or in some blind evidence, will turn clean upside down the quiet state and good order of that commonweal. what availeth it with so great troubling to change any title, which in short space by one chance or other must go to another man? specially since we might see, that no things in this world continue still in one state, but at the scornful pleasure of fortune they roll to and fro, as the waves of the sea. finally, if christian men cannot despise and set at naught these so light things, yet whereto need they by and by to run to arms? since there be so many bishops, men of great gravity and learning; since there be so many venerable abbots; since there be so many noble men of great age, whom long use and experience of things hath made right wise: why are not these trifling and childish quarrels of princes pacified and set in order by the wisdom and discretion of these men? but they seem to make a very honest reason of war, which pretend as they would defend the church: as though the people were not the church, or as though the church of christ was begun, augmented, and stablished with wars and slaughters, and not rather in spilling of the blood of martyrs, sufferance, and despising of this life, or as though the whole dignity of the church rested in the riches of the priests. nor to me truly it seemeth not so allowable, that we should so oft make war upon the turks. doubtless it were not well with the christian religion, if the only safeguard thereof should depend on such succours. nor it is not likely, that they should be good christians, that by these means are brought thereto at the first. for that thing that is got by war, is again in another time lost by war. will ye bring the turks to the faith of christ? let us not make a show of our gay riches, nor of our great number of soldiers, nor of our great strength. let them see in us none of these solemn titles, but the assured tokens of christian men: a pure, innocent life; a fervent desire to do well, yea, to our very enemies; the despising of money, the neglecting of glory, a poor simple life. let them hear the heavenly doctrine agreeable to such a manner of life. these are the best armours to subdue the turks to christ. now oftentimes we, being ill, fight with the evil. yea, and i shall say another thing (which i would to god were more boldly spoken than truly), if we set aside the title and sign of the cross, we fight turks against turks. if our religion were first stablished by the might and strength of men of war, if it were confirmed by dint of sword, if it were augmented by war, then let us maintain it by the same means and ways. but if all things in our faith were brought to pass by other means, why do we, then (as we mistrusted the help of christ), seek such succour as the heathen people use? but why should we not (say they) kill them that would kill us? so think they it a great dishonour, if other should be more mischievous than they. why do ye not, then, rob those that have robbed you before? why do ye not scold and chide at them that rail at you? why do ye not hate them that hate you? trow ye it is a good christian man's deed to slay a turk? for be the turks never so wicked, yet they are men, for whose salvation christ suffered death. and killing turks we offer to the devil most pleasant sacrifice, and with that one deed we please our enemy, the devil, twice: first because a man is slain, and again, because a christian man slew him. there be many, which desiring to seem good christian men, study to hurt and grieve the turks all that ever they may; and where they be not able to do anything, they curse and ban, and bid a mischief upon them. now by the same one point a man may perceive, that they be far from good christian men. succour the turks, and where they be wicked, make them good if ye can; if ye cannot, wish and desire of god they may have grace to turn to goodness. and he that thus doeth, i will say doeth like a christian man. but of all these things i shall entreat more largely, when i set forth my book entitled antipolemus, which whilom when i was at rome i wrote to julius, bishop of rome, the second of that name, at the same time, when he was counselled to make war on the venetians. but there is one thing which is more to be lamented then reasoned: that if a man would diligently discuss the matter, he shall find that all the wars among us christian men do spring either of foolishness, or else of malice. some young men without experience, inflamed with the evil examples of their forefathers, that they find by reading of histories, written of some foolish authors (and besides this being moved with the exhortations of flatterers, with the instigation of lawyers, and assenting thereto of the divines, the bishops winking thereat, or peradventure enticing thereunto), have rather of foolhardiness than of malice, gone in hand with war; and with the great hurt and damage of all this world they learn, that war is a thing that should be by all means and ways fled and eschewed. some other are moved by privy hatred, ambition causeth some, and some are stirred by fierceness of mind to make war. for truly there is almost now no other thing in our cities and commonweals than is contained in homer's work iliad, the wrath of indiscreet princes and people. there be those who for no other cause stir up war but to the intent they may by that means the more easily exercise tyranny on their subjects. for in the time of peace, the authority of the council, the dignity of the rulers, the vigour and strength of the laws, do somewhat hinder, that a prince cannot do all that him listeth; but as soon as war is once begun, now all the handling of matters resteth in the pleasure of a few persons. they that the prince favoureth are lifted up aloft, and they that be in his displeasure, go down. they exact as much money as pleaseth them. what need many words? then they think themselves, that they be the greatest princes of the world. in the meantime the captains sport and play together, till they have gnawed the poor people to the hard bones. and think ye that it will grieve them, that be of this mind, to enter lightly into war, when any cause is offered? besides all this, it is worth while to see by what means we colour our fault. i pretend the defence of our religion, but my mind is to get the great riches that the turk hath. under colour to defend the church's right, i purpose to revenge the hatred that i have in my stomach. i incline to ambition, i follow my wrath; my cruel, fierce and unbridled mind compelleth me; and yet will i find a cavillation and say, the league is not kept, or friendship is broken, or something (i wot not what myself) concerning the laws of matrimony is omitted. and it is a wonder to speak, how they never obtain the very thing that they so greatly desire. and while they foolishly labour to eschew this mischief or that, they fall into another much worse, or else deeper into the same. and surely if desire of glory causeth them thus to do, it is a thing much more magnificent and glorious to save than to destroy; much more gay and goodly to build a city than to overthrow and destroy a city. furthermore admit that the victory in battle is got most prosperously, yet how small a portion of the glory shall go unto the prince: the commons will claim a great part of it, by the help of whose money the deed was done; foreign soldiers, that are hired for money, will challenge much more than the commons; the captains look to have very much of that glory; and fortune has the most of all, which striking a great stroke in every matter, in war may do most of all. if it come of a noble courage or stout stomach, that you be moved to make war: see, i pray you, how far wide ye be from your purpose. for while ye will not be seen to bow to one man, as to a prince your neighbour, peradventure of your alliance, who may by fortune have done you good: how much more abjectly must ye bow yourself, what time ye seek aid and help of barbarous people; yea, and, what is more unworthy, of such men as are defiled with all mischievous deeds, if we must needs call such kind of monsters men? meanwhile ye go about to allure unto you with fair words and promises, ravishers of virgins and of religious women, men-killers, stout robbers and rovers (for these be thy special men of war). and while you labour to be somewhat cruel and superior over your equal, you are constrained to submit yourselves to the very dregs of all men living. and while ye go about to drive your neighbour out of his land, ye must needs first bring into your own land the most pestilent puddle of unthrifts that can be. you mistrust a prince of your own alliance, and will you commit yourself wholly to an armed multitude? how much surer were it to commit yourself to concord! if ye will make war because of lucre, take your counters and cast. and i will say, it is better to have war than peace, if ye find not, that not only less, but also uncertain winning is got with inestimable costs. ye say ye make war for the safeguard of the commonweal, yea, but noway sooner nor more unthriftily may the commonweal perish than by war. for before ye enter into the field, ye have already hurt more your country than ye can do good getting the victory. ye waste the citizens' goods, ye fill the houses with lamentation, ye fill all the country with thieves, robbers, and ravishers. for these are the relics of war. and whereas before ye might have enjoyed all france, ye shut yourselves from many regions thereof. if ye love your own subjects truly, why revolve you not in mind these words: why shall i put so many, in their lusty, flourishing youth, in all mischiefs and perils? why shall i depart so many honest wives and their husbands, and make so many fatherless children? why shall i claim a title i know not, and a doubtful right, with spilling of my subjects' blood? we have seen in our time, that in war made under colour of defence of the church, the priests have been so often pillaged with contributions, that no enemy might do more. so that while we go about foolishly to escape falling in the ditch, while we cannot suffer a light injury, we afflict ourselves with most grievous despites. while we be ashamed of gentleness to bow to a prince, we be fain to please people most base. while we indiscreetly covet liberty, we entangle ourselves in most grievous bondage. while we hunt after a little lucre, we grieve ourselves and ours with inestimable harness. it had been a point of a prudent christian man (if he be a true christian man) by all manner of means to have fled, to have shunned, and by prayer to have withstood so fiendish a thing, and so far both from the life and doctrine of christ. but if it can by no means be eschewed, by reason of the ungraciousness of many men, when ye have essayed every way, and that ye have for peace sake left no stone unturned, then the next way is, that ye do your diligence that so ill a thing may be gested and done by them that be evil, and that it be achieved with as little effusion of man's blood as can be. now if we endeavour to be the selfsame thing that we hear ourselves called,--that is, good christian men,--we shall little esteem any worldly thing, nor yet ambitiously covet anything of this world. for if we set all our mind, that we may lightly and purely part hence; if we incline wholly to heavenly things; if we pitch all our felicity in christ alone; if we believe all that is truly good, truly gay and glorious, truly joyful, to remain in christ alone; if we thoroughly think that a godly man can of no man be hurt; if we ponder how vain and vanishing are the scornful things of this world; if we inwardly behold how hard a thing it is for a man to be in a manner transformed into a god, and so here, with continual and indefatigable meditation, to be purged from all infections of this world, that within a while the husk of this body being cast off, it may pass hence to the company of angels; finally, if we surely have these three things, without which none is worthy of the name of a christian man,--innocency, that we may be pure from all vices; charity, that we may do good, as near as we can, to every man; patience, that we may suffer them that do us ill, and, if we can, with good deeds overcome wrongs to us done: i pray you, what war can there be among us for trifles? if it be but a tale that is told of christ, why do we not openly put him out of our company? why should we glory in his title? but if he be, as he is in very deed, the true way, the very truth, and the very life, why doth all the manner of our living differ so far asunder from the true example of him? if we acknowledge and take christ for our author, which is very charity, and neither taught nor gave other thing but charity and peace, then go to, let us not in titles and signs, but in our deeds and living, plainly express him. let us have in our hearts a fervent desire of peace, that christ may again know us for his. to this intent the princes, the prelates, and the cities and commonalties should apply their counsels. there hath been hitherto enough spilt of christian man's blood. we have showed pleasure enough to the enemies of the christian religion. and if the common people, as they are wont, make any disturbance, let the princes bridle and quail them, which princes ought to be the selfsame thing in the commonweal that the eye is in the body, and the reason in the soul. again, if the princes make any trouble, it is the part of good prelates by their wisdom and gravity to pacify and assuage such commotion. or else, at the least, we being satiate with continual wars, let the desire of peace a little move us. the bishop exhorteth us (if ever any bishop did leo the tenth doth, which occupieth the room of our peaceable solomon, for all his desire, all his intent and labour, is for this intent) that they whom one common faith hath coupled together, should be joined in one common concord. he laboureth that the church of christ should flourish, not in riches or lordships, but in her own proper virtues. surely this is a right goodly act, and well beseeming a man descended of such a noble lineage as the medici: by whose civil prudence the noble city of florence most freshly flourished in long-continued peace; whose house of medici hath been a help unto all good letters. leo himself, having alway a sober and a gentle wit, giving himself from his tender youth to good letters of humanity, was ever brought up, as it were, in the lap of the muses, among men most highly learned. he so faultless led his life, that even in the city of rome, where is most liberty of vice, was of him no evil rumour, and so governing himself came to the dignity to be bishop there, which dignity he never coveted, but was chosen thereto when he least thought thereon, by the provision of god to help to redress things in great decay by long wars. let julius the bishop have his glory of war, victories, and of his great triumphs, the which how evil they beseem a christian bishop, it is not for such a one as i am to declare. i will this say, his glory, whatsoever it be, was mixed with the great destruction and grievous sorrow of many a creature. but by peace restored now to the world, leo shall get more true glory than julius won by so many wars that he either boldly begun, or prosperously fought and achieved. but they that had liefer hear of proverbs, than either of peace or of war, will think that i have tarried longer about this digression than is meet for the declaration of a proverb. finis of this volume which is edited by john w. mackail with types & decorations by herbert p. horne ccciii copies were printed [illustration: optimum vix satis] by d. b. updike at the merrymount press boston massachusetts in the month of august mcm vii produced from scanned images of public domain material from the google print project.) transcriber's note spelling and punctuation have been preserved as faithfully as possible. only obvious typographical errors have been corrected. for ease of reading, the footnotes have been moved to the end of the book. a discourse on the study of the law of nature and nations. by sir james mackintosh, m.p. _second edition._ london: henry goode and co. queen's head passage, paternoster-row. sold by t. clark, edinburgh; and wardlaw and co. glasgow. m.dccc.xxviii. a discourse, etc. * * * * * before i begin a course of lectures on a science of great extent and importance, i think it my duty to lay before the public the reasons which have induced me to undertake such a labour, as well as a short account of the nature and objects of the course which i propose to deliver. i have always been unwilling to waste in unprofitable inactivity that leisure which the first years of my profession usually allow, and which diligent men, even with moderate talents, might often employ in a manner neither discreditable to themselves, nor wholly useless to others. desirous that my own leisure should not be consumed in sloth, i anxiously looked about for some way of filling it up, which might enable me, according to the measure of my humble abilities, to contribute somewhat to the stock of general usefulness. i had long been convinced that public lectures, which have been used in most ages and countries to teach the elements of almost every part of learning, were the most convenient mode in which these elements could be taught; that they were the best adapted for the important purposes of awakening the attention of the student, of abridging his labours, of guiding his inquiries, of relieving the tediousness of private study, and of impressing on his recollection the principles of science. i saw no reason why the law of england should be less adapted to this mode of instruction, or less likely to benefit by it, than any other part of knowledge. a learned gentleman, however, had already occupied that ground,[ ] and will, i doubt not, persevere in the useful labour which he has undertaken. on his province it was far from my wish to intrude. it appeared to me that a course of lectures on another science closely connected with all liberal professional studies, and which had long been the subject of my own reading and reflection, might not only prove a most useful introduction to the law of england, but might also become an interesting part of general study, and an important branch of the education of those who were not destined for the profession of the law. i was confirmed in my opinion by the assent and approbation of men, whose names, if it were becoming to mention them on so slight an occasion, would add authority to truth, and furnish some excuse even for error. encouraged by their approbation, i resolved without delay to commence the undertaking, of which i shall now proceed to give some account; without interrupting the progress of my discourse by anticipating or answering the remarks of those who may, perhaps, sneer at me for a departure from the usual course of my profession; because i am desirous of employing in a rational and useful pursuit that leisure, of which the same men would have required no account, if it had been wasted on trifles, or even abused in dissipation. the science which teaches the rights and duties of men and of states, has, in modern times, been called the law of nature and nations. under this comprehensive title are included the rules of morality, as they prescribe the conduct of private men towards each other in all the various relations of human life; as they regulate both the obedience of citizens to the laws, and the authority of the magistrate in framing laws and administering government; as they modify the intercourse of independent commonwealths in peace, and prescribe limits to their hostility in war. this important science comprehends only that part of _private ethics_ which is capable of being reduced to fixed and general rules. it considers only those general principles of _jurisprudence_ and _politics_ which the wisdom of the lawgiver adapts to the peculiar situation of his own country, and which the skill of the statesman applies to the more fluctuating and infinitely varying circumstances which affect its immediate welfare and safety. "for there are in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived, but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains."[ ]--_bacon's dig. and adv. of learn._ works, vol. i. p. . on the great questions of morality, of politics, and of municipal law, it is the object of this science to deliver only those fundamental truths of which the particular application is as extensive as the whole private and public conduct of men; to discover those "fountains of justice," without pursuing the "streams" through the endless variety of their course. but another part of the subject is treated with greater fulness and minuteness of application; namely, that important branch of it which professes to regulate the relations and intercourse of states, and more especially, both on account of their greater perfection and their more immediate reference to use, the regulations of that intercourse as they are modified by the usages of the civilised nations of christendom. here this science no longer rests in general principles. that province of it which we now call the law of nations, has, in many of its parts, acquired among our european nations much of the precision and certainty of positive law, and the particulars of that law are chiefly to be found in the works of those writers who have treated the science of which i now speak. it is because they have classed (in a manner which seems peculiar to modern times) the duties of individuals with those of nations, and established their obligation on similar grounds, that the whole science has been called, "the law of nature and nations." whether this appellation be the happiest that could have been chosen for the science, and by what steps it came to be adopted among our modern moralists and lawyers,[ ] are inquiries, perhaps, of more curiosity than use, and which, if they deserve any where to be deeply pursued, will be pursued with more propriety in a full examination of the subject than within the short limits of an introductory discourse. names are, however, in a great measure arbitrary; but the distribution of knowledge into its parts, though it may often perhaps be varied with little disadvantage, yet certainly depends upon some fixed principles. the modern method of considering individual and national morality as the subjects of the same science, seems to me as convenient and reasonable an arrangement as can be adopted. the same rules of morality which hold together men in families, and which form families into commonwealths, also link together these commonwealths as members of the great society of mankind. commonwealths, as well as private men, are liable to injury, and capable of benefit, from each other; it is, therefore, their interest as well as their duty to reverence, to practise, and to enforce those rules of justice which control and restrain injury, which regulate and augment benefit, which, even in their present imperfect observance, preserve civilised states in a tolerable condition of security from wrong, and which, if they could be generally obeyed, would establish, and permanently maintain, the well-being of the universal commonwealth of the human race. it is therefore with justice that one part of this science has been called "_the natural law of individuals_," and the other "_the natural law of states_;" and it is too obvious to require observation,[ ] that the application of both these laws, of the former as much as of the latter, is modified and varied by customs, conventions, character, and situation. with a view to these principles, the writers on general jurisprudence have considered states as moral persons; a mode of expression which has been called a fiction of law, but which may be regarded with more propriety as a bold metaphor, used to convey the important truth, that nations, though they acknowledge no common superior, and neither can nor ought to be subjected to human punishment, are yet under the same obligations mutually to practise honesty and humanity, which would have bound individuals, even if they could be conceived ever to have subsisted without the protecting restraints of government; if they were not compelled to the discharge of their duty by the just authority of magistrates, and by the wholesome terrors of the laws. with the same views this law has been styled, and (notwithstanding the objections of some writers to the vagueness of the language) appears to have been styled with great propriety, "the law of nature." it may with sufficient correctness, or at least by an easy metaphor, be called a "_law_," inasmuch as it is a supreme, invariable, and uncontrollable rule of conduct to all men, of which the violation is avenged by natural punishments, which necessarily flow from the constitution of things, and are as fixed and inevitable as the order of nature. it is the "_law of nature_," because its general precepts are essentially adapted to promote the happiness of man, as long as he remains a being of the same nature with which he is at present endowed, or, in other words, as long as he continues to be man, in all the variety of times, places, and circumstances, in which he has been known, or can be imagined to exist; because it is discoverable by natural reason, and suitable to our natural constitution; because its fitness and wisdom are founded on the general nature of human beings, and not on any of those temporary and accidental situations in which they may be placed. it is with still more propriety, and indeed with the highest strictness, and the most perfect accuracy, considered as a law, when, according to those just and magnificent views which philosophy and religion open to us of the government of the world, it is received and reverenced as the sacred code, promulgated by the great legislator of the universe for the guidance of his creatures to happiness, guarded and enforced, as our own experience may inform us, by the penal sanctions of shame, of remorse, of infamy, and of misery; and still farther enforced by the reasonable expectation of yet more awful penalties in a future and more permanent state of existence. it is the contemplation of the law of nature under this full, mature, and perfect idea of its high origin and transcendent dignity, that called forth the enthusiasm of the greatest men, and the greatest writers of ancient and modern times, in those sublime descriptions, where they have exhausted all the powers of language, and surpassed all the other exertions, even of their own eloquence, in the display of the beauty and majesty of this sovereign and immutable law. it is of this law that cicero has spoken in so many parts of his writings, not only with all the splendour and copiousness of eloquence, but with the sensibility of a man of virtue; and with the gravity and comprehension of a philosopher.[ ] it is of this law that hooker speaks in so sublime a strain:--"of law, no less can be said, than that her seat is the bosom of god, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."--_eccles. pol._ book i. in the conclusion. let not those, who, to use the language of the same hooker, "talk of truth," without "ever sounding the depth from whence it springeth," hastily take it for granted, that these great masters of eloquence and reason were led astray by the specious delusions of mysticism, from the sober consideration of the true grounds of morality in the nature, necessities, and interests of man. they studied and taught the principles of morals; but they thought it still more necessary, and more wise, a much nobler task, and more becoming a true philosopher, to inspire men with a love and reverence for virtue.[ ] they were not contented with elementary speculations. they examined the foundations of our duty, but they felt and cherished a most natural, a most seemly, a most rational enthusiasm, when they contemplated the majestic edifice which is reared on these solid foundations. they devoted the highest exertions of their mind to spread that beneficent enthusiasm among men. they consecrated as a homage to virtue the most perfect fruits of their genius. if these grand sentiments of "the good and fair" have sometimes prevented them from delivering the principles of ethics with the nakedness and dryness of science, at least, we must own that they have chosen the better part; that they have preferred virtuous feeling to moral theory; and practical benefit to speculative exactness. perhaps these wise men may have supposed that the minute dissection and anatomy of virtue might, to the ill-judging eye, weaken the charm of her beauty. it is not for me to attempt a theme which has perhaps been exhausted by these great writers. i am indeed much less called upon to display the worth and usefulness of the law of nations, than to vindicate myself from presumption in attempting a subject which has been already handled by so many masters. for the purpose of that vindication it will be necessary to sketch a very short and slight account (for such in this place it must unavoidably be) of the progress and present state of the science, and of that succession of able writers who have gradually brought it to its present perfection. we have no greek or roman treatise remaining on the law of nations. from the title of one of the lost works of aristotle, it appears that he composed a treatise on the laws of war,[ ] which, if we had the good fortune to possess it, would doubtless have amply satisfied our curiosity, and would have taught us both the practice of the ancient nations and the opinions of their moralists, with that depth and precision which distinguish the other works of that great philosopher. we can now only imperfectly collect that practice and those opinions from various passages which are scattered over the writings of philosophers, historians, poets, and orators. when the time shall arrive for a more full consideration of the state of the government and manners of the ancient world, i shall be able, perhaps, to offer satisfactory reasons why these enlightened nations did not separate from the general province of ethics that part of morality which regulates the intercourse of states, and erect it into an independent science. it would require a long discussion to unfold the various causes which united the modern nations of europe into a closer society; which linked them together by the firmest bands of mutual dependence, and which thus, in process of time, gave to the law that regulated their intercourse greater importance, higher improvement, and more binding force. among these causes we may enumerate a common extraction, a common religion, similar manners, institutions, and languages; in earlier ages the authority of the see of rome, and the extravagant claims of the imperial crown; in later times the connexions of trade, the jealousy of power, the refinement of civilization, the cultivation of science, and, above all, that general mildness of character and manners which arose from the combined and progressive influence of chivalry, of commerce, of learning, and of religion. nor must we omit the similarity of those political institutions which, in every country that had been over-run by the gothic conquerors, bore discernible marks (which the revolutions of succeeding ages had obscured, but not obliterated) of the rude but bold and noble outline of liberty that was originally sketched by the hand of these generous barbarians. these and many other causes conspired to unite the nations of europe in a more intimate connexion and a more constant intercourse, and of consequence made the regulation of their intercourse more necessary, and the law that was to govern it more important. in proportion as they approached to the condition of provinces of the same empire, it became almost as essential that europe should have a precise and comprehensive code of the law of nations, as that each country should have a system of municipal law. the labours of the learned accordingly began to be directed to this subject in the sixteenth century, soon after the revival of learning, and after that regular distribution of power and territory which has subsisted, with little variation, until our times. the critical examination of these early writers would perhaps not be very interesting in an extensive work, and it would be unpardonable in a short discourse. it is sufficient to observe that they were all more or less shackled by the barbarous philosophy of the schools, and that they were impeded in their progress by a timorous deference for the inferior and technical parts of the roman law, without raising their views to the comprehensive principles which will for ever inspire mankind with veneration for that grand monument of human wisdom. it was only indeed in the sixteenth century that the roman law was first studied and understood as a science connected with roman history and literature, and illustrated by men whom ulpian and papinian would not have disdained to acknowledge as their successors.[ ] among the writers of that age we may perceive the ineffectual attempts, the partial advances, the occasional streaks of light which always precede great discoveries, and works that are to instruct posterity. the reduction of the law of nations to a system was reserved for grotius. it was by the advice of lord bacon and peiresc that he undertook this arduous task. he produced a work which we now indeed justly deem imperfect, but which is perhaps the most complete that the world has yet owed, at so early a stage in the progress of any science, to the genius and learning of one man. so great is the uncertainty of posthumous reputation, and so liable is the fame even of the greatest men to be obscured by those new fashions of thinking and writing which succeed each other so rapidly among polished nations, that grotius, who filled so large a space in the eye of his contemporaries, is now perhaps known to some of my readers only by name. yet if we fairly estimate both his endowments and his virtues, we may justly consider him as one of the most memorable men who have done honour to modern times. he combined the discharge of the most important duties of active and public life with the attainment of that exact and various learning which is generally the portion only of the recluse student. he was distinguished as an advocate and a magistrate, and he composed the most valuable works on the law of his own country; he was almost equally celebrated as an historian, a scholar, a poet, and a divine; a disinterested statesman, a philosophical lawyer, a patriot who united moderation with firmness, and a theologian who was taught candour by his learning. unmerited exile did not damp his patriotism; the bitterness of controversy did not extinguish his charity. the sagacity of his numerous and fierce adversaries could not discover a blot on his character; and in the midst of all the hard trials and galling provocations of a turbulent political life, he never once deserted his friends when they were unfortunate, nor insulted his enemies when they were weak. in times of the most furious civil and religious faction he preserved his name unspotted, and he knew how to reconcile fidelity to his own party, with moderation towards his opponents. such was the man who was destined to give a new form to the law of nations, or rather to create a science, of which only rude sketches and indigested materials were scattered over the writings of those who had gone before him. by tracing the laws of his country to their principles, he was led to the contemplation of the law of nature, which be justly considered as the parent of all municipal law.[ ] few works were more celebrated than that of grotius in his own days, and in the age which succeeded. it has, however, been the fashion of the last half-century to depreciate his work as a shapeless compilation, in which reason lies buried under a mass of authorities and quotations. this fashion originated among french wits and declaimers, and it has been, i know not for what reason, adopted, though with far greater moderation and decency, by some respectable writers among ourselves. as to those who first used this language, the most candid supposition that we can make with respect to them is, that they never read the work; for, if they had not been deterred from the perusal of it by such a formidable display of greek characters, they must soon have discovered that grotius never quotes on any subject till he has first appealed to some principles, and often, in my humble opinion, though, not always, to the soundest and most rational principles. but another sort of answer is due to some of those[ ] who have criticised grotius, and that answer might be given in the words of grotius himself.[ ] he was not of such a stupid and servile cast of mind, as to quote the opinions of poets or orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of judges, from whose decision there was no appeal. he quotes them, as he tells us himself, as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of morals. on such matters, poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all witnesses; for they address themselves to the general feelings and sympathies of mankind; they are neither warped by system, nor perverted by sophistry; they can attain none of their objects; they can neither please nor persuade if they dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their readers. no system of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature and the according judgment of all ages and nations. but where are these feelings and that judgment recorded and preserved? in those very writings which grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. the usages and laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are, in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and experience, the sole foundation of all true philosophy. if this were merely an objection of taste, i should be willing to allow that grotius has indeed poured forth his learning with a profusion that sometimes rather encumbers than adorns his work, and which is not always necessary to the illustration of his subject. yet, even in making that concession, i should rather yield to the taste of others than speak from my own feelings. i own that such richness and splendour of literature have a powerful charm for me. they fill my mind with an endless variety of delightful recollections and associations. they relieve the understanding in its progress through a vast science, by calling up the memory of great men and of interesting events. by this means we see the truths of morality clothed with all the eloquence (not that could be produced by the powers of one man, but) that could be bestowed on them by the collective genius of the world. even virtue and wisdom themselves acquire new majesty in my eyes, when i thus see all the great masters of thinking and writing called together, as it were, from all times and countries, to do them homage, and to appear in their train. but this is no place for discussions of taste, and i am very ready to own that mine may be corrupted. the work of grotius is liable to a more serious objection, though i do not recollect that it has ever been made. his method is inconvenient and unscientific. he has inverted the natural order. that natural order undoubtedly dictates, that we should first search for the original principles of the science in human nature; then apply them to the regulation of the conduct of individuals, and lastly, employ them for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise with respect to the intercourse of nations. but grotius has chosen the reverse of this method. he begins with the consideration of the states of peace and war, and he examines original principles only occasionally and incidentally as they grow out of the questions which he is called upon to decide. it is a necessary consequence of this disorderly method, which exhibits the elements of the science in the form of scattered digressions, that he seldom employs sufficient discussion on these fundamental truths, and never in the place where such a discussion would be most instructive to the reader. this defect in the plan of grotius was perceived, and supplied, by puffendorff, who restored natural law to that superiority which belonged to it, and with great propriety treated the law of nations as only one main branch of the parent stock. without the genius of his master, and with very inferior learning, he has yet treated this subject with sound sense, with clear method, with extensive and accurate knowledge, and with a copiousness of detail sometimes indeed tedious, but always instructive and satisfactory. his work will be always studied by those who spare no labour to acquire a deep knowledge of the subject; but it will, in our times, i fear, be oftener found on the shelf than on the desk of the general student. in the time of mr. locke it was considered as the manual of those who were intended for active life; but in the present age i believe it will be found that men of business are too much occupied, men of letters are too fastidious, and men of the world too indolent, for the study or even the perusal of such works. far be it from me to derogate from the real and great merit of so useful a writer as puffendorff. his treatise is a mine in which all his successors must dig. i only presume to suggest, that a book so prolix, and so utterly void of all the attractions of composition, is likely to repel many readers who are interested, and who might perhaps be disposed to acquire some knowledge of the principles of public law. many other circumstances might be mentioned, which conspire to prove that neither of the great works of which i have spoken, has superseded the necessity of a new attempt to lay before the public a system of the law of nations. the language of science is so completely changed since both these works were written, that whoever was now to employ their terms in his moral reasonings would be almost unintelligible to some of his hearers or readers; and to some among them too who are neither ill qualified nor ill disposed to study such subjects with considerable advantage to themselves. the learned indeed well know how little novelty or variety is to be found in scientific disputes. the same truths and the same errors have been repeated from age to age, with little variation but in the language; and novelty of expression is often mistaken by the ignorant for substantial discovery. perhaps too very nearly the same portion of genius and judgment has been exerted in most of the various forms under which science has been cultivated at different periods of history. the superiority of those writers who continue to be read, perhaps often consists chiefly in taste, in prudence, in a happy choice of subject, in a favourable moment, in an agreeable style, in the good fortune of a prevalent language, or in other advantages which are either accidental, or are the result rather of the secondary than of the highest faculties of the mind.--but these reflections, while they moderate the pride of invention, and dispel the extravagant conceit of superior illumination, yet serve to prove the use, and indeed the necessity, of composing, from time to time, new systems of science adapted to the opinions and language of each succeeding period. every age must be taught in its own language. if a man were now to begin a discourse on ethics with an account of the "_moral entities_" of puffendorff,[ ] he would speak an unknown tongue. it is not, however, alone as a mere translation of former writers into modern language that a new system of public law seems likely to be useful. the age in which we live possesses many advantages which are peculiarly favourable to such an undertaking. since the composition of the great works of grotius and puffendorff, a more modest, simple, and intelligible philosophy has been introduced into the schools; which has indeed been grossly abused by sophists, but which, from the time of locke, has been cultivated and improved by a succession of disciples worthy of their illustrious master. we are thus enabled to discuss with precision, and to explain with clearness, the principles of the science of human nature, which are in themselves on a level with the capacity of every man of good sense, and which only appeared to be abstruse from the unprofitable subtleties with which they were loaded, and the barbarous jargon in which they were expressed. the deepest doctrines of morality have since that time been treated in the perspicuous and popular style, and with some degree of the beauty and eloquence of the ancient moralists. that philosophy on which are founded the principles of our duty, if it has not become more certain (for morality admits no discoveries), is at least less "harsh and crabbed," less obscure and haughty in its language, less forbidding and disgusting in its appearance, than in the days of our ancestors. if this progress of learning towards popularity has engendered (as it must be owned that it has) a multitude of superficial and most mischievous sciolists, the antidote must come from the same quarter with the disease. popular reason can alone correct popular sophistry. nor is this the only advantage which a writer of the present age would possess over the celebrated jurists of the last century. since that time vast additions have been made to the stock of our knowledge of human nature. many dark periods of history have since been explored. many hitherto unknown regions of the globe have been visited and described by travellers and navigators not less intelligent than intrepid. we may be said to stand at the confluence of the greatest number of streams of knowledge flowing from the most distant sources that ever met at one point. we are not confined, as the learned of the last age generally were, to the history of those renowned nations who are our masters in literature. we can bring before us man in a lower and more abject condition than any in which he was ever before seen. the records have been partly opened to us of those mighty empires of asia[ ] where the beginnings of civilization are lost in the darkness of an unfathomable antiquity. we can make human society pass in review before our mind, from the brutal and helpless barbarism of _terra del fuego_, and the mild and voluptuous savages of otaheite, to the tame, but ancient and immovable civilization of china, which bestows its own arts on every successive race of conquerors; to the meek and servile natives of hindostan, who preserve their ingenuity, their skill, and their science, through a long series of ages, under the yoke of foreign tyrants; to the gross and incorrigible rudeness of the ottomans, incapable of improvement, and extinguishing the remains of civilization among their unhappy subjects, once the most ingenious nations of the earth. we can examine almost every imaginable variety in the character, manners, opinions, feelings, prejudices, and institutions of mankind, into which they can be thrown, either by the rudeness of barbarism, or by the capricious corruptions of refinement, or by those innumerable combinations of circumstances, which, both in these opposite conditions and in all the intermediate stages between them, influence or direct the course of human affairs. history, if i may be allowed the expression, is now a vast museum, in which specimens of every variety of human nature may be studied. from these great accessions to knowledge, law-givers and statesmen, but, above all, moralists and political philosophers, may reap the most important instruction. they may plainly discover in all the useful and beautiful variety of governments and institutions, and under all the fantastic multitude of usages and rites which have prevailed among men, the same fundamental, comprehensive truths, the sacred master-principles which are the guardians of human society, recognised and revered (with few and slight exceptions) by every nation upon earth, and uniformly taught (with still fewer exceptions) by a succession of wise men from the first dawn of speculation to the present moment. the exceptions, few as they are, will, on more reflection, be found rather apparent than real. if we could raise ourselves to that height from which we ought to survey so vast a subject, these exceptions would altogether vanish; the brutality of a handful of savages would disappear in the immense prospect of human nature, and the murmurs of a few licentious sophists would not ascend to break the general harmony. this consent of mankind in first principles, and this endless variety in their application, which is one among many valuable truths which we may collect from our present extensive acquaintance with the history of man, is itself of vast importance. much of the majesty and authority of virtue is derived from their consent, and almost the whole of practical wisdom is founded on their variety. what former age could have supplied facts for such a work as that of montesquieu? he indeed has been, perhaps justly, charged with abusing this advantage, by the undistinguishing adoption of the narratives of travellers of very different degrees of accuracy and veracity. but if we reluctantly confess the justness of this objection; if we are compelled to own that he exaggerates the influence of climate, that he ascribes too much to the foresight and forming skill of legislators, and far too little to time and circumstances, in the growth of political constitutions; that the substantial character and essential differences of governments are often lost and confounded in his technical language and arrangement; that he often bends the free and irregular outline of nature to the imposing but fallacious geometrical regularity of system; that he has chosen a style of affected abruptness, sententiousness, and vivacity, ill suited to the gravity of his subject: after all these concessions (for his fame is large enough to spare many concessions), the spirit of laws will still remain not only one of the most solid and durable monuments of the powers of the human mind, but a striking evidence of the inestimable advantages which political philosophy may receive from a wide survey of all the various conditions of human society. in the present century a slow and silent, but very substantial mitigation has taken place in the practice of war; and in proportion as that mitigated practice has received the sanction of time, it is raised from the rank of mere usage, and becomes part of the law of nations. whoever will compare our present modes of warfare with the system of grotius[ ] will clearly discern the immense improvements which have taken place in that respect since the publication of his work, during a period, perhaps in every point of view, the happiest to be found in the history of the world. in the same period many important points of public law have been the subject of contest both by argument and by arms, of which we find either no mention, or very obscure traces, in the history of preceding times. there are other circumstances to which i allude with hesitation and reluctance, though it must be owned that they afford to a writer of this age some degree of unfortunate and deplorable advantage over his predecessors. recent events have accumulated more terrible practical instruction on every subject of politics than could have been in other times acquired by the experience of ages. men's wit, sharpened by their passions, has penetrated to the bottom of almost all political questions. even the fundamental rules of morality themselves have, for the first time, unfortunately for mankind, become the subject of doubt and discussion. i shall consider it as my duty to abstain from all mention of these awful events, and of these fatal controversies. but the mind of that man must indeed be incurious and indocile, who has either overlooked all these things; or reaped no instruction from the contemplation of them. from these reflections it appears, that, since the composition of those two great works on the law of nature and nations which continue to be the classical and standard works on that subject, we have gained both more convenient instruments of reasoning and more extensive materials for science; that the code of war has been enlarged and improved; that new questions have been practically decided; and that new controversies have arisen regarding the intercourse of independent states, and the first principles of morality and civil government. some readers may, however, think that in these observations which i offer, to excuse the presumption of my own attempt, i have omitted the mention of later writers, to whom some part of the remarks is not justly applicable. but, perhaps, further consideration will acquit me in the judgment of such readers. writers on particular questions of public law are not within the scope of my observations. they have furnished the most valuable materials; but i speak only of a system. to the large work of wolffius, the observations which i have made on puffendorff as a book for general use, will surely apply with tenfold force. his abridger, vattel, deserves, indeed, considerable praise. he is a very ingenious, clear, elegant, and useful writer. but he only considers one part of this extensive subject, namely, the law of nations strictly so called; and i cannot help thinking, that, even in this department of the science, he has adopted some doubtful and dangerous principles, not to mention his constant deficiency in that fulness of example and illustration, which so much embellishes and strengthens reason. it is hardly necessary to take any notice of the text-book of heineccius, the best writer of elementary books with whom i am acquainted on any subject. burlamaqui is an author of superior merit; but he confines himself too much to the general principles of morality and politics, to require much observation from me in this place. the same reason will excuse me for passing over in silence the works of many philosophers and moralists, to whom, in the course of my proposed lectures, i shall owe and confess the greatest obligations; and it might perhaps deliver me from the necessity of speaking of the work of dr. paley, if i were not desirous of this public opportunity of professing my gratitude for the instruction and pleasure which i have received from that excellent writer, who possesses, in so eminent a degree, those invaluable qualities of a moralist, good sense, caution, sobriety, and perpetual reference to convenience and practice; and who certainly is thought less original than he really is, merely because his taste and modesty have led him to disdain the ostentation of novelty, and because he generally employs more art to blend his own arguments with the body of received opinions, so as that they are scarce to be distinguished, than other men, in the pursuit of a transient popularity, have exerted to disguise the most miserable common-places in the shape of paradox. no writer since the time of grotius, of puffendorff, and of wolf, has combined an investigation of the principles of natural and public law, with a full application of these principles to particular cases; and in these circumstances, i trust, it will not be deemed extravagant presumption in me to hope that i shall be able to exhibit a view of this science, which shall, at least, be more intelligible and attractive to students, than the learned treatises of these celebrated men. i shall now proceed to state the general plan and subjects of the lectures in which i am to make this attempt. i. the being whose actions the law of nature professes to regulate, is man. it is on the knowledge of his nature that the science of his duty must be founded.[ ] it is impossible to approach the threshold of moral philosophy, without a previous examination of the faculties and habits of the human mind. let no reader be repelled from this examination, by the odious and terrible name of _metaphysics_; for it is, in truth, nothing more than the employment of good sense, in observing our own thoughts, feelings, and actions; and when the facts which are thus observed, are expressed as they ought to be, in plain language, it is, perhaps, above all other sciences, most on a level with the capacity and information of the generality of thinking men. when it is thus expressed, it requires no previous qualification, but a sound judgment, perfectly to comprehend it; and those who wrap it up in a technical and mysterious jargon, always give us strong reason to suspect that they are not philosophers but impostors. whoever thoroughly understands such a science, must be able to teach it plainly to all men of common sense. the proposed course will therefore open with a very short, and, i hope, a very simple and intelligible account of the powers and operations of the human mind. by this plain statement of facts, it will not be difficult to decide many celebrated, though frivolous, and merely verbal controversies, which have long amused the leisure of the schools, and which owe both their fame and their existence to the ambiguous obscurity of scholastic language. it will, for example, only require an appeal to every man's experience, to prove that we often act purely from a regard to the happiness of others, and are therefore social beings; and it is not necessary to be a consummate judge of the deceptions of language, to despise the sophistical trifler, who tells us, that, because we experience a gratification in our benevolent actions, we are therefore exclusively and uniformly selfish. a correct examination of facts will lead us to discover that quality which is common to all virtuous actions, and which distinguishes them from those which are vicious and criminal. but we shall see that it is necessary for man to be governed not by his own transient and hasty opinion upon the tendency of every particular action, but by those fixed and unalterable rules, which are the joint result of the impartial judgment, the natural feelings, and the embodied experience of mankind. the authority of these rules is, indeed, founded only on their tendency to promote private and public welfare; but the morality of actions will appear solely to consist in their correspondence with the rule. by the help of this obvious distinction we shall vindicate a just theory, which, far from being modern, is, in fact, as ancient as philosophy, both from plausible objections, and from the odious imputation of supporting those absurd and monstrous systems which have been built upon it. beneficial tendency is the foundation of rules, and the criterion by which habits and sentiments are to be tried. but it is neither the immediate standard, nor can it ever be the principal motive of action. an action, to be completely virtuous, must accord with moral rules, and must flow from our natural feelings and affections, moderated, matured, and improved into steady habits of right conduct.[ ] without, however, dwelling longer on subjects which cannot be clearly stated, unless they are fully unfolded, i content myself with observing, that it shall be my object, in this preliminary, but most important part of the course, to lay the foundations of morality so deeply in human nature, as may satisfy the coldest inquirer; and, at the same time, to vindicate the paramount authority of the rules of our duty, at all times, and in all places, over all opinions of interest and speculations of benefit, so extensively, so universally, and so inviolably, as may well justify the grandest and the most apparently extravagant effusions of moral enthusiasm. if, notwithstanding all my endeavours to deliver these doctrines with the utmost simplicity, any of my auditors should still reproach me for introducing such abstruse matters, i must shelter myself behind the authority of the wisest of men. "if they (the ancient moralists), before they had come to the popular and received notions of virtue and vice, had staid a little longer upon the inquiry concerning _the roots of good and evil_, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and specially if they had consulted with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix, and more profound."--_bacon. dign. and adv. of learn._ book ii. what lord bacon desired for the mere gratification of scientific curiosity, the welfare of mankind now imperiously demands. shallow systems of metaphysics have given birth to a brood of abominable and pestilential paradoxes, which nothing but a more profound philosophy can destroy. however we may, perhaps, lament the necessity of discussions which may shake the habitual reverence of some men for those rules which it is the chief interest of all men to practise, we have now no choice left. we must either dispute, or abandon the ground. undistinguishing and unmerited invectives against philosophy, will only harden sophists and their disciples in the insolent conceit, that they are in possession of an undisputed superiority of reason; and that their antagonists have no arms to employ against them, but those of popular declamation. let us not for a moment even appear to suppose, that philosophical truth and human happiness are so irreconcilably at variance. i cannot express my opinion on this subject so well as in the words of a most valuable, though generally neglected writer: "the science of abstruse learning, when completely attained, is like achilles's spear, that healed the wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the damage itself had occasioned, and this perhaps is all it is good for; it casts no additional light upon the paths of life, but disperses the clouds with which it had overspread them before; it advances not the traveller one step in his journey, but conducts him back again to the spot from whence he wandered. thus the land of philosophy consists partly of an open champaign country, passable by every common understanding, and partly of a range of woods, traversable only by the speculative, and where they too frequently delight to amuse themselves. since then we shall be obliged to make incursions into this latter tract, and shall probably find it a region of obscurity, danger, and difficulty, it behoves us to use our utmost endeavours for enlightening and smoothing the way before us."[ ] we shall, however, remain in the forest only long enough to visit the fountains of those streams which flow from it, and which water and fertilise the cultivated region of morals, to become acquainted with the modes of warfare practised by its savage inhabitants, and to learn the means of guarding our fair and fruitful land against their desolating incursions. i shall hasten from speculations, to which i am naturally, perhaps, but too prone, and proceed to the more profitable consideration of our practical duty. ii. the first and most simple part of ethics is that which regards the duties of private men towards each other, when they are considered apart from the sanction of positive laws. i say, _apart_ from that sanction, not _antecedent_ to it; for though we _separate_ private from political duties for the sake of greater clearness and order in reasoning, yet we are not to be so deluded by this mere arrangement of convenience as to suppose that human society ever has subsisted, or ever could subsist, without being protected by government and bound together by laws. all these relative duties of private life have been so copiously and beautifully treated by the moralists of antiquity, that few men will now choose to follow them who are not actuated by the wild ambition of equalling aristotle in precision, or rivalling cicero in eloquence. they have been also admirably treated by modern moralists, among whom it would be gross injustice not to number many of the preachers of the christian religion, whose peculiar character is that spirit of universal charity, which is the living principle of all our social duties. for it was long ago said, with great truth, by lord bacon, "that there never was any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt that good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the christian faith."[ ] the appropriate praise of this religion is not so much, that it has taught new duties, as that it breathes a milder and more benevolent spirit over the whole extent of morals. on a subject which has been so exhausted, i should naturally have contented myself with the most slight and general survey, if some fundamental principles had not of late been brought into question, which, in all former times, have been deemed too evident to require the support of argument, and almost too sacred to admit the liberty of discussion. i shall here endeavour to strengthen some parts of the fortifications of morality which have hitherto been neglected, because no man had ever been hardy enough to attack them. almost all the relative duties of human life will be found more immediately, or more remotely, to arise out of the two great institutions of property and marriage. they constitute, preserve, and improve society. upon their gradual improvement depends the progressive civilization of mankind; on them rests the whole order of civil life. we are told by horace, that the first efforts of lawgivers to civilise men consisted in strengthening and regulating these institutions, and fencing them round with rigorous penal laws. oppida coeperunt munire et ponere leges neu quis fur esset, neu quis latro, neu quis adulter. _serm._ iii. . a celebrated ancient orator, of whose poems we have but a few fragments remaining, has well described the progressive order in which human society is gradually led to its highest improvements under the guardianship of those laws which secure property and regulate marriage. et leges sanctas docuit, et chara jugavit corpora conjugiis; et magnas condidit urbes. _frag. c. licin. calvi._ these two great institutions convert the selfish as well as the social passions of our nature into the firmest bands of a peaceable and orderly intercourse; they change the sources of discord into principles of quiet; they discipline the most ungovernable, they refine the grossest, and they exalt the most sordid propensities; so that they become the perpetual fountain of all that strengthens, and preserves, and adorns society; they sustain the individual, and they perpetuate the race. around these institutions all our social duties will be found at various distances to range themselves; some more near, obviously essential to the good order of human life, others more remote, and of which the necessity is not at first view so apparent; and some so distant, that their importance has been sometimes doubted, though upon more mature consideration they will be found to be outposts and advanced guards of these fundamental principles: that man should securely enjoy the fruits of his labour, and that the society of the sexes should be so wisely ordered as to make it a school of the kind affections, and a fit nursery for the commonwealth. the subject of _property_ is of great extent. it will be necessary to establish the foundation of the rights of acquisition, alienation, and transmission, not in imaginary contracts or a pretended state of nature, but in their subserviency to the subsistence and well-being of mankind. it will not only be curious, but useful, to trace the history of property from the first loose and transient occupancy of the savage, through all the modifications which it has at different times received, to that comprehensive, subtle, and anxiously minute code of property which is the last result of the most refined civilization. i shall observe the same order in considering the society of the sexes as it is regulated by the institution of marriage.[ ] i shall endeavour to lay open those unalterable principles of general interest on which that institution rests: and if i entertain a hope that on this subject i may be able to add something to what our masters in morality have taught us, i trust, that the reader will bear in mind, as an excuse for my presumption, that _they_ were not likely to employ much argument where they did not foresee the possibility of doubt. i shall also consider the history[ ] of marriage, and trace it through all the forms which it has assumed, to that decent and happy permanency of union, which has, perhaps above all other causes, contributed to the quiet of society, and the refinement of manners in modern times. among many other inquiries which this subject will suggest, i shall be led more particularly to examine the natural station and duties of the female sex, their condition among different nations, its improvement in europe, and the bounds which nature herself has prescribed to the progress of that improvement; beyond which, every pretended advance will be a real degradation. iii. having established the principles of private duty, i shall proceed to consider man under the important relation of subject and sovereign, or, in other words, of citizen and magistrate. the duties which arise from this relation i shall endeavour to establish, not upon supposed compacts, which are altogether chimerical, which must be admitted to be false in fact, which if they are to be considered as fictions, will be found to serve no purpose of just reasoning, and to be equally the foundation of a system of universal despotism in hobbes, and of universal anarchy in rousseau; but on the solid basis of general convenience. men cannot subsist without society and mutual aid; they can neither maintain social intercourse nor receive aid from each other without the protection of government; and they cannot enjoy that protection without submitting to the restraints which a just government imposes. this plain argument establishes the duty of obedience on the part of citizens, and the duty of protection on that of magistrates, on the same foundation with that of every other moral duty; and it shews, with sufficient evidence, that these duties are reciprocal; the only rational end for which the fiction of a contract could have been invented. i shall not encumber my reasoning by any speculations on the origin of government; a question on which so much reason has been wasted in modern times; but which the ancients[ ] in a higher spirit of philosophy have never once mooted. if our principles be just, the origin of government must have been coeval with that of mankind; and as no tribe has ever yet been discovered so brutish as to be without some government, and yet so enlightened as to establish a government by common consent, it is surely unnecessary to employ any serious argument in the confutation of a doctrine that is inconsistent with reason, and unsupported by experience. but though all inquiries into the origin of government be chimerical, yet the history of its progress is curious and useful. the various stages through which it passed from savage independence, which implies every man's power of injuring his neighbour, to legal liberty, which consists in every man's security against wrong; the manner in which a family expands into a tribe, and tribes coalesce into a nation; in which public justice is gradually engrafted on private revenge, find temporary submission ripened into habitual obedience; form a most important and extensive subject of inquiry, which comprehends all the improvements of mankind in police, in judicature, and in legislation. i have already given the reader to understand that the description of liberty which seems to me the most comprehensive, is that of _security against wrong_. liberty is therefore the object of all government. men are more free under every government, even the most imperfect, than they would be if it were possible for them to exist without any government at all: they are more secure from wrong, _more undisturbed in the exercise of their natural powers, and therefore more free, even in the most obvious and grossest sense of the word_, than if they were altogether unprotected against injury from each other. but as general security is enjoyed in very different degrees under different governments, those which guard it most perfectly, are by way of eminence called _free_. such governments attain most completely the end which is common to all government. a free constitution of government and a good constitution of government are therefore different expressions for the same idea. another material distinction, however, soon presents itself. in most civilised states the subject is tolerably protected against gross injustice from his fellows by impartial laws, which it is the manifest interest of the sovereign to enforce. but some commonwealths are so happy as to be founded on a principle of much more refined and provident wisdom. the subjects of such commonwealths are guarded not only against the injustice of each other, but (as far as human prudence can contrive) against oppression from the magistrate. such states, like all other extraordinary examples of public or private excellence and happiness, are thinly scattered over the different ages and countries of the world. in them the will of the sovereign is limited with so exact a measure, that his protecting authority is not weakened. such a combination of skill and fortune is not often to be expected, and indeed never can arise, but from the constant though gradual exertions of wisdom and virtue, to improve a long succession of most favourable circumstances. there is indeed scarce any society so wretched as to be destitute of some sort of weak provision against the injustice of their governors. religious institutions, favourite prejudices, national manners, have in different countries, with unequal degrees of force, checked or mitigated the exercise of supreme power. the privileges of a powerful nobility, of opulent mercantile communities, of great judicial corporations, have in some monarchies approached more near to a control on the sovereign. means have been devised with more or less wisdom to temper the despotism of an aristocracy over their subjects, and in democracies to protect the minority against the majority, and the whole people against the tyranny of demagogues. but in these unmixed forms of government, as the right of legislation is vested in one individual or in one order, it is obvious that the legislative power may shake off all the restraints which the laws have imposed on it. all such governments, therefore, tend towards despotism, and the securities which they admit against mis-government are extremely feeble and precarious. the best security which human wisdom can devise, seems to be the distribution of political authority among different individuals and bodies, with separate interests and separate characters, corresponding to the variety of classes of which civil society is composed, each interested to guard their own order from oppression by the rest; each also interested to prevent any of the others from seizing on exclusive, and therefore despotic power; and all having a common interest to co-operate in carrying on the ordinary and necessary administration of government. if there were not an interest to resist each other in extraordinary cases, there would not be liberty. if there were not an interest to co-operate in the ordinary course of affairs, there could be no government. the object of such wise institutions which make the selfishness of governors a security against their injustice, is to protect men against wrong both from their rulers and their fellows. such governments are, with justice, peculiarly and emphatically called _free_; and in ascribing that liberty to the skilful combination of mutual dependence and mutual check, i feel my own conviction greatly strengthened by calling to mind, that in this opinion i agree with all the wise men who have ever deeply considered the principles of politics; with aristotle and polybius, with cicero and tacitus, with bacon and machiavel, with montesquieu and hume.[ ] it is impossible in such a cursory sketch as the present, even to allude to a very small part of those philosophical principles, political reasonings, and historical facts, which are necessary for the illustration of this momentous subject. in a full discussion of it i shall be obliged to examine the general frame of the most celebrated governments of ancient and modern times, and especially of those which have been most renowned for their freedom. the result of such an examination will be, that no institution so detestable as an absolutely unbalanced government, perhaps ever existed; that the simple governments are mere creatures of the imagination of theorists, who have transformed names used for the convenience of arrangement into real polities; that, as constitutions of government approach more nearly to that unmixed and uncontrolled simplicity they become despotic, and as they recede farther from that simplicity they become free. by the constitution of a state, i mean "_the body of those written and unwritten fundamental laws which regulate the most important rights of the higher magistrates, and the most essential privileges[ ] of the subjects._ "such a body of political laws must in all countries arise out of the character and situation of a people; they must grow with its progress, be adapted to its peculiarities, change with its changes; and be incorporated into its habits. human wisdom cannot form such a constitution by one act, for human wisdom cannot create the materials of which it is composed. the attempt, always ineffectual, to change by violence the ancient habits of men, and the established order of society, so as to fit them for an absolutely new scheme of government, flows from the most presumptuous ignorance, requires the support of the most ferocious tyranny, and leads to consequences which its authors can never foresee; generally, indeed, to institutions the most opposite to those of which they profess to seek the establishment.[ ] but human wisdom indefatigably employed for remedying abuses, and in seizing favourable opportunities of improving that order of society which arises from causes over which we have little control, after the reforms and amendments of a series of ages, has sometimes, though very rarely,[ ] shewn itself capable of building up a free constitution, which is "the growth of time and nature, rather than the work of human invention." such a constitution can only be formed by the wise imitation of "_the great innovator_ time, which, indeed, innovateth greatly, but quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived."[ ] without descending to the puerile ostentation of panegyric, on that of which all mankind confess the excellence, i may observe, with truth and soberness, that a free government not only establishes an universal security against wrong, but that it also cherishes all the noblest powers of the human mind; that it tends to banish both the mean and the ferocious vices; that it improves the national character to which it is adapted, and out of which it grows; that its whole administration is a practical school of honesty and humanity; and that there the social affections, expanded into public spirit, gain a wider sphere, and a more active spring. i shall conclude what i have to offer on government, by an account of the constitution of england. i shall endeavour to trace the progress of that constitution by the light of history, of laws, and of records, from the earliest times to the present age; and to shew how the general principles of liberty, originally common to it, with the other gothic monarchies of europe, but in other countries lost or obscured, were in this more fortunate island preserved, matured, and adapted to the progress of civilization. i shall attempt to exhibit this most complicated machine, as our history and our laws shew it in action; and not as some celebrated writers have most imperfectly represented it, who have torn out a few of its more simple springs, and, putting them together, miscall them the british constitution. so prevalent, indeed, have these imperfect representations hitherto been, that i will venture to affirm, there is scarcely any subject which has been less treated as it deserved than the government of england. philosophers of great and merited reputation[ ] have told us that it consisted of certain portions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; names which are, in truth, very little applicable, and which, if they were, would as little give an idea of this government, as an account of the weight of bone, of flesh, and of blood in a human body, would be a picture of a living man. nothing but a patient and minute investigation of the practice of the government in all its parts, and through its whole history, can give us just notions on this important subject. if a lawyer, without a philosophical spirit, be unequal to the examination of this great work of liberty and wisdom, still more unequal is a philosopher without practical, legal, and historical knowledge; for the first may want skill, but the second wants materials. the observations of lord bacon on political writers, in general, are most applicable to those who have given us systematic descriptions of the english constitution. "all those who have written of governments have written as philosophers, or as lawyers, _and none as statesmen_. as for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high."--"_hæc cognitio ad viros civiles propriè pertinet_," as he tells us in another part of his writings; but unfortunately no experienced philosophical british statesman has yet devoted his leisure to a delineation of the constitution, which such a statesman alone can practically and perfectly know. in the discussion of this great subject, and in all reasonings on the principles of politics, i shall labour, above all things, to avoid that which appears to me to have been the constant source of political error: i mean the attempt to give an air of system, of simplicity, and of rigorous demonstration, to subjects which do not admit it. the only means by which this could be done, was by referring to a few simple causes, what, in truth, arose from immense and intricate combinations, and successions of causes. the consequence was very obvious. the system of the theorist, disencumbered from all regard to the real nature of things, easily assumed an air of speciousness. it required little dexterity to make his argument appear conclusive. but all men agreed that it was utterly inapplicable to human affairs. the theorist railed at the folly of the world, instead of confessing his own; and the men of practice unjustly blamed philosophy, instead of condemning the sophist. the causes which the politician has to consider are, above all others, multiplied, mutable, minute, subtile, and, if i may so speak, evanescent; perpetually changing their form, and varying their combinations; losing their nature, while they keep their name; exhibiting the most different consequences in the endless variety of men and nations on whom they operate; in one degree of strength producing the most signal benefit; and, under a slight variation of circumstances, the most tremendous mischiefs. they admit indeed of being reduced to theory; but to a theory formed on the most extensive views, of the most comprehensive and flexible principles, to embrace all their varieties, and to fit all their rapid transmigrations; a theory, of which the most fundamental maxim is, distrust in itself, and deference for practical prudence. only two writers of former times have, as far as i know, observed this general defect of political reasoners; but these two are the greatest philosophers who have ever appeared in the world. the first of them is aristotle, who, in a passage of his politics, to which i cannot at this moment turn, plainly condemns the pursuit of a delusive geometrical accuracy in moral reasonings as the constant source of the grossest error. the second is lord bacon, who tells us, with that authority of conscious wisdom which belongs to him, and with that power of richly adorning truth from the wardrobe of genius which he possessed above almost all men, "civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which, above all others, is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom."[ ] iv. i shall next endeavour to lay open the general principles of civil and criminal laws. on this subject i may with some confidence hope that i shall be enabled to philosophise with better materials by my acquaintance with the law of my own country, which it is the business of my life to practise, and of which the study has by habit become my favourite pursuit. the first principles of jurisprudence are simple maxims of reason, of which the observance is immediately discovered by experience to be essential to the security of men's rights, and which pervade the laws of all countries. an account of the gradual application of these original principles, first, to more simple, and afterwards to more complicated cases, forms both the history and the theory of law. such an historical account of the progress of men, in reducing justice to an applicable and practical system, will enable us to trace that chain, in which so many breaks and interruptions are perceived by superficial observers, but which in truth inseparably, though with many dark and hidden windings, links together the security of life and property with the most minute and apparently frivolous formalities of legal proceeding. we shall perceive that no human foresight is sufficient to establish such a system at once, and that, if it were so established, the occurrence of unforeseen cases would shortly altogether change it; that there is but one way of forming a civil code, either consistent with common sense, or that has ever been practised in any country, namely, that of gradually building up the law in proportion as the facts arise which it is to regulate. we shall learn to appreciate the merit of vulgar objections against the subtlety and complexity of laws. we shall estimate the good sense and the gratitude of those who reproach lawyers for employing all the powers of their mind to discover subtle distinctions for the prevention of injustice;[ ] and we shall at once perceive that laws ought to be neither more _simple_ nor more _complex_ than the state of society which they are to govern, but that they ought exactly to correspond to it. of the two faults, however, the excess of simplicity would certainly be the greatest; for laws, more complex than are necessary, would only produce embarrassment; whereas laws more simple than the affairs which they regulate would occasion a defect of justice. more understanding[ ] has perhaps been in this manner exerted to fix the rules of life than in any other science; and it is certainly the most honourable occupation of the understanding, because it is the most immediately subservient to general safety and comfort. there is not, in my opinion, in the whole compass of human affairs, so noble a spectacle as that which is displayed in the progress of jurisprudence; where we may contemplate the cautious and unwearied exertions of a succession of wise men through a long course of ages; withdrawing every case as it arises from the dangerous power of discretion, and subjecting it to inflexible rules; extending the dominion of justice and reason, and gradually contracting, within the narrowest possible limits, the domain of brutal force and of arbitrary will. this subject has been treated with such dignity by a writer who is admired by all mankind for his eloquence, but who is, if possible, still more admired by all competent judges for his philosophy; a writer, of whom i may justly say, that he was "_gravissimus et dicendi et intelligendi auctor et magister_;" that i cannot refuse myself the gratification of quoting his words:--"the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, which, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected reason of ages combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns."[ ] i shall exemplify the progress of law, and illustrate those principles of universal justice on which it is founded, by a comparative review of the two greatest civil codes that have been hitherto formed--those of rome and of england;[ ] of their agreements and disagreements, both in general provisions, and in some of the most important parts of their minute practice. in this part of the course, which i mean to pursue with such detail as to give a view of both codes, that may perhaps be sufficient for the purposes of the general student, i hope to convince him that the laws of civilised nations, particularly those of his own, are a subject most worthy of scientific curiosity; that principle and system run through them even to the minutest particular, as really, though not so apparently, as in other sciences, and applied to purposes more important than in any other science. will it be presumptuous to express a hope, that such an inquiry may not be altogether an useless introduction to that larger and more detailed study of the law of england, which is the duty of those who are to profess and practise that law. in considering the important subject of criminal law it will be my duty to found, on a regard to the general safety, the right of the magistrate to inflict punishments, even the most severe, if that safety cannot be effectually protected by the example of inferior punishments. it will be a more agreeable part of my office to explain the temperaments which wisdom, as well as humanity, prescribes in the exercise of that harsh right, unfortunately so essential to the preservation of human society. i shall collate the penal codes of different nations, and gather together the most accurate statement of the result of experience with respect to the efficacy of lenient and severe punishments; and i shall endeavour to ascertain the principles on which must be founded both the proportion and the appropriation of penalties to crimes. as to the _law of criminal proceeding_, my labour will be very easy; for on that subject an english lawyer, if he were to delineate the model of perfection, would find that, with few exceptions, he had transcribed the institutions of his own country. the whole subject of my lectures, of which i have now given the outline, may be summed up in, the words of cicero:--"natura enim juris explicanda est nobis, eaque ab hominis repetenda naturâ; considerandæ leges quibus civitates regi debeant; tum hæc tractanda, quæ composita sunt et descripta, jura et jussa populorum; in quibus."--_cic. de leg._ lib. i. c. . v. the next great division of the subject is the law of nations, strictly and properly so called. i have already hinted at the general principles on which this law is founded. they, like all the principles of natural jurisprudence, have been more happily cultivated, and more generally obeyed, in some ages and countries than in others; and, like them, are susceptible of great variety in their application, from the character and usages of nations. i shall consider these principles in the gradation of those which are necessary to any tolerable intercourse between nations; those which are essential to all well-regulated and mutually advantageous intercourse; and those which are highly conducive to the preservation of a mild and friendly intercourse between civilised states. of the first class, every understanding acknowledges the necessity, and some traces of a faint reverence for them are discovered even among the most barbarous tribes; of the second, every well-informed man perceives the important use, and they have generally been respected by all polished nations; of the third, the great benefit may be read in the history of modern europe, where alone they have been carried to their full perfection. in unfolding the first and second class of principles, i shall naturally be led to give an account of that law of nations, which, in greater or less perfection, regulated the intercourse of savages, of the asiatic empires, and of the ancient republics. the third brings me to the consideration of the law of nations, as it is now acknowledged in christendom. from the great extent of the subject, and the particularity to which, for reasons already given, i must here descend, it is impossible for me, within any moderate compass, to give even an outline of this part of the course. it comprehends, as every reader will perceive, the principles of national independence, the intercourse of nations in peace, the privileges of embassadors and inferior ministers, the commerce of private subjects, the grounds of just war, the mutual duties of belligerent and neutral powers, the limits of lawful hostility, the rights of conquest, the faith to be observed in warfare, the force of an armistice, of safe conducts and passports, the nature and obligation of alliances, the means of negotiation, and the authority and interpretation of treaties of peace. all these, and many other most important and complicated subjects, with all the variety of moral reasoning, and historical examples, which is necessary to illustrate them, must be fully examined in this part of the lectures, in which i shall endeavour to put together a tolerably complete practical system of the law of nations, as it has for the last two centuries been recognised in europe. "_le droit des gens_ est naturellement fondé sur ce principe, que les diverses nations doivent se faire, dans la paix, le plus de bien, et dans la guerre le moins de mal, qu'il est possible, sans nuire à leurs véritables intérêts." "l'objet de la guerre c'est la victoire; celui de la victoire la conquête; celui de la conquête la conservation. de ce principe et du précédent, doivent dériver toutes les loix qui forment _le droit des gens_." "toutes les nations ont un droit des gens; les _iroquois_ même qui mangent leurs prisonniers en ont un. ils envoient et reçoivent des embassades; ils connoissent les droits de la guerre et de la paix: le mal est que ce droit des gens n'est pas fondé sur les vrais principes." _de l'esprit des loix_, liv. i. c. . vi. as an important supplement to the practical system of our modern law of nations, or rather as a necessary part of it, i shall conclude with a survey of the _diplomatic and conventional law of europe_; of the treaties which have materially affected the distribution of power and territory among the european states; the circumstances which gave rise to them, the changes which they effected, and the principles which they introduced into the public code of the christian commonwealth. in ancient times the knowledge of this conventional law was thought one of the greatest praises that could be bestowed on a name loaded with all the honours that eminence in the arts of peace and of war can confer: "equidem existimo, judices, cùm in omni genere ac varietate artium, etiam illarum, quæ sine summo otio non facilè discuntur, cn. pompeius excellat, singularem quandam laudem ejus et præstabilem esse scientiam, _in fæderibus, pactionibus, conditionibus, populorum, regum, exterarum nationum_: in universo denique bellijure ac pacis."--_cic. orat. pro l. corn. balbo_, c. . information on this subject is scattered over an immense variety of voluminous compilations; not accessible to every one, and of which the perusal can be agreeable only to very few. yet so much of these treaties has been embodied into the general law of europe, that no man can be master of it who is not acquainted with them. the knowledge of them is necessary to negotiators and statesmen; it may sometimes be important to private men in various situations in which they may be placed; it is useful to all men who wish either to be acquainted with modern history, or to form a sound judgment on political measures. i shall endeavour to give such an abstract of it as may be sufficient for some, and a convenient guide for others in the farther progress of their studies. the treaties, which i shall more particularly consider, will be those of westphalia, of oliva, of the pyrenees, of breda, of nimeguen, of ryswick, of utrecht, of aix-la-chapelle, of paris ( ), and of versailles ( ). i shall shortly explain the other treaties, of which the stipulations are either alluded to, confirmed, or abrogated in those which i consider at length. i shall subjoin an account of the diplomatic intercourse of the european powers with the ottoman porte, and with other princes and states who are without the pale of our ordinary federal law; together with a view of the most important treaties of commerce, their principles, and their consequences. as an useful appendix to a practical treatise on the law of nations, some account will be given of those tribunals which in different countries of europe decide controversies arising out of that law; of their constitution, of the extent of their authority, and of their modes of proceeding; more especially of those courts which are peculiarly appointed for that purpose by the laws of great britain. though the course, of which i have sketched the outline, may seem to comprehend so great a variety of miscellaneous subjects, yet they are all in truth closely and inseparably interwoven. the duties of men, of subjects, of princes, of law-givers, of magistrates, and of states, are all parts of one consistent system of universal morality. between the most abstract and elementary maxim of moral philosophy, and the most complicated controversies of civil or public law, there subsists a connexion which it will be the main object of these lectures to trace. the principle of justice, deeply rooted in the nature and interest of man, pervades the whole system, and is discoverable in every part of it, even to its minutest ramification in a legal formality, or in the construction of an article in a treaty. i know not whether a philosopher ought to confess, that in his inquiries after truth he is biased by any consideration; even by the love of virtue. but i, who conceive that a real philosopher ought to regard truth itself chiefly on account of its subserviency to the happiness of mankind, am not ashamed to confess, that i shall feel a great consolation at the conclusion of these lectures, if, by a wide survey and an exact examination of the conditions and relations of human nature, i shall have confirmed but one individual in the conviction, that justice is the permanent interest of all men, and of all commonwealths. to discover one new link of that eternal chain by which the author of the universe has bound together the happiness and the duty of his creatures, and indissolubly fastened their interests to each other, would fill my heart with more pleasure than all the fame with which the most ingenious paradox ever crowned the most eloquent sophist. i shall conclude this discourse in the noble language of two great orators and philosophers, who have, in a few words, stated the substance, the object, and the result of all morality, and politics, and law. "nihil est quod adhuc de republicâ putem dictum, et quo possim longius progredi, nisi sit confirmatum, non modo falsum esse illud, sine injuriâ non posse, sed hoc verissimum, sine summâ justitiâ rempublicam regi non posse."--_cic. frag._ lib. ii. _de repub._ "justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society, and any eminent departure from it, under any circumstances, lies under the suspicion of being no policy at all."--_burke's works_, vol. iii. p. . footnotes [ ] see "a syllabus of lectures on the law of england, to be delivered in lincoln's-inn hall by m. nolan, esq." london, . [ ] i have not been deterred by some petty incongruity of metaphor from quoting this noble sentence. mr. hume had, perhaps, this sentence in his recollection, when he wrote a remarkable passage of his works. see hume's essays, vol. ii. p. . ed. lond. . [ ] the learned reader is aware that the "jus naturæ" and "jus gentium" of the roman lawyers are phrases of very different import from the modern phrases, "law of nature" and "law of nations." "jus naturale," says ulpian, "est quod natura omnia animalia docuit." d. i. i. i. . "quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id que apud omnes peræque custoditur vocaturque jus gentium." d. i. i. . but they sometimes neglect this subtle distinction--"jure naturali quod appellatur jus gentium." i. . i. ii. _jus feciale_ was the roman term for our law of nations. "belli quidem æquitas sanctissimè populi rom. feciali jure perscripta est." off. i. ii. our learned civilian zouch has accordingly entitled his work, "de jure feciali, sive de _jure inter gentes_." the chancellor d'aguesseau, probably without knowing the work of zouch, suggested that this law should be called, "_droit entre les gens_," (oeuvres, tom. ii. p. .) in which he has been followed by a late ingenious writer, mr. bentham, princ. of morals and pol. p. . perhaps these learned writers do employ a phrase which expresses the subject of this law with more accuracy than our common language; but i doubt whether innovations in the terms of science always repay us by their superior precision for the uncertainty and confusion which the change occasions. [ ] this remark is suggested by an objection of _vattel_, which is more specious than solid. see his prelim. § . [ ] "est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, _naturæ congruens_, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando à fraude deterreat, quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat, neque improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. huic legi neque obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. nec verò aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. neque est quærendus explanator aut interpres ejus alius. nec erit alia lex romæ, alia athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus. ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator, cui qui non parebit _ipse se fugiet et naturam hominis aspernabitur_, atque hoc ipso luet maximas poenas etiamsi cætera supplicia quæ putantur effugerit."--_fragm._ lib. iii. _cicer. de republ. apud lactant_. it is impossible to read such precious fragments without deploring the loss of a work which, for the benefit of all generations, _should_ have been immortal. [ ] "age verò urbibus constitutis ut fidem colere et justitiam retinere discerent et aliis parere suâ voluntate consuescerent, ac non modò labores excipiendos communis commodi causâ sed etiam vitam amittendam existimarent; qui tandem fieri potuit nisi homines ea quæ ratione invenissent eloquentiâ persuadere potuissent."--_cic. de inv. rhet._ lib. i. in proëm. [ ] [greek: dichaiômata tôt polimôt.] [ ] cujacius, brissonius, hottomannus, &c. &c.--vide _gravina orig. jur. civil._ pp. - . edit. lips. . leibnitz; a great mathematician as well as philosopher, declares that he knows nothing which approaches so near to the method and precision of geometry as the roman law.--_op._ tom. iv. p. . [ ] proavia juris civilis.--_de jur. bell. ac pac. proleg._ § . [ ] dr. paley, princ. of mor. and polit. philos. pref. pp. xiv. and xv. [ ] grot. jur. bell. et pac. proleg. § . [ ] i do not mean to impeach the soundness of any part of puffendorff's reasoning founded on moral entities. it may be explained in a manner consistent with the most just philosophy. he used, as every writer must do, the scientific language of his own time. i only assert that, to those who are unacquainted with ancient systems, his philosophical vocabulary is obsolete and unintelligible. [ ] i cannot prevail on myself to pass over this subject without paying my humble tribute to the memory of sir w. jones, who has laboured so successfully in oriental literature, whose fine genius, pure taste, unwearied industry, unrivalled and almost prodigious variety of acquirements, not to speak of his amiable manners and spotless integrity, must fill every one who cultivates or admires letters with reverence, tinged with a melancholy which the recollection of his recent death is so well adapted to inspire. i hope i shall be pardoned if i add my applause to the genius and learning of mr. maurice, who treads in the steps of his illustrious friend, and who has bewailed his death in a strain of genuine and beautiful poetry, not unworthy of happier periods of our english literature. [ ] especially those chapters of the third book, entitled, _temperamentum circa captivos_, &c. &c. [ ] natura enim juris explicanda est nobis, _eaque ab hominis repetenda naturâ_.--_cic. de leg._ lib i. c. . [ ] est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta atque ad summum perducta natura.--_cic. de leg._ lib. i. c. . [ ] search's light of nature, by abraham tucker, esq., vol. i. pref. p. xxxiii. [ ] bacon, dign. and adv. of learn. book ii. [ ] see on this subject an incomparable fragment of the first book of cicero's economics, which is too long for insertion here, but which, if it be closely examined, may perhaps dispel the illusion of those gentlemen, who have so strangely taken it for granted, that cicero was incapable of exact reasoning. [ ] this progress is traced with great accuracy in some beautiful lines of lucretius: ---- mulier conjuncta viro concessit in unum, castaque privatæ veneris connubia læta cognita sunt, prolemque ex se vidère coortam: tum genus humanum primum mollescere coepit. ---- puerisque parentum blanditiis facile ingenium fregere superbum. _tunc et amicitiam coeperunt jungere_ habentes finitima inter se, nec lædere nec violare. et pueros commendârunt muliebreque sêclum vocibus et gestu cum balbè significarent imbecillorum esse Ã�quum miserier omnium. _lucret._ lib. v. . - . [ ] the introduction to the first book of aristotle's politics is the best demonstration of the necessity of political society to the well-being, and indeed to the very being, of man, with which i am acquainted. having shewn the circumstances which render man necessarily a social being, he justly concludes, "[greek: kai oti anthropos physei politikon zôon.]"--_arist. de rep._ lib. i. the same scheme of philosophy is admirably pursued in the short, but invaluable fragment of the sixth book of polybius, which describes the history and revolutions of government. [ ] to the weight of these great names let me add the opinion of two illustrious men of the present age, as both their opinions are combined by one of them in the following passage: "he (mr. fox) always thought any of the simple unbalanced governments bad; simple monarchy, simple aristocracy, simple democracy; he held them all imperfect or vicious, all were bad by themselves; the composition alone was good. these had been always his principles, in which he agreed with his friend, mr. burke."--_mr. fox on the army estimates_, th feb. . in speaking of both these illustrious men, whose names i here join, as they will be joined in fame by posterity, which will forget their temporary differences in the recollection of their genius and their friendship, i do not entertain the vain imagination that i can add to their glory by any thing that i can say. but it is a gratification to me to give utterance to my feelings; to express the profound veneration with which i am filled for the memory of the one, and the warm affection which i cherish for the other, whom no one ever heard in public without admiration, or knew in private life without loving. [ ] _privilege_, in roman jurisprudence, means the _exemption_ of one individual from the operation of a law. political privileges, in the sense in which i employ the terms, mean those rights of the subjects of a free state, which are deemed so essential to the well-being of the commonwealth, that they are _excepted_ from the ordinary discretion of the magistrate, and guarded by the same fundamental laws which secure his authority. [ ] see an admirable passage on this subject in dr. smith's theory of moral sentiments, vol. ii. pp. - , in which the true doctrine of reformation is laid down with singular ability by that eloquent and philosophical writer.--see also mr. burke's speech on economical reform; and sir m. hale on the amendment of laws, in the collection of my learned and most excellent friend, mr. hargrave, p. . [ ] pour former un gouvernement modéré, il faut combiner les puissances, les régler, les tempérer, les faire agir, donner pour ainsi dire un lest à l'une pour la mettre en état de résister à une autre, c'est un chef-d'oeuvre de législation que le hasard fait rarement, et que rarement on laisse faire à la prudence. un gouvernement despotique au contraire saute pour ainsi dire aux yeux; il est uniforme partout: comme il ne faut que des passions pour l'établir tout le monde est bon pour cela.--_montesquieu, de l'esprit des loix_, liv. v. c. . [ ] lord bacon, essay xxiv. of innovations. [ ] the reader will perceive that i allude to montesquieu, whom i never name without reverence, though i shall presume, with humility, to criticise his account of a government which he only saw at a distance. [ ] this principle is expressed by a writer of a very different character from these two great philosophers; a writer, "_qu'on n'appellera plus philosophe, mais qu'on appellera le plus éloquent des sophistes_," with great force, and, as his manner is, with some exaggeration. il n'y a point de principes abstraits dans la politique. c'est une science des calculs, des combinaisons, et des exceptions, selon les lieux, les tems, et les circonstances.--_lettre de rousseau au marquis de mirabeau_. the second proposition is true; but the first is not a just inference from it. [ ] the casuistical subtleties are not perhaps greater than the subtleties of lawyers;_ but the latter are innocent, and even necessary_.--hume's _essays_, vol. ii. p. . [ ] "law," said dr. johnson, "is the science in which the greatest powers of understanding are applied to the greatest number of facts." nobody, who is acquainted with the variety and multiplicity of the subjects of jurisprudence, and with the prodigious powers of discrimination employed upon them, can doubt the truth of this observation. [ ] burke's works, vol. iii. p. . [ ] on the intimate connexion of these two codes, let us hear the words of lord holt, whose name never can be pronounced without veneration, as long as wisdom and integrity are revered among men:--"inasmuch _as the laws of all nations are doubtless raised out of the ruins of the civil law_, as all governments are sprung out of the ruins of the roman empire, it must be owned _that the principles of our law are borrowed from the civil law_, therefore grounded upon the same reason in many things."-- _mod._ . finis. j. moyes, took's court, chancery lane. pax mundi. pax mundi a concise account of the progress of the movement for peace by means of arbitration, neutralization, international law and disarmament by k.p. arnoldson _member of the second chamber of the swedish riksdag_ authorized english edition with an introduction by the bishop of durham [illustration] london swan sonnenschein & co. paternoster square butler & tanner, the selwood printing works, frome, and london. contents. page introduction arbitration neutrality further developments the prospects appendix prefatory note. this little work, written by one who has long been known as a consistent and able advocate of the views herein maintained, has been translated by a lady who has already rendered great services to the cause, in the belief that it will be found useful by the increasing number of those who are interested in the movement for the substitution of law for war in international affairs. j.f.g. introduction to the english edition. it is natural that the advocates of international peace should sometimes grow discouraged and impatient through what they are tempted to consider the slow progress of their cause. sudden outbursts of popular feeling, selfish plans for national aggrandisement, unremoved causes of antipathy between neighbours, lead them to overlook the general tendency of circumstances and opinions which, when it is regarded on a large scale, is sufficient to justify their loftiest hopes. it is this general tendency of thought and fact, corresponding to the maturer growth of peoples, which brings to us the certain assurance that the angelic hymn which welcomed the birth of christ advances, slowly it may be as men count slowness, but at least unmistakably, towards fulfilment. there are pauses and interruptions in the movement; but, on the whole, no one who patiently regards the course of human history can doubt that we are drawing nearer from generation to generation to a practical sense of that brotherhood and that solidarity of men--both words are necessary--which find their foundation and their crown in the message of the gospel. under this aspect the essay of mr. arnoldson is of great value, as giving a calm and comprehensive view of the progress of the course of peace during the last century, and of the influences which are likely to accelerate its progress in the near future. mr. arnoldson, who, as a member of the swedish parliament, is a practical statesman, indulges in no illusions. the fulness with which he dwells on the political problems of scandinavia shows that he is not inclined to forget practical questions under the attraction of splendid theories. he marks the chief dangers which threaten the peace of europe, without the least sign of dissembling their gravity. and looking steadily upon them, he remains bold in hope; for confidence in a great cause does not come from disregarding or disparaging the difficulties by which it is beset, but from the reasonable conviction that there are forces at work which are adequate to overcome them. we believe that it is so in the case of a policy of peace; and the facts to which mr. arnoldson directs attention amply justify the belief. it is of great significance that since there have been "at least sixty-seven instances in which disputes of a menacing character have been averted by arbitration"; and perhaps the unquestioning acceptance by england of the genevan award will hereafter be reckoned as one of her noblest services to the world. it is no less important that since the principle of arbitration was solemnly recognised by the congress of paris in , arbitral clauses have been introduced into many treaties, while the question of establishing a universal system of international arbitration has been entertained and discussed sympathetically by many parliaments. at the same time mr. arnoldson justly insists on the steady increase of the power of neutrals. without accepting the possibility of "a neutral league," he points out how a necessary regard to the interests of neutrals restrains the powers which are meditating war. and i cannot but believe that he is right when he suggests that the problems of the neutralization of scandinavia, of alsace and lorraine, of the balkan states, of the bosphorus and dardanelles, demand the attention of all who seek to hasten "the coming peace." it would be easy to overrate the direct value of these facts; but their value as signs of the direction in which public opinion is rapidly moving can hardly be overrated. they are symptoms of a growing recognition of the obligations of man to man, and of people to people, of our common human interests and of our universal interdependence. i should not lay great stress on the deterrent power of the prospect of the ruinous losses and desolations likely to follow from future wars. a great principle might well demand from a nation great sacrifices; and the very strength of a policy of peace lies in the postponement of material interests to human duties. but none the less the wide expansion of commercial and social intercourse, joint enterprises, even rivalries not always ungenerous, exercise a salutary influence upon the feeling of nation for nation, and make what were once regarded as natural animosities no longer possible. under the action of these forces we are learning more and more to endeavour to regard debated questions from the point of sight of our adversaries, to take account of their reasonable aspirations, to make allowance for their difficulties, even to consider how they can best render their appropriate service to the race, while we strive no less resolutely to keep or to secure the power of fulfilling our own. we could not regard our enemies as our grandfathers regarded theirs. already the conviction begins to make itself felt that the loss of one people is the loss of all. meanwhile the growth of popular power and popular responsibility brings a wider and more collective judgment to bear upon national questions. the masses of peoples have more in common than their leaders, among whom individual character has fuller development. the average opinion of men, when the facts are set forth, responds to pleas of fellowship and righteousness, and tends to become dominant. such influences in favour of international peace spring out of steady movements which, as they continue, will increase them. the past does not limit their power, but simply reveals the line of their action. above all, they correspond with that view of our christian faith which the holy spirit is disclosing to us by means of the trials of our age. through many sorrows and many disappointments we are learning that the fact of the incarnation assures to us the unity of men and classes and nations; and a wider study of history, which is now possible, shows that the course of events makes for the establishment of that unity for which we were created. i cannot therefore but hope that the essay of mr. arnoldson, which gives substantial evidence of the reality and growth of this movement towards peace, will confirm in courageous and patient labour for an assured end all who join in the prayer that it may please god "to give to all nations unity, peace, and concord." b.f. dunelm. auckland castle, _october th, _. pax mundi. introduction. it was the small beginning of a great matter when, on december nd, , a hundred puritans landed from the ship _mayflower_ upon the rocky shore of the new world, having, during the voyage, signed a constitution to be observed by the colonists. these pious pilgrims were guided by the conception of religious freedom which should construct for them there a new kingdom. they had, say the annalists of the colony, crossed the world's sea and had reached their goal; but no friend came forth to meet them; no house offered them shelter. and it was mid-winter. those who know that distant clime, know how bitter are the winters and how dangerous the storms which at that season ravage the coast. it were bad enough in similar circumstances to travel in a well-known region; but how much worse when it is a question of seeking to settle on an entirely unknown shore. they saw around them only a bare, cheerless country, filled with wild animals and inhabited by men of questionable disposition and in unknown numbers. the country was frozen and overgrown with woods and thickets. the whole aspect was wild; and behind them lay the measureless ocean, which severed them from the civilized world. comfort and hope were to be found only in turning their gaze heavenward. that they did conquer that ungrateful land and open the way for the boundless stream of immigration which for wellnigh three centuries has unceasingly poured in, must find its explanation in the faith that upheld their ways amid the dangers of the wilderness, amid the hunger, cold, and all manner of disheartening things, and gave them that power which removed mountains and made the desert bloom. these puritans, strong in faith, were the founders of the new world's greatness; and their spirit spoke out to the old world in the greeting with which the president of the united states consecrated the first transatlantic telegraph cable in :-- "glory be to god in the highest, and on earth peace, goodwill to men." when this message came to us, the roar of cannon was but newly hushed, and the man of "blood and iron" had victoriously set his foot upon one of europe's great powers; the same austria which since then has, by the triple alliance, united its warlike strength with germany. but that message has not been an unheeded sound to all; especially to those whose warning voices the people never listen to before the misfortune falls, but who are always justified after it has struck. yes! perchance in the near future it may again appeal to their reason, and find a hearing only when europe has fallen into untold miseries after another war. while menacing forebodings of this long expected war were spreading in the summer of through various parts of our continent, a little company of courageous men, strong in faith, like the pious pilgrims of the _mayflower_, gathered together for the voyage across the sea to the new world, there to lay the foundation of a lasting work for peace. their first object was to present to the president of the united states and to congress an address aiming at the establishment of a court of arbitration, qualified to deal with disputes which might arise between great britain and the united states of north america. in that address, signed by members of the british parliament, allusion was made to the resolutions on peace which from time to time had been brought into congress; and those who undersigned it declared themselves ready to bring all their influence to bear in inducing the government of great britain to accept the proposition which should come from the congress. amongst those who signed it were, besides many distinguished members of the house of commons, several peers, including some of the bishops. the address was presented to president cleveland on october st, by a deputation of twelve members of parliament, whose spokesman, mr. andrew carnegie, in his introductory speech, said: "few events in the world's history would rank with the making of such a treaty. perhaps only two in our own country's history could fitly be compared with it. washington's administration established the republic; lincoln's administration abolished human slavery. we fondly hope, sir, that it may be reserved for yours to conclude a treaty not only with the government of the other great english-speaking nation, but with other lands as well, which shall henceforth and for ever secure to those nations the blessings of mutual peace and goodwill. the conclusion of such a treaty will have done much to remove from humanity its greatest stain--the killing of man by man. and we venture to hope, that if the two great nations here represented set such an example, other nations may be induced to follow it, and war be thus ultimately banished from the face of the earth." in the president's favourable answer he mentioned that no nation in its moral and material development could show more victories in the domain of peace than the american; and it appeared to him that the land which had produced such proofs of the blessings of peace, and therefore need not fear being accused of weakness, must be in a specially favourable position to listen to a proposal like the present; wherefore he received it with pleasure and satisfaction. a week later, nov. th, the son-in-law of queen victoria, the marquis of lorne, presided over a great meeting in london, at which many eminent men were present. the chairman emphatically remarked in his speech, that the settlement of international disputes by a court of arbitration has the advantage that, through the delay which is necessary, the first excitement has time to cool. the meeting declared itself unanimously in favour of the proposed memorial. thereupon followed many similar expressions of opinion in england, whilst simultaneously in twenty of the largest cities of north america mass meetings were held, which with unanimous enthusiasm gave adhesion to the cause, and petitions of the same character flowed in to the president and congress from the various parts of the great republic. encouraged by these preparatory movements amongst the two great english-speaking peoples, m. frédéric passy, with other members of the legislative assembly of france, placed himself at the head of a movement to petition the french government, requesting that it should conclude an arbitration treaty with the united states. such a memorial, bearing the signatures of deputies and senators, was received with much interest by the president. on april st, , passy and forty-four other deputies moved a resolution in the chamber to the same effect; and the idea has been carried forward in many ways since then, especially by a petition to the president of the united states from three international congresses held in paris, june rd- th, . arbitration. should these efforts lead in the near future to the intended result, international law would thereby have made an important progress. it can no longer be denied that international law does actually exist; but we undervalue its significance because we are impatient. we do not notice the advances it has made because they have been small; but they have been numerous; and slowly, step by step, international jurisprudence has progressed. this affects not only the awakening sense of justice and acknowledged principles, but also their application, which from the days of hugo grotius, years ago, down to martens, bluntschli, calvo, and other most distinguished jurists of our day, has been the subject of great scholarly activity, by means of which the various regulations of jurisprudence have little by little been pieced together into a foundation and substance of universally accepted law. what has been most generally done to gain the object in view has been the insertion of arbitral clauses in treaties which were being concluded or had already been concluded in reference to other questions. in this direction signor mancini of italy has been especially active. as during the time he was minister of foreign affairs he had the concluding of a great number of treaties between italy and other countries, he made use of the opportunity to insert into almost all--in nineteen instances[ ]--an arbitral clause. we have examples of treaties with such clauses in the commercial treaty between italy and england, ; norway, sweden, and spain, by a supplement in ; also england and greece, . according to the first two agreements, all disputes about the right understanding of the treaties shall be settled by arbitration, as soon as it becomes apparent that it is vain to hope for a friendly arrangement. in the greco-english treaty it is further stipulated that all disputes which directly or indirectly may arise in consequence of that treaty always shall, if they cannot be amicably arranged, be referred to a committee of arbitration, which shall be nominated by each party with a like number of members; also that if this committee cannot agree, there shall be appointed a tribunal of arbitration, whose decision both nations bind themselves to accept. the idea of concluding distinct treaties of arbitration, or of giving a widely extended range to arbitral clauses, so that they should affect the whole relation of the contracting parties to one another, is comparatively new. so far as i know, mr. william jay was the first who in modern times advocated this idea, in a work which came out in new york in , and in which he proposed: that in the next treaty between, for example, the united states and france, it should be stated that in case any dispute should arise between the two nations, not only in respect of the interpretation of that treaty, but also in respect of any other subject whatever, the dispute should be settled by means of an arbitration by one or more friendly powers. a similar proposition was presented to lord clarendon in . by sending a deputation to the plenipotentiaries at the congress at paris in , the english "peace society" succeeded in inducing them to introduce into, one of the protocols a solemn recognition of the principle of arbitration. in the name of their governments they expressed the wish that the states between which any serious misunderstanding should arise, should, as far as circumstances permitted, submit the question to the arbitration of a friendly power before resorting to arms. this proposition, which was unanimously adopted, was made by lord clarendon, the representative of england, and supported by the emissaries of france, prussia, and italy,--walewsky, manteufel, and cavour. but the first movement in favour of independent treaties of arbitration came up in a petition in , from the english peace society to parliament. the next year this subject was discussed in the peace congress at brussels. a few months later, cobden brought forward in the house of commons an address to the government, with the request that the minister of foreign affairs should be charged to invite foreign powers to enter into treaties with this object. the proposal was in the beginning received with astonishment and scorn; but called forth later an earnest and important debate. about six years later, henry richard drew the attention of many influential members of the american congress to the relations which were felt to be favourable for trying to arrange a treaty of arbitration between great britain and the united states. american statesmen, less bound by the old traditions of european diplomacy would, it was thought, be able with greater freedom to attempt such a novelty. the replies to this application were very favourable and encouraging, and in various ways since then attempts have been made to realize the idea. in many parliaments from time to time propositions in this direction have been brought forward and approved. on july th, , henry richard brought before the english parliament a proposition requesting the government to invite negotiation with foreign powers for creating a universal and well-established international system of arbitration. the then prime minister, gladstone, expressed himself as favourable to, the proposal, but advised its being withdrawn. richard, nevertheless, persisted that it should be dealt with, and obtained the remarkable result, that it was carried with a majority of ten. this example was followed by the italian chamber of deputies, nov. th of the same year; and again on july th, ;[ ] by the states general of holland, nov. th, ; by the belgian chamber of representatives, dec. th, ; and shortly after by the senate of the united states of america, and congress also, june th, ; and april th, . the last-named resolution of congress had been accepted by the senate, feb. th of the same year, being recommended by the committee on foreign affairs, and runs thus:-- the president be, and is hereby requested to invite from time to time, as fit occasions may arise, negotiations with any government with which the united states has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any difficulties or disputes arising between them, which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency, may be referred to arbitration, and be peaceably adjusted by such means. on may th, , don arturo de marcoartu moved in the spanish senate that the spanish government should enter into relations with other european powers to bring about a permanent tribunal of arbitration in europe. in the first place, the mover proposed that the states should come to an agreement upon a general truce for five years. in that interval a congress of emissaries from all the european governments and parliaments should be called together. the business of the congress should be to work out a code of international law. the proposition was urged, especially with regard to the necessity of finding a reasonable solution of the great social question, since all effort in that direction appears to be hopeless so long as the savings of the nations are swallowed up by military expenditure. the minister of foreign affairs requested the senate to take the proposition into serious consideration, and on june th the senate resolved to authorize the government to enter into negotiations with foreign powers for the object indicated. neither are the scandinavian parliaments unaffected by this movement. as far back as the question of arbitration was mooted in the swedish parliament by jonas jonassen. in he proposed in the second chamber that parliament should submit to the king "that it would behove his majesty on all occasions that might present themselves to support the negotiations which foreign powers might open with sweden or with each other with reference to the creation of a tribunal of arbitration for the solving of international disputes." the committee which dealt with the proposition advised its acceptance. the lower house passed it, march st, by seventy-one votes against sixty-four; but the upper house rejected it. the miserable dealing of the parliament of with the question i shall have occasion to refer to further on. in the same year, the question made surprising advance in norway. on march th the storting voted on the motion of ullmann and many others, by eighty-nine votes against twenty-four, an address to the king, which begins thus:-- "the storting hereby respectfully approaches your majesty, with the request that your majesty will make use of the authority given by the constitution in seeking to enter into agreements with foreign powers, for the settling by arbitration of disputes which may arise between norway and those powers." and concludes with these words:-- "in the full assurance that what the storting here requests will be an unqualified benefit to our people, it is hereby submitted that your majesty should take the necessary steps indicated." a similar resolution was very near being voted by the danish folketing in . the proposition as brought forward was, may th, unanimously recommended by the committee in charge, but on account of the dissolution of the house two days later, could not be acted upon. several years ago a petition was circulated in the various districts of denmark, by which parliament was urged to co-operate as early as possible in bringing about a permanent scandinavian treaty of arbitration. in such a treaty, binding in the first instance for thirty years, the petition affirms that the three northern kingdoms will have an efficient moral support when there is occasion to withstand the efforts of the great powers to entice or to threaten any of them to take part in war as allies on one side or the other. such a treaty will, therefore, in great measure serve to preserve the neutrality of the northern kingdoms, and thereby their lasting independence. this petition was dealt with in the folketing, march th, . after a short discussion, the following motion of f. bajer was passed by fifty votes against sixteen. "since the folketing agrees with the wish expressed in the petition, provided it is shared by the other states without whom it cannot be carried out, the house passes on to the order of the day." in his little paper: _on the prevention of war by arbitration_, f. bajer writes: "it may certainly be granted, that a little state like denmark cannot well work at the creation of a european tribunal of arbitration, so far as that means setting itself at the head of a movement for inviting the other european states to a congress by which its creation shall be adopted. "but a little state like denmark can always do something in the direction of arbitration between states. it can bring the matter a practical step forward by applying first to the other small states, especially to the neighbour states of sweden and norway, and proposing to them that mutual disputes shall in future, as far as possible, be settled by arbitration when other means have failed. the relations between the three northern kingdoms are indeed now so friendly that a war between them can hardly be thought of for a moment. but--as was said in confirmation of the resolution in the first northern peace meeting, respecting a permanent arbitration treaty between the three kingdoms--they have carried on many bloody internecine wars, which have only benefited their powerful neighbours, but have been in the highest degree injurious to themselves; and the possibility of war between the three northern kingdoms is not excluded so long as they are not simultaneously neutralized, or in some other way engaged to carry out a common foreign policy. it is no longer ago than that the so-called "pilots' war" in oeresund caused much bad blood among relatives on both sides of the sound. that that was settled authoritatively by the mutual declaration of the th of august is due to circumstances on whose continuance for the future it is not possible to reckon. had a strained relation at the same time obtained between one or more of the great powers within or without the baltic ports, and had these endeavoured to sow discord between the coast powers, that they might fish in the troubled waters, and feather their own nests by getting these small states as their allies; and if one power had got denmark, but its enemy got sweden-norway as an ally--a new northern fratricidal war would have broken out. even if such a future possibility cannot be entirely eradicated by a mutual arbitration treaty amongst the northern nations, a new guarantee for peace would be secured." (bluntschli's expression.) "for the small northern kingdoms would by such a treaty acquire an excellent moral support when it came to withstanding the attempt of the great powers to entice or threaten them into taking part in wars as their allies. such a participation is always a dangerous game, because, as history shows, the small states lose rather than gain. the small states are used as counters for the great ones to play with." at this point we may remark, that as far back as , the same year that the peace congress was held in brussels, feb. nd, a treaty (the guadaloupe-hidalgo treaty) was concluded between the united states of america and mexico, containing a clause that a committee of arbitration shall settle, not only such differences as may arise directly concerning that treaty, but also shall, as the highest authority, adjudicate as far as possible all disputes which may arise between the high contracting states.[ ] switzerland concluded, july th, , a similar treaty with the hawaian islands, and on october th with san salvador.[ ] siam, whose monarch has given many proofs of sympathy for oskar ii., concluded a similar treaty, may th, , with the united kingdoms, and also with belgium, aug. th of the same year.[ ] the central and south american republics, honduras, and the united states of colombia did the same when on april th, , they signed an arbitration treaty between themselves.[ ] since that time this vigorous idea has grown into the central and south american arbitration league, and is now making good way towards being applied to the whole of america. the question now is, whether the value of peace treaties, in general or in particular, which are established between mutually distant small states can be estimated as highly as the good intention of their creation, which is habitually acknowledged to be good? are they something to be depended upon? will they be carried into effect? that depends in the first place upon what is meant by peace treaties. if reference is made to certain international settlements which the conquered, with hatred in their hearts, bleeding, upon their knees were forced to accept, we may at once grant that they imply no security for peace, but, on the contrary, are a fresh source of warlike complications. thus, for example, the conclusion of peace which france was forced to sign at versailles, feb. th, , and by which alsace-lorraine was torn from france, became a volcano which now for nineteen years has held the nations in suspense and unrest, and still threatens to ruin europe. neither would it be advisable to set much store on such obligations as the western powers undertook in the agreement which goes by the name of the november treaty, to help us to defend the northern part of our peninsula against russia; because a guaranteed neutrality implies in reality more danger than safety, if the guarantee is not mutual; that is, in this instance, if our eastern neighbour is not included in the guarantee; which is so far from being the case that the treaty, on the contrary, is a source of menace and distrust to him.[ ] with respect to certain treaties of alliance, whose object is to collect the greatest possible number of bayonets as a mutual security against other powers, who, on their side, seek to protect themselves by uniting their forces, nobody can see in them anything else than a guarantee for an armed peace, which, by the necessity of its nature, leads to war. if, on the contrary, by peace treaties are meant such international contracts as are not written in blood; such as relate to trade and commerce, industry, art, science and so on, it would be in vain to seek for a single instance of the breach of contract, either on the side of the weaker or the stronger. neither can any example in our time be pointed to of open violation of the rights of a small country in its quality of an independent state, as long as these rights have stood under the mutual guarantee of the great powers. as evidence to the contrary, the london treaty of may th, , has been adduced, which was intended to secure denmark's neutrality; the treaty of paris, april th, , respecting the black sea; and the fifth article of the peace of prague in . but here the fault lies in a misunderstanding. what the treaty of london established was not the indivisibility of denmark, but of the dano-german monarchy. the german territory was to be fast linked to the danish. this was admitted, as a principle, by the treaty to be fitting and right, but the treaty contained no trace of stipulations as to guarantee. with respect to russia's breach of treaty of the stipulations as to her banishment from the black sea as a military power,[ ] it must be remembered that the representatives of the powers, and of russia also, on january th, , signed a protocol, whereby it was settled as an essential axiom in international law, that no power can absolve itself from the obligations which are entered into by treaty without the consent of the contracting parties. therefore russia openly acknowledged that her declaration of not choosing to abide by the injunctions stipulated for in the treaty of paris respecting the black sea, was precipitate, and that, consequently, the treaty was permanently in force until it was formally abrogated. this took place in the new treaty of march rd, of the same year. besides, here comes in what was said above about the value of such treaties as are concluded after brute force has determined the issue. and this not only was the case in the black sea stipulations, but also with respect to the unfulfilled promises of article of the treaty of prague, whereby the danish people was to be given the opportunity for a plebiscite in determining upon their reunion with denmark. as to the peace treaties between the lesser states, which certainly have important trade relations one with another, but which, on account of their mutually distant position, cannot reasonably be expected to go to war with each other, it is true that one cannot in general attribute any special importance to them. nothing is gained by over-estimating their value. but they deserve to be brought forward as enrichments of international law and guide-posts for other states. and that the small states need not wait until the great ones are ready to unite appears just as much in accordance with the nature of the case as with the interests of their own well-being. calvo, undeniably the first authority in these matters, emphasizes as a significant fact, that no single example can be pointed to in which states, after their mutual disputes have been referred to the consideration or judgment of arbitrators, have sought to _withdraw from the operation_ of the decision. and according to henry richard and other authorities, by allowing international questions to be settled by arbitration, at least in sixty-seven instances, disputes of a menacing character have been averted. i shall not here give a detailed account of all these instances, but only with the greatest conciseness refer to some of them. in a contest between england and the united states of america respecting st. croix river was settled by arbitration; in france was in the same way condemned to pay million francs to the united states of america for unlawful seizure of vessels; in a threatening dispute between spain and the united states of america was settled by arbitration, and a contention between these and england was arranged by the emperor of russia, who was chosen as arbitrator, etc. the best known of such disputes was the so-called alabama question, which threatened a desolating world-war. this affair sprang out of the north american civil war - . the southern states had privateers built in england, among which the _alabama_ especially wrought great mischief to the northerners. the government of the union considered that england had broken her neutrality in allowing the equipment of the privateer, and requested compensation. a bitter feeling grew up and war appeared inevitable. but on january th, , an agreement was happily entered into, which, with fresh negotiations, led to the washington treaty, may th, . in harmony with this the dispute was referred for settlement to a court of arbitration consisting of five members, of which england and the united states each chose one, and the neutral states of italy, switzerland, and brazil, likewise each chose one. these five met on december th, , as a tribunal of arbitration, at geneva, and delivered their judgment on september th following (four votes against england's one), that the english government had made a breach in its duty as a neutral power with respect to some of the privateers under consideration, and therefore england would have to pay an indemnity of - / million dollars to the united states.[ ] england bowed to the award and fulfilled her duty. in the same way the powerful insular kingdom voluntarily submitted to settlement in the weary contention regarding the possession of delagoa bay and the surrounding region on the east coast of africa. the dispute was entrusted for settlement, in , to the president of the french republic, macmahon, and he decided in july, , in favour of portugal. that the new contention between these two states, which for some time now has excited an inflammable spirit, not only in portugal, but in other countries as well, will be arranged in the same friendly manner, there is but little doubt. the claim of portugal is much older than that of england. its special ground is the discovery of the coast which was made by portuguese mariners three hundred years ago. the portuguese urge, that since the coast is theirs, they have a right to go as far inland as they choose and place the country thus entered under their dominion. they say further, that they have made a treaty with a native ruler over a kingdom which stretches far inland, and that ruined fortresses are still to be found which show that they once had this distant region in possession. to this assertion lord salisbury answers, that where ruined fortresses are found they only testify to fallen dominion. the english government could not recognise portugal's construction of the contested question; according to that construction the question would virtually turn upon the possession of shireland and mashonaland (the inland country north and south of the zambesi). it denied portugal's claim to this territory as so entirely groundless that it could not enter into such a question; but has on the other hand made a peremptory claim, arising from portugal's violence towards the natives who are under england's protection, for dishonour to the english flag, and for other international offences, etc. the right of possession of the regions in question can no longer be regarded as doubtful, since portugal had set aside the general international axiom, that the claim for possession according to colonial usage can only be held valid when colonization is actually carried out to the furtherance of civilization and public safety. portugal's assertion that the signatories of the congo act would be the right adjudicators of the question was denied, upon the ground that portugal had delayed to make her claim valid when nyassaland was declared to belong to the sphere of england's interests. on july st, , the under-secretary, sir james fergusson, in the lower house, explained that the portuguese government had been informed that they would be held answerable for all loss which englishmen might suffer by the annulling of the delagoa railway convention. the same day lord salisbury informed the upper house that the english government would send three war-ships to delagoa bay, to be ready in case of need. portugal's conduct was, in his opinion, unjustifiable. then came the noble lord's ultimatum, with the demand that portugal should recall all portuguese officers and troops from the territory which stands under the sovereignty of england or lies within the sphere of england's interests, and give an answer within twenty-four hours; otherwise england would be compelled to break off her relations with portugal. this threatening manner of procedure, by which a weaker nation was humbled by superior power, roused bad blood in portugal and was sharply censured in many parts of europe; yes, even in england, and in parliament, in the press, and at many great public meetings. at one of these meetings, composed of workmen delegates from various parts of england and members of parliament, in quality of vice-presidents, it was unanimously resolved to protest against lord salisbury's conduct as at variance with the dignity of the british nation; and to request that the dispute should be settled by arbitration--so much the rather, as the more certain one is of being in the right, the more confidently can one's cause be placed in the hands of an impartial tribunal. later on the english government, together with the north american virtually resolved on this expedient for solving, the difficulties relating to delagoa bay. portugal made difficulties and delays, but at length declared herself willing to enter into a proposal for arbitration.[ ] all three states were now united in asking the government of switzerland to choose three of her most distinguished jurist officials as arbitration judges. at the time when the first anglo-portuguese contest was settled by the president of the french republic there occurred a second example of both importance and interest. for many years there had been a menacing boundary dispute between italy and switzerland, just a little seed of quarrel, such as formerly always broke out into bloody strife, since according to the traditions of national honour not an inch of a patch of ground must be given up except at the sword's point. but the two kingdoms decided to commend the case to an arbitrator, viz., the united states minister in rome, p. marsh, who, after a careful study of the claims of the contending parties, declared judgment in favour of italy, and so the contention was adjusted. two dangerous disputes, which in - and threatened an outbreak of war between china and japan, but were happily solved by arbitration, might be named, but for fear of being prolix i dare not go more particularly into them, instructive as they are. the first arose as a result of a murder of some japanese on the island of formosa, and was settled by the english minister in pekin, who was chosen by both parties as arbitrator, who decided that china should give japan in redress a large sum of money, which was done.[ ] the second of these disputes concerned the sovereignty of the liu kiu islands, and was adjusted by a compromise brought about by ex-president grant, who in a conversation with the chinese minister uttered these memorable words: "an arbitration between two nations will never satisfy both nations alike; but it always satisfies the conscience of humanity."[ ] not to be tedious, i pass over here many other remarkable instances in which war and lesser misfortunes have been averted by arbitration; and will now name further only some of the latest date. in a lengthened dispute about boundaries between chili and the argentine republic was adjusted by arbitration, through the mediation of the united states ministers in the two countries. after a complete and precise fixing of the boundary line, an agreement was added: that the straits of magellan shall for ever be neutralized; free passage shall be secured to ships of all nations, and the erection of forts or other military works on either of its shores shall be forbidden. fresh in the memory is the passionate quarrel between spain and germany about the caroline islands. that was submitted, on prince bismarck's proposal, to pope leo xiii. for settlement, and was adjusted by him. most people now living remember the afghanistan boundary question, which was happily solved by the friendliness on both sides of the russian and english governments. the whole world followed for a while that dispute with anxiety and disquietude. the press unhappily, as usual, employed its influence in stirring up the national passions in both countries. but before it had gone too far, fortunately the feelings were quieted by the public being reminded that both england and russia had taken part in the resolution of the paris congress, which declared that when any serious dispute arose between any of the contracting powers, it should be referred to the mediation of a friendly power. upon this ground the english government proposed to the russian that the "dispute should be referred to the ruler of a friendly state, to be adjusted in a manner consistent with the dignity of both lands." this proposal was accepted, but did not come into practice. it was not needed. the afghanistan boundary commission itself carried out its duties to a successful issue. still later many smaller international disputes have been solved by arbitration; for instance:-- between italy and colombia in south america, respecting italian subjects who had suffered loss through the last revolution in colombia, in which spain as arbitrator decided in favour of italy. between brazil and argentina respecting their boundaries, a dispute in which both parties appealed for a settlement to the president of the united states of america, and which was adjusted by him. between the united states of north america and denmark, in which the latter was, by the chosen arbitrator, the english ambassador at athens, sir edward monson, after long delay freed from the obligation to pay compensation to the americans, because the danish authorities had fired at an american ship which in was escaping out of the harbour of st. thomas, and which was suspected of carrying supplies to venezuela, at that time in insurrection. in conclusion it can be urged,-- that france and holland agreed to have the boundary between their possessions in guiana determined by arbitration.[ ] that the international committee which met in washington to arrange the impending fishery question between great britain, canada and the united states, decided to recommend the creation of a permanent tribunal of arbitration for adjusting future disputes respecting these relations; also: that the council of the swiss confederation, at the combined request of portugal and of the congo state government has undertaken to arbitrate the possible disputes which may arise respecting the regulation of boundaries amongst their african territories. besides these and other instances which i am acquainted with, many others have certainly taken place, though attracting less attention. the idea of arbitration goes peacefully and quietly forward, and the world therefore takes little notice of it. it is quite otherwise with the crash of war, whose external show of greatness and glory, and whose inward hatred and crime, are desolating the happiness of the nations and are accompanied by distress and gloom. the one is a fearful hurricane which rends the mountains and breaks in pieces the rocks. the other is the still small voice, mightier than the devastating storm, since it speaks to us in the name of everlasting righteousness, because it is the voice of god. footnotes: [footnote : mazzoleni, in his "l'italia nel movimento per la pace," gives twenty instances. see pp. , . trans.] [footnote : on a motion by ruggiero bonghi, supported by crispi in a speech in which he said that the future depended upon a european tribunal of arbitration.] [footnote : see martens' "nouveau recueil général," xiv. p. (art xxi.), and calvo, "droit international," ii., § .] [footnote : according to a manuscript by president louis ruchonnet, addressed to f. bajer.] [footnote : see "svensk förfaltningssamling," , no. , page , and "lois beiges," , no. , § . in the swedish-siamese treaty, art. , it is stated: "should any disagreement arise between the contracting parties which cannot be arranged by friendly diplomatic negotiation or correspondence, the question shall be referred for solution to a friendly neutral power, mutually chosen, whose decision the contracting powers shall accept as final." similar agreements are to be concluded between italy and switzerland, spain and uruguay, spain and hawaii, and between france and ecuador.] [footnote : the treaty is given word for word in the _herald of peace_, july, .] [footnote : in this treaty, which was concluded at stockholm, nov. st, , the king of norway and sweden bound himself not to resign to russia, or to barter with her, or otherwise allow her to possess, any portion of the territory of the united kingdoms, nor to grant to russia right of pasture or fishery, or any similar rights, either on the coast of norway or sweden. any russian proposal which might be made under this head must be made directly to france or england, who then by sea and land must support us by their military power. a glorious contrast to the declaration of neutrality, dec. th, !] [footnote : conquered russia had to bind herself, at the conclusion of peace, not to keep war ships in the black sea, not to have any haven for war ships on her coasts. stipulations which were perceived by all thinking men at the time to be untenable in the long run.] [footnote : £ , , were received by sec. fish, sept. th, . see haydn's "dictionary of dates."] [footnote : _the arbitrator_, , april.] [footnote : the japanese government demanded redress, which was at first refused by china. this led to a stormy correspondence, which at last became so bitter that both sides prepared for war. the japanese troops had already taken possession of formosa. during this dangerous juncture, the british minister in pekin, sir thomas wade, offered to mediate as an arbiter. the offer was accepted, and led to an agreement between the chinese government and the japanese ambassador in pekin, by which china was to pay japan , taels, and the japanese troops were to evacuate formosa. when lord derby, who was at that time foreign secretary of great britain, received a telegram from sir thomas wade respecting this happy result, he answered him: "it is a great pleasure to me to present to you the expression of the high esteem with which her majesty's government regards you for the service you have rendered in thus peaceably adjusting a dispute which otherwise might have had unhappy consequences, especially to the two countries concerned, but also for the interests of great britain and other parties to treaties." sir harry parkes, the english minister in japan, wrote to lord derby, that the mikado, the emperor of that land, had invited him to an interview for the purpose of expressing his satisfaction at the result, and through him to present his warm thanks for his brave and efficient service. the japanese minister in london also called upon lord derby and expressed the thanks of his government to mr. wade. "he could assure me," said lord derby, when he repeated the words of his excellency, "that the service which has thus been rendered will remain in grateful remembrance among his countrymen."] [footnote : this dispute had assumed quite a serious and menacing character when the ex-president grant, on his journey round the world, came to china. when his arrival became known, the chinese prince, kung, submitted to him that he should use his great influence in mediating between the two countries. a specially interesting conversation followed: "we have," said prince kung, "studied international law as it is set forth by english and american authors, whose works are translated into chinese. if any value is to be set upon principles of international right, as set forth by the authors of your nation, the doing away with the independence of the liu kiu islands is an injustice." grant reminded him that he was there only as a private individual, but added, "it would be a true joy to me if my advice or efforts could be the means of preserving peace, especially between two nations for whom i cherish such interest as for china and japan." immediately afterwards he returned to tokio, the capital of japan, called upon the emperor and his minister, and advocated a peaceable settlement of the dispute. he wrote to prince kung the result of his mediation, and produced a scheme for a court of arbitration.] [footnote : at the peace of utrecht, , it was decided that the course of the river maronis was the boundary. but that river divides itself into two branches which embrace a large tract of land, almost a fifth part of french guiana. neither france nor holland had claimed that land until gold beds were discovered there, and it had to be decided which of the two arms of the river was to be considered as the maronis, and which as a tributary.] neutrality. side by side with the idea of arbitration, another pacific idea, already powerful, is pressing forward, and growing into an international law, namely, the law of neutrality. he is neutral, who neither takes part for, nor against, in a dispute. neutrality is the impartial position which is not associated with either party. the state is called neutral which neither takes part in a war itself, nor in time of war sides with any of the warring parties. in ancient times neutrality was not understood as a national right. neither the greek nor the latin language has any word to express the idea. in the days when roman policy was seeking to drag all the nations of the earth into its net, the romans saw in other peoples only tributaries who had been subdued by their armies, subject nations who had submitted to the roman yoke, allies who were compelled to join in their policy of conquest, or lastly enemies, who sooner or later would have to bow before their victorious legions. neutral states there were none. the centuries immediately following the dissolution of the western roman empire were filled with constant strife. this continued long before the refining power which exists in the heart of christianity began to show itself in the foreign relations of states. the foundations of modern europe were laid in war. during the crusades the whole of our continent was under arms. the struggle against the "infidel" was not simply a contest between one state and another, it was also a contest between christian europe and mohammedan asia. to be neutral in such a struggle would, according to the judgment of the time, have been equivalent to denying the faith. within the european states, feudalism exerted no less a hindrance to the embodiment of the principle of neutrality. it would have been thought the gravest crime to loosen the bond of military service which compelled vassals to support with arms the cause of their feudal lords. it was only with the close of the age of feudalism, when europe began to separate into three or four great monarchies, that neutrality in politics became a means of preserving the balance. in later times increasing communication and trade have above all contributed to the development of neutral laws. without the sanction of these, a naval war between two great nations would have made any maritime trade all but impossible. down to the close of the last century, however, neutral rights were dependent either on national statutes or on special treaties concluded between one state and another. the law only gained certain international importance towards the close of the eighteenth century through the neutral alliances which from time to time were contracted between states. in the period between and the subject gained an entrance by degrees among all maritime nations except england, who, independent of it, and always relying on her own strength, continuously sought to maintain unlimited domination at sea. in - begins, so far as neutrality is concerned, a new era of international law. from this time the opposition which england raised to the practical application of neutrality in naval war may be regarded as having broken down. on the th of march, , the french minister of foreign affairs, drouyn de lhuys, published a communication, including, amongst other things, that the neutral flag during the then begun (crimean) war, should be regarded as a protection for all neutral and hostile private property, except contraband of war. the same day the english government gave forth in the _london gazette_ a similar declaration, and on april th of the same year the russian government notified in the _official gazette_ of st. petersburg that russia would, during that war, act upon the same rules as the allied powers. the provisions, which thus the western powers on one side, and russia on the other, believed themselves bound to observe towards neutral states, were at the peace of paris, , solemnly ratified as international law in force for all time. the principles which the plenipotentiary signatories of the peace treaty of paris agreed upon in a proclamation of april th, , are as follows:-- . privateering is and shall be abolished. . the neutral flag shall protect property belonging to the enemy, with the exception of contraband of war. . neutral goods, except contraband of war, may not be seized under the enemy's flag. . blockades in order to be obligatory must be fully effectual; that is, shall be maintained with a strength really sufficient to prevent approach to the enemy's coast. the governments which signed the treaty bound themselves also, in this proclamation, to communicate the resolutions to the states which were not called to take part in the paris conference, and to invite them to agree in these decisions. all the european states except spain, and a number of powers outside europe, declared themselves ready to carry out in practice the entire resolutions of the proclamation. many wars since then have shaken europe; but under all these misfortunes the warring states have not only conscientiously observed the principles laid down in , but they have gone further, in certain points, in applying them, than they by it were bound to do. thus the austrian government issued an order, during the war with france and sardinia, with respect to maritime national law, in many points far beyond what hostile or neutral powers had any ground for requesting. the imperial decree not only charged its military and civil officers to follow strictly the injunctions of the proclamation, but sardinian and french vessels, which lay moored in austrian waters, were also to be permitted to load freight and proceed to foreign seas, on condition that they took on board no contraband of war or prohibited goods of any description. immediately on the outbreak of war, the same principles were adopted by france and sardinia. these states, however, went a step further than austria, inasmuch as they unreservedly declared that they would not regard coal as a contraband of war. during the dano-german war, in , and the war between austria and prussia and italy, in , the international principles of maritime law received a similarly wide interpretation. during the north american civil war important questions came up, which more or less affected the principle of neutrality. the question, which became one of the greatest importance, arose in respect of the injury which the commerce and navigation of the union suffered during the war from various privateers which were built in england on the southerners' account. the alabama question took its name from the privateer which went out from liverpool and occasioned the greatest devastation while the war lasted. although the executive of the union at washington duly directed the attention of the english government to the fact that allowing the pirate to leave the english port would be equivalent to a breach of the peace, yet the government took no measures to prevent the vessel leaving. the american government, who with reason regarded this omission as a violation of the laws of neutrality, claimed from england full compensation for the property which had been destroyed in the course of the civil war by the southern privateer which came from an english port. i have previously given more particularly the constitution and functions of the court of arbitration appointed to settle the threatening dispute which arose on this occasion. the arbitration award had to be adjudicated in accordance with the three following fundamental principles of international law:-- a neutral government is bound:-- . to guard assiduously against any vessel being armed or equipped in its ports, which there is reason to believe would be employed for warlike purposes against a peaceful power, and with equal assiduity to prevent any vessel designed for privateering, or other hostility, from leaving the domain of the neutral state: . not to allow any belligerent power to make use of its ports or harbours as the basis of its operations, or for strengthening or repairing its military strength, or for enlisting: . to use every care within its ports and harbours and over all persons within its domain, to prevent any violation of the obligations named. the contracting parties to this treaty agreed to hold themselves responsible for the future, and to bring them before the notice of other maritime powers, with the recommendation that they also should enter into them. the historical facts here produced show that the mutual interest nations have in the inviolability of the seas has effectually contributed to the development of an accepted international law. when the necessity of making the principles of neutrality binding at sea was once understood, it was not long before the value of adopting them on land became apparent. in the documents, for instance, by which belgium, switzerland and luxemburg are neutralized, it is distinctly stated that the permanent neutrality of these states is in full accord with the true interests of european policy. according to the actual modern law of nations, there is a permanent neutrality guaranteed by international deeds of law and treaties, and one occasionally resting upon free decisions.[ ] as instances of permanent and guaranteed neutrality, we have: the neutralization of switzerland. ever since the unhappy italian war in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the swiss confederation has endeavoured to assure to the country the security which neutrality gives. this neutrality was recognised and guaranteed by the great european powers at the congress of vienna in (art. and ), and later was further solemnly confirmed by a special act of the powers at paris, nov. th of the same year, in which it was stated: "the powers declare ... by a permanent act that the permanent neutrality and inviolability of switzerland, as well as its independence of foreign influence, accords with the true interests of european policy."[ ] the neutralization of belgium. in virtue of the treaty of london, nov. th, (art. vii.), further confirmed by the powers april th, , a permanent neutrality was awarded to belgium. this country, which for centuries had served as a battle-ground for foreign powers, especially for france and germany, was hereby secured against such dangers, and at the same time the field for european warfare was materially narrowed. article vii. of the london protocol runs thus: "belgium shall, within the boundaries established in art. i. and iv., form an independent state. the kingdom is bound to observe the same neutrality towards all states."[ ] during the franco-german war - , the neutralization of belgium was threatened with violation by france, and further guarantees were given in new protocols arranged by england. the neutralization of the archduchy of luxemburg resulted from the london protocol of may th, . as an evidence of the power and importance in our day of entering into agreements of neutrality, the following may be adduced:-- during the franco-german war, - , the prussian government complained to the guaranteeing powers of conduct at variance with neutrality on the part of luxemburg, and threatened no longer to respect the neutrality of the archduchy. (despatch of prince bismarck, dec. rd, .) in consequence of this, count beust, the austrian chancellor, in an opinion given dec. nd of the same year, remarked, that upon the ground of the principle of european guarantee, it belonged to the powers who had signed the document of neutralization, to inquire into and to settle whether a violation had taken place on the part of the neutral state, and not to one of the belligerent powers.[ ] besides the states named, a permanent neutrality has been secured to the ionian islands according to the treaties of london, - ; and also to the samoan islands, in virtue of the agreement between england, germany, and the united states of north america, whereby, amongst other things, it was settled that in case of any difference of opinion arising; an appeal should be made to arbitration; and that a supreme tribunal should be created with a supreme judge, whom the king of sweden and norway has been empowered to name. * * * * * one general advantage which neutralization affords is the simplification with respect to foreign policy thereby obtained. the attitude of a neutralized state can be reckoned on beforehand by all parties. in proportion to its military importance and position, a neutral country constitutes in many ways a security to all the powers. it is in close connection with neutralization that in these days an ever-growing need is becoming apparent to localize wars as much as possible; that is, to confine them to those who begin them. as a result of the extraordinarily rapid development of world-wide trade and intercourse, and the consequent community of interests, a war between two states necessarily occasions more or less derangement to the rest. in this increasing solidarity lies the surest guarantee that neutrality will be respected. we may already be justified in drawing the conclusion that the security of neutral states will continually increase. * * * * * supported upon these foundations of history and of international law, a discussion was raised on the neutralization of sweden, in the first chamber by major c.a. adelsköld, and by myself in the second, in the hope thereby not only to oppose the king's bill for the extension of the war department, but also especially to open the way for a profitable solution of the tough, old, threadbare question of defence.[ ] before this resolution was brought into the riksdag, i had read it to seventy members of the riksdag, who unanimously accepted it, as did also, later on, in the main, a majority of the [norwegian] storting. [ ]and as soon as the purport of the resolution became generally known through the press, there came in from popular meetings all over sweden numerous congratulatory addresses to major adelsköld and myself. but from its very commencement the proposition met with an unconquerable opposition from those in power. with great unanimity efforts were made in this quarter to depreciate the value and the historical importance of the principle of neutrality. all possible means were used with this object, to touch the tenderest fibres of the national feelings. it would be a disgrace to us, it was said, to employ any other than military power in asserting our primeval freedom. we should thereby break off from our glorious history, and draw a black line over its brilliant warlike reminiscences. there were certainly neutral countries to be found, but their neutrality was not the result of their own desire, but proceeded from the great powers themselves. should we then, they say further, be the first people to take such a step? would it not be equivalent to begging peace of our neighbour, and declaring ourselves incapable before the whole world? the sensible thing would be to further develop and strengthen our army. the resolution was called a political demonstration of indigence; a disgusting nihilist plot, and so on. one member of the riksdag proposed that it should be consigned to a committee charged with arranging for sending beasts abroad. scoffs came thick as hail; and when it became known that the mover in the _second chamber_ was its author, the really guilty one, he was branded as a universal traitor,--just as the year before, when he raised a peaceable question about extended liberty of conscience. in my defence of the resolution in the riksdag, i sought to anticipate all objections to it which were worthy of notice.[ ] amongst these i give special attention to the following five:-- . "the powers will not enter into the neutralization of sweden. . "but if, contrary to expectation, they did, the safety of the country would gain nothing by it. . "on the contrary, our independence would be diminished by a guaranteed neutrality. . "without lessening our military burdens for defence. . "the proposition is untimely." with regard to the first objection, _viz._, that the powers would not enter upon sweden's neutralization, it appears to me that circumstances of great weight imply the contrary. we may be quite sure that the powers will first and foremost consult their own interests. scandinavia may be certainly regarded as specially valuable as a base of military operations to any of the great baltic and western states. but it would be quite a matter of consideration, whether these powers would not gain more by the reciprocal security of being all alike cut off from this base, than by the doubtful advantage of being possibly able to reckon upon scandinavia as an ally. a neutralized scandinavia would be a switzerland among the seas; a breakwater in the way between england and france on the one side, and russia and germany on the other. in case of a war between these great powers it would now be of considerable moment for any of them to get the powers along the coasts of the sound and the belts, upon its side. and how difficult it would be for the latter to preserve their neutrality during such a war, must be evident to everybody. so the interests are seen to be equally great on all sides. it may therefore be deemed prudent to establish, in time, a permanent neutrality of the powers along the coast. here, according to my view, lies a great problem for the foreign secretaries of the united kingdoms and denmark. my reason for speaking here of neutralizing the whole of scandinavia is, that i am convinced that the brother-nations take entirely the same view as the swedish. with respect to the general interests of european peace, the neutralization of scandinavia would be more important than that of switzerland and belgium, because the interests of the great powers are greater and more equally balanced around the scandinavian north than around those two small continental states. we have old friends in the western powers; we have gained a new friend in united germany and by the neutralization of scandinavia we shall not only make friendship with russia, but denmark will gain that of germany, perhaps causing the last-named power to fulfil its duty to denmark with respect to north sleswick, seeing that it need no longer fear that its small neighbour would ever be forced into an alliance with a powerful enemy of germany. but it is not only the political interests of the powers which would be advanced by the neutralization of scandinavia. in the course of the last ten years world-wide traffic has made an unheard-of growth and connecting links between nations have been formed in many regions. as an example of the effect of these we may mention that even thirty years ago the normal freightage for corn was - shillings sterling per ton, from the black sea to north europe; but the freightage from california and australia to europe, now, hardly exceeds the half. a european war would exercise a paralyzing effect here. every one who has any conception of the influence of the price of corn on, to speak broadly, the whole civilization of modern times, will easily understand this. before the century closes this development will have woven a net of common interest all over our continent, and necessarily called forth such a sensitiveness in the corporate body of europe, that, for example, an injury in the foot of italy may be said to cause pain right up to norway. the merchant fleet of norway, alone, is indeed the third in rank of all the merchant fleets of the world. as is well known, the united kingdoms take an advanced place in the carrying trade by sea. according to what was told me by a distinguished merchant, the transport trade undertaken by norwegian and swedish ships between foreign countries is five times greater than that between home and foreign lands. consequently, as the keen competition between steam and sailing vessels increases, the only country which can dispense with the service of our sailing vessels is england, the great power upon which we may reckon always as an ally. most of the remaining countries, on the other hand, require our merchant fleet. since, now, we could not of course defend our merchant service in a war, and other and greater nations may be jeopardized as much as we, it may be assumed that they would be willing, through the neutralization of scandinavia, to secure its fleet against the eventualities of war. if we add such interests as affect trade and credit, civilization and humanity, to the political interests, it appears that we may plead on grounds of strong probability that the great powers would be willing to guarantee our neutrality. according to the second objection, the country would gain no security from a guaranteed neutrality, even if, contrary to expectation, such could be obtained. perfect safety cannot be attained here on earth by any system. this is as true for nations as for individuals but i believe that a neutrality thus guaranteed would be a strong protection to our national independence, whilst in a not inconsiderable degree it would contribute to the preservation of peace, and gradually help to lessen the military burdens of all lands; consequently, and in the first place, of our own. treaties, it is said, are broken as easily as they are made. even if it be true that this has occurred, it does not necessarily follow that it must continue to occur. new factors may come in making it more difficult to break engagements that have been entered into. experience shows that righteous laws have been transgressed, but no one would aver that they are therefore unnecessary. as the moral power of the law makes it possible to diminish the police force, so also treaties of neutrality make it possible to diminish the military forces. besides, our opponents ought to bring forward evidence that the rights of states at present neutralized have been violated. that they have been threatened is true, and it would have been a wonder if this had not happened under the lawless condition which has obtained among nations. the idea of neutrality has, nevertheless, as i have tried to show by many examples, little by little developed into a valid principle of justice; and the growth continues. the neutralization of scandinavia would bring it a great step forward, to the blessing both of ourselves and of other nations. according to objections and , a guaranteed neutrality would diminish our independence without contributing to lessen our burdens for defence. the truth is, that international law as at present constituted does not permit another power to interfere under any pretext with the internal concerns of a neutral state, and therefore not with anything which affects its system of defence or its measures for preserving its neutrality. with these the neutral state, and it only, can deal. as a proof of this being so, luxemburg was neutralized in upon condition that the strong fortress bearing that name should be demolished. but this circumstance, imperative for the general peace of europe, shows on the other hand that guaranteeing powers do not willingly impose upon a state any serious duty of fortifying itself in order to defend its rights. nevertheless the powers found it needful to make a supplementary clause to the protocol by which the congress concluded the neutrality of luxemburg, whereby it was emphasized, as a matter of course, that the article respecting the destruction of the fortress of luxemburg did not imply any sort of limitation of the right of the neutral state to maintain, or, if it chose, to improve its own works of defence. belgium did indeed construct the great fortresses around antwerp long after the country was neutralized. in reference to what one and another has said about the value of the subject, nothing is needed beyond the fact that neutral rights have, even in its present position, been respected in all essentials. that a neutral power must abstain from mixing itself up with the policy of other powers cannot imply a greater limitation of its right to self-regulation than that a guaranteeing power shall abstain from attacking a neutralized state or from making military alliance with it. there is certainly a limitation for both parties, as far as is necessary for adopting an intelligent union between states,--a limitation of physical force and of love of war. the neutral state has not to submit to any guardianship beyond what any man must do and does, when he subjects his passions to the control of a moral purpose. seeing that a guaranteeing state has no right to interfere in our internal concerns, not even in anything we think good for our defence, we shall always be free to keep up a military force, large or small. but a neutralized state is obliged to disarm the troops of other belligerent powers that may overstep its frontiers, just as of course, under the lawless condition which war is and which it entails, it has, according to its ability, to protect its boundaries with arms. but if this duty cannot exempt switzerland and belgium from proportionately large war burdens in time of peace, this would not at all in the same degree affect the neutralization of the scandinavian peninsula, since there could never be a question of disarming troops which had overstepped its boundaries, but only of preventing the war-ships of a belligerent power from entering norwegian or swedish seas, a thing which, under the protection of a guaranteed neutrality, could not take place. respecting the fifth objection, which declares that the proposition is untimely, i do not hesitate to express my opinion that just now, during the truce which prevails, is the time to bring it forward. the need of a settled peace increases everywhere, and it is therefore probable that a proposition to the great powers respecting a guaranteed neutrality for the united kingdoms would meet with general sympathy in europe. on these and many other grounds i sought to maintain my proposition. it was opposed by the minister of foreign affairs, baron hochschild, amongst others, who declared that he could not possibly support it. he informed us that the whole of his colleagues in the government took the same view of the subject as himself. he desired that the bill as well as the contingent appointment of a committee should be thrown out totally and entirely. as the minister in this way has made the matter into a cabinet question, there could not well, under the present conditions, be any question of the adoption of the bill. in spite of this, however, the request of the foreign minister was not complied with, seeing the second chamber adopted an amendment after fifty-three members had voted for the acceptance of the original bill. by the amendment which was adopted, the chamber did not accept the grounds of the committee's opinion--which the foreign secretary approved--but, in the hope that the government would spontaneously carry out the chief object of the bill, accepted for the present the report of the committee that no address be sent to the king on the subject. by reason of this result in the second chamber no action was taken in the first on the matter.[ ] during the debate in the second chamber, april , the foreign secretary remarked that i must have overlooked the fact that the european powers had, ever since , looked upon the two kingdoms of the scandinavian peninsula as a political unity in questions relating to peace and war; why otherwise should i propose from the first that the sister kingdom should have the opportunity of expressing itself on a matter which concerned norway equally with sweden. this objection was without foundation. during the drawn debate, march , i had already taken occasion to point out that it would not be seemly for one moving a resolution in the swedish riksdag to act as spokesman for norway at the same time expressing my confidence that the storting would meet us in a friendly manner, if the riksdag approved the bill with respect to sweden.[ ] that the neutralization ought to include not only norway, but denmark too, seems to be obvious. a highly esteemed jurist, count l. kamarowsky, professor of law at the university of moscow, puts it as a matter of great importance in the interests of the world's peace that international seas and coasts should be neutralized.[ ] this particularly affects denmark in connection with the other two scandinavian states. such a neutralization, he says, will lead to a disarmament in the sound and belts. these great traffic-ways would then be accessible for the merchant and war vessels of all nations. they must not be fortified, but the freedom of navigation would be watched over by an international committee. at the conference at berlin in , where fifteen states were represented, just principles were adopted for the navigation of the congo and the niger. free navigation and commerce on these rivers was secured to the flags of all nations. the same principle was likewise extended to their tributaries and lakes, together with canals and railroads which might in the future be constructed to get past the unnavigable portions of the congo and niger. not even in time of war may the freedom of communication and commerce be interrupted. the transport of contraband of war alone is forbidden. an international commission takes care that all these international agreements are kept in force. this authority, composed of delegates from each of the states which took part in the berlin conference, is independent of the local authorities in congo-land. now, every free people has naturally an independent right to arrange its own affairs as it chooses, upon condition that it grants the same right to every other state. in consequence of this principle in international law, neutralization is applied in very varied ways according to the very varying conditions of those who have the benefit of it, and altogether in harmony with their wishes. thus, for example, neutralization when it concerns a territory, consists not only in forbidding any warlike operation in the domain thus rendered inviolate, but involves a similar prohibition with respect to any marching or countermarching of armies, or smaller detachments, even of single officers or soldiers. a canal or a strait may be so neutralized, on the other hand, that all warlike operations are forbidden in it, but nevertheless it is open for passage through, yet upon condition that no belligerent has a right, in passing through, to land upon the shores of the neutralized region. this is the kind of neutralization which appears applicable to the scandinavian seas. * * * * * one question which for a long time came up constantly at the congresses of peace societies, was the neutralization of the suez canal, until it became at last solved in practice. after tedious negotiations, this burning question was settled by an agreement between england and france in the treaty of october , , which was later entered into by the other powers interested and that important channel of communication became at all times inviolate.[ ] upon the programme of the friends of peace questions have long been mooted respecting the neutralization of elsass-lothringen, and of the balkan states, together with that of the danube, bosphorus, sea of marmora, dardanelles, and their european coasts; whereupon should follow the rendering inviolate of constantinople; as also of the baltic, and as a result of this, the neutralization of the scandinavian kingdoms. in connection with the neutralization of the sound has arisen the still newer question of the non-german region north of the north sea canal, now in course of construction, between the mouth of the elbe and the naval port of kiel. by constituting elsass-lothringen into an independent neutral state, a division would be made between france and germany, and these great powers would be separated by a huge wall of neutral states which would also narrow in an essential degree the european battle-field. the same result is hoped for from a confederacy of neutral states on the balkan, with respect to the relations between russia and austria, as well as with respect to the whole of europe. the sound is one of the most important arteries of the world's commerce. about one hundred vessels of all nations pass daily through this strait, but only about ten (on the average, however, certainly larger ships) pass through the suez canal, which in the interests of the world's trade has become neutral. it can be nothing but a gain to europe that the entrances both into the baltic and the black sea should be rendered inviolate. in an address upon the importance of the sound to the north, given to the national economic society, mr. bajer pointed out that so long as the sound and its coasts were not rendered inviolate, military devastations will be carried on in and around the strait by belligerent powers; also that the facts that the sound is not danish only, but swedish also, and that sweden has a common foreign policy with norway, make it probable that it may the sooner be understood to be for the european interest that all three northern kingdoms should be simultaneously neutralized, and not one of them only.[ ] in consequence of mr. bajer's indefatigable zeal for the united co-operation of the northern kingdoms in the cause of peace, this idea has gained many influential adherents in foreign countries also; and on his proposition, two international congresses, geneva, sept. th, , and berne, aug. th, , unanimously accepted the following resolution, which in its general meaning was adopted by the first northern peace meeting at gotenberg, aug. th, :-- considering that,-- . the geographical position of the three northern states, is such, that they might, with a larger military and commercial naval power than they now possess, hold the keys of the baltic: . whilst the very weakness of these states probably removes all danger of their using the advantages of this position against europe, the same weakness may one day expose them, either by force or fraud, to be plundered by their powerful neighbours: . the inviolability of the three northern states, and their independence of every foreign influence, is in the true interest of all europe, and their neutralization would tend to the general order. . their independence, which is indeed a common right of all nations, can only be secured to the northern nations by their neutralization. . this neutralization ought to have for its object and legal effect: firstly, to place beyond all danger of war all those portions of land and sea which belong to sweden, denmark and norway. secondly, to secure at all times, even during war, to all merchant and war-ships, whatever flag they carry, whether that of a belligerent or not, full liberty to run into the baltic from the north sea, or _vice versâ_, whether sailing singly or in fleets. on these accounts the meeting declares,-- that denmark, sweden and norway ought to be neutralized, and that this neutralization ought to include:-- . with respect to the mainland and islands of norway, sweden and denmark, that all parts of this territory shall be at all times entirely neutral. . with respect to the sound and the little belt, that in time of war, ships belonging to any belligerent power shall be forbidden to show themselves in these seas; which, on the other hand, shall be always open for merchant craft, even those belonging to belligerent powers, as well as for war-ships belonging to neutrals. . with respect to the great belt, that this strait shall always be open for merchant and war-ships of every flag, including belligerents, whether singly or in fleets; but that these ships shall be entirely forbidden to undertake any inimical action on the coasts of the above-named strait, or in its seas, within a distance exceeding the maximum range of its artillery before sailing in or sailing out, or indeed any attack, seizure, privateering, blockade, embargo, etc., or any other warlike action whatever. the meeting expressed its desire to see an international congress arrange and conclude a treaty which should be open for all european nations to enter into and sign, which should establish on the above-named basis, under the guarantee of the signatory powers, the neutrality of the northern states, together with the creation of a really solid tribunal of arbitration, which, as the highest court of appeal, should solve all difficulties that might arise with respect to the said treaty. that the neutralization of the suez canal, so long looked upon as a pious wish, may in the near future lead to the inviolability of egypt, will doubtless be suggested. when this is accomplished, the good understanding between france and england will be further strengthened, and a foundation thereby laid for an extended co-operation in the service of the peace of the world, in the young congo state, with its twenty millions of inhabitants and a territory equal to half europe; a realm founded without costing a drop of blood, from its first commencement sanctioned and declared a neutral community by the european powers unanimously, which will some day be looked upon as one of the fairest pages in the history of the human race. footnotes: [footnote : this and the following regulations are taken from bluntschli's "das moderne völkerrecht der civilizirten staatens," nordlingen, . some of the treaty provisions and questions are grounded upon "recueil des traités, conventions," etc., par ch. de martens and f de cussy, leipzig, , and "archives diplomatiques:" --since practical abstaining from war is the natural assumption of neutrality, a neutral state is bound not to assist any belligerent power in warlike purposes. --a neutral state may not supply a belligerent power with weapons or other war material. --if private persons furnish belligerent powers with war material as articles of commerce, they assuredly run the risk of confiscation by the contending parties of such articles, as contraband of war; but the neutral _state_ is not to be regarded as having violated its neutrality by tolerating trade in contraband of war. --permission freely to purchase food even upon account of a belligerent power is not regarded as a serious concession towards that state, provided that the permission is general, applying alike to both parties. --a neutral state may not permit the war-ships of a belligerent power to run into its ports or (with any other object than to procure provisions, water, coal, etc.) to traverse its sounds, rivers and canals. --belligerent powers are bound fully to respect the right of peace of the neutral states, and to abstain from any invasion of their territories. --where a violation of neutral territory has taken place from ignorance of the boundary and not from evil intent, the neutral state shall immediately claim redress, compensation, and the adoption of measures necessary to prevent a similar mistake in future.] [footnote : see in respect of this act, "recueil des traités, conventions," etc., ch. de martens and f. de cussy, part iii. p. leipzig, .] [footnote : see ch. de martens and f. de cussy, in the above-named collection, part iv. p. .] [footnote : respecting the correspondence on this question, see the remainder of "archives diplomatiques," - .] [footnote : motion in the second chamber, no. . since the european states have settled into their present grouping, the material preponderance of the great powers over the smaller countries has more and more diminished the possibility of these defending their external liberty and independence by military power only. there are states whose whole male population cannot equal or barely exceed the number, which a great power can command for its fully equipped army. in olden time, a small high-spirited people might with success fight against a greater and more powerful neighbour. in consequence of the weak organization, the feeble spirit of cohesion and the slightly developed art of war, it was then possible. now this condition is changed. as a rule we find that the military strength of a state is in direct proportion to its population and material wealth. the consequence is that the smaller states have virtually ceased to be belligerent powers. such examples as germany's proceeding against denmark in , and england's against egypt in , or in general, when the stronger state only needs to consider how large a portion of its forces must be employed to accomplish its object, are not to be considered as wars, but as military executions. as to our own country (sweden), it certainly has, together with norway, an advantage in its situation above other small powers. but it concerns us that we utilize this advantage with wisdom and at the right time. this is not to be done by turning sweden into a military state, because even if we did so to the greatest possible extent, we should, if left to ourselves, not even so be in a condition to defend ourselves against our powerful neighbours. in proportion as a nation exhausts its resources by military preparations, its ability lessens to cope with an over-powering enemy. in our day, not only are great and well-disciplined hosts required for carrying on war, but great material riches are equally indispensable. the relation between a nation of four or five millions, and one of forty or fifty millions, is like that between the dwarfs and the giants. it is easily understood that patriotic feelings may bewilder the judgment, and that our nation, with its brilliant war memories, can only with difficulty perceive this simple truth, and with reluctance accommodate itself to the changed condition which modern times have created. let us, however, realize that we are standing at the parting of the ways; that we have before us the alternative, on the one hand, of a barren and ruinous militarism; on the other, the seeking of our defence in a neutrality guaranteed by the united powers; making it possible for us to get our defence adjusted, without any very great difficulty, and settled upon a footing so satisfactory. the first-named alternative would, in our naturally poor land, excessively depress our natural vitality, and in a great degree prevent our progress as a cultured people keeping pace with greater and wealthier nations. the second would put us into a position to confine our military burdens within reasonable limits, and to expend the powers and resources of prosperity thus relieved, in means of promoting business, trade, science, and well-being of all kinds. the clear-sighted friend of his country, who sees the population in ever-swelling numbers leaving their homes for a foreign shore, seeking a new fatherland, will surely not hesitate in his choice. it will perhaps be said that such a choice does not now lie before us. there are two opinions about that. but in one thing we may all unite, namely, that a settled neutrality for sweden is a thing to be aimed at. here almost every interest of the fatherland converges. but if such a neutralization is considered by many not a sufficient peace-protection under all circumstances, yet no one with reason can deny that it does form a security for our country against foreign powers. accepting this conclusion as correct, it follows that we should find some practicable means of realizing it; and if hindrances do meet us, we shall, on nearer inspection, find that they are not great, but with hearty goodwill and perseverance may be overcome. this is my conviction. in drawing attention to the subjoined, i would further bring to mind that the seat of war in europe is limited in the proportion in which the number of neutralized states grows, a condition of things which may little by little in an essential degree impede or prevent the outbreak of war; that the peculiar situation of sweden (greatly superior, for example, to belgium or switzerland) must naturally facilitate its neutralization; that, lastly, the neutrality proposed does not stand in the way of arranging our own defence, but that rather, in case parliament rejects his majesty's army bill, adapts itself powerfully to contribute to a right solution of the _defence question_; and so much the more, as all suspicion that that old vexed question aims perhaps at something more and other than defence of the country would thereby disappear. for this reason--and since we cannot expect that other powers should take the first step and offer us what we do not ask for--i respectfully propose:-- _that parliament shall in writing express to the king its desire that it might please his majesty to initiate, amongst the states with which sweden has diplomatic relations, negotiations for bringing about a permanent guaranteed[ ] neutrality of sweden, in harmony with the principles of modern international law._ k.p. arnoldson. stockholm, _february, _. this motion was supported by-- s.a. hedlund, will. farup, j. andersson, tenhuset, j.e. ericsson, alberta, per persson, f.f. borg, j. jonassen, gullahs, c.j. sven's, a. th. waylen's, p.m. larson, la, p.g. peterson, arvid gumoelius, j. jonassen, eric olsson, j.a. ericsson, lars nilsson, c.g. otterborg.] [footnote : taken from the following communication: at a meeting, march st, , of the association of members of the storting, a document was presented, being a motion in the second chamber, no. , respecting the neutralization of sweden; which document was sent to the president of the meeting by a swedish m.p. in consequence of this the following declaration and resolution was voted unanimously: recognising that the neutralization of a single country is in the interest of universal peace; that being secured from foreign attack by stronger nations, gives ability to use its own resources and develop its institutions, including its defence, according to its special requirements; that the condition and situation of our country give equal opportunity for working for this object, and facilities for its attainment; and that the action taken in the swedish rigsdag upon the question, seriously calls our attention to it on the ground of the constitutional relation between the kingdoms and their union in war and in peace; a committee is requested to take into consideration, how the question may be subjected to further attention. a. quam, secretary of the association.] [footnote : protocol of the second chamber, no , april th, .] [footnote : see on the dealing with the question in parliament, "riksdagstrycket" . motion in the second chamber, no. , pp. - ; first chamber, protocol no. , pp. - , etc., etc.] [footnote : mr. arnoldson's speech ran thus:-- "the second speaker on the right propounded certain difficulties, amongst others, one referring to sweden's union with norway. since sweden and norway have the same foreign policy, and the initiative in this question comes from sweden, the union king ought certainly to be able to act freely in the common interest of the two kingdoms. in any case, it is probable, as mr. hedlund remarked, that if the riksdag takes the first step it will not be long before the storting comes to meet us. it was chiefly on the ground of courtesy that i did not undertake to speak for norway too in the riksdag. we know that the norse--and it does them honour--are tenacious of their right of deciding for themselves. i do not think it would be seemly for the mover of such a resolution as this to make himself their spokesman in the swedish riksdag--not to mention the positive incorrectness of the proceeding. this is why i limited the matter to sweden in my proposition."] [footnote : "revue de droit international et de legislation comparée," , .] [footnote : the most important provisions of the treaty are the following:-- article . the suez canal shall always be free and open whether in time of war or peace, for both merchant and war-ships, whatever flag they carry. the treaty-powers therefore decide that the use of this canal shall not be limited either in time of peace or war. the canal can never be blockaded. article . no fortifications which can be used for military operations against the suez canal, may be erected at any point which would command or menace it. no points which command or menace its entrance or course may be occupied in a military sense. article provides that, although the suez canal shall be open in war-time, no belligerent action shall take place in its vicinity or in its harbours, or within a distance from its area which shall be determined by the international committee that watches over the canal. article is a continuation of the foregoing and runs thus: in time of war none of the belligerent powers are permitted to land, or to take on board, ammunition or other war material, either in the canal or in its harbours. article . the powers are not allowed to keep any warship in the waters of the canal. but they may lay up war-ships in the harbours of port said and suez to a number not exceeding two of any nation. article . the representatives in egypt of the powers who signed the treaty shall be charged with seeing to its fulfilment. in all cases where free passage through the canal may be menaced, they shall meet upon the summons of the senior member to investigate the facts. they shall acquaint the khedive's government with the danger anticipated, that it may take the measures needful to secure the safety and unimpeded use of the canal. they shall meet regularly once a year to ascertain that the treaty is properly observed. they shall most especially require the deposition of all works and dispersion of all collections of troops which on any part of the area of the canal might either design or cause a menace to the free passage or to the security thereof. article treats of the obligations of the egyptian government and runs thus:-- the egyptian government shall, so far as its power by firman goes, take the measures necessary for enforcing the treaty. in case the egyptian government has not adequate means it shall apply to the sublime porte, which will then consult with the other signatories of the london treaty of march , and with them make provision in response to that application. article sets forth: beyond the duties expressed and stipulated for in the paragraphs of this treaty, the sovereign rights of his imperial majesty the sultan are in no way curtailed, nor are the privileges and rights of his highness the khedive as defined by the firman.] [footnote : nationaloekonomisk tidsskrift, xxii. pp. - . see also _politiken_, , march . article "oeresunds fred," signed, defensor patriæ.] [footnote : the word "guaranteed" was inserted in the motion contrary to the opinion of the committee] further developments. in other ways the european powers have shown that, with a little willingness to do so, they can work together in the interests of peace. we have an illustrative instance of this in the danube commission, which, since , has watched over the traffic in the delta of the danube, neutralized by the treaty of paris. this commission, which is composed of members from all the great powers and turkey and roumania, and was originally appointed only for a short time, has, in consideration of its great value as an international institution, been renewed from year to year, and has had its power gradually extended. the commission possesses its own flag, its customs and pilotage, its police, its little fleet, and so on. it has for thirty years exercised an almost unlimited power over the mouths of the danube, has made laws, raised a loan, carried out works, and in many other respects given evidence of the possibility of united co-operation amongst the powers under many changing and intricate international relations. in the so-called european concert is seen a commencement of an extended co-operation in a similar direction. the war between servia and bulgaria was confined within certain limits by the united will of the powers, and greece was obliged to subdue her fierce military ardour. again, so far as concerns such coalitions as it is evident are not formed for the whole of europe, but are said to aim at securing peace by accumulating forces, it could hardly be expected, from their very nature, that they would fulfil the alleged design in themselves. but, on the other side, it would be short-sighted to overlook their importance as a link in the gradually progressive development of the interests of various nations in the common concerns of europe. one token in this direction is the proposal which was brought forward in the beginning of by a number of deputies in the austrian parliament, urging the government, after procuring the consent of the hungarian government, to initiate negotiations with germany for the purpose of getting a germano-austrian alliance adopted by the parliaments of both realms, and constitutionally incorporated in the fundamental law of both states. this proposal may have hardly any practical result, but it is worth notice as one of the small rays of light which from time to time point the way to a common goal. thither point too, though indeed from afar, those propositions for disarmament which now and then crop up, but which, quite naturally, fade away as quickly as they come, so long as the principle of arbitration does not prevail in europe. "europe's only salvation is a general disarmament," cries the illustrious frenchman jules simon, and yet louder the italian ex-minister, bonghi. the latter a distinguished conservative statesman, utters these powerful words in the _international review_ (rome). "the ideas of peace, which i have just expressed and which are also entertained by the masses, sound almost like a jest in the menaces of war which we hear around us. and they are ridiculous if the policy which the government follows is considered serious. the great thing is to be able to guess how long the ludicrous shall be regarded as serious, and the serious as ludicrous; and how long a proceeding so devoid of sound reason as that of the great european powers will be counted as sense. i, for my part, am persuaded that such a confusion as to the meaning of the words cannot endure continually, and that the present condition of things, whether people will or not, must soon cease. but we ought not to wait until the change is brought about by violence, nor indeed till it comes by violence from--below. dynasties must give heed to this, and must hold me responsible for saying it--i, who am a royalist by conviction." in the english house of commons, mr. a. illingworth, may th, , questioned the first lord of the treasury, mr. w.h. smith, "whether the government had recently made a proposal to the continental governments that they should agree upon a considerable and early reduction of armaments? and with what result? and if not, whether her majesty's government would without delay initiate such negotiations, having for their object to lessen the military burdens and the dangers which menace the peace of europe." in his answer the first lord of the treasury[ ] said: "if any favourable opportunity manifested itself, the government would have pleasure in using its influence in the direction indicated by the honourable member. but the questioner should bear in mind, that an interference in a question of this sort often does more harm than good to the object he wishes to attain. i can assure him that the government is as deeply impressed with this question as himself, and it has often expressed its view in the house, that the present armed condition of europe is a great misfortune and a danger to the peace of the world." in the german parliament, also, similar utterances may be heard; in the latest instance from one of the centre, reichensperger, who in the military debate, june th, , expressed the wish that they could set in motion a general disarmament. the speaker had certainly spoken in favour of the government bill for adding , men to the peace footing of the army. but he wished alongside of that to say, that as the decision of the emperor in summoning a conference of working men from all parts of europe had been greeted with applause, so would the civilized world, with still greater applause greet the tidings that william ii. had advocated a general disarmament. * * * * * many entertain the belief that the first condition of such a disarmament must be to absolve the rulers themselves from the dangerous power they possess in being able at their discretion to declare war, conclude peace, and make alliances one with another for warlike aims. in our country many propositions have been brought forward for limiting this power especially with regard to the concluding of treaties without so much as consulting the whole swedish cabinet. as is well known, even in the time of gustavus adolphus, the royal power did not extend beyond the king having to consult the riksdag, and to obtain its consent, whether he were engaging in a war or entering into an alliance with foreign powers. the absolute monarchs seized upon greater power, and the law-makers of simply ratified this dangerous extension of it. now we are unceasingly told, when the subject of defence is on, about sacrifices. they declare to us that no sacrifice should be esteemed too great. the state has the right of enlisting soldiers by compulsion, fathers, husbands and sons, for the defence of the country; and not only when it is really a question of defence, but when it is a matter of preparation for defence, that is drill, even if this extend to years of barrack life in time of peace. these are the sacrifices demanded from the people. there are those who think, would it not be much better if the people, on their side, demanded a little security that the country should not be far too thoughtlessly plunged into war--war which can no longer be carried on by paid volunteers, but with members of families conscripted by force, by means of compulsory service? such security could be effected by changing the formulas of government §§ and , and the constitutional law § , partly so that the conclusion of treaties should require the confirmation of a united meeting of the swedo-norse cabinet councils, and partly also, that certain treaties, namely such as include a greater political intricacy, should be subjected to the confirmation of the riksdag and the storting, as has been the case with certain treaties of commerce--bagatelles in comparison with the entanglement of the kingdoms in war. it is simply an assertion, refuted by experience, that the king cannot make use of the law here treated of. during the crimean war, according to a treaty, we should have been entangled in the war, had not the peace of paris intervened. so also during the last dano-german war, when interference on our part, as the result of a treaty, would have taken place, had not the death of king frederic vii. occurred. the same thing would have happened during the last franco-german war, if the battle of wörth had not thrown out the reckoning, according to a treaty which entailed our interference. into all these treaties the king could enter without giving the whole cabinet the opportunity of expressing its opinion. the danger of such a power begins to be increasingly felt, especially in england. in , henry richard raised in the house of commons the question of abolishing the right of the sovereign to declare war without the consent of parliament. the proposition was certainly rejected, but with the large minority of against votes. that the proposition could gather round it such a minority may certainly be regarded as a remarkable sign of the times. in , w.r. cremer made a similar motion in the house. he proposed that a "parliamentary committee should be chosen to examine and arrange foreign matters, which were then to be laid before parliament." this proposal fell through but progress was made, and mr. cremer still awaits a suitable occasion for renewing it. a characteristic expedient is pointed out by the well-known belgian professor of political economy, de molinari, in an article published in the _times_. he shows, in the first place, how solidarity among the civilized states of the world has lately increased in a marvellous degree, for not long ago the foreign trade of a civilized nation and the capital invested in other states was of very small importance. each country produced nearly all the requisites for its own consumption, and employed its capital in its own undertakings. in , the whole of england's imports and exports amounted to only five million pounds sterling. a hundred years later, indeed, the united foreign trade of the whole of europe did not amount to so much as the present foreign trade of little belgium. still more unimportant were the foreign loans. holland was the only country whose capitalists lent to foreign governments, and persons were hardly to be found who ventured to put their money into industrial undertakings in foreign lands, or even beyond the provinces in which they dwelt. consequently at that time a neutral state suffered little or no injury when two states were at war. a quarrel between france and spain or germany then did no more harm to english interests than a war between china and japan would do now. at present it is quite otherwise. trade and capital have in our day become international. while the foreign traffic of the civilized world two hundred years ago did not exceed one hundred millions sterling, it runs up now to about five thousand millions; and foreign loans have augmented in the same degree. in every country there is a constantly increasing portion of the population dependent for its subsistence upon relations with other peoples, either for the manufacture or exportation of goods, or for the importation of foreign necessaries. in france a tenth part of the population is dependent in this way upon foreign countries, a third in belgium, and in england probably not far from a third. so long as there is peace, this increasing community of interests is a source of well-being, and advances civilization; but if a war breaks out, that which was a blessing is turned into a common ill. for, not to mention the burden which preparations for defence impose upon the neutral nations, they suffer from the crisis which war causes in the money market, and from the cessation or curtailing of their trade with the belligerent powers. from these facts, de molinari deduces a principle of justice--neutral states have the right to forbid a war, as it greatly injures their own lawful interests. if two duellists fight out their quarrel in a solitary place, where nobody can be injured by their balls or swords, they may be allowed without any great harm to exercise their right of killing. but if they set to work to shoot one another in a crowded street, no one can blame the police if they interfere, since their action exposes peacable passers-by to danger. it is the same with war between states. neutral states would have small interest in hindering war, if war did not do them any particular harm; and under those circumstances their right to interfere might be disputed. but when, as is now the case, war cannot be carried on without menacing a great and constantly increasing portion of the interests of neutrals, yes, even their existence, their right to come in and maintain order is indisputable. the worst is that, after all, the belligerent nation itself never decides its own fate. that is settled by a few politicians and military men, who have quite other interests than those of business. it is often done by a single man; and it may be said without exaggeration, that the world's peace depends upon the pleasure of three or four men, sovereigns or ministers, who can any day, at their discretion, let slip all the horrors of war. they can thereby bring measureless misery and ills upon the whole civilized world's peaceable industries, not excepting even those of neutral nations, with whom they have nothing to do. the most absolute despots of the rude old times had no such power. self-interests of purely political nature give the neutral states, especially the smaller ones, the right to do what they can to prevent war between other powers; because it is an old experience that war among the great powers readily spreads itself to the little ones. de molinari states further that the neutral states may so much the more easily ward off all this evil, as they have not only the right, but also the power, if they would set themselves to do it. thereupon he unfolds his proposition:-- "with england at the head, and with holland, belgium, switzerland and denmark as members, there might be formed a confederation, 'the neutral league,' for the purpose of attacking any of the other powers who should begin a war, and of helping the attacked. the states named have a united strength of , men, and can place on a war footing , , . to these may be added the fleets of england, holland and denmark, which together form the strongest naval power in the world."[ ] suppose that a complication takes place between two great powers on the continent of europe--germany, france, austria, or russia--there can be no doubt that if the "league" united its strength with the threatened power, that power would become thereby so superior to its opponent that victory would be certain. for this reason a peaceable interference on the part of the league before the war broke out, would make the most warlike amongst the powers consider. but the fact that no state could stir up a war without meeting a crushing superior force would lead to a constant and lasting state of peace, and disarmament. de molinari thinks his plan would be advanced by forming an association in the countries named, which should work for an agreement between them in the above-named direction. the proposition will never of itself lead to any practical result. but it is at least useful in having pointed out the growing interest which neutral powers have in maintaining peace unmolested. this interest shows itself already in general politics in the zealous pains with which, on the outbreak of war, all powers not implicated unite to "localize" war, that is, to limit it to as few partisans, and to as, small an area, as possible. the peace interests of neutral states become year by year more powerful factors in politics. here we must bear in mind that more states are continually passing over into the condition of unconsciously forming "a neutral league." they are approaching the goal which they have long been striving after by arms and by diplomacy. "they are," to quote bismarck, "satisfied and do not strive for more." such states are germany and italy, which have achieved their unity, and hungary, which has gained its freedom. nevertheless all great causes of war are not thereby eradicated from europe. in the forenamed article by the russian jurist, kamarowski, light is thrown upon this circumstance with scientific clearness. he says respecting germany, that this country has essentially realized its national unity, and thereby reached a justifiable object; but at the same time has been guilty of two serious violations of the principles of international right. "it carried on the war against france with an inflexible and altogether unnecessary severity, and it tore from that state elsass-lothringen." the attempt is certainly made to justify this by the fact that both these provinces formerly belonged to germany, and that it was an absolute necessity for germany to acquire a military guarantee against a fresh attack on the part of france. kamarowski shows both these grounds to be untenable. if nations should continually look back to the past, and strive to renew the old conditions, they never could found a more durable or righteous state of things in the present. what ought to be decisive is, that in these unhappy provinces the sympathy of the great part of the population is completely on the side of france. the possession of strasburg and metz has not only failed to give germany the anticipated security; it has, on the other hand, compelled the germans to live since in perpetual unrest; to keep on foot an immense army, and to expend their last resources in building fortresses. besides, this possession cripples german activity in both internal and external political questions. the situation of france is equally unenviable; constantly kept in suspense, and with the feeling of having been unjustly treated, and longing for revenge. is it possible, with this deadly hatred between two of europe's most civilized states, to think of a lasting peace? and what can the governments of these nations do with respect to this evil, unless they set themselves to eradicate it? kamarowski proposes three different solutions of the question of elsass-lothringen. a european congress might arrange the destiny of these provinces, by dividing them, for example, so that elsass should remain united to germany, and lothringen to france; or by forming them into two or more cantons united to switzerland; or lastly, by letting them become an independent state with a self-chosen mode of government, but with the _sine quâ non_ that they shall be neutralized, and placed under the guarantee of combined europe. it would be almost immaterial to europe which of these three expedients were chosen; therefore the choice might be left to the inhabitants of elsass-lothringen themselves; and the opportunity might be given them of expressing themselves by a plebiscite, uncontrolled by any influence from either the french or german side. this naturally affects danish south jutland in an equal degree, which germany wrenched from denmark by a gross breach of international law. that the writer does not adduce this instance may be simply because he does not regard it as involving any danger of war. kamarowski finds this to be much more pronounced with regard to the eastern question. this is more threatening than that of elsass-lothringen. ever since the close of the last century the turkish empire has, on account of its internal condition, been doomed to fall to pieces, and its final dissolution is only a question of time. it is difficult to say what is to be done with the remains. the only reasonable and righteous settlement is to allow the christian peoples who were in the past subjected by the turks, and who compose the great majority of the population in european turkey, to form independent states. manifold causes have hitherto prevented the organization of the political life of these nations, shorn of political maturity in consequence of protracted thraldom, mutual jealousy, and influences of the great powers, who under all manner of excuses have played their own game at the cost of these people, pretending to protect them, while they sought to make them into their subjects. russia has doubtless, even if unintentionally, in the greatest degree helped to set these nations free, and to produce the present position by which servia and roumania have been changed, from being subject to turkey, into independent states; and bulgaria, instead of being a turkish province, has now a less subject position as regards turkey. "it is," says the writer, "not altogether without reason that the russians accuse their southern sclav brethren of ingratitude"; but he admits that russia ought partly to blame herself. she has, for instance, at times shown a decided inclination to force her forms of thought and policy upon them, and to get the whole of their inner national life placed under her authority. this action of russia is blameworthy, both because it violates the independence which belongs of right to every state, and because it is foolishly opposed to russia's own well-known interests. by such a policy she can only betray her sclav mission, create more than one new poland for herself, and artificially shift her political power from north to south, thereby weakening her national strength. kamarowski further describes the selfish schemes of england and austria in the balkan peninsula. these plans are even more distasteful to the christian population than russia's, because it stands in the closest relation to that country both as to race and a common religion. england and austria seek to entice this people by the prospect of freer institutions and greater economic well-being but they can only drag them into their net at the cost of their national and moral independence. and the jealousy between these powers, russia on the one hand and austria and england on the other, each wanting to get the advantage, or to possess itself of the remains of the dying realm, is a standing menace to the peace of europe. this danger would disappear if people could be satisfied to let these nations belong to themselves. now that austria has carried out the injunction laid upon her by the berlin congress--for the present to undertake the management and administration of bosnia and herzegovina--she ought to withdraw from these provinces, whose population should be allowed to decide their own fate by universal suffrage, whether this would result in the union of bosnia with servia, and of herzegovina with montenegro, or whether the situation should be arranged in some other way. all that austria has any ground for requiring is, the free navigation of the danube and the straits (bosphorus and dardanelles), and therewith her true interests in this region would be abundantly satisfied. the christian states which, alongside of turkey, have spread over the balkan peninsula, are greece, roumania, servia, montenegro and bulgaria. the last named still stands in subjection to turkey, but has the same right to full independence as the neighbour states. it is evidently their vocation to divide amongst themselves the remains of turkey in europe, for their population in an overwhelming proportion consists of southern sclavs and greeks. but unhappily they seem to have little conception of this their task, because they live in a constant state of jealousy and bickering. these states are all only just in the embryo. they have not yet by a long way attained their natural boundaries. a large number of greeks and bulgarians are still under the direct government of turkey. it would be labour lost to attempt to guess how many small states will form themselves out of the ruins of turkey, or what political form they will take. the author remarks that it would be best for them to arrange themselves into one or more confederations with self-government for each single state composing this alliance. europe, in harmony with international justice, should see to it: ( ) that the peoples of the balkan peninsula should not become the prey of any foreign power; ( ) that they should not be allowed to trespass upon each other's domains; ( ) that their development should as far as possible proceed in a peaceful and law-abiding way; ( ) that they should divide the inheritance of turkey in a thoroughly just manner, so that the political boundaries should be marked out in harmony with the wishes and interests of the inhabitants; ( ) that they themselves do not invade the domains of other states, and that they recognise all the maxims of international justice. a european congress, co-operating in such an arrangement of the conditions of the balkan peninsula, would contribute in no small degree to remove the causes of war in europe, and would do effective work in the cause of freedom and civilization. greece would acquire all the islands of the archipelago, together with candia and cyprus. macedonia would, according to the conditions of its nationalities, be divided between greece and bulgaria. the natural boundary of the latter would be the danube on the one side and the archipelago on the other. constantinople would remain the capital of a bulgarian kingdom, or of a southern sclav federation; or again, a free city with a small independent territory.[ ] the fortifications on both sides the bosphorus and dardanelles should be destroyed, and both these straits be thrown open to the navigation of all nations. after being obliterated from the list of european nations, turkey would peacefully continue its existence in asia. but not even so are all the causes of war removed from our continent. many are to be found in the relations between russia and england especially two, says kamarowski. one is the opposition between the dissimilar forms of government in these countries. england is the advocate of liberal social institutions all over the continent, but russia poses as the mainstay of unlimited sovereign power and of conservative principles. yet doubtless russia will sooner or later, with a firmness and consistency hitherto lacking, strike into the path of political reform, and then this contrast will be assimilated. the other consists in the opposing interests of the two powers upon the eastern question. but if this question is solved as the author proposes, by the whole balkan peninsula being permitted to form itself into independent states under the guarantee of united europe, this cause of strife would also be removed. russia need no longer threaten india. russia's true well-being can never consist in spreading herself over the deserts and wastes of asia, or in the endless compulsory subjection of hostile races under her. she will doubtless in time perceive this. historical facts have already marked out the domain of both realms and the boundaries of their influence. the greater part of southern asia is more or less subjected to england. the whole of northern and central asia belongs to russia. russia and england have a common mission in asia--to promote the christian civilization of the world; and in this direction each has her special call. also in the relations between russia and germany are found indeed inflammable materials; but with wise action on both sides they may be got rid of. russia has, more than any other power, promoted the unity and powerful position of germany. except during the strife between the empress elizabeth and frederic ii., constant friendly relations have obtained between russia and prussia; so, under frederick ii. and catherine ii., and during prussia's struggle against napoleon i. while the friendship between alexander ii. and william i. made possible the wars of and - . the house of hohenzollern, which has never been any friend of popular freedom, felt drawn to russia upon the ground of its devotion to conservative modes of thought and its absolutism. but since prussia has realized her goal--that of being the leading power in germany--the relations with russia have become more and more strained. one of the chief causes has been the disputes caused by economic questions, and that of the customs in particular. in addition to this is the general misunderstanding fomented by the press. the political press, says kamarowski, ought to serve the cause of peace to-day more than ever. unhappily it by no means does. with few exceptions it helps to fan and feed national hatred, and to stir up enmity between the european states. most of the principal organs have a narrower horizon than this. some of these papers and periodicals are worked only as business undertakings, to make the greatest possible profit to the shareholders; the best of them defend with gross one-sidedness the interests of their own country; seldom do they disclose any insight into great, purely humanitarian interests. the political press is, therefore, for the most part a constant source of reciprocal suspicion and hatred, which hinders the states of europe from entering into the condition of peace they all inwardly so long for. dip at random into a heap of most of the great papers, and you will find the strangest ideas respecting international justice; rank self-assertion in judgment, and purely barbarous sentiments respecting subjugating and destroying so-called hereditary enemies. lastly, there is a cause of tension between russia and germany in their opposing attitude with regard to the sclav question; and if a satisfactory solution is not found for this question in a peaceable way, a crowd of complications will arise, into which russia will inevitably be drawn. we have first the polish question. in our day russia is entering, through the power of circumstances, more and more into her historic vocation of giving freedom and unity to the sclavs. but this undertaking stands in direct opposition to the policy which was expressed in the partition of poland. russia's future _rôle_ may be to favour a confederation of all the sclav peoples. her true mission cannot be to subdue or trample down any sclav nationality, but much rather to emancipate them all. emancipate from what? from the yoke of turkey and of germany. so far as the former is concerned, a great part of the work has been already carried out. with regard to the germans, russia cannot think of the restoration of the disputed and long obliterated boundaries of the sclav races, which were lost in the struggle with the germans; but she may assist the organization of the bodies politic of the sclav races, and co-operate in revivifying those branches of the nation which are not altogether dead. the author desires, therefore, that poland should be restored by russia's own act. yet poland must not demand her boundaries as they were before (that is, the possession of lithuania). once admitted into a sclav confederation, she would cease to be a menace to any one, but would serve as a bulwark between russia and germany. the solution of the sclav question might, according to the author's idea, bring with it the dismemberment of the austrian empire. the german part would go to germany, and trieste and south tyrol fall to italy. austria's sclav provinces would be acknowledged as independent, and either unite themselves with the sclav federation on the balkan peninsula, or form a separate state. the situation in bohemia would be the most difficult to arrange, since in part it is a german-speaking country; but as a sclav land, it ought under no circumstances to be entirely given over to the germans. hungary also would obtain its independence, but must, on its own part, recognise the freedom of croatia. the inhabitants of the various portions of the austrian empire would themselves have to decide their fate, and in the interests of all, a european congress should be summoned, to maintain the general peace, and to prevent one nationality from subjecting or swallowing up another. but while professor kamarowski here and elsewhere in his treatise speaks of congresses, he does not mean thereby the meetings of diplomatists to which that name now applies. congresses ought, he says, to be actual international organs, whose object is not to serve the fluctuating and conflicting interests of policy, but the strict principles of justice. they must be permanent institutions, and being so, help on international reforms, such as a gradual disarmament and a codification of international law; that is, a correct digest of the various regulations and principles of international law, forming a common law for all civilized nations. in the last named direction there is in the field already the association for the reform and codification of international law, founded at brussels, oct. th, , and in an important degree consisting of the most eminent jurists of the nations. this association, which meets annually for the discussion of international law in various parts of europe, deals also with the scholarly inquiry into the continually growing material, springing from the many international congresses, which so often now, with various objects, meet first in one part then in another of the civilized world. as examples of some of the most recent of these may be named: the post and telegraph conferences; the conference on maritime law in washington, representing twenty-one separate states, with the purpose of working out a universal system of signals for preventing collisions; the african conference at brussels, with representatives of most of the european powers for considering the best way of civilizing africa, getting rid of the slave trade, and limiting the exportation of alcohol;[ ] the railway meeting at lugano, for introducing a uniform time table and scale of freight, on all railways of the european continent; the madrid conference, for international protection of industrial property, and above all the labour congress held at berlin by william ii.'s invitation. whilst in this way the nations' own desire and the needs of the case grow and branch into great common interests, the friends of peace unceasingly set before themselves this distinct goal, "right before might." to paint the historic background of the activity of the friends of peace would be almost synonymous with bringing forward all that is uniting, important and lasting in the history of the nations. it would be a "saga" on the welfare of the human race through all time. such a task i do not undertake. i give only a short indication of what, in our own time, organized peace-work is. its activity was almost a result of the wars of napoleon, which were terminated by the peace of paris, november, . these wars had deeply stirred the minds of many, both in the old and new world, and directed their thoughts to the apathy of the christian churches in not proclaiming, with unmistakable emphasis, that war is irreconcilable with the teaching of christ. this view was represented in america by dr. w. ellery channing, and dr. noah worcester, who as early as stirred up the friends of peace to organize themselves into united work. a peace society was formed in new york in august, ; and in november of the same year the ohio peace society. the massachusetts peace association (boston) started in january, , and a similar society was begun in rhode and maine in . these, with that of south carolina, united in , and formed the american peace society, an association which is still in active operation. also in philadelphia an association was formed, which was succeeded in by the universal peace union. in a zealous philanthropist, mr. william allen, a member of the society of friends, invited a number of persons to his house in _london_ to form a peace association. they did not at once agree upon the best method, and the proposal was deferred for a time. but after the conclusion of peace was signed in , mr. allen, with the assistance of his friend mr. joseph tregelles price, also a member of the society of friends, called his friends together again, and succeeded in bringing into existence the english peace association, under the name of the peace society. the source from which the association sprang is to be found in the society of friends (quakers), that sect which has always been a faithful proclaimer of the peace principles of christianity. but the founders were not all of this society. some were members of the church of england and of other religious persuasions. as the foundation of its effort, the association advanced the great principle that war is contrary to the spirit of christianity and to the true interests of mankind. it has always been open to persons of all persuasions. one of its first stipulations was, that "the society shall consist of all ranks of society who will unite in forwarding peace on earth and goodwill amongst men." the association has always been international. from its commencement it proclaimed its desire to bring other nations as far as possible within the reach of its operations. some of the first acts of the founders were to translate its most important writings into french, german, spanish and italian. immediately after, in , mr. j.t. price, the most zealous amongst the founders, undertook a journey to _france_ to gain adhesion and co-operation amongst christians and philanthropists in that country. many hindrances lay in the way of forming an association in that country which should have peace only for its object. these difficulties were overcome by founding a society of christian morals (_la société de morale chrétienne_), whose aim was to bring the teaching of christianity to bear upon the social question. this society continued for more than a quarter of a century and numbered amongst its members many illustrious frenchmen. its first president was the duke of rochefoucauld-liancourt; its vice-president was the marquis of the same name, the son of the above. amongst the members were benjamin constant, the duke of broglie, de lamartine, guizot, carnot, and duchatel. the promotion of peace was one of the objects of the society. a branch of it was formed in _geneva_, under the leadership of count sellon, and the english parent society stood in close and lively connection with both these associations. it had for many years in its service an active man, stephen rigaud, who travelled through france, belgium, germany and holland, held meetings, distributed tracts, and formed committees and associations in furtherance of peace. between the years and a still greater aggressive peace movement was set on foot upon the european continent, by means of congresses held at brussels, paris and frankfort, and by the attendance of many hundred delegates from all the countries of europe. this effort for peace was entered upon by the secretary, mr. henry richard. at least twenty times he visited the continent, speaking for peace and arbitration in many, if not most, of the largest cities--paris, berlin, vienna, pesth, dresden, leipsic, munich, frankfort, brussels, antwerp, bremen, cologne, the hague, amsterdam, genoa, rome, florence, venice, milan, turin, etc. these efforts bore good fruit. the friends of peace began to stir. peace societies were formed, devoted attachments were made, and personal intercourse created between the adherents of peace principles in various lands. this was especially the case in france, where _la ligue internationale de la paix_ was founded by m. frédéric passy. in the name of the league was changed to the _société française des amis de la paix_. this name it retained until its amalgamation with the _comité de paris de la fédération internationale de l'arbitrage et de la paix_, founded by mr. hodgson pratt in . the new society, formed of the union of the two, bears the name of the _société française de l'arbitrage entre nations_. the _ligue internationale de la paix el de la liberté_ was founded at geneva by m. charles lemonnier as far back as . under the powerful leadership of this aged captain of peace the league has, by its activity in promoting the idea of the "united states of europe," constantly sought to work in a practical way for its object,--peace and freedom. the same year, too, were founded the _ligue du désarmement_ and the _union de la paix_, at havre. but the most remarkable occurrence in this domain was the spontaneous interchange of addresses and greetings between workmen in france and germany, which led to the formation, in biebrich on the rhine, of an association of german and french workingmen. as a result of a visit from mr. richard three years later, there was founded at the hague, sept. th, , "the dutch peace society," by mr. van eck and others. later in the same year ten similar associations sprang up in the hague, amsterdam, zwolle, groningen and other places. one of these, the "women's peace society," in amsterdam, under the leadership of miss bergendahl, deserves to be named, on account of its advanced character. in this union took the name of the "_peace society's national union for holland_," and in of the "peace league of the netherlands." its present name is the "_universal peace association for the netherlands_" (_algemeen nederlandsch vredesbond_). for seventeen years mr. geo. belinfante as the indefatigable secretary of this union. he died in , and was succeeded by m.c. bake, of the hague. in the belgian association was formed at brussels, and at the same time a local association at verviers. later on, april th, , was founded the belgian branch of the international arbitration and peace association (_federation internationale de l'arbitrage et de la paix, section belge_), under the leadership of m.e. de laveleye. the english parent society has, in the course of three-quarters of a century, employed every means that can serve to advance a public cause. by lectures and public meetings; by the distribution of literature and a diligent use of the press; by appeals to the peoples; petitions to the governments; resolutions in parliament; by adapting themselves to sunday and other schools, by influencing the religious community, the clergy and teachers; by combinations and interviews with peace friends in all lands--by all practicable means it has sought to work towards its goal. first and foremost, it has advocated arbitration as a substitute for war, laboured for the final establishment of an international law, and a tribunal for the nations, and for a gradual reduction of standing armies; at the same time it has never ceased to raise its voice against the wars in which england and other nations have engaged. at a universal international peace congress, held in london under the auspices of the society in , it was resolved to send an address "to the governments of the civilized world," whereby they should be earnestly conjured to consider the principle of arbitration, and to recognise it. this address was sent to forty-five governments. by a deputation to the powers at the paris congress in , this society succeeded, as before said, in getting the principle of arbitration recognised, etc. from the commencement, the english and american peace societies have worked side by side with brotherly concord. there are over forty peace societies in america. besides these already named--viz., the _american peace society_, and the _universal peace union_--the following are most important: _the christian arbitration and peace society_, philadelphia; _the national arbitration league_, washington; _the american friends' peace society_, for indiana and ohio, founded december , ; and _the international code committee_, new york, of which david dudley field is president. on the th of july, , the english workmen's peace association, now called the international arbitration league, was founded by members of the "reform league," a great union of workmen in london. two years later this arbitration league, under mr. w. r. cremer's powerful leadership, had well-appointed local associations all over the country, and nearly a hundred zealous leaders in various towns. since then mr. cremer has become a member of parliament, and as such has had the opportunity of helping the peace cause in many ways; for example, as a zealous participant in the deputation of twelve to the president of the united states, which has been mentioned more particularly in the beginning of this work. in april, , was formed the women's auxiliary of the peace society. this continued to work in connection with the english parent society until , when a division took place. part of the members gathered themselves into an auxiliary, now called the local peace association auxiliary of the peace society, which has thirty-three sub-associations in england only. the other part formed the women's peace and arbitration association.[ ] at the same time great progress was made upon the continent. in italy a league of peace and brotherhood was founded as early as , by signor e.t. moneta. a workmen's peace association was formed at paris in , by m. desmoulins and others, under the name of the _société des travailleurs de la paix_. at the close of , the danish peace society, or "society for the neutralization of denmark," was founded in copenhagen, with fredrik bajer, m.p., as chairman, and twenty-five local associations in denmark.[ ] there is also at copenhagen a "women's progress society," which, with mrs. bajer as president, placed the cause of peace prominently upon its programme. at a meeting of members of the riksdag, in the spring of , a swedish peace society was formed, which has for its object to co-operate with the _international arbitration and peace association_ of great britain and ireland, in working for the preservation of peace among nations, and the establishment of an international tribunal of arbitration, under the mutual protection of the states, to which disputes that may arise may be referred. the first chairman of the society was s.a. hedlund, who has long laboured in sweden for the spread of information as to the efforts of the friends of peace. the same year a norwegian peace society was formed, which, however, like the swedish sister association, has been apparently only dead-alive of late. this is the result, certainly in great degree, of the slender interest taken by the cultivated classes, who in general pose as either indifferent or antagonistic to peace work; indifferent, because, in ignorance of the subject, they look upon organized peace effort as fanciful and fruitless; antagonistic, because they see in these efforts a hindrance to getting the national defence strengthened by increased military forces. as regards norway, there are, however, signs that a different view of things has lately begun to make itself felt.[ ] in france the peace societies received strength in , through the foundation by m. godin of the _société de paix et d' arbitrage international du familistère de guise_ (aisne), godin's activity has embraced not less than forty-two departments in france. besides these may be named the _société d'aide fraternelle et d'etudes sociales_, the _société de paix par l'education_ at paris, the _groupe des amis de la paix à clermont-ferrand_, _la fraternité universelle_ grammond, canton de st. galmier (loire), and the _association des jeunes amis de la paix_, nîmes. the international arbitration and peace association for great britain and ireland was founded in .[ ] this association, with which the scandinavian society should co-operate the most closely, has a worthy chairman in mr. hodgson pratt, a man whose devoted and untiring zeal has made him a distinguished leader of the peace movement, to which he has dedicated the whole business of his life. his sphere of action has also included the continent, and borne good fruit. amongst others he succeeded in instituting peace societies at darmstadt, stuttgart and frankfort; a committee of the association at budapest; and in rome, the _associazione per l'arbitrato e la pace tra le nazione_, with ruggiero bonghi as president; and also in milan, the _unione lombarda per la pace e l'arbitrato internazionale_. in the course of the last three years, - , the idea of peace has made great progress in italy. the movement has not been confined to any special class of society, or to any particular political or religious party, but has spread alike amongst all. in the autumn of the central committee of the _italian league of peace and liberty_ sent out a leaflet, with a protest against any war with france. the central committee, which numbers amongst its members, senators, deputies, and many of garibaldi's former companions in arms, declares: "the league requires all italians, young and old, women and men, philosophers, tradesmen and working men, to unite all their energies in the great work of peace; that there may be an end of armaments, which are a positive ruin to all nations." in the course of several important peace congresses were held. in milan, such a congress met for the first time, january th, representing associations in france, italy, and spain and for the second time, april th, when fifty-four italian societies were represented. eight days after the first milan meeting, a similar one took place in naples, attended by , persons, which expressed the united views of five hundred associations. lastly, a congress was held in rome, may - , which represented thirty-nine peace associations, the ex-minister bonghi in the chair. the meeting expressed the desire that governments would find means to diminish the war burdens by international agreements similar to those by which economic and scientific matters are already arranged, as well as questions dealing with general sanitary concerns. a committee, consisting of six senators and deputies, was afterwards chosen for further work in the cause of peace. a specially noteworthy feature in these italian peace congresses is the deep repugnance to the triple alliance--which is regarded as a standing menace of war,--and a strong craving for good relations with france. the way to this lies through increased peaceful connection. this was especially manifest in the meeting at rome, which had to prepare for the participation of italians in the peace congress at paris in the summer of . the congresses of formed part of the great commemoration of the revolution; that meeting of international fraternity which, in the words of president carnot in his opening, speech, "shall hasten the time when the resources of the nations, and the labour of mankind, shall be dedicated only to the works of peace." one of these gatherings, the universal peace congress, june - , which was composed of delegates from the peace societies of europe and america, had, amongst other vocations, to express itself on certain general principles for carrying forward the idea of arbitration. it specially maintained and emphasized that the principle of arbitration ought to form a part of fundamental law in the constitution of every state.[ ] before the meeting closed, it was decided that the next universal congress should be held in london in . the other assembly, an interparliamentary conference (june - ), composed exclusively of legislators from many lands, was entitled to express itself more definitely on the adoption of actual measures; notably, on the best means of bringing about arbitration treaties between certain states and groups of states. with this interparliamentary conference, this international parliamentary meeting, we come to the beginning of a new and exalted organization, forming almost a powerful prelude to co-operation between england, america and france, such as i spoke of in the commencement of this book. after the emissaries of the members of the legislature had in the autumn of fulfilled their mission to america, and had started an active movement there which has since spread over the whole american continent, english and french representatives of the people met in paris, october st, , and decided on behalf of many hundreds of their absent associates that a meeting of members of as many parliaments as possible should take place during the universal exposition in . this resolution was carried into effect. on june th about one hundred parliamentary representatives assembled in paris from belgium, denmark, england, france, hungary, italy, liberia, the united states and spain. nearly four hundred members of various parliaments had given their adhesion to the design of the meeting. jules simon opened the proceedings. many important resolutions were passed, with a view to practically carrying into effect the principle of arbitration. after this it was arranged that a similar assembly should meet annually in one or other of the capital cities of the countries in sympathy; in , in london; and lastly, a committee of forty was chosen, composed, according to resolution, of six members of every nationality, which should undertake the preparation of the next conference, send out the invitations, collect the necessary contributions, and in the interim do all in their power to remove the misunderstandings which might possibly arise, when it appealed, as it would be needful to do, to public opinion. pursuant to the invitation of this committee, the second international assembly of members of parliament met in london, july - , . in consequence of the second universal peace congress, the central gathering of the peace societies, being held only a short time previously (july - ), a large number of influential men attended this international meeting of legislators; but whilst amongst those who took part in the first named conference, the universal peace congress, were a fair number of m.p.s of various countries, yet (with few exceptions) all those who took part in the interparliamentary meeting were members of one or other national legislative assembly. the second interparliamentary conference, in london, , had double the attendance of the first, in paris, members from austria, belgium, denmark, england, france, germany, holland, hungary, italy, norway, spain and sweden; besides which, more than a thousand representatives of the people, who were prevented attending, signified by letter their adhesion. amongst these were gladstone, clemenceau, the vice-president of the german reichstag, baumbach, the italian prime minister crispi, andrassy, and three french ministers. ninety-four italian senators and deputies, and thirty-one members of the spanish cortes, in their respective addresses, expressed their sympathy with the work of the conference. the ex-lord chancellor, lord herschell, acted as chairman. the most important resolution of the meeting was, that all civilized governments were urged to refer all disputes in which they might be involved to arbitration for solution. those present bound themselves to work to the best of their ability for the object, especially through the press and in the national assembly of their own lands, and thus gradually win public opinion over to the cause. as a first step towards practically settling international disputes by arbitration, the conference urged that in all treaties affecting trade, literature, or other arrangements, a special arbitral clause should be inserted. amongst other resolutions it was voted, that a parliamentary committee should be created in each country for mutual consultation on international matters. lastly, a standing interparliamentary committee of thirty members was chosen, to serve as a connecting link in the interval between the conferences. the third interparliamentary conference will meet in rome in . in the fact that these conferences are composed of legislators chosen by the people lies their peculiar significance. they speak with power, because they are supported by millions of electors in various lands. the weight of their utterances naturally increases in the proportion in which the number of members grows. as yet this parliament of the peoples represents only a minority of the national assemblies; but the day may be coming when it will express the opinion of the majority, and that would be the triumph of right over might. * * * * * in the effort to reach this goal there must be no settling into stagnation. the peace societies especially must work with all their might to get friends of peace into parliament, and subscribe to enable them to take part in the interparliamentary meetings. it would, of course, be still better if the means for their attendance were supplied by a public grant. here the norwegian storting has set an example which will be to its honour for all time; for after about sixty members had joined the interparliamentary union, and chosen messrs. ullmann, horst and lund as representatives to the conference in london, ; and after the arbitration resolution moved had been adopted by the storting (voted july nd, , by eighty votes against twenty-nine), a subsidy of , kroner was granted for the travelling expenses of the three delegates to, the london conference. this is probably the first time in the life of the nations that a state has granted money in support of a direct effort to make a breach in the old system of cain. there is less strain in america: a similar inception seems to be at hand. long before the great rousing in , the present united states minister, james g. blaine, was possessed with the idea of bringing about a peace-treaty between all the independent states of north and south america. he stood at the head of the foreign department of the union when general garfield was president, , and already at that time entertained this grand idea. he desired, in order to realize it, to invite all the american states, by means of government emissaries, to take part in an international congress at washington. in the interim garfield died, and when arthur became president, blaine ceased to be minister of foreign affairs; but as soon as, upon harrison being chosen to the presidency, he became foreign minister again, he resumed the interrupted work. in june, , the president confirmed a resolution adopted by congress, empowering him to invite all the american states to a conference composed of emissaries from their governments, with the view of establishing a tribunal of arbitration for settling differences that may arise between them; and for establishing by commercial treaties more facile trade combinations, adapted to the needs of the various states, and their productive and economic well-being. the invitations were issued, and met with approval by all the independent states throughout america. the representatives of these states met at washington, oct. st, , in a deliberative assembly, which was styled the pan-american conference. mr. blaine was voted to the chair, and under his leading the members of the congress decided to begin with a circular tour of forty days through the whole of the states of the union. its labours were afterwards continued until april th, . the results of the conference as regards the common interests of trade and commerce, etc., will only be felt gradually, since many of these matters are of intricate character, and in some instances require entirely fresh international transactions. but as regards the chief thing--viz., the establishment of a permanent tribunal of arbitration--the object was achieved. congress almost unanimously[ ] adopted the resolution of the report of the committee respecting the election of such a supreme judicial authority in case of any menacing international disagreement. the members of the conference were not authorized to conclude binding treaties. their task was confined to deliberating upon affairs which might have a reciprocal interest in various countries, and then laying before their governments such resolutions as in the opinion of the conference might best promote the well-being of all the states. nevertheless the majority of the states later bound themselves to the conclusions of the congress. indeed, a week before the assembly broke up the respective members for brazil, bolivia, columbia, equador, guatemala, hayti, honduras, nicaragua and salvador, were empowered to sign at washington the arbitration-treaty adopted by the pan-american conference; and the other governments have since in the same way sanctioned it.[ ] when this document has been fully confirmed, a quarter of the inhabited world will be rendered inviolate, and millions of men set free from the chronic frenzy of war. if minor breaches of the peace possibly may not thereby be for ever prevented, yet certainly the irresponsible system of violence will become powerless against the force of civilization which is spreading over the whole western hemisphere. footnotes: [footnote : as an adherent of the conservative party, he has always held to a strong armed force, and hardly ever supported peace efforts.] [footnote : that he does not take in the scandinavian peninsula, must be because he regards the position of the northern kingdoms as too remote from the continental quarrels to be sensibly disturbed by them; or because he has not a high opinion of the fitness of their military forces for attack, which is here alluded to.] [footnote : according to the proposal of an old diplomatist, the sultan should be given a similar position in constantinople to that of the pope, now, in rome. thereby the sultan would become innocuous to europe, but continue to be the "ruler of the faithful" to asia. ("la question d'orient devant l'europe democratique." paris: e. dentu, _libraire_, ).] [footnote : in the united states congress, mr. blaine has introduced a bill for calling an international conference in washington, in , for making an alliance, whose object is the suppression of slavery and the prohibition of alcohol in uncivilized countries. the conference is further to discuss the creation of a tribunal of arbitration, for the solution of international questions, and a general disarmament.] [footnote : since amalgamated with the women's committee of the international arbitration and peace association.] [footnote : for the objects of this association see appendix.] [footnote : "on august th, , at a meeting at seljord, a new norwegian peace association was formed, and a provisional committee appointed." trans.] [footnote : for programme of the association see appendix.] [footnote : this principle is likely to be realized by the bill of the constitution of the brazilian republic, sanctioned by the executive of the new free state, which proclaims that the government may not begin a war without having first appealed to arbitration.] [footnote : the scruples entertained by chili, argentina and mexico appear to have been dropped, in the case at least of the two last named.] [footnote : for provisions of this treaty see appendix.] the prospects. the events which i have here described will perhaps one day be regarded as the transition into a new era. but specially here, in the old world, with its many unsettled accounts, we cannot rely upon bright pictures of the future. we are convinced of nothing beyond the range of our own knowledge and experience. i have thought so myself, and therefore i have endeavoured to keep to facts which no one can deny. it is a fact that wars continually diminish in proportion as peoples are brought nearer to one another by trade and commerce. the old warlike condition has ceased. formerly not a year passed without war in europe--in the middle ages hardly a week. after an international peace reigned over most of the european states for forty years. in the scandinavian peninsula that peace is continuing still. before that time, at least until , sweden was almost continually involved in war. we reckon two hundred and sixty years of war to the kalmar union, and the proneness to invade and defend the countries on the other side the baltic. the old causes of war are being removed. certainly new ones arise as a result of selfish patriotism, breaking out in new acts of violence. but these outbreaks of barbarism become continually more rare. unhappily, they are so much the more horrible when they do occur, but yet much more transitory. this is applicable to all the great wars in the last half of the present century. no thirty years' war is known now. in consequence of the shorter flow of blood the wounds get time to heal, and the divided interests are allowed to grow together again. the levers of civilization are again in motion; commerce spreads over land and sea by steam, electricity, and other motive powers. the victories of alexander and napoleon are cast into the shade by the triumphal procession of the tiny postage stamp around the world. trade and industry, art and science, efforts in the direction of universal morality and enlightenment, all branch out and weave around the nations a boundless web of common interests, which, though at certain intervals violently torn asunder by brute force, grows together again with increased strength and in broader compass; until one day, under the majesty of law, it will form an irresistible civilizing power. this is what in reality is taking place. men do not in general see it; and this, because they busy themselves so much with warlike notions, and trouble themselves so little about events of the character that i have dwelt upon in the foregoing pages. * * * * * the friends of peace ought to stimulate one another, especially when there is gloom over the great world, and no one knows whence the approaching calamity may spring. once it was warded off from our land by a wise measure of one of our kings. i refer to oscar i., when he saved us from being embroiled in the chances of war, by drawing up a declaration of neutrality in , which was approved by the united powers, and earned for him the homage and gratitude of the swedish riksdag, in an address which lauded him as one of the wisest and noblest of kings.[ ] but there is little security that the same expedient will always lead to a like successful result, if people wait till war is at the door before setting to work. in time of peace, and during the specially good relations which obtain between the two english-speaking nations, as well as between france and america, our fellow-workers on both sides the atlantic are making use of the favourable opportunity for trying to get this good relation established by law. it may well be asked why we, who are friendly with the whole world, should not be able to do the same, not only with respect to siam, but also first and foremost with our near neighbours. it was this thought which led to the arbitration resolution in , in the storting and in the riksdag. at the first meeting of the left (liberals) of the storting, feb. th, the subject was discussed and gained unanimous adhesion. whereupon followed the resolution in the storting on the st, which was adopted by a large majority, march th, after the minister of state (stang) had delivered a long speech against the resolution in vain. after this successful result, a similar resolution for sweden was brought into the first chamber by f.t. borg, and in the second by j. andersson. the reports of the committees upon it ran diversely. the committee of the first chamber opposed, and that of the second chamber approved, the resolution. on may th the question was thrown out in both chambers.[ ] mr. borg spoke with dignity for his resolution in a long speech. this was answered by the chairman of the committee, with a reminder of the perverse condition of the world and of the human race. the resolution contained a "meaningless expression of opinion." it was a real danger for small nations to go to sleep, hoping and believing in a lasting peace. it was now just as in the olden times: those who loved peace and would preserve it "must prepare for war." the speaker had, as chairman of the committee, expressed sympathy with the resolution, but he added, "one does not get far with paper and words; and, according to my opinion, the honourable mover of the resolution will certainly show more love for peace if he, next year, on coming back with this peace business, will set about it with a proposition for some ironclads and artillery regiments or such like things, of more effectual service than the platonic love which he has expressed; and i venture to predict that both the committee and the chamber will support him more powerfully than to-day." after another distinguished genius had expressed himself in the same well-known fashion, wherein proofs were conspicuous by their absence, and the narrow circle of thought was filled with scorn and slighting talk about "pious notions," etc., the high chamber threw out the bill by fifty-six votes against four. in the second chamber the debate was opened by the foreign minister with a speech which clearly enough justifies the "memorial diplomatique" where it points to the necessity of the study of the arbitration-system having a high place amongst the requirements made of those who enter the path of diplomacy;--a thing that they have actually begun seriously to set before themselves in england. in full accord with the evidence brought forward above, the judicial professor of the chamber declared in short that the chamber would disgrace itself by adopting the resolution before it. after the mover of the resolution and some who shared his views had expressed their hope that the chamber would not fall back from the position it took in upon this question, a speaker rose who requires to be met, herr a. hedin. he began with the assertion that if a refusal of the report of the committee would show that the chamber had now changed its opinion, they had before them sufficient reason for this. he wondered that a resolution of such a nature as this had been brought forward, so soon after the unpleasant experience which the country and people of sweden lately had in a so-called decision by arbitration. "the chamber will please to remember," continued the speaker, "that the king, with no authority from the riksdag, agreed with spain to appeal to arbitration upon the difficulties that had arisen on the right understanding of the prolonged commercial treaty with spain. also the chamber will please to remember that this arbitration tribunal neither acted upon the plan settled in the agreement, nor did it act in harmony with the instructions of the treaty; and what was worse, the so-called, or supposed, sentence which this one-man arbitration tribunal passed did not concern the matter, which according to the agreement was to have been settled by arbitration, but quite another, which could not reasonably be subjected to arbitration--though the matter was, so far as we were legally concerned, made to appear as though sweden had received an injustice in the principal matter which should have been tried by arbitration, but which was not--a circumstance which, with the spanish authorities, has greatly weakened the position in law due to swedish citizens, whose rights have been violated in so unprecedented a manner by the mode of procedure in consequence of which arbitration was appealed to." all this had truth in it. but does that prove anything against the usefulness of arbitration clauses in treaties of commerce? the agreement referred to between the united kingdoms and spain, january th, , establishes:-- "a question which affects customs or the carrying out of commercial treaties, or relates to results of some special violation of the same, shall, when all attempts to come to an amicable agreement and all friendly discussions have proved fruitless, be referred to an arbitration tribunal, whose decision shall be binding on both parties." according to this it may be plainly seen, that the well-known swedo-spanish spirit-dispute, to which mr. hedin alluded, ought to have been solved in its entirety by arbitration. the spanish government, however, maintained that this affected spanish internal concerns, since in fact the forced sale of karlstamms-volagets brandy stores in spain took place as a result of a new spirit law, to which the arbitration clause in this case could not be applied. this starting-point for the judgment of the whole dispute was accepted by the swedish government; which also agreed to let an arbitrator settle whether the question of the spirit tax was independent of the treaty or not. both governments agreed to choose the portuguese ex-foreign minister, count de casal riberio, as arbitrator, and he expressed himself in favour of the spanish construction. and with this the whole matter was settled. no one can seriously think that the method of procedure on the swedish side, which led to so distressing a violation of justice as that referred to by herr hedin, could prove anything against the principle of arbitration. on the other hand, it appears to betray the character of the statesmanship of our then foreign minister; which indeed earned for him a diamond-set snuffbox from the emperor william ii., but otherwise, the blame only of sensible people. herr hedin, who has a weakness for strong expressions, had the opportunity of using some such in their right place. unhappily, this cannot be said with truth of the closing words of his speech, where he remarks that the expressions of the foreign minister are so decisive against the bill that they deal the report of the committee of the second chamber a right deadly blow. the committee had proposed that the king, with the authority which § in the form of government accords him, should seek to bring about such agreements with foreign powers, that future possible differences between the powers named and sweden should be settled by arbitration. the deadly blow must be the remark of the foreign minister that questions affecting the _existence and independence of nations_ must be excepted from decisions by arbitration. this principle is known to be universally accepted, and in no way stands in antagonism to the report of the committee, which of course left the hands of the king as free as possible to promote the idea of arbitration according to circumstances. however, the report of the committee was thrown out by eighty-eight votes against eighty-three. herr hedin got his way. he has always been the consistent opposer of the active friends of peace; and this time he has besides won the gratitude even of our government organ, _nya dagligt allehanda_, which calls his speech glittering; meaning that upon this resolution "there was no need to waste many words," and continues thus:-- "the resolution is worthy of notice, because it shows the return of the chamber to a sounder perception of this question. it seems at last to recognise the extravagance of the expectation certain fanatics entertain of bringing about a lasting peace by so apparently simple a means as a tribunal of arbitration. we have indeed, as herr hedin reminded us, now had experience ourselves of how unsatisfactory this can be; and it certainly appears that they must be lacking in common sense who would question the justice of the foreign minister's reminder, that arbitration cannot be appealed to when a nation's political freedom or independence is touched by the issue." i may here beg leave to calm the ruffled feelings of the honourable government organ by bringing to remembrance the lesson, otherwise applicable also, which our dismembered sister-land on the other side of the sound offers us. at the london conference in , the representative of england, lord russell, referred to the decision arrived at by the paris congress in , that states which had any serious dispute should appeal to the mediation of a friendly power before taking to arms. in harmony with this the british plenipotentiary proposed that the question, whether the boundary line should be drawn between the lines of aabenraa-toender, on the one side, or dannewerke-sli on the other, should be decided by arbitration. prussia and austria consented to accept the mediation of a neutral power; but denmark replied to the proposition with a distinct refusal. in the same way denmark refused the proposal made first by prussia, and later by france, that a means of deciding the boundary should be sought in a plebiscite of the people in sleswick. _denmark trusted too much upon might and too little upon right. otherwise sleswick had still been danish._ if the axiom be correct, that disputes which affect the existence and independence of nations ought not to be submitted for solution to arbitration, it is of so much the greater moment to try to get international complications settled in this way, because they may swell up into questions of the kind first named; since in any case this means could be adopted as a last resource in time of need. history knows of no example of the destruction of a free nation by the impartial judgment of arbitration. * * * * * now it may well appear honourable on the part of the free nations of the scandinavian peninsula that they should openly show to the whole world that they are prepared (in full harmony with king oscar ii.'s pacific expressions in the speech from the throne to the riksdag and the storting in ), for their own part, in all international circumstances to substitute justice for brute force, and this without compromising and meaningless limitations. in the swedish arbitration resolution, as well as in the norse, lies the road certainly to efficiently carrying out the neutral policy so strongly emphasized in the speech from the throne. besides the public gain, which a favourable result in both chambers would have been, a unanimous co-operation in this cause would in a great degree have facilitated the solving of the important question of the union (unionelle tvistemaal). the last named consideration will indeed claim more attention as the consequences of the divergent decisions of the storting and the riksdag develop themselves. that these consequences will be scattering, rather than uniting, the friends of peace in both lands must keep in view; and must look out, in time, for means to soothe them, as long as they continue. * * * * * that which lies nearest my heart has been to help, with cheering words, to strengthen the faith of my fellow-workers. if these words have succeeded also, here and there, in scattering doubts, so much the better. little-faith is faint-hearted. without confidence in a cause, there is no action. ignorance may be enlightened, superstition wiped out; intolerance may become tolerant, and hate be changed into love; ideas may be quickened, intelligence widened, and men's hearts may be ennobled; but from _pessimism_ which can see nothing but gloomy visions nothing is to be expected. this offspring of materialism is one of the most powerful opponents which the cause of international law and justice has to encounter. it is only self-deception to conceal the fact that it still reigns in our christian community. these gloomy-sighted people refer us to history, which on every page tells of crime and blood, sorrow and tears. we answer by pointing to the development of civilization, and show how all things slowly grow and ripen, whether in human life or in the world of nature. human perfection does not provide for an individual being a law-abiding member of a human community, and exclude a community from being a law-abiding member of an alliance of states. the abolition of war therefore in no way pre-supposes universal righteousness, but only a certain degree of moral cultivation. but that this perfection is not attained to cannot be any rational objection _against_ striving after the perfect. discontent with imperfection ought much rather to goad us on to work for what is better. now, war is not something imperfect only: it is a summing up of all human depravity--a condition which we might expect all enlightened men and women would turn against with combined energies. that this does not take place is an evidence that the enlightenment is not so great among so-called cultivated people. the dazzling external show of war conceals from many its inner reality. this applies not only to the horrors of the battle-field and their ghastly accompaniments. fancy's wildest pictures of the infernal abyss are nothing to the descriptions eye-witnesses give of this veritable hell. tolstoï's pen and veretschagin's pencil give us an idea of it.[ ] from this misery spring untold sufferings for thousands upon thousands of innocent victims; and, besides, it remains to be a flowing source of fresh calamities. the armed peace is a similar calamity, which threatens european civilization with complete overthrow. we have got so far in the general race in the science of armaments that the yearly outlay in europe for military purposes, including the interest of national debts, is reckoned as about twelve milliards of kroner,[ ] millions sterling, which of course must imply a corresponding limitation of productive labour. in time of peace the european armies are reckoned at four millions of men. in time of war this can grow to nineteen millions; and in a few years when, as intended, the new conscription law comes into full effect, to something like thirty millions.[ ] war, the personification of all human depravity, desolates the progressive work of culture, and the armed peace which ruins the nations prepares new wars and augments the misery. ignorance, war, and poverty follow one another in an unvarying circle. by the side of this wild race for armaments goes on a terrible struggle for existence, and discontent reigns in all lands. this condition of things, which fills the world with unrest and fear, must in the near future have an end. it will either come in the form of a social revolution, which will embrace the whole of our continent, or it may come by the introduction of an established condition of international law. it is the last named outcome that active friends of peace labour for. they strive to enlighten the nations as to the means of removing and preventing these calamities; and they hope that the so-called educated classes will cease to be inactive spectators of these efforts. while they do not feel called upon to oppose the nonsense of folly, they listen respectfully to objections dictated by a sincere patriotism. in that feeling we ought all to be able to join. it depends upon the way in which this is expressed whether we can work together or must go on separate lines. commonly, we commend an action as virtuous when it does not oppose our interests, but brand it as blameworthy when it in some way threatens our position. thus we read, with glad appreciation, the deeds of our own warriors; but our admiration is changed into resentment when the exploits are achieved against ourselves by the heroes of other nations. when one says in sweden, "i am not a russian, indeed"; they say in russia, "you behave yourself like a swede." it needs an independent third party to give an impartial judgment. right must be right. if our so-called enemy is _really_ in the right, he does not become wrong _because_ he is called our enemy; and if we conquer and kill him, we only thereby increase a hundredfold our terrible guilt. it is in the long run a loss to both sides. here, at any rate at least, a _compromise_ is needed, for it is seldom the fault of _one_ when two quarrel. but the endeavour to get a permanent arbitration tribunal established cannot, in any way, be reasonably opposed to efforts for the welfare of one's own country. the very consciousness of the existence of such a tribunal would little by little, as a matter of course, bring about the reign of law. it would indeed be a marvellous perversion of ideas which esteemed it dishonourable to feel bound, in case of disputes with other countries, to appeal to law and justice; inasmuch as this very unwillingness to seek the path of justice must excite a serious suspicion as to the cause you maintain. to lay hold on the sword under the influence of passion is like taking a knife when intoxicated; and it is a crying absurdity to expect people, who soberly know what they are doing, to go to homicide with a light heart. that is to say, that a good man in severe conflict as to his duty, may possibly be forced to do a bad action to escape participation in a still worse. if he forbears to kill his brother, this last will murder his father. when warriors are led out to battle, the brilliant uniform ought to be laid aside, and the troops clad in sombre mourning, which would better accord with the naked reality. when they have slain many and come back in triumph, decorated with honourable cain-badges, they are wont in their homes to point with pride to their brothers who lie silent in their blood. they earn a character for having done something great; they are received with exultation and honourable distinctions, and praised as gods in popular story. but the whole spirit and conception is false if christ's teaching of love is true; and we should long since have grown out of this heathenish religion if there had not been incorporated with it so much patriotism, both true and false--the false wrapped in those high sounding words and phrases of self-love and vanity which still exercise so great a power over the easily excited spirit of the nations. but if we set our thoughts free, confined as they are by warm devotion to our hereditary soil, and now and then venture to look out over the wide world, we shall see points of contact in the progressive effort of humanity; and it is our highest honour to be able to take an active part in this. barriers are crumbling away one after the other. they do not go down with violence; they vanish as new ideas smooth the way for a higher conception of human dignity. inquiry dissipates prejudice, and continually shows us new phases of the inner cohesion of the life of nations. the inhabitants of europe, says draper, show a constantly increasing disposition towards the complete levelling of their mutual dissimilarities. climatic and meteorological differences are more and more dissolved by artificial means and new inventions; and thence arises a similarity, not only in habits of life, but in physical conformation. such inventions soften the influences to which men are subjected, and bring them nearer to an average type. with this greater affinity one to the other in bodily form, follows also a greater similarity in feeling, habit and thought. day by day, too, the economic fellowship of europe increases. communications by ship, railroad, post and telegraph are developed; by means of state loans, share and exchange connections, interests are knit together. therefore we see the bourse, the barometer of economic life, fluctuate when serious rumours of war are afloat; an evidence that common economic interests and war are at variance one with the other. i shall not venture further, but simply indicate in closing that even the differences in language will certainly go on being gradually adjusted. it is a remarkable fact, says the above-named investigator, that in nearly all indo-germanic races, family appellatives, father, mother, sister, brother, daughter, are the same. a similar agreement may be observed in the names of a great number of everyday things, such as house, door, way; but one finds that whilst these observations hold good in respect to the designation of objects of a peaceful character, many of the words which have a military signification are different in the different languages. here lies, perhaps, the germ of a future progressive growth which will rise higher heavenward than the tower of babel. i believe, for my part, that the english language, both on the ground of its cosmopolitan character and of its great expansion, is already on the path of transition into a universal common language. according to mulhall, it has spread since , per cent., whilst german has increased , and french per cent. a hundred years ago, gladstone says, the english tongue was spoken by fifteen millions; it is now spoken by millions; and according to the computation of barham zincke, in another hundred it will be spoken by at least , millions. the computation is probably correct; and then not only in america, but in every part of our globe, the remembrance will be treasured of the little flock of puritans who, ere they landed from their frail _mayflower_ upon the desolate rocks of a strange coast, drew up in that undeveloped language the great social law for their future, which begins with the words, "in the name of god be it enacted." mankind will hold them in remembrance for their faith in a high ideal, these persecuted, weary, sick, and hungry men. for it was that faith which upheld them under continued trials and sufferings, and brought them a victory guiltless of blood, but fraught with blessing to coming generations. even if many of us do not believe in the way those christian heroes believed, yet we may in this materialistic age have strong confidence in the power of good, and so pronounced, that we shall gain something for our cause. in the life of society, however, as in external nature with all its teeming variety, we observe a subserviency to law, which may be taken as the surest pledge of the final triumph of the cause of peace. for my part, i see herein the divine government of the world. and therefore my love for this idea can never be extinguished. footnotes: [footnote : transactions of the riksdag, - , no. . in the introduction to the address to the riksdag the king observed, that he had, in providing for the welfare of the nation, found himself obliged to declare sweden neutral; consequently he informed the riksdag of the declaration of neutrality, respecting which the king said:-- "the system which the king intends steadily to adhere to and employ is a strict neutrality, founded upon sincerity, impartiality, and full regard to the rights of all the powers. this neutrality will entail upon the government of his majesty of sweden and norway the following duties, and secure to it the following benefits: . to hold himself free from any participation in any contentions which directly or indirectly may be advantageous to one and injurious to another of the belligerent states.... "such are the general principles of the neutral position, which his majesty of sweden and norway designs to take in case war should break out in europe. his majesty feels persuaded that it will be accepted as in accordance with international law, and that the exact and impartial observance of these principles will make it possible for his majesty to continue to sustain those connections with friendly and allied powers which his majesty, for his people's weal, so greatly desires to preserve from every infringement." to this communication, satisfactory answers, accepting the decision announced by his majesty, arrived from the various governments in the following words: ... "his majesty has been pleased to announce to the assembled estates of the realm the attainment of this result, so satisfactory for the undisturbed continuance of peaceful transactions and the uninterrupted course of trade and navigation so much the more as on account of the political relations of sweden and norway with foreign powers, they may be regarded as for the present amply secured. his majesty gratefully acknowledges that the patriotism and the reliance upon the paternal designs of his majesty which the estates of the realm have manifested on this occasion may be regarded as having in an important degree contributed to the attainment of the desired object. his majesty, in expressing his sincere satisfaction, will continue to devote incessant pains to all the measures which the maintenance of neutrality may require in harmony with the principles laid down and promulgated by his majesty. with his majesty's royal favour and constant best wishes to the estates of the realm." the address of thanks from the riksdag to the king:-- "after the declaration of neutrality made by your majesty on behalf of the united kingdoms, and in concert with the king of denmark, had been accepted by the european powers and also the united states, it pleased your majesty to inform the estates of the realm of this result, so satisfactory for the undisturbed continuance of our peaceful transactions, and for the uninterrupted course of our trade and navigation. your majesty has at the same time been pleased also to express your gracious appreciation of the patriotism and reliance upon your paternal designs which the estates of the realm have on this occasion manifested. "the representatives of the swedish people hold in grateful remembrance these expressions of your majesty's high satisfaction, and beg respectfully to assure your majesty of their deep and warm gratitude. the fatherland is indebted to your majesty's incessant and unremitting pains in securing the friendly relations of the united kingdoms towards foreign powers during the contests in which a great part of europe is at present embroiled. the estates of the realm offer sincere homage to the resolution and wise forethought with which your majesty, under these troublous conditions, has safeguarded the interests, the independence and power of the united kingdoms. with confidence between the king and the people, with mutual co-operation in working together to promote the true welfare of our beloved fatherland, they will, with the blessing of the highest, be henceforth preserved. the peace we enjoy is the dearer because it is the evidence of the fidelity with which the best interests of the country are guarded by your majesty. ready to follow her noble king in all vicissitudes, the swedish nation implores the blessings of providence upon the vigilant fatherly love whose untiring care for the people's welfare reaps its reward in this answering love. "the estates of the realm, remain," etc.] [footnote : riksdagen protocol, . first chamber, no. ; second chamber, no. .] [footnote : when wellington once, as a victor, went over the field of battle, he burst out with the cry, "there is nothing so disastrous as a victory, except a defeat."] [footnote : that is , , , ; sufficient to furnish the annual pension of a minister of state, , kroner, for every man and woman, old man and suckling in the whole of norway.--ed. of danish edition.] [footnote : five times as many able-bodied men as there are men, women, old men and children in the whole of norway.--do.] appendix. _note on page ._ the association for the neutralization of denmark. the objects of this association are to work for: . securing for denmark a permanent neutrality recognised by europe, like that of belgium or switzerland; . the concluding of arbitration treaties between denmark and other independent states, especially the two northern kingdoms; . the solution by a pacific means of the north sleswick question in accordance with the principle of popular veto. _note on page ._ international arbitration and peace association ( and , outer temple, london, w.c.). objects. among the objects of this association are the following: . to create, educate, and organize public opinion throughout europe in favour of the substitution of arbitration for war. . to promote a better understanding and more friendly feeling between the citizens of different nations. . to correct erroneous statements in the public press or in parliaments on international questions. modes of action. . to establish in the chief cities of europe committees or societies which shall correspond with each other on all matters likely to create disputes, with the view of ascertaining the facts and of suggesting just and practical modes of settlement. . where committees cannot at present be formed, to obtain the services of individuals acting in co-operation for the same purpose. . to form a medium of communication between men of different countries by a journal devoted to these purposes, and to promote international fraternity and co-operation, mutual appreciation and esteem. . to hold periodical conferences and congresses in all parts of europe. . to correspond and work with similar associations and committees in america. what the association has done. it has held two international congresses on the european continent. many visits have been paid to cities in germany, italy, france, switzerland, belgium, austria, and hungary, for the above purpose. in these countries, including america, the association has directly or indirectly corresponded with more than six hundred persons, many of whom are members of parliament, journalists, literary men, professors, merchants, and manufacturers. corresponding committees and societies have been founded by the association in germany, hungary, italy and france; and societies are affiliated in belgium, norway, sweden, denmark, and california. what it desires to do. to complete the "international federation" of peace-makers proposed by the congress held at berne in . to promote the formation of societies belonging to this federation in all parts of europe. to form branches of the association in various parts of england. to publish a foreign edition of the monthly paper, _concord_, in french and german. _note on page ._ the following are the provisions of the treaty agreed to at the pan-american conference. article i.--the republics of north, central, and south america hereby adopt arbitration as a principle of american international law for the settlement of all differences, disputes, or controversies that may arise between them. article ii.--arbitration shall be obligatory in all controversies concerning diplomatic and consular privileges, boundaries, territories, indemnities, the right of navigation, and the validity, construction, and enforcement of treaties. article iii.--arbitration shall be equally obligatory in all cases other than those mentioned in the foregoing article, whatever may be their origin, nature, or occasion; with the single exception mentioned in the next following article. article iv.--the sole questions excepted from the provisions of the preceding article are those which, in the judgment of any one of the nations involved in the controversy, may imperil its independence. in which case, for such nation, arbitration shall be optional; but it shall be obligatory upon the adversary power. article v.--all controversies or differences, with the exception stated in article iv., whether pending or hereafter arising, shall be submitted to arbitration, even though they may have originated in occurrences ante-dating the present treaty. article vi.--no question shall be revived by virtue of this treaty concerning which a definite agreement shall already have been reached. in such cases arbitration shall be resorted to only for the settlement of questions concerning the validity, interpretation, or enforcement of such agreements. article vii.--any government may serve in the capacity of arbitrator which maintains friendly relations with the nation opposed to the one selecting it. the office of arbitrator may also be entrusted to tribunals of justice, to scientific bodies, to public officials, or to private individuals, whether citizens or not of the states selecting them. article viii.--the court of arbitration may consist of one or more persons. if of one person, he shall be selected jointly by the nations concerned. if of several persons, their selection may be jointly made by the nations concerned. should no choice be made, each nation claiming a distinct interest in the question at issue shall have the right to appoint one arbitrator on its own behalf. article ix.--when the court shall consist of an even number of arbitrators, the nations concerned shall appoint an umpire, who shall decide all questions upon which the arbitrators may disagree. if the nations interested fail to agree in the selection of an umpire, such umpire shall be selected by the arbitrators already appointed. article x.--the appointment of an umpire, and his acceptance, shall take place before the arbitrators enter upon the hearing of the question in dispute. article xi.--the umpire shall not act as a member of the court, but his duties and powers shall be limited to the decision of questions upon which the arbitrators shall be unable to agree. article xii.--should any arbitrator, or an umpire, be prevented from serving by reason of death, resignation, or other cause, such arbitrator or umpire shall be replaced by a substitute to be selected in the same manner in which the original arbitrator or umpire shall have been chosen. article xiii.--the court shall hold its sessions at such place as the parties in interest may agree upon, and in case of disagreement or failure to name a place the court itself may determine the location. article xiv.--when the court shall consist of several arbitrators, a majority of the whole number may act notwithstanding the absence or withdrawal of the minority. in such case the majority shall continue in the performance of their duties, until they shall have reached a final determination of the questions submitted for their consideration. article xv.--the decision of a majority of the whole number of arbitrators shall be final both on the main and incidental issues, unless in the agreement to arbitrate it shall have been expressly provided that unanimity is essential. article xvi.--the general expenses of arbitration proceedings shall be paid in equal proportions by the governments that are parties thereto; but expenses incurred by either party in the preparation and prosecution of its case shall be defrayed by it individually. article xvii.--whenever disputes arise the nations involved shall appoint courts of arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the preceding articles. only by the mutual and free consent of all of such nations may those provisions be disregarded, and courts of arbitration appointed under different arrangements. article xviii.--this treaty shall remain in force for twenty years from the date of the exchange of ratifications. after the expiration of that period, it shall continue in operation until one of the contracting parties shall have notified all the others of its desire to terminate it. in the event of such notice the treaty shall continue obligatory upon the party giving it for at least one year thereafter, but the withdrawal of one or more nations shall not invalidate the treaty with respect to the other nations concerned. article xix.--this treaty shall be ratified by all the nations approving it, according to their respective constitutional methods; and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the city of washington on or before the first day of may, a.d. . any other nation may accept this treaty and become a party thereto, by signing a copy thereof and depositing the same with the government of the united states; whereupon the said government shall communicate this fact to the other contracting parties. butler & tanner, the selwood printing works, frome, and london. the human slaughter-house _scenes from the war that is sure to come_ translated from the german of wilhelm lamszus by oakley williams with an introduction, by alfred noyes new york frederick a. stokes company publishers introduction _there is one thing that will certainly be said about this book by some of its readers. it will certainly be said to exaggerate the horrors of modern war; and, just as certainly, that is a thing which this book does not do. it is appallingly reticent; and, for every touch of horror in its pages, the actual records of recent warfare could supply an obscure and blood-stained mass of detail which, if it were once laid before the public, would put an end to militarism in a year. it is not the opponents of militarism who are given over to "cant" and "hypocrisy" and "emotionalism." it is the supporters of militarism who on the eve of a great war go about crying for suppression of facts, censorship of the facts not only of military plans, but of human suffering. for if there is one thing that the military journalist dreads it is the sight and smell of blood. "let us enjoy this pleasant compaign. let us present our readers with a little military music played upon the brass bands of the press. but for god's sake do not waft over europe the smell of iodoform, or of the slaughter-house. man is a fighting animal; let us enjoy the fight. and_--pollice verso!" _unfortunately for these gentlemen, whose good taste is so impeccable that they shrink from the whole truth, man is also a fighting god. 'and the next thing we are going to fight is militarism. there is hardly a great commander in the history of modern warfare who has not described his own profession as "a dirty trade" and war itself as hell. the party of "bad taste" which is going to destroy militarism is not likely to reject the testimony of wellington, grant and napier in favor of the sensational journalist. this book deals chiefly with the physical and mental horrors of war. it presents just that one side of the case; but it must not be forgotten that there are vast battalions of logic and common sense on the same side. from a logical point of view a war between civilized peoples is as insane as it is foul and evil. the pacificists are fighting the noblest battle of the present day. they are not going to win without a struggle; but they will win. and they will win because they have on their side the common good of mankind, common sense, common justice, and common truth._ alfred noyes. contents introduction wilhelm lamszus letter from the congres universel de la paix chapter i mobilization chapter ii soldier chapter iii our father which art in heaven chapter iv the last night chapter v the departure chapter vi like the promise of may chapter vii blood and iron chapter viii the swamp chapter ix the whirling earth epilogue--we poor dead wilhelm lamszus few books of its size--one hundred and eleven pages in the original edition--can perhaps of recent years claim the striking and instantaneous success of wilhelm lamszus's "menschenschlachthaus." in appraising this success, i am less concerned with the number of copies sold (which now, three months after publication, approximates, i believe, one hundred thousand) than with the impression it has left on the mind of its readers in germany and elsewhere on the continent. within a few days of its publication the author awoke to find himself famous--or infamous, according to the point of view adopted--in his own country. the fact that his book has been, or is being, translated into no less than eight european languages is evidence that its appeal is not confined to the conditions of one country, or of a single nationality. its appeal is broad-based. it is addressed to the conscience of civilized humanity, and as was to have been expected, the conscience of the individual has reacted to its stimulus in various ways. the first evidence the author received of the success of his work was drastic. by profession he is a master at one of the great german public schools. he was at once "relieved" of his duties, but has now, i understand, been reinstated. the schoolmaster in germany, it must be borne in mind, is primarily a state official. his most important function is to educate, not only the rising generation of citizens, but the future levies of conscripts. for a schoolmaster to write a book "with a tendency" to strip the pomp and circumstance of war of its traditional glamour--an integral factor in the german educational system--must, in the eyes of the orthodox of the "state-conserving" parties, have savored of an unholy alliance between blasphemy and high treason. the sale of the book was interdicted in the town of its first publication--the "free" city of hamburg. the interdict had the effect of stimulating its sale elsewhere. it challenged a hearing. even the "state-conserving" journals were unable to ignore it entirely. a short time ago, in an open letter addressed to the german press, the author replied to the criticisms and strictures of his professional reviewers. as may be conceived, these criticisms and strictures lacked nothing in virulence or acrimony. "a peril to the public safety," "an hysterical neuropath," "a morbid phantasy," "a socialist-anarchic revolutionary," "a cowardly weakling," "a landless man," "an imported alien draining the marrow of patriotic backbone," may serve as an anthology (for which i am mainly indebted to the _hamburger nachrichten_) of the compliments showered on the author and his work. as this reply discloses what was in the author's mind when he wrote his book, definitely explains its purport and its purpose, it may be worth some consideration. it may serve to differentiate "the human slaughter-house" from the itch of mere literary sensationalism and enable the foreigner to understand the light in which the commission for instruction, education, etc., of the nineteenth universal peace congress at geneva regarded it when last year it wrote officially to congratulate its author on having placed "a weapon of the greatest importance" in the hands of the pacificists. at all times and at all places, lamszus points out, patriotism has been of two kinds. the one sort takes its stand on the public market-place, with its hand on its manly chest, to advertise the public spirit that inflates it. in season and out of season, it never fails to invite the public gaze to dwell on the integrity of its patriotic sentiments. its main strength lies in the spectacular and oratorical. as such it not infrequently deteriorates into the idle sound and fury of junkerdom, chauvinism and jingoism. there is that other type of patriotism that, no less loyal to its own country, believes in the dignity and worth of humanity, that believes in the patriotism of quiet, unadvertised, productive work and in the virtue of a sense of moral responsibility. it is sanguine enough to believe that it may yet be the destiny of a great nation to serve the cause of humanity by eliminating the hideous necessity for war. it finds its highest representative in the patriot of the type of the late emperor frederick the noble, who, himself a soldier proven on the stricken field, found the courage to say, "i hate the business of blood. you have never seen war. if you had ever seen it you would not speak the word unmoved. i have seen it, and i tell you it is a man's highest duty to avoid war if by any means it can be avoided." the issue lamszus raises at the bar of public opinion of the civilized world is whether the patriot of this type must necessarily be either a "neuropath" or a "landless alien," as compared with him of the other sort; whether he be necessarily lacking in civic spirit, virility, and even soldierly virtues. if the matter be of any concern, i gather that the author himself, so far from being physically a weakling, is a trained gymnast (of the type that our representatives will have to take into account at the next olympic games) given to athletic exercises. he has also had sufficient medical training to have passed through a school of comparative anatomy. there are, therefore, no grounds for assuming offhand that he is of the nerveless type that faints at the first sight of blood; yet he writes of war with a shudder that the reader can feel in every line. yet--a contradiction his critics have not been slow to underline--this same man, who abhors the very thought of war, has written to the praise and glorification of war "like a professional panegyrist." while he was writing "the human slaughter-house," he was also engaged in etching some literary silhouettes, embodying the dutch folk-songs, of the revolt of the netherlands. the contrast is so striking that one or two of these "prose poems" may be worth quoting. i a reign of terror has dawned on the netherlands. the netherlands, ever proud of their freedom, are henceforward to be spanish provinces. but the netherlander has no mind for the honor. he cleaves obstinately to his chartered rights and to his nationality. then the duke of alva has come into the country in the emperor's stead. he has brought in his train an army of spanish soldiers, the gallows, and the executioner's axe. he has turned the country into a cemetery. a graveyard stillness reigns over it. for where three men foregather in the streets they smell out conspiracy in their midst. an ill-considered word, and the gallows, lowering in the background, silences the foolish mouth. setting their teeth, the netherlander have to suffer it. the spanish sword reaches the remotest village. only in secret do they dare clench their fists. for the hangman's rack has a way of smoothing out clenched fists. terror lies on its chain like a wild beast. only when it believes itself to be unobserved does it rise and sees the people lying on their knees, and hears a tortured country crying up to heaven. ii a star has risen against the sky of despair. the saviour of the fatherland has been found. egmont and hoorn, the darlings of the people, have walked into the trap and have been beheaded in the market-place. but orange has escaped. he has taken flight to germany. orange, a clever brain! more clever than spanish guile. orange, a brave heart! braver than spanish death and swords. how calm was his countenance! how confident his speech! he is not the man to rush anything, to spoil anything. he will return in his own time. they are already whispering it stealthily in one another's ear. the whisper is already passing from ear to ear, increasing to joyous certainty: he is already in our midst. as yet he is in hiding. but on the morrow his call will ring out, and his confidence glow through every man's heart. william of orange! iii the call has come. they are flocking in on every road. groups of peasants and artisans. masters, and apprentices among them. and the greybeards have taken their old weapons from the wall. halberds flash in the sunlight. old-fashioned furniture of war. but still more ardently do their eyes flash. all are of one mind. all driven on irresistibly by one single impulse. so they pass singing along the highroads. they had almost forgotten how to sing. but now it breaks out the more joyously in the sunlight--the solemn chant. dumfounded, the spanish outpost, under cover of a hedge, gapes after them. let them run, the spies. the spell is broken. let them hear of it till their ears ring again. the morning sun is shining. but we are marching to death and singing: "happy is he who knows how to die for god and his dear fatherland." iv a pleasant farm hidden away in a garden. it is springtide. the garden is a blaze of white. apple-trees in blossom. beneath their boughs a man and a girl are standing close intertwined. beyond, on the other side of the hedge, they are passing along the village street. their friends of the village. their hour has come. the girl's head is resting heavily on his breast, and her arm trembling round his neck. "stay with me, only stay one day more. the wedding was to have been tomorrow. you will never come back! and we are so young--so very young. look, how the blossom is falling. you, too, will lie on the ground like that, so dead and white. and i shall waste away and fade." then he looks into her eyes--sad unto death and fearful. "so you wish me to stay behind, and the others to go and die for us?" she shakes her head without a word, and looks up at him with a smile amid her tears. then he kisses her, and clasps her hand in farewell. v the groups have assembled. they have grown from day to day, and drawn nearer and nearer to the enemy. and now the two armies are arrayed against each other--eye to eye. on the plain yonder you can see them--the spanish troops flashing in steel--so close that you can distinguish their yellow faces in the sunlight. what is their quest here on foreign soil? they are selling their blood for a hireling's wage, and turning themselves into hangmen to lay a free people in chains. a distant glow is still glowering to the heavens. the last villages through which the spanish dogs passed. they have left smoke and ruin behind them. mangled corpses, the wailing of children. what do the strangers care? they have come into the country for loot. there they stand, the destroyers! splendidly harnessed, practised in war, and used to victory. callously, as if at their handicraft, without much shouting, or much running about and movement, the array over there falls into line. a dangerous foe in its uncanny quiet. over against them the netherlanders are a people assembled at haste. they are ignorant of drill, are ignorant how they ought to fight in ranks, and on horseback. but on the issue they are staking hearts filled with indomitable hate, filled full with undying love of country. beggars, the spaniards once called them. and the beggars are mindful of their nakedness. their fists clench. their teeth are set. and their lips are mumbling curses and hot prayers. vi it came to fighting. it came to murder. death leaped up, and raced neighing across the battlefield, until it dripped blood--until at even, blinded with blood, it fled away into the darkness. the battle is over now. the daylight is dying behind bergen's towers. the shadows of night are blending with the shadow of death. it was a glorious fight. the wrath of a people is mightier than all the guile and strategy on earth. but the victors are exhausted. watch fires are ablaze. they all crowd round them to comfort themselves in their warmth. dark figures are whispering in groups. "ha! how they ran! whoever was overtaken was cut down--without mercy. they will remember the day. will they come on again? how will the sinister emperor take it? how far does his power reach? they will come on again. a bigger army! a bigger fleet!" look how the stars are gleaming. the air is clear. even now you can see the heavens opening. and the milky way is glimmering down to meet you. the sound of singing rises in the distance. an old hymn. a prayer of thanks of the days of our fathers. those nearest by take it up. the chant leaps from fire to fire. the darkling field is singing. the night is singing. a choir raising their hands to heaven, their voices to the stars. lord! grant us freedom! * * * * * where then lies the truth? in these "prose poems" aglow with martial enthusiasm, and ringing with the soldier's spirit, or in the relentless anatomical realism of "the human slaughter-house"? or are both lies--"both deliberate conscious untruths, written under the inspiration of a social democratic lawyer?" the explanation, as lamszus see it, lies in the condition of the times. no one, he claims, could write of the revolt of the dutch republics otherwise than in the brave setting of flashing eyes, glittering steel, and the stirring clash of men-at-arms. but it is equally untrue to tell of modern warfare waged with picric acid and electric wires in the same spirit. the romance and glamour of warfare in the past are grinning lies when transferred to latter-day warfare, where long-drawn fronts of flesh and blood are opposed to machines of precision and the triumphs of the chemical laboratory. the anachronism becomes nothing less than the deliberate falsification of history. dynamite and machine-guns, not the writer, have turned the "field of honor" into a "human slaughter-house," where regiments are wiped out by pressing an electric button. in the hideousness of these scenes of future warfare the charge of exaggeration, of painting carnage red, is easy to raise, and difficult to rebut. lamszus does not shirk it. "what i have written was worked out empirically. it is a sum that is, mathematically, so incontestable that no one has hitherto ventured to dispute it. for the second factor in this sum is the albuminous substance of human brain and marrow. and when we hear that in the russo-japanese war thousands went mad, who would care to maintain that the nervous system of the civilized mid-european is hardier and tougher than that of asiatics and semi-civilized russians? 'the material has become softer,' says the authority of the staff-general. what now, when the sum total of acoustic and visual stimuli, of physical and psychic shocks, to which this 'softer material' is exposed, has, with every new invention, become more destructive in quality and quantity? to find the answer to such a simple problem did not assuredly call for a mathematical genius." with the answer before us, the question rises whether it is more patriotic to blink it, to go on pretending that war is what it used to be--a soldier's death on the field of honor, or senseless automatic slaughter by machinery. it is against this latter mechanical aspect of war that the instinct of humanity, to which lamszus has given voice in vivid words, revolts. does it become a man better to look, with the full sense of his moral and ethical responsibility, the hideous fact in its face, or to continue to disguise it under a veil of romance woven round the pomp and circumstance of glorious war? in this sense "the human slaughter-house" of lamszus' invention stands, as the universal peace congress read it, for the revolt of the spirit of humanity, the spirit of progress and evolution, against the cumulative horror of the mechanics of modern warfare. "for just as there is no room for the uncouth monsters of primeval times, for mastodon and brontosaurus, on the green earth today, so little will a nation of krupp's steel plates be able to continue to live in the community of civilized nations." none the less, a nation of men of virile breed will, he believes, be no less prompt to take up arms in defence of its heritage of culture than prussia was in , and to fight in its defence to the last gasp. for in the war of liberation it was not drill, but the spirit of the people that saved the country. "thus the people in which we have belief will be irresistible in the council of nations, and be destined before every other to lead the nations to the work for which nature has fashioned them.... worthless indeed is the nation that would not stake its all for its honor. the only question that remains is what the spirit of this honor be; whether the appetite of savages and barbarians, hungry for spoils, impels me, or whether moral honor, the blood-stained desecrated face of god, inspires me." with these bold words lamszus concludes his apologia for the brutality of "the human slaughter-house." oakley williams. [_translation_.] to herr lamszus. _xixme congres universel de la paix a geneve_. _geneve_, . dear sir, i have great pleasure in acquitting myself of the duty of expressing to you, in the name of "the commission for education, instruction, etc.," composed of delegates of the most varied nations assembled at the world's peace congress, and, further, in the name of all pacificists, our thanks for the distinguished word-picture of rare artistic originality and of gripping effectiveness of the wholesale murders of the future in "the human slaughter-house," _for having furnished the cause of peace with a weapon of considerable importance_, and for having more especially made a very valuable gift to the cause of every pacificist. may the blessing of its work be great! on behalf of the congress commission for education, instruction, etc. dr. a. westphal, _secretary_. the human slaughter-house chapter i mobilization war! war is declared! so the news speeds hollow-eyed through the streets. we are at war. it's the real thing this time. mobilization! the ominous word dominates the placards on the hoardings. the newspapers reproduce the proclamations in their heaviest type, and rumors and dispatches flutter like a ruffled dovecote round this day of blood and iron. it is deadly earnest now. and this sense of the seriousness of it has numbed the state like a stroke of paralysis. but then a jar, as of a lever thrown over, goes through the vast iron fabric. and every one has got to yield to this jar. the time for anxiety and hesitation is over, for doubts and oscillation. the moment has now come when we cease to be citizens, from henceforward we are only soldiers--soldiers who have no time to think, who only have time to die. so they come flocking in from the work-shops, from the factories, from behind the counters, from business offices, and the open country--they come flocking into the town, and every man falls in to stand by his native land. "four days from date" was the order on my summons. well, the fourth morning has come, and i have said good-by to my wife and my two children. thank god, the fourth morning has come, for the parting was not easy, and my heart aches when i think of them "at home." "where are you going, daddy?" asked baby, as i kissed her for the last time with my portmanteau in my hand. "daddy's going on a journey," said her mother, and looked at me with a smile amid her tears. "yes, he's going on a journey, girlie, and you, little chap, you've got to be good, and do as mummy tells you." and then we got the parting over quickly, for dora kept up her pluck until the last moment.... * * * * * now we are drawn up in the barrack-yard with bag and baggage--we of the rank and file--we reservists and militiamen, every man at his place by the table. how serious their faces are. they reveal no trace of youthful high spirits or martial exuberance. their expressions rather betoken deep thought. "the war that in the end was bound to come"--so we heard and so we read in the papers. "that is bound to be so, that is a law of nature. the nations are snatching the bread from one another's mouths; they are depriving each other of the air to breathe. that is a thing which in the end can only be settled by force. and if it has to be, better it should be today than tomorrow." we are mercenaries no longer--those hirelings for murder, who once sold their blood for money down to all and sundry. we are gladiators no longer--slaves who enact the drama of dying as an exciting spectacle for the entertainment of the rich, and for the lust of their eyes. it is to our native land we took our oath. and if it must be, we are resolved to die as citizens, to die in the full consciousness and full responsibility for our acts. what will the next few days have in store for us? not one of us has probably ever, with his own eyes, seen a field of battle. but we have heard about it from others, and we have read in books of other men what a battlefield looked like in - , and, as though with our own eyes, we have watched the shells shattering human bodies. and another thing we know is that forty years ago in spite of inferior guns and rifles, over a hundred and twenty thousand dead stayed behind on the field of honor. what percentage of the living will modern warfare claim? armies are being marshalled vaster than the world has ever seen. germany alone can put six million soldiers in the field; france as many. then the war of ' -' was nothing more than a long-drawn affair of outposts! my brain reels when i try to visualize these masses--starting to march against one another; i seem to choke for breath. then are we a breed of men other than our fathers? is the reason because we only have one life to lose? and do we cling so passionately to this life? isn't our native land worth more than this scrap of life? there probably won't be many among us who believe in the resurrection, who believe that our mangled bodies will rise again in new splendor. nor do we believe that our father in heaven will have pleasure in our murderous doings, that in that better world he will regard us other than as our brothers' murderers. but we bend our heads before iron necessity. the fatherland has called us, and we, as loyal sons, obey the command there is no evading, submissively.... from today onward we belong to our native land, so the major shouted a minute ago as he read out the articles of war. and it's going to be the real thing this time. the sergeant-major has already read the roll and checked it. we are already told off in fours. now, in a long column, we are marching across the barrack-yard, for this very day we are ordered to doff our civilian dress, and don our new kit. this very day we have got to become soldiers. things are moving apace with us now. chapter ii soldier on the afternoon of the following day, the company is detailed for barrack drill. we are lying on our stomachs in the barrack-yard, and are being drilled in taking aim and firing lying down. i have just been sighting. in front of me on the barrack wall over there they have painted targets. ring targets, head targets, chest targets. three hundred yards. i take pointblank aim, and press the trigger. "square in the chest." that ought to count as a bull's-eye. wonder how many clips of cartridges am i going to get through? wonder if there will be a bull's-eye among them? if every man of those millions they are putting into the field against the enemy fires about a hundred cartridges, and there is one bull's-eye in every hundred, that works out at ... that amounts to ... and i can't help smiling at this neat sum in arithmetic ... then the answer is no one at all. that is a merry sum. snick! the fifth cartridge tumbles out. i ram in another clip of dummy cartridges. how quickly and smoothly that's done. one--two seconds, and five cartridges are set in your magazine. every one of them, if need be, can penetrate six men; it can penetrate palisades and trees; it can penetrate earthworks and stone walls. there is practically no cover left against this dainty little missile, against this little pointed cone. and what a wonderful bit of mechanism this mauser rifle is. how wretchedly badly off they were in - with their rattletrap needle guns. a single feeble bullet at a time, and after you had fired it came the long, complicated business of reloading. and yet the war accounted for well over a hundred thousand french and german dead. i wonder how many dead this war will ac count for? if only every fifth man is left on the field, and if another fifth comes home invalided ... what will its harvest amount to then? the whole of both countrysides are at this moment covered with soldiers lying flat, and all of them with their rifles at the ready, and all of them pointing the death-bearing barrels at one another, are perfecting themselves in the art of hitting the heart. but behind them the guns are swinging up. the gunners are jumping down and dragging the trail round. they are already aligned, and a thousand black mouths are gaping uncannily toward the heavens. we were once standing--we were in camp for musketry training at the time--and watching a battery firing with live ammunition. they had unlimbered and were ready to fire. the officers were peering into the distance through their field-glasses. the targets were not as yet in sight. we were all gazing intently toward the firing zone, where at any moment something might come into view.... there! away over there. in the distance. something is moving! a shout of command. the subaltern points to the moving target with his right hand. he shouts out the range. the gunners take aim, and: "ready! no. i gun. fire!" the missile is already a-wing, and for the space of a moment we feel the iron messenger flitting past. the air is a-hum. boom--and a thousand yards in front of us the shell has exploded above the cavalry riding to the attack, and has spattered its rain of lead over the blue targets. and then nos. , , , and . the next target was about a mile away, and the new range quickly found. again the strange missile sped away and covered its measured course. it was a thing to marvel at, to see how it checked in the air of its own volition and burst. it seemed as though each one of these iron cylinders had a brain--as if it were endowed with life and consciousness--so certainly did it find its billet. and when the battery had ceased firing and had limbered up, and the danger cone had been pulled down, we went out into the field of fire. there the linked targets under fire were lying. they had been struck down by the shrapnel--all, the whole line. head, body, limbs;--we did not find a single figure there that had not been drilled through and through. we stood and marvelled at the accuracy of it, and with a silent shudder thought of targets other than contraptions of laths and canvas. wonder whether they have engines of such perfect precision on the other side? how the experts have, day in, day out, been inventing and constructing new marvels of mechanism. the mechanical side of war has been raised to a high standard of genius and a fine art. two hundred and forty bullets and more to the minute! what a marvel of mechanism one of those machine-guns is. you set it buzzing, and it spurts out bullets thicker than rain can fall. and the automaton licks its lips hungrily and sweeps from right to left. it is pointed on the middle of the body, and sprays the whole firing-line with one sweep. it is as though death had scrapped his scythe for old iron; as if nowadays he had graduated as expert mechanic. they have ceased to mow corn by hand nowadays. by this time of day even the sheaves are gathered up by machinery. and so they will have to shovel our millions of bodies underground with burying machines. curse! i cannot get rid of this hideous; thought. it is always cropping up again. we have passed on from retail to wholesale methods of business. in place of the loom at which you sat working with your own hands, they have now set the great power-looms in motion. once it was a knightly death, an honorable soldier's death; now it is death by machinery. that is what is sticking in my gullet. we are being hustled from life to death by experts--by mechanicians. and just as they turn out buttons and pins by wholesale methods of production, so they are now turning out the crippled and the dead by machinery. why do i, all of a sudden, begin to shudder? i feel as if it had suddenly become clear as daylight that this is madness--blood-red madness lowering for us there. curse! i must not go on brooding over it any longer, or it will drive me mad. your rifle at the ready! the enemy is facing you! has that ceased to be a case of man to man? what does it matter even if the bullet finds its billet more surely? aim steadily--straight for the chest.... who is it really facing me? the man i am now going to shoot dead! an enemy? what is an enemy? and again i see myself on that glorious morning of my holidays, at a french railway station, and again i am gazing curiously out of the window. a foreign country and a stranger-people. the moment for departure has come. the station-master is just giving the signal. then a little old woman extends her trembling hand to the window, and a fine young fellow in our carriage takes the wrinkled hand and strokes it, until the old woman's tears course down her motherly cheeks. not a word does she speak. she only looks at her boy, and the lad gazes down on his mother. then it flashes upon me like a revelation. foreigners can shed tears. why, that is just the same thing it is with us. they weep when they take leave of one another. they love one another and feel grief.... and as the train rolled out of the station, i kept on looking out of the window and seeing the old woman standing on the platform so desolately, and gazing after the train without stirring. i could not help thinking of my own mother. it was i myself who was saying good-by there, and on the platform yonder my poor old mother was in tears. pocket-handkerchiefs were floating in the breeze. they were waving their hands, and i waved mine too; for i, too, was one who belonged to her.... and again i put my rifle to my shoulder, and take aim for the centre of the target. i will not go on torturing myself with these thoughts. the target seems to have been moved nearer to me. of a sudden it seems to me as if the blue-painted figure had stepped out of its white square. i gape at it. i distinctly see a face in front of me. i have got my finger on the trigger, and feel the tension of the pressure. why don't i pull it through? my finger is trembling.... now, now, i recognize the face. that is the young fellow at nancy who was saying good-by to his mother.... then the spring gives, and the great horror masters me, for i have fired straight into a living face. murderer! murderer! you have shot the only son of his mother dead. thou art thy brother's murderer.... i take a hold on myself. i pull myself together. a murderer? folly! a spook! you are a soldier. soldiers cease to be human beings. the fatherland is at stake. and without turning a hair i take aim at the enemy. if you miss him he will get you. "got him! in the middle of the chest." chapter iii our father which art in heaven we rejoined the colors on friday. on monday we are to move out. today, being sunday, is full-dress church parade. i slept badly last night, and am feeling uneasy and limp. and now we are sitting close-packed in church. the organ is playing a voluntary. i am leaning back and straining my ears for the sounds in the dim twilight of the building. childhood's days rise before my eyes again. i am watching a little solemn-faced boy sitting crouched in a corner and listening to the divine service. the priest is standing in front of the altar, and is intoning the exhortation devoutly. the choir in the gallery is chanting the responses. the organ thunders out and floods through the building majestically. i am rapt in an ecstasy of sweet terror, for the lord god is coming down upon us. he is standing before me and touching my body, so that i have to close my eyes in a terror of shuddering ecstasy.... that is long, long ago, and is all past and done with, as youth itself is past and done with.... strange! after all these years of doubt and unbelief, at this moment of lucid consciousness, the atmosphere of devoutness, long since dead, possesses me, and thrills me so passionately that i can hardly resist it. this is the same heavy twilight--these are the same yearning angel voices--the same fearful sense of rapture---- i pull myself together, and sit bolt upright on the hard wooden pew. in the main and the side aisles below, and in the galleries above, nothing but soldiers in uniform, and all, with level faces, turned toward the altar, toward that pale man in his long dignified black gown, toward that sonorous, unctuous mouth, from whose lips flows the name of god. look! he is now stretching forth his hands. we incline our heads. he is pronouncing the benediction over us in a voice that echoes from the tomb. he is blessing us in the name of god, the merciful. he is blessing our rifles that they may not fail us; he is blessing the wire-drawn guns on their patent recoilless carriages; he is blessing every precious cartridge, lest a single bullet be wasted, lest any pass idly through the air; that each one may account for a hundred human beings, may shatter a hundred human beings simultaneously. father in heaven! thou art gazing down at us in such terrible silence. dost thou shudder at these sons of men? thou poor and slight god! thou couldst only rain thy paltry pitch and sulphur on sodom and gomorrah. but we, thy children, whom thou hast created, we are going to exterminate them by high-pressure machinery, and butcher whole cities in factories. here we stand, and while we stretch our hands to thy son in prayer, and cry hosannah! we are hurling shells and shrapnel in the face of thy image, and shooting the son of man down from his cross like a target at the rifle-butts. and now the holy communion is being celebrated. the organ is playing mysteriously from afar off, and the flesh and blood of the redeemer is mingling with our flesh and blood. there he is hanging on the cross above me, and gazing down upon me. how pale these cheeks look! and these eyes are the eyes as of one dead! who was this christ who is to aid us, and whose blood we drink? what was it they once taught us at school? didst thou not love mankind? and didst thou not die for the whole human race? stretch out thine arms toward me. there is something i would fain ask of thee.... ah! they have nailed thy arms to the cross, so that thou canst not stretch out a finger toward us. shuddering, i fix my eyes on the corpse-like face and see that he has died long ago, that he is nothing more than wood, nothing other than a puppet. christ, it is no longer thee to whom we pray. look there! look there! it is he. the new patron saint of a christian state! look there! it is he, the great djengis khan. of him we know that he swept through the history of the world with fire and sword, and piled up pyramids of skulls. yes, that is he. let us heap up mountains of human heads, and pile up heaps of human entrails. great djengis khan! thou, our patron saint! do thou bless us! pray to thy blood-drenched father seated above the skies of asia, that he may sweep with us through the clouds; that he may strike down that accursed nation till it writhes in its blood, till it never can rise again. a red mist swims before my eyes. of a sudden i see nothing but blood before me. the heavens have opened, and the red flood pours in through the windows. blood wells up on the altar. the walls run blood from the ceiling to the floor, and--god the father steps out of the blood. every scale of his skin stands erect, his beard and hair drip blood. a giant of blood stands before me. he seats himself backward on the altar, and is laughing from thick, coarse lips--there sits the king of dahomey and butchers his slaves. the black executioner raises his sword and whirls it above my head. another moment and my head will roll down on the floor--another moment and the red jet will spurt from my neck ... murderers, murderers! none other than murderers! lord god in heaven! then-- the creaking-- light, air, the blue of heaven, burst in. i draw a breath of relief. we have risen to our feet, and at length pass out of the twilight into the open air. my knees are still trembling under me. we fall into line, and in our hob-nailed boots tramp in step down the street toward the barracks. when i see my mates marching beside me in their matter-of-fact and stolid way, i feel ashamed, and call myself a wretched coward. what a weak-nerved, hysterical breed, that can no longer look at blood without fainting! you neurasthenic offspring of your sturdy peasant forbears, who shouted for joy when they went out to fight! i pull myself together and throw my head back. i never was a coward, and eye for eye i have always looked my man in the face, and will do so this time, too, happen what may. chapter iv the last night i am lying in bed, and counting a hundred slowly. it must be close on midnight now, and i am still unable to get to sleep. the room resounds to the noise of snoring. they are lying to the right and left of me, and if i turn over on my back, i am staring up at the wooden planking of a bed. for the cots extend all along the wall from door to window, one above the other, and in every cot a soldier is lying asleep. now and again one or other tosses about, and rolls heavily over to the other side. further away, near the window, some one is mumbling in his sleep. suddenly he shouts out aloud: "and that wasn't me. i ain't touched a bit of the wire. d'you take me for a thief?" it sounds exactly as if he were wide-awake. i am on the point of speaking to him. then all is silence again, and i lie listening intently for what is going to happen next. but he keeps quiet, and goes on dreaming. he is still in the midst of his workshop; yet tomorrow he is going to be carted out to war. and nothing but sleeping and snoring men all round me. wonder if any one else in barracks is lying wide-eyed and staring into the future? my thoughts flit homeward. wonder whether she slept well to-night? wonder if she has chanced to be thinking of me? wonder how the little chap is getting on? his teeth were giving him trouble.... it is not good to marry so young; the unmarried men who are called out now are better off. wonder whether the war will last long? we have put by a little nest-egg. but what's the good of that in these times of famine prices? the allowance for wife and children is so small that it won't even cover rent. where's she to turn for money when the post-office savings book is finished? she will have to go out sewing. but what's to happen when hundreds of thousands of others have to go out sewing too? well, then she will have to start a little business, open a greengrocer's shop. but what's to happen when hundreds of thousands of others have to start a shop? the state is taking charge of your wives and children, that's what it said in the regimental orders yesterday. well, there is no use in imagining the very worst at the start. the war may be over quickly. perhaps it will never get as far as big battles. perhaps they will think better of it, and give way yet. and then my mind feels at ease again. in spirit i see myself back again at my office-desk and writing invoices. a glance at the clock--it's close on the hour--only a few more strokes of the pen. so let's finish up quickly. let's hang up our office coat on the nail and slip into another. and then get out into the street, for dora must be waiting supper. by this time we have already reached the bridge by the town hall, with the two big triple lamps.... who is standing there by the railing of the bridge, and gazing down into the canal so motionlessly? it's a woman. she must have run straight out of the kitchen, for her apron-strings are hanging to the ground behind her anyhow. and all of a sudden her red-striped skirt strikes me as so familiar, and as i pass behind her she turns round without a word, and looks at me wild-eyed. "dora, is that you?" then she bows her face, streaming with tears, and says dully to herself: "they have shot my husband dead." "but, dora," i shout to her anxiously--for it suddenly flashes upon me that she is ill--"why, here i am! don't you know me any more?" but she shakes her head, and turns away from me comfortless, and passes me by like a stranger. "dora!" i shout aloud, "dora!" and stretch out my arms toward the vanishing figure. a sob chokes my throat.... then i start, and am sitting up in bed, resting on my elbow. through the window sounds the long-drawn reveille. dawn is peeping through the panes. so i did nod off after all, and i did not have a pleasant dream. but i have no time to be grumpy over it, for footsteps are ringing along the corridor. hobnail boots clatter across the floor. the door is flung open. "turn out!" a cheery voice shouts in. it is the sergeant on duty. by this time he has already reached the next door. and sleepy figures are rising from their cots, yawning and stretching their arms; are turning out and slipping, shivering with cold, into their clothes. yawning, they stretch their limbs and flap their arms until the second more welcome morning signal, "breakfast rations," lends life and animation to fasting men. chapter v the departure we are already drawn up in the barrack-yard in service kit. we have stacked our rifles and have fallen out. no one thinks of kit inspection or anything of that kind today. everything is now being pushed on at racing pace. "fall in!" "stand by your packs!" how heavy the full knapsack weighs in one's hands, and yet as soon as it is settled in the small of your back you do not notice it so very much. "stand by arms!" "slope arms!" as if we were marching out for parade, the captain's orders sound as crisp as that. we shoulder arms as smartly as if we were moving out on parade. "form sections! right about turn! quick march!" and we swing round smartly in four at the command. "fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth company!" shouts the major, who has pulled up in the middle of the yard. we are the eighth company, and are following on the heels of the seventh. the gates of the barrack-yard are open. we are marching out. our legs mark time on the pavement of the street in the goose-step of grand parade. "march at ease!" and the muscles of our legs relax and advance at more natural gait. the streets are full of people. they are lining the pavement on both sides and watching us march past. though it is still quite an early hour of the morning, yet the whole town is up and about. they weren't able to stay abed. they wanted to see the soldiers march out. and they welcome us with their eyes and wave their hands to us. a fifteen-year-old lad is running along beside us. his brother is marching in our file. "mother sends you her love; she says she is feeling better again--but she wasn't well enough to get up yet, else she'd have come with me this morning--but i was to give you this from her." and the lad stretches his open hand out to his brother, and tries to hand him something wrapped up in paper--money! but the elder brother waves it aside. "put it away. tell her i said she was to spend it on herself, and to look after herself properly, and be well and fit when we come back again." reluctantly the lad puts the money in his pocket. a little ahead of us a young woman is tripping alongside. we have set a pretty smart pace, and she has to break into a run to keep up. but though her feet may stumble over the uneven pavement she never turns her eyes from her husband. what they may have to say to each other at the very last moment we can't catch. but we catch the expression of her face, and her comically touching devotion. and now the crowds accompanying their soldiers through the streets become denser and denser. a few folk who are seeing members of their family off are running beside every section. white-haired fathers and mothers, with anxious looks, sisters, sweethearts, wives. there is one among them of whom you can tell at a glance that she is about to become a mother. well, she will be brought to bed lonely and desolate. the man marching on my right, a taciturn yokel, who until now has been staring gloomily straight ahead of him, half turns to me. "how many kids are there under way that'll never come to see their dads?" and then he thaws, and begins to talk about his brother, who had to leave with the army service corps two days before, and he was called on the colors the very same day his wife was brought to bed, so that he had to leave her before she was out of the wood. "almost make you think us wasn't human beings." the drums and fifes strike up briskly, and play a merry march. some one or other, somewhere in the crowd, sets up a loud, crowing sort of cheer. "hip! hip! hooray!" and the others join in. it spreads all down the whole length of the street, and does not die down again. but it leaves my yokel unmoved. "what's the good of that how-d'ye-do? folks are fair crazed. there is no sense in it." i glance at him out of the corner of my eye. he is impenetrably rapt in his own gloomy reflections. then he begins again. "ah've left a wife and three kids to home. they're to get a few pence a day, the lot, and nought more. and that's what four people have got to live on." some one tries to cheer him up. "then some one else'll turn up who'll look after 'em!" "what others?" comes the answer in a deep growl. "they'll have their hands full looking after theirselves. by the time i get home they'll have kicked the bucket, the whole lot of 'em. the best thing'd be never to come home no more." then the big drum breaks into his com-plaint. a dull reverberating throb. it is to usher in the regimental band, and orders the drums and the fifes to desist. and then again, deep and monitory. boom! the pipers begin to play the regimental march. and now--the regimental band strikes up. you may kick against it as you will. the martial strain infects the excited streets, trumpets back from a wall of houses, stirs the blood so joyously, and exorcises the spectres of the night from your brain. your muscles stiffen, you throw your head up, and your legs strut along proudly to keep step and time. and the rhythm of step and time infects the whole crowd. the effect on the crowd is electric. they are waving their hands from the pavements; they are waving their hands from the windows; they are waving their hands from the balconies. the air is white with pocket-handkerchiefs. and now some one in front begins to sing. they are shouting and singing against one another. the tune gains strength until it has fought its way through, and swirls above our heads like the wind before a storm. the national anthem! the whole street is taking it up. the regimental band has capitulated to the song that carries every one away with it. and then it solemnly joins in. the crowds bare their heads. we can see nothing except glowing faces, figures marching under a spell, a nation afire and kindled to enthusiasm. we march through the town singing ecstatically until we reach the station, until we at length come to a standstill on the platform reserved for us. the train is already standing there. the bridge, beyond, leading over the rails is black with people shouting and waving down to us. we are already told off. eight men to the compartment. "tara, tata!" the bugle calls us to entrain, and the doors are thrown open. we have scarcely stacked our packs and rifles, and donned our caps when the engine starts, and amid thunderous cheers we slide out of the station, and leave behind us a distant, fading roar, a dying hum--the town shouting her last farewell to her soldiers. we make ourselves comfortable. we are sitting and smoking our pipes. three, unable to change all at once, have already started a game of cards. two more are sitting in the corner and putting their heads together. the yokel is by himself, and shows no interest in anything. i am looking out of the window, watching the landscape fly past my eyes. the rejoicings are still hot in my blood. i have lived to see a great day. wherever the bulk of the people rises above the dust of every day it becomes irresistible, and carries away with it even the man who would fain stand aloof, and keep his head cool. and we hurry past forests and rivers, past meadows whose extent i cannot see, past hills that fade away into the blue of distance, past an immeasurably rich country that stands golden in its ears of corn. and over it all shines the sun of one's native land. and i would fain spread out my arms. yes, our native land is fair and great, and worthy that a man should shed his blood for it. chapter vi like the promise of may we have turned off the main road, and have to march over a field of stubble. a battle was fought here yesterday, for the field is sown with dead bodies. they have picked up the wounded. but as yet they have had no time to bury those who died where they fell. the first dead man we saw struck us dumb. at first we hardly realized what it meant--this lifeless new uniform spread out there--from the way he was lying you could hardly believe he was really dead. it gave you a prickly feeling on the tongue. it seemed as if you were on manoeuvres, and the fellow lying there in a ditch had got a touch of the sun. a rough soldierly jest, a cheery shout was all that was wanted to raise him to his ramshackle legs. "hullo, you! got a head? keep a stiff neck." but the words froze in our throat, for an icy breath was wafted to us from the dead man, and a chill hand clutched at our terror-stricken hearts. so that was death! we knew all about it now. that is what it looks like, and we turned our heads back and shuddered. but then there came more and more of them. and by this time we have become accustomed to them. strange! i gaze at these silent faces that seem to laugh at us, at these wounds that seem to mouth at us fantastically, as if they had i nothing to do with me. it strikes me all as so remote, so indifferent. as if all these dead bodies were lying in glass cases, as if i were in an anatomical museum, and were staring with dispassionately curious eyes at some scientific exhibits. sometimes no wounds at all are visible. the bullets have passed through the uniforms somewhere, and have gone clean through the softer parts of the bodies. they have grown rigid in death in grotesque postures as if death had been trying to pose figures here. there are certain schemes of death that are always recurring. hands out-stretched--fingers clawing the grass--fallen forward on to the face--that fellow over there lying on his back is holding his hand pressed tight against his abdomen, as if he were trying to staunch the wound. in the country i was once watching them killing sheep. there a beast lay, and was waiting for the butcher, and as the short knife cut through its windpipe and jugular vein, and the blood leaped hot from its neck, i could see nothing but the big eye, how it enlarged in its head to a fearsome stare, until at last it turned to a dull glass. all the bodies lying about here, as if bleating up to heaven, have got these glazed eyes, they are lying as if they were outstretched in the abattoir. well, to be hit and to fall down dead, there's nothing to make a fuss about that! but to be shot through the chest, to be shot through the belly, to burn for hours in the fever of your wounds, to cool your mangled body in the wet grass, and to stare up into the pitiless blue heavens because your accursed eyes go on refusing to glaze over yet---- i turn away from them. i force myself to look past these mocking, grotesque _posés plastiques_ of death. and i am already spirited far away, and am sitting in my little study at home. my coffee cup is standing snugly to my hand. my book-case is beaming down on me. my well-loved books invite me, and in front of me my book of books, "faust," lies open. and so i read, and feel the wonderful relaxation that comes after work stealing through my longing blood. the door opens. a little girl, and a boy who has just learned the use of his legs, put their noses in at the door. "daddy, may we?" i nod consent. then they spread out their little arms, and rush at me. "daddy!" they are climbing on to my knees now, and i give them a ride--"this is how we ride to war." but they twine their soft arms round my neck until at length i put them down on the floor: "now go to mummy--" and now---- a new picture. how very plainly i see it. we have gone out of a sunday afternoon beyond the suburbs, gone out with bag and baggage. i see the green fields bright and fair, and see the two kiddies bright and fair. they are rolling about in the grass and chasing the butterflies, and laughing up at me, and crowing with delight as they run after the ball i have thrown down for them to play with. and the sky stretches above us in its sabbath blue, and so confidently as if it all could never come to an end. and dora smiles at me with quiet eyes. then i come back with a start--i feel my knapsack chafing my back--i feel my rifle--i see the dead at my feet again-- my god! how can these things be? how can these two worlds be so terribly close to each other?... and we pass on through this first spring crop of dead bodies. no one says a word. no one has a joke. how surreptitiously the others glance aside when some corpse, all too grotesquely mangled, meets their eyes. i wonder what is passing through their brains? working men, tradesmen, artisans, and agricultural laborers, that's what they are for the most part. they themselves have as yet never smelled powder, nor ever been under fire. that, i suppose, is the reason why they have suddenly become so dumb. then a voice beside me says something abruptly, and it seems as if the voice rebounded hollow from the silence. "the stuff is laying about here same as muck." that was my yokel beside me. then he, too, relapses into silence, and i feel as if i could read behind their shy eyes, as if all that is going on in these dull brains had suddenly become clear as daylight. they're all drawn from that other world, where life kissed us and cozened caressingly round our bodies. you have brought us up as human beings. that we have been human no longer counts. life and love no longer count; flesh and blood no longer count; only gore and corpses count for anything now. how we used to tremble in that other world, when a naked human life was even in danger. how we rushed into the burning house to drive away the death for which some poor old paralyzed woman craved. how we plunged into the wintry river to snatch a starved beggar brat from the quiet waters. we would not even suffer a man to creep away out of life by stealth while we looked on. we cut down suicides at their last sob, and hustled them back into life. of our mercy we set up half-rotted wastrels with new bodies; with pills, elixirs and medicines, with herbalists, professors and surgeons, with cauteries, amputations and electrotherapy, we fanned the flickering life and fed the sunken flame with oxygen and radium and all the elements. there was nothing greater, nothing more sacred than life. life was everything to us, was for us the most precious possession on earth. and here lies that most precious of possessions--here it is lying wasted and used up--spurned as the dust by the roadside--and we are marching along over it as over dust and stones. chapter vii blood and iron the whole of that morning we had been marching in the eye of the sun without coming across a drop of water, for the country was not well watered, and there had been no rain for weeks. our tongues were parched; our throats were burning. when about midday we passed through a farmyard, where we found a last remaining drop of dirty liquid, it seemed as if the water evaporated on the tongue before it ever reached our throats. then we had been marched on interminably, so that it was almost with a sense of relief that we heard the first sound of the guns rolling up to meet us. the firing grew hotter, and we soon left the main road and turned down a lane. we were pushed on at a smart pace. our faces were glowing from thirst and heat. the column was enveloped in a thick cloud of dust. the taste of dust instead of water was on our tongues. the dust was lying thick as a layer of flour on our cheeks. and we hurried on without a word. a quickset hedge barred the view on either side. nothing but heavy footfalls, walking packs, black, clattering pannikins, rifles at the slope--hustle and dust.... then some one blundered over a stone in his way, and looked as if he were going to fall into the back of the man in front of him ... but no shout of laughter greets it--we are pushing on almost at the double--at times, when a gap in the hedge slips past, we can catch glimpses of the line of skirmishers advancing over open country--now at length comes a check.... halt! order arms! ... and i am scrambling through a gap in the hedge on to the open fields ... open order at five paces distance.... the long-drawn line of skirmishers advances, rifles at the ready ... in front of us nothing but green fields in sight. in the heart of them gleams the crude yellow of a field of mustard. ahead of us, just opposite our front, a dark wood ... not a trace of the enemy in sight. on our right they have already pushed on the advance line. on our left the skirmishers are just breaking through the hedge and opening out to extend our line of attack. the heavy noise in the air is incessant. i can't see where they are firing, and i can't see what they are firing at. the air is heavy with iron thunder. it closes like a ring round my chest. i am distinctly conscious that my chest is reverberating like a tense sounding-board---- what on earth is that? a sound like the cracking of whips from somewhere or other ... the sound is so sharp, so distant, so intermittent, as if it were coming from the rifle-range.... then--by my side a man falls down, falls on his rifle, and lies still, never stirs again ... shot through the head, clean through the brain ... that's what the cracking of whips means; it's coming from over there, out of the wood. somewhere over there the enemy's sharpshooters are lying and lining its edge and opening fire on us. what's the next thing? lie down--mark distance--cover! but no order comes. we push on toward the wood undeterred, as if these bullets did not concern us in any way. the sharpshooters' fire is not hot enough as yet; we have not, so far, got into sufficiently close touch with the enemy. it is an uncomfortable sensation to feel that over there muzzles are pointing straight at us. we are advancing almost as hurriedly and clumsily as 'rookies at their first field day. as i move forward, i turn my head and look back. behind me i sec new lines of skirmishers advancing one behind the other--supports to be pushed forward later. what is that crawling along the ground behind our line?... there is one here, another over there--it looks so novel and so odd. they are crawling back out of the firing-line. and i see how one of them suddenly tries to rise, clutches his rifle with both hands, and hauls himself to his feet by his gun. and now he is spreading his arms out, tumbling over backwards, and flinging his hands away from him, far apart ... his hands are still flapping up and down on the grass. i am looking back as if fascinated while my legs keep on advancing. but suddenly something begins to set up a rattle over there in the wood and buzzes like huge alarum-clocks running down. "lie down." and there we are lying down, flat on our stomachs, as if we had already been mown down, for every man of us knows what that was. they have masked machine-guns in the wood over there; they are opening fire on us. i feel how my heart is thumping against my ribs. a machine-gun is equivalent to a company, the old man once explained to us, after we had been shot down in heaps to the last man by the machine-guns in the autumn manoeuvres. what's the next thing? cautiously, without raising it, i turn my head. behind us, too, the lines of skirmishers, close up to us, have disappeared from the face of the earth; they too, have gone to cover in the grass. only outside the firing zone are they still being pushed forward. shall we have to retreat? are we going to attack? then the order to fire rings out, and is zealously passed on from unit to unit. "rapid fire! into the wood!" yes, but what are we to fire at? lying down, there is nothing to be seen of the sharpshooters. they won't do us any harm; in another minute they will have disappeared among the trees. but the machines--they have hidden them away among the foliage to good purpose. our subaltern, lying a bare five paces away from me in the grass, raises himself on his elbows, and gazes intently through his field-glasses. i know what is vexing his soul. he is a handsome, splendid lad, for whom even we grizzled old-timers would go through fire and water, for he meets you as man to man, without sniffing or swagger, as it becomes a youngster. and the other day, when i was marching with the rear guard, we discussed lilliencron's novels. since then he has always appealed to me as if he had stepped straight out of one of these romances of war. he is all ablaze to glean his first laurels. but however much he may twiddle the focus of his glasses up and down and crane his neck, he cannot discover a trace of the enemy, and we blaze away foolishly at the wood, and may, for all i know, be bringing down leaves or birds from the trees there. "close to the big oak. to the right in the undergrowth," some one of the rank and file sings out. i strain my eyes to the spot, and fail to see anything. and again i hear the guns growling all round us. but somewhere out of the far distance a clear, long-drawn bugle-call rings out amid the iron bass. it thrills like nerve and brain against an iron wall. behind there, to the right--they are on the run there! and from afar the rifle fire rattles like mad. "my men! up with you! at the double!" that came from our lot ... our subaltern is racing on with his drawn sword in his hand.... i am still prone, and have, almost automatically, drawn my right knee close up under my body ... they are rising to their feet to the left and right of me, and dashing on after him ... a wrench! and my knapsack slides lop-sided up the back of my neck ... then i jump up with my rifle in my right hand, and am running for all my legs are worth. but as we rise to our feet the machine-guns in the woods begin to buzz, and to rain lead into our ranks, until right and left of me men yelp and drop twisted and tumbled to the ground. "down! rapid fire!" the line is prone and again we are blazing desperately into the wood, and can catch no glimpse of our enemy. never a single arm raised against us, never the eye of a single man to challenge us. the wood, the green wood, is murdering us from afar, before a single human face comes in view. and while to the right and left of me the rifle fire chatters incessantly, the grim mockery of it maddens my blood, and makes me see red before my eyes. i see scale-armor and visors ... high in their stirrups the knights burst blazing out of the wood, and i, a reckless horseman of the past, i leap into the saddle--my broad sword flashes clear and kisses the morning breeze--and now up and at them like a thunderbolt. then eyes are flashing into mine and hands are raised for the _mêlée_--and stroke for stroke, breast to breast, the pride of youthful, virile strength.... ha-ha-ha-ha! what has happened? where have horse and rider vanished? where is my sword? we are not even charging men. machines are trained on us. why, we are only charging machines. and the machine triumphs deep into our very flesh. and the machine is draining the life-blood from our veins, and lapping it up in bucketsful. those who have been hit are already lying mown down in swathes behind us and are writhing on their wounds. and yet they are racing up behind us in their hundreds--young, healthy human flesh for the machines to butcher. "up! get on! at the double!" the gallant young subaltern dashes on ... he is waving his sword above his head recklessly ... a picture for a painter. i am rushing after him ... his cheer in my ears ... then the gallant vision begins to sway ... the sword flies from his grasp--the subaltern stumbles and falls face forward in the short, stiff stubble ... then i race past him ... i can hear nothing except the uncanny buzz coming out of the wood ... i literally feel how the lead is splashing into our ranks, how men are breaking down to the right and left of me.... "down! rapid fire!" ... i throw myself on my face, my rifle at the ready.... why does the order fail to reach us? no shout comes from the subaltern, none from the non corns.... the nearest man a good twenty paces away ... and then one other ... only we three.... the first line is lying shot down in the stubble ... what's the next thing? the ground becomes alive behind us ... and clattering, panting and shouting ... and again the wood rumbles sullenly ... there they are, lying flat, breathing hard ... never a word ... rifle to the ready ... and shot after shot ... those are the sixth and seventh companies ... they have filled up our gaps. "up, up! at the double!" the head is plunging on, the body after it, into the zone of bullets, and dashing forward with eyes fixed greedily on the ground to spy out the nearest molehill when we fling ourselves down. and when the excited "down!" o'erleaps itself, we too tumble down as if we had been swept away. and look, it is advancing to meet us, that murderous wood.... "up! at the double!" ... who can tell whether he has been hit or not?... behind there, out of the undergrowth--that's where it came from ... that's where the streak of bullets flashed ... there between the white larch trunks the beam of lead leaped out to meet us ... over there, behind that green wall, that's where murder is sitting, and shooting our arms and legs away from our trunks. slay her as she has slain us. rend her to pieces, as she has rent us. "up! at the double!" the body rages on in the whirl of the tempest--the wood, the wood!... the last muscle is still straining for the wood ... as if the soul had leaped free of the body, so the body chases after it--toward the wood ... lungs perforated by shot are running still; entrails riddled by bullets are still pressing on toward it ... and if you are not hit in the head, you are still jumping up once more; and if you fall, you are crawling on all fours--toward the wood.... what's happened? of a sudden a deep stillness falls.... the machines are silenced! not a single shot, not a single spurt of flame ... there--a rustling rising amid the undergrowth ... the branches overhead are swaying frantically against each other. look! something is scurrying among the trees, and pushing and hauling--now, to crown it all, they are trying to save their precious machines from us. yah! yah! the earth reverberates dully and trembles under our tread ... a roar of cheers, clubbed rifles, that's how they are coming up behind us ... our reserves are driving the last assault home ... they are charging in dense mobs--sappers, sharpshooters, rifle-men ... a tall sapper jumps clean over me--i see how his eyes are flashing as he passes.... up, after them ... there is the heather ... there is the entrenchment ... down with you into the trench and scramble up on hands and feet ... where are they? where?--where?... there, by that belt of firs ... they will have disappeared in another minute--past thick, silvery tree-trunks, through the green beech leaves, with the sun laughing in them, the lust of blood charges red and naked ... headlong through the undergrowth--and now--there is something wriggling away so comically before our eyes, and twisting with sinuous dexterity in and out among the trees and the undergrowth ... there is something clinging to the machine as if it were ingrown into the iron.... ha, ha!--in the clearing yonder the horses are waiting.... "let go! run for what you are worth--let go!" but they won't let go ... for their horses are already ploughing through the undergrowth ... the wagon is straining to the traces ... in another minute they will have thrown their guns into the wagon ... and then so-long ... i am done--the trees are dancing round and round before my eyes ... i catch my foot in the root of a tree.... lay on! lay on! they are "ours" who have come up, and are laying on blindly on heads, and bayoneting bent backs and bared necks, till the whole tangle disperses squealing.... i drag myself to my feet. a lad, a mere boy, is sprawling over and clutching his abandoned gun ... with an oath some one dashes at him--it is my yokel bareheaded, his face distorted by rage ... the boy stretches out his mangled hand to ward him off, his lower jaw is waggling, but his mouth remains voiceless.... the next moment the fixed bayonet plunges into his chest ... first his right, then his shattered left hand seizes the blade as if in his death throes he were trying to pluck it out of his heart; so he clings tightly to the bayonet ... a thrust! a recovery!... a bright, leaping jet follows the steel ... and heart and breath gasp their last among the dead leaves.... all round men are lying slain on the brown carpet of the woods.... but the machines are still alive, and rage against the machines fires the blood, and consumes the flesh.... up with the trenching tools!... with axes upraised they rush at the machines, and hail blows upon the barrels. the retorts wherein death has brewed his potion shriek as though wounded ... the jackets burst ... the water flows out ... and the carriage leaps splintered into the air ... twisted metal, the spokes of wheels and cartridge-belts litter the ground all round, but we are battering and smashing everything underfoot until our hot blood has cooled its rage on the metal.... and now amid joyous cheers raise the thunderous shout of victory. let the pipes and the bugles ring out. this is death on the stricken field! this is a soldier's frenzy and the joy of battle: to charge with bared breast against planted steel--to dash cheering with soft, uncased brain against a wall of steel. in such wholesale, callous, purposeful fashion vermin only are exterminated. we count for nothing more than vermin in this war. and dazed and sick, we gaze at the machines, and the steel and iron littering the ground blink up at us full of guile. chapter viii the swamp for the whole of the forenoon we had heard firing in the distance, the thunder of cannon and the rattle of musketry. our regiment had been marched hither and thither. the fight had drawn nearer and nearer. we were expecting to be under fire at any moment, and then we had to fall back again, and look for a new place to develop our attack. it seemed as if the orders that came through were contradictory, and this tension of uncertainty fell like a blight on our spirits, and got on the nerves both of officers and men. at length we had wound through a defile, the steep slopes of which, left and right, were thickly grown with trees. things had got into a bit of a mess. we had had to force our way through undergrowth soaked with rain, through brambles and clumps of tall broom on which the green pods were still pendent. at times there was nothing in sight except the roof and wall of greenery. we breathed more freely when at last the sky spread clear overhead again. so now we have reached a green meadow, and are marching straight across it, but are still unable to see anything of the enemy's forces yet. even the firing has died down, and has become more distant than before. it seemed as if we had come into another, remoter world, and--so we have; for soon we notice how soft the ground has become under our feet, how water is oozing up at every step. we shall, if we go on, be right in the middle of a swamp. that is the reason of the solitude reigning all around us. the terrain is impracticable. to the right and left of us, and all about us, nothing but swamp, running out into a broad sheet of open water, the depths of which no one can guess, or tell whether it be fordable. the head of the column is already swinging round and we are retracing our steps toward the defile to get out of the rat-trap. and in the middle of the meadow: "halt! form sections!" the companies have fallen in. the officers have assembled, and are pow-wowing. we seem to have lost touch. the sergeant beside me is swearing up his sleeve, and is cursing at something about lunacy and blindman's buff. i am gazing up meditatively at the heights, overgrown with trees and undergrowth, and am thinking what fun it would be if we were to have to make our way back to the defile now, and in the thick of it the enemy were to break in on us right and left--no man would come out of it alive--the battle of the teutoburger forest recurs to me--i am trying to, make out if they are oaks or beeches over there----of a sudden there is a flash of lightning from the undergrowth; the very firmament cracks and sways as if it were going to fall in on us.... "lie down!" horror screams somewhere or other. and trembling, we lie down ... and over our heads rushes something that howls for our flesh.... what's the next thing? up and at them now! rush straight at the guns. suffocate their fiery mouths with our flesh and bones. "up! get up!" the captain comes up to us at a run. the breath of the iron holds us tight pressed to the ground as if in a vice.... turn your head away. now! now! then--a-a-h! the vault of heaven has cracked above us, and has spurted down on to the sand from above. life is lying there, wriggling on the earth, and the hands that were clawing the ground are now clutching idly at the shattered air. i rise to my feet again.... i have not been hit. but the man who leaped up beside me--he is lying flat in the sand and screaming in a broken voice. he is lying as if he had been nailed firmly through his stomach to the earth, and as if he could not get free again. the body itself is dead, only the arms and legs are still alive. and arms and legs are working wildly through the air. "up! get up! quick march!" a voice yells in our ears. we no longer know who it is shouting to us, and we don't know from what quarter they have called us.... we leap to our feet. we leave the captain and the wounded in their blood; we start up and run away, and are running a race with the shells, for we are running for our bare, naked life. but the shells have the legs of us. they catch us up from behind in our backs, and wherever the invisible sheaf plunges hissing down, men are falling with it and rolling, helter-skelter in their blood. but we speed away over twitching and dismembered bodies, and over bodies turning somersaults, and look neither to the right nor to the left. we are on the run, and shrink into ourselves as we run. we draw our necks deep between our shoulders, for every man feels that the next moment his head will be leaping out from between his shoulder-blades from behind. and eyes of iron are glaring at us from behind. the swamp! the swamp! the thought suddenly uprears its head in me. we are running blindly straight into the swamp. only another twenty paces now--already the foremost have reached it, and, senseless in their terror, jump into it--the water spurts up high--and now--what has happened now? their feet are stuck fast--they tilt over forwards--they claw for something to hold on to--the rifle flies out of their hand--and face forward they plunge into the water--and close on our heels they come stamping up--the tight-packed, maddened mob.... "back! get back!" but every one has ceased to be conscious of what he is doing. and though our eyes start out of our head at the terror we see in front of us, death is breathing its cold breath into the back of our neck. and into the gurgling water, wriggling with bodies and alive with lungs, over human bodies writhing beneath the water, death tramples us to the other bank. any man who goes down is lost, for they are pressing on behind us past all holding. the water is already up to our armpits. but there is a firm bottom beneath our feet. true, the bottom may clutch at us, and cling round our feet. true, the water may bite savagely at our flesh with teeth and with nails. but whatever may be trying to draw us down to itself from below, we trample underfoot. the shoulders of a form emerge; they plunge down again, and disappear. the faces of drowning men emerge and cleave to the light, and sink gurgling into the depths. lost arms wave about in the air and try to find support on the surface of the water. we dodge these arms, for whomever they may seize they draw down with them to death. and in the thick of this hurly-burly of death, amid these whistling lungs, amid these panting, red, panic-stricken faces, the cloud of shells strikes home, and hurls its hail of iron overhead. the water spurts up in jets. and again! explosions and screams, and the hissing of lead, and the shrieks of men, and blood and water foam up, till no one knows whether he has been hit or is still alive; for in front of me--so close that i could clutch it--i see a jugular vein, ripped through, spurting in an arch like a fountain--and in his blood the fellow hit staggers back, and blood and howls surfeit the black flood, until it is at length reddened with human blood--get on! get on! don't look round! there--the other bank over there! there life is standing and spreading out his arms toward us. get on! before they have murdered all of us in this swamp! get up! get up! thank god! the water's falling! only up to the hips now--only up to the knees. and now---- our feet leap on to the dry, blessed land and strike forward beyond all control, and race over the field. they refuse to obey any orders. they are racing--racing toward the protection of the forest beckoning us of its mercy. there! headlong in among the trees, and into the bushes, into the thorns. there they are falling lifeless to the ground, their faces buried in the soil, and they are squeezing their eyes tight, to shut out the sight of the accursed blue of heaven that spat down on us so treacherously--you dogs! you beasts! to shoot us down from behind--it is nothing more nor less than cowardly assassination. and slowly breath and consciousness return to us again, and when we have come to our senses we look at one another with dumb eyes, and these eyes presage nought that is good. a great, unspeakable horror that will never be allayed again has risen in these eyes. chapter ix the whirling earth half-way on the march some one fell down beside me, flung out his arms, clawed himself tightly to the earth, and screamed and gasped against the soil. barely half an hour later we saw another who had fallen into convulsions. and when we were lying in a damp ditch waiting for the enemy, a man suddenly jumped up, and shrieked, and ran away. he laughed back at us from afar until he vanished from our sight in the rain. the shrieking and running away had infected us all. 'twon't be long before it will be your turn. one night when we were lying in our trenches, and had fallen asleep to the thunder of the guns, i suddenly started up--confused--dazed; and lo, the stars were standing bright in the dark, rainless sky, and shone down solemnly, ah god! how solemnly, on the turmoil, as if nothing in this world mattered. yet there--in front of me, before my very eyes --glimmered a red reflection--that surely must be a pool of blood, for the stars are mirrored in it so redly--and suddenly a blind rage overtook me to howl aloud and clench my fists, and to scream in the very face of the great master up above there--but i had neither time to howl nor to run. for in this self-same night it so happened that an uncanny whirr fell on our ears from out the distance. that was death flying toward us on propellers. the spectres of the night whirred above us; we shot blindly into the air--for every moment the storm was bound to break over us.... torpedo tubes above us ... they'll spurt in a minute ... they're going to fling down dynamite ... and then the magnesium bombs blazed out ... cries and crashes rose wherever we looked ... then they are gone again ... but we had to retire from our trenches ... senselessly, like automata, we marched for the whole of that day. i felt the goose-flesh creeping over my skin; my nerves ached, and if the bayonet were not at the small of my back i should chuck my rifle away, and roll sprawling in the damp sand. and yet four days afterward they have contrived to get us to make a stand again. for in our rear, on the other bank of the river, our regiments have crossed, and are groping for new positions. but we have to cover their passage at any cost. we were now drawing on our last reserve. we were still standing with our spades in our hands, and throwing, with aching backs and arms, more soil on the works, when in front of us we saw figures passing up and down on the grey, twilight field. they were grubbing the soil up busily, and were putting something we could not see into holes, and covering it in again. they went about their work noiselessly--no incautious step and no unguarded movement--and when they came back again and passed us, and marched on, their faces were livid and their lips dumb. they proved themselves to be first-class moles. they had done a good bit of work. they had undermined the earth. they had stuffed the ground with explosives, and if the enemy comes to-night we shall repay the gifts they lavished upon us from the sky the other day with interest. they have arranged it all like a rat-trap. over there, beyond the mined field even, two companies are lying in extended order. and midway between them, without a vestige of cover, stands our battery on the open field. it is planted there as if it were doomed to be delivered into the enemy's hands. and now we are lying in our long trenches, and are peering out into the field, with our eyes glued to the sharply outlined silhouettes of the guns. the sun has set some time ago. from the far distance the thin rattle of musketry reaches us clearly. wonder if it'll last much longer? our orders are to remain under arms. we have put on our overcoats. the night is chilly, and lowering, i gaze out over the field of death--nothing makes any difference to me now--if only it were over quickly. a scout has come in, and delivers his report in a whisper. our instructions are not to fire before the order to fire is given, and--then to fire into the air. in the background, far on the horizon, the ground rises, and the gray skyline stands out against the cloudy sky. the musketry fire has become hotter from minute to minute, and has increased to a threatening rattle. to the right and left of us fighting is in full swing. in front of us the mined field lies silent, and the two companies too, are lying silent in their rifle-pits. i am conscious that i am terribly tired--i can no longer keep myself on my feet--my head sinks down on my rifle--my eyes close--but the overstrained nerves are still alert. and now---- the earth reverberates sullenly. that's our battery! it is firing straight into the darkness. so our turn is coming now. we hear how "ours" over there are opening fire, and how it suddenly increases, and dies down, and then again swells to a maddening rattle. that is an attack by sharpshooters in overwhelming strength ... they cannot be very far from one another now ... and yet the battery goes on bellowing, and luring the enemy to assault.... and now a martial symphony rises over the dark country ... bugles shrill through the darkness, and drums are rolling sullenly ... that means a general assault ... there rises a sound of shouting and tramping ... a thunderous roar of triumph rises to the dark sky ... that is the shout of victory from a thousand throats ... in their thousands they have charged "ours" over there, and have crushed them by assault.... ha, ha! they have taken a battery by storm.... why, of a sudden, has silence fallen ... what is the object of it ... now it's our turn.... "into the air! rapid fire!" and the volley, crashes. and look there ... over there the cheer rings out again ... the signals for assault sound, and thousands of voices are shouting it simultaneously ... there they are foaming up ... they are charging on, drunk with victory, in closed ranks ... they are rolling with a roar over the mined field ... they are trampling the earth, as if with horses' hoofs ... that means death ... i am lying rigid ... now it must break, now ... i open my mouth wide ... my rifle is trembling in my grasp.... and then-- the earth has opened her mouth ... lightnings, crashes and thunderings, and the heaven splits in twain and falls down in flame--the earth whirls upwards in shreds ... men and the earth blaze and hurtle through the air like catharine wheels ... and then ... a crash, a maddening uproar, strikes us full in the chest, so that we reel backward to the ground, and half-consciously struggle for breath in the sand ... and now ... the storm is over ... the pressure of the atmosphere relaxes off our chest ... we breathe deep ... only scattered, dancing flames now and squibs ... fireworks.... but what on earth has happened?---- we peer out fearfully over our earthworks. has red hell opened its mouth: there rises a noise of screams and yells, an uproar so unnaturally wild and unrestrained that we cringe up closer to one another ... and, trembling, we see that our faces, our uniforms, have red, wet stains, and distinctly recognize shreds of flesh on the cloth. and among our feet something is lying that was not lying there before--it gleams white from the dark sand and uncurls ... a strange dismembered hand ... and there ... and there ... fragments of flesh with the uniform still adhering to them--then we realize it, and horror overwhelms us. outside there are lying arms, legs, heads, trunks ... they are howling into the night; the whole regiment is lying mangled on the ground there, a lump of humanity crying to heaven.... clouds are arising from the earth ... they are rising crying aloud in the air ... they pass over us in thick drifts, so that we can see the wounds steaming, and can taste blood and bones upon our tongues.... and then a spectral vision rises before my eyes ... i see red death standing outside there on the plain ... the clouds reveal a face grinning down on the symphony ... and suddenly a clear note detaches itself from the darkness--a tune which enraptured death is playing to himself till his fiddle splits ... is that a human being coming up, running, here?... he is coming with a rush ... he will leap upon our backs ... halt! halt! halt! he stumbles upright into the trenches, and tumbles sobbing and howling, among our rifles. he strikes out at us with hands and feet ... he is crying and struggling like a child, and yet no man dares go up to him ... for now he is rising on his knee ... and then we see! half his face has been torn away ... one eye gone ... the twitching muscle of the cheek is hanging down ... he is kneeling, and opening and closing his hands, and is howling to us for mercy. we gaze at him horror-stricken and are paralyzed ... then at length the yokel--and our eyes thank him for it--raises the butt of his rifle and places the muzzle against the sound temple ... bang!... and the maimed wreckage falls over backward and lies still in his blood.... and again the darkness casts up shapes ... they run up and reel about like drunken men ... they fall over and pick themselves up anew ... they race forward through the night in zigzags, until they at last collapse exhausted, and lie still under our very eyes and make an end of it.... and at length some one comes crawling toward us ... he is crawling up on all fours ... he is dragging something behind him with his body, and all the time he is whining like a sick dog, and is howling shrilly in long-drawn tones ... he is still crawling along i fast--and when he has reached us we see--i and the blood stands still in our hearts--they are his entrails hanging out of his body ... his belly has been ripped up from below ... he is crawling, he is crawling up on his entrails ... he is coming ... the entrails are coming ... horror breaks out from every pore ... for hardly three paces away from me he lies still ... and then ... may god forgive me!... he raises himself slowly on his hands ... he succeeds for a moment ... and looks ... merciful god!... he looks at me, and refuses to let my eyes go again ... i can see nothing except these great, death-stricken eyes.... merciful god! ... his eyes, those eyes! those are a mother's eyes looking down on me unspeakably ... that is a son of his mother lying there before us butchered.... i will break out of my fastness.... i will throw myself on him, sobbing, and kiss his face, and bathe his anguish away in my tears.... i will do it! i will! ... and cannot stir myself from my rigid tension.... then the monstrous strain relaxes--his arms give way ... he falls forward on his face and sinks down on his tortured body. his hands twitch once more ... then he lies still and kisses mother earth, who has slain her children so horribly.... i am done ... my hands are trembling.... then all of a sudden, a voice behind us begins to sing ... solemnly--long-drawn.... "now thank we all our god" ... that is madness singing there ... we are all next door to madness.... i look round, and see gray, distorted faces, and blazing, startled eye-balls.... and suddenly the singing voice changes to a loud, impudent burst of laughter.... "ha! ha! ha! ha!" the laugh is full of horror, and mingles with the dying whine beyond.... the laugh grows ever louder, and ever wilder, and laughs in triumph at the naked, pitiful dying, littering the ground. "drummers! strike up!" shouts the voice. "uncover for prayer!" we recognize him; he is a reservist belonging to some pious sect. a sergeant has seized him, and tries to hold him ... the captain has run up, but the madman tears himself away and runs ahead of them to a rifle-pit ... he stands aloft, a black, wild silhouette against the pale sky, and spreads out his arms in blessing over the sick night ... he stands there like a rapt priest, and raves, and is blessing the mangled darkness. "in the name of the father, and of the son, and of the holy ghost." then arms seize him from behind and pull him down ... they drag him to the ground.... "our father" he howls aloud, and strikes and kicks out all round him, and goes on praying from his raging body until at length breath fails him ... they have tied him hand and foot, and have gagged him.... but now the thing-that-couldn't happens--that none the less was bound to happen. and when the voice calls out it comes over me as if i had lived it all once before.... "captain!" shouts the hard, naked, impudent voice we all know. "haven't you got any cotton wool for us to plug our ears with?" we have all turned round as if at the word of command. it is the militia-man, the yokel, standing facing the captain and gesticulating at him. "i only wanted to ask if those are wild beasts, or if they're what are called human beings you've torn to pieces there?" but curt and sharp, as we knew it, the rasping note of command responds: "what the devil's the matter with you? pull yourself together. can't you hear? get back to your place at once." but then it bursts out, the voice of nature, and resounds so harshly, and tears down all barriers. "murderers!" roars a blasphemous mouth. "murderers of men! we shall have to knock them all on the head like dogs." we all start as if under an electric shock ... that was what was on the tip of the tongues of all of us ... that was the climax that was bound to come ... we cannot endure to go on lying in this charnel-house any longer.... "you mind what you're about." the other's wrath breaks out once more ... and then we know it for certain, the captain is a fool ... he has lost the game from the very start ... and now ... it is like a shadow play before my eyes ... like a ghostly kinematograph.... i see that the militia-man has drawn his bayonet ... the captain is standing facing him with his revolver in his hand, and gives him an order ... he promptly gets a blow with the butt end of the rifle on his head that fells him to the ground without a sound ... and they leap up from all the trenches.... "murderers!" they cry. "murderers! kill them!" there is no stopping it now.... i feel i have gone mad.... i do not know where i am.... i see wild beasts all round me distorted unnaturally in a life-and-death grapple ... with bloodshot eyes, with foaming, gnashing mouths, they attack and kill one another, and try to mangle one another.... i leap to my feet.... i must get away, to escape from myself, or in another minute i shall be in the thick of this maddened, death-doomed mob.... i stumble over the rifle-pits.... i race out into the night, and tread on quaking flesh ... step on hard heads, and stumble over weapons and helmets ... something is clutching at my feet like hands, so that i race away like a hunted deer with the hounds at its heels ... and ever more bodies--breathless--out of one field into another.... horror is crooning over my head ... horror is crooning beneath my feet ... and nothing but dying, mangled flesh.... has the whole earth exploded then?... are there nothing but dead abroad this night?... has every human being been fusilladed? how long have i been running?... i hear how my lungs are whistling ... and hear how my temples are beating ... my breath is choked.... i am done.... i stagger backwards ... am falling dead to the ground ... no! i am sinking back on something soft, and sit still motionless, and listen intently to the night.... i can hear nothing except the blood in my ears ... all of a sudden there is a light in my eyes like bright, clean daylight ... the sun is shining ... then i realize it, it is my own head ... visions are teeming in my brain, and are teeming out of my head, one unwearyingly on the heels of the other.... i see the regiments marching out ... they are passing by in the bright sunshine ... the blues from over there, the reds from over here; they are marching against each other in long array.... now they halt, and are standing drawn up against each other on a huge front ... ready for the fray ... then our captain's voice on this side rings out.... "ready?" ... and the rifles on both sides are raised. i see the black mass of the muzzles ... they are scarcely ten paces apart ... they are aiming straight for the chest.... "stop!" i am trying to cry out, "stop! you ought to attack in open order with seven paces intervals." ... then our captain's voice rings out again, "fire!" ... the volley crashes, and behold! not a man is hit ... they all are standing there unscathed ... they have fired into the air ... and with shouts of joy the ranks dissolve ... they rush toward one another ... the rifles fall to the ground ... but they rush into one another's arms, and fondle one another, and laugh aloud as children laugh ... then they fall back into line ... they shoulder their rifles ... right about turn!... the bands strike up a joyous march, they march off with bands playing--every regiment to its own home.... and now i catch myself singing an accompaniment to it aloud.... i am beating time with my right hand, and supporting myself on my seat with my left ... and something trickles oddly across my hand--something like warm water.... i raise my hand to my eyes ... it is red and moist ... blood is flowing over my white hand ... then i realize it, the white thing under me is not a heap of sand.... i have been sitting on a corpse ... horror-stricken, i rush about ... and one is lying over there, too ... and there, and there!... merciful god! i see it plainly now; there are only dead to-night ... the human race died out this very night ... i am the last survivor ... the fields are dead--the woods dead--the villages dead--the cities dead--the earth is dead--the earth was butchered to-night, and i, only i have escaped the slaughter-house. and it comes over me as a great thing, a pathetically great thing--now i know what my destiny is--lowering, i watch my own actions, and wait to see how i shall accomplish it--i mark how i am slowly putting my hand into my pocket--before i left home i took my pocket-pistol with me. i am holding the toy in my hand--the steel is looking up at me and blinking at me--i am gazing with a smile into its black, confiding muzzle--i am holding it against my temples--i pull the trigger, and fall over backward--the last of mankind on this dead earth! epilogue we poor dead they have now covered up our hot breath with earth. why are you blinking at me with your bleared eyes, my brother? are you not glad? don't they envy us our sweet death? they have laid us out in a picturesque row, and you need only turn your head to rub against human flesh at once, and if you turn your yellow eyeball, you can see nothing but corpses in the twilight. one beside the other, that is how they are sleeping. and corpse upon corpse, ever more of them, through the whole length of the loose soil of the potato-field, and we even fill the whole adjoining field of roots. wonder whether the sun still goes on shining above us?--whether they still know how to laugh in the towns as we used to in our time? wonder whether my wife still goes on remembering her dead husband--and my two kiddies--whether they have already forgotten their father? they were so tiny at the time--another man'll come along--they will call another fellow father--and my wife is still so young and fair. we poor dead heroes! so do not disturb our last sleep any longer. we had to die to enable the others to live. we died for our native land in its straits. we are victorious now, and have won land and fame, land enough for millions of our brothers. our wives have land, our children, our mothers, our fathers have land. and now our poor native land has air to breathe. it need no longer be stifled. they have cleared the air of us. they have got rid of us, of us who were far too many. we are no longer eating the bread away from other folks' mouths. we are so full-fed, so full-fed and quiet. but they have got land! fertile land! and ore! iron mines! gold! spices! and bread! come, brother philosopher, let us turn our faces to the earth. let us sleep upon our laurels, and let us dream of nothing but our country's future. the end pamphlet series of the carnegie endowment for international peace division of international law no. the future of international law by l. oppenheim, ll.d. member of the institute of international law whewell professor of international law in the university of cambridge, england hon. member of the royal academy of jurisprudence in madrid oxford: at the clarendon press london, edinburgh, new york, toronto, melbourne and bombay humphrey milford printed in england at the oxford university press introductory note in a note prepared in for the english edition, professor oppenheim stated the circumstances under which his tractate on _the future of international law_ was undertaken and published. 'this little work,' he said, 'originally written in german, was first published in , under the title _die zukunft des völkerrechts_ (leipzig: w. engelmann), as a contribution to the _festschrift_ offered to professor karl binding. events which have since happened make it necessary to call the reader's attention to the date of original publication. 'the translation into english has been made by dr. john pawley bate. in accordance with the wish of the author some slight modifications of the original text were made before translation. the numbers of the paragraphs and the marginal summaries do not appear in the original.' as was his wont with all his publications, professor oppenheim had sent the undersigned a copy of the german text. the value of 'this little work', as its author called it, was at once apparent, and he yielded to the suggestion that it be put into english, in order that it might be available to english readers in the four quarters of the globe. it was accordingly translated, set up in type, and was on the point of appearing, when on july , , the then austro-hungarian monarchy declared war upon serbia; on august the then german empire declared war upon russia, and two days later against france, violated the neutrality of luxemburg on the same day, and the neutrality of belgium on the night of the rd and th of august--thus beginning the series of wars which, taken together, are commonly called the world war. professor oppenheim subsequently came to the conclusion that it would be better to withhold publication until the end of the war. it was done, and the deposit of ratifications of the treaty of versailles on january , , removed this obstacle. it should be said, however, that professor oppenheim expressed doubts on more than one occasion as to the desirability of its publication, but he allowed himself to be persuaded that an english version might be of service to the great and worthy cause of international law and of international organization. modesty was not the least of his virtues. from time to time professor oppenheim has ventured into the same field. in , in the performance of his duty 'to lay down such rules and suggest such measures as may tend to diminish the evils of war and finally to extinguish war between nations', he delivered three lectures on _the league of nations and its problems_, as holder of the chair of international law, founded by dr. whewell in the university of cambridge. as in _the future of international law_, so in the lectures, he started from the hague conferences and made the work of the hague the foundation upon which he would base any scheme of international organization. the epigraph which he put upon the title-page, _festina lente_, indicated the spirit in which he approached his task and the advice which he felt called upon to give to the most casual of his readers. in the lectures he took a step in advance--or backward, according to the point of view--advocating that all members of a league of nations should 'agree to unite their economic, military, and naval forces against any one or more states which resort to arms without submitting their disputes to international courts of justice or international councils of conciliation'. in the course of , and after the signature of the treaty of versailles on june of that year, professor oppenheim contributed to the _revue générale de droit international public_ an article in french on _the essential character of the league of nations_. and what may be considered as his final views on the subject are contained in the third edition of his _treatise on international law_ (vol. i, pp. - ), the first volume of which appeared in . professor oppenheim accepted the league of nations, but his eyes were open to its defects as well as to its merits. the partisans of the present league of nations will prefer professor oppenheim's later views, as expressed in his lectures and in the _treatise on international law_. the opponents of the present league of nations will prefer his earlier views, contained in the present publication. the future will decide which are the more acceptable. at the oxford session of the institute of international law, held a year to the month before the outbreak of the world war, it was the custom of its members to pass the evenings together in informal discussion of their chosen subject. on one occasion the discussion assumed the form of a dialogue between professor oppenheim on the one hand and mr. elihu root on the other. at an unusually late hour the company broke up, and mr. root, putting out his hand to professor oppenheim, said, 'bon soir, cher maître'. james brown scott, _director of the division of international law_. washington, d.c. _february , ._ contents introduction page . international law in the past . no international law in antiquity . how the conception of a family of nations arose . the law of nature as the basis of the law of nations . positive international law . international legislation initiated by the congress of vienna . international administrative union . legislation of the peace conferences and of the naval conference of london . the permanent court of arbitration and other international courts . the hague peace conferences as a permanent institution . uncertainty as to the fate of the declaration of london and of some of the hague conventions . the task of the future chapter i the organization of the society of states . is the law of nations an anarchic law? . all law is order . the family of nations is a society ruled by law although it does not as yet possess special organs . not necessary that the family of nations should remain an unorganized society . the pacificist ideal of an organization of the family of nations . the world-state is not desirable . the world-state would not exclude war . war may gradually disappear without a world-state . importance of pacificism . impossible for the family of nations to organize itself on the model of the state . impossible to draft a plan for the complete organization of the family of nations . the permanent court of arbitration the nucleus of the future organization of the family of nations . the hague peace conferences as organs of the family of nations . outlines of a constitution of the family of nations . the proposed constitution leaves state-sovereignty intact . the equality of states . absence of any executive power chapter ii international legislation . quasi-legislation within the domain of international law . hague peace conferences as an organ for international legislation . difficulties in the way of international legislation. the language question . the opposing interests of the several states . contrasted methods of drafting . these difficulties distinct from those due to carelessness. article (_h_) of the hague regulations of land war is an example . the german and the english interpretation of article (_h_) . davis's interpretation of article (_h_) . impossible to reconcile the divergent views about article (_h_) . difficulties due to the fact that international law cannot be made by a majority vote, or repealed save by a unanimous vote. a way out found in the difference between universal and general international law . international laws which are limited in point of time . international legislation no longer to be left to mere chance . the declaration of london thoroughly prepared beforehand . the preparation of the declaration a pattern for future international legislation . intentionally incomplete and fragmentary laws . interpretation of international statutes . international differences as regards interpretation . different nations have different canons of interpretation . controverted interpretation of the declaration of london an example . some proposals for the avoidance of difficulties in interpretation chapter iii international administration of justice . law can exist without official administration . the hague court of arbitration as a permanent institution . the proposed international prize court and court of arbitral justice . does the constitution of the international prize court violate the principle of the equality of states? . does the international prize court restrict the sovereignty of the several states? . would the formation of an international prize court of appeal infringe the sovereignty of the several states? . the powers of the international prize court do not curtail state-sovereignty . difference between international courts of arbitration and real international courts of justice . fundamentals of arbitration in contradistinction to administration of justice by a court . opposition to a real international court . a real international court does not endanger the peaceable settlement of disputes . composition of an international court . international courts of appeal a necessity . are international courts valueless if states are not bound to submit their disputes to them? . what is to be done if a state refuses to accept the decision of an international court? . executive power not necessary for an international court . right of intervention by third states and war as _ultima ratio_ chapter iv the science of international law . new tasks for the science of international law . the science of international law must become positive . the science of international law must be impartial . the science of international law must free itself from the tyranny of phrases . the meaning of '_kriegsräson geht vor kriegsmanier_' . the doctrine of rousseau concerning war . the science of international law must become international . necessary to consult foreign literature on international law . necessary to understand foreign juristic methods conclusion . the aims defended are not utopian . obstacles to progress introduction [sidenote: international law in the past.] . he who would portray the future of international law must first of all be exact in his attitude towards its past and present. international law as the law of the international community of states, such as is the present-day conception of it, is of comparatively modern origin. science dutifully traces it back to hugo grotius as its father. in his immortal work on the _law of war and of peace_ he, with masterly touch, focalizes (as it were) all the tendencies which asserted themselves during the latter half of the middle ages into a law between independent states, in such sort that all subsequent development goes back to him. undoubtedly the roots of this law reach back into the remotest past of civilization, for independent states, nay, independent tribes too, cannot have more or less frequent dealings with each other without developing definite forms therefor. and so the immunity which must everywhere be conceded to ambassadors and heralds will probably be the oldest root of international law. [sidenote: no international law in antiquity.] . but all attempts to find in the ancient world a law of the same kind as modern international law must inevitably come to grief on the fact that the idea of a community of law between civilized states was entirely foreign to antiquity, and only begins to make its gradual appearance in the last third of the middle ages. the jewish ideal of perpetual peace and the union of all mankind under _one_ god, foreseen in prophetic vision by isaiah (ii. - ), may be taken as the first formulation of pacificist doctrine, which of course implies a community of law between all states, but the prophet does not apprehend this community of law as an independent idea. this idea was likewise unknown in its generality to greek civilization, although certainly looming before it with some clearness in the international relations of the greek city-states one to another. but even if we may speak of a law resembling in many respects modern international law as prevailing between the states of ancient greece, this law must nevertheless be limited to greek states, foreign states and peoples standing outside this community of law as barbarians. on the other hand, roman law possessed, it is true, a mass of legal rules for the intercourse between the roman empire and all foreign states, but these rules were _roman_ law and not rules of an international law such as postulates an international community of law. [sidenote: how the conception of a family of nations arose.] . the idea of an international community of law could not have obtained acceptance before a time when there existed a number of completely independent states, internally akin in virtue of a community of intensive civilization and continually brought into contact with one another by a lively intercourse. it was in this way that an international community of law was begotten at the end of the middle ages out of christian civilization and mutual intercourse. grotius and his forerunners would not have been able to create international law, had not the conception of a community of law between christian states enjoyed a general recognition, and had not international intercourse before their day evolved already a large number of rules of intercourse, which were based on custom and in part on very ancient usages. [sidenote: the law of nature as the basis of the law of nations.] . a theoretical basis for the erection of a system of international law was provided by the law of nature. this likewise is duteously traced back by science to grotius, although in this department also he stands on the shoulders of his predecessors. the riddle, how it was possible to find a foundation for international law (as also for constitutional law and other branches of law) in the law of nature, which itself reposed upon so unstable a basis, is easy of solution for those who contemplate the historical development of all law with minds clear from prejudice. the contention of the historical school that all law springs up 'naturally', like language, is chimerical. wherever a demand for law and order imperiously asserts itself, rules of law arise there. every epoch of history produces alike that mode of legal development which it needs and that theoretical basis therefor which corresponds to its own interpretation of the nature of things. accordingly the growth of law is everywhere dependent on, or at least influenced by, a conscious or unconscious creation of law. custom, usage, habit, religion, morality, the nature of the thing, tradition, reason, the examples of single individuals, and many other factors, contribute the material out of which the requisite rules of law are built up. where a strong central authority busies itself, year in year out, with legislation, expressly enacted law naturally takes the foremost place, and customary law makes itself felt to a less and less degree. but where such a strong central authority does not exist or does not busy itself with continuous legislation, then the above-named factors exercise a more direct influence upon the development of law, should there arise in actual life an imperious demand for definite rules of law. the theory of natural law was only the mirror held up by legal philosophy, in which the rays emitted by these factors were focused into a homogeneous image. [sidenote: positive international law.] . that, by the side of his international law, with its basis in natural law, there was also a positive international law, was not unrecognized by grotius, but his purpose was merely to depict a system of international law which should compel universal observance irrespective of time and nation. and shortly after grotius, zouche and his followers did indeed attempt, in opposition to him, to formulate just such a positive international law, but it could not win for itself, at any rate in the seventeenth century, any great recognition; development was overshadowed by the system of grotius, and many of his rules of natural law gradually obtained recognition in practice as customary law. but the increasing intercourse of states in the eighteenth century called forth a more positive school of international jurists, and the works of bynkershoek, moser, and martens fertilized the soil on which in the nineteenth century there could gradually grow a really positive theory of international law, even if the scales which betoken its past connexion with natural law still adhere to the international law of to-day. [sidenote: international legislation initiated by the congress of vienna.] . a positive theory of international law was demanded by the fact that in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, with the final act of the congress of vienna, the quasi-legislative activity of international conventions asserted itself for the first time. from then onwards, general international law was frequently evolved by means of an international convention. it was in this way that the permanent neutralization of switzerland, belgium, and luxemburg was effected, the navigation of the so-called international rivers in europe declared free, the slave-trade abolished, the grades of diplomatic agents regulated, privateering abolished, the necessity of effectiveness in a blockade recognized, the principle 'free ships, free goods' finally established, neutral goods on enemy ships declared free, rules provided in the interest of those wounded in battle, explosive bullets under the weight of grammes forbidden, the suez canal neutralized, and so forth. [sidenote: international administrative union.] . another fact of great importance is the endeavour, which first manifested itself in the world postal union of , to carry out the international administration of common interests, economic and other, by means of more or less general international unions. in this way a series of international administrative unions, often conjoined with special international boards, have been called into existence. [sidenote: legislation of the peace conferences and of the naval conference of london.] . with the end of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century, in which occur the first and second peace conferences at the hague and the naval conference of london, the development of international law enters upon a new and pregnant epoch. if hitherto, despite the momentous law-making treaties of the nineteenth century, international law was essentially a book-law, a system erected by greater or smaller authorities on the foundations of state practice and in its details often uncertain and contested, it is now subjected more and more, and in a wide domain, to the legislating influence of law-making international conventions. to mention only the principal matters: a code has been issued which, full of lacunae as it is, nevertheless encompasses the whole area of land war; it has been laid down that war shall only be begun by a declaration of war; the employment of force for the recovery of contract-debts has been forbidden; the rights and duties of neutrals in land war and naval war, the treatment of enemy merchant vessels at the outbreak of hostilities, and the conditions of the conversion of merchant vessels into men-of-war have been legislatively fixed; rules concerning the laying of submarine mines, concerning bombardment by naval forces in time of war, concerning the application of the principles of the geneva convention to naval warfare, concerning certain limitations on the right of prize in naval warfare have been agreed on; many states have concurred in a prohibition of the discharge of explosive missiles from air-ships; and a code of the rules of naval warfare, so far as it touches the trade of neutrals, dealing with the topics of blockade, contraband of war, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, sale of enemy merchantmen to neutrals, enemy property, convoy and so forth, has been agreed on, though still unratified. [sidenote: the permanent court of arbitration and other international courts.] . it is noteworthy that the first hague conference established a permanent international arbitral tribunal and that the second hague conference decided on the establishment of an international prize court and produced a plan for a standing international court at the hague. hitherto there have been no international courts for the decision of disputes, and if contending powers have been ready to refer their disputes to arbitration, they have always first had to form an arbitral tribunal; but now there is in existence an actual international court of arbitration, and other international courts are in contemplation. [sidenote: the hague peace conferences as a permanent institution.] . lastly, it is noteworthy that in the final act of the second hague conference a recommendation was expressed that the powers should call a third conference in the year , and two years before its meeting should appoint a preparatory committee, entrusted, among other things, with the task of proposing a system of organization and procedure for the coming conference. this recommendation gives the first impetus towards making the hague conferences a permanent institution and so ensuring their periodic assembly without the need of initiative on the part of some one power or another. [sidenote: uncertainty as to the fate of the declaration of london and of some of the hague conventions.] . neither all the results of the second hague peace conference nor those of the london naval conference are as yet assured, for the declaration of london has not yet been ratified, and so the fate of the international prize court is still involved in doubt. the fate of some of the numerous conventions of the second hague conference is still in similar doubt, and many of those conventions which have been ratified present only a fragmentary and provisional settlement of their respective topics. whatever may be the fate of these agreements which are still in suspense, this much is certain, that international legislation, international administration of justice, and international organization occupy the foreground of affairs, have already been in part established, and must be in ever-increasing requisition by the present and the coming generation. [sidenote: the task of the future.] . if in the following pages i undertake the discussion of these three weighty matters, it is entirely foreign to my purpose to peer into the future with the eyes of prophecy or to busy my fancy with building castles in the air. what i propose is only to place in clear light the problems which are now coming into view and to furnish some indications which may contribute to their successful solution. if it is only to happy accident that we owe the assembling of the peace conferences, and likewise the issues of the same, we must all the more attempt in the future to assure success by dint of careful deliberation, systematic preparation, and a purposeful consideration of the problems which press for attention. and the science of international law must bethink itself and devote itself, with a more exact method than has hitherto been usual, to the elaboration of the results of past and future conferences and to the incorporation of them in its system. chapter i the organization of the society of states [sidenote: is the law of nations an anarchic law?] . international legislation and administration presuppose the existence of law and order within the society of states, and this latter topic must therefore be treated before the former. international law has been called 'anarchic law' on the ground that hitherto the society of states has not been organized and that it must ever remain unorganized on account of the complete sovereignty of its members. it seems to me that this position is untenable. the idea of anarchy forms a contrast to that of law. law can as little be anarchic as anarchy can be an institute of law. the conception of the one excludes the other. he who cannot conceive of law apart from a superior power enforcing it on its subjects, may perhaps call the international society of states anarchic, but then he will also have to contest the existence of an international law, and, logically, he should also deny the possibility of the existence of an international society. [sidenote: all law is order.] . he, however, who identifies law and order, and who, whenever he finds in any society rules making their appearance which are conceived as compulsory for the conduct of its members, speaks of law--in contrast to morality, the observance of which is left to the conscience of the members--will also be able to speak of law in a society where there is no relation of superior and subject, provided only that the relation between the members is regulated in an ordered manner. that the international society of states is orderly regulated after this wise will be denied by no one who looks at it without prejudice, and who does not confuse order in a society with order of such a kind as is maintained by special organs of the society in question. [sidenote: the family of nations is a society ruled by law although it does not as yet possess special organs.] . the admission that hitherto the international society of states has not possessed any special organs, is not an admission that it has not been an ordered society. quite the contrary is the case, for numerous rules may be pointed to which show that that society is an ordered one. there are the rules which relate to the independence of each state of all other states, to the equality of all states, to their supremacy both personal and territorial, and to their responsibility; and in addition there are those rules which, exceptionally, allow, or at any rate excuse, certain inroads on the legal sphere of other states. and the admission that hitherto this society has possessed no permanent special organs is not an admission that no ways and means are available for the maintenance of existing order and for the formation of more thoroughgoing order, and for the development of a quasi-legislative and administrative activity. here, too, quite the contrary is the case. every state has possessed and possesses numerous organs for its international relations, these relations are governed by international conventions and international custom, and numerous congresses and conferences assemble from time to time, when it is a question of making international arrangements of a more general character. in this way it has been possible, even without permanent organs of the international society, to increase and multiply the rules of the law of this society. it does not follow, however, that this society would not attain its aims better than in the past, if it were able to convert itself from an unorganized into an organized society. [sidenote: not necessary that the family of nations should remain an unorganized society.] . the assertion that, because of the unlimited sovereignty of its members, the family of nations must remain for all time an unorganized society, either has in view the organization of international society _on the model of a state_, or is founded on an untenable conception of the idea of sovereignty. if the compression of the whole world into the form of a single state were attained, the states of the day would certainly lose their sovereignty and be degraded into provinces. on the other hand, however, the sovereignty of the members of the international society just as little excludes its organization as the fact of the existence of this society excludes the sovereignty of its members. sovereignty as the highest earthly authority, which owes allegiance to no other power, does not exclude the possibility that the sovereign should subject himself to a self-imposed order, so long as this order does not place him under any higher earthly power. all members of the international society thus subject themselves in point of fact to the law of nations without suffering the least diminution of their sovereignty. but of course, for him to whom sovereignty is equivalent to unrestrained power and unlimited arbitrariness of conduct, there cannot be any international law at all, any more than any constitutional law, seeing that international and constitutional law are opposed to absolute arbitrariness, even though they recognize that a sovereign state is the highest earthly authority. [sidenote: the pacificist ideal of an organization of the family of nations.] . hitherto, the demand for an organization of the international society has always issued from the pacificist party, in order to render the suppression of war possible. in the struggle round the pacificist ideal the chief objection has always been the absence of any judicial authority over states, and of any supreme executive power, able to compel, in a dispute between states, the execution of a judicial decree. accordingly it has been the aim of the pacificists to obtain an organization of the international society, such as would compress the whole world, or at least whole parts of the world, such as europe and america, into the form of a federal state or a system of confederated states. the belief is that only in this way can war be got rid of as a mode of settling disputes between states, and thereby the ever-increasing demands of naval and military budgets be avoided. [sidenote: the world-state is not desirable.] . whatever else can be urged against a universal federal state and the like, it is at the present day no longer a physical impossibility. distance has been so conquered by the telegraph, the railway, and the steamboat, that in fact the annual assembly of a world-parliament would be no impossibility, and in any case a world-government, wherever its seat might be, would be able to secure almost immediate obedience to its behests in the uttermost parts of the earth. there is, indeed, only a quantitative and not a qualitative difference between a command issued by the british government in london to the remotest part of india or africa, and such a command as, in a federal state comprising the whole world, would issue to the remotest part of the earth from the central government. moreover, the ever-increasing international intercourse and its results--the expression 'internationalism', to denote this, is found to-day in all languages--has brought the populations of the various states so near to one another, and has so closely interwoven their interests, that on this ground also the theoretical possibility of erecting and maintaining a world-state of the federal type cannot be denied. but its theoretical and physical possibility prove absolutely nothing as regards its utility and desirability. in spite of all my sympathy with the efforts of my idealistic pacificist friends, it is my firm conviction that the world-state is in no form practically useful or desirable, for it would bring death instead of life. so far as we can foresee, the development of mankind is inseparably bound up with the national development of the different peoples and states. in these conditions variety brings life, but unity brings death. just as the freedom and competition of individuals is needed for the healthy progress of mankind, so also is the independence and rivalry of the various nations. a people that is split up into different states may attain its national development better in a federal state than in a unitary state, and smaller nations and fragments of nations may (let us admit) develop better when combined into one state which has grown up historically out of several nationalities, than each would do in a state of its own, but the rule nevertheless remains, that strong nations can develop successfully only in an entirely independent and self-supported state of their own. [sidenote: the world-state would not exclude war.] . further, it is by no means sure that war would necessarily disappear from a world-state. the example of the duel is instructive here. although forbidden in all civilized states and threatened with penalties, it--certain states excepted--continues to flourish. enactments being impotent where the public sentiment of the dominant class refuses them any moral recognition, the duel will not disappear so long as the moral attitude of the circles concerned demands it as a protection for personal honour. and the _sonderbund_ war of in switzerland, the american war of secession from to , and the austro-prussian war of within the german _bund_, show that organization into a confederation of states or into a federal state does not necessarily banish war. [sidenote: war may gradually disappear without a world-state.] . on the other hand, the gradual disappearance of war, which certainly is a correct ideal, is to be hoped for and expected quite apart from any development of a world-state, even if neither to-day nor to-morrow can be contemplated for the complete realization of this ideal. many states have already entered into numerous agreements with other individual states to refer to arbitration disputed questions of law and questions about the interpretation of treaties, so far as these disputed questions do not touch the vital interests, independence, or honour of the parties. it is here that further development must begin. the man who is not a victim to prejudice asks the reasonable question, why should vital interests and the independence and honour of states necessarily be withdrawn from the domain of judicial decision? if individuals in a state submit themselves to the judge's sentence, even when their vital interests, their honour, their economic independence, aye, and their physical existence are in issue, why should it be impossible for states to do the same? if only we succeeded in the clear enunciation of legal rules for all international relations; if only we could succeed in finding independent and unbiased men to whose judgment a state could confidently submit its cause; if only we could succeed in bringing such men together in an independent international court--there would then be no reason why the great majority of states should not follow the example of the very small minority which has already agreed to settle all possible disputes by means of arbitration. the objection that a state could not submit its honour, for example, to the sentence of a judge is as little entitled to recognition as is the claim, made by those dominant classes which in many states glorify the duel, that men of honour could not settle an affair of their honour by means of a judge's decree. as long as public sentiment concerning international relations remains rooted in its present position, it must be confessed that there can be no talk of any progress, just as the duel also will not disappear as long as there is no success in bringing about a change of moral attitude on the part of the classes concerned. but by degrees obsolete moral positions are undermined by all kinds of influences, then they are abandoned and higher positions are adopted in their stead. [sidenote: importance of pacificism.] . it is here that the importance and value of the modern pacificist movement emerge with clearness. wide circles are caught by this movement, even the governments of all countries are no longer able to hold aloof from its influence, and its opponents too can no longer fight it with nothing but scorn and ridicule. whoever is a believer in the unlimited progress of civilization will also believe that a time must come when all states will freely bind themselves to submit all disputes to judicial or arbitral decision. general disarmament will not hasten the dawn of this day, for it can only arrive through the deepening of the public sentiment with reference to international relations. general disarmament will not make wars to cease, but the ceasing of war will bring about general disarmament! as already said, not to-day nor to-morrow will this time come; we stand now only at the very beginning of the developments that make for the realization of this ideal. it cannot come to pass unless and until international society develops an organization of a kind ever tending to perfect itself. [sidenote: impossible for the family of nations to organize itself on the model of the state.] . how then must and will this organization take shape? the proposals which hitherto have been made for the organization of the world are freaks of fancy. of notable value as indications of idealistic speculation in the midst of an adverse world, they crumble into dust immediately they are soberly scrutinized. all proposals which aim at the organization of international society after the pattern of the organization of the state--whether a unitary state or a federal state, or a system of confederated states--are either impracticable or do not meet the needs of the case. every organization of the community of states must take as its starting-point the full sovereignty and the absolute equality of states, and must preserve these characters intact. there can, therefore, be no talk of a political central authority standing above individual states; and so the organization in question must be _sui generis_ and cannot frame itself on the model of state organization. [sidenote: impossible to draft a plan for the complete organization of the family of nations.] . it is, however, impossible to draft at the present time the plan of such a complete organization in its details or even in mere outline. the growth and final shaping of the international organization will go hand in hand with the progress of the law of nations. now the progress of the law of nations is conditioned by the growth of the international community in mental strength, and this growth in mental strength in its turn is conditioned by the growth in strength and in bulk, the broadening and the deepening, of private and public international interests, and of private and public morale. in the nature of the case this progress can mature only very slowly. we have here to do with a process of development lasting over many generations and probably throughout centuries, the end of which no man can foresee. it is enough for us to have the beginning of the development before our eyes and, so far as our strength and insight extend, to have the opportunity of trying to give it its appropriate aim and direction. more we cannot do. much, if not all, depends on whether the _international_ interests of individual states become stronger than their _national_ interests, for no state puts its hand to the task of international organization save when, and so far as, its international interests urge it more or less irresistibly so to do. [sidenote: the permanent court of arbitration the nucleus of the future organization of the family of nations.] . i said, we have the beginning of the development before our eyes. it consists in the erection of the permanent court of arbitration at the hague, and in the permanent bureau attached thereto. here we have an institution belonging not to the individual contracting states but to the international society of states in contrast to the individual members, and it is open to the use of all the individual members. if the declaration of london be ratified, and if (which scarcely admits of doubt) it be adopted by all the states which were not represented at the conference of london, then the international prize court, which was decided on at the second hague conference, will become a fact. this court will also become an organ of the international community. mention must also be made of the so-called international bureaux of the so-called international unions, which have come into existence in the period beginning with ; for some at least of them will develop into organs of international society, although they so far are only organs of the respective special international unions. [sidenote: the hague peace conferences as organs of the family of nations.] . reference must in conclusion be made to the hague peace conferences themselves, for it is to be expected that such conferences will assemble periodically in the future. if success attends the effort to bring all members of the international community to an agreement, in virtue of which a hague peace conference assembles at periodic intervals without being called together by this or that power, then an organ of international society will have arisen, the value of which none can decry. it will then be possible to say that the international community has become an actually organized society, and it will then be no longer open to doubt that the organization of this society will gradually become more and more developed. before everything else this at least will then be attained, that an organ of the international society of states, comparable to the parliaments of individual states, will have come into existence, which can attend to international legislation as the needs of the time require, and can cause a continuous growth in the range of matters submitted to international tribunals. all the same, i yield myself to no hot-blooded hope of a speedy realization of utopian schemes. even when this organization is already there, progress will be but slight and gradual, and will encounter unceasing opposition. progress in this department has always to reckon on a conflict with adverse interests and efforts, and it must be expected that in the continuous struggle between _international_ and _national_ interests the latter will only slowly prepare themselves to yield. [sidenote: outlines of a constitution of the family of nations.] . it is not, however, enough that agreement should make periodic peace conferences a permanent institution. the international community must provide itself with a constitution, the ground-plan of which would be something like the following: . the society of states is composed of all sovereign states which mutually recognize each other's internal and external independence. . every recognized sovereign state has the right to take part in the peace conferences. . no state taking part in the conferences is bound by the resolutions of the conferences without its assent. majority resolutions only bind the members of that majority. on the other hand, no state is entitled to require that only such resolutions be adopted as it assents to. . every participant state has the right to be heard at the conferences, to bring forward proposals, to make motions, and to speak on the proposals and motions of other participants. . a standing international commission shall be appointed whose duty it shall be to summon all the members of the international community to the conferences, to make previous inquiries as to the proposals and motions which are to be brought before the conference and to inform all participants of them, and to prepare and carry out all other business which the conferences may from time to time entrust to it. . rules of procedure for the conferences shall be elaborated, which shall govern the conduct of the proceedings of the conferences, so that the proceedings can follow a defined course without degenerating into a time-wasting discussion. . the question of the presidency of the conferences shall be settled once for all, so that no room be left for quarrels and jealousies about precedence. it might perhaps be found expedient before every conference to decide on the presidency by lot. . all resolutions come into force only when and so far as they are ratified by the respective states. on the other hand, every state binds itself, once and for all, to carry out in good faith the resolutions which it has ratified. . all states bind themselves to submit to the decisions of the international tribunals to which they have appealed, so far as these decisions are within the competence of the respective tribunals. something like this would be the ground-plan of a constitution of the international community. rules - are demanded by the nature of the case; rules - and - contain nothing new, but merely express what observation would show to be the legal position at present. [sidenote: the proposed constitution leaves state-sovereignty intact.] . it must be particularly remarked that such a constitution can in no way infringe on the full sovereignty of individual states. apart from the fact that the idea of sovereignty indicates an absolute independence of any higher earthly power, that idea has never acquired a rigid and uniformly recognized content. times and circumstances have influenced and shaped it in different states and in the mouths of different authorities. this development of the idea, an idea which has won a place for itself and the retention of which seems desirable despite all opposition, may go further still in the future. [sidenote: the equality of states.] . the proposed constitution, further, makes no inroad at all on the equality of states. this equality is the indispensable foundation of international society. the idea of equality merely expresses the fact that in all resolutions of the international society every state, whatever may be its size and political importance, obtains one voice and no more than one, that every state can be bound by a resolution only with its consent, and that no state can exercise jurisdiction over another state. it does not and cannot express more. in no circumstances is it to be asserted that unanimity is a condition for all resolutions of the conferences, and that all resolutions are void to which one or more states refuse their consent. of course, such resolutions bind those only who assent to them, and of course unanimous resolutions alone can be considered to be universally binding. but nothing should hinder the conferences--and so it happened in the two first conferences--from passing majority resolutions. it must never be lost sight of that such majority resolutions do not go to form a _universal_ but only a _general_ law of nations. only he who repudiates the necessary distinction between a particular and a general and a universal law of nations can demand unanimity. now the development which up to the present has taken place in the law of nations has shown the necessity of this distinction. it would be extremely difficult to enumerate any large number of universally accepted rules of the law of nations--apart from those which have obtained recognition as customary law. we have only to think of the declaration of paris, to which some states still refuse assent. history also teaches us that the general law of nations has a tendency gradually to become the universal law of nations. it is therefore permissible, when a forward step which fails to gain unanimous approval has become a practical matter, for that majority of states which is ready for it to take the step by themselves; the dissenting states will give in their adhesion in course of time. and if and when this should turn out not to be the case, such a majority resolution would anyhow represent, in a narrower circle of international society, a step forward from which there is no obligation to forbear merely because others are unwilling to join in taking it. [sidenote: absence of any executive power.] . this constitution, finally, makes no provision for any kind of executive power, and so it avoids the proposal to set up in international society an organization resembling that of a state. all proposals for an international executive authority run counter not only to the idea of sovereignty, but also to the ideal of international peace and of international law. the aim of this development is not the coercion of recalcitrant states, but a condition of things in which there are no recalcitrant states because every state has freely submitted to the obligation to refer disputes to the international tribunals and to abide by their decision. it is just in this respect that the international community of states differs for all time from the community of individuals who are united into a state, the latter requiring as _ultima ratio_ executive compulsion on the part of a central power, while the former consistently with its nature and definition can never possess such a central power. it will, we must confess, call for a long development before such a condition of things is realized, and, until this realization is effected, war will not disappear but will remain an historic necessity. chapter ii international legislation [sidenote: quasi-legislation within the domain of international law.] . when we speak of legislation we have in view as a rule a state, wherein there is a law-making power which acts without reference to the consent of individual subjects. for even if in a constitutional state an individual does anyhow exercise so much influence upon legislation as comes from voting at the election of members of parliament, still he has no direct influence, and must submit to a law that has been enacted whether he approves of it or not. that is why it is asserted that there cannot be any talk of legislation in the domain of international law. and, in fact, that is so if we adhere rigorously to the meaning of the concept 'legislation', as developed in the domain of internal state life. the nature of the case does not, however, demand so rigid an adherence as this; legislation is really nothing more than the conscious creation of law in contrast to the growth of law out of custom. and it is an admitted fact that, side by side with international law developed in this latter way, there is an international law which the members of the community of states have expressly created by agreement. we might therefore quite well substitute the term _agreeing a law_ for the term _decreeing a law_,--but why introduce a new technical term? this international 'agreeing a law' does consciously and intentionally create law, and it is therefore a source of law. and provided that we always bear in mind that this source of law operates only through a quasi-legislative activity, there is no obstacle to speaking, in a borrowed sense, of international 'legislation'. nevertheless, agreeable and apt as this term is, it must not lead us to assimilate the internal legislation of a state and international legislation save in the one respect that in both law is made in a direct, conscious and purposive manner, in contrast to law that originates in custom. [sidenote: hague peace conferences as an organ for international legislation.] . international law of the legislative kind existed before the law of the hague peace conferences; it issued from the conventions drawn up from time to time at congresses and conferences. it was a great step forward that the congress of vienna was able, for the first time, to create general international law by agreement, and that thereby general international law of the legislative kind could come into existence side by side with the customary law of nations. but the nineteenth century introduced international legislation only occasionally. if, as sketched above, success attends the attempt to make the hague peace conferences a permanent institution, there would be evolved for the society of states a legislative organ corresponding to the parliaments of individual states. a wide field opens thus for further international legislative activity. even if the time be not ripe for a comprehensive codification of the whole law of nations, there is nevertheless a series of matters in need of international regulation; for example, extradition, the so-called international private law and international criminal law, acquisition and loss of nationality, and a series of other matters, not to mention matters of international administration. matters which are already governed by customary law might also be brought within the domain of enacted law, and at the same time could be put as regards details upon a surer basis. i have in mind the law of ambassadors and consuls, the law concerning the open sea and territorial waters, the law about merchantmen and men-of-war in foreign territorial waters, and more of this kind. [sidenote: difficulties in the way of international legislation.] . the peculiar character of international legislation involves, however, difficulties of all sorts. [sidenote: the language question.] there is, to begin with, the question of language. seeing that it is impossible to employ all languages in the enactment of rules of international law, an agreement must be made for adopting some one language for these laws, in the same way that french is used at the present time. but the difficulty thence arising is not insuperable, and is hardly greater than that which is encountered in drafting a treaty between peoples whose speech belongs to different families. it must, however, be a rigid rule that in every case of doubt the text of the law in its original language--not that of a translation into the languages of other countries--is authoritative. [sidenote: the opposing interests of the several states.] . there is, secondly, the difficulty of contenting the opposite interests of the members of the community of states. but this, too, is in practice not insurmountable. of course, where there is such a brawling between these interests that no agreement is possible, there can from the outset be no talk of international legislation. this, however, is not everywhere the case. on the contrary, it is often and in different areas the case, that the _international_ interests of states make themselves felt so urgently and so cogently that these states are ready to sacrifice their particular interests if only a reasonable compromise be open to them. [sidenote: contrasted methods of drafting.] . there is further the difficulty of finding expression in adequate language for the intention of the legislator. even the internal legislation of states suffers under this difficulty in so far as the art of legislation is still very clumsy and undeveloped. for _international_ legislation there is in addition the further difficulty that different groups of peoples employ very different methods in drafting their laws. if we were to give to an englishman, a frenchman, and a german the task of drafting a law upon the same topic, and if they were provided with the point of view from which the regulation of individual points was to proceed, so that the intention of the draftsmen would be the same, three very different drafts would nevertheless emerge. the english draft would deal in the most concrete manner possible with the situations to which it meant to apply; it would adduce as many particular cases as possible, and so would run the risk of forgetting some series of cases altogether. the german draft would be as abstract as is possible, and would entirely disregard individual cases, except such as required a special treatment; and so it would expose itself to the danger that in practice cases would be brought within the enactment which were outside the intention of the legislator. the french draft would attach more weight to principles than to individual points, enunciating principles in a legislative manner and leaving it to practice to construct out of these principles the rule for the particular case. now, seeing that french is the language of international legislation, and so in the editing of drafts at the hague conferences the lion's share will naturally fall to french jurists attending the conference, it will scarcely be possible to prevent the french method of legislation from obtaining great influence over international legislation. but there is no need for this mode of legislation to become dominant. the jurist representatives of other states must see to it that the french method is perfected by their own; the english and the germans must make it their business to bring the drafts into a more concrete form, and to split up principles into more abstract rules. in this way, it may in time be possible by means of common international labour to make essential advance in the art of legislation. [sidenote: these difficulties distinct from those due to carelessness.] . but the difficulties inherent in the legislative method must not be confused with those which come from a careless employment of the method; the latter must always be avoided, otherwise we arrive at contradictions of interpretation, and these are insuperable. [sidenote: article (_h_) of the hague regulations of land war is an example.] an example of such carelessness is afforded by the incorporation--at the second hague conference--of a new provision in the former article of the 'regulations respecting the laws of land warfare'. i am referring to the provision added under the letter (_h_), which runs as follows: [it is forbidden] 'to declare extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law, the rights and rights of action of the nationals of the adverse party'. [sidenote: the german and the english interpretation of article (_h_).] . from the german memorandum on the second peace conference it is quite clear that this additional rule, which was proposed by germany and adopted by the conference, was directed to the alteration of the rule, prevailing in several states, whereby during a war the subjects of one belligerent lose in the country of the other belligerent their _persona standi in judicio_, and the like. it is in this sense, then, that the addition has been unanimously interpreted by german literature, with the agreement of many foreign writers. the official standpoint of england, on the contrary, is that article (_h_) has nothing whatever to do with the municipal law of the belligerent countries. article (_h_), so the english foreign office explains, forms a subdivision of article , which itself comes under the second section (headed 'hostilities') of the regulations, and forbids a series of acts which otherwise might be resorted to in the exercise of hostilities by the members of the contending armies, and by their commanding officers. that this interpretation is the right one--so it is further explained by the english side--is shown by the fact that article of the convention expressly says, with reference to the 'regulations respecting the laws of land warfare', that the contracting parties shall issue to their armed land forces instructions which shall be in conformity with the 'regulations respecting the laws of land warfare' annexed to the convention. it would therefore be the duty of every contracting power to instruct the commanders of its forces in an enemy's country (among other things) not 'to declare extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law, the rights and rights of action of the nationals of the adverse party'. [sidenote: davis's interpretation of article (_h_)] . this is also the opinion of davis, one of the american delegates to the second hague conference; he gives the following explanation with regard to article (_h_), in the third edition of his _elements of international law_ (new york, ), p. : in this article a number of acts are described to which neither belligerent is permitted to resort in the conduct of his military operations. it was the well-understood purpose of the convention of to impose certain reasonable and wholesome restrictions upon the authority of commanding generals and their subordinates in the theatre of belligerent activity. it is more than probable that this humane and commendable purpose would fail of accomplishment if a military commander conceived it to be within his authority to suspend or nullify their operation, or to regard their application as a matter falling within his administrative discretion. especially is this true where a military officer refuses to receive well-grounded complaints, or declines to consider demands for redress, in respect to the acts or conduct of the troops under his command, from persons subject to the jurisdiction of the enemy, who find themselves, for the time being, in the territory which he holds in military occupation. to provide against such a contingency it was deemed wise to add an appropriate declaratory clause to the prohibitions of article . the prohibition is included in section (_h_). [sidenote: impossible to reconcile the divergent views about article (_h_).] . if, from the fact that davis was an american delegate, we may conclude that he represents the government view of the united states of north america, we are confronted by the fact that official england and america adopt an interpretation of article (_h_) which is entirely at variance with that of germany, and it is quite impossible to build a bridge of reconciliation between the two camps. this regrettable fact has its origin simply in the careless use of the legislative method. if the german conception of article (_h_) be the correct one, the lines of subsection (_h_) ought never to have found a shelter in article , for they have not the slightest connexion with hostilities between the contending forces. if, on the other hand, the anglo-american interpretation be the right one, pains should have been taken to secure a wholly different draft of the provision in question, for the present wording is by no means transparently clear. the protocols of the conference (_actes_, i, ; iii, , ) are not sufficiently explicit on the matter. the german delegate, göppert, did indeed explain (cf. _actes_, iii, ) at the session of the first subcommission of the second commission on july , , 'that this proposal is in the direction of not limiting to corporeal goods the inviolability of enemy property, and that it has in view the whole domain of obligations with the object of forbidding all legislative measures which, in time of war, would deprive an enemy subject of the right to take proceedings for the performance of a contract in the courts of the adverse party'. but we shall scarcely go wrong if we assume that the members of the second commission, who were entrusted with the consideration of the 'regulations respecting the laws of land warfare', had not sufficiently realized the full meaning of the german proposal. it would otherwise be quite unintelligible that the reporter upon the german proposal could say (cf. _actes_, i, ): 'this addition is deemed a very happy attempt to bring out in clear language one of the principles admitted in ', for these 'principles' (concerning the immunity of the private property of enemy subjects in land warfare) have very little indeed to do with the question of the _persona standi in judicio_ of an enemy subject. [sidenote: difficulties due to the fact that international law cannot be made by a majority vote, or repealed save by a unanimous vote.] . a difficulty of a special kind besets international legislation, owing to the fact that international rules cannot be created by a majority vote, and that, when once in existence, they cannot be repealed save by a unanimous resolution. [sidenote: a way out found in the difference between universal and general international law.] but when once we free ourselves from the preconception that the equality of states makes it improper for legislative conferences to adopt any resolutions which are not unanimously supported, there is nothing to prevent a substantial result being arrived at even without unanimity. at this point the difference between general and universal international law furnishes a way out. rules of universal international law must certainly rest on unanimity. it is postulated in the equality of states that no state can be bound by any law to which it has not given its consent. but there is naught to prevent a legislative conference from framing rules of general international law for those states which assent to it and leaving the dissentient states out of consideration. if the inclusion in a single convention of all the points under discussion be avoided, and if the method, adopted at the second peace conference, of dividing the topics of discussion among as many smaller conventions as possible be followed, it will always be found possible to secure the support of the greater number of states for the regulation of any given matter. in no long time thereafter the dissentient states will give in their adherence to these conventions, either in their existing or some amended form. attention will then be paid also to the consolidation of several smaller laws in a single more comprehensive statute. the nature of the case and the conditions of international life call for concessions without which no progress would be practicable. the course of international legislation hitherto shows unmistakably that the trodden path is the right path. and it must be emphasized that it is open to a state to assent to an act of international legislation although some one or other provision thereof be unacceptable to it. in such a case the assent of the state in question is given with a reservation as regards the particular article of the act, so that it is in no wise bound by that article. numerous instances of this could be adduced: thus, at the hague conference of germany withheld her assent to some of the proposed rules of land war, and england to certain articles in conventions v and xiii. [sidenote: international laws which are limited in point of time.] . so also, the difficulty is not insuperable as regards the other point, namely, that international enactments when once in existence cannot be repealed or amended save by a unanimous resolution of the participant states. here, too, the analogy between municipal and international legislation must not be pushed too far. municipal legislation can at any time be annulled or altered by the sovereign law-maker; but international legislation, for want of a sovereign over sovereign states, is not open to such treatment. here there is a way out, which was in fact adopted at the second peace conference, and also at the naval conference of london, namely, the enactment of laws so limited in duration to a period of years, that at the expiry of the period every participant state can withdraw. in this way, for example, it was agreed that the law about the international prize court and the declaration of london should only be in force for twelve years, and that any of the powers which were parties thereto might withdraw twelve months before the expiry of that period, and that, if and as far as no withdrawal ensued, these laws should from time to time be continued in force automatically for a further period of six years. this kind of international legislation, with its time limit and the right of denunciation, is to be recommended wherever more or less hazardous legislative experiments are being made, or where interests are at stake which in course of time are liable to such an alteration as obliges states to insist on the amendment or repeal of the previously made law. for example, the international prize court as a whole, and its composition, constitution, and procedure in particular, form an unparalleled experiment. but the fact that its institution is only to be agreed on for a period of twelve years facilitates its general acceptance, because of the possibility of either abrogating it altogether, or of reforming it, should experience show this to be necessary. [sidenote: international legislation no longer to be left to mere chance.] . however this may be, one point must be decisively emphasized,--international legislation can no longer be left to mere chance. apart from the declaration of london and the geneva convention, it has always hitherto been a more or less happy chance which has controlled international legislation. of conscious legislative consideration and deliberation, based on far-reaching, thoroughgoing preparation, there is no trace. for example, the declaration of paris of was but a by-product of the peace of paris of the same year. so also the legislation of the first peace conference was simply due to the anxiety to accomplish something positive which might conceal the fact that the proposed aim of the conference--general disarmament, to wit--had in no wise been realized. at the second peace conference we did indeed see individual states appear with some well-prepared projects of legislation, but the preparation was entirely one-sided on the part of the states in question, and not general; accordingly, the adoption, rejection, amendment, and final shaping of these projects were also none the less the result of chance. the second peace conference itself took steps to prevent a repetition of this, calling the attention of the powers in its final act to the necessity of preparing the programme of the future third conference a sufficient time in advance to ensure its deliberations being conducted with the necessary authority and expedition: in order to attain this object the conference considers that it would be very desirable that, some two years before the probable date of the meeting, a preparatory committee should be charged by the governments with the task of collecting the various proposals to be submitted to the conference, of ascertaining what subjects are ripe for embodiment in an international regulation, and of preparing a programme which the governments should decide upon in sufficient time to enable it to be carefully examined by each country. [sidenote: the declaration of london thoroughly prepared beforehand.] . in contrast to the rules of the peace conferences, a really notable and exemplary preparation took place in connexion with the declaration of london, and the befitting result was a law excellent alike in matter and in form. england, the state which summoned the naval conference of london, made a collection of the topics which would arise, and communicated it to the states attending the conference with the request that they would send in full statements on the subjects mentioned. after the answers to this request had come in they were collated with regard to each of the points on which discussion would arise, and _bases de discussion_ were elaborated which made a thorough examination of each point possible at the conference. by this means it was at once made clear when the different states were in accord and when not. the door to compromise was opened. and apart from a few vexed questions an agreement was in this way successfully reached with regard to a comprehensive law resting at every point on exhaustive deliberation. [sidenote: the preparation of the declaration a pattern for future international legislation.] . this model method must be the method of the future. if, as indicated in § above, art. , a permanent commission for the preparation of the peace conferences be successfully inaugurated, it will be its task to make preliminary preparations for the legislative activity of the conferences in the manner just sketched out, and chance will no longer have the same part to play as heretofore. international legislation will no longer produce anything so full of gaps as the 'regulations respecting the laws of land warfare', which leave essential matters--for instance, capitulations and armistices--without any adequate regulation. [sidenote: intentionally incomplete and fragmentary laws.] . of course, where the interests of different states are still involved in some uncertainty, or are in such antagonism that a complete agreement is impossible, even the fullest preparation and most painstaking deliberation will not procure a more satisfactory treatment for many matters than that the legislation which regulates them should be (so to say) only experimental and intentionally incomplete and fragmentary in character. thus, for example, the conventions about the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war and about the use of mines in naval war can only be considered as legislative experiments, regulating these matters merely temporarily and in an incomplete and unsatisfactory manner. but even conventions which designedly are full of lacunae have their value. they embody all the same an agreement upon some important parts of the respective topics, and provide a regulation which in every case is better than the chaos previously prevailing in the areas in question. they also constitute a firm nucleus round which either custom or future legislation can develop further regulation. [sidenote: interpretation of international statutes.] . but even if international legislation attains the degree of success suggested, there still remains another great difficulty which must indirectly influence legislation itself, and that is the interpretation of international statutes once they have been enacted. it is notorious that no generally received rule of the law of nations exists for the interpretation of international treaties. grotius and his successors applied thereto the rules of interpretation adopted in roman law, but these rules, despite their aptness, are not recognized as international rules of construction. it can scarcely be said, however, that insurmountable difficulties have arisen hitherto out of this situation, for the majority of treaties have been between two parties, and the interpretation thereof is the affair of the contracting parties exclusively, and can be ultimately settled by arbitration. but in the case of general or universal international enactments we have to deal with conventions between a large number of states or between all states, and the question, accordingly, now becomes acute. [sidenote: international differences as regards interpretation.] . the difficulty of solving this question is increased by the fact that jurists of different nations are influenced by their national idiosyncrasies in the interpretation of enactments, and are dependent on the method of their school of law. here are contrarieties which must always make themselves powerfully felt. the continental turn of mind is abstract, the turn of the english and american mind is concrete. germans, french, and italians have learnt to apply the abstract rules of codified law to concrete cases; in their abstract mode of thought they believe in general principles of law, and they work outwards from these. english and americans, on the contrary, learn their law from decided cases--'law is that which the courts recognize as a coactive rule' is an accepted and widely current definition of law in the anglo-american jurisprudence; they regard abstract legal rules, which for the most part they do not understand, with marked distrust; they work outwards from previously decided cases and, when a new case arises, they always look for the respects in which it is to be taken as covered by previous cases; they turn away as far as possible from general principles of law, and always fasten on the characteristic features of the particular case. if continental jurists may be said to adapt their cases to the law, english and american jurists may be said to adapt the law to their cases. it is obvious that this difference of intellectual attitude and of juristic training must exercise a far-reaching influence on the interpretation and construction of international enactments. [sidenote: different nations have different canons of interpretation.] . it is because of what has just been explained that the rules for the interpretation of domestic legislation are different with different nations. for example, whilst in germany and france the judge avails himself more or less liberally of the _materialien_[ ] of a statute in order to arrive at its meaning, the english judge limits himself to the strict wording of the text, and utterly refuses to listen to an argument based on the historical origin of the statute. the english bench, sticking more closely to the letter of the law, allows also an extensive or restrictive interpretation thereof much more seldom than the continental judiciary does. [ ] it seems impossible to find any single english phrase which gives the meaning of _materialien_ in this context. in the _materialien_ of a statute is comprised everything officially put on record concerning it between the time the draftsman undertakes to draft the measure and the time it is placed on the statute-book. for instance, the commentary which a draftsman on the continent always adds to his draft, giving the reasons for the provisions of the bill; the discussions in parliament about the bill; and the like.--translator. [sidenote: controverted interpretation of the declaration of london an example.] . a good illustration of the factors under consideration was furnished by the movement in england against the ratification of the declaration of london, and the discussion evoked thereby in the press and in parliament. it was asserted that many rules of the declaration were so indefinitely framed as to lie open, castle and keep, to the arbitrary inroads of a belligerent interpreter. and when the advocates of ratification pointed to the official 'general report presented to the naval conference by its drafting committee', which gave a satisfying solution to the issues raised, the answer came that neither a belligerent nor the international prize court would be bound by the interpretation of the declaration contained in this general report. it was asserted that the ratification of the declaration would refer only to the text itself, and that the general report, not being thereby ratified, would not be binding; only by express extension of the ratification to the general report could the latter bind. continental jurisprudence, if my conception of it be correct, would stand shaking its head at the whole of this discussion. it would ask how there could be any talk of ratifying a report, ratification having only to do with agreements. and as regards the question of the binding character of the general report, there might indeed be some objection on the continent to the epithet 'binding', but, on the other hand, there would be no doubt that the interpretation of the declaration given in the report must be accepted on all sides. the report expressly says: we now reach the explanation of the declaration itself, on which we shall try, by summarizing the reports already approved by the conference, to give an exact and uncontroversial commentary; this, when it has become an official commentary by receiving the approval of the conference, would be fit to serve as a guide to the different authorities--administrative, military, and judicial--who may be called on to apply it. seeing that the conference unanimously accepted the report, there is expressed in it and by it the real and true meaning of the individual articles of the declaration as the conference itself understood and intended it. every attempt to procure an inconsistent interpretation must come to grief on this fact, and so the report is in this sense 'binding'. the ratification of a treaty extends, of course, not only to the words themselves, but also to their meaning, and if the conference which produces an agreement itself unanimously applies a definite meaning to the words of the agreement, there cannot remain any doubt that this is the meaning of the verbal text. nevertheless, the contrary was maintained in england by a party of men of legal eminence, and the explanation of this is only to be found in the fact that these english lawyers were applying to the interpretation of the declaration the rules which govern the interpretation of english statutes. the only way to enable the english government to ratify the declaration seems to be a statement by the powers at the time of ratification that the interpretation of the declaration expressed in the general report is accepted on all sides. [sidenote: some proposals for the avoidance of difficulties in interpretation.] . however this may be, the illustration adduced is sufficient proof that the interpretation of international enactments creates a difficulty of its own for international legislation. international legislators must bring even greater solicitude than municipal legislators to the expression of their real meaning in rigid terms. and this aim can only be attained by the most assiduous preparation and consideration of the contents of the enactment. it would be best if these contents were published and thereby submitted to expert discussion before they were finally accepted at the conferences. the national jurisconsults of the participant states would thus be enabled to criticize the proposals and to indicate the points which especially need clearing up. it might also be possible to consider the enactment, by convention, of an international ordinance containing a series of rules for the interpretation and construction of all international statutes. this much is sure, that the interpretation of international statutes must be freer than that of municipal statutes, and must therefore be directed rather to the spirit of the law than to the meaning of the words used. this is all the more requisite because french legal language is foreign to most of the states concerned, and because it is not to be expected that before ratification they should obtain minute information about the meaning of every single foreign word employed. chapter iii international administration of justice [sidenote: law can exist without official administration.] . it is inherent in the nature of law that it should be put in question whenever from time to time one party raises a claim in the name of the law which the other resists in the name of the same law. if, however, it be asserted that there cannot be any law where there is no official administration of justice, this is a fallacy, and the fallacy lies in considering the presence of the elements of the more perfect situation to be presupposed in the less perfect situation. beyond a doubt it is the administration of law which gives law the certainty that its authority will in every case obtain operative effect. but this operative effect is obtainable even apart from administration, because those who are subject to the law are in most cases clear as to its contents, and so they raise no question about it, but submit to its application without any need of recourse to jurisdictional officials. all the same, when a dispute does arise, law needs official administration: and, accordingly, in the long run, no highly developed legal society can dispense with it. [sidenote: the hague court of arbitration as a permanent institution.] . until the end of the nineteenth century the society of states possessed no organ which made international administration of justice possible. when states had made up their mind to have a dispute between them settled amicably, they either appointed the head of a foreign state or a foreign international jurist as arbiter, or they selected a number of persons to form an arbitral tribunal. it was a great step forward when the first hague conference established a permanent court of arbitration and agreed on international rules of procedure for the conduct of this court. and if, seeing that in every particular instance the court is ultimately chosen by the parties, the expression 'permanent court of arbitration' is only a euphemism, nevertheless the permanent list of persons from among whom the arbiters can be chosen, and, in addition, the permanent bureau of the court of arbitration at the hague, and, lastly, the international rules of procedure, represent at least the elements of a permanent court. thereby an institution is obtained which is always available if only parties will make use of it, whereas such an institution was entirely lacking formerly, and if parties wanted an arbitration they had to enter on lengthy arrangements about the machinery of the process. and the short experience of twelve years has already shown how valuable the institution is, and how well adapted to induce disputant states to make use of it. [sidenote: the proposed international prize court and court of arbitral justice.] . the second peace conference took, however, another great step forward in the resolution to establish an international court of appeal in prize matters, and also in the proposal about a really permanent international court to exist by the side of the court of arbitration. and the united states of north america have recently entered on negotiations with the object of utilizing the international prize court, should it come into existence, as at the same time a permanent tribunal for all legal issues. here present and future touch hands, and these proposed institutions must therefore be discussed. attacks upon them have been made from two sides, it being asserted that they infringe the principles of the equality and sovereignty of states. [sidenote: does the constitution of the international prize court violate the principle of the equality of states?] . it is alleged that the principle of equality is violated in that the prize court is contemplated as consisting of fifteen members, so that, while the eight great powers are always represented by a member, the thirty-seven smaller states are only represented by seven members who take their seats in the court in rotation according to a definite plan. now it is not clear how the principle of equality can be deemed violated thereby. this principle has really nothing to do with the constitution of an international court so long as no state is compelled to submit itself to such a tribunal against its will. it would be possible to constitute an international court without basing it on the representation of definite states, and that is very likely to come to pass in the future, when fuller confidence in the international judicature is felt. in the proposed composition of the prize court expression is given, undoubtedly, to the actually existing _political inequality_ of states, a matter which, however, has not the least connexion with their _legal equality_. this political inequality will never disappear from the world, and if in course of time the creation of an international judicature is really intended, the realization of this idea is only possible subject to the existence of political inequality. there is little doubt that when we come to the constituting of the prize court certain smaller states will abstain because no permanent representation therein is allotted to them. but it may confidently be expected that the recalcitrant states will give in their adherence in the future, when they begin to see what beneficent results the institution has produced. [sidenote: does the international prize court restrict the sovereignty of the several states?] . the international prize court violates the sovereignty of states just as little as it violates the principle of equality. no state submitting itself to an international tribunal submits itself thereby to the power of any other earthly sovereign so long as no other power is entrusted with the execution of the awards of the international tribunal, that is to say, so long as submission to any such award rests always and entirely on the voluntary submission of the state concerned. if this be not correct, then there would also be an invasion of sovereignty whenever--as indeed happens everywhere more or less--a state submits itself to the decrees of its own courts, and allows its subjects an appeal to its courts against the measures of the government. in the latter, as in the former case, what we have is merely the demission to the determination of the court of the question whether certain acts and claims are consistent with law. he who at the present day conceives sovereignty as an unlimited arbitrariness of conduct is guilty of an anachronism which is everywhere contradicted by the mere fact that there are such things as international law and constitutional law. [sidenote: would the formation of an international prize court of appeal infringe the sovereignty of the several states?] . it is next alleged that there is a violation of sovereignty in the fact that the proposed prize court is a court of appeal which is to be competent to reverse the decisions of national prize courts. there is nothing in this objection also, for it rests on a _petitio principii_. if we but get rid of the preconception that a sovereign state can only admit an interpretation of law to be authoritative for itself when pronounced by its own courts, no reason is visible why an award of an international court which upsets an award of a national court should be considered an infringement of state sovereignty. he who alleges it to be an infringement has really in view, however unconsciously, the power of execution which is inherent in the decrees of a national court, and he is unable to conceive a judicial decree without power of execution. judicial declarations of law have, however, as little as the essence of law itself to do with power of execution; otherwise--as indeed happens in the case of many persons--the law of nations must be denied any legal character. now, just as that system of law is more complete behind which there stands a central authority enforcing it by compulsion, so also that judicial activity is more complete with which physical power of execution is conjoined. but alike in the one and in the other case, physical power is not an essential element in the conception. just as there is law which in point of fact is not enforceable by any central authority, so there can also be jurisdictional functions without any correlative power of execution. international administration of justice is, in the nature of the case, dissociated from any power of this kind; therefore, too, it does not impair the sovereignty of states. [sidenote: the powers of the international prize court do not curtail state-sovereignty.] . it is imagined that a trump card is played when it is asserted that article of the convention, entered into at the second peace conference, respecting the prize court, curtails state-sovereignty when it provides that, in default of definite agreement and of generally recognized rules of the law of nations, the prize court is to give its decisions in accordance with the principles of justice and equity, and that therefore (so the assertion continues) on certain points the prize court can make international law by itself. whilst up to the present time custom and convention have been the two sources of the law of nations, the prize court--so it is said--is now to be added as a third, and the law made by it is to become international law without requiring the assent of the several states. all this argument rests on a false assumption. the article in question endues the prize court in certain points with a law-making power which is simply a _delegated_ power. the states which are concerned with the prize court desire, in the interests of legal security, that the tribunal should not declare itself incompetent by reason of want of existing rules on any given matter. they accordingly delegate to this tribunal the power which lies in them collectively of making rules of international law, and they prospectively declare themselves at one with regard to the rules which the tribunal shall declare to be binding in the name of justice and equity. now the prize court is not hereby made a special and independent source of international law by the side of convention, but the law which it declares is law resting on an agreement between states. even in the inner life of states we meet with delegation of legislative power to a limited degree, and yet this does not mean that the authorities in question are raised into special and independent sources of law side by side with the government of the state. and just as in the inner life of a state a delegation of legislative power does not involve an infringement of sovereignty, so also the delegation of legislative power to the prize court involves no infringement of the sovereignty of the members of the international community of states. [sidenote: difference between international courts of arbitration and real international courts of justice.] . the step from the international court of arbitration to the erection of a real international court is, on two grounds, a decided step onward. in the first place, an arbitral tribunal is not a court in the real sense of the word, for its decisions are not necessarily based on rules of law, and it does not necessarily deal with legal matters. an arbiter, unless the terms of the reference otherwise provide, decides _ex aequo et bono_, whilst a judge founds his decision on rules of law and is only applied to on legal issues. valuable as it may be in many cases to withdraw a matter from the courts and remit it to arbitration, it is in other cases equally valuable to have a cause decided in legal fashion by a judge. the experience which we have so far had of arbitral tribunals shows that they make praiseworthy efforts to arrive at a finding which shall as far as possible satisfy both parties, and that they have in view a compromise rather than a genuine declaration of law. now the cases are, all the same, numerous enough in which the parties want a real, genuine declaration of law, and so it would be most valuable if a real international court were in existence. in the determination to erect an international prize court it has been recognized that prize cases ought not to be brought, from occasion to occasion, before an arbitral tribunal and there peaceably arranged, but ought to be decided by a real court on the basis of the law of prize. if success attends the attempt to convert the prize court into a general international court or if a special international court is created, this would render it possible to have other international legal disputes also decided by a real court upon naked principles of law. such a possibility is in the interest of the parties and also in that of international law itself, for it will be held in higher and surer esteem if a court is provided for its authoritative interpretation and application. [sidenote: fundamentals of arbitration in contradistinction to administration of justice by a court.] . the second ground referred to is that it is a fundamental part of the idea of arbitration that in every case the choice of the arbiters as men in whom the parties have confidence should be left to the parties themselves, whilst it is fundamental in the conception of a court that it is once and for all composed of judges appointed independently of the choice of the parties and permanently to adjudicate upon matters of law. such a court secures continuity of jurisprudence, affords a guarantee for the most exact examination of questions of fact and of law, deems itself to a greater or a less degree bound by its previous decisions, contributes thereby to the settlement of open legal questions, and furthers the growth of law while adding to the respect in which it is held. nothing can heighten the respect in which international law is held more than the existence of a real international court. [sidenote: opposition to a real international court.] . but, incredible as it may sound, this is not generally recognized. it is just among the old champions of the arbitral decision of international disputes that the most violent opposition is raised to the erection of a real court of justice for international law causes. in such a court they see a great danger for the future. the fact that arbitration has a tendency to furnish rather a decision which is as far as possible satisfactory to both parties than one which is based on naked law, is just the respect which, in the eyes of many, gives it a higher value than a real court possesses. not _jural_ but _peaceable_ settlement of disputes is the motto of these men; they do not desiderate justice in the sense of existing law, but equity such as contents both parties. and they gain support and approval from those who see in the law of nations rather a diplomatic than a legal branch of knowledge, and who therefore resist the upbuilding of the law of nations on the foundation of firmer, more precise, and more sharply defined rules on the analogy of the municipal law of states. these persons range themselves against an international court because such a court would apply the rules of the law of nations to disputed cases in the same way in which the courts of a state apply the rules of municipal law to disputed cases arising within the state; they prefer diplomatic or, at any rate, arbitral settlement of disputes between states to the purely legal decision thereof. they also contend that an international court without an international power of execution is an absurdity. [sidenote: a real international court does not endanger the peaceable settlement of disputes.] . this last objection has already been dealt with above (paragraph ), where it is shown that a judicial award as an authoritative declaration of the legitimate character of an act or claim has, in and for itself, nothing to do with the governmental execution of the award. but as to the fear that the erection of an international court might endanger the peaceable settlement of disputes and the development of international arbitration, that is certainly groundless. the contrary is the case, as is shown by the fact that the happy movement towards the erection of an international court was initiated by the united states of north america. this country, which since its entry into the international community of states has more than any other championed the idea of the arbitral adjustment of disputes, and has in practice put it to good use, is well aware of the value of arbitration, but, on the other hand, it knows also how to prize the purely legal decision of legal questions. it has actually happened that a state has not ventured to submit a certain dispute to arbitration because it feared that its claim would not receive jural treatment in this way. it is just because the existence of an international court would promote the non-warlike settlement of international claims that its erection has been put forward. the reason is that even with the most careful selection of arbiters, one is never certain beforehand as to the quarter whence they will derive their ideas of the _aequum et bonum_, whilst with a jural settlement of claims the decision rests on the sure basis of law. further, the erection of an international court is not intended to cause the suppression of the so-called permanent court of arbitration; on the contrary, the machinery of this latter is to be retained in full existence, so that the parties may in every case be able to choose between the court of arbitration and a real court. the future will show that both can render good service side by side. [sidenote: composition of an international court.] . if the erection of an international court comes to pass, the equipment of it with competent and worthy men will be of the highest importance. their selection will have difficulties of all sorts to overcome. the peculiar character of international law, the conflict between the positive school and the school which would derive international law from natural law, the diversity of peoples (consequent on diversity of speech and of outlook on law and life) and of legal systems and of constitutional conceptions, and the like--all these bring the danger that the court in question should become the arena of national jealousies, of empty talk, and of political collisions of interest, instead of being the citadel of international justice. all depends on the spirit in which the different governments make the choice of judges. let regard be paid to a good acquaintance with international law joined to independence, judicial aptitude, and steadfastness of character. let what is expected of candidates be the representation not of political interests but of the interests of international jurisprudence. let nomination be made not of such diplomatists as are conversant with the law of nations, but of jurists who, while conversant with this branch of law, have had the training required of members of the highest state judiciary, and have been tested in practice. let men be chosen who are masters not only of their own language and of french, but also of some other of the most widely diffused languages, and who possess an acquaintance with foreign legal systems. if this be done, all danger will be avoided. judges so selected will speedily adapt themselves to the _milieu_ of the international court and be laid hold of by it, and their equipment for their task completed. as things are at present, the institution of an international court is an unheard-of experiment. but the experiment must be made at some time, and the hope may be confidently entertained that it will be successful. petty considerations based on the weakness of humanity and doubts as to the sincerity of the efforts of states to submit themselves voluntarily to international tribunals must be silenced. fear of international entanglements and groupings is misplaced. national prejudices and rivalries must keep in the background. the big state's disdain of the little state and the little state's mistrust of the big state must give place to mutual respect. opposed to the hope and confidence that the experiment will succeed there are no considerations other than those which have been arrayed against every step forward in international life. they will disappear like clouds when the sun of success has once begun to shine upon the activity of the international court. [sidenote: international courts of appeal a necessity.] . obviously it will not be possible in the long run to stop at a single international court; the erection over the court of first instance of an international court of appeal is also a necessity. the proposed prize court will indeed be itself a court of appeal because it cannot be approached until one or two national courts have spoken. but the proposed international court of justice would be a court of first instance. now there are no infallible first-instance decisions. even courts are fallible and make mistakes. if this is universally recognized for municipal administration of justice, it must be recognized for international administration of justice, all the more as public and not private interests are then in issue. if states are to feel bound to rely on their right rather than on their might, and to submit it to a judicial decision, it must be possible to carry an appeal against a decision of the international court of justice to a higher tribunal. many advocates of arbitration will not hear of an appeal. in this they may be right as regards a real arbitral decision given _ex aequo et bono_, but their arguments lose all force before the nakedly jural decision of a real court. the difficulties which beset the erection of an international court and the appointment of its members may lead to the renunciation of the immediate establishment of an international court of appeal. but when once the international court is in active working, the demand for a court of appeal will be raised and it will not be silenced until it has been satisfied. it would be premature to make proposals now as to the manner in which such a court of appeal ought to be composed, and as to the way in which it could be brought into existence. it is enough to have pointed to the need for it. directly this need makes itself felt, ways and means will be found for supplying it. [sidenote: are international courts valueless if states are not bound to submit their disputes to them?] . we next are faced by the objection, what possible value can the establishment of international courts possess if it be optional to states either to submit their causes to them or to rely on arms for a decision of those causes? it is, accordingly, asserted that such courts can only be of value if states place themselves under a permanent obligation to submit to them all or at any rate the greater number of their disputes. this leads to the question of obligatory arbitration treaties, which played so prominent a part at the second peace conference, and will surely come up again at the third conference. i have not the slightest doubt that the third or some later conference will agree on the obligatory reference of certain disputes between states to arbitration, but the matter is of quite subordinate importance so far as the erection of international courts is in question. any one who contemplates international life and the relations of states to one another, without prejudice and with open eyes, will see quite clearly that, when once there exist international courts, states will voluntarily submit a whole series of cases to them. these will, at first, admittedly, be cases of smaller importance for the most part, but in time more important cases will also come to them, provided that the jurisprudence developed in them is of high quality, and such as to give states a guarantee for decisions at once impartial and purely jural and free from all political prepossessions. _it is the existence of the institution which is the vital question now._ once the machinery is there, it will be utilized. in all states of the world there are movements and forces at work to secure the ordered and law-protected settlement of international disputes. the existence of an international court will strengthen these movements and forces and render them so powerful that states will scarcely be able to withdraw themselves from their influence. and the time when states were ready to draw the sword on every opportunity belongs to the past. even for the strongest state war is now an evil, to which recourse is had only as _ultima ratio_, when no other way out presents itself. [sidenote: what is to be done if a state refuses to accept the decision of an international court?] . in conclusion the great question is, what is to happen if a state declines to accept the decision of the international court to which it has appealed? important as this question may be in theory, it is a minor one in practice. it will scarcely happen in point of fact--assuming that there is an international court of appeal above the court of first instance--that a state will refuse a voluntary acceptance of the award of an international court. only slowly, and only when irresistibly compelled by their interests so to do, will states submit their disputes to international courts. but when this is the case these same interests will also compel them to accept the award then made. [sidenote: executive power not necessary for an international court.] . we have neither desire nor need to equip these courts with executive power. in the internal life of states it is necessary for courts to possess executive power because the conditions of human nature demand it. just as there will always be individual offenders, so there will always be individuals who will only yield to compulsion. but states are a different kind of person from individual men; their present-day constitution on the generally prevalent type has made them, so to say, more moral than in the times of absolutism. the personal interests and ambition of sovereigns, and their passion for an increase of their might, have finished playing their part in the life of peoples. the real and true interests of states and the welfare of the inhabitants of the state have taken the place thereof. machiavellian principles are no longer prevalent everywhere. the mutual intercourse of states is carried on in reliance on the sacredness of treaties. peaceable adjustment of state disputes is in the interests of the states themselves, for war is nowadays an immense moral and economic evil even for the victor state. it may be that a state will decline to submit its cause to the international tribunal because it thinks that its vital interests do not allow such submission; but when, after weighing its interests, it has once declared itself ready to appear before the court, it will also accept the court's award. all other motives apart, the strong state will do this, because its strength allows it to make voluntary submission to the award, and the weak state will also do so because war would be hopeless for it. [sidenote: right of intervention by third states and war as _ultima ratio_.] . if, however, in spite of all, it should happen that a state declined such acceptance of an award, the powers who were not parties would have and would use the right of intervention. for there can be no doubt of the fact that all states which took part in the erection of an international court would have a right to intervene if a state which entered an appearance before an international court should refuse to accept its award. and of course, in such a case, war is always waiting in the background as an _ultima ratio_; but it is in the background only that it waits; while, apart from the erection of an international court, it is standing in the foreground. the whole problem shows that the development in question cannot be rushed, but must proceed slowly and continuously. step can follow step. the economic and other interests of states are more powerful than the will of the power-wielders of the day. these interests have begotten the law of nations, have driven states to arbitration, have called forth the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration at the hague, and are now at work compelling the erection of international courts. let us arm ourselves with patience and allow these interests to widen their sway; they will bring about a voluntary submission to the judgments of the international court on the part of all states. chapter iv the science of international law [sidenote: new tasks for the science of international law.] . international organization and legislation and the establishment of international courts are the business of the hague peace conferences; but to work out the new enactments and to turn them to good account and to prepare for their practical application, this is the business of the science of international law. science obtains thereby a share in the future of the law of nations, and quite new tasks are allotted to it. as mentioned earlier, the law of nations was, until the first of the peace conferences, essentially a book-law. treatises depicted the law such as it was growing, in the form of custom, out of the practice of states in international intercourse. there were only a few international enactments, and there was no international court practice. but that state of things has now been altered once and for all. international enactments appear in greater number. decisions of international courts will follow, just as we already possess a number of awards of the permanent court of arbitration. if science is to be equal to its tasks, it must take good heed to itself, it must become wholly positive and impartial, it must free itself from the domination of phrases, and it must become international. [sidenote: the science of international law must become positive.] . it is indispensably requisite that this science should be positive in character. what natural law and natural law methods have done for the law of nations in the past stands high above all doubt, but they have lost their value and importance for present and future times. now and onwards the task is, in the first place, to ascertain and to give precision to the rules which have grown up in custom, and in the second place to formulate the enacted rules in their full content and in their full bearing. in doing so it will come to light that there are many gaps not yet regulated by law. many of these gaps may be successfully filled up by a discreet employment of analogy, but many others will remain which can only be remedied by international legislation or by the development of customary law in the practice of the courts or otherwise. what science can do here is to make proposals _de lege ferenda_ of a politico-jural character, but it cannot and may not fill up the gaps. science may also test and criticize, from the politico-jural standpoint, the existing rules of customary or enacted law, but, on the other hand, it may not contest their operation and applicability, even if convinced of their worthlessness. it must not be said that these are obvious matters and therefore do not need special emphasis. there are many recognized rules of customary law the operativeness of which is challenged by this or that writer because they offend his sense of what is right and proper. as an example thereof let us take the refusal by some well-reputed writers to include annexation after effective conquest (_debellatio_) among the modes, known to international law, of acquisition of state territory. they teach that _debellatio_ has no consequences in point of law, but only in point of fact; that it rests on naked might and brings the annexed area under the power of the victor only in point of fact and not in point of law. here they are putting their politico-jural convictions in the place of a generally recognized rule of law. [sidenote: the science of international law must be impartial.] . science cannot, however, be genuinely positive unless it is impartial and free from political animosities and national bias. to believe that it really is at present impartial is a great deception. whoever compares the writings of the publicists of the several states runs up against the contrary at every step. there is no state which in the past has not allowed itself to be guilty of offences against international law, but its writers on international law seldom admit that this has been the case. they perceive the mote in the eye of other nations, but not the beam in the eye of their own nation. their writings teem with ungrounded complaints against other nations, but scarcely throw the slightest blame on their own country. by such a method problems are not brought nearer to solution, but only shoved on to one side. what is wanted, is that an ear should be lent to the principle _audiatur et altera pars_, that the opponent should be heard and his motives weighed. it will then often turn out that what was believed to merit reprobation, as a breach of law, will show itself to be a one-sided but forceful solution of a disputed question. and even where a real breach of law has been committed it will be worth while to weigh the political motives and interests which have driven the perpetrator to it. it must ever be kept in mind that at the present day no state lightheartedly commits a breach of the law of nations, and that, when it does commit such a breach, it is generally because it deems its highest political interests to be in jeopardy. such a weighing of motives and interests does not mean excusing the breach of law, but only trying to understand it. [sidenote: the science of international law must free itself from the tyranny of phrases.] . it is also indispensable that the science should free itself from the tyranny of phrases. as things are, there is scarcely a doctrine of the law of nations which is wholly free from the tyranny of phrases. the so-called fundamental rights are their arena, and the doctrines of state-sovereignty and of the equality of states are in large measure dominated by them. any one who is in touch with the application of international law in diplomatic practice hears from statesmen every day the complaint that books put forth fanciful doctrines instead of the actual rules of law. now it is often not difficult to push the irrelevant to one side and to extract what is legally essential from the waste of phrase-ridden discourse. but there are entire areas in which the tyranny of phrases so turns the head that rules which absolutely never were rules of law are represented as such. two conspicuous examples may serve to illustrate this statement. [sidenote: the meaning of '_kriegsräson geht vor kriegsmanier_'.] . my first example is taken from the use made of the german maxim '_kriegsräson geht vor kriegsmanier_'. this maxim is a very old one, and there was nothing in the law of nations which stood in the way of its unreserved acceptance so long as there was no real _law_ of war, but the conduct of war rested only on a fluctuating number of general _usages_. the meaning of '_manier_' is '_usage_', and '_kriegsräson geht vor kriegsmanier_' means that the usages of war can be pushed aside when the reason of war demands it. at the present day, however, the conduct of war is no longer entirely under the control of _usages_, but under the control of _enacted rules of law_ to be found in the 'regulations respecting the laws of land war', and the application of the old saw to these legal rules can only lead to abuses and erroneous interpretations. what it says is, in short, nothing else than this: if the reason of war demands it, everything is permissible. but since the first hague peace conference that is definitely no longer the case. article of the 'regulations respecting the laws of land war' expressly says that belligerents have not an unlimited right of choice of means of injuring the enemy. _kriegsräson_, therefore, cannot justify everything. some enacted rules about the conduct of war are, indeed, framed with such latitude as to allow scope for the operation of _kriegsräson_. but most of them do not leave it any scope, and they may not remain unobserved even if _kriegsräson_ were to make it desirable. it must be admitted that the general principle of the law of nations, that such acts as are absolutely necessary for self-preservation may be excused even though illegal, is applicable to the law of war also. and, further, in the exercise of justified reprisals, many enacted rules of war can be set aside. but mere _kriegsräson_ never extends so far as to dispense with enacted rules of war. nevertheless numerous well-reputed german authors teach the contrary, and even those who perceive the falsity of this doctrine still retain the old saying and identify _kriegsräson_ with the narrower idea of military necessity. if we are to arrive at clearness, if possible abuses are not to receive in advance the sheltering protection of law, the maxim '_kriegsräson geht vor kriegsmanier_' must disappear from the science of international law. it has lost its meaning and has become an empty but dangerous phrase. [sidenote: the doctrine of rousseau concerning war.] . my second example is taken from the use to which an assertion of rousseau is commonly put. in his _contrat social_, bk. i, ch. iv, is the following passage: 'war, then, is not a relation of man to man, but a relation of states in which private persons are enemies only accidentally; not as men nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders. in a word, each state can only have as enemies other states and not men; seeing that no true relation can exist between things of different natures.' it is in this assertion of rousseau that a basis is found for a quite common doctrine to the effect that war is a relation only between the belligerent states and their contending forces. see how much else has been deduced from this principle and demanded on the strength of it! that blockade is only permissible in the case of naval ports and fortified coast-towns, and not in the case of other ports and places. that breach of blockade is as little punishable as carriage of contraband, seeing that it is but a commercial act of peaceable individuals, it being immaterial whether they are subjects of a neutral power or of the enemy. that the capture of enemy merchant vessels on the high seas is unlawful, because these vessels are dedicated to peaceful trade alone, and have naught to do with hostilities. that peaceful intercourse, and especially commercial intercourse, between the subjects of the belligerents cannot be forbidden. and more of the same kind. if now we examine more closely, we find that there is a sound principle at the core of rousseau's doctrine, but that the sentence 'war is merely a relation between the belligerent states and their contending forces' is an empty, untenable phrase. the sound central principle is that in fact, according to modern conceptions, war is a struggle between the belligerent states, carried on by means of their military and naval forces, and that their subjects can only be attacked or taken prisoners so far as they take part in hostilities, and that, if they behave quietly and peaceably, they are spared harsh treatment as far as possible. but to assume on that account that a war in which his state is engaged does not affect a subject, and that he is not brought thereby into hostile relations to the other side so long as he abstains from any active part in hostilities--this deals a blow in the face to all the actual facts of war. certainly, a peaceable subject does enjoy exemption from avoidable severities, but he is none the less the object of coercive measures. if at the outbreak of a war he be resident in the territory of the enemy, cannot he be expelled? if he contribute to a loan raised by the enemy, will not his own state punish him for treason? is it not the law of many states that if they go to war, an end is put to peaceful intercourse, and especially commercial intercourse, between their own subjects and the subjects of the enemy state? must not the private person submit to requisitions, pay contributions, endure limitations on his freedom of movement, and obey the commands of the hostile occupant? is not his property on many occasions--for example, during a siege or a bombardment, or on the field of battle--destroyed without compensation? must he not, if his fatherland is completely conquered and annexed by the enemy, reconcile himself to becoming a subject of the enemy? whoever has lived in a district occupied by an enemy knows what an empty phrase the assertion is, that war is not a hostile relation between a belligerent state and the subjects of its enemy. yet the phrase, nevertheless, wanders from book to book and from mouth to mouth, and must always be available whenever wanted in order to justify some assertion which contradicts the recognized rules of warfare. the kernel of truth in rousseau's doctrine is this, that while the soldier is put in an actively hostile position, the peaceable subject of a belligerent is put in a passively hostile position; but the doctrine is absolutely misunderstood, although the distinction which it asserts is quite commonly recognized. and so here also it must be repeated that, if we are to arrive at clearness, if baseless claims are not to appear under the cover of law, the phrase 'war is only a relation between the belligerent states and their contending forces' must disappear, as being misleading, from the science of international law. [sidenote: the science of international law must become international.] . it is, finally, a pressing necessity that the science of international law should become international. the science of international law is essentially a branch of the science of law, and it can only thrive if this dependence be not suppressed. now the science of law must, of necessity, be a national one, even if at the same time it employs the comparative method. on this ground the science of international law, forming always a part of a national science of law, must in this sense be national. when, despite this, i insist that it must become international, what i have before my eyes is merely the requirement that it should not limit itself to the employment of national literature and the jurisprudence of national courts, and that it must make itself acquainted with foreign juristic methods. [sidenote: necessary to consult foreign literature on international law.] . there is as yet scarcely any systematic reference to foreign literature on international law. monographs may possibly cite the old editions of some wellnigh obsolete text-books, but, with individual laudable exceptions, there is scarcely any suggestion of the real utilization of foreign literature. this defect is, admittedly, to be attributed not so much to writers themselves as to the fact that foreign literature is for the most part inaccessible to them. there ought to be in every state at least _one_ library which devotes especial attention to international law, and makes, on a well-elaborated plan, a judicious collection of foreign literature on the subject, particularly foreign periodicals. [sidenote: necessary to understand foreign juristic methods.] . in worse plight than even the employment of foreign literature is the understanding of foreign juristic methods. and yet without such an understanding the gates are thrown open for misconceptions, for unfounded claims, and for mutual recriminations. how great is the divergence of juristic method can only be appreciated by one who has practised and been called to the teaching of law in different countries. now, just as the outlook of its people is incorporated in the law of every state, so the specific mode of thought and the logical attitude of any given people are mirrored in its juristic methods. historical tradition, political interdependence, and other accidental influences do indeed also play a great part therein, but the fundamental factor is the difference of modes of thought and points of view. seeing, then, that the law of nations is one and the same for every member of the community of states, but that on the other hand the science of every state elaborates the law of nations on the basis of its national juristic methods, it is unavoidable that discord should arise if the science of international law of individual states neglect to acquaint itself with foreign juristic methods. it is not only in scientific treatises, but also in judicial decisions, that expression is given to these methods, and the discordance between judicial decisions on the same issue given in different states is often traceable simply to the difference of juristic method. that the law is essentially the same is no guarantee that in all countries there will be a unanimity of judicial pronouncement on every point thereof. if ever--and it is not outside the range of practical possibility--an international agreement, including all states, were arrived at concerning all the topics of the so-called international private law and international criminal law, there would, for the reason under consideration, still continue to be no security that the same law would in every point receive the same treatment from the courts of all countries. in order to attain this end there would have to be an international tribunal erected above the municipal courts of all states, and its judgments would have to be accepted as binding by the municipal courts concerned. it is just for this reason that the proposed international prize court and the proposed permanent court for international disputes will aim in the course of their practice at securing an identical application of the rules of the law of nations. and the joint labours of judges of diverse nationalities in these international courts will influence their mutual understanding in a manner which will be serviceable to the juristic methods of the different peoples. conclusion [sidenote: the aims defended are not utopian.] . we have reached the end. i have conducted the reader over wide areas, and have put before him aims which cannot be immediately attained. but these aims are not on that account nebulous and utopian. we are already on the way which leads to them, even though a long time will still be required before we draw quite near. this hope may be with certainty indulged in, because the forces at work for the organic development of the community of states are ever gathering strength. the governments of states may continue an obstinate opposition to these forces, but in the end they must give way. economic interests primarily, but many others also, prevent individual states from allowing the international community of states to remain unorganized any longer. slowly indeed, and only by degrees, and to a large extent unwillingly and of compulsion, but nevertheless step by step, states will be impelled onwards towards a goal still in part unknown. it is amusing to observe the parts which individual states play in this process of development. at one time it is one power, and at another time another power, that is led by its interests to seize on the leading rôle, and make progressive proposals. at one time a progressive proposal is joyfully welcomed, at another it is declined, at another time it meets with partial assent and partial dissent. in the matter before us the united states of north america play a very prominent part; they have the merit of having taken a most conspicuous share in the development of the law of nations, especially of the law of neutrality. it was america that moved for the erection of a permanent international court, and in any event she will not give up the idea even if she cannot secure its speedy realization. [sidenote: obstacles to progress.] . favourable as the auspices are for continuous progress, there are not wanting, on the other hand, influences and circumstances opposed to progress. in the first place, there is national chauvinism, to which the existence of a law of nations is hateful, and which represents unlimited national self-seeking. where it obtains the upper hand, international conflicts are unavoidable, and cannot be composed by a judicial sentence. in the second place, there is the fact that the political equilibrium, on which the whole law of nations rests, presents itself as a system liable to gradual as well as to sudden alteration. were the earth's surface permanently divided between equally great and equally powerful states, the political equilibrium would be stable, but it is rooted in the nature of things that this equilibrium can only be unstable. the reason is that individual states are subject to a perpetual process of evolution, and thereby to perpetual change. this evolution is for one state upwards, for another downwards. no state is permanently assured against break-up, and it is the break-up of existing states and the rise of new states that threaten the permanent organization of the international community of states with danger. there is also another factor demanding attention, and that is the opposition between west and east, although the glorious example of japan shows that the nations of the east are indeed capable of putting themselves on the plane of western civilization, and of taking a place in the sun in the international community of states. however this may be, we must move onward, putting our trust in the power of goodness, which in the course of history leads mankind under its propitious guidance to ever higher degrees of perfection.