16 THE PERIPATETIC METHOD: WALKING WITH WOODBRIDGE, THINKING WITH ARISTOTLE ..• thinking and walking are different ways of getting about in a common world which has a make- up agreeable to each of these ways. PREAMBLE Walking the streets of the Greenwich Village on a rather bitter, early January day, a year after defending my dissertation and months before receiving my first job offer, I stum- bled upon one of those inconspicuous little bookstores tucked away from the bustle of things, just below street level. Descending three stairs, I entered, drawn more by the promise of warmth than by the hope of inspiration. As I made my way toward the Philosophy section, I was ·prepared to feel my reigning mood of uncertainty aug- mented by the daunting quantity of words to be read, new ideas somehow to be digested. Almost immediately, I found myself addressed by a rather pathetic looking lit- tle volume: it seemed to be a photocopy of a text, bound in plastic with a spine of burnt orange and nothing to identify its content. Pulling it from the shelf, I was at first put off by its announced title, Aristotle's Vision of Woodbridge, The Realm of Mind, 19261 Nature, so critical as I was at the time of the metaphysics of vision. And yet, there was this name, Woodbridge, and another, Randall, that seemed to give the thing a kind of weight. Someone had taken care to photocopy these pages, to bind them together, to preserve them for posterity, per- haps, indeed, for me. Plus, it only cost a dollar. And so it was, with a cenain hesitation, and yet in wonder, that I opened the book and began to read. "This small volume is offered," wrote Randall in the introduction, "in the convic- tion that it is the most imponant writing on Aristotle's thought since the revolutionary study of Werner Jaeger in 1923."2 The state- ment comes as a shock and one is tempted initially to dismiss it as nothing more than yet another one of those generous, but hyper- bolic gestures of respect students tend to bestow upon their teachers. However, somewhere along the paths of thinking Woodbridge traverses in these 311 THE PERIPATETIC MEIBOD lectures, this initial impression gives way to the growing realization that Woodbridge, drawing upon his own great mentor, George Santayana, has indeed charted a methodo- logical approach to Aristotle's thinking that surpasses that of Jaeger's developmentalism. Although Woodbridge offers only a rough topography of what I have elsewhere called Aristotle's peripatetic legomenology, to pur- sue the tack Woodbridge takes in these lec- tures is to be led back to an Aristotle who brings his thinking to life by allowing life to animate his thinking. 3 ...... PERIPATETIC LEGOMENOLOGY To say more than human things with human voice, That cannot be; to say human things with more Than human voice, that, also, cannot be; To speak humanly from the height or from the depth Of human things, that is acutest speech. Wallace Stevens, "Chocorua to its Neighbor" 4 These lines from Wallace Stevens articulate something of the spirit in which Aristotle's thinking unfolds; for his philosophical endeavor involves precisely that "acutest speech" that attempts "to speak humanly from the height or from the depth of human things." But as the Stevens poem itself brings to language, the realm "of human things" is bound intimately up with the realm of natu- ral things . .1 This intimacy between human-be- ing and natural being is at the very root of Aristotle's thinking. Thus, although Aristotle has sometimes been accused of seeking "to say more than human things with human voice," in fact, everything he says is said in an attempt to give voice to the nature of things. 6 The manner in which nature expresses itself is, for Aristotle, so deeply integrated into the power of human articulation that each genu- ine attempt to articulate the truth concerning the nature of things touches upon something of that nature however ultimately elusive. 7 The attempt to speak humanly from the height and depth of human things is, then, to embark on a path of speaking and thinking that uncovers something of the highest and deepest truths of nature itself. This is pre- cisely the path toward which Woodbridge's engagement with Aristotle points; it is the path that Randall recognizes as on par with the contributions of Jaeger, but it is also a path so deeply rooted in Aristotle's thinking that it remains discernible in Jaeger's own developmental approach. In his seminal book, Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, Werner Jaeger shows that "at the root of [the Aristotelian texts], there is a process of development." 8 His great insight is the recognition that Aristotle's texts give voice to a thinking that lives and develops. 9 The book's appearance in 1923 might best be traced along a line of scholarship that extends back through F. A. Trendelenburg to Hegel, who, a century earlier, argued in his Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie that Aristotle is not to be read as a "unspeculative empiricist" but rather as a great idealist whose thinking was alive to the life of thinking itself .10 If Hegel's inter- pretation excited his students because it chal- lenged the "the axiom defended by Locke to Kant up to Schleiermacher, that Aristotle was an unspeculative empiricist," Trendelenburg, challenging Hegel's own tendency to privi· lege pure thinking, emphasized the organic interaction between the human mind and 312 the environment.11 As Rosenstock puts it, Trendelenburg "views the role of reason in the context of its genesis and operation in nature." 12 Situating Jaeger in this tradi- tion at once accounts for a central tension in his reading of Aristotle and connects him to a tradition that had a deep influence on Frederick Woodbridge. 13 The central tension in Jaeger's work is between a certain tendency toward systema- ticity and an affirmation of the living context in which Aristotelian thinking unfolds. The developmental approach to Aristotle's work resolves the tension beautifully by turning a specific biographical story about Aristotle into the organizing principle of his philoso- phy. More specifically, Jaeger appeals to Aristotle's relationship to his teacher, Plato, and his alleged struggle to come to his own terms with the world in the shadow of Plato's "unlimited genius," in order to explain away the inconsistencies one encounters if one reads Aristotle's work as the articulation of fully developed system. 14 But the develop- mental approach, despite its great recog- nition of the living nature of Aristotelian thinking, ultimately reinforced the seduc- tion of hermeneutical consistency: it remains animated by an attempt to explain away the apparent contradictions in Aristotle's think- ing. However, the appearing of contradiction is for Aristotle the very sort of diction that announces the presence of a matter for thinking. Aristotle attends to such dictions carefully, not as intractable contadictories, one side of which must be destroyed to allow the other to reign, but as indications of impasses to be navigated, oriented always by the beacon of the appearing of things. 15 His is a thinking on the way. It is peripatetic, just as those who followed him as he walked the grounds of the Lyceum were called "peripatoi," the ones who walk. THE PERIPATETIC METHOD Although Woodbridge does not speak of Aristotle's thinking as peripatetic, the great -insight of his own engagement with Aristotle is precisely this attempt to walk with him as he "goes directly without preliminary to the subject-matter involved and follows where it leads him." 16 Like Jaege.r; Woodbridge rec- ognizes the living dimension of Aristotelian thinking; but unlike Jaeger, for Woodbridge, the deepest expression of this living thinking is experienced in Aristotle's philosophical meth- odology. Here, "methodology" speaks with a decidedly Greek accent: it names a way of following along after, meta-hodos, the logos of things. 17 But the logos of things expresses a structure accessible to the powers of the human soul, even if our finite powers can never cap- ture the full depth of nature's expression. John E. Smith at once articulates the meaning of the term "expression" that should be amplified here and emphasizes the dimension of inacces- sibility that cannot be eclipsed: In any present, something is expressed or made manifest, but much is not expressed. I do not mean that the mani- fest or surface is "appearance" and the depth "reality," since both are equally real in relation to the individual express- ing itself; it is rather that with respect to the expression of any individual in any specific situation, there is always "more to come." 18 For Smith as for Aristotle, the surface and the depth are part of the same reality at work expressing itself. Human access to the depth of things is, however, mediated by the power of human articulation that itself, as Smith rightly suggests, "is integral to Being." 19 Thus, the way to the depth of things is mediated by the human capacity for articulation that itself ought not to be understood to fundamen- tally distort the nature of things, but rather, 313 THE PERIPATETIC METHOD to correspond to and with the expression of nature in ways that bring meaning to life. This sense of correspondence-Woodbridge speaks in terms of "cooperation," "correla- tion" and even "conformation"-between the human power of articulation and the natural expression of things is at the root of Aristotle's methodological approach. 20 In an early passage from the De Anima, Aristotle articulates the manner in which his investigation into the soul follows along after the things said beautifully about it: While inquiring concerning the soul, going through the impasses (diaporoun- tas) concerning which there is a need to find a way (euporein) in order to move forward, it is at the same time necessary to take up along the way the opinions of those who came before, however many showed forth (arephenanto) something concerning the soul, in order that we may take hold of the things said beauti- fully, but, if any are not said beautifully, that we may beware of these.21 The peripatetic methodology is thus a legom- enology: the things said, 'ta A.£y6µevn, open a path into the nature of things. In this passage the appearance of words related to the Greek, poros-road, passage, way-testifies to the dynamic nature of Aristotle's thinking as a thinking on the way. In the Physics, Aristotle has famously designated his way of thinking as a "natural road from what is more famil- iar and clearer to us to what is more famil- iar and clearer by nature." 22 In practicing a peripatetic legomenology, however, Aristotle recognizes that this natural path to nature is itself made possible by the nature of language. Woodbridge puts it this way: Metaphysics thus follows and may refine the uses of common speech. We need not be metaphysicians to claim mind and body as our rightful possessions. For just as it is natural for us to speak of a man who walks far and lustily, as a great walker, and to endow him with a strong body, so it is natural for us to speak of him who thinks profoundly, as a great thinker, and to endow him with a great mind. Thus common speech condenses into single words meanings which require many sentences for their full expression. Such words economize speech and give to language its wealth of significance. 23 From this perspective, it is unnecessary to posit two separate methodological appro- aches in Aristotle, the one empirical, deal- ing with the appearances of sense, the other, dialectical, dealing with the common manner in which people speak.24 Rather, Aristotle's naturalistic understanding of language roots the things people say in the very nature of things in a way that undercuts the standard dichotomy between naturalism and conven- tionalism. That dichotomy is predicated on a conception of human-being and human language fundamentally uprooted from the world of nature. 25 The wealth of signifi- cance endemic to human language is itself an expression of the wealth of significance endemic to nature. Woodbridge emphasizes this deep correla- tion between language and nature in his lec- tures on Aristotle when he writes: But [Aristotle] will not let the natural- ness of language be natural in admission only. He makes it natural in nature. It becomes one of nature's supreme prod- ucts, the product in which all other products find articulated linkage. For things to go into language is a going, just as much of a going on their part, and just as natural, as their going into air or water, up or down, or from seed to flower. 26 314 Thus, when Aristotle speaks, again and again, of how things are said, when he attends care- fully to the various ways they are said and when he rehearses what others have said about them, his manner of speaking must be heard as organically bound to a way of think- ing rooted in the natural community of com- munication between the powers of the soul and things of nature. Aristotle's phenomeno- logical attunement to the ways things express themselves and his assiduous attempts to get things said beautifully are thus two dimen- sions of a peripatetic legomenology that speaks with and attends to the language of nature in an attempt to do justice to the nature of things. THE SURFACE OF THINGS It is as if being was to be observed, As if, among the possible purposes Of what one sees, is the purpose to be seen, The property of the moon, what it evokes. Wallace Stevens, "Note on Moonlight" 27 Peripatetic legomenology is rooted in Arist- otle's naturalistic understanding of the rela- tionship between the powers of the soul and the things with which they cooperate. Woodbridge puts it this way: "The correla- tion between the powers of the soul and the natural conditions of their exercise is, perhaps, the one dominant and outstanding characteristic of Aristotle's psychology."28 Yet, what Woodbridge identifies as the key to Aristotle's psychology, is in fact the organic enabling condition of Aristotelian thinking itself. His peripatetic legomenology is predi- cated on the recognition that the logos at work in nature is also somehow at work in the soul. THE PERIPATETIC METHOD In DA II.5, Aristotle pursues a legomenol- ogy of perceiving, "'to aio0aveo0ai.," in order to lend determination to the precise manner in which the power of perceiv- ing cooperates with that which can be per- ceived. Attending first to the things said about aisthesis, Aristotle identifies the limits of understanding perceiving in purely pas- sive terms.29 He proceeds then to consider the way perceiving itself is said. The articu- lar infinitive that designates the activity of perceiving, "to aio0aveo0at," speaks in the middle voice and so points to perceiving as an active condition of the soul, a hexis with the power to actively receive what presents itself in perceiving. By attending to the way perceiving is said, Aristotle is himself able to hear the manner in which perceiving is itself the expression of a cooperation between the power of the soul and the nature of the thing perceived. He begins by delineating the two ways perceiving is said: Since we say perceiving (to aio0aveo0aL) doubly (for what has the potency of hear- ing and seeing we say hears and sees, even if it happens to be asleep, as well as what is already at-work ['to Evepyoi3v] seeing and hearing), so too should the power of perceiving be said doubly, on the one hand, as in potency, and on the other, as being-at-work; also similarly that which is perceived (to aioerit6v) is a being both in potency and at-work. 30 The way we speak about perceiving suggests something decisive about the nature of the phenomenon itself: namely, that it must be twofold. Not only is the Greek word itself articulated in the middle voice, suggest- ing already that it is not simply passive, but we also speak about hearing and seeing as active powers even when they are not actively 315 THE PERIPATETIC MElHOD at work. The cascading structure of this passage that moves from "'to alo0v :rcpayµatrov ... Mvaµtv). For the form (eidos) that is thought of [the warm or cold] or pleas- ant or fearful happens to be in some way like each of the things themselves; and because of this those who are just thinking [these things] shudder and are frightened. All these things are affections (pathe) and ways of becoming-other. And when body parts become-other, some become larger, some smaller. It is not unclear, then, that a small change generated in the origin produces great and numerous differences at a distance- just as, if the rudder is briefly shifted, a great shift of the prow is generated. 56 The example of the rudder illustrates the point that small shifts close to the fulcrum can widely alter the course of the ship. In this passage, Aristotle connects the phenomena of the rudder, which functions here on the lever principle, with the origins of perceiving, being appeared to (phantasia) and thinking in the things encountered in the world. Indeed, it is the power of the things themselves that moves us to shudder and be frightened not only when we perceive them but also when we imagine or think them. The vitality of the imagination and the life of thinking itself is rooted in the power of things expressing themselves. Ultimately however, it is not simply, as the above passage suggests, the form or look, the eidos, of things that is taken up by perceiving, imagining, and thinking, but the logos express- ing itself in and through the eidos that enables the cooperative connection between the pow- ers of the soul and the power of things to move us in certain ways. This logos too is at work in the things encountered in perceiving, and it can be translated by the imagination into the vernacular of thinking precisely because it belongs to things as an expression of nature itself. To borrow from Woodbridge, perhaps it might be said this way: for things perceived to go into thinking is a going, just as much of a going on their part, and just as natural, as their going into air or water, or up or down, or from seed to flower, or, indeed, for a winter walk in the city. Thus, by attending to the logos of things, Aristotle's own imaginative thinking is able to chart a path to a profounder inti- macy with nature in which the things said are heard to give voice to the nature of things. ...... POSTAMBLE The longer, more difficult and more beau- tiful path toward which I point here but 320 cannot follow further in this chapter has been marked by the words and poetry of Wallace Stevens. Stevens' writing gives voice to the recognition at the root of Aristotle's peripatetic legomenology and Woodbridge's naturalism: human-being is at home in nature even if nature remains always also alien to us. Stevens emphasizes the connection between human-being and natural being by focusing on the power of the imagination: " ... absolute fact includes everything that the imagination includes. This is our intimidating thesis." 57 The the- sis, however intimidating, implies that even the human imagination must be experi- enced as a way, perhaps as an extraordinar- ily powerful way, nature expresses itself. The thesis may indeed be intimidating precisely because it requires us to consider the degree to which we are bound inti- mately up with-now to use Woodbridge's words-the "whole vast scheme of things," which "seems to be engaged in expressing what it is." 58 The dialogue between the guitarist and his audience that opens Stevens' poem "The Man with the Blue Guitar" suggests the depth of the human connection with the things that are, even as it articulates the impossibility of reducing the reality of things to our attempts to articulate them well: The man bent over his guitar, · A shearsman of sorts. The day was green. They said, "You have a blue guitar, You do not play things as they are." The man replied, "Things as they are Are changed upon the blue guitar." And they said then, "But play, you must, A tune beyond us, yet ourselves, A tune upon the blue guitar Of things exactly as they are." 59 THE PERIPATETIC METHOD Play, we must, a tune beyond us, yet our- selves: this indeed articulates something of the path along which Aristotle's thinking unfolds. And if the tune he plays attempts assiduously to say things exactly as they are, we too must recognize that things as they are are changed upon the blue guitar, not indeed by being rendered other than what they are; but rather, things are exactly what they are in relational dialogue with the things they encounter. One path toward this recognition was marked for me on that bitter January day when I encountered a strangely bound burnt orange volume on a walk through the streets of Greenwich Village. NOTES 1 See Woodbridge, 1926. 2 Ibid., xvi. Christopher P. Long 3 The idea of a phenomenology of the things said is developed in Long, 2006. The term, "legomenology," however, was introduced first in an essay on Aeschylus and Hesiod as a way to articulate the methodological approach to read- ing the Theogony and the Oresteia. See, Long, 2007, 68. 4 See Stevens, 1997, 266-7. 5 Gyorgyi Voros mentions "Chocorua to Its Neighbor" when he speaks both about the degree to which Stevens "joyfully affirms human nature, while allowing nonhuman Nature its own integrity and domain" and, later in his life, "more and more sang of a self subsumed under a greater natural order." See Voros, 1997, 113, 151-2. 6 For one poignant example, see Dewey, 1958, 48. For a more detailed discussion of Dewey's misreading of Aristotle and of why Dewey, of all people, should have known better, see Long, 2011, 15-19. 7 A passage from book II of the Metaphysics, 993a30-b3, emphasizes at once the accessibil- ity and the elusiveness of the nature of things. For a discussion of this passage, see Long, 2011, 50-6. 321 THE PERIPATETIC METHOD 8 See Jaeger, 1923, 5. The translation is my own. 9 Ibid., 4. The formulation seems to have been borrowed from Goethe. 10 Hegel thus writes in typical fashion: "The Platonic is the objective in general, but the Jiving principle, the principle of Subjectivity is missing; and the Jiving principle, Subjectivity, not in the sense of an accidental and merely particular Subjectivity, but rather pure Subjectivity is proper to Aristotle." See Hegel, 1986, vol. 19, 153. 11 Michelet reports that the students in Hegel's seminars on Aristotle were eager to hear this new, living Aristotle. See, Michelet, 1837, 686. 12 See Rosenstock, 1964, 20. 13 Trendelenburg is the connection between Woodbridge and Jaeger. As Suzanne Marchand notes: "Upon Jaeger's induction into the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1924, Gustav Roethe claimed that the philosophi- cally oriented philologist represented a link to the tradition of Schleiermacher and AdolfTrendelenburg as well as an unswerv- ing defender of text-critical accuracy." See Marchand, 2003, 320. Woodbridge's own interest in Aristotle was cultivated during the period he spent in Berlin studying with Friedrich Paulsen. See, Lachs and Talisse, 2008, 345. In his book on the character and develop- ment of German Universities, Paulsen speaks in compelling and personal terms of the way Trendelenburg, "the restorer of Aristotelian philosophy," gave "his pupils heart for the study of Aristotle." See, Paulsen, 1895, 69, 147. There is, then, an important line of scholarship stemming from Trendelenburg that connects American pragmatic naturalism to a German philosophical and philological tradition that includes not only Jaeger but also Dilthey, Brentano, and Heidegger. The American tradition of naturalism can be traced from Trendelenburg to Paulsen to Woodbridge, George Santyana and George Sylvester Morris, and thus to Dewey and John Herman Randall. For its part, the philological side of the German tradition might be traced from Trendelenburg to Wilamovitz and Hermann Diel• to Jaeger, while on the phenomenologi- cal side it might be traced from Trendelenburg to Dilthey, Brentano, and Heidegger. For an attempt to bring the tradition of American naturalism back into dialogue with German phenomenology via a reading of Aristotle that is informed by that German tradition of close philological attention, see Long, 2011. 14 See Jaeger, 1923, 11. There is no question that Aristotle was influenced by Plato and, indeed, that their relationship must have been a pro- found and perhaps, at times, a tense one. The issue is that reading Aristotle in the shadow of Plato eclipses the extent to which Aristotle, as Woodbridge insisted, sought always to address and pursue the things at hand (Met. I.1, 982b13). 15 Joseph Owens draws upon precisely this rec- ognition of the important role such impasses or aporiai play in Aristotle's thinking in his seminal study of Aristotle's Metaphysics. See Owens, 1978. 16 See Woodbridge, 1965, 17. 17 See Long, 2011, 6-8. 11 Smith, 1971, 599. 19 Ibid., 605. The difference between expression and articulation is important. Articulation, following Smith, "means the making of something distinct so that it stands out as an identifiable unit with its parts arranged in significant patterns. On the other hand, articulation means that the manner of making something distinct requires its being set in precise relations to other things. The term, therefore, focuses attention on what is individual and on the fact of its belonging to a system or world at the same time." Ibid., 602. For a more detailed discussion of expression and articulation, see Long, 2011. 20 Woodbridge writes: "The correlation is ... between an act and a field of action, and an act and a field of action are as different as can be, but it is only the cooperation of the two that is ever effective. The effect of this correla- tion in operation is the 'conformation' of the soul to what is perceives." See Woodbridge, 1965, 46. 21 See De Anima 403b20-4. All translations are my own. 22 See Physics 184a16-8. For a further discussion of Aristotle's path of inquiry in relation to the things said, see Long, 2006, 253-9. See too, Long, 2011, 1-20, 49-71. 23 See Woodbridge, 1926, 6. 322 See Irwin, 1988, 29-30. John Cleary argues the case for a unified methodological approach in Aristotle along the lines of the legomenology developed here. See Cleary, 1994. 25 Deborah Modrak calls the traditional dichotomy into question when she insists that Aristotle advocates a conventionalism with respect to the relationship between phoneme and meaning and a naturalism with respect to the relationship between meaning and refer- ence. See Modrak, 2001, 19. 26 See Woodbridge, 1965, 24. 27 Stevens, 1984, 449. 28 Woodbridge, 1926, 45. 29 DA 416b32-417a9. 30 DA 417a10-14. 31 DA 418a1-6. The translation of entelecheia as "being-at-work-staying-itself" is drawn from Joe Sachs. See Sachs, 2001. 32 For another example of the use of the perfect tense to gesture to that moment of transforma- tion that is difficult to articulate, see the discus- sion of praxis in Met. IX.6, in which Aristotle speaks of complete actions as actions in which we can say, at once, the same thing is seeing and has seen, or is thinking and has thought. Met. IX.6, 1048b30-5. For a discussion of that passage along lines similar to those pursued here, see Long, 2004, 98-103. 33 See Woodbridge, 1965, 136, 45-6. Woodbridge calls this an "algebraic sentence," but it is more geometric than algebraic insofar as, on Woodbridge's own account, it establishes an analogy between terms that are correlated without being connected. DA Ill.4, 429a15-18. 35 See Woodbridge, 1965, 46. 36 Ibid., 47. 37 To be sure, Aristotle distinguishes between various parts of the soul, but he thinks of these "parts" most often in terms of capaci- ties or powers that may best be articulated in terms of various dimensions of the soul as opposed to segregated parts. Aristotle articulates the various dimensions of the soul, for example, in DA 11.2, by talking about the various senses in which we speak about living: "thinking, perceiving, motion and stasis with respect to place, and the motion that results from nourishment, that is, perishing and growth." DA 413a23-5. In II.3, THE PERIPATETIC METHOD he speaks more explicitly of the "powers of the soul" (Trov l>E bvvaµewv tij; 1jlvxij;) as he delineates its nutritive, perceptive, locomotive and deliberative capacities (DA 414a29-32). To be fair, Woodbridge himself argues eloquently against the modern tendency to divorce the mind from the body. In his 1926 book, The Realm of Mind, Woodbridge draws on precisely this vision of nature in order at once to critique and explain the origins of the modern dichotomy between mind and body. There he shows how the modern assumption that the mind is an agent separable from but operating with the body, specifically the brain, leads to the notion that the immediate objects of the mind are "nerv- ous processes in the brain." But, he argues, this is patently untrue for although the tree may stimulate a brain, what the mind thinks is not these brain processes, but the tree. The recognition that the idea of the tree is differ- ent from the processes of the brain leads, on the assumption of the mind as agent, to the positing of a dichotomy between mind and body. See Woodbridge, 1926, 13-15. 38 See Woodbridge et al., 1937, 163. 39 Met. 982b13-14. "" Phys. 184a31-3. 41 Spinoza recognizes thinking and corporeality as two attributes of God's infinite substance. This leads to a strict parallelism between ideas and things as expressed clearly in Ethics, book II, proposition VII: "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connec- tion of things." See Spinoza, 1985. 42 Stevens, 1997, 645. 43 Woodbridge, 1926, 35. 44 Ibid., 29, 34. 45 Ibid., 137. Emphasis added. 46 Woodbridge writes: "If, however, our thinking is to be wise and sane and correct, it is not the body which makes it so, but a genuine coherence among the things we think about. It is something we discover. We discover, that is, that there is in the realm of being a structure by virtue of which one fact or event in it may lead our thinking on to other facts and events what are involved, and opens us to the reaches of space and time and what they contain. This structure cannot be described as physical. It is logical." Ibid., 46. 323 THE PERIPATETIC MElHOD • 7 In an unpublished 1973 paper entided "Aristotle on the Ontology of the Senses," John M. Cooper traces the connection between aisthesis and krinein in order to account for the active dimension of perceiving in Aristode. I am grateful to Professor Cooper for sending me a copy of this paper. See, Cooper, 1973. For a detailed discussion of the role of krinein in Aristotle's account of aisthi sis, see Long, 2011, 127-31. There are a number of important passages in which Aristotle introduces the capacity to discern- krinein--into the logic of perceiving. See, for example, DA Il.10, 422a20-1, ill.2, 425b20-2, 426b12-14, and 426b17-22; in Parts of Animals, Aristotle insists that ani- mals too can discern the pleasant in what they taste. See, Parts of Animals 678b8-9. • 3 This is, in fact, the longer path that was pur- sued in Chapters 4 and 5 of Long, 2011. • 9 See Woodbridge, 1940, 242. 50 Poetics 1459a7-8. 51 The nature of the phantasia in Aristotle has given rise to a long tradition of rich scholar- ship. In calling it a metaphor here, the intent is decidedly not to suggest that, as Philoponus has insisted, the phantasia is that which "carries off from things that are and constructs a representation of that which is not, for instance a centaur." See, Philoponus, 2000, 497, 24-6. Rather, metaphor here draws on the original Greek meaning of "meta- pherein," to carry from one place to another. s2 DA m.3, 428b10-19. 53 See, DA fil.7, 431a16-17 and ill.8, 432a13-14. Freudenthal suggests that the difficulties associated with interpreting the meaning of the phantasia in Aristotle result from its position between perceiving and thinking. See, Freudenthal, 1863, 53. Wedin has suggested, to name only one scholar who has taken up the question of the phantalia as situated between perceiving and thinking in a serious way, that the phantasia ought not be understood as a "full fledged faculty" at all, but rather, it should be under- atood to serve the full faculties of aisthisis and nolsis. See Wedin, 1988, 46-52. For a detailed discuuion of these issues, see Long. 2011, 79-89. 54 &p6f>ov, 't6, see Liddell, 1968. For a discussion of this connection, see Whitney, 1981. 55 For a discussion of the "lever principle" on which this analogy depends, see De Groot, 2008,46. 56 See Nussbaum, 1985, 701b16-23. For a justification of the translation of phantasia as "being appeared to," see Long, 2011, 82. See too, Lycos, 1964. 57 Stevens, 1951, 61. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Critchley, 2005, 53-4. 58 Woodbridge, 1926, 62. 59 Stevens and Stevens, 1984, 133. REFERENCES Cleary, John J., "Phainomena in Aristotle's Methodology," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2.1 (1994), 61-97. Cooper, John M., "Aristotle on the Ontology of the Senses," Princeton University Conference on Ancient Philosophy (1973; unpublished). Critchley, S., Things Merely Are: Philosoplry in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, London/ New York: Routledge, 2005. De Groot, J., "Dunamis and the Science of Mechanics: Aristotle on Animal Motion," journal of the History of Philosoplry, 46.1(2008),43-68. 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