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The Group Basis of Partisan Affective Polarization

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Abstract

What explains rising partisan animosity in the United States? We argue that mass partisans' feelings toward the social group coalitions of the parties are an important cause of rising affective polarization. We first leverage evidence from the ANES Time Series to show that partisans' feelings toward the social groups linked to their in-party (out-party) have grown more positive (negative) over time. We then turn to the 1992-1996 and 2000-2004 ANES Panel surveys to disentangle the inter-relationship between partisan polarization and social group evaluations. Individuals with more polarized social group evaluations in 1992 or 2000 report substantially more polarized party thermometer ratings and more extreme, and better sorted, partisan identities four years later. Notably, these variables exerted little reciprocal influence on group evaluations. Our study has important implications for understanding affective polarization and the role of social groups in public opinion.

Key Words: Partisan polarization, social groups, affect, panel analyses

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Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition. Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (<http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop>).

Mass partisans in the United States increasingly dislike the other side, a phenomenon called *partisan affective polarization* (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). A leading explanation for this growing polarization points less to the role of ideology and more to the increasing group distinctiveness of the parties and concomitant identity-based motivations to impugn the other side (Ahler and Sood n.d.; Mason 2015, 2016). Broadly, this perspective calls attention to the increasing social homogeneity of the parties due to changes in the voting behavior of racial, geographic, gender, and religious groups (Achen and Bartels 2016; Layman 2001; Zingher 2014). Better-sorted social groups may mean that partisans are less able to see themselves, and their kind of people, in the other side thereby leading to greater social distance between these group coalitions and ultimately enhanced animosity.

We take up this argument and address a key empirical limitation facing existing work. While this group-oriented explanation for affective polarization calls attention to *changing* evaluations of group/party relationships, e.g. a growing association between the out-party and disliked groups, existing work has not examined whether these evaluations have actually changed over time. However, without this analysis we cannot truly know whether beliefs about social groups are a cause of the overtime *change* in partisan affective polarization. We leverage ANES Time Series and Panel data to address two questions: (1) have partisans' attitudes toward the social groups linked to the parties also polarized over time and (2) is any such social group polarization associated with higher levels of partisan affective polarization? We find that partisans' have indeed grown to increasingly like (dislike) the groups associated with their in-party (out-party). In addition, polarization in these group evaluations is substantially related to later levels of partisan affective polarization, party identity extremity, and party/ideological sorting. Our study thus builds on, and contributes to, existing work connecting social groups to partisan affect and identity by exploring a

broader array of social groups over a longer period and thus provides novel evidence for the group bases of partisan affective polarization and ultimately partisan conflict.

Study 1: Social Group Polarization Over Time

We turn to evidence from the American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series to investigate partisans' evaluations of the parties' social group coalitions. To do so we fit a confirmatory factor analysis on the social group feeling thermometers contained on each Presidential year ANES survey from 1980-2016.¹ This method has the advantages of enabling a correction for systematic differences in the use of the thermometer scale by respondents and also enables the groups to differentially contribute to the calculation of a respondent's latent evaluation of the parties' group coalitions (Weisberg, Haynes, and Krosnick 1995; Wilcox and Cook 1989).

In each survey-year we began by fitting a two-factor model on which all social group feeling thermometers (including those for the two parties) were included: a 'substantive' dimension and a 'measurement' dimension on which the thermometers were constrained to load equally and which was constrained to be uncorrelated with the 'substantive' dimension. This second dimension captures the aforementioned individual differences in thermometer use by respondents. How the groups loaded on the 'substantive' dimension affected how we treated them in the ensuing three-dimension (Democratic Groups, Republican Groups, and Measurement) model. Those groups that loaded in the same direction as the Democratic Party were sorted into a "Democratic Groups" factor in the ensuing model while those loading in the opposite direction were sorted into the "Republican Groups" factor. Common 'Democratic' groups included 'liberals,' 'Feminists,' 'unions,' 'environmentalists,' and 'Blacks', while common 'Republican' groups included 'conservatives',

¹ We focus on this period because it captures the period of growing partisan affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2012). In addition, affect toward the Democratic and Republican *parties* is not asked until 1980; before then, the ANES asked about "Democrats" and "Republicans" which may elicit slightly different reactions among respondents.

‘big business’, ‘Christian fundamentalists’, and the ‘military’. It should be noted that we omitted the Democratic and Republican party thermometer items in this second three-factor model so that the ensuing factor scores capture affect specifically regarding the social groups linked to the parties and not the parties themselves. Online Appendix A provides the model results for these models.²

In Figure 1 we plot the predicted evaluations of the Democratic and Republican group coalitions from these models with separate sub-graphs for Democratic and Republican respondents. Figure 1 also plots the difference between in-group (e.g. Democrats’ evaluations of Democratic groups) and out-group evaluations (e.g. Democrats’ evaluations of *Republican* groups). Figure 1 shows that partisans evaluated in-party associated groups more positively than out-party associated groups in all survey-years. These ratings, moreover, have diverged over time with a jump in polarization from the 1980s to the 1990s and then again in 2012; this is notably similar to the time trends in partisan antipathy shown in Iyengar and Krupenkin (2018). However, Figure 1 also shows some slight differences by respondent partisanship and target. For instance, Republicans’ evaluations of their party’s group coalition became only slightly more positive between 1980 and 2008 before a jump in 2012. On the other hand, Republicans grew substantially more negative in their evaluations of *Democratic*-aligned groups during this period save 2008. Democratic respondents show an inverse pattern: slightly growing positive affect toward in-party aligned groups before a recent acceleration, but more consistency in their evaluations of Republican-aligned groups

² Some additional points. First, we recoded missing data to a score of 50 to maximize the data available to us. Second, the 2012/2016 results focus on non-online sample respondents; Online Appendix A shows that this leads to lower levels of group polarization in 2012 than would otherwise occur. Second, items would occasionally load negatively on their assigned dimension in the 3-factor model implying that the group did not belong on this dimension. In these cases the group was removed (or constrained to load at 0) from the group dimension in question such that it would no longer contribute to the estimation of the latent evaluation. We investigate a variety of alternative specifications for these models the Online Appendices with broadly similar results emerging (in particular, Appendices C, E, F, and G).

before 2012. Figure 1 thus demonstrates evidence in favor of increasing social group polarization over time akin to the partisan affective polarization observed in other studies.

Study 2: Panel Evidence

In the preceding section we found evidence of increasing social group polarization; partisans evaluate in-party aligned groups more positively than out-party aligned groups and this gap has increased over time. We turn to data from the 1992-1994-1996 and 2000-2002-2004 ANES Panel Surveys to investigate the inter-relationship between social group polarization and partisan affective polarization. The use of panel data here is crucial as it enables us to untangle the potentially reciprocal relationship between these concepts. However, panel data are no panacea for causal inference with observational data particularly insofar as omitted variables cause changes in both our independent and dependent variables (Finkel 2008; Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010).

For both panels we estimated *Social Group Polarization* in the same manner as we did in the Time Series analyses. For all three waves of each panel survey we fit a three-factor model on the social group thermometers in the same manner discussed above and predicted each respondent's factor score from the model. We then sorted these scores along partisan lines to produce partisan in-group and out-group evaluations much as we did earlier. We finally subtracted out-group evaluations from in-group evaluations to obtain our measure of social group polarization. We rescaled this variable to fall on a 0-1 scale where increasing values indicate a growing bias toward in-groups relative to out-groups.

We will investigate three variables related to partisan affective polarization due to unevenness in the variables available across the two panels. First, we use data from the 1992-1994-1996 Panel to look at *Partisan Affective Polarization*, i.e. the difference between a respondent's thermometer rating of their in-party and out-party. Higher scores on this variable indicate greater in-party bias (scale:0-1). Unfortunately, this variable is only available in this particular Panel so we

will also explore two variables theoretically and substantively related to partisan affective polarization. We investigate *Party Identity Extremity* using data from both panel surveys. More extreme partisan identities are associated with a greater degree of partisan affective polarization (Mason 2015). As we are interested in the changing reactions of partisans, identity extremity ranges from leaning partisan (=0) to strong partisan (=1) in the first year of the panel (i.e. 1992) and from Independent (=0) to strong partisan (=1) in subsequent years. This accounts for the possibility that some partisans in 1992/2000 may identify as an Independent in the later waves. Finally, we will examine *Partisan-Ideological Sorting* in both the 1992-1994-1996 and 2000-2002 ANES Panels. Sorted partisans also report more partisan affective polarization (Mason 2015); if social group polarization predicts sorting, then it should also be related to partisan affective polarization as well. It is also plausible that social group polarization will predict sorting given that ideological self-placements are also predicated upon social group evaluations (Zschornt 2011). We measure partisan-ideological sorting in a manner following Mason (2015). Specifically, a respondent's sorting score is formulated by taking the absolute value of their 7-point party identification and 7-point (reverse coded) ideology scores and then multiplying this difference by both partisan identity and ideological strength.³ We then re-scaled this variable to range from 0-1 with higher scores indicating greater identity alignment.

We estimate the reciprocal relationship between social group polarization and these three variables via cross-lagged panel models (Finkel 2008).⁴ For instance, we regress time t values of partisan affective polarization on its $t-1$ values as well as $t-1$ values for social group polarization.

³ In other words, $\text{Sorting} = |\text{PID} - \text{Ideology}| * \text{PID Extremity} * \text{Ideological Extremity}$.

⁴ We investigate alternative specifications in Online Appendix B. We first show results from cross-lagged OLS models for each wave dyad (i.e. 92-94, 94-96, and 92-96). We then explore fixed-effect panel models that enable us to control for unobserved time *invariant* variables (Finkel 2008). These specifications yield substantially similar results.

Likewise, time t values for social group polarization are regressed on its $t-1$ values as well as $t-1$ values for partisan affective polarization. We estimate both models simultaneously for each year dyad (i.e. 1992->1994 and 1994->1996) using a structural equation modeling estimator (Finkel 2008). Because we control for lagged values of the dependent variable we can thus assess whether prior social group polarization is associated with *changes* in subsequent levels of partisan affective polarization, etc., and vice versa. Moreover, we can test for whether the relationship between prior social group polarization and later partisan affective polarization, etc., is equivalent to, or alternatively greater/lesser than, the inverse pathway. We include a series of control variables measured in the first wave of the panel survey: age, education, race, gender, political interest, racial resentment, ideological extremity (in the non-sorting analyses), and issue extremity.

Table 1 provides an overview of the relationship between social group polarization and our three affective polarization related variables; we provide full model results in Online Appendix B. If the group based account of partisan affective polarization is accurate than we should see a positive relationship between social group polarization and the three “Party” even while controlling for prior values of the dependent variable. And, indeed, Table 1 shows that social group polarization measured in year t has a significant and substantive relationship with subsequent levels of party affective polarization, PID strength, and party/ideological sorting in all models save for the 2000-2002 model of PID strength. Moving from minimum to maximum levels of social group polarization in year t is associated with 16-25% more partisan polarization, 8 to 21% more extreme partisan identities, and 12-38% higher scores on the sorting variable in year $t+1$. On the other hand, the three party polarization-related variables have a much more inconsistent relationship with later social group polarization and one that is generally substantially smaller in scope. Indeed, as the Wald tests at the bottom of Table 1 attest, the pathway from social group polarization to these party variables is nearly always significantly greater than the inverse pathway. Table 1 lends novel and

substantive support to the claim that social group evaluations lead, rather than follow, party affective polarization and associated variables.

Conclusion


We have explored an untested implication of group-based theories of partisan affective polarization, and of party conflict more generally: that partisans' evaluations of the parties' social group coalitions have polarized over time and that these evaluations are related to subsequent levels of partisan affective polarization. In the former case, we saw evidence that the polarization that has emerged along partisan lines also extends to evaluations of these social group coalitions. In the latter case, we saw consistent evidence that social group polarization is a driving force behind increased partisan affective polarization rather than vice versa. We thus provide novel and substantial evidence in favor of the group interpretation of partisan affective polarization.

There exist several notable paths that future research could take to expand upon our results. First, a similar methodology as used here could be exploited to explore the origins of partisan identification itself and its roots in group evaluations. Second, the role of partisan elites in this process deserves special attention. Elites may matter in two non-exclusive ways. First, the demographic composition of party elites provide signals concerning the types of groups at home in a partisan coalition (e.g., Evans and Tilley 2017). Party elites may thus serve as a heuristic enabling voters to ascertain changes in the party's group coalitions. Second, elites appeal to social groups in society via rhetoric and also use rhetoric designed to prime group considerations (e.g., Valentino and Neuner n.d.). This raises an important question for further research: what role does such rhetoric play in the development of both social group and partisan affective polarization?

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Figure 1: Democratic and Republican Respondents' Evaluations of Partisan Group Coalitions



Notes: The first two subgraphs provide the predicted factor score for Democratic Party and Republican aligned groups (with 95% confidence intervals) separately for Democratic and then Republican respondents. For the final graph we sorted these scores into in-groups (i.e. evaluations of Democratic Groups by Democrats), out-groups (i.e. evaluations of Democratic Groups by *Republicans*) for each respondent and took the difference; positive scores thus indicate a positive bias in favor of in-party related groups. The bandwidth for the lowest regression line is 0.8. Figure schemes courtesy of Bischof (2017).

Table 1: The Reciprocal Relationship Between Social Group Polarization & Party Affective Polarization, PID Strength, and Party/Ideological Sorting

	1992-1994-1996; “Party” =			2000-2002-2004; “Party” =	
	Party Polarization	PID Strength	Sorting	PID Strength	Sorting
Cross-Lag Coefficient					
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.161** (0.0417)	0.212* (0.0833)	0.378** (0.0677)	0.0795 (0.0715)	0.280** (0.0575)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.251** (0.0659)	0.195* (0.0908)	0.309** (0.0730)	0.124* (0.0616)	N/A
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0504+ (0.0290)	0.00394 (0.0113)	0.0847** (0.0225)	0.0343** (0.0115)	0.117** (0.0159)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.118* (0.0490)	0.0273 (0.0206)	0.100** (0.0283)	-0.00602 (0.0184)	N/A
N =	425	425	425	621	831
Wald Tests					
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.05	p < 0.10	p < 0.01	p = 0.53	p < 0.01
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p = 0.119	p < 0.05	p < 0.01	p < 0.05	N/A

Notes: Each column provides the results from a different model differentiated by which party variable is involved. Cell entries provide the unstandardized coefficients for the Party variables (Party Polarization, PID Strength, and Partisan/Ideological Sorting) and for Social Group Polarization (SGP). T1 = 1992 or 2000; T2 = 1994 or 2002; T3 = 1996 or 2004. The Cross-Lagged coefficients show the reciprocal influence of these variables on each other after controlling for the lagged values of the DV. The Wald tests test whether we can reject the null that the Party_{t-1} -> SGP_t path is equivalent to the SGP_{t-1} -> Party_t path. Full model results, including estimates for control variables and stability coefficients, can be found in Online Appendix B. ; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

The Group Basis of Partisan Affective Polarization

Online Appendices

1. [Appendix A](#): ANES Times Series Results/Analyses
2. [Appendix B](#): ANES Panel Analyses – Models for Analyses in Text, SUREG Results, and Fixed Effect Regression Models
3. [Appendix C](#): Replication of Results with ‘Common’ Items Only
4. [Appendix D](#): Replication of Results while Accounting for Group ‘Closeness’
5. [Appendix E](#): Replication of Results while Omitting Racial Groups from Group Dimensions
6. [Appendix F](#): Replication of Results while Omitting ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’ from Group Dimensions
7. [Appendix G](#): Free vs. Fixed Thermometer Loading Results

Appendix A

In this Appendix we provide the results from our ANES Time Series confirmatory factor analyses.


Figure OA1 provides a different way of showing the level of group polarization over time; the left hand sub-graph in this figure shows the mean rating given to 'in-groups' and 'out-groups' while the right hand sub-graph explicitly focuses on its difference.

Table OA1, meanwhile, provides a comparison of results between models conducted on the full sample of the 2012 and 2016 ANES Time Series with models based on just those that completed the survey with an interviewer present. These latter analyses are the ones reported in text. We focus on the FTF only sample in-text to maintain comparability across the Time Series waves. As Homola, Jackson, and Gill (2016) have shown, for instance, feeling thermometer ratings on the ANES 2012 Time Series yield more variable or extreme patterns of responses than the face-to-face ratings. Table A1 shows this in effect albeit *only* for Democratic respondents. An analysis of the full sample would thus reveal even higher levels of group polarization in 2012. Notably, the exclusion of the online sample does not materially influence the predicted evaluations in 2016, suggesting that mode had a reduced influence in this year.

Figure OA2 further delves into the TS analyses by presenting the mean ratings of the social group coalitions by *Independents*. If partisanship and associated party evaluations are driven by evaluations of party-group images (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004), then one plausible supposition would be that Independents are individuals with more muted evaluations of the party's group coalitions perhaps due to cross-pressures (e.g. positive evaluations of *some* groups associated with Party X and negative evaluations of *other* groups associated with Party X). Figure OA2 is consistent with this supposition; evaluations of the group coalitions among Independents hover around 0 with overlapping confidence intervals.

Tables OA2 to OA11, meanwhile, provide the factor loadings from the CFA analyses.

Figure OA1: Social Group Polarization Over Time




Notes: The left-handed sub-graph provides the mean score for evaluations of party in-groups (i.e. evaluations of 'Democratic' aligned groups by Democratic respondents) and party out-groups (i.e. evaluations of 'Republican' aligned groups by Democratic respondents) over time with 95% CIs. The right-hand graph explores the difference between these two scores.

Table OA1: Comparison of Results: Full Sample vs. FTF Only in 2012 & 2016

	2012 ANES		2016 ANES	
	Full Sample	Only FTF	Full Sample	Only FTF
Democrats				
Democratic Groups	8.33 [7.70, 8.96]	3.64 [2.88, 4.40]	9.50 [8.08, 10.92]	9.84 [8.46, 11.22]
Republican Groups	-12.05 [-12.98, -11.12]	-4.92 [-5.92, -3.92]	-7.91 [-9.78, -6.05]	-8.69 [-10.41, -6.96]
Republicans				
Democratic Groups	-7.80 [-8.56, -7.04]	-7.66 [-8.80, -6.52]	-10.55 [-12.04, -9.07]	-10.38 [-11.85, -8.91]
Republican Groups	12.21 [11.55, 12.88]	10.12 [9.07, 11.16]	10.48 [9.45, 11.52]	8.21 [7.25, 9.17]
Social Group Polarization				
In-Groups	10.11 [9.65, 10.58]	6.62 [5.95, 7.28]	9.97 [9.09, 10.86]	9.05 [8.20, 9.91]
Out-Groups	-6.18 [-6.93, -5.42]	-6.18 [-6.93, -5.42]	-9.19 [-10.39, -7.99]	-9.51 [-10.64, -8.37]
Difference	19.86 [18.95, 20.78]	12.80 [11.57, 14.02]	19.16 [17.20, 21.13]	18.56 [16.69, 20.43]

Notes: Cells provide the mean scores on the factor dimensions and polarization measures separately for models of the Full Sample and the non-Online Sample.

Figure OA2: Group Ratings by 'Pure' Independents



Notes: Markers provide the mean ratings given to the two parties social group coalitions by Independent respondents in the ANES TS.

Table OA2. 1980 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1.00 (fixed)	0.43		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.41	0.20		
<i>Civil Rights Leaders</i>	1.44	0.59		
<i>Black Militants</i>	1.77	0.59		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.75	0.31		
<i>Unions</i>	0.77	0.32		
<i>Women's Movement</i>	1.08	0.39		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.22	0.11		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.24	0.11		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1.00 (fixed)	0.33
<i>Whites</i>			1.33	0.48
<i>Big Business</i>			0.06	0.02
<i>Businessmen</i>			1.42	0.53
<i>Military</i>			0.92	0.28
<i>Southerners</i>			0.57	0.19
<i>Workingmen</i>			1.25	0.45
<i>Middleclass</i>			1.68	0.60
<i>Fit Statistics</i>				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.095			
<i>CFI</i>	0.790			
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	2645.867 (0.000)			
<i>X²/df</i>	15.56			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.098			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations:</i>				
<i>w/Republican Dimension</i>	-0.97			
<i>w/Democratic Party Therm.</i>	0.29		-0.27	
<i>w/Republican Party Therm.</i>	-0.26		0.24	

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Poor People, Government Employees, and Evangelicals

Table OA3. 1984 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1.00 (fixed)	0.47		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.63	0.34		
<i>Civil Rights Leaders</i>	1.35	0.56		
<i>Black Militants</i>	1.91	0.67		
<i>Unions</i>	1.08	0.45		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	1.08	0.47		
<i>Poor</i>	0.14	0.08		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.71	0.36		
<i>Women's Mvt</i>	1.11	0.48		
<i>Women</i>	0.17	0.09		
<i>Gays</i>	1.97	0.64		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1.00 (fixed)	0.39
<i>Big Business</i>			1.65	0.56
<i>Evangelical</i>			2.31	0.68
<i>Anti-abortion</i>			1.66	0.47
<i>Military</i>			0.83	0.32
Fit Statistics				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.125			
<i>CFI</i>	0.702			
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	5527.456 (0.000)			
<i>X²/df</i>	36.36			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.281			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
Correlations:				
<i>w/Republican Dimension</i>	0.51			
<i>w/Democratic Party Therm.</i>	0.25		-0.08	
<i>w/Republican Party Therm.</i>	-0.21		0.22	

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites, Middle Class, and Elderly

Table OA4. 1988 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1.00 (fixed)	0.55		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.64	0.39		
<i>Civil Rights Leaders</i>	1.20	0.62		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.67	0.41		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	1.38	0.60		
<i>Unions</i>	0.89	0.43		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.95	0.50		
<i>Poor</i>	0.23	0.15		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.15	0.09		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	1.41	0.55		
<i>Feminists</i>	1.06	0.54		
<i>Catholics</i>	0.26	0.16		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1.00 (fixed)	0.24
<i>Big Business</i>			1.27	0.28
<i>Military</i>			0.53	0.13
<i>Anti-abortion</i>			2.21	0.37
<i>Christian</i>			2.86	0.57
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Evangelical</i>			4.21	0.69
<i>Fit Statistics</i>				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.106			
<i>CFI</i>	0.677			
<i>X²</i>	5044.067			
<i>X²/df</i>	24.02			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.209			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations:</i>				
<i>w/Republican</i>	0.47			
<i>Dimension</i>				
<i>w/Democratic Party</i>	0.28		-0.001	
<i>Therm.</i>				
<i>w/Republican Party</i>	-0.27		0.04	
<i>Therm.</i>				

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites, Women, Jews, and the Elderly

Table OA5. 1992 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1.00 (fixed)	0.58		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.14	0.10		
<i>Unions</i>	0.70	0.36		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.06	0.04		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.48	0.30		
<i>Poor People</i>	0.12	0.09		
<i>Women's Mvt</i>	1.10	0.62		
<i>Feminists</i>	1.33	0.72		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.54	0.32		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.91	0.41		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.46	0.24		
<i>Lawyers</i>	0.37	0.21		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1.00 (fixed)	0.43
<i>Whites</i>			0.67	0.32
<i>Southerners</i>			0.61	0.29
<i>Big Business</i>			0.82	0.35
<i>Military</i>			1.29	0.54
<i>Police</i>			1.03	0.44
<i>Christian</i>			1.02	0.39
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Catholics</i>			0.42	0.19
Fit Statistics				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.101			
<i>CFI</i>	0.729			
<i>X²</i>	6038.421			
<i>X²/df</i>	26.25			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.129			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
Correlations:				
<i>w/Republican Dimension</i>	-0.48			
<i>w/Democratic Party Therm.</i>	0.38		-0.21	
<i>w/Republican Party Therm.</i>	-0.32		0.39	

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Jews, Asians, Immigrants

Table OA6. 1996 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1.00 (fixed)	0.71		
<i>Unions</i>	0.54	0.39		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.09	0.09		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.14	0.13		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.33	0.26		
<i>Women's Mvt</i>	0.71	0.52		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.61	0.47		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.98	0.53		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1.00 (fixed)	0.42
<i>Big Business</i>			0.46	0.20
<i>Military</i>			0.48	0.21
<i>Christian</i>			1.89	0.70
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Christian Coalition</i>			2.02	0.75
<i>Fit Statistics</i>				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.110			
<i>CFI</i>	0.795			
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	2241.737			
<i>X²/df</i>	21.55			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.149			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations:</i>				
<i>w/Republican Dimension</i>	-0.49			
<i>w/Democratic Party Therm.</i>	0.46		-0.22	
<i>w/Republican Party Therm.</i>	-0.41		0.34	

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Poor People, Whites, and the Elderly

Table OA7. 2000 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1.00 (fixed)	0.58		
<i>Unions</i>	0.75	0.40		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.43	0.26		
<i>Women's Mvt</i>	0.90	0.54		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.13	0.63		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.67	0.41		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.89	0.42		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1.00 (Fixed)	0.51
<i>Big Business</i>			0.75	0.38
<i>Military</i>			0.63	0.32
<i>Christian</i>			1.40	0.66
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Christian Coalition</i>			1.46	0.68
<i>Catholics</i>			0.23	0.14
<i>Protestants</i>			0.26	0.16
<i>Whites</i>			0.08	0.05
<i>Fit Statistics</i>				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.097			
<i>CFI</i>	0.820			
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	3444.447			
<i>X²/df</i>	17.94			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.184			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations:</i>				
<i>w/Republican Dimension</i>	-0.05			
<i>w/Democratic Party Therm.</i>	0.36		-0.19	
<i>w/Republican Party Therm.</i>	-0.27		0.31	

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Blacks, Hispanics, Poor People, Asians, Jews, and the Elderly.

Table OA8. 2004 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1.00 (fixed)	0.65		
<i>Unions</i>	0.60	0.38		
<i>Welfare</i>	0.48	0.34		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.63	0.45		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.97	0.52		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.90	0.50		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.91	0.59		
<i>Muslims</i>	0.59	0.40		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.08	0.07		
<i>Poor</i>	0.06	0.05		
<i>Asians</i>	0.14	0.12		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1.00 (fixed)	0.55
<i>Whites</i>			0.15	0.10
<i>Southerners</i>			0.30	0.20
<i>Big Business</i>			1.08	0.57
<i>Business</i>			0.59	0.38
<i>Military</i>			0.60	0.33
<i>Christian</i>			1.03	0.50
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Men</i>			0.25	0.16
<i>Rich</i>			0.65	0.38
<i>Catholic Church</i>			0.75	0.39
<i>Catholics</i>			0.44	0.27
<i>Middle Class</i>			0.05	0.04
<i>Fit Statistics</i>				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.092			
<i>CFI</i>	0.791			
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	4261.547			
<i>X²/df</i>	11.21			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.173			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations:</i>				
<i>w/Republican Dimension</i>	-0.12			
<i>w/Democratic Party Therm.</i>	0.35		-0.24	
<i>w/Republican Party Therm.</i>	-0.39		0.44	

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Working Class, Women, Jews, Hispanics, Elderly, and the Young

Table OA9. 2008 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1.00 (fixed)	0.40		
<i>Unions</i>	0.45	0.17		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.38	0.15		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.03	0.02		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.38	0.17		
<i>Asians</i>	0.26	0.13		
<i>Jews</i>	0.14	0.06		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.77	0.31		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.56	0.23		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	1.72	0.53		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	1.30	0.42		
<i>Muslims</i>	1.36	0.52		
<i>Hindus</i>	1.05	0.45		
<i>Atheists</i>	1.82	0.55		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1.00 (fixed)	0.27
<i>Southerners</i>			0.87	0.25
<i>Big Business</i>			0.50	0.12
<i>Military</i>			1.52	0.38
<i>Christian</i>			1.33	0.33
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Christians</i>			1.58	0.45
<i>Catholics</i>			0.38	0.11
<i>Rich</i>			0.17	0.05
<i>Middle Class</i>			0.58	0.18
<i>Fit Statistics</i>				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.089			
<i>CFI</i>	0.794			
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	4833.402			
<i>X²/df</i>	19.33			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.101			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations:</i>				
<i>w/Republican</i>	-0.99			
<i>Dimension</i>				
<i>w/Democratic Party</i>	0.21		-0.21	
<i>Therm.</i>				
<i>w/Republican Party</i>	-0.28		0.28	
<i>Therm.</i>				

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites

Table OA10. 2012 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1	0.58		
<i>Unions</i>	0.70	0.39		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.28	0.17		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.31	0.19		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.54	0.33		
<i>Poor</i>	0.06	0.04		
<i>Asians</i>	0.26	0.17		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.97	0.48		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.72	0.34		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.75	0.44		
<i>Muslims</i>	0.84	0.49		
<i>Atheists</i>	0.91	0.41		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1	0.70
<i>Whites</i>			0.04	0.03
<i>Big Business</i>			0.64	0.45
<i>Military</i>			0.18	0.15
<i>Christian</i>			0.63	0.43
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Christians</i>			0.37	0.29
<i>Catholics</i>			0.34	0.26
<i>Rich</i>			0.54	0.38
<i>Mormons</i>			0.51	0.36
<i>Tea Party</i>			1.07	0.63
<i>Fit Statistics</i>				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.111			
<i>CFI</i>	0.595			
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	0.00			
<i>X²/df</i>	26.28			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.131			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations:</i>				
<i>w/Republican</i>	-0.58			
<i>Dimension</i>				
<i>w/Democratic Party</i>	0.52		-0.49	
<i>Therm.</i>				
<i>w/Republican Party</i>	-0.49		0.61	
<i>Therm.</i>				

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Middle Class; Working Class

Table OA11. 2016 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
<i>Liberals</i>	1	0.68		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.87	0.61		
<i>Unions</i>	0.50	0.36		
<i>Poor</i>	0.08	0.07		
<i>Gays & Lesbians</i>	0.92	0.61		
<i>Muslims</i>	0.75	0.55		
<i>Transgender</i>	0.95	0.64		
<i>Scientists</i>	0.30	0.26		
<i>Black Lives Matter</i>	1.15	0.65		
<i>Asians</i>	0.14	0.13		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.23	0.19		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.23	0.19		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.73	0.45		
<i>Conservatives</i>			1	0.69
<i>Christian Fundamentalists</i>			1.02	0.63
<i>Big Business</i>			0.66	0.47
<i>Rich</i>			0.40	0.32
<i>Christians</i>			0.60	0.45
<i>Tea Party</i>			1.00	0.63
<i>Police</i>			0.52	0.38
<i>Fit Statistics</i>				
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.125			
<i>CFI</i>	0.662			
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	0.000			
<i>X²/df</i>	17.65			
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.116			
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations:</i>				
<i>w/Republican Dimension</i>	-0.80			
<i>w/Democratic Party Therm.</i>	0.59		-0.46	
<i>w/Republican Party Therm.</i>	-0.49		0.56	

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites and Jews

Appendix B

In this Appendix we provide the full model results for the results reported in text. These are provided in Tables OB1 to OB5. Table OB6, meanwhile, provides an overview of analyses wherein we focus not on the polarization between in and outgroup evaluations but on them separately as predictor variables. There is some evidence here that the Out-Group dimension is more strongly related to Party Polarization and Sorting, and the In-Group dimension to PID Strength, but this evidence is rather uneven at best.

In the foregoing analyses we estimate the inter-relationship between social group polarization and our dependent variables via a three-wave cross-lagged model estimated using STATA's structural equation modeling (SEM) estimator. In the remainder of Appendix B we analyze the data via alternative modeling strategies. First, we provide results looking at cross-lagged OLS models (estimated via seeming-unrelated regressions) for each of the panel dyads (i.e. 1992 → 1994, 1994 → 1996, and 1992 → 1996). This is analogous to what we do via the SEM model but broken up into separate pieces. These analyses are presented in Tables OB7-OB11. Second, we leverage the panel nature of the data to fit fixed effect panel regressions, which are akin to estimating first differences (i.e. does the change in X predict the change in Y); these analyses are presented in Tables OB12-OB16. In these analyses, we fit two sets of models; for the first we focus only on those respondents who completed all three of the panel waves (as we do by necessity in the SEM models reported in text), while the latter focus on all respondents. In these models we control for time variant predictors common to all waves of the panel as well as dummy variables for panel wave. These results are substantially similar to those reported in the SEM models, although we see a weakened influence of social group polarization on PID strength in the 1992-1996 fixed effect models.

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Table OB1. Party Polarization and Social Group Polarization, 1992-1994-1996

	(1)			
	Party Polarization (1996)	Party Polarization (1994)	Social Group Polarization (1994)	Social Group Polarization (1996)
Party Polarization (t-1)	0.573** (0.0602)	0.262** (0.0338)	0.0504+ (0.0290)	0.118* (0.0490)
Social Group Polarization (t-1)	0.251** (0.0659)	0.161** (0.0417)	0.424** (0.0358)	0.707** (0.0537)
Issue Extremity (1992)	0.0439+ (0.0255)	0.0259 (0.0207)	-0.00948 (0.0178)	0.00792 (0.0207)
Ideology Strength (1992)	0.0214 (0.0225)	0.0277 (0.0180)	0.0649** (0.0155)	0.0293 (0.0183)
Follow Politics (1992)	-0.0304 (0.0241)	0.0502** (0.0193)	0.0258 (0.0166)	0.0336+ (0.0196)
Racial Resentment (1992)	-0.00486 (0.0285)	0.0572* (0.0231)	0.00868 (0.0198)	0.0144 (0.0232)
Gender	0.00876 (0.0131)	0.0109 (0.0106)	-0.00180 (0.00907)	-0.0137 (0.0107)
Race	-0.00158 (0.0197)	0.00686 (0.0159)	-0.00998 (0.0137)	-0.0219 (0.0161)
Education (1992)	-0.0261 (0.0209)	0.00498 (0.0169)	0.0338* (0.0145)	0.0144 (0.0170)
Age (1992)	0.0430 (0.0298)	-0.0392+ (0.0238)	-0.0582** (0.0205)	-0.00277 (0.0242)
Constant	0.0850+ (0.0477)	0.344** (0.0338)	0.273** (0.0290)	-0.0197 (0.0388)
Error Covariances				
Wave 2	0.00338** (0.000495)			
Wave 3	0.00258** (0.000692)			
N	425			
Log-Likelihood	1175.1			
Chi2	45.30			
RMSEA	0.156			
CFI	0.957			
SRMR	0.0191			
Wald Tests	p =			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) =	0.0382			
(Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2})				
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) =	0.119			
(Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3})				

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB2. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 1992-1994-1996

	(1)			
	PID Strength (1996)	PID Strength (1994)	Social Group Polarization (1994)	Social Group Polarization (1996)
PID Strength (t-1)	0.573** (0.0383)	0.312** (0.0274)	0.00394 (0.0113)	0.0273 (0.0206)
Social Group Polarization (t-1)	0.195* (0.0908)	0.212* (0.0833)	0.441** (0.0344)	0.757** (0.0487)
Issue Extremity (1992)	0.0237 (0.0385)	-0.0231 (0.0428)	-0.00519 (0.0177)	0.0143 (0.0207)
Ideology Strength (1992)	0.0217 (0.0343)	0.0136 (0.0376)	0.0665** (0.0155)	0.0291 (0.0184)
Follow Politics (1992)	-0.0254 (0.0366)	0.0164 (0.0403)	0.0254 (0.0167)	0.0373+ (0.0197)
Racial Resentment (1992)	-0.0484 (0.0432)	-0.00460 (0.0480)	0.00718 (0.0198)	0.0202 (0.0232)
Gender	0.0163 (0.0200)	-0.00514 (0.0221)	-0.00171 (0.00911)	-0.0124 (0.0107)
Race	-0.0157 (0.0301)	0.0461 (0.0332)	-0.00802 (0.0137)	-0.0213 (0.0162)
Education (1992)	-0.0690* (0.0319)	0.0162 (0.0352)	0.0324* (0.0145)	0.0126 (0.0171)
Age (1992)	0.0872+ (0.0455)	-0.0301 (0.0501)	-0.0574** (0.0207)	-0.00471 (0.0244)
Constant	0.226** (0.0697)	0.458** (0.0659)	0.290** (0.0272)	0.00323 (0.0374)
Error Covariances				
Wave 2	0.000643 (0.000977)			
Wave 3	-0.0000691 (0.00104)			
N	425			
Log Likelihood	244.4			
Chi2	64.03			
RMSEA	0.188			
CFI	0.935			
SRMR	0.0214			
Wald Tests	p =			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2})	0.0722			
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3})	0.0135			

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB3. Social Group Polarization and Party/Ideological Sorting, 1992-1994-1996

	(1)			
	Partisan/Ideological Sorting (1996)	Partisan/Ideological Sorting (1994)	Social Group Polarization (1994)	Social Group Polarization (1996)
Partisan/Ideological Sorting (t-1)	0.643** (0.0403)	0.374** (0.0433)	0.0847** (0.0225)	0.100** (0.0283)
Social Group Polarization (t-1)	0.309** (0.0730)	0.378** (0.0677)	0.442** (0.0351)	0.704** (0.0514)
Issue Extremity (1992)	0.0838** (0.0291)	0.0128 (0.0342)	-0.00510 (0.0178)	0.0122 (0.0205)
Follow Politics (1992)	-0.00931 (0.0275)	-0.00214 (0.0322)	0.0264 (0.0167)	0.0402* (0.0194)
Racial Resentment (1992)	0.0217 (0.0325)	0.0321 (0.0385)	0.00811 (0.0200)	0.0174 (0.0229)
Gender	-0.00442 (0.0152)	-0.0404* (0.0176)	-0.00298 (0.00914)	-0.00896 (0.0107)
Race	-0.0267 (0.0226)	-0.0196 (0.0264)	-0.00932 (0.0137)	-0.0186 (0.0159)
Education (1992)	0.0362 (0.0241)	0.0325 (0.0281)	0.0321* (0.0146)	0.0107 (0.0169)
Age (1992)	-0.0175 (0.0343)	-0.0459 (0.0397)	-0.0591** (0.0206)	-0.00297 (0.0241)
Constant	-0.158** (0.0504)	0.0747 (0.0525)	0.294** (0.0272)	0.0251 (0.0355)
Error Covariances				
Wave 2	0.00485** (0.000819)			
Wave 3	0.00306** (0.000795)			
N	425			
Log Likelihood	847.7			
Chi2	44.39			
RMSEA	0.154			
CFI	0.966			
SRMR	0.0172			
Wald Tests				
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2})	0.00990			
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3})	0.0000687			

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB4. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 2000-2002-2004

	(1) PID Str (2004)	PID Str. (2002)	Social Group Polarization (2002)	Social Group Polarization (2004)
PID Str. (t-1)	0.653** (0.0319)	0.365** (0.0207)	0.0343** (0.0115)	-0.00602 (0.0184)
Social Group Polarization (t-1)	0.124* (0.0616)	0.0795 (0.0715)	0.522** (0.0398)	0.578** (0.0356)
Pol. Interest (2000)	0.000282 (0.0298)	0.0178 (0.0314)	0.0431* (0.0175)	0.0460** (0.0172)
Avg. Issue Extremity (2002)	-0.00893 (0.0343)	-0.00637 (0.0359)	0.0270 (0.0200)	0.0122 (0.0198)
Ideology Str. (2000)	-0.0252 (0.0299)	0.0904** (0.0317)	0.0543** (0.0176)	0.0539** (0.0173)
Racial Resentment (2000)	-0.0300 (0.0350)	0.0175 (0.0367)	0.0244 (0.0204)	-0.0669** (0.0202)
Gender	0.0494** (0.0167)	0.0322+ (0.0174)	-0.00860 (0.00968)	0.0188+ (0.00963)
Race	0.0177 (0.0248)	0.0864** (0.0259)	0.0129 (0.0144)	-0.0493** (0.0143)
Education	-0.0616* (0.0292)	-0.0210 (0.0304)	0.0380* (0.0169)	0.0291+ (0.0168)
Age (2000)	0.0313 (0.0443)	-0.0214 (0.0469)	0.0108 (0.0261)	-0.0710** (0.0256)
Constant	0.282** (0.0518)	0.397** (0.0570)	0.000541 (0.0317)	0.191** (0.0299)
Error Covariances				
Wave 2	0.00356** (0.000958)			
Wave 3	0.00328** (0.000907)			
N	621			
Log-Likelihood	608.2			
Chi2	153.88			
RMSEA	0.246			
CFI	0.897			
SRMR	0.0259			
Wald Tests				
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2})	0.534			
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3})	0.0443			

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB5. Social Group Polarization and Party Sorting, 2000-2002

	(1)	
	Sorting (2002)	Social Group Polarization (2002)
Sorting (2000)	0.470** (0.0267)	0.117** (0.0159)
Social Group Polarization (2000)	0.280** (0.0575)	0.464** (0.0342)
Pol. Interest (2000)	0.0354 (0.0247)	0.0429** (0.0147)
Avg. Issue Extremity (2000)	0.0259 (0.0273)	0.0196 (0.0162)
Racial Resentment (2000)	0.0709* (0.0288)	0.0196 (0.0171)
Gender	0.0162 (0.0138)	-0.00626 (0.00818)
Race	0.0215 (0.0188)	0.0144 (0.0112)
Age (2000)	0.0462+ (0.0236)	0.0319* (0.0140)
Education (2000)		
Constant	-0.0922* (0.0438)	0.0360 (0.0260)
N	831	
Log Likelihood	381.2	
Chi2	62.55	
RMSEA	0.272	
CFI	0.929	
SRMR	0.0187	
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2}))	0.00628	

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ **Table OB6:** The Reciprocal Relationship Between Social Group Polarization & Party Affective Polarization, PID Strength, and Party/Ideological Sorting

1992-1994-1996

2000-2002-2004

	Party Polarization	PID Strength	Sorting	PID Strength	Sorting
Cross-Lag Coefficient					
T1 In-Groups -> T2 Party	0.103* (0.0469)	0.264** (0.0967)	0.111 (0.0770)	0.0519 (0.0737)	0.174** (0.0573)
T1 Out-Groups -> T2 Party	0.116** (0.0432)	0.0507 (0.0883)	0.377** (0.0710)	0.0602 (0.0661)	0.218** (0.0538)
T2 In-Groups -> T3 Party	0.00601 (0.135)	0.119 (0.206)	0.154 (0.154)	0.164** (0.0609)	N/A
T2 Out-Groups -> T3 Party	0.240* (0.117)	0.0886 (0.171)	0.127 (0.133)	0.0497 (0.0645)	N/A
T1 Party -> T2 In-Groups	0.0482+ (0.0265)	-0.000634 (0.0104)	0.00913 (0.0300)	0.00939 (0.0124)	0.108** (0.0243)
T1 Party -> T2 Out-Groups	0.0516+ (0.0304)	0.0144 (0.0120)	0.0510 (0.0344)	0.0319** (0.0113)	0.0705** (0.0218)
T2 Party -> T2 In-Groups	0.0352 (0.0428)	0.0124 (0.0177)	0.0509* (0.0256)	0.00311 (0.0168)	N/A
T2 Party -> T3 Out-Groups	0.117** (0.0381)	0.0260 (0.0159)	0.0750** (0.0228)	-0.0117 (0.0197)	N/A
N =	425	425	425	621	831
Wald Tests					
T1 In-Groups = T1 Out-Groups	p = 0.851	p = 0.144	p < 0.05	p = 0.931	p = 0.559
T2 In-Groups = T2 Out-Groups	p = 0.334	p = 0.934	p = 0.922	p = 0.151	

Notes: Cell entries provide the unstandardized coefficients for the Party variables (Party Polarization, PID Strength, and Partisan/Ideological Sorting) and for the In-Groups and Out-Groups dimensions. T1 = 1992 or 2000; T2 = 1994 or 2002; T3 = 1996 or 2004. The Cross-Lagged coefficients show the reciprocal influence of these variables on each other after controlling for the lagged values of the DV. The Wald tests test whether we can reject the null that the influence of T1 In-Groups on the Party variable is equivalent to the T1 Out-Groups variable on the same Party Variable. Note that the Out-Groups variable here is *reverse coded* such that higher scores indicate increasing *dislike* for groups associated with the out-party rather than increasing like.

Table OB7. Social Group Polarization and Party Polarization, 1992-1994-1996 (SUREG Models)

	1992-1994		1992-1996		1994-1996	
	Party Polarization (1994)	SGP (1994)	Party Polarization (1996)	SGP (1992)	Party Polarization (1996)	SGP (1996)
Party Polarization	0.265**	0.0600*	0.311**	0.0428	0.554**	0.0634*

(t-1)	(0.0322)	(0.0276)	(0.0447)	(0.0371)	(0.0391)	(0.0292)
Social Group Polarization (t-1)	0.120** (0.0406)	0.399** (0.0348)	0.248** (0.0548)	0.494** (0.0455)	0.207** (0.0437)	0.657** (0.0326)
Ideology Strength (t-1)	0.0455** (0.0174)	0.0679** (0.0149)	0.0395+ (0.0237)	0.0592** (0.0196)	-0.00995 (0.0186)	0.0420** (0.0139)
Issue Extremity (t- 1)	0.0215 (0.0200)	-0.00880 (0.0171)	0.0302 (0.0273)	-0.00869 (0.0227)	0.0350+ (0.0193)	-0.0177 (0.0144)
Follow Politics (t- 1)	0.0407* (0.0185)	0.0243 (0.0158)	0.0000339 (0.0255)	0.0452* (0.0211)	0.000706 (0.0163)	0.0302* (0.0121)
Racial Resentment (1992)	0.0442* (0.0221)	0.00814 (0.0189)	0.0491 (0.0305)	0.0339 (0.0253)		
Age (t-1)	-0.0218 (0.0227)	-0.0508** (0.0194)	0.00431 (0.0312)	-0.0384 (0.0259)	0.0454* (0.0207)	-0.0173 (0.0155)
Education (t-1)	0.00983 (0.0163)	0.0372** (0.0140)	-0.0171 (0.0220)	0.0216 (0.0183)	-0.0405** (0.0149)	0.0227* (0.0111)
Female	0.00489 (0.0102)	-0.00151 (0.00874)	0.00813 (0.0140)	-0.0127 (0.0116)	0.0181+ (0.00952)	0.00145 (0.00710)
Non-White	-0.00172 (0.0150)	-0.0181 (0.0128)	-0.00476 (0.0211)	-0.0231 (0.0175)	0.00835 (0.0140)	-0.0380** (0.0104)
Constant	0.365** (0.0319)	0.272** (0.0273)	0.253** (0.0440)	0.167** (0.0365)	0.110** (0.0286)	0.0503* (0.0213)
Observations	475		438		987	
r2	0.255	0.456	0.236	0.395	0.285	0.484
chi2	162.6	398.6	135.0	286.1	393.6	927.4

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB8. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 1992-1994-1996 (SUREG Models)

	1992-1994		1992-1996		1994-1996	
	PID Strength	SGP	PID Strength	SGP	PID Str	SGP
PID Strength (t-1)	0.334** (0.0261)	0.00525 (0.0110)	0.317** (0.0267)	-0.000977 (0.0144)	0.562** (0.0256)	0.0135 (0.0139)
Social Group Polarization (t-1)	0.181* (0.0792)	0.421** (0.0333)	0.197* (0.0808)	0.510** (0.0437)	0.0879 (0.0576)	0.676** (0.0312)
Ideology Strength (t-1)	0.0333 (0.0357)	0.0694** (0.0150)	0.0269 (0.0364)	0.0613** (0.0197)	0.0359 (0.0257)	0.0448** (0.0139)
Issue Extremity (t-1)	-0.00656 (0.0406)	-0.00533 (0.0171)	-0.00150 (0.0416)	-0.00503 (0.0225)	0.0401 (0.0264)	-0.0138 (0.0143)
Follow Politics(t-1)	0.00603 (0.0378)	0.0235 (0.0159)	-0.0227 (0.0391)	0.0452* (0.0212)	-0.000536 (0.0226)	0.0306* (0.0122)
Racial Resentment (1992)	0.00531 (0.0452)	0.00679 (0.0190)	-0.0305 (0.0468)	0.0327 (0.0253)		
Age (t-1)	-0.00571 (0.0467)	-0.0496* (0.0196)	0.0257 (0.0484)	-0.0361 (0.0262)	0.0882** (0.0287)	-0.0174 (0.0155)
Education (t-1)	0.0235 (0.0334)	0.0364** (0.0141)	-0.0338 (0.0338)	0.0204 (0.0183)	-0.0420* (0.0205)	0.0230* (0.0111)
Female	-0.00330 (0.0209)	-0.00102 (0.00879)	0.00296 (0.0214)	-0.0123 (0.0116)	0.0235+ (0.0131)	0.00267 (0.00709)
Non-White	0.0375 (0.0307)	-0.0163 (0.0129)	-0.00726 (0.0322)	-0.0207 (0.0174)	0.0197 (0.0194)	-0.0386** (0.0105)
Constant	0.427** (0.0613)	0.292** (0.0258)	0.489** (0.0634)	0.182** (0.0343)	0.217** (0.0358)	0.0678** (0.0194)
Observations	475		438		987	
r2	0.295	0.451	0.285	0.393	0.386	0.482
chi2	198.5	390.4	174.7	283.9	620.0	920.1

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB9. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 1992-1994-1996 (SUREG Models)

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	1992-1994		1992-1996		1994-1996	
	Sorting	SGP	Sorting	SGP	Sorting	SGP
Partisan/Ideological Sorting (t-1)	0.397** (0.0412)	0.0971** (0.0217)	0.408** (0.0441)	0.0824** (0.0288)	0.584** (0.0292)	0.0875** (0.0193)
Social Group Polarization (t-1)	0.333** (0.0646)	0.416** (0.0339)	0.381** (0.0684)	0.505** (0.0446)	0.327** (0.0493)	0.648** (0.0326)
Issue Extremity (t-1)	0.00664 (0.0326)	-0.00565 (0.0171)	0.0720* (0.0346)	-0.00547 (0.0225)	-0.00234 (0.0215)	-0.0155 (0.0142)
Follow Politics(t-1)	-0.00503 (0.0304)	0.0238 (0.0159)	-0.0213 (0.0325)	0.0454* (0.0212)	0.00957 (0.0184)	0.0283* (0.0121)
Racial Resentment (t-1)	0.0226 (0.0364)	0.00870 (0.0191)	0.0638 (0.0390)	0.0338 (0.0254)		
Age (t-1)	-0.0281 (0.0371)	-0.0500* (0.0195)	-0.0536 (0.0398)	-0.0384 (0.0259)	-0.0260 (0.0233)	-0.0167 (0.0154)
Education (t-1)	0.0352 (0.0268)	0.0357* (0.0141)	0.0542+ (0.0281)	0.0201 (0.0183)	0.0238 (0.0168)	0.0202+ (0.0111)
Female	-0.0363* (0.0167)	-0.00257 (0.00878)	-0.0319+ (0.0178)	-0.0134 (0.0116)	0.0116 (0.0106)	0.00237 (0.00699)
Non-White	-0.0276 (0.0245)	-0.0176 (0.0128)	-0.0308 (0.0267)	-0.0224 (0.0174)	-0.0365* (0.0158)	-0.0364** (0.0104)
Constant	0.0812+ (0.0490)	0.296** (0.0257)	-0.0478 (0.0526)	0.185** (0.0343)	-0.108** (0.0283)	0.0831** (0.0187)
Observations	475		438		987	
r2	0.344	0.448	0.380	0.391	0.507	0.486
chi2	249.0	386.2	268.8	281.4	1013.7	934.8

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB10. Social Group Polarization and PID Strength, 2000-2002-2004 (SUREG Models)

	(1) 2000-2002		(2) 2000-2004		(3) 2002-2004	
	PID St. (t)	SGP (t)	PID St. (t)	SGP (t)	PID St. (t)	SGP (t)
PID Str (t-1)	0.356** (0.0182)	0.0324** (0.00982)	0.353** (0.0218)	0.0127 (0.0112)	0.636** (0.0312)	-0.00196 (0.0173)
Social Group Polarization (t-1)	0.121* (0.0614)	0.506** (0.0331)	0.0994 (0.0752)	0.639** (0.0387)	0.140* (0.0616)	0.565** (0.0341)
Pol. Interest (t-1)	0.0140 (0.0271)	0.0427** (0.0146)	0.0101 (0.0328)	0.0427* (0.0169)	-0.00731 (0.0285)	0.0532** (0.0158)
Avg. Issue Extremity	0.0103 (0.0304)	0.0174 (0.0164)	-0.0130 (0.0377)	0.0220 (0.0194)		
Ideology Str. (t-1)	0.0684* (0.0288)	0.0581** (0.0155)	-0.00282 (0.0334)	0.0386* (0.0172)	-0.0285 (0.0291)	0.0488** (0.0161)
Racial Resentment (2000)	0.0694* (0.0320)	0.0185 (0.0172)	-0.00972 (0.0388)	-0.0488* (0.0199)		
Gender	0.0149 (0.0153)	-0.00780 (0.00823)	0.0635** (0.0183)	0.0132 (0.00942)	0.0514** (0.0162)	0.0154* (0.00899)
Race	0.0631** (0.0208)	0.00988 (0.0112)	0.0667* (0.0271)	-0.0298* (0.0140)	0.0302 (0.0229)	-0.0464** (0.0127)
Age (t-1)	0.0215 (0.0385)	0.0283 (0.0207)	0.00359 (0.0493)	-0.0401 (0.0254)	0.0230 (0.0431)	-0.0605* (0.0239)
Education	-0.0278 (0.0260)	0.0373** (0.0140)	-0.0572* (0.0322)	0.0384* (0.0165)	-0.0434 (0.0269)	0.0430** (0.0149)
Constant	0.349** (0.0480)	0.00572 (0.0258)	0.512** (0.0600)	0.0672* (0.0309)	0.258** (0.0398)	0.148** (0.0221)
Observations	841		637		681	
r2	0.371	0.364	0.341	0.430	0.437	0.436
chi2	495.7	482.1	329.1	480.7	528.3	525.4

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table. OB11 Social Group Polarization and Party/Ideological Sorting, 2000-2002 (SUREG Models)

	(1)	
	Sorting (2002)	Social Group Polarization (2002)
Sorting (2000)	0.470** (0.0267)	0.117** (0.0159)
Social Group Polarization (2000)	0.280** (0.0575)	0.464** (0.0342)
Pol. Interest	0.0354 (0.0247)	0.0429** (0.0147)
Avg. Issue Extremity	0.0259 (0.0273)	0.0196 (0.0162)
Racial Resentment (2000)	0.0709* (0.0288)	0.0196 (0.0171)
Gender	0.0162 (0.0138)	-0.00626 (0.00818)
Race	0.0215 (0.0188)	0.0144 (0.0112)
Age	-0.00702 (0.0347)	0.0257 (0.0206)
Education	0.0462+ (0.0236)	0.0319* (0.0140)
Constant	-0.0922* (0.0438)	0.0360 (0.0260)
Observations	831	
r2	0.403	0.381
chi2	560.5	511.2

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB12. Social Group Polarization and Party Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression Model; 1992-1994-1996 Panel

	(1) 1992-1994-1996 Only	(2) 1992-1994-1996 Only	(3) All	(4) All
Social Group Polarization	0.243** (0.0420)	0.234** (0.0430)	0.237** (0.0341)	0.223** (0.0350)
1994	0.0620** (0.00780)	0.0626** (0.00851)	0.0620** (0.00701)	0.0669** (0.00761)
1996	0.0209** (0.00734)	0.0294** (0.00747)	0.0224** (0.00680)	0.0286** (0.00694)
Pol. Interest		0.0421* (0.0195)		0.0248+ (0.0150)
Ideology Strength		0.0275 (0.0175)		0.0365** (0.0137)
Issue Extremity		0.0721** (0.0195)		0.0433** (0.0159)
Age		0.00829 (0.221)		-0.216 (0.173)
Education		-0.0509 (0.0446)		-0.00710 (0.0349)
Constant	0.458** (0.0205)	0.417** (0.0887)	0.459** (0.0167)	0.502** (0.0714)
Observations	1485	1436	2751	2668
Respondents	537	533	1214	1204
R2_Within	0.138	0.164	0.131	0.144
R2_Between	0.250	0.281	0.200	0.0704
R2_Overall	0.187	0.233	0.164	0.0897

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB13. PID Strength and Social Group Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression; 1992-1994-1996 Panel

	(1) 1992-1994-1996 Only	(2) 1992-1994-1996 Only	(3) All	(4) All
Social Group Polarization	0.0105 (0.0659)	-0.0181 (0.0686)	0.0298 (0.0517)	0.00994 (0.0533)
1994	0.0452** (0.0122)	0.0403** (0.0136)	0.0331** (0.0106)	0.0265* (0.0116)
1996	0.0368** (0.0115)	0.0408** (0.0119)	0.0402** (0.0103)	0.0421** (0.0106)
Pol. Interest		0.0484 (0.0312)		0.0505* (0.0227)
Ideology Strength		0.0845** (0.0279)		0.0680** (0.0209)
Issue Extremity		0.0308 (0.0312)		0.0224 (0.0241)
Age		-0.0368 (0.352)		0.0973 (0.264)
Education		-0.0138 (0.0712)		-0.0260 (0.0531)
Constant	0.653** (0.0321)	0.612** (0.141)	0.653** (0.0253)	0.575** (0.108)
Observations	1485	1436	2751	2668
Respondents	537	533	1214	1204
R2_Within	0.0184	0.0318	0.0106	0.0220
R2_Between	0.000452	0.0405	0.0164	0.103
R2_Overall	0.00476	0.0362	0.0101	0.0741

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB14. Party/Ideological Sorting and Social Group Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression

	(1) 1992-1994-1996 Only	(2) 1992-1994-1996 Only	(3) All	(4) All
Social Group Polarization	0.263** (0.0527)	0.232** (0.0542)	0.261** (0.0411)	0.230** (0.0424)
1994	0.0680** (0.00978)	0.0676** (0.0107)	0.0673** (0.00844)	0.0677** (0.00921)
1996	0.0233* (0.00920)	0.0283** (0.00945)	0.0220** (0.00819)	0.0273** (0.00842)
Pol. Interest		0.0812** (0.0245)		0.0619** (0.0181)
Issue Extremity		0.0495* (0.0247)		0.0559** (0.0192)
Age		0.401 (0.279)		0.332 (0.210)
Education		0.0437 (0.0563)		0.0322 (0.0423)
Constant	0.127** (0.0256)	-0.115 (0.112)	0.116** (0.0201)	-0.0820 (0.0866)
Observations	1485	1436	2751	2668
Respondents	537	533	1214	1204
R2_Within	0.108	0.129	0.114	0.129
R2_Between	0.358	0.0541	0.349	0.0807
R2_Overall	0.220	0.0630	0.229	0.0853

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB15. PID Strength and Social Group Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression; 2000-2002-2004 Panel

	(1) 2000-2002- 2004 Only	(2) 2000-2002- 2004 Only	(3) All	(4) All	(5) 2000-2002
Social Group Polarization	0.132** (0.0484)	0.143** (0.0524)	0.0999* (0.0451)	0.0989* (0.0498)	0.0186 (0.0716)
2002	0.0156 (0.00997)	0.0150 (0.0106)	0.0113 (0.00882)	0.00524 (0.00969)	0.0126 (0.0114)
2004	0.0606** (0.00919)	0.0583** (0.0103)	0.0582** (0.00893)	0.0508** (0.0101)	
Pol. Interest		0.0213 (0.0249)		0.0385+ (0.0233)	0.0233 (0.0341)
Ideology Strength					0.106** (0.0303)
Constant	0.632** (0.0239)	0.611** (0.0299)	0.642** (0.0219)	0.619** (0.0282)	0.608** (0.0410)
Observations	2316	2220	2922	2716	1845
Respondents	823	821	1157	1128	1074
R2_Within	0.0354	0.0369	0.0282	0.0310	0.0176
R2_Between	0.0279	0.0357	0.0368	0.0451	0.0822
R2_Overall	0.0274	0.0322	0.0266	0.0331	0.0740

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table OB16. Party/Ideological Sorting and Social Group Polarization, Fixed Effect Regression

	(1)	(2)
	Sorting	Sorting
Social Group Polarization	0.227** (0.0557)	0.214** (0.0650)
2002	-0.0169+ (0.00919)	-0.0238* (0.0104)
Pol. Interest		0.0161 (0.0314)
Constant	0.240** (0.0267)	0.242** (0.0370)
Observations	2043	1845
Respondents	1117	1074
R2_Within	0.0469	0.0493
R2_Between	0.294	0.274
R2_Overall	0.194	0.202

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Appendix C

In this Appendix we investigate the consequences of restricting the group dimension factor analyses to a 'common' core of social groups across the various Time Series or Panel Waves.

Time Series

The analyses in in-text rely on models that include a panoply of social group feeling thermometers. One question may be whether the increasing polarization on display is the result of momentarily salient social groups. To explore this possibility we have investigated models wherein we restrict the group dimension to 'common' social groups.

The results from our first attempt at this process are presented in Figure OC1-OC3. Our models here attempt to strike a balance between restricting the models to common groups while maintaining a good deal of coverage across relevant groups. This involves two compromises. First, between the years of 1980 and 2012 the ANES consistently asked respondents about these groups: Blacks, whites, big business, labor unions, liberals, conservatives, the military, Hispanics, people on welfare, and poor people. However, the ANES also asked respondents during this time frame to record their evaluation either of Christian Fundamentalists or Evangelicals and either between Feminists and the Women's Movement. These two attitude objects are not interchangeable, but they do load on the same dimensions (i.e. the Republican Groups dimension in the former case or the Democrats in the latter case) and are thematically quite similar. Thus, for our initial analyses we maintain these groups within the model. Second, the 2016 ANES Time Series asks about the foregoing groups but leaves off the military and people on welfare. For this initial analysis we do not omit these two groups from the 1980-2012 analyses. The key difference, as Figure OC1-OC3 show, concerns evaluations of the Republican Groups dimension where evaluations are generally more positive (negative) among Republicans (Democrats) when we restrict our attention to these 'core' groups. This is perhaps not surprising given that whites and the military may serve as societal reference groups for many people, even if associated with the Republican Party, and thus earn broadly positive evaluations. The results is greater initial polarization in the [mostly] common items analyses that nevertheless slopes upwards over time.

One obvious drawback to the above process is that we are not quite comparing apples to apples. While Feminists and the Women's Movement likely both tap into similar affective responses among respondents, they are of course not *quite* the same; the same can be said for Evangelicals and Christian Fundamentalists. Moreover, we cannot easily go from the 1980-2012 to 2016 time points due to the further dropping of social groups in this last year. We have thus refit our models focused only on those groups common to the entire 1980-2016 time frame: liberals, Blacks, Unions, Conservatives, Whites, Big Business, the Poor, and Hispanics. However, we should note that we are still not *quite* comparing apples to apples in these analyses at least when comparing against the original model results below. To quote the STATA guide to structural equation modeling, "it can be devilishly difficult for software to obtain results for SEMs," and this was true in this case. In particular, cutting the group models back so far led to convergence issues in several cases in the 1980-2012 sample, issues that we could only circumscribe by restricting some thermometers to not load on the substantive dimension it loaded on in the original analyses. This frequently involved the Hispanics and Poor thermometers and particularly so in the 1980s analyses. One likely reason for these groups to stand out is that they loaded rather weakly on the group dimension in question (Democratic Groups) to begin with. Regardless, we provide a comparison between the original models, presented in text, and these restricted models in Figures OC4-OC7. We see a similar pattern of results as in Figures OC1-OC3; affect toward the Republican group dimension is more polarized to begin

with in the common items models than in the in-text models, albeit again with a growing degree of group polarization, albeit one that is more uneven in the common groups models shown in Figure OC7.

What does these results tell us? First, we can still detect polarization in affect toward the parties group coalitions even when restricting our attention to a small number of groups likely to lie close to the center of the party's group coalitions. Second, polarization in affect toward these groups still appears to have increased over time, albeit in a less even way. However, this 'unevenness' is, to us, likely a remnant of omitting social groups that are likely key to how partisans view the parties, i.e. gender groups such as Feminists and religious groups such as Christian Fundamentalists (e.g., Ahler and Sood n.d.).

Panel

The panel analyses in text also use group dimensions that vary in their group inputs. Here, we compare our original model results to (1) results from analyses wherein the group dimensions are restricted only to those groups common to all three waves within a panel survey (i.e. 1992 & 1994 & 1996) and (2) to analyses where the group dimensions are composed of evaluations of groups common to all *six* surveys across the two panels. These results are presented in Tables OC1-OC3. Importantly, we continue to see the same patterns as before; while the coefficients jump around, social group polarization continues to influence later partisan affective polarization, PID strength, and party/ideological sorting even when social group polarization is measured via these restricted models.

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Figure OC1: Evaluation of Groups by Democrats, Original Model and [Mostly] 'Common' Groups




Figure OC2: Evaluation of Groups by Republicans, Original Model and [Mostly] 'Common' Groups

Republican Respondents





Figure OC3: Social Group Polarization, Original Model and [Mostly] 'Common' Groups

Figure OC4: Democrats Ratings of Group Coalitions, Original Model vs. Only Common




Figure OC5: Republican Ratings of Group Coalitions, Original Model vs. Only Common

Republican Respondents




Figure OC6: In and Out Group Ratings of Group Coalitions, Original Model vs. Only Common





Figure OC7: Social Group Polarization, Original Model vs. Only Common

Table OC1. Overview of Results From Original Models, Restricting to Social Groups Common Within Panels, and Common on All Six Panels: Party Polarization & Social Group Polarization

	1992-1994-1996		
	Original	Common to All three Panels	Common to All Six Panels
Cross-Lag Coefficient			
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.161** (0.0417)	0.136** (0.0434)	0.136** (0.0463)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.251** (0.0659)	0.242** (0.0650)	0.208** (0.0633)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0504+ (0.0290)	0.0483 (0.0295)	0.0693* (0.0327)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.118* (0.0490)	0.148** (0.0410)	0.183** (0.0449)
N =	425	425	425
Wald Tests			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2})	p < 0.05	p = 0.111	p = 0.265
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3})	p = 0.119	p = 0.242	p = 0.763

Table OC2. Overview of Results From Original Models, Restricting to Social Groups Common Within Panels, and Common on All Six Panels: PID Strength & Social Group Polarization

	1992-1994-1996			2000-2002-2004		
	Original	All Three	All Six	Original	All Three	All Six
Cross-Lag Coefficient						
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.212* (0.0833)	0.172* (0.0861)	0.181* (0.0919)	0.0795 (0.0715)	0.0809 (0.0678)	0.180* (0.0721)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.195* (0.0908)	0.190* (0.0893)	0.214* (0.0858)	0.124* (0.0616)	0.129* (0.0607)	0.139* (0.0649)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.00394 (0.0113)	0.00180 (0.0115)	0.00781 (0.0128)	0.0343** (0.0115)	0.0314** (0.0114)	0.0254* (0.0111)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.0273 (0.0206)	0.0387* (0.0173)	0.0523** (0.0188)	-0.00602 (0.0184)	0.00695 (0.0177)	0.0208 (0.0193)
N =	425	425	425	621	621	621
Wald Tests						
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.10	p < 0.10	p < 0.10	p = 0.53	p = 0.473	p < 0.05
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p < 0.05	p < 0.10	p < 0.10	p < 0.05	p < 0.10	p = 0.10

Table OC3. Overview of Results From Original Models, Restricting to Social Groups Common Within Panels, and Common on All Six Panels: Party Ideological Sorting & Social Group Polarization

	1992-1994-1996			2000-2002		
	Original	All 3	All Six	PID Strength	All Three	All Six
Cross-Lag Coefficient						
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.378** (0.0677)	0.353** (0.0706)	0.370** (0.0760)	0.280** (0.0575)	0.321** (0.0556)	0.387** (0.0583)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.309** (0.0730)	0.322** (0.0718)	0.319** (0.0687)	N/A	N/A	N/A
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0847** (0.0225)	0.0796** (0.0233)	0.108** (0.0262)	0.117** (0.0159)	0.0995** (0.0160)	0.0819** (0.0159)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.100** (0.0283)	0.121** (0.0237)	0.163** (0.0254)	N/A	N/A	N/A
N =	425	425	425	831	831	831
Wald Tests						
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.01	p < 0.01	p < 0.05	p < 0.01	p < 0.01	p < 0.01
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p < 0.01	p < 0.01	p < 0.01	N/A	N/A	N/A

Appendix D

One potential question concerns *identification* and, in particular, the role of the individual's own identifications in affecting social group polarization, party polarization (etc.), and their inter-relationship. In the models reported in text we include gender and race as control variables. In the models described in this appendix we also add religious preference (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Other [Base: None]). These items capture one element of identification (membership) but not another (psychological attachment). Unfortunately the ANES does not contain the type of identity measures for social groups that have grown in acceptance due to the work of Mason, Huddy, Greene and others drawing upon the social identity framework (e.g. Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema n.d.; Greene 2002; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). So, we are limited in our ability to speak to the role of group *identification* in this broader story.⁵

However, respondents in both panels were asked to indicate which social groups they felt “close” to in 1992 and 2000 with the list of groups asked about partially overlapping with the social groups in the feeling thermometer battery. One potential solution is to leverage these items to address the potential role of identification. However, there are some drawbacks to such an approach. In particular, these “close to” items are not an ideal measure of identification as individuals may report feeling ‘close to’ a group for reasons other than membership + a psychological attachment. For instance, 22.5% of male respondents on the ANES reported feeling close to “women”. “Closeness”, moreover, may reference feelings of shared interests but not necessarily indicate that the individual has incorporated the group into their broader self-concept, so even in the case where this item overlaps with group membership it may be the case that group *identification* is not being precisely addressed. Regardless we investigate how their inclusion as control variables affects the panel analyses in a new appendix, Online Appendix D.

We use these items in two ways; Tables OD1-OD5 provide an overview of the cross-lagged results from our original models and in these two alternative models.

First, we simply add each of these binary items (1 = close, 0 = not close) as control variables; this does not affect the relationship between the thermometer-based group affective dimension and the outcome variables save for the 2000-2004 PID Strength analyses where the coefficient turns for social group polarization turns insignificant (see below). Second, we create a similar differenced measure from these “close to” items to include as a control. We first take the mean of all of the “close to” groups typically related to the Democratic Party and then again those typically associated with the Republican Party; we use a mean here because there are more groups in this battery traditionally linked to the Democrats than the Republicans.⁶ Then, much as with the thermometer based measure, we sort this by respondent partisanship into In-Party Group Closeness and Out-Party Group Closeness and take the difference between the items such that higher scores indicate greater ‘closeness’ to groups associated with one’s in-party. This resulting difference measure is positively correlated with the latent affective dimension formed from the CFA ($r = 0.40$ [1992]; $r = 0.22$ [2000]). We see three key results from its inclusion as a control variable in the panel analyses: (1) the measure does not significantly predict later levels of social group polarization; (2) it

⁵ As a side note, insofar as group identities influence T1 values in social group polarization and our other outcome variables, then the lagged values of these variables should capture some of the effects of identification.

⁶ Democratic Groups in the 92-96 Panel: Poor, liberals, Blacks, Unions, Feminists, Hispanics, Women, Working Class, and Asians. Republican Groups in this panel: Southerners, Business People, Conservatives, and Whites. Democratic groups in the 00-04 Panel: Poor, Asians, Liberals, Blacks, Unions, Feminists, Hispanics, and Women. Republican Groups were: Whites, Southerners, Business People, and Conservatives.

does predict later levels of the three party variables (particularly the party sorting measure), and (3) it does not significantly alter the relationship between social group polarization and our outcome variables in the 1992-1996 analyses or on the sorting analyses in the 2000-2002 panel, but does lead to an insignificant social group thermometer coefficient in the 2000-2002-2004 PID strength analyses. Notably, in these last analyses this differenced item is a substantial predictor of later PID strength.

As we note, these items are not very well suited for investigating *identity* or *identification*, but they may be the closest such measure for identification with social identities beyond partisanship in the ANES. Ultimately, we are heartened to see them have a similar influence on the later party variables as we believe this provides further evidence of a group-based dimension to party polarization, whether they are tapping identification or serve as an alternative measurement of group polarization.

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Table OD1. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness Items, and Group Closeness 'Differenced' Items [Party Affective Polarization, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	1992-1994-1996		
	Original	Group Closeness	Group Closeness: Differenced
Cross-Lag Coefficient			
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.161** (0.0417)	0.138** (0.0425)	0.235** (0.0662)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.251** (0.0659)	0.252** (0.0659)	0.174** (0.0436)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0504+ (0.0290)	0.0584+ (0.0302)	0.0519+ (0.0294)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.118* (0.0490)	0.140** (0.0488)	0.127** (0.0489)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 SGP			-0.00420 (0.0280)
T1 Group Difference -> T3 SGP			0.0307 (0.0310)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			0.117** (0.0378)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			-0.0139 (0.0326)
N =	425	422	422
Wald Tests			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2})	p < 0.05	p = 0.147	p < 0.03
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3})	p = 0.119	p = 0.191	p = 0.207

Table OD2. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness Items, and Group Closeness ‘Differenced’ Items [PID Strength, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	1992-1994-1996		
	Original	Common to All three Panels	Common to All Six Panels
Cross-Lag Coefficient			
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.212* (0.0833)	0.209* (0.0860)	0.226* (0.0878)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.195* (0.0908)	0.161+ (0.0924)	0.163+ (0.0923)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.00394 (0.0113)	0.00682 (0.0113)	0.00593 (0.0114)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.0273 (0.0206)	0.0341+ (0.0205)	0.0279 (0.0206)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 SGP			0.00236 (0.0278)
T1 Group Difference -> T3 SGP			0.0317 (0.0312)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			0.0169 (0.0670)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			0.142* (0.0583)
N =	425	422	422
Wald Tests			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2})	p < 0.10	p = 0.181	p = 0.154
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3})	p < 0.05	p < 0.05	p < 0.05

Table OD3. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness Items, and Group Closeness 'Differenced' Items [Party/Ideological Sorting, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	1992-1994-1996		
	Original	Common to All three Panels	Common to All Six Panels
Cross-Lag Coefficient			
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.378** (0.0677)	0.340** (0.0688)	0.339** (0.0704)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.309** (0.0730)	0.258** (0.0728)	0.263** (0.0746)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0847** (0.0225)	0.0848** (0.0230)	0.0349 (0.0331)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.100** (0.0283)	0.104** (0.0286)	0.0939** (0.0298)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 SGP			0.000952 (0.0278)
T1 Group Difference -> T3 SGP			0.0177 (0.0313)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			0.133* (0.0531)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			0.0964* (0.0442)
N =	425	422	422
Wald Tests			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2})	p < 0.01	p < 0.10	p < 0.05
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3})	p < 0.01	p < 0.01	p < 0.01

Table OD4. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness Items, and Group Closeness 'Differenced' Items [PID Strength, 2000-2004 ANES Panel]

	2000-2002-2004		
	Original	Common to All three Panels	Common to All Six Panels
Cross-Lag Coefficient			
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.0795 (0.0715)	0.118 (0.0827)	0.0313 (0.0817)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.124* (0.0616)	0.0651 (0.0695)	0.101 (0.0672)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0343** (0.0115)	0.0405** (0.0131)	0.0432** (0.0124)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	-0.00602 (0.0184)	0.00738 (0.0195)	-0.00451 (0.0191)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 SGP			-0.00221 (0.169)
T1 Group Difference -> T3 SGP			0.198 (0.158)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			0.714* (0.303)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			-0.0566 (0.288)
N =	621	517	547
Wald Tests			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2}))	p = 0.53	p = 0.356	p = 0.885
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3}))	p < 0.05	p = 0.429	p = 0.136

Table OD4. Overview of Results From Original Models, Models Controlling for Individual Group Closeness Items, and Group Closeness 'Differenced' Items [Sorting, 2000-2002 ANES Panel]

	Original	Common to All three Panels	Common to All Six Panels
Cross-Lag Coefficient			
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.280** (0.0575)	0.337** (0.0665)	0.285** (0.0654)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.117** (0.0159)	0.126** (0.0176)	0.155** (0.0242)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 SGP			0.927** (0.247)
T1 Group Difference -> T2 Party			0.927** (0.247)
N =	831	688	723
Wald Tests			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.01	p < 0.01	p < 0.10

Appendix E

Racial groups are a key element in perceptions of political parties and in recent accounts of partisan antipathy (e.g., Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Ahler and Sood n.d.; Mason 2016). How does the inclusion of racial groups within our group coalition measurement analyses influence our subsequent results? In this Appendix we replicate our in-text analyses after excluding racial groups from the construction of the group coalition latent dimensions.⁷

Figures OE1-OE4 provide a comparison of our Time Series results between the in-text models and the ones excluding racial groups. There is one notable deviance that shows up in 2016 and, to a lesser extent, in 2008. In these years, Democratic (Republican) respondents record less *positive (negative)* evaluations on the Democratic Groups dimension. Scores on the Republican Groups dimension are virtually unaffected. This does not yield a change in the overall level of group polarization in 2008 but does yield less polarization in 2016. These changes are perhaps not entirely surprising given the relationship between Presidents Obama and Trump and the racialization of party conflict (e.g., Piston 2010; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018; Tesler 2013). On the whole, though, the patterns in the Time Series analyses are highly consistent regardless of whether the racial groups are omitted or not.

Tables OE1-OE5, meanwhile, provide an overview of results comparing the estimates of the relationship between T SGP and T+1 Party Variables, and the reciprocal relationships, between the original models and those based on group dimensions expunged of racial groups. Omitting the racial groups from the groups dimension does not materially influence our conclusions.

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⁷ This requires removing the following thermometers: Blacks, Civil Rights Leaders, Black Militants, Hispanics, Asians, Whites, Illegal Immigrants, Immigrants, and Blacks Lives Matter

Figure OE1: Comparing Results Across Models, Democratic Respondents




Figure OE2: Comparing Results Across Models, Republican Respondents




Figure OE3: Comparing Results Across Models, In- and Out-Groups





Figure OE4: Comparing Results Across Models, Social Group Polarization

Table OE1. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group Dimensions [Party Affective Polarization, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	Original	Excluding Racial Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.161** (0.0417)	0.158** (0.0441)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.251** (0.0659)	0.245** (0.0640)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0504+ (0.0290)	0.0413 (0.0294)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.118* (0.0490)	0.143** (0.0399)
N =	425	425
Wald Tests		
$(SGP_{t1} \rightarrow Party_{t2}) = (Party_{t1} \rightarrow SGP_{t2})$	p < 0.05	p < 0.05
$(SGP_{t2} \rightarrow Party_{t3}) = (Party_{t2} \rightarrow SGP_{t3})$	p = 0.119	p = 0.194

Table OE2. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group Dimensions [PID Strength, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	Original	Excluding Racial Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.212* (0.0833)	0.217* (0.0876)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.195* (0.0908)	0.187* (0.0884)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.00394 (0.0113)	0.00454 (0.0114)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.0273 (0.0206)	0.0356* (0.0169)
N =	425	425
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.10	p < 0.10
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p < 0.05	p < 0.05

Table OE3. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group Dimensions [Party/Ideological Sorting, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	Original	Excluding Racial Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.378** (0.0677)	0.381** (0.0705)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.309** (0.0730)	0.315** (0.0709)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0847** (0.0225)	0.0787** (0.0230)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.100** (0.0283)	0.118** (0.0231)
N =	425	425
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.01	p < 0.05
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p < 0.01	p < 0.01

Table OE4. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group Dimensions [PID Strength, 2000-2004 ANES Panel]

	Original	Excluding Racial Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.0795 (0.0715)	0.0764 (0.0703)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.124* (0.0616)	0.136* (0.0604)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0343** (0.0115)	0.0354** (0.0119)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	-0.00602 (0.0184)	-0.00244 (0.0182)
N =	621	621
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p = 0.53	p = 0.57
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p < 0.05	p < 0.03

Table OE5. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models Excluding Racial Groups from Group Dimensions [Sorting, 2000-2002 ANES Panel]

	Original	Excluding Racial Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.280** (0.0575)	0.273** (0.0565)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.117** (0.0159)	0.124** (0.0163)
N =	831	831
Wald Tests (SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.01	p < 0.05

Appendix F

One question that may arise is the role of more or less ideological groups in driving the results we see in text. One potential suspicion is that the *less* ideological groups are driving our patterns as they get folded into the mix over time. Alternatively, it may be the *more* ideological groups that are at fault. A robustness check we investigate in this appendix involves the omission of ‘ideological groups’. However, this raises the question of which groups to omit. While liberals and conservatives are perhaps clearly ‘ideological’, it is less clear with regards to many of the other groups that we could look at. Indeed, we think it is plausible that many individuals assign ideological meaning to many other groups in the data that are not explicitly ideological. A novel study by Swigger (2012), for instance, shows that candidate advertisements randomly featuring visual images of African Americans, senior citizens, blue collar workers, Latinos, or soldiers (e.g. the military) substantially influenced subjects subsequent ideological and issue placement of the candidate involved (see also: Brady and Sniderman 1985). While they do not explore perceptions of candidate ideology per se, Campbell, Green, and Layman’s (2011) shows that cueing an Evangelical identity with regards to a candidate substantially influences how partisans respond to the candidate. We’re hesitant then to draw clear lines in the sand with groups other than liberals and conservatives. We thus simply replicate our intext results by re-estimating the group dimensions absent liberals and conservatives.

Figures OF1-OF4 compare our original model results to these replications. The key difference that emerges concerns evaluations of the Democratic group coalition, with less positive evaluations emerging among Democratic respondents when we omit liberals from the mix and *more positive* (or, less negative) evaluations for Republicans. Polarization still exists but it now grows more slowly until 2012 where we see a dramatic upsurge in antipathy. Tables OF1-OF3, meanwhile, focus on the panel results; here we see little change in the partisan affective polarization models but some reduced precision in the PID strength and party/ideological sorting models.

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Figure OF1: Democrats Ratings of Democratic & Republican Group Dimensions – Original Models vs. Those Without Liberals and Conservatives




Figure OF2: Republicans Ratings of Democratic & Republican Group Dimensions – Original Models vs. Those Without Liberals and Conservatives




Figure OF3: In Groups and Out Groups Group Dimensions – Original Models vs. Those Without Liberals and Conservatives




Figure OF4: Social Group Polarization – Original Models vs. Those Without Liberals and Conservatives




Table OF1. Comparison of Results: Original Models to Those Excluding Liberals and Conservatives From Group Dimension [Partisan Affective Polarization, 1992-1994-1996 ANES Panel]

	1992-1994-1996	
	Original	Excl. Ideological Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.161** (0.0417)	0.157** (0.0379)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.251** (0.0659)	0.233** (0.0576)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0504+ (0.0290)	0.0417 (0.0315)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.118* (0.0490)	0.172** (0.0510)
N =	425	425
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2}))	p < 0.05	p < 0.05
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3}))	p = 0.119	p < 0.438

Table OF2. Comparison of Results: Original Models to Those Excluding Liberals and Conservatives From Group Dimension [PID Strength]

	1992-1994-1996		2000-2002-2004	
	Original	Excluding Ideological Groups	Original	Excluding Ideological Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient				
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.161** (0.0417)	0.181* (0.0774)	0.0795 (0.0715)	0.0243 (0.0707)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.251** (0.0659)	0.134 (0.0853)	0.124* (0.0616)	0.122 (0.0773)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0504+ (0.0290)	0.0119 (0.0125)	0.0343** (0.0115)	0.0138 (0.00933)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.118* (0.0490)	0.00531 (0.0231)	-0.00602 (0.0184)	-0.00989 (0.0170)
N =	425	425	621	621
Wald Tests				
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2}))	p < 0.05	p < 0.05	p = 0.53	p = 0.883
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3}))	p = 0.119	p = 0.146	p < 0.05	p < 0.10

Table OF3. Comparison of Results: Original Models to Those Excluding Liberals and Conservatives From Group Dimension [Party/Ideological Sorting]

	1992-1994-1996		2000-2002	
	Original	Excl. Ideol Groups	Original	Excl. Ideol Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient				
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.378** (0.0677)	0.321** (0.0628)	0.280** (0.0575)	0.208** (0.0571)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.309** (0.0730)	0.124+ (0.0678)	N/A	N/A
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0847** (0.0225)	0.0318 (0.0241)	0.117** (0.0159)	0.0443** (0.0124)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.100** (0.0283)	0.118** (0.0299)	N/A	N/A
N =	425	425	831	831
Wald Tests				
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> (SGP _{t2}))	p < 0.01	p < 0.01	p < 0.01	p < 0.01
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> (SGP _{t3}))	p < 0.01	p = 0.936	N/A	N/A

Appendix G

Feeling group thermometer ratings contain measurement error, particularly due to differences in how individuals use the thermometer scale points (Wilcox and Cook 1989). We follow prior work in accounting for this error by fitting a thermometer measurement dimension on which all the thermometer load equally and which is uncorrelated with our more substantive dimensions (Weisberg, Haynes, and Krosnick 1995). However, in a recent article Highton and Kam (2011) also take this approach to dealing with error in the thermometers, but they allow the thermometers to load 'freely', e.g. not constrained to equality, on the thermometer dimension. In this appendix we investigate the importance of this choice. We see two key results from the analyses reported below. First, the models wherein the thermometers are allowed to load freely on the measurement dimension possess superior fit to those that use a fixed loading. Second, this difference does not influence our subsequent results; the factor scores that emerge from the 'free' loading analyses are highly correlated with those that emerged from the fixed analyses and vary by trivial margins.

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Table OG1. 1980 CFA Results (Standardized Loadings)

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.43	0.47		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.20	0.23		
<i>Civil Rights Leaders</i>	0.59	0.62		
<i>Black Militants</i>	0.59	0.63		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.31	0.33		
<i>Unions</i>	0.32	0.34		
<i>Women's Movement</i>	0.39	0.40		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.11	0.13		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.11	0.14		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.33	0.41
<i>Whites</i>			0.48	0.41
<i>Big Business</i>			0.02	0.06
<i>Businessmen</i>			0.53	0.47
<i>Military</i>			0.28	0.28
<i>Southerners</i>			0.19	0.18
<i>Workingmen</i>			0.45	0.37
<i>Middleclass</i>			0.60	0.54
<i>Fit Statistics</i>	<u>Fixed</u>	<u>Free</u>		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.095	0.085		
<i>CFI</i>	0.790	0.849		
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	2645.867 (0.000)	1925.311 (0.000)		
<i>X²/df</i>	15.56	12.67		
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.098	0.051		
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations</i>				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.99	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	-0.97	-0.95	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	-0.98	-0.98	0.99	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.29	0.32	-0.27	-0.32
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.26	-0.26	0.24	0.26
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.29	-0.31	0.27	0.31
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.40	-0.40	0.34	0.40

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Poor People, Government Employees, and Evangelicals

Table OG2. 1984 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.47	0.47		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.34	0.49		
<i>Civil Rights Leaders</i>	0.56	0.66		
<i>Black Militants</i>	0.67	0.54		
<i>Unions</i>	0.45	0.40		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.47	0.45		
<i>Poor</i>	0.08	0.17		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.36	0.45		
<i>Women's Mvt</i>	0.48	0.50		
<i>Women</i>	0.09	0.23		
<i>Gays</i>	0.64	0.56		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.39	0.37
<i>Big Business</i>			0.56	0.53
<i>Evangelical</i>			0.68	0.69
<i>Anti-abortion</i>			0.47	0.43
<i>Military</i>			0.32	0.36
<i>Fit Statistics</i>	Fixed	Free		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.125	0.101		
<i>CFI</i>	0.702	0.828		
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	5527.456 (0.000)	3237.166 (0.000)		
<i>X²/df</i>	36.36	23.97		
<i>Stand. Root Square Mean Residual</i>	0.281	0.062		
<i>Correlations</i>				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.70	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	0.51	0.06	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	0.11	0.09	0.78	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.25	0.35	-0.08	-0.08
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.21	-0.25	0.22	0.32
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.21	-0.27	0.14	0.18
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.29	-0.34	0.27	0.36

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites, Middle Class, and Elderly

Table OG3. 1988 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.55	0.54		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.39	0.53		
<i>Civil Rights Leaders</i>	0.62	0.71		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.41	0.51		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.60	0.56		
<i>Unions</i>	0.43	0.39		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.50	0.50		
<i>Poor</i>	0.15	0.25		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.09	0.19		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.55	0.42		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.54	0.52		
<i>Catholics</i>	0.16	0.24		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.24	0.25
<i>Big Business</i>			0.28	0.29
<i>Military</i>			0.13	0.23
<i>Anti-abortion</i>			0.37	0.38
<i>Christian</i>			0.57	0.62
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Evangelical</i>			0.69	0.78
Fit Statistics	Fixed	Free		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.106	0.088		
<i>CFI</i>	0.677	0.798		
<i>X²</i>	5044.067	3212.635		
<i>X²/df</i>	24.02	16.91		
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.209	0.064		
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
Correlations				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.78	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	0.47	0.23	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	0.22	0.33	0.85	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.28	0.40	-0.001	0.06
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.27	-0.22	0.04	0.13
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.27	-0.31	0.02	0.03
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.32	-0.33	0.14	0.19

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites, Women, Jews, and the Elderly

Table OG5. 1992 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.58	0.63		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.10	0.21		
<i>Unions</i>	0.36	0.40		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.04	0.14		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.30	0.35		
<i>Poor People</i>	0.09	0.16		
<i>Women's Mvt</i>	0.62	0.69		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.72	0.78		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.32	0.37		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.41	0.41		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.24	0.25		
<i>Lawyers</i>	0.21	0.25		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.43	0.49
<i>Whites</i>			0.32	0.33
<i>Southerners</i>			0.29	0.29
<i>Big Business</i>			0.35	0.40
<i>Military</i>			0.54	0.58
<i>Police</i>			0.44	0.45
<i>Christian Fundamentalists</i>			0.39	0.42
<i>Catholics</i>			0.19	0.22
Fit Statistics	Fixed	Free		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.101	0.090		
<i>CFI</i>	0.729	0.803		
<i>X²</i>	6038.421	4436.136		
<i>X²/df</i>	26.25	21.23		
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.129	0.064		
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
Correlations				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.93	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	-0.48	-0.48	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	-0.42	-0.33	0.97	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.38	0.44	-0.21	-0.12
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.32	-0.27	0.39	0.40
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.38	-0.40	0.32	0.27
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.46	-0.46	0.48	0.45

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Jews, Asians, Immigrants

Table OG6. 1996 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.71	0.77		
<i>Unions</i>	0.39	0.41		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.09	0.18		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.13	0.21		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.26	0.29		
<i>Women's Mvt</i>	0.52	0.57		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.47	0.51		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.53	0.57		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.42	0.46
<i>Big Business</i>			0.20	0.22
<i>Military</i>			0.21	0.22
<i>Christian Fundamentalists</i>			0.70	0.73
<i>Christian Coalition</i>			0.75	0.79
Fit Statistics				
<i>RMSEA</i>	Fixed	Free		
	0.110	0.088		
<i>CFI</i>	0.795	0.886		
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	2241.737	1283.775		
<i>X²/df</i>	21.55	14.26		
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.149	0.052		
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
Correlations				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.94	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	-0.49	-0.52	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	-0.50	0.47	0.98	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.46	0.53	-0.22	-0.17
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.41	-0.37	0.34	0.36
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.47	-0.50	0.27	0.24
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.63	-0.62	0.48	0.47

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Poor People, Whites, and the Elderly

Table OG8. 2000 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.58	0.62		
<i>Unions</i>	0.40	0.39		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.26	0.22		
<i>Women's Mvt</i>	0.54	0.58		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.63	0.69		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.41	0.42		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.42	0.41		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.51	0.56
<i>Big Business</i>			0.38	0.37
<i>Military</i>			0.32	0.36
<i>Christian</i>			0.66	0.70
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Christian Coalition</i>			0.68	0.73
<i>Catholics</i>			0.14	0.19
<i>Protestants</i>			0.16	0.21
<i>Whites</i>			0.05	0.13
<i>Fit Statistics</i>	Fixed	Free		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.097	0.081		
<i>CFI</i>	0.820	0.886		
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	3444.447	2229.927		
<i>X²/df</i>	17.94	12.890		
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.184	0.049		
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations</i>				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.93	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	-0.05	-0.24	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	-0.29	-0.30	0.87	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.36	0.43	-0.19	-0.16
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.27	-0.27	0.31	0.39
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.36	-0.40	0.25	0.27
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.46	-0.49	0.41	0.47

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Blacks, Hispanics, Poor People, Asians, Jews, and the Elderly.

Table OG8. 2004 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.65	0.70		
<i>Unions</i>	0.38	0.33		
<i>Welfare</i>	0.34	0.30		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.45	0.48		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.52	0.52		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.50	0.45		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.59	0.62		
<i>Muslims</i>	0.40	0.39		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.07	0.14		
<i>Poor</i>	0.05	0.08		
<i>Asians</i>	0.12	0.15		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.55	0.61
<i>Whites</i>			0.10	0.14
<i>Southerners</i>			0.20	0.22
<i>Big Business</i>			0.57	0.59
<i>Business</i>			0.38	0.40
<i>Military</i>			0.33	0.36
<i>Christian Fundamentalists</i>			0.50	0.52
<i>Men</i>			0.16	0.17
<i>Rich</i>			0.38	0.38
<i>Catholic Church</i>			0.39	0.39
<i>Catholics</i>			0.27	0.29
<i>Middle Class</i>			0.04	0.07
<i>Fit Statistics</i>	Fixed	Free		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.092	0.084		
<i>CFI</i>	0.791	0.837		
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	4261.547	3388.242		
<i>X²/df</i>	11.21	9.60		
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.173	0.056		
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations</i>				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.85	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	-0.12	-0.37	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	-0.36	-0.43	0.93	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.35	0.45	-0.24	-0.26
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.39	-0.39	0.44	0.52
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.41	-0.46	0.36	0.41
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.51	-0.53	0.48	0.55

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Working Class, Women, Jews, Hispanics, Elderly, and the Young

Table OG9. 2008 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.40	0.50		
<i>Unions</i>	0.17	0.27		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.15	0.29		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.02	0.25		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.17	0.38		
<i>Asians</i>	0.13	0.34		
<i>Jews</i>	0.06	0.26		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.31	0.42		
<i>Environmentalists</i>	0.23	0.35		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.53	0.59		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.42	0.51		
<i>Muslims</i>	0.52	0.66		
<i>Hindus</i>	0.45	0.60		
<i>Atheists</i>	0.55	0.58		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.27	0.51
<i>Southerners</i>			0.25	0.15
<i>Big Business</i>			0.12	0.38
<i>Military</i>			0.38	0.24
<i>Christian Fundamentalists</i>			0.33	0.52
<i>Christians</i>			0.45	0.23
<i>Catholics</i>			0.11	0.09
<i>Rich</i>			0.05	0.24
<i>Middle Class</i>			0.18	-0.04
<i>Fit Statistics</i>	Fixed	Free		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.089	0.077		
<i>CFI</i>	0.794	0.858		
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	4833.402	3400.499		
<i>X²/df</i>	19.33	14.91		
<i>Stand. Root Square Mean Residual</i>	0.101	0.054		
<i>Correlations</i>				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.85	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	-0.99	-0.84	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	-0.55	-0.35	0.58	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.21	0.29	-0.22	-0.20
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.28	-0.21	0.28	0.38
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.28	-0.30	0.28	0.29
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.45	-0.40	0.45	0.48

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites

Table OG10. 2012 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.58	0.54		
<i>Unions</i>	0.40	0.37		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.26	0.41		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.28	0.44		
<i>Ppl. On Welfare</i>	0.36	0.40		
<i>Poor</i>	0.09	0.17		
<i>Asians</i>	0.25	0.43		
<i>Homosexuals</i>	0.49	0.51		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.39	0.45		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.45	0.45		
<i>Muslims</i>	0.50	0.55		
<i>Atheists</i>	0.41	0.41		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.68	0.73
<i>Whites</i>			0.01	0.12
<i>Big Business</i>			0.43	0.50
<i>Military</i>			0.08	0.16
<i>Christian</i>			0.41	0.48
<i>Fundamentalists</i>				
<i>Christians</i>			0.23	0.35
<i>Catholics</i>			0.23	0.34
<i>Working Class</i>			-0.16	-0.03
<i>Rich</i>			0.36	0.45
<i>Mormons</i>			0.35	0.43
<i>Tea Party</i>			0.62	0.64
<i>Fit Statistics</i>	Fixed	Free		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.11	0.10		
<i>CFI</i>	0.597	0.692		
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	0.000	0.000		
<i>X²/df</i>	26.27	22.13		
<i>Stand. Root Square</i>	0.131	0.077		
<i>Mean Residual</i>				
<i>Correlations</i>				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.88	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	-0.41	-0.36	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	-0.41	-0.19	0.91	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.37	0.37	-0.39	-0.30
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.37	-0.27	0.48	0.48
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.42	-0.37	0.46	0.40
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.52	-0.42	0.51	0.50

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Middle Class

Table OG11. 2016 CFA Results

	<i>Democratic Dimension</i>		<i>Republican Dimension</i>	
	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement	Fixed Loadings on Measurement	Free Loadings on Measurement
<i>Liberals</i>	0.68	0.75		
<i>Feminists</i>	0.61	0.68		
<i>Unions</i>	0.36	0.48		
<i>Poor</i>	0.07	0.21		
<i>Gays & Lesbians</i>	0.61	0.60		
<i>Muslims</i>	0.55	0.54		
<i>Transgender</i>	0.50	0.64		
<i>Scientists</i>	0.26	0.35		
<i>Black Lives Matter</i>	0.65	0.69		
<i>Asians</i>	0.13	-0.03		
<i>Hispanics</i>	0.19	0.03		
<i>Blacks</i>	0.19	0.07		
<i>Illegal Immigrants</i>	0.45	0.38		
<i>Conservatives</i>			0.69	0.76
<i>Christian Fundamentalists</i>			0.63	0.69
<i>Big Business</i>			0.47	0.55
<i>Rich</i>			0.32	0.46
<i>Christians</i>			0.45	0.57
<i>Tea Party</i>			0.63	0.65
<i>Police</i>			0.37	0.45
Fit Statistics	Fixed	Free		
<i>RMSEA</i>	0.125	0.108		
<i>CFI</i>	0.662	0.774		
<i>X² (p-value)</i>	0.000	0.000		
<i>X²/df</i>	17.65	13.31		
<i>Stand. Root Square Mean Residual</i>	0.116	0.085		
Correlations				
<i>Dem Groups (Fixed)</i>	1			
<i>Dem (Free)</i>	0.93	1		
<i>Rep (Fixed)</i>	-0.80	-0.62	1	
<i>Rep (Free)</i>	-0.68	-0.44	0.88	1
<i>Dem. Party</i>	0.59	0.60	-0.46	-0.34
<i>Rep. Party</i>	-0.49	-0.38	0.56	0.51
<i>PID (High = Str. Rep)</i>	-0.62	-0.58	0.57	0.47
<i>Ideology (High = Conservative)</i>	-0.72	-0.67	0.70	0.62

Notes: The following groups are constrained to load only on the measurement dimension: Whites and Jews

Figure OG1: In-Group Ratings (Fixed Vs. Free)




Figure OG2: Out-Group Ratings (Fixed vs. Free)




Figure OG3: Difference Scores (Fixed vs. Free)




Table OG1. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free Loadings’ on Measurement Dimension [Party Affective Polarization, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	Original	”Free Loading” Modles
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.161** (0.0417)	0.148** (0.0394)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.251** (0.0659)	0.255** (0.0652)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0504+ (0.0290)	0.0567+ (0.0293)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.118* (0.0490)	0.147** (0.0484)
N =	425	425
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.05	p < 0.10
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p = 0.119	p = 0.200

Table OG2. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free Loadings’ on Measurement Dimension [PID Strength, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	Original	”Free Loading” Models
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.212* (0.0833)	0.201* (0.0789)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.195* (0.0908)	0.197* (0.0909)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.00394 (0.0113)	0.00597 (0.0115)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.0273 (0.0206)	0.0315 (0.0206)
N =	425	425
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.10	p < 0.10
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p < 0.05	p < 0.05

Table OG3. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free Loadings’ on Measurement Dimension [Party/Ideological Sorting, 1992-1996 ANES Panel]

	Original	Excluding Racial Groups
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.378** (0.0677)	0.353** (0.0641)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.309** (0.0730)	0.276** (0.0731)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0847** (0.0225)	0.0703** (0.0229)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	0.100** (0.0283)	0.115** (0.0280)
N =	425	425
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p < 0.01	p < 0.05
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p < 0.01	p < 0.01

Table OG4. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with ‘Free Loadings’ on Measurement Dimension [PID Strength, 2000-2004 ANES Panel]

	Original	”Free Loading” Models
Cross-Lag Coefficient		
T1 SGP -> T2 Party	0.0795 (0.0715)	0.0785 (0.0717)
T2 SGP -> T3 Party	0.124* (0.0616)	0.125* (0.0604)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP	0.0343** (0.0115)	0.0353** (0.0118)
T2 Party -> T3 SGP	-0.00602 (0.0184)	-0.000865 (0.0182)
N =	621	621
Wald Tests		
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})	p = 0.53	p = 0.55
(SGP _{t2} -> Party _{t3}) = (Party _{t2} -> SGP _{t3})	p < 0.05	p = < 0.05

Table OG5. Overview of Results From Original Models and Models with 'Free' Loadings on Measurement Dimension [Sorting, 2000-2002 ANES Panel]

		Original	
Cross-Lag Coefficient			
T1 SGP -> T2 Party		0.280** (0.0575)	0.280** (0.0580)
T1 Party -> T2 SGP		0.117** (0.0159)	0.119** (0.0163)
	N =	831	831
Wald Tests			
(SGP _{t1} -> Party _{t2}) = (Party _{t1} -> SGP _{t2})		p < 0.01	p < 0.01