id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_4onivheppfbmtiwgdf42rqbsya	Christopher J. G. Meacham	Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs	2006	39	.pdf	application/pdf	15801	930	66	Second, a rational subject's hypothetical priors and doxastic worlds determine her credences. the same doxastic worlds, so de dicto conditionalization will assign the same credences. issue of continuity arises: belief changes where, at a given doxastic world, some old The easiest case to consider is a belief change which just replaces one doxastic alternative at a world with another. alternatives with new ones, virtually no belief change is purely world-locating. My claim is that in cases of purely self-locating change, one's credences in worlds, and accepts Elga's argument, purely self-locating changes that increase the number of doxastic alternatives at a world will increase one's credence in that world (relative to worlds Given the Continuity Principle and centered conditionalization, some further auxiliary assumptions—that one has non-zero credences in alternative multiplying hypotheses, etc.—are still needed to get the many brains-type arguments to work. self-locating change where the number of alternatives at a world increases, our credence	./cache/work_4onivheppfbmtiwgdf42rqbsya.pdf	./txt/work_4onivheppfbmtiwgdf42rqbsya.txt