The nature of man A learned and usefull tract written in Greek by Nemesius, surnamed the philosopher; sometime Bishop of a city in Phœnicia, and one of the most ancient Fathers of the Church. Englished, and divided into sections, with briefs of their principall contents: by Geo: Wither. On the nature of man. English Nemesius, Bp. of Emesa. 1636 Approx. 511 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 358 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2005-12 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1). A08062 STC 18427 ESTC S113134 99848373 99848373 13463 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A08062) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 13463) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1475-1640 ; 997:8) The nature of man A learned and usefull tract written in Greek by Nemesius, surnamed the philosopher; sometime Bishop of a city in Phœnicia, and one of the most ancient Fathers of the Church. Englished, and divided into sections, with briefs of their principall contents: by Geo: Wither. On the nature of man. English Nemesius, Bp. of Emesa. Wither, George, 1588-1667. [44], 661, [1] p. Printed by M[iles] F[lesher] for Henry Taunton in St. Dunstans Churchyard in Fleetstreet, London : 1636. A translation of: Peri physeōs anthrōpou. Title page printed in red and black. Printer's name from STC. The first leaf is blank. Only quire A has vertical chain lines. Running title reads: Of the nature of man. Reproduction of the original in the University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign Campus). Library. 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Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site . eng Human beings -- Early works to 1800. 2005-06 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2005-06 Aptara Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2005-07 Jonathan Blaney Sampled and proofread 2005-07 Jonathan Blaney Text and markup reviewed and edited 2005-10 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion THE NATVRE OF MAN. A learned and usefull Tract ▪ written in Greek by Nemesius , surnamed the Philosopher ; sometime Bishop of a City in Phoenicia , and one of the most ancient Fathers of the Church . ENGLISHED , And divided into Sections , with briefs of their principall CONTENTS : BY GEO : WITHER . LONDON : Printed by M. F. for Henry Taunton in St. Dunstans Churchyard in Fleetstreet . 1636. TO HIS MOST LEARNED AND MUCH HONOURED Friend , Iohn ●●den ESQUIRE . SIR , I Am not carefull to annexe your other Titles : for they are not so much honour to you , as they are honoured by you ; and your bare Name sounds more honorably in my judgment , then that which the breath of others can adde unto it . I have made bold therefore ( though without your knowledge ) to send abroad with your Name prefixed , this ancient Greek Father , newly taught to speak English ; that hee may receive your approbation where hee well expresseth his meaning , and your correction hereafter where hee proves defective ; For , I presumed you might by this meanes be provoked to the perusall thereof , notwithstanding your many studies . Your Candor , and singular humanity , make mee confident in this attempt ; For though my Author be a stranger to most moderne Students , you ( from whom no such Worthie is obscured ) are his familiar acquaintance ; and in whose Name could I have more properly brought this Auncient among my Country-men ( to be entertained with respect ) then in yours , who are the truest lover of Antiquities ; and hee , who hath best shewed the right use of them to this Age ? I think not you to be any whit honoured by this Dedication ; but , ●hat I have rather magnified my selfe in making it an occasion to signifie that I have so noble a Friend . Yet without all such respects , I have done this , meerely to content my self , in that which I thought could not justly discontent you ; and , to say truth , having a long time loved your person , and honoured your worth , it is now an ease , and a delight to mee , to expresse it by this occasion . And , you have not been pretious to mee without cause : For , I being one of those , who preposterously , begin to write before they learne , you might justly enough have reputed mee worthy of contempt onely , when I was first presented to your acquaintance . Neverthelesse , ( perceiving , it may be that the affections of my heart were sound , though the fruits of my braine were defective ) you vouchsafed mee a friendly , and a frequent familiarity : whereby I got opportunities both to rectifiemy Judgement , and encrease my Vnderstanding in many things . Were the same humble affability in those , ( whom a lesse degree of knowledge hath vainly puffed up , to the corrupting of them into that , which is worse then Ignorance ) they might have beene more beloved ; and perhaps , more wise men then they are . To amend them & to encourage others to the like Vertue , I have testified this of you , and in that , shall perchance , adde somewhat to your honour . I have lately confined my selfe to my rustick habitation , in that part of this Kingdome , which is famous for the best of those meats , wherewith the Poet Martial invited his friend : Pallens Faba , cum rubenti Lardo : yet it hath not made mee so meer a Corydon , but that I relish the delicates of the MVSES ; and retaine some ambition to be continued in your esteem . And , SIR , wheresoever I am , you shall ever be remembred , and beloved of Your unfained friend , and true Honourer , GEO : WITHER . From my Cottage , under the Beacon hill neere Farnham . May 23. 1636. A PREFACE to the Reader , concerning the Author of this Book ; touching the Contents thereof , and the Translation of the same , &c. COnsidering how many professe Knowledge , few have attained the right way of it : and , those few are so much employed in labouring to keep the Truth from being smothered among the heaps of impertinent Volumes ; and compelled to spend so much time in weeding out Heresies , and in discovering the fallacies of Error , that they cannot so improve themselves and others , as else they might . Upon the Foundations laid by the Prophets , and Apostles , many sacred Buildings , were with comely uniformity erected by the Primitive Doctors of the Church ; and , in every future Generation somewhat was , now and then , added ( by the Worthies of their times ) according to the first Patterns ; and upon such occasions or necessities , as required the same , to the continuing and enlarging of Divine knowledge . But , wee in this last Age have blinded the same with confused Opinions ; and heaped upon them so many tedious Commentaries , so many false Glosses , and needlesse Treatises ; that Students half outrun their course , before they can passe through that Rubbish , which obscures from them the directest Paths , and fairest monuments of Truth . Yea , some of our later Paper-works are so plaistered , glazed , painted , and sophisticated , according to the vanity of our newfangled-humours : and , othersome , are so durtily slubbered over , sutably to the homelinesse of our moderne-fancies : that the first insinuates a false beleefe , or a superstitious faith , to the disadvantage and dishonour of ancient simplicity : the later , a prophane neglect of all Piety & good order . A good meanes ( as I conceive ) to prevent such inconveniences , is to bring into more frequent view , the Writings of these Ancients who lived so neer to the Apostles , that they cannot be justly suspected , as favourers , or parties to the factions of these later Ages . For , many of them , are ( if not altogether unknown ) very rarely perused , by reason of the numberlesse Novelties , which have wearied the Presses , and filled the Libraries of Europe . Or , if an Ancient Peece , be accidentally discovered in this Wildernesse of Inventions , ( by our Students of the later Editions ) they seldome bring it , honestly , to light : But , either mangle it , as they please ; or steale as much of it , as is generally plausible to trim , and stuffe out those Volumes , by which they purchase an undue opinion of being learned . The rest , they endevour to rake up againe in obscurity ; that their Theft may be hidden : Or , ( which is worse ) that those Truths which they understand not , ( or favour not ) may be weakned . For this cause , it well became us to revive , now and then , those Ancients , whose wisedome is usefull to moderate our controversies . Some , have already laboured happily in this way . And , I ( who may well enough be reputed among such as have increased those Treatises , which keep more profitable Books from being frequently perused ) doe now desire to make some satisfaction for the same : and , to that end , have published in English this Tract of Nemesius . who was one of the Champions of the Christian faith , whose Labours have been famously profitable in former times . Though few are , now adayes , acquainted with him , you shall find him among the most ancient Greek Fathers : And , this Tract of his ( which is pertinent to every member of man-kinde capable of Book-knowledge ) was heretofore so wel esteemed , as to have been twice interpreted , out of Greek into Latine , ( viz. ) by Georgius Valla Placentinus , and Nacasius Ellebodius , of whose interpretations I have made use . This Author was as honourable in his generation , as those that are more voluminous , and more frequently named : for , he was not onely so eminent for his Naturall Philosophy , as to be called ( by way of excellency ) NEMESIUS the Philosopher ; but , so good a Moralist also , and so expert in the Lawes of the Romane Empire , that , the most Reverend , learned and devout Father GREGORIE Nazian : ( among whose Poems are Verses written to this NEMESIUS ) hath highly magnified him , both for his Learning , and uprightnesse : and left it witnessed , likewise , that he was dignified with a Presidentship in Cappadocia . When those Verses were first written to our Author , he had not embraced the Christian Faith. For , hee was by them invited thereunto : And their invitation seemed to have taken so good effect , that he became a happy Beleever ; an eminent Champion in the Christian Warfare ; a Bishop of a City in Phoenicia , about the times of the Emperours VALENS and THEODOSIUS . Some have doubted whether he were the same Nemesius mentioned by GREGORIE ; onely , because he was a Lawyer & a Temporall Magistrate : But questionlesse hee that was once an Infidell , and afterward a Beleever , might aswell have been , also , a Divine , and a Bishop , after he had exercised the Functions of a Lawyer and a Iudge ; seeing it is no new matter , that they should execute a double-calling , who have received a double portion of the Spirit . For , in all Ages , ( since Princes became Nursing-Fathers of the Church ) it hath been usuall for Emperours , Kings , and other Free States , to make use of their Gifts , in Temporall Iudicatures , and in other publike Affaires , of whose Wisedome , and Faithfulnesse , they had experience in Ecclesiasticall Governments : yea , and it was no strange thing for men of say professions , to be called from common Affaires , to assume sacred Orders . And ( though some are undiscreetly offended thereat ) it is not onely both convenient and comely , that Ecclesiasticall persons ( who neither desire , nor ambitiously affect such Employments ) should be , sometime , invited and authorized by their Soveraigns , to joyne unto their spirituall charge , an industrious care of the temporall welfare . But it so happeneth otherwhile , also , that this double Authority , ( though it double the imployment ) proveth so farre from being over-burthensome , or a hinderance to the due execution of the first single calling , that hee upon whō it is conferred , is thereby the better enabled to mannage both for the generall advantage : And we finde this double calling , to have been so often , so commendably , and so successefully practised in the most flourishing times , both of Iewish , and Christian Commonweales ; that it may be still warrantably imitated , so often as Soveraign power shall be pleased therewithall . Our Nemesius ( whose manifold employments , and gifts of the Spirit , have perhaps , occasioned this digression , to some good purpose ) embraced the Christian Faith , and received his Episcopall dignity ( as it seemes by circumstances ) long after his Presidentship : For , as by the words of GREGORIE may be collected , he had given faire testimonies both of his Prudence and Vprightnesse in that Office , before his Conversion : and his faithfulnes in the emploiment of that single talent ; first vouchsafed , by the Common grace , was rewarded with a large encrease , through the speciall favour of GOD , as the sequele hath declared . The Authors whom he nameth ( none of them having lived since the Emperours aforementioned ) are a probable argument of his Antiquitie ; and so likewise , is the scope of this Treatise , and his manner of handling the same : For , according to this command , When thou art converted , strengthen thy brethren ; the learned Converts of the Primitive Church , endevoured to fortifie their Profession ( against the many heathen Philosophers who did then oppose it ) by turning the weapons of those enemies of Christianity against themselves ; even by fooling their carnall wisedome , in their owne logicall reasonings ; and by the Principles of their own Philosophie . And in this performance , our Author was both faithfull and painefull ; as will appeare by the following Tract , worthy to be preserved and perused in all generations . For in what age , will the knowledge of the humane nature bee impertinent , or to what person of that kinde ? nay , what knowledge , save the knowledge of GOD is more pertinent ? Or , how can GOD be well knowne , by him , that knoweth not himselfe ? It is that knowledge which this Booke teacheth ; and in my opinion the ignorance of rightly knowing our owne nature is one maine cause of the many absurdities , and unreasonable controversies which distract these times , yea , the ignorance thereof is a principall cause that so many wickedly blaspheme GOD , & unthankfully accuse him ( without cause ) of being niggardly towards them in the Talents of nature ; and in requiring that of them , which hee hath not given them ability to performe . Hence ariseth it also , that some consequently , and some directly make our good GOD the Author of all sinne ; and MAN , not properly an agent , but a patient only in committing evill . From this Ignorance , likewise it proceedeth , that wee neither husband the gifts of nature ( which is Gods common grace ) nor endevour as we ought to doe , according to that ability which we have received : whereas , if wee knew what were given into our power , and what not ; I think we should not so often , ( as many of us doe ) foolishly denie our essentiall propertie ; but beleeve and worke , according to Sanctified reason . Though our originall Nature were so depraved by our first parents fall , that wee lost our Well-beeing ; yet wee lost not our Naturall-beeing , nor those Faculties , which made us capable of being renewed by speciall grace , when it should be tendred unto us . Though we fell very low , & were in a Downfall , in which we should never have left sinking ; and from which wee could never have raised our selves , by any power remaining in our selves ; yet we were not at the lowest by our Grand-fathers offence . For , the mercy of GOD , even IESVS CHRIST , stayed us from falling so low , as we had else tumbled ; and from loosing absolutely our Rationality , or any thing essentiall thereunto , by that Transgression . Yea , though the Will , and every other Powre of the SOUL were so maimed and bruized by the first Adam , that , like a broken Watch , their motions would have been still worse and worse , till they had utterly perished ; and should never have moved rightly of themselves , ( nor by any other meanes ) unless the second Adam , had , at least , benefited us without our owne righteousnesse , as much as the first Adam harmed us , without our personall sinne : yet , no man lost by the first Transgression , so much , as hee may lose by his own fault . By the first sinne , wee lost , indeed , our light , but not our eyes . And therefore , when GOD sent the light of MANKIND into the World , hee reprobated those , onely , who rejected it . And why ? not because they saw it not ; but because they loved it not . For , that they saw it , is manifest by that place , which said , It enlightens every one which commeth into the world . Yea , the reprobate Jews could not deny but that they saw it ; for , our Saviour told them , that , if they could have truely denyed to have seene this Light , they should not have had their sins imputed unto them : which , ( under correction ) I take to be the meaning of his words . Now , if they saw it , wee may truely inferre that they received of his fulnesse , that common grace , and the preservation of every naturall faculty , so far forth , as might have enabled them , to become the sons of GOD ; whereas , by the neglect of that single Talent , they became losers of more then Adam lost them ; even to lose the right use of their naturall faculties , and to be of a Reprobate sense ; having eyes , that see not : eares , that heare not : and hearts as void of understanding , as the beast that perisheth . And , all this comes to passe through want of considering , what is taught in this Book , even for want of knowing what power wee have given us , and how wee are to exercise that power . Let no man , therefore , despise this meanes of Instruction , nor prejudicately conceive ( because it may have some expressions unsutable to their opinions ) that NATURE is here magnified above GRACE , or in any measure equalled thereunto : or , that any power is thereto ascribed , derogating from the free mercy of GOD. Far is it from our Authors intention : and for ever , far be it from me , to become an instrument of publishing such Doctrines . There is not ( in my judgement ) one syllable in this Tract , which tendeth not to the glorifying of GOD's Grace to Mankinde . For , whatsoever is ascribed to man , as being primarily in him by nature , is acknowledged to be the gracious gift of GOD : That which is affirmed to be left in him , since the fall , is confessed to have been justly forfeited , and yet preserved in him , by the free Grace of the same GOD : The good effects of all those Faculties , which are affirmed in mans power , were not ( in my understanding ) so much as thought , by this Author , ( nor are they so conceived by me ) to be wrought at any time without the continuall assistance of the holy Spirit : neither is the naturall power of man , or the excellency of his nature , here set forth for mans owne glory , or that he should arrogate anything to himselfe : But , that GOD's first and second GRACE vouchsafed unto us , might the more manifestly appeare . And that it might not be onely said , but made evident , also , that the sinne and unhappinesse of every man , is of himselfe , and not of GOD : all which is implyed ( though not directly expressed ) by the scope of this Booke . They affirme in effect , this blasphemy , that every sinne is GOD's , ( though in word they professe never so violently against it ) who will not allow that MAN ( as this Treatise declareth ) hath some things naturally in his owne power . For , unlesse that be granted , hee should have as little sinne , as righteousnesse of his owne : and beasts or blocks might as well be reputed righteous , or sinfull , & as justly be termed Reasonable-creatures , as men : yea , and many other absurdities are beleeved and occasioned , by the ignorance of that , which is here taught . Besides that , which is the maine scope of this Booke , divers brief testimonies of ancient Truths ( lately suspected of novelty ) are here and there , occasionally inserted ; yea , and to some in these dayes , that which was the prime intention of this Discourse is , yet , as pertinent as when it was first written : For , there are not only as many still ignorant of their own Nature as heretofore ; but , the same Stoicall Divinity , here opposed , and confuted , is , in some branches , so largely sprouted up againe , that , they are supposed to be ancient & orthodoxe principles of Christianity ; and so are they cryed up by a multitude of modern voices , that few beleeve , Antiquity ever mentioned ought in contradiction to what they fancie to be the Truth . To make it appeare otherwise , this Father of the Church speakes now in English , what he spake in Greek much above a thousand yeares past : And therefore , though it were true ( which as yet , I beleeve not ) that some of the later times have as learnedly handled the same subject ; yet , because the noblenes of Truth , is other while suspected , when her Pedigree is obscured , I thought it not in vaine , to help to discover her Antiquitie , by the publication of this Author . You have him ( if I am not much deceived ) according to his Genuine sense , though not every where grammatically interpreted ; for that were but to play the part of a Pedant . And because a shew of tediousnes , might make the same lesse profitable , I have not only caused him to speak as briefly and as plainly to the meanest capacities , as I possibly could , ( which is not easie in a Subject of this nature ) but to prevent wearisomenes , and render it the more usefull , I have divided the longest Chapters , into equall Sections ; & before every Chapter and Section , summed up the principall Contents of the same . Which will bee easefull unto those who have not leasure to read out long continued Discourses ; especially when they have some speedy occasion to collect the Testimonies of Antiquitie . Now that I may every way ( as much as in me lieth ) keep my Nemesius from being either misconceived , or misreputed ; I beseech my common Readers , to bee very heedfull in the perusall of him , least through want of understanding in themselves , they censure him to be an Author not Intelligible , ( as it hath pleased them to censure a learned writer now living ) for such halfe witted people , as are neither capable of the mysteries of Nature , nor of such tearms , as may properly expresse them , should learne to know , before they presume to censure : which will never bee attained , without humility & some diligence . Let them please to be heedfull also , when this Author speaks in his own person , and when in the person of others : for , sometime he bringeth in Arguments , and continued disputes , out of Ethnick Philosophers , ( with all their circumstances , to confute their fellowes ; and if it be not well observed when hee so doth , some heathenish proposition , ( interlaced therewith ) may be wrongfully taken for his opinion : And , perhaps also a well meaning expression may bee misunderstood , contrary to the minde of the Authour , by a little obscurity in the Text , or by want of heeding , how his intention may be discovered in other passages of the same Booke . Nemesius hath heretofore suffred in this kinde , even by no worse men , then his two Latine Interpreters ; and one of them hath charged him with being of their opinion , who beleeved the Transmigration of Soules , whereof hee was no way guilty , as may be made probable , not only by sundry expressions in this Tract ; but by those words also , from whence this misconceit arose ; they being interpreted , as I understand them . They are to be found about the beginning of the seaventh Section of the second Chapter , and speake to this effect . Iamblicus ( saith he ) hath affirmed in his Booke called MONOBIBLON , that the changing of Soules never hapneth from men to unreasonable creatures , nor from unreasonable creatures to men : but from Beasts , to Beasts , and from men , to men ▪ and in so saying , hee hath not only conjectured very well of Platoes opinion , but of the Truth it selfe . By these last words , Nemesius hath seemed to justifie the opinion , both of Iamblicus , & Plato , touching Transmigration of Soules . Now this clause I have understood as if it said thus , rather : And in so saying , hee hath not only well guessed , but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Platoes opinion . Let the learned judge , whether the Greek words will not well enough beare this Version ( though not in a strict Grammaticall sense ) especially since the context proves his opinion concerning the Soule to be the same which is generally beleeved among Christians , for my part , till I see more cause to suspect the contrary , I shall alway so conceive of it . That which is mentioned by another concerning his opinion touching the Soules preexistence before the Bodie , is not a matter of faith , or so precisely decided , as that he or we are ( for ought I know ) obliged , to be peremptorily for it , or against it ; and therefore I my self have not yet so much thought upon it as to resolve which way to encline : or what to answer for him . If any man can assure me whether part is without errour , that will I embrace ; and I am perswaded so would Nemesius have done , if any man could have proved unto him that his opinion was erroneous , in that point ; which if others beleeve of him , ( as they have no just cause to the contrary ) no more needes to be spoken of this matter . If any be offended that hee argues philosophically , rather then by proofs of Scripture , and citeth Moses not as a Divine Prophet , but a Wiseman ; Let them consider , that hee had such to contest withall , as neither beleeved the Scriptures , nor ascribed more unto Moses , or any other , then the Reasonablenesse of their affections seemed to deserve ; The alledging of Scripture , therefore , to such men , had been to cast pearles to swine , and more to the derision , then to the honour of his cause . This course was practiced by the Apostles themselves ; To the Iewes and beleeving Gentiles , they brought the testimony of the Prophets : but to Unbeleevers , they cited their owne Poets , or convinced them by Reason . Had our Author argued with Christians , the holy Scriptures onely , should have been Judges of their Controversies : For he himselfe saith , Cap. 2. Sect. 7. To us the Doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient , &c. but against those who embrace not the Scriptures ( as wee Christians doe ) we must prove by Demonstration , &c. In these times , there be many , who though they deny not the letter of the Scriptures , yet they doe as bad ( or worse rather ) for they deny the true sense of them , and make interpretations according to their owne lusts and fancies . To these also , the holy Scriptures are impertinent proofs , till by some reasonable Demonstrations we can make them understand and confesse their true meaning : And some of these have so long , and so violently professed against Reason , as unusefull in the consideration of the Divine mysteries , that there is little hope either to work upon them by a rationall dispute , or to convince them by divine Authority , till GOD shall forgive their deniall and abuse of his common graces , upon true repentance for the same ; and restore the Vnderstanding which is worthily darkned by that sinne : and for enlightning whereof , this Treatise , may perhaps become helpfull . Other things might bee here declared , to prevent prejudice , and to shew forth the use and profitablenesse of this Booke : but lest they make this Preface over-large , I wil here conclude , and commit all to Gods blessing . Geo : Wither . PErcurri Librum bunc Denaturâ hominis , in quo nihil reperio sanae fidei , aut bonis moribus contrarium . THO : WEEKES , R. P. Episc . Lond. Cap. domest . NEMESIVS of the Nature of MAN. CAP. 1. SECT . 1. I. The Definition of MAN : A quaere touching the Understanding ; and the opinions of Plotinus , Apollinarius , Aristotle & Plato concerning the SOVL & BODY of MAN. II. MAN partaking in somewhat with every Creature , is a medium knitting together the whole Creation , & a manifestation of the Unity of the CREATOR of all things . III. The Agreement , and comely order of GOD'S Works , of all which MAN is the true Epitome . GOod men , ( and of those not a few ) have defined Man to consist of an Vnderstanding Soul and a Body ; and so true is this Definition , that it may seeme he could not otherwise be , well , defined . Yet , when wee terme him an Vnderstanding soul , it may appeare doubtfull to some , whether the Vnderstanding comming to the soul ( as one distinct thing comes to another ) did beget Vnderstanding in the Soul ; Or , whether the Soul doth naturally contain in it self this understanding , as the most excellent part thereof ; and , as being the same to the Soul , which the Eie is to the Body . There be some , ( and of this opinion is Plotinus ) who thinking the Soul to be one thing , and the Body another , doe therfore affirme , that MAN is composed of these three , a Soul , a Body , and Vnderstanding . Of this mind also was Apollinarius Bishop of Laodicea : For , having laid this , as the Foundation of his own opinion , he made the rest of his Building agreeable to the same Groundwork . Others there are who divide not the Vnderstanding from the Soul in this manner ; but suppose rather , that the Vnderstanding is a principall of the Soules essence . Aristotle conjectures that a certain potentiall understanding was made together with MAN , which might become actuall in time ; and that the understanding which commeth to us from without , ( and whereby we acquire an actuall knowledge ) pertains not to the naturall Essence of the Soul ; but , assisteth in the knowledge and speculation of things : By which means it comes to passe , that very few , or none , but men addicted to the study of wisdome , are thought capable of this Actuall understanding . PLATO seems to affirm that MAN consists not of a double essence ; that is to say , joyntly of a Soul and a Body : but rather , that he is a soul , using ( as it were Instrumentally ) such a Body : and perhaps by fixing the mind upon that only , which is the most excellent part of Man , he seeks to draw us to such a serious consideration of our selves ( and of the divine nature ) as might win us , the better , to pursue vertue , godlinesse , and such good things as are in the Soul : or else by perswading that we are ( essentially ) nothing else but soul , hee would , peradventure , allure us to renounce the desires of the Body , as things not primarily pertinent to MAN as MAN ; but , chiefely belonging to him , as he is a living creature ; and so , by consequence appertaining to him as he is a Man , in regard Man is a living-creature . And it is indeed confessed ( not much otherwise ) of all men , that the soul is far more to be esteemed then the body : and that the body is but as it were an Instrument moved by the soul , as is evident in death . For if thereby the soul be divided from the body it is immediately as much without motion , as a Workmans Tools when hee hath cast them aside . This is manifest , that MAN in some things participates with creatures void of life ; and that he is partaker also of life , as those living-creatures be , which are unreasonable : and that he is indowed likewise with understanding , as are Creatures reasonable . With inanimate creatures Man partakes in this , that he hath a Body , and in his mixture of the foure Elements . He agrees with Plants , not onely in that which is afore-mentioned , but in having also both a nourishing and a feeding-power . His coherence with unreasonable Creatures ( over and above all the former particulars ) is , in having a certaine voluntary motion , appetite , anger , and a power enabling him to feele and breathe : for all these are common both to Men and unreasonable creatures . Furthermore , he communicates with Intelligent incorporeall Natures , in reasoning , understanding , judging , and in pursuing vertue and a good life , which is the chief end of all vertues . These things considered , MAN standeth in such a Being as comprehends the sensible and intelligible Nature . In respect of his Bodily powers , and of his Bodily substance ( which is subject unto sense ) hee agrees both with living-creatures , and with things void of life . In respect of his Reasonable part he communicates with Substances which are bodilesse ( or spirituall ) as hath been said before : For , GOD the Creator of all things , hath seemed by little and little so to collect and knit together sundry differing natures , that all created things should become ONE And indeed , it will be a manifest proofe unto us , that there is but One Creator of all things , if we well consider how fitly he hath united the substance of individuall things by their particular parts ; and all the severall species ( thorowout the world ) by an excellent sympathie . For , as in every living creature hee hath joyned the parts insensible with such as have sense in them ( as bones , fatt , haire , ( and other insensible parts ) to the flesh and sinewes ( which are sensible ) compounding the Living-creature both of sensible and insensible portions ; and declaring that all these together make but one living-creature : Even so he hath joyned one to another , every particular species which was created , by ordering and compounding that agreement and disagreement which is in their natures ; In so much that things inanimate doe not greatly differ from Plants which have in them a vegitative and nourishing life ; neither are Plants wholy differing from sensible living creatures void of reason ; nor are those unreasonable creatures so alienated in all things from creatures indowed with reason , as that they have no naturall allyance or similitude , whereby they may be linked one to another . For even in stones ( which are inanimate creatures , not having in them , for the most part , so much as a vegitative life ) there is otherwise a certaine power , making them to differ from each other even in their stony properties : but the Loadstone seemeth very far to exceed the nature and vertue of other stones , in that it both attracts Iron thereunto , and also detaineth it ( being so attracted ) as if it would be nourished thereby . Neither doth it exercise this vertue upō one peece of Iron alone ; but , by that one peece , linketh fast another , and imparteth his owne power to all other peeces which are contiguous thereunto : yea Iron draweth Iron , when it is touched by the Loadstone . Moreover , when the CREATOR passed from Plants to living-creatures , he rushed not ( as we may say ) all at once , into things whose nature is to remove from place to place ; and , to such as are indowed with sense : but , he proceeded , rather , by degrees , and by a naturall and most comely progression . For , the Shell-fishes called Pinnae , and Vrticae , are so made as if they were certain Plants , having sense in them For , he fastned them in the Sea with roots , and covered them also with shells as with bark . And , as therein he made them to participate with Plants ; so , he gave them likewise ( in some measure ) the feelingsense , which is common to living-creatures . They agree with Plants in being rooted and fixed , and they communicate with living-creatures in their feeling In like manner the Sponge ( though it be rooted in the Rocks ) is of it self , opened and contracted , according as the passenger approcheth toward it , or departeth frō it . And therefore , Wise men have anciently termed such things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in English , Life-plants , if by a new word I may so name that which is partly a living-creature , and partly a Plant. After the Fishes called Pinnae , he proceeded unto those , which ( being unable to passe far from their station ) doe move onely to and fro within some certaine space , such as are the most part of those , which have shells , and are called the bowels of the earth . He went further , and added ( in the like maner , ) something to every thing in particular ( as to some things more senses ; and to some other , more ability to remove themselves from place to place ; ) and , came next to those unreasonable-creatures which are more-perfect . Those , I call more-perfect-creatures , which have obtained all the senses , and , can also remove themselves to places far distant . And when GOD passed from unreasonable-creatures to MAN ( a Creature indowed with Reason ) he did not perfect him in himself , ( and , as it were , all at once ; ) but , first , ingraffed into some other living-creatures , certain naturall wiles , sleights , and devises for the saving of themselves , which , make them seeme to be almost reasonable-creatures : And , having done all this , he , then , brought forth MAN , which is , indeed , the true Reasonable-Creature . The same Order ( if it bee well considered ) will appeare in the Voice , which from the noise of Horses & Oxen is brought , by little and little , from one plaine simple sound , unto the voices of Crowes and Nightingales , ( whose voices consisting of many notes , can imitate what they are taught ) and , so , by degrees it is terminated in the Articulate voice of MAN , which is distinct and perfect . Furthermore hee made the various expressions of the Tongue to depend upon the Minde , and upon Reason ; ordaining the speech to publish forth the motions of the Minde : And , in this wise , by a sweet Musicall proportion , hee ( collecting all things together ) incorporated all into ONE ; aswell , things Intelligible , as things visible , and , made MAN as a meanes thereunto . SECT . 2. I. Why MAN was first made , and why he hath in him somewhat of the Nature of all Creatures . II. MAN is the Bounder between visible and Intellectuall things , and becomes either an Earthly or Spirituall MAN , according as he is inclined to Good or Evill . A distinction between the Goods of the Mind and Body ; and betweene the life of MAN as he is Man , and as he is meerly a living creature . III. The opinion of the Hebrews touching the mortality and immortality of MAN. THese things considered , Moses in expressing the Creation of the World , did very properly affirme that MAN was last made . Not only , because all things being made for MAN , it was most convenient , that all such things ought first to bee provided , which were necessarily pertinent to his use ; and that he who was to have the use of them , should afterward be created : But , in respect both intellectuall and visible substances , were created , it seemed also convenient that One should be made , by whom those two Natures should be so united together , that the whole World might become ONE ; and be in it owne selfe so agreeable , that the same might not bee at variance , or estranged from it selfe . Even to this end , was MAN made such a living-creature , as might joyne together both Natures , and ( to summe up all in a word ) therein was manifested the admirable wisdome of the universall CREATOR . Now MAN being placed ( as it were ) in the Bounds betweene the Reasonable-nature , and that which is Irrationall ; if he incline to the Bodie , setling the maine part of his affectiō upon corporal things ; he chuseth and embraceth the life of unreasonable-creatures ; and , for that cause , shall be numbred among them , and be called ( as Saint Paul terms him ) An earthly MAN , to whom it shall be thus said , Earth thou art , and to Earth thou shalt returne : yea by this meanes he becomes ( as the Psalmist affirms ) like the Beast which hath no understanding . But , if he incline rather to the Reasonable part , and contemning Bodily lusts and pleasures , shall make choice to follow that blessed and divine life which is most agreeable unto MAN , he shall , then , be accounted a Heavenly MAN , according to that saying ; Such as the earth is , such are they that are earthly ; such as the heavenly are , such are they that are heavenly : and indeed that which principally pertaineth unto the Reasonable-Nature , is to avoid and oppose Evill , and love and follow that which is Good. Of Good things some are common both to the Soul and to the Body ( of which sort the Vertues are ) and these have a relation unto the Soul , in respect of the use which it maketh of the Body , being joyned thereunto . Some good things pertaine to the soul only , by it self , ( so that it should not need the help of the body ) as godlinesse , and the Contemplation of the nature of things : and therefore so many as are desirous to live the life of MAN as he is a MAN , ( and not onely in that he is a living creature ) do apply themselves to Vertue and Piety . But we will anon shew distinctly what things pertain to Vertue , and what to Piety , when we come to discourse of the Soul and of the Body : For , seeing wee doe not yet know what our Soul is in respect of the substance thereof , it is not yet convenient for us to treat here , of those things that are wrought by it . The Hebrewes affirme that MAN was made from the beginning , neither altogether mortall , neither wholly immortall , but , as it were , in a state betweene both those natures , to the end that if he did follow the affections of the body , he should be liable to such alterations as belong to the bodie ; But if he did prefer such good things as pertaine to the soul , he should then be honoured with Immortalitie For , if GOD had made MAN absolutely mortall from the beginning , he would not have condemned him to die after he had offended ; because it had beene a thing needlesse to make him mortall by condemnation , who was mortall before . And on the other side , if he had made Man absolutely immortall , hee would not have caused him to stand in need of nourishment ; for , nothing that is immortall needeth bodily nourishment . Moreover , it is not to be beleeved , that God would so hastily have repented himself , and made Him to be forthwith mortall , who was created absolutely immortall : For it is evident that he did not so in the Angels that sinned , but ( according to the nature which they obtained from the beginning ) they remained immortall , undergoing for their offences not the penalty of Death , but of some other punishment . It is better therefore , either to be of the first mentioned opinion touching this matter ; or , else , thus to think , that MAN was indeed created mortall , but , yet , in such wise that if hee were perfected by a vertuous and pious progression , he might become immortall : that is to say , he was made such a One , as had in him a potentiall abilitie to become immortall . SECT . 3. I. Our Author sheweth why the Tree of Knowledge of good and evill was forbidden ; & , that it was , at first , expedient for MAN to be ignorant of his owne Nature . II. MAN by the Transgression , attained that knowledge of himselfe , which diverted him from the way of perfection and Immortalitie . III. The Elementarie c●mposition and nourishment of Mans bodie : The reasons also why it needed feeding , clothing , curing &c. and why MAN was made a Creature sensible , and capable of Arts and Sciences , &c. IT being inexpedient , rather then any way helpful , for MAN to know his own nature , before he came to his perfection , GOD forbad him to taste the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill : For there were , and doubtlesse as yet there are very great vertues in Plants ; but at the first , ( in respect it was in the beginning of the worlds Creation ) their vertues being ( before the curse ) pure and void of all mixture , had in them a strong operation ; and it is not therefore strange that there should be ( by Gods providence ) the taste of a certain Tree , that should have a power given to ingender in our first parents , the knowledge of their own nature . The cause why God would not have MAN to know his owne nature , before hee had attained to perfection , was this : lest he knowing himself to stand in need of many things , should ( as by the sequell we find it manifest ) labour only to supply the wants of his Body , and utterly cast away the care of his Soul ; and for this cause did God forbid him to tast of the fruit of knowledge of good and evill . By disobeying this Commandement , MAN attained to the knowledge of Himself , but thereby fell from the state of growing to perfection , and busied himself in taking care for such things as the body needed : For ( according to the words of Moses ) as soone as he had eaten , He knew that he was naked , and immediately sought about to get a covering for his nakednesse : whereas , till then , God kept him as it were in a Traunce , and in such case that hee knew not himself . When hee fell away from the state of growing to perfection , hee fell also from his immortalitie , which by the mercy of his Creator he shall recover againe at the last . In the meane time it was granted him that hee should eat flesh ( whereas before his fall , God willed him to bee content with such things only as grew out of the earth , all which hee had provided for him in Paradise ) yea the first meanes of growing to perfection being become desperate , it was permitted him to feed as hee would . Now , seeing Man consisteth of a Bodie ( as of one of his parts ) and seeing every ( inferiour compound ) bodie is composed of the foure Elements , it is necessary that such things should happen unto him , as the Elements are subject unto ; That is to say , Cutting , mutation and flowing . By mutation I mean mutation in Qualitie ; and I terme it Flowing when he is emptied or purged of such things as are in him . For a living creature hath alway his evacuations , both by such pores as are manifestly seene , and by such also as we see not ; whereof I shall speake hereafter . It is necessary therefore , that so much should be taken in again , as was evacuated ; seeing else , the living creature would perish through defect of what should re-enter to supply the want : And ( if the things evacuated be either dry , or moist , or spirits ) it is as necessary that the living creature should have a continuall supply of dry and moist nourishments , and of spirits . The meats and drinks which wee receive , are made of those Elements , whereof we also are composed : for every thing is nourished with what is agreeable and like unto it , and ( in diseases ) we are cured with what is contrary ( to the disease . ) There he some of the Elements which we sometime receive into our Bodies immediately of thēselves ; and sometime use means unto the receiving of them ; as for example , we somtime receive water of it self ; sometime wee use Wine and Oyle , and all those that are called moist fruits , as means to the receiving of water . For wine is nothing else but a certain water comming from the Vine , and so or so qualified . In like manner we partake of Fire sometime immediately , as when we are warmed by it ; sometime also by the means of such things as we eate and drink : for all things containe in them some portion of Fire , more or lesse . We are in like case partakers of Aire : either immediately when we breathe it , and have it spread round about us , or draw it in by our eating and drinking ; or else by meanes of such other things as we receive into us . But as for the Earth , we seldome or never receive it immediately , but by certain meanes . For , we eate the corn which commeth of the earth . Larks , Doves , and Partridges feed oftentimes upon the earth ; but Man usually feedeth on the earth by the means of feeds , fruits , berries , and by the flesh which proceedeth from things nourished by the Earth . And forasmuch as God respecting not onely a decencie , but also the furnishing of us with a very quick sense of feeling , ( in which man exceedeth all other living creatures ) he hath clothed us neither with a tough skin as Oxen and other beasts , that have a thicke hide ; neither with large thicke set haire , as goats , hares , and sheepe ; neither with scales , as fishes and serpents ; neither with hard shells , as Tortoises and Oysters ; neither with a more fleshie bark , as Lobsters ; neither with feathers , as birds ; and therefore ( wanting these coverings ) it is necessary wee should have Raiment , to supply that in us , which nature hath bestowed on other living creatures . These are the causes why wee stand in need of nourishment and clothing : And not onely for the same ends are our houses become necessary ; but also that wee may escape the violence of wilde beasts , which is none of their least commodities . Moreover ( by reason of the distemperature of qualities in the humane body ) Physitians and their art are likewise needfull , that thereby ( as often as occasion requires ) those things which are rent asunder , may be fastned againe together for the preservation of health . And whereas the alteration consisteth in the quality , it is necessary that wee bring the state of the body to a just temperature by the contrary Quality : For , it is not the Physitians purpose ( as some think ) to coole the Bodie which hath beene in a heat , but to change it into a temperate estate ; seeing if they should coole it , the disease turneth ( not to health , but ) to the contrary sicknesse . Now in regard of Arts and Sciences , ( and by the necessarie use which we have of such things as they accomplish ) it so commeth to passe that we need the mutuall assistance one of another , and by that need which wee have each of other , many of us assembling together in common , doe thereby the more conveniently bargaine and contract for such things as may serve to supply the necessities of life . This meeting and dwelling together , was anciently termed by the name of a Citie ; by the neere neighbourhood whereof , men received aid and profit by each others arts & labours , without the discommodities of long and far Travaile . For , Man was naturally made to be such a living creature , as should be sociable , & delighted in neighbourhood . And forasmuch as men could not otherwise be so conveniently provided of useful things ; it is evident that the study of Arts , and the necessity of traffick were the first occasions of erecting Cities . SECT . 4. I. Of the two Priviledges which MAN hath obtained above all other Creatures , ( viz. ) to be capable of the Forgivenes of sinnes , and Immortalitie : the Justice and Mercy of GOD in vouchsafing the pardon of sinne of MAN , and denying the same to Angels . II Man only is a creature capable of learning Arts and Sciences : A Definition of Man , and Reasons justifying every branch of that Definition . III. The World was not made for the Angels , nor for any other , but MAN onely . To him was committed the government of the Vniverse , with a limitation to use , not abuse the Creatures . THere are also two Priviledges which Man hath specially gotten above all other . One is , to obtaine pardon by Repentance ; the other is that his body being mortall should be brought to immortalitie . This ( priviledge ) of the body , he getteth by meanes of the soul ; and the priviledge of the soul , by reason of the bodie : Yea , among Reasonable creatures , Man only hath obtained this Peculiar , that God vouchsafeth him the pardon of sin upon repentance ; For neither the Devils nor the Angels are vouchsafed pardon , though they doe repent . Hereby the most exact Iustice , and admirable mercy , of GOD is both fully proved and evidently declared : For , good cause is there why pardon should not bee granted to Angels , though they doe repent ; because there is nothing in them , which naturally allures or draws them to sin ; and in regard also that they ( of their own nature ) are free from all passions , wants , and pleasures of the body . But MAN , though hee be indowed with Reason , yet hee is also a bodily living creature , and therefore his wants ( in that hee is such a living creature ) together with his passions , do often blinde and captivate his reason . And therefore ( when he returnes againe by repentance , and applies himselfe unto vertue ) he obtaineth mercy and forgivenesse : For as it is proper to the Essence of MAN to have the ability of laughing ( because it agreeth to man only , to all men , and ever to man ) so ( in respect of those things , which proceed from the grace of God ) it is proper unto Man above all Creatures indued with Reason , to bee delivered , by Repentance , from the accusation and guiltinesse of all those things wherein he hath formerly transgressed . Yea , this Grace is given to MAN onely ; to all men ; and ever to man , during the continuance of his life in this world , and no longer : for after Death there is no more Forgivenesse . Some there bee who give a reason why the Angels could no more obtaine pardon by repentance after they had fallen ; and it is this that followes . The Fall of Angels , was ( as they affirme ) a kind of Death unto them ; and God vouchsafed them the tender of a pardon before their utter falling away , when like account was to bee made of them , as is made of Men during this life : But because they accepted not the grace offered , they received afterward ( as a just reward ) punishment everlasting without pardon . And hereby it plainly appeares that such as refuse Repentance , doe reject that which is a speciall good gift of God , and peculiar to MAN. This also is one of the things proper and peculiar unto MAN , that of all other living creatures only the body of MAN should arise againe after Death , and aspire to Immortalitie . This priviledge the body gaineth in respect of the immortalitie of the soule ; as likewise the soule obtaineth the other ( that is to say , pardon after Repentance ) in respect that the Body , is weake and troubled with many passions . It is a thing proper also , to MAN only , to learn Arts and Sciences , and to worke according unto such Arts : For which cause they who define him , say thus ; MAN is a living Creature , induced with Reason , mortall , capable of Consideration and Science . He is tearmed a living-creature , in that he is a substance having life indued with sense : for , that is the definition of a living-creature . He is said to be indued with Reason , that hee may be distinguished from unreasonable-creatures . He is called mortall , to make a difference betwixt him and the Reasonable-creatures , that are immortall . And , this clause [ capable of Consideration & Science ] is added thereunto , because wee come to Arts and Sciences by learning of them ; having in us naturally a certaine potentiall ability to receive both understanding and Arts ; but , not actually attaining them save by study and practise . There be some , who say that this last clause was lately added to the Definition ; and , that it had beene good enough without the same , were it not , that some bring in their Nymphes , and other petty Deities of those kinds , who are said to live long , and yet not to be immortall ; And to distinguish MAN from those , these words , Capable of consideration and science were judged needfull ; because , none of that sort are thought to learne any thing ; but , to know naturally , whatsoever they are said to know . The Iewes are of opinion on that the whole World was made for MAN ( even immediately for his sake ) as Oxen with other beasts for tillage , or to bear burthens ; and , as grasse was made for the Beasts . For some things were made for their owne sakes ; and some for the sakes of others . All reasonable-creatures were made for their owne sakes : Vnreasonable-creatures and things without life , were ordained for others , not for themselves . Now , if such things were made in respect of others , let us consider for whom they were , indeed , created . Shall wee think they were made for the Angels ? Doubtlesse , no wise man will say that they were made for their sakes ; because , the things made for the respect or sake of another , must concern either the making , or the continuance , or the recreation of those things for which they were made : For , they are made either in respect of the propagation and succession of their kinde ; or of their nourishment ; or to cover them ; or to cure them , or for their better welfare and rest . Now the Angels need no such things ; for , they neither have any succession of their kind , neither want clothing , bodily nourishment , nor any thing else : And , if Angels have no need of such things , it is then evident that no other nature having place above the Angels ; can have need of them ; because by how much higher the place of it is , so much the lesse need hath it of supply or assistance from another . This being so , we must seek out a Nature which is indued with Reason , and yet needeth such things as are aforementioned ; and what other nature can be found of that sort , if MAN be passed over ? Surely none : And if no other can be discovered , it followeth by good reason that both things void of life , and unreasonable-creatures , were made for the sake of MAN ; and if they were ordained for him ( as it is evident they were ) then , that was likewise the cause why he was constituted the Governor also of those creatures . Now , it is the duty of a Governour , to use those things which are put under his government , in such manner and measure as need and conveniencie shall require ; and not to abuse them untemperately , or to serve voluptuously his owne delicate Appetite . Neither ought he to bear himself tyrannously or ungently towards those whom he governes . For , they that so doe ( yea and they that use not mercifully , their unreasonable-cattell ) are therein great Offenders ; neither performing the part of a Governour , nor of a just man , according to that which is written , The just man hath compassion upon the life of his Beast . SECT . 5. I. It is here proved , that neither things without-life , nor the unreasonable . creatures , were made for themselves ; First , by arguments taken from the consideratiō of the nature and use of things without life . II. It is proved also by considering those creatures , which are void of reason , and which are ( for the most part ) very serviceable to MAN. III. And lastly , it is proved by considering those things which seeme to be rather harmfull then profitable to Mankind . BUt some perhaps will say , that nothing was made inrespect of another but every thing in respect of it selfe . Therefore , distinguishing first between things inanimate and those that have life , let us observe whether things void of life are likely to have beene created onely for their owne sake . For if those things were made in respect of themselves , how , or upon what should living-creatures feed ? wee see that Nature out of the earth produceth food both of fruits , and of plants , to every living-creature , some few excepted , whose feeding is upon flesh ; yea , and those creatures which are nourished by eating flesh , doe feed on such beasts as are sustained by eating the fruits of the earth : For , Lions and Wolves , feed on Lambes , Goats , Harts , and Swine . Aegles also , and all sorts of Hawkes , devoure Partridges , Doves , Hares , and such like ; which are fed with what springeth out of the ground . Moreover , the nature of those Fishes which devoure one another , doth not so extend it self to all fishes , that they do generally devoure the flesh of one another ; but it breaketh off in such as eate weeds and such other things as grow in the water . For , if all sorts of fishes had been inclined to eate the flesh of one another , so that no kindes of them could feed on any thing else , but on the flesh of themselves , verily they could not have long continued ( no not for a small time ) but would have beene utterly destroyed , some of them each by other , and the rest for lacke of meat . To the intent then , that it might not so happen , certaine Fishes were so made , that they might abstaine from the flesh of the rest , and feed ( if I may so tearme it ) on the grasse of the Sea , that , by them , the other sorts of fishes might be preserved . These fishes feed upon weedes ; other fishes feed upon them ; Those , againe , are food for other greater fishes . So , by the feeding on such fishes as last of all doe eate the weeds of the Sea , ( which come of the slimie waters ) the substance of the rest of the fishes is successively continued . Having reasonably demonstrated , that the Plants were not created in respect of themselves , but in regard of the nonrishment and nature both of Men & of other living-creatures , it will be thereby manifest that such things also , were made in respect of Man and other living-creatures , which are meanes and causes of the encrease and preservation of those interiour things : And if that be so , it will be as apparant that the motions of the starres , the firmament , the seasons of the yeare , the showers , and all such like things , were made in respect of those things without life afore-mentioned , and to the end that nourishment being continually administred unto them , the nature of such fruits might be perpetuated , and that Men and living-creatures also ( for whom those were ordained ) might bee preserved , by them . It resteth not to consider whether the nature of unreasonable creatures , was made in respect of it selfe , or for MAN's cause : and sure , it cannot but be very absurd , to affirme that things incapable of understanding , and living only by an instinct of Nature ( yea , things groveling toward the earth , and by their very shape declaring their bondage ) should be brought into the world for their owne sake . Much might be spoken to prove the contrary , even so much as would spin out this one point to the length of a Treatise , if I should handle the same at large , and therefore I will briefly mention in this place , those things onely which are of greatest weight . By seriously considering ( as it were in a glasse or image ) those things which are without us by such things as are within us , we should make a plain demonstration hereof ; yea , and by considering the very substance of the things themselves , which are in question . For , if wee ponder in our minde that part of our selves , which is irrationall , and the parts thereof ( I mean appetite and anger , which are ordained to serve the Reasonable-part ) wee shall there see , that Reason ruleth , and that the unreasonable-parts , are ruled ; that Reason commandeth , and that the other are commanded , and serviceable to such uses , as Reason will have them to bee subject unto ; if MAN preserve that cōdition which doth naturally appertaine unto him . Now then , if our part which is reasonable doth beare rule over our unreasonable-parts , which are within us ; seemeth it not much more probable , that our reasonable-part should have dominion over such unreasonable-things as are without us ? and that such things were ordained to serve our necessities ? especially seeing it is according to the law of Nature that the unreasonable shold be subject to the reasonable , as hath beene declared by those things which are in our selves ? This may bee further manifested , by considering that divers creatures are made even fit for the necessary services of MAN. For , Oxen and all bearing cattell are naturally fitted for the tillage of the earth , and for bearing of burthens . Sundry other beasts of the field also , and many fishes and soules , for dainty feeding , yea , and singing-birds for our delight and recreation . And al-beit all things doe not alwayes serve to such pleasing uses , but that there are some which may seeme rather to harm and destroy man ; it is to be considered that when those things were created , the speciall end of whose creation was at first for man's service ; all other things which might be otherwise usefull were then created also , that in the Creation there might bee no defect , or want of such things whereof there might bee afterward any use . Neither were such things as are now accounted harmfull , exempted utterly from the profitable fruition of man ; but , he by reason , doth , or may , fruitfully employ to his advantage , even the most venomous things . For , hee useth poisonous creatures to the curing of such harmes as come by those , and other venomous beasts , and to the curing of many infirmities other wayes occasioned . Such are the confections called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( whereof our Triacle is one sort ) which reason hath invented , that by their owne power those things might be made to cōquer themselves , and procure health and safety ( as it were ) from conquered enemies . Man hath also many other things of great vertue given unto him by his Creator , which being contrary to those mischievous things , have in them a power to withstand or qualifie their virulent operations ; to remedy their hurts ; and to defend him from their secret assaults . One thing serveth to one use , other things to other uses , and God hath so provided that all things should bee helpfull for the benefit and preservation of Man , yea and some things there be which are serviceable no way else . SECT . 6. I. He sheweth why the creatures are now harmfull to MAN , seeing all things were at first created for his benefit : Exemplary demonstrations intimating how this mischiefe might be remedied . II. A briefe Elogium in praise of the excellent nature and prerogatives of MAN. III. This chapter is concluded , with a short exhortation , that a thankfull use be made of the high favours vouchsafed unto MAN. THat which hath beene formerly said touching the harme which MAN receiveth somtimes from the unreasonable-creatures , hath respect onely to the present condition of Mankinde in this life ; for , if we looke back to the first time which was long ago , wee shall finde that none of the irratinall-creatures durst to be offensive unto MAN ; but , that all of them were subject unto him , faithfully serving and obeying him , so long as he did master his owne passions , and subjected his unreasonable-parts to the part-reasonable . And when hee gave the reines to his owne affections , not subduing them to reason , but suffered himselfe to be over-mastered by the brute desires which were within him ; it was very just , that ( as it hath since hapned ) he should be over-awed by the wilde-beasts , and by such other harmefull things as are without him . For , after MAN had sinned , then began those beasts to be hurtfull unto him , which had else been serviceable ; as may yet appeare true by those who have lived a supereminent life , and thereby prevented the mischievous assaults of such creatures . Of this , Daniel and Paul are exemplary witnesses : for , neither could the Lions finde power to seife the one ; nor the Viper to fasten upon the other . These things considered , who is able to commend sufficiently the nobility of this living-creature ? Behold , he bindeth together in himself things mortall and immortall ; and knitteth up in One , things reasonable and unreasonable . In his owne nature , hee beareth the image of all creatures , and from thence is rightly called A little world . He is a creature , of whom God hath vouchsafed to take so much regard , that all created-things both present and to come , were for him created . He is that creature also , for whose sake GOD became MAN , and who shaking off his corruption , finisheth it in a never-ending immortality . Yea , he is that creature , who being made after the image and likenesse of GOD , raigneth above the heavens , living and becomming cōversant with CHRIST the sonne of GOD , who sitteth above all power and authority ; and no eloquence may worthily publish forth the manifold preheminences , and advantages which are bestowed on this creature . He passeth over the vast Seas ; he rangeth about the wide heavens , by his contemplation , and conceives the motions and the magnitudes of the stars . He enjoyes the commodities both of sea and land : He contemns the furie of wild-beasts , & the strength of the greatest fishes . He is learned in every science , and skilfull in Artificiall , workings . Hee communicates by writing , with whomsoever he pleaseth , though they be far distant ; and is nothing hindred therein by the absence of his Bodie . He foretelleth things to come : he ruleth all , subdueth all , and enjoyeth all things . He talketh with Angels , yea , and with GOD himself . He hath all the Creatures within his Dominion ; and keeps the Devils in subjectiō . He searcheth out the nature of every thing , and is diligently studious in the knowledge of GOD. He was borne to be the house and Temple of the Holy-ghost ; and he acquires the fruition of all these priviledges by Vertue and Piety . But lest it may be thought , of some , that we proceed unskilfully , in setting forth so largely the praises of Man ; ( whereas wee should rather have contented our selves to proceed with a Discourse touching the nature of MAN , according to our first purpose ) wee will break off our speech , in this place ; though we are not ignorant , that by setting forth his preheminence and priviledges , we have not improperly prosecuted our intention to declare the Nature of MAN. And , now , seeing it is manifested unto us , of how great nobility we are partakers , and that we are a heavenly plant ; let us not deface or shame our Nature , neither let it be truely said that we are unworthy of such gifts : nor let us foolishly deprive our selves of so great Power and Glory and Blessednes , by casting away the fruition of Ioyes that shall be everlasting , for the seeming possession of imperfect pleasures , which will endure but a while : But , let us preserve , rather , this nobility of ours , by doing good , by abstaining from evill works , and by a good-zeal , intent or purpose ; For to such endeavours , ( if we seek it by prayer ) God alwaies lendeth his assisting hand . Thus much concerning these matters : And now seeing it is the received opinion , that MAN consisteth of Body and Soul we will follow the same Division ; treating first of the Soul , and therein passe by those questions which being over subtile , and difficultly understood , cannot be intelligibly expressed to many capacities . CAP. 2. SECT . 1. I. The severall and different Opinions of the Ancients concerning the SOVL , as whether it be a Substance ; whether corporeall , or incorporeall , whether mortall or immortall , &c. II. The confutation of those who affirme in generall that the SOVL is a corporeall-substance . III. Confutations of their particular Arguments , who affirme that the SOVL is Bloud , Water , or Aire . EXceeding great variance is discovered among the old Philosophers in their discourses of the SOUL ; insomuch that almost all of them differ one from another in that matter . Democritus and Epicurus , and the whole sect of the Stoicks doe peremptorily affirme that the SOVL is a Bodie ; and those very men who affirme the SOVL to be a Bodie , dissent one from another in declaring the Essence of it . The Stoicks affirm , that it is a certain Blast , hot and fiery . Critias holds , that it is bloud . Hippon the Philosopher , will have it to be water , Democritus thinks it is fire ; and his opinion is , that the round Formes of indivisible-bodies or Atomes being incorporated , by ayre and fire , do make up the Soul. Heraclitus conceives that the Soul of the whole frame of the World is a certaine breathing out of the vapours , from moist things ; and , that the Soul which is in living-creatures , doth proceed both from exhalations without themselves , and from exhalations , also , within them ; and being of the same kind , of which they themselves are . Againe ( on the contrary part ) there are almost innumerable disagreements among them who say that the SOUL is not a Body , or Bodily-substance . Some of them affirm that the SOUL is a substance and immortall ; Some , that it is without a Bodie , and neither a substance nor immortall . Thales , who was the first of that opinion , held that the SOUL was alwaies in motion , and had that motion from it selfe . Pythagoras thought that it was a NUMBER moving it selfe . Plato affirmed that it was a substance ( to be conceived in mind ) that received motion from it self , according to NUMBER and HARMONY . Aristotle taught that it was the first continuall-motion of a BODIE-NATURALL , having in it those Instrumentall parts , wherein was possibility of life . Dinarchus took it to be an Harmony of the foure Elements ; not a Harmony made of sounds , but as it were a tunable temperature and agreement , of hot & cold , moist & dry things , in the Bodie . But , it is without doubt that all the best of these doe agree in this , that the SOUL is a substance ; Aristotle and Dinarchus excepted , who affirme that it is no substance at all . Besides all these , some were of opiniō that there was but one and the same SOUL belonging to all things ; which was by smal portions distributed to all particular things ; and , then gathered into it self againe : of which opinion were the Manichees and certain others . Some likewise imagined the Soules were many , and of differing sorts ; Some affirmed that there was both one universall , and many particular SOULS ; and therefore it cannot be , but that my Discourse must be drawne to a great length , seeing I am to disprove so many opinions . Therefore , to confute in generall all those together , who affirme that the Soul is a corporeall essence , it shall be sufficient to alledge that which hath been heretofore delivered to that purpose by Numinius the Pythagorist , and by Amonius the Master of Plotinus , who thus affirme : All Bodies , being by their proper nature mutable , and such as may be utterly dispersed and divided into innumerable parts ( and having nothing remaining in them which may not be changed and dispersed ) have need of something to close them in , to bring them together ; to knit them into one ; and ( as it were ) to hold them fast united : And , this we say is done by the SOUL . Now if the SOUL be corporeall , ( let it be what Body you please ) yea , though it be a body consisting of the most thin and subtile parts , what will you say holds that together , as that knitteth the Bodie in One ? For , as we declared before , every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together ; yea the Bodie of this SOUL , that knits together our visible BODIE , ( if we should grant the same to be a corporeall SOUL ) and the next to that also , infinitely , it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together , untill an incorporeall-essence were found out . If they answer , as the Stoicks doe , that , there is a certaine motion pertaining unto Bodies , extending both to the inward and outward parts of the Body : That the motion tending outward , effects the quantity and the qualities of the Body ; and , that the motion tending inward , is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof ; wee will then aske them ( seeing every motion doth proceed from some power ) what kinde of power it is , which that motion hath ? in what consisteth it ? and what gives essence thereunto ? If this power bee a certaine matter ( which the Greekes call Hylen ) wee will use the same reasons against them , which wee objected before . If they say it is not matter , but a materiall thing , ( for matter and materiall things thus differ ; That which hath matter in it , is called a materiall thing ) wee then aske them , whether that which hath matter in it , be likewise matter , or void of matter ? If they say it is matter , we demand how it can be both materiall and matter ? If they answer , that it is not matter , then they must grant it to be void of matter , and if it be void of matter , wee will easily prove it to be no Body ; because , every body hath matter in it . If they alleage that Bodies have the three Dimensions in them , and that the SOUL extending it selfe through the whole Body , hath in it also the three Dimensions , and therefore must necessarily be a Body ; wee will then thus answer them ; It is true , that all BODIE' 's have in them the three Dimensions , but every thing having the three Dimensions is not a BODY . For place , and Quality which in themselves have no Body , have accidentally , a Quantity if they bee in such things as have magnitude . In like maner the SOUL in respect of it selfe , is utterly void of the Dimensions ; but , accidentally it hath Dimensions ; because the Body ( in which it is ) having in it the three Dimensions , wee so conceive it , together with the Body , as though the Soule also had in it the three Dimensions . We argue further , and say thus : Every Body hath his motion either from without it selfe , or from within . If the motion bee from without it selfe , it must then be void of life : if it be from within it selfe , it must be indued with life : now , it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either indued with life , or without life ( one of which must necessarily be affirmed , if the Soule bee a corporeall substance ) therefore the soule cannot be a corporeal Essence . Againe , the SOUL , if it be nourished , it is nourished by that which is void of Body ( for , knowledge is the nourishment thereof ) but , no corporeal essence is norished by things bodiless , therefore , the SOUL cannot be a Body . Xenocrates thus concluded this argument : If ( said hee ) the SOUL be not nourished , it cannot be a corporeal-substance ; because , the Body of every living-creature must be nourished . Thus much in generall , in confutation of all those who generally affirm , that the SOUL is a bodily thing . Now , we will treate particularly against them who are of opinion that the SOUL is either Blood , or Breath ; because , when either Blood or Breath is taken away , the living-creature dyeth . Wee will not say ( as some well accounted of have written ) that , part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth , if the SOUL be the Blood : for , that were but a slender answer . In those things which have every part of like nature with the whole , the part remaining is the same with the whole : Whether the water bee much or little , it is every way perfect water . In like maner , gold , silver , and every other thing , whose parts do not essentially differ from each other , are still the same , as is afore said : And even so , that part of blood which remaineth ( of what quantity soever ) may be called the SOUL ( aswell as the whole quantity ) if the blood be the SOUL . We , therfore , will rather answer them thus : If that be rightly accounted the SOUL , upon whose taking away , the death of the living creature ensues ; then , should it needs bee , that flegme , and the two choller 's must be also the SOUL , seeing , if any one of these faileth , it brings the living-creature to his death . The like falleth out in the Liver , in the Braine , in the Heart , in the Stomach , the Reines , the Entrails , and in many other parts , whereof if you bereave a living-creature , it will immediatly perish . Moreover , there are many things without blood , which have life in them , neverthelesse ; as some smooth and gristly fishes ; some also of a softer kind , to wit , Sepiae , Teuthides , and Smyli ( as the Greekes call them ) and Lobsters , Crabs , Oysters , and all shel-fish , whether they have hard or soft shells . Now if these things have a living-Soule in them ( as we know they have ) and yet are void of blood , then it plainely followes that blood cannot bee the SOUL . Against those who say that water is the Soule , many things may bee said to disprove their opinion , though water helps to quicken and nourish all things ; and though it bee ( as they say ) impossible to live without water . Wee cannot live without nourishment , and therefore if their assertion bee true , wee may aswell affirme that all nourishment in generall , and every particular nourishment is the SOUL . And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water , wee finde the contrary to bee probable ; for it is written of some Aegles , and of Partridges , that they live without drinke . And why should water be the SOUL rather then ayre ? Seeing it is possible to abstaine from water very long , whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the Aire . And yet , neither is Aire the SOUL : For , there are many creatures which live without breathing the Aire ; as all Insectae ( riveted creatures ) such as Bees , Wasps , and Ants ; as also all bloodlesse creatures , all those which live in the waters , and such as have no Lungs . For , none of those things that are without Lungs can breath Aire . The proposition is true also , if it be converted , There is no creature having Lungs , which doth not breath aire . SECT . 2. I. The arguments of Cleanthes the Stoick ( affirming the SOUL to bee corporeall ) are here confuted logically and by demonstration . II. Chrysippus ( intending to maintaine the like opinion ) is here , likewise answered , and his Fallacies discovered . III. A confutation of their Tenet also , who affirme that the SOUL is an Harmony . SEeing certaine reasons of some account , are divulged by Cleanthes the Stoick , and by Chrysippus ( to prove the SOUL a corporeall . substance ) wee will here deliver somewhat in answer of them ; and it shall be the same which the Platonists have thereunto replyed heretofore . Cleanthes composeth a syllogisme in this manner ; There is ( saith hee ) a likenesse betweene us and our parents , not in respect of the Body onely , but in regard also , of the SOVL , as in Passions , Manners , and Affections : now it pertaineth to a body to have in it likenesse and unlikenesse ; and likenesse and unlikenesse cannot belong to things void of Bodie ; Therefore the Soul is a bodily-thing . It is here to be observed , first , that he proveth things universall by things particular ( which is not allowable by the Rules of Logick . ) Next , whereas he saith that likenesse and unlikenesse cannot pertaine to any thing void of bodie , it is false . For wee know that Numbers , which have their side-numbers answering in proportion , are like one to another , as the side-numbers to sixe and to foure and twentie . The side-numbers to sixe are two , and three : The side numbers to foure and twenty are foure , and sixe . Now , there is like proportion of two in respect of four ; and of three in respect of sixe : For they have a double proportion , each in respect of other ; foure being twice as much as two , and sixe twice as much as three . Thus it appears that Nūbers are like unto Nūbers , & yet Numbers are no bodily thing . Likewise , Figures ( in Geometrie ) are like unto Figures , so many of them as have both their corners equall , & their sides which inclose their equall-corners , answering one another in proportion : and even the Platonists themselves will confesse , that such Figures are no Bodily-things . Moreover , as it is a propriety in the predicament of Quantity , that a thing should be equall , or unequall ; So , also , it is a propriety in the predicament of Quality , that things should be like , or unlike . Now the predicament of Quality is an Incorporeall thing ; Therefore , a thing incorporeall may be like unto another thing , that is incorporeall . Cleanthes , thus frameth another Argument : No Incorporeall thing ( saith he ) can suffer together with a thing corporeall ; neither can a bodily-thing , suffer with such a thing as hath no body ; but , things corporeall , only , may suffer one with another . Now it is evident , that if the body be diseased , and wounded , the SOVL suffereth grief with it ; The Bodie suffereth also with the SOVL ; for , when the mind is afflicted by shame , the Bodie blusheth , and when the minde feareth , the body looketh pale . Therefore the SOVL is a corporeall thing . One of his Assumptions is false ; and he taketh unto himself that which no man granteth . For whereas he saith , that no Incorporeal thing can suffer with a thing having a bodie ; what if this be true onely in the SOVL ? This is as if we should argue thus ; No living-creature moves the upper jaw ; But a Crocodile moves the upper jaw ; Therefore , a Crocodile is no living-creature . The major of this proposition is false ; because , in saying , No living-creature moves the upper-jaw , hee taketh as granted that which is denied : for , behold the Crocodile both moveth his upper-jaw , and is also a living-creature . The like arguing useth he , who saith , that Nothing , void of body , suffereth together with a bodily-thing ; for , he taketh unto himself , in his negation , that which lieth in question . But , if we should grant ( for argument sake ) that no Incorporeall-thing , doth suffer together with a thing-corporeall ; yet , that which is inferred thereupon , is not fully confessed , ( to wit ) that the Soul suffereth with the Body , if it be sick , or wounded : For , it is yet in controversie whether it be the Body onely that suffereth pain ; which having taken sense from the Soul , leaves the same insensible of sufferings ; or whether the Soul be grieved together with the Bodie . The former opinion hath hitherto been most generally received among learned men ; and therefore , Cleanthes ought not to have made his propositions of things in question ; but , of such onely as are quite out of doubt : for in doing otherwise he in vaine laboureth to demonstrate that , for which he contendeth . And yet ( to make the fashood of his Assumption more evident ) it might be proved , that some things void of body , doe suffer together with such things as have body : For , Qualities being things-incorporeall , doe suffer with corporeall-things when they are altered : yea , both in the corruption of the body , and in the Generation of the same , the Quality thereof suffers change and alteration therewith . Chrysippus thus argueth . Death is a separation of the Soul from the Bodie : Now , nothing void of body is separated from a body ; because , a thing incorporeall cannot be touched ( or laid even along ) by a corporeall-thing : But the Soul toucheth , and is equally touched by the body : and is also separated from the same : Therefore the Soul is a corporeall-essence . Among these propositions , this is true , that death is a separation of the soul from the body : But , this , that a thing void of body cannot touch a body , is false , if it be generally spoken ; and true , if it be affirmed of the soul . It is false ; because , a Line which is an incorporeall-thing doth evenly touch a corporeall-essence , and is also separated from the same ; as also whitenesse . Yet , in the Soul it is true ; by reason the Soul doth not ( so ) touch the Bodie . For , if the Soul should ( so ) touch the body , it must needs follow that it must be laid ( as it were ) along by it . And if that be so , then it lieth along by the whole bodie ( that is , by every part of the same ) which is impossible . For , how can a wholebody , lie along by every part of another body ? Or , if it should be that the Soul so touched the Bodie ; then , the whole Creature should not have life : For , if it ( so ) touched the same , it would indeed consequently follow , that the Soul were a corporeall-essence ; but , then , the thing made alive , should not have life in it , throughout every part of the same . And , contrariwise , if the whole living-creature hath life in it , then the Soul neither touches the Bodie , neither is it a bodily-thing . But , the whole living-creature hath life in it ; therefore , neither doth the Soul touch it ; neither is the Soul a bodily-thing ; and , being a thing void of body ; is , neverthelesse , separated from the bodie , ( contrary to the proposition of Chrysippus . ) It is manifest , by what hath been hitherto said , that the Soul is no corpreall-substance : it now remaines that we prove the same to be a substance . And , because Dinarchus defines the Soul to be an Harmonie ; And Simmias , contradicting Socrates , affirmes the same ; comparing the Soul to an harmonie , and the body to a Harp ; we will here set downe the same confutations of them , which we finde in Plato's Dialogue called Phaedon . One of them is taken from what Plato had proved by things granted : For , he had demonstrated that when we doe learne , we doe but call to minde things that were ingraffed formerly in us : And therefore , taking this unto him ( as a thing granted ) hee thereupon confirmes his Argument in this maner ; If ( saith hee ) the learning of things be nothing else , but the recalling of them to minde ; then , our soule had a being , before it was in the forme of MAN : Now , if it were a Harmony , it was not before the body , but came after it , when the body was harmoniously joyned together . Such of necessity must the composition bee , as the things are whereof the composition is made : For , composition is a certaine common joyning together of those things , which are compounded , having a harmony in the same : and , it cannot bee otherwise , in reason , but that the Harmony must follow , and not precede those things whereof it is compounded . These matters considered , this saying , That the SOUL is an Harmony , is contrary to this other saying , That , the learning of things is the recordation of things : But the opinion concerning recordation ( as is aforesaid ) is true ; even in their judgement who affirme the SOUL to bee an HARMONIE ; therefore the SOUL is not a Harmony , according to their owne Principle . Againe , the SOUL is a part repugnant to the body ; and is in stead of a Ruler , exercising a government over the same . But Harmony neither exerciseth any government over the Body , neither is any way repugnant thereunto ; therefore , the SOUL is not an Harmony . Moreover , one Harmony may bee more or lesse Harmony then another , according as it is slackned or stretched forth , ( wee meane not to bee understood as if we spoke of the very nature of Harmony ; seeing it is impossible there should be intension and remission , in the very nature thereof , ) but wee meane Harmony as it consisteth in joyning together of the notes : For , if a shrill and a base-sound , being matched together , shall afterward bee made more slack , there will bee a diversitie in the Harmony , by reason of joyning together of the notes , more or lesse reached forth , though they retain the same nature in the greatnesse of the sounds : But one SOUL is not more or lesse SOUL then another ; therefore , the SOUL cannot be a Harmony . Futhermore , the SOUL in that it receives contraries succeeding one another , is a substance and a subject : But , Harmony is a Quality , and in the subject Now the predicament of substance is one thing , and the predicament of Quality is another ; therefore , the SOUL and Harmony are two distinct things . It is indeed , no absurdity , to say that the SOUL hath Harmony in it ; howsoever , it followeth not that the SOUL is therefore an Harmony : Because , though the SOUL hath vertues in the same , it cannot bee thereupon inferred that the SOUL is vertue . SECT . 3. I. It is here declared , that the SOUL is not ( as Galen implicitly affirmeth ) a Temperature in generall . II. It is here proved also , that the SOUL is no particular temperature or quality . III. And it is likewise demonstrated , that the SOUL is rather governesse of the temperatures of the Body , both ordering them , and subduing the Vices , which arise from the bodily-tempers . GAlen , hath determined nothing peremptorily of the SOUL ; yea , hee himselfe affirmeth plainly , in his writings of demonstration , that hee hath delivered nothing precisely of the same : But , it may bee collected by some of his expressions , that he could be best pleased to affirme that the SOUL is a temperature . For , he saith , that the diversitie of manners followes the temperature of the Body , and confirmeth his opinion by certaine collections out of Hippocrates : Wherein , if hee delivered that which hee truly thinketh , then , doubtlesse , hee beleeveth also , that the SOUL is mortall : not the whole SOUL , but that onely which is irrationall ; for , hee maketh a doubt concerning the reasonable soul , as his words declare . Now , that the temperature of the Body cannot be the SOUL , it may be made evident by these reasons : First , every body , aswell that which hath life in it , as that which is void of life , is made of the temperature of the foure Elements ( for , the temperature of these Elements make all Bodies ) And if the SOUL bee the temperature of the body , there can be no body with out life : For , if the Soul be the temperature , then , every body hath life in it , because every body hath his temperatures . And if every Body hath life in it , then there is no body void of life : So , consequently , neither stone , nor timber , nor iron , nor any other thing can be without life . But he did not meane , perhaps , to affirme in generall , that every temperature of the body was the SOUL ; but rather , that some such , or such a temperature . Wee , then , demand what temperature it is which maketh a living-creature , and standeth instead of the SOUL ? For , let him name what temperature soever hee can devise , we will finde him out the like in things without life . There are ( as hee himselfe hath declared in his Booke intituled OF THE TEMPERAMENTS ) nine temperatures ; eight distempered ; and one in good temper ; by which ( as he likewise affirmeth ) every man is tempered , whose temperature keepeth a meane . But by the other distemperatures other living-creatures are composed ( every one according to the severall kinde thereof ) with a certaine intension and remission , to the more and to the lesse . Yea , and all the nine temperatures are found also more or lesse in things void of life ; as he himselfe hath taught , in his booke of simple-medicaments . Moreover , if the SOUL be a temperature , then is the SOUL subject to alteration ; for , the temperatures are altered according to the diversitie of Ages , Seasons , and Dyets : And , if the SOUL be altered , then wee have not at all times the same SOUL ; but , a Soule varied according to our temperatures ; sometime the soule of a Lion , sometime of a Sheepe , and sometime of other creatures , which were absurdly affirmed . Againe , our temperature doth not oppose it selfe against any lusts of our bodies , but rather helps to provoke them , or effect them , for , it is that which stirreth up the desires : But , the SOUL bendeth it selfe against those desires ; therefore our temperature is not the SOUL . Furthermore , the temperature is a quality ; and a qualitie may be in the subject , or absent from it without the destruction of the same subject : Now , if our temperature bee our soule , it will then follow ( by the reason afore-mentioned ) that the soule may be separated from the body ( which is the subject thereof ) without the destruction of the same . But , this is universally knowne to be false ; therefore , the SOUL can be neither temperature nor qualitie . None will imagine it more possible to change that which is of the essence of a living-creature , into the contrary thereof , and yet preserve the living-creature , then , in fire to change the nature of heat into coldnesse , and yet still continue the fire . But it appeareth plainly that our temperature doth alter into the contrary ; ( & that such as Galen was are they , who change our temperatures , by their art of Physick . Therefore the soule ( which is the essence of a living-creature ) cannot be the temperature . Neither is the Soule a quality of the body : For , the qualities of every body are subject to sense ; But the soule is not subject to sense , but to understanding onely , and therefore it is not a Quality . Wee know that this good temper of blood and spirits , accompanied with flesh and sinewes , and such other things , is strength . And , that the good temperature of hot and cold , dry and moist things , is health . And that the measurable proportion of the members , with a fresh colour , is cause of the beauty which is in the Body . Now , if the soul be a certaine harmony , of health , and strength , and beauty ; It must needs follow that Man as long as he hath a Soule in him , can neither be sick , nor weake , nor deformed . But , wee see by often experience , that even while the living-soule continueth in them , many men are deprived , not only of one , but of all these good temperatures ; insomuch , that the very same man is deformed , and weak , and sick all at once . Therefore , the soule is not the good temperature of the Bodie . Some will aske , perhaps , how it comes to passe , ( if the soule be not the temperature of the body ) that men are vitious or vertuous , according to their naturall constitutions and complexions ▪ and they may demand also , whether these things proceed not frō the tēperature . We answer , that they doe indeed proceed from the bodily temperature : For , as there bee some naturally healthfull , or sickly , by reason of their constitution ; So , othersome , naturally abounding in bitter choller , are froward ; and some other cowardly , or leacherous , ( more or lesse according to their complexions . ) But , there bee some , who overcome these naturall inclinations , and by getting the victory over them , doe evidently manifest , that these temperatures may bee suppressed . Now , that which overcommeth is one thing , and that which is overcome is another thing : Therefore , the temperature is also one thing , and the soule ( which is the vanquisher and orderer of inclinations proceeding from the temperature ) is another thing , and not the same . The body being an instrument which the soule useth , if it bee well fitted for the same , is a helper unto the soule ; and she the better useth it to her own contentment . But , if it be not every way framed and tempered for the soule 's use , it becommeth her hinderance , and much adoe hath she to strive against the unfitnesse of her instrument . Yea , so much , that if shee bee not very wary and diligent in rectifying the same , she her selfe is perverted aswell as the instrument ; even as a musitian misseth of true musick , when his harp is out of tune . The soule therefore must be carefull of the body , and make it a fit instrument for her selfe : which may be done by ordering it according to Reason , and by accustoming the same to good manners ; as in Harmony , otherwhile slackning , and sometime winding up , according as necessity requires : By the neglect whereof , shee her selfe , may else ( as it often happeneth ) become as faultie , and as perverse as her Instrument . SECT . 4. I. The SOVL is not a perpetuall motion as Aristotle affirmes : Hee shewes what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is , and the defects of Aristoles judgement concerning the SOVL. II. The Body hath not in it selfe a possibility to live , before the SOVL commeth unto it , as Aristole hath also affirmed . III. The SOVL is neither unmovable of it selfe , nor accidentally moved , nor bred in the Body ; as the fore said Philosopher hath delivered . ARistotle affirming that the Soule is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perpetuall motion , is neverthelesse to bee accounted among them , who say that the SOUL is a quality . But , first , let me make it appeare what Aristotle meaneth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( which is to say ) a perpetuall motion . He divideth a substance into three parts : The first is matter ( which is as it were the subject ) and this matter is in it selfe nothing , but a generating power , out of which another thing may bee formed . The second part of the Essence , is forme , ( or speciall kinde ) by which the matter is brought unto a certaine forme . The third part , consisteth both of matter and forme united together , and endued with life : The matter being a thing in possibility only , and the forme an actuall thing considerable two wayes . That is to say , either as you consider of a science , or of a contemplation according to the science ; as a habit ; or , as working by that habit . It is considerable as a science ; because , in the very substance of the Soule there is a kinde ( as wee may call it ) both of sleepe and of waking . This waking is analogically answerable unto contemplation ; and sleepe represents the having of this habit , without any working thereby . The Science , is , before working according to that science ; and Aristotle calls the forme it selfe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , the first continued motion : The working according to this forme , he names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second continued motion . As for example : The eye consisteth of a materiall subject , and of a certaine forme . This materiall subject , is in the eye it selfe ; even that which containeth the sight ( I meane the matter of the eye ) and this matter is equivocally called the eye . But the forme and continuall motion of the eye is the operation wherby it seeth : A whelp before he can see though he hath neither of the two motions aforementioned , hath yet , an aptnesse to receive such a motion : Even in such maner we must conceive of it in the SOUL . When sight commeth to the welp it perfects the eye ; and when the SOUL commeth unto the Body , it perfects the living-creature . So then , in a perfect living-creature , neither can the SOUL bee at any time without the Bodie , neither the Body without the Soul : For , the SOUL is not the Body it selfe ; but , it is the SOUL of the BODY : and therefore , it is in the Body , yea , and in such a kinde of body : for , it hath not an existence by it self . Aristotle first calls the possible ( inferiour ) part of the soul , by the Name of the soul , severing the Reasonable-part from it , wheras hee should have taken the whole soul of Man together , and not have given his judgement of the whole , by a part , much lesse by the weakest part there of . Aristotle hath affirmed also , that the body hath an aptnesse to live , even before the soul commeth unto it : For he saith , that the body hath in it selfe a possibility to live . Now , the body which hath in it self a possibility to live , must first be actually a body , before it receives that form : For , such a body is a matter void of all qualities . Therefore it is impossible that the thing which is not actually it self , should have in it an aptnesse whereby another thing may be made of it . If it be a bodie , and hath in it self , no other being , but in possibility only ; how can that which is a bodie but in possibility , have a possibility of life in it self ? Though in other things , it is possible , that a man should have somewhat which he never useth ; yet in the soul it is impossible : For , the soul doth not cease to worke , even in them that are asleep ; but , a man , even in sleeping , is nourished , & groweth . and seeth visions , and breathes , which is the chiefest symptome of life . It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the possibility to live , but , it must needs have life actually in it : For , indeed , it is nothing else but life which doth principally form the Soul , ( it is planted together with the Soul ) and it is in the bodie by participation . If therefore any man shall affirme , that Health answereth proportionably to Life ; we will reply that in saying so , he tal keth not of the life of the SOUL but of the body , and so useth a sophisticall reasoning : For , the corporeall-substance doth receive contraries one after another ; but , in the substance , which is the forme , that cannot be possible ; Because , if the difference , which is the Form , should be altered , the living creature would be altered also . It is not therefore , the substantiall forme , which receiveth contraries ; but the substance which is the subject ; that is to say , the bodily-substance : And therefore also the Soul cannot be , by any means , the continued motion of the bodie ; but must be a substance all perfect within it selfe , and incorporeall ; for that it receiveth contraries one after another , ( as vice and vertue ) whereof the very Forme , by it self , is not capable . Furthermore , Aristotle saith , that the Soul being a continued-motion , unmoveable of it self , is moved accidentally ; and , that it is not unlikely wee should be moved by an immoveable thing ; because we see by common experience , that beautie being a thing unmoveable doth neverthelesse move us . But , though Beautie , which is unmoveable in it self , may move us , ( as hee saith ) yet , the Beautie so moving us , is a thing by nature , apt enough to be moved , & not such a thing as is altogether unmoveable . Therefore , if the body had any selfe-motion , it had not been any absurdity to say it should be moved of that which was immoveable : But , it is impossible that a thing of it self immoveable , should be moved of that which is also immoveable How then should the body attain unto motion , except it receive it from the soul ? seeing it cannot have any motion from it self ? It appeares , therefore , that when Aristotle went about to declare the first breeding of Motion , hee shewed us not the first , but the second . For , if he had moved that which of it self is not moved , he had then made the first-motion . But , if ( otherwise ) he move that which is moved of it self , hee discourseth how the second-motion commeth . From whence then is the first motion procured to the bodie ? If he say the Elements are moved of themselvess ; in regard some of them are naturally light , & some heavy ; It is not so : For , if levity & weightinesse were kinds of motion ; then , light and heavy things would never leave moving . But , they cease from moving when they have attained their proper place . Therefore , lightnesse and heavinesse are not causes of the first-motion , but qualities of the Elements . If it were granted ( that lightnesse and heavinesse were causes of the first-motion ) how can the Qualities of Reasoning , of Judging , and of holding Opinion , be wrought by heavinesse and lightnesse ? If they be not effects of these ; neither are they effects of the Elements ; and if not of the Elements , then also not of the Bodies . Beside , if the soul be moved accidentally , and the bodie of it self ; then should the bodie be moved of it self , although it had no soul ; and if that were possible , then it might be a living-creature without a soul . But , these things are absurd ; and absurd therefore is the former opinion . Moreover , it is likewise untruely affirmed , that every thing which is moved naturally , is moved also violently ; and that whatsoever is moved violently , is moved by nature . For , the World being moved naturally , is not moved violently . Neither is it true , that such things as are moved naturally , doe rest naturally also : For , the World , and the Sunne , and the Moone , are naturally moved , and yet cannot rest naturally : In like manner being naturally inclined to a perpetuall motion , they cannot rest naturally : For Rest is the destruction of the Soul , & of every thing which is given to perpetuall-motion . It is herewith considerable also , that there is as yet no solution made unto that which was objected in the beginning of this Chapter , ( viz. ) how the bodie ( whose nature is to be easily dispersed ) can be knit together , ( if it be not by an Incorporeall-substance ) . SECT . 5. I. The SOUL is not a Number according to the opinion of Pythagoras ; nor as Xenocrates understands it . II. The error of Eunomius in adding to his definition of the Soul , these words , created ( or ingendred ) in the Bodie ; and the absurdity thereupon insuing . III. The difference betweene the Workes of Creation , & Providence , &c. and the error of Apollinarius touching the generation of Soules . PYthagoras , whose custome it was , by a certaine kind of Comparison to liken God , and all other things to NUMBERS , defined the soul , also , to be a number moving it self . Him , Xenocrates imitated ; not as though the soul were number ; but , for that it is in things numbred ; and in such as are multiplyed ; and , for that it is the soul which discernes things ; and , because , likewise it putteth ( as it were ) upon every thing , certaine formes , and distinctions . ( For , it is the SOVLE that separates one form from another , and shewes how they differ ; both by the diversity of their Formes , and by the multitude of their number ; thereby causing things to be contained in number : And , therefore , betweene the soul and numbers , there is some affinity . ) He himselfe hath born witnesse of the soule that it is moved of it selfe : And , that it is not a number , wee may thus prove ; Number , is in the predicament of quantity ; But , the soul is not in the predicament of quantity , but in the predicament of substance ; Therfore , the soul is not a number . Yea though they would never so faine , that number should bee a substance accounted among things comprehended in understanding , it will bee proved otherwise , as it shall hereafter bee declared . Againe , the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another ; but , so hath not number ; Therefore the SOUL is not a Number . Againe , a number is increased by putting more and more unto it , but , the Soul taketh no such increase . Againe , a number is either even or odd ; but the SOUL can neither bee termed even nor odd . Againe , the SOUL hath motion of it selfe ; but a number is undoubtedly unmoveable . Againe , a number remaining one and the same in nature , is able to alter no quality that belongeth unto numbers : But , the Soul remaining one and the same in substance , doth change his qualities , altering from ignorance to knowledge , and from vice to vertue ; therefore ( all these particulars considered ) the SOVL is not a number . These were the ancient Philosophers opinions concerning the SOUL . But Eunomius defined it to be a SVBSTANCE void of body , and created in the body , agreeing therein both with Plato and Aristotle . For , he took these words , a substance void of body , out of Plato ; and these , created in the body , from Aristotle : not considering ( though hee was otherwise very quick witted ) that he endeavours to knit those things into One which can by no meanes be united together . For , every thing that is engendred both bodily and in time , is corruptible and mortall . To this the doctrine and judgement of Moses is agreeable . For , in describing the Creation of things subject unto sense , hee did not therein deliver in expresse words , that the nature of things intelligible were then made . But , some ( though othersome are not of their opinion ) insisting upon conjectures , are of that minde . Now if any man suppose that the SOUL was made after the body ; because it was put into the body , after the same was fashioned , he erreth wide from the truth . For , neither doth Moses say , that the SOUL was at the same time created when it was brought into the body , neither doth any reason perswade thereunto . Eunomius therefore , might aswell have said that the Soul is mortall , as doth Aristotle , and the Stoicks , as affirme it is engendred in the body . For , if he will say the soul is an incorporeall Essence ; hee should have refused to say that , it was created in the body ; lest hee give men occasion to thinke the soule mortall , and utterly void of Reason . Beside , it seemes by his opinion , that the World is not yet replenished ; but , is at this present ( as it were ) no more then halfe perfected , and stands every day in want of some additions . For , there are every day added unto it , at the least five times ten thousand intelligible substances . And ( which is most unreasonable ) hee seemeth to beleeve , that when the number of soules is finished , then the whole world shall bee dissolved , and the last not come to light before the day of the generall resurrection . What can be more contrary to reason , then to imagine that the world shall be destroyed , assoone as it is fully furnished ? It were like the play-games of little children so to do . For when they have made any workes or devises upon the sands , they usually tread them out againe as soone as they have done them . Now if any shall hereunto reply , that the soules are now made by Providence and not by Creation ; and that there is no new substance brought into the world ( whensoever any body is replenished with a soule ) nor any other Essence , but the same multiplyed , by Providence , which was before ; doubtlesse , they know not the difference between Creation and Providence . For it is the speciall worke of Providence to preserve the substance of corruptible living creatures , by breeding them one of another . I meane , here , all such corruptible living-creatures as are bred by generation , and excepting those which are generated by some rotten-matter ; for , the succession of such , is preserved , ( by the same providence ) by generating them of some other putrifaction . But the chiefe operation of Creation is , to make things of nothing . If , therfore , the SOULS bee made one of another : It will also follow , that they are corruptible , like those other creatures , which are made successively one of another , according to their kindes . If contrariwise , the SOULS be made of nothing ; then their making commeth by Creation ; and in so affirming , we deny that place of Moses : God ceased from all his workes . But both of these opinions are absurd ; Therefore , the Soules are not now made . For , that saving of the Scripture ; My Father worketh , &c. by the judgement even of Eunomius himselfe , is to be understood not of the workes of Creation , but of Providence . Apollinarius held opinion that Soules were engendred one of another , as Bodies are ; and that the SOUL proceeds by succession from the first Man , unto all men descending from him , according to the bodily succession ; therein dissenting both from those who conceive them to have beene from the beginning ( as it were ) stored up ; and from those also who thinke they are daily created . For , in contradiction to these tenets , they affirme , that by them God is set on work with Adulterers when they beget children . And they further say that these words of Moses , God ceased from all his works , &c. should be untrue , if God continueth to create Souls . In answer hereunto , we have already shewed , that all things are mortall which have a successive generation one of another : For , therefore onely they generate and are generated , that the race of corruptible things might be preserved . And therefore , Apollinarius , must either deny the successive generation of Souls ; or by holding such a generation , he must ( consequently at least ) necessarily affirme that the Soul is mortall . Whereas hee mentions children borne in Adultery ; let us leave that unto the Divine Providence , whereof we are ignorant . But , if we may presume to conjecture ought of the Divine Providence , it may be conceived that God very well knowing a child so begotten may be some way profitable , permitteth such a bodie also to be furnished with a Soul , as hath been testified unto us by the child which was begotten of David on the wife of Vrias . SECT . 6. I. The opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL , and the absurdity and contradictions thereof . II. The judgement of Plato touching one generall SOUL , and many particular SOULS ; The office of the SOUL ; and the difference betweene things that live , and Living-creatures , is here also declared . III. Of the Transmigration of SOULS according to the various fancies of the Grecian Philosophers . NOw , it followes that we examine the opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL . For , they say truely , that the SOUL is a substance , both immortall and incorporeall : But , they adde also , that there is but one onely Soul for all things ; and that it is parted , and ( as it were ) peecemeal distributed unto all particular bodies , as well to bodies inanimate , as to those which are indued with life . They affirme likewise that some bodies receive the same in more ample sort , and some in a lesse measure . Things indued with life in a larger proportion ; Things void of life , in the lesse ; And , heavenly things in the most abundant manner ; and that the particular soules , are portions of that soul which is universall . Now , if they had affirmed the soul to have been so divided , as that it had not been divided into parts , but after some such sort as one voice is divided to the eares of many hearers , the error had been the more tolerable . But , their opinion is , that the very substance of the soul is divided into parts ; and ( which is most harsh ) they will have it to be accounted properly among the Elements , and to be distributed together with the Elements , in the making up of bodily-things ; and for the collecting of them againe into one , when they are dissolved , as water is divided into certain portions , and then mingled again all together . They are of opinion , likewise , that ( after the dissolution of their bodies ) the pure soules , being light , doe ascend unto the light , and that souls which have been defiled by the materiall substance ( in which they resided ) doe passe into the Elements , and from the Elements depart againe into Plants , and living-creatures . And though they do thus mangle the substance of the soul , by their fancies making it in effect both corporeall and subject to perturbations , they say neverthelesse , that it is immortall . But , in these things they contradict themselves : For , first , they say that the souls which have been defiled , doe returne back to the Elements , and are mingled and tempered one with another ; and contrariwise , in the passing of soules from body to body , they say that punishments are inflicted on them according to their offences , joyning and separating again the nature of them , ( as occasion serves . ) They hold likewise , that when it is light , shadowes are dispersed ; and when all is covered with clouds , that the shadowes are gathered together ; which cannot possibly come to passe in an intelligible Nature . For , if a Man should grant that shadowes are dispersed and gathered againe ; we must then count shadowes among things subject unto sense . Plato is of opinion that there is both one generall soul , and many particular soules . One soule for the whole world altogether , and other soules for particular things : In such manner , that the whole world is indued with a proper soul of its owne , even with that soul which belongeth unto the whole world ; and so also , that particular things are indued with their proper soules , even with the soul , which is peculiar unto every one of them . The soul ( saith hee ) which pertaineth to the Vniverse is stretched forth from the center of the Earth to the uttermost limits of the Heavens , ( not as though he conceived such a stretching forth as is inclosed in Place , but such an extension rather as is conceived in our understanding . ) And hee saith , that this is the SOUL which turneth about the whole Globe , and which holdeth in , and bindeth together all such things as have bodily shape . For ( as hath been already declared all corporeall substances have need of somewhat to hold them together ; and that is done by the SOUL , which giveth unto every thing the forme . For , every thing that liveth , hath a proper life of his owne , and every thing that is corrupted hath his proper corruption , ( say the Platonists . ) So long as it is held , and knit together , they terme it a Bodie ; and , when it is dissolved , they say it is corrupted or destroyed . They affirme , also , that all things live ; but , say not that all things are living-creatures . For , they distinguish Plants from things inanimate , for that they increase and are nourished by a nourishing and vegitative power . They distinguish the living-creatures , void of reason , from plants , by sense ; And the rationall from the irrationall , by reason . Thus , though they affirme generally , that all things live ; yet they distinguish the nature of every living-thing . Such things as are utterly void of a sensible life , doe live ( say they ) an habituall life , and are held together by the generall Soul of the World , which keeps them in their proper Being , and undissolved . This , they hold also to be the Soul which governs the world ; and , that , it sends into every particular thing such particular Souls , as were before , made for them by the CREATOR . Yea , and they say to , that the Creator gave unto it certaine Lawes , whereby it should order this whole world , ( which Lawes they call DESTINIE ) and that the same Creator vouchsafed thereunto a sufficient power to supply such things as are necessary for Man : whereof wee shall treat more at large in our discourse of Destinie . All the Greek Philosophers who affirme the Soul to be immortall , are of opinion that the SOUL passeth from bodie to bodie : But they differ in setting down of what sort of souls they meane it . Some understand it of one sort onely ; that is to say , of the Reasonable-soul ; affirming that it passeth into Plants , and into the bodies of irrationall-creatures : Some of these think this transmigration was but at certaine appointed Revolutions of Time ; and some of them imagined the time to be casuall and uncertaine . Some other understand it , not of one sort of souls onely ; but of the Irrationall , as well as of the Rationall : and some again , understand it of many sorts of soules , even of so many , as there are divers kinds of living-creatures . The Schollers of Plato have been somewhat singular in this opinion . For , considering Plato said , that the soules of such as were furious , and angry , and given to rapine , were clothed with the bodies of Wolves and Lions ; and that their souls who spent their lives in wantonnesse , tooke upon them the bodies of Asses and such like beasts : Some understand him as though hee had meant Lions and Wolves & Asses as the bare words doe signifie . Some perceived that he spake figuratively , and by the names of those beasts , understood the conditions or qualities of those creatures . For Cronius in his booke intituled Of the renewed generation ( for so he termes the transmigration of SOULS from Bodie to Body ) will have it understood of none but reasonable-Soules : Yea and Theodorus ( one professing the doctrines of Plato ) in his book which affirmeth , that one SOUL comprehends all the species , is likewise of the same minde ; And so is Porphyrie . SECT . 7. I. The singular opinion of Iamblicus , touching the Trāsmigration of Souls . II. Every BODIE hath a SOUL convenient for the same . III. The brute creatures doe nothing according to Reason , but by-naturall instinct ▪ IV. The judgement of Galen concerning diversitie of Soules , and a recapitulation of the severall things proved and disproved in this Chapter , concluding the Soule to be both immortall , and incorporeall . BUt , Iamblicus running a contrary race to these men , sayes that wee must understand , that the soul is of the same sort that the living-creature is ; and that there be divers kinds of SOULS . He hath affirmed in his booke called MONOBIBLON ; that the changing of SOULS never hapneth from Men to unreasonable-creatures , neither from unreasonable-creatures to Men , but from beasts to beasts ; and from Men to Men. And in so saying he hath not only well guessed , but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Plato's opinion : As by many other of his Arguments may be shewed ; but , especially by these that follow . No one of the motions of reason ( saith he ) manifests it selfe in unreasonable creatures : For , neither Arts , nor Learning , nor Consultations , nor Vertues , nor any other thing belonging to an intelligible nature , can bee found in them . And , therefore it is plaine that they have no part of the reasonable-Soul . Though in Infants , which are very young , there is altogether an unreasonable-motion ; yet wee say they have a Reasonable-Soule ; because , when they come to yeares , they shew forth the workes of reason . But , in the unreasonable-creature , which , at no age , giveth any token of Reason , the Reasonable-soule would bee superfluous ; because , the force of Reason would bee altogether , and at all times , uselesse unto him . All men have agreed unanimously , that God made no superfluous creature ; which being true , it cannot be that a Reasonable-soule should be so superfluously bestowed , as to be placed in cattle , and wilde beasts , which cannot exercise the same ; lest it might bee objected as a fault in the Creator , to give an unfit SOUL to the Body : For , it is not the part of a good workeman ( or of one who knowes the order and method of working ) so to doe . Now , if any shall object , that there is in beasts , a certaine hidden habit of reason , whereby they are moved ; and that their shape makes them uncapable of artificiall workes , as the want of a mans fingers , depriveth him of meanes to practise many Arts , wherein he is experienced , it makes nothing to the matter : For , the same absurdity still remaines ; implying that God applyeth SOULS unto some BODIES , which are so unfit , and superfluous , that they are hindered , throughout all the ages , of those creatures , from their operations . Beside , they confirme their propositions , by things unknowne , and such as are not confessed : For , who allowes this fancy , that , beasts have in them a motion , according to an hidden habit of Reason ? It is therefore better to hold , that a SOUL convenient for every Body , is fitly applyed thereunto : That beasts also have nothing more , according to any hidden habit of reason , then doth outwardly appeare in their naturall and simple actions ; That every sort of unreasonable-creatures is moved likwise according to a proper instinct of their owne , to such uses , and to such workes as they were ordained unto , from the beginning : and , that the shapes of their Bodies are likewise very fitly accommodated for such purposes Moreover , the CREATOR , because hee would not leave them utterly void of help in their necessities , hath placed in every one of them such an understanding as is naturall , though not reasonable . In some he hath placed a wilinesse representing Art , and having a shadow of Reason ; partly for their better avoiding of snares and dangers , which may betide them , and partly to make all creatures to be the more naturally knit one to another ; as hath beene said before . Now , that the brute-creatures have not the use of reasō in doing these things is evident in this , that every living-creature of one kinde , doth the same things , and all of them in one , and the same manner . Their practices differ not in multitude , but in this onely , that some use them , perhaps more , and some lesse ; for all the whole kinde of them , practise the same wiles . Every Hare doth use the same subtleties , every Foxe is alike crafty , and every Ape imitates alike . But , it is not so with Man ; For , his actions are infinitely various , because , Reason being a certaine thing which is free ; and men having also many things in their power , their workings are not one and the same , as it is in every kinde of irrationall creature . For beasts have their motion onely by nature ; and such things as are in a creature naturally , are in all of the same kinde . But , the actions proceeding from Reason , are after one sort in one man , after another sort in another , and not necessarily the same in all men . But , if they should say that mans SOVL is driven into the Bodies of beasts , for a punishment of those faults which i● had committed , when it was formerly in man while he lived : This demonstration of theirs ( contrary to the rules of Logick ) proveth former things , by such as come after : For , why should reasonable SOULS bee cast into the Bodies of beasts which were made before man ? can you say they had offended in the Body of man before they had entred at all into mans body ? Galen , that admirable Physitian seemeth to bee of the former opinion , & to suppose that in every severall kinde of living-creature there is a sundry kind of soul : For , in the beginning of the first booke of that Tract which he wrote Of the use of the parts ; hee sayes thus . Though there be many parts of a living-creature , some greater , some lesse , ( and some that cannot be divided into any other kinde ) every one of them is usefull some way to the SOUL : For , the Body , is the instrument of the soul , and the parts of living-creatures , differ much from one another , because there is difference in their SOULS . Againe , somewhat after that in the same book , he addes these words , speaking of an Ape . Oh , thou that art so witty in finding faults I Nature can tell thee that it was convenient a ridiculous shape of Body should be given to that beast whose SOUL was ridiculous . By this it may sufficiently be declared , that Galen thought a diversitie of SOULS was planted in those creatures which were of divers kindes . Thus much of these matters . Seeing wee have now proved ( even by their owne arguments who have held the contrary ) that the SOUL is neither a corporeall essence , nor a harmony , nor a Temperature , nor any other quality ; it will necessarily follow , that it is a substance incorporeall . All confesse there is a SOUL ; and if it be neither a Body , nor an accident , it is mannest that it is a substance without a body ; and no such thing as cannot stand by it selfe without a subject : For such things may without the destruction of the subject be either in the same , or absent ; but if the SOUL be separated from the body , that body must of necessity be destroyed . We may use the same reasons to prove the Soul immortall : For , if it bee neither a body , whose nature is subject to dissolution and destruction , as is aforesaid ; nor a quality , nor a quantity , nor any thing subject to corruption ; then it must needs bee immortall . There bee many other demonstrations , both in Plato , and others , illustrating the immortality of the SOUL , but they are full of obseurity , and can hardly be understood , or borne away by those who have beene trained up in the same sciences . To us the doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient , to prove the SOULS immortality ; & beare a ful credit in themselves , because they were inspired by God. But , against those who embrace not the Scriptures , as wee Christians doe , wee must prove by demonstration , that the SOUL is no such thing , as is subject to corruption . If it bee no corruptible thing , it must needs bee incorruptible ; and consequently immortall . And therefore , to that purpose let this be sufficient . CAP. 3. SECT . 1. I. Of the uniting of the SOUL and BODY , and whether their Natures be altered , or confounded by their union . II. The mystery of the SOUL and BODIE' 's union illustrated by considering things conceivable in understanding , and by a similitude taken from the Sun. III. Of the admirable proprieties of the SOUL ; and how it is properly or improperly said to be in the BODY , or in Place , &c. OUr purpose is now to enquire , how between the SOUL and a lifelesse-body there may bee a perfect union : For , the possibility of this thing appeareth somewhat doubtfull ; and , it is much the more doubtfull , it Man consist not of these two parts onely , but of understanding also ( as a distinct thing ) which is the opinion of some . But , the greatest doubt of all , ariseth in this respect , that all those things which concurre unto the making of one essence , are joyned all together in the making of that one ; seeing all such things as are united to the making up of another thing , are ( usually ) so altered that they remaine not the same they were before , as it shall plainly be declared in our Treatie of the four Elements . How then can the BODIE being united unto the SOUL , remaine still a Bodie ? or , how can the SOUL being incorporeall , and having a substance of his owne , be united with the BODIE , and become a part of the Living-creature , preserving still his owne proper substance , without corruption and confusion ? It seemes to be no way else possible , but that the Soul and the Body must by their union one with other , either become altered one with the other , or corrupted with each other , as the Elements are ; or else , ( to avoid those absurdities ) that they should not be truly united ; but , be so joyned onely as Dauncers are in their daunce , or lie one by the other as Counters in a summe , or at best be so mixed , as wine and water . But , we have already declared in my Treatise upon the SOUL , that the Soul cannot be laid ( as it were ) along by the Bodie ; because , if it should be so , that part onely of the body should have life in it , which joyneth neare unto the soule ; and that the part which the soule toucheth not , should be without life . Moreover , wee cannot say , that two sundry things placed one beside the other , ( as two pieces of timber , two iron wedges , or such like ) are one and the same thing . And as for such a mixture as is made of wine and water , wee know it corrupts both the one and the other ; for there doth remaine neither pure water , nor pure wine , after such a mixture . Yet this mixture of wine and water , is but ( as it were ) a laying of them one beside another , though our senses be not able to apprehend the same , because they are hindred from perceiving it , by the thinnesse of the parts of those things which are mixed . For , the wine and water may be separated againe the one from the other , by a sponge dipped in oyle , or by paper , either of which will suck away the pare water from the wine . But , indeed , it is utterly impossible to separate sensibly one frō the other , those things which are exactly united . If therefore , the parts of MAN be neither united , nor placed one beside the other , nor mixed together , as aforesaid ; what reason should move us to say , that one Living creature is made of these two parts , a Soul and a bodie ? It was the consideration hereof , which partly moved Plato to imagine that this living-creature did not consist of Soule and Body ; but , that he was a Soule having the use of the Body , and to whom the Body served as a garment . But , even in affirming that , he occasioned as much doubting ; for , how can the Soul bee one with what is but his garment , seeing a Coat , is not all one with him that wears it ? But Amonius , who was master to Plotinus thus dissolved this question : even by affirming that intelligible things have such a nature as may both bee united unto such things as are capable of them ( and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting ) and yet remaine as truly without confusion or corruption , when they bee united , as those things do , which are but laid along one by another . It is true that Bodily-things being perfectly united together , must of necessity suffer alterations by their union , and be changed in every one of those parts which concurre thereunto ; because , they are thereby changed into other Bodies , as are the Elements making compound bodies ; or as nourishment , being changed into blood ; or as the blood when it is converted into Flesh , and other parts of the Bodie . But things intelligible , may bee united , and yet no alteration of the substance thereupon ensue . For , it is not agreeable to the nature of intelligible-things , to bee altered in substance ; but , either it departeth away , or is brought to nothing , and so can admit no alteration . The SOUL is immortall and therefore cannot bee corrupted , or brought to nothing ; for , then it could not be immortall . It is also life it selfe ; and therefore cannot be changed in the mixture : For , if it should be changed in the union , it should be altered from being life any more ; and what should the SOUL profit the Body if it gave not life thereunto ? All these arguments considered , it must be concluded that the soul is not altered by being united unto the Body . Having thus proved that the substance of intelligible-things cannot be altered ; it followes necessarily therupon , that as they are not corrupted by their union with other things ; so likewise , the things whereunto they are united remaine uncorrupted ; and that in the union of the SOVL and Body there is neither any corruption or confusion of the one or of the other . That they are neverthelesse perfectly united , is manifested by this , that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole living-creature : For , the whole man grieveth as one creature , if any cause of griefe happen to the one part or the other , ( to the SOUL or to the Body . ) And , it is as plaine , that they remaine united without confusion , in that the soule being separated ( after a sort ) from the Body when wee bee asleepe ( and leaving the body lying in maner of a dead Corps , and only breathing into the same , as it were , certaine vapours of life , least it should utterly perish ) doth worke by it selfe , in dreames , whilest the Body sleepeth ; foreseeing things to come , and exercising it selfe meerely in things intelligible . The like hapneth when the minde is very seriously occupied in cōtēplation , & enters into the consideration of intellectuall-things . For , even then the soule endeavours by all possible meanes to bee separated from the body , and to bee alone by it selfe that it may thereby ascend to the knowledge of things . For , being without body , it separates it self from the whole body , as things which are therewithall corrupted ; and yet remaineth uncorrupted as those things also doe wherein there is no confusion : And keeping it selfe one and alone , changeth that wherein it abideth , by the life which is contained in it selfe ; and yet is not changed by the same . For , as the Sun , so soon as it appeareth , changes the ayre into light ; so making it light some , and so diffusing it selfe with the ayre , that it is united with the same , and yet not confoūded therewith : Even so , the soul being united with the Body , remaines without confusion therwith ; differing in this onely , that the Sunne being a Body , and circumscribed within the compasse of Place , is not himselfe in every place where his light is , but ( as fire in the wood , or as the flame in a candle ) is confined to a certaine place . It is not so with the soul . For , being void of all Body , and not contained within the limits of any place , it passeth all and whole , through it own whole light , and through the whole Body , wherein it is ; neither is any part of it illuminated thereby , wherein it is not fully and wholly present . Neither is it in the body as in some bottle or other vessell , nor compassed in by the same ; but the Body is rather in the soule , and is thereby held in and fastned together . For , intelligible things ( such as the soul is ) are not hindred by bodily things ; but , enter , and pierce , and passe through every corporeall thing , and cannot possibly bee contained within the circumference of a bodily-place . Things intellectuall , have their being in places also intelligible ; yea they are either in themselves , or else in such intellectuall things , as are above themselves . The soul is otherwhile in it selfe ; as , when it reasoneth or considereth of things ; and otherwhile in the understanding ; as , when it conceiveth any thing : And when it is said to bee in the body , it is not said to be there , as in place ; but , to be as it were in a certaine relation to the body ; and to bee present with it in such a sense , as , God is said to be in us . For , wee say that the soul is bound ( as it were ) by a certaine disposition and inclination , as the lover is to his beloved : not bound in place , or as bodies are bound ; but by the habituall bands of affection . And indeed , seeing it hath neither magnitude , nor massinesse , nor parts , how can it be enclosed by a speciall place ? Or within what place can that bee contained , which hath no parts ? Where place is , there must needs bee a massinesse ; because place is the Bound which compasseth another thing ; and hath it being in respect of that which it encloseth . Now , if any man shall thereupon conclude , that his soule is in Alexandria , and in Rome , and in every place ; let him know , that even in so saying , hee includeth a Place . For , to be in Alexandria , or generally to be here , or there , or any where , pertaineth unto a place ; whereas the soul is no where ( no not in the body ) as in a place ; but habitually ; because , ( as is aforesaid ) it cannot be contained within a place . For this cause , when things intellectuall have any habituall inclination to a place , or to such things as are in place ; wee turne the word from his proper use , and say abusively , that such a thing is there , or there ; by reason of the operation which it there hath ; taking the name of place , for the inclination , or working in a place . And , whereas we should rather say , it there worketh , we say , There it is . SECT . 2. I. Of the union of the Godhead with the Man-hood , how far forth it hath any similitude with the union of the Soule and Body ; and wherein it is unlike thereunto . II. Arguments taken from Porphyrie , confuting himselfe , and others , who deny the possibility of an union betweene the Godhead and the Man-hood , and a disproofe of the opinion of the Eunomians concerning that union . III. He proceeds to treat of the union of the soule and body ; and shewes that as it was meerely , of Gods good pleasure , to unite the Godhead to the Man-hood ; So it was also agreeable to the Nature of God , that this union should be without mixture or confusion . THat which is last aforesaid , agrees more plainly and in more speciall manner to that union , which is betweene GOD the WORD , and the Man-hood ; by which union , the two Natures being united , remained neverthelesse without confusion ; and so , also , that the divinity was not comprehended by the Humanity : And , yet , this uniting is not altogether such , as is betweene the soul and the body : For , the soul being in the number of multiplied things , suffers ( after a sort ) with the Body , in such things as happen thereunto , and by reason of their mutuall necessities , and conversation together , both holds it in , and is also held in , by the same . But , GOD the Word being himselfe nothing altered , by that union , which unites the divinity and humanity together ( nor by that communion which the soule and body have with each other ) imparts his God-head unto them , without participating of their frailties ; and becommeth one with them , still remaining in himselfe the same thing which hee was , before such an uniting . This is a strange and mysterious temperature & uniting : For , Hee is tempered with them , and yet he himselfe continues utterly without mixion , without confusion , without corruption , and without change : Neither suffering any thing with them ; but , only helping , and furthering them : nor being corrupted nor altered by them ; but , greatly encreasing them , without any diminution in himselfe ; because , hee is altogether without mutation , without confusion , and without possibility of changing . Hereof may Porphyrie himselfe beare witnesse , who hath moved his tongue against CHRIST ( for , the testimonies of our Adversaries are the most undeniable proofes which may be brought against themselves . ) This Porphyrie in the second Booke of his mixt questions uses these words . It is not , then ( saith he ) to be judged a thing impossible , that some ESSENCE should be assumed to the perfiting of another ESSENCE , and be part of that ESSENCE , perfecting also the same , and yet remaine still in it owne NATVRE , both being ONE with that other thing , and yet preserving the VNITY of it selfe : yea , and ( which is more then this ) changing those things wherein it is , by the presence thereof , and making it so to worke as it selfe worketh , and yet nothing altered in it SELFE . Now , Porphyrie spake these things of the uniting of the SOUL and body : and if his reason hold good , in the SOUL , in regard it is an incorporeall substance , it holds true much rather , in GOD the Word , who is verily without bodie , and also utterly void of composition . And this doth mafestly shut the mouthes of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the God-head and the Man-hood , as many of the Grecians have done ; Jeasting , and deriding at it , as impossible , improbable , and absurd , that the Divine-nature should be joyned in a temperature and an unity with our mortall-nature ; for , it is here discovered , that they may be opposed in this argument , by the testimony of such as are in most esteeme among themselves . The opinion of some ( especially of the Eunomians ) is this , that GOD the Word is united to the body not in substance , but by the powers of either ( Nature : ) For it is not ( say these ) their substances which are united and tempered together ; but the powers of the BODY are tempered with the Divine powers . Now , they affirme ( according to Aristotle ) that the Senses are the powers of the body ( meaning of all the body as it containes the instruments thereof ) and therefore , in their judgement , the Divine powers being tempered with the Senses , is cause of that uniting : But , wee shall never be perswaded to grant unto them that the Senses are certaine powers of the body : For , wee have already manifestly declared , what things belong properly to the Body , what things to the SOUL only ; and what to the SOUL and body both together : And , we therupon concluded , that the Senses , which worke by the instruments of the Body , are to bee reckoned among those things which are proper to the SOUL and bodie joyned in One. These things confidered , it is most agreeable to reason , wee should affirme ( according to the nature of incorporeall-things ) and as is aforesaid , that these Essences of the soule and Body are united without confusion ; and in such maner , that the more Divine nature , is nothing impaired by the inferiour nature ; but that onely the inferiour nature is profited by that which is Divine . For a nature which is purely incorporeall , can passe without stop thorow all things , whereas nothing hath passage thorow that : By passing through all things , it is united ; and in regard nothing passes through the same , it remaines void of mixture , and without confusion . It is not rightly affirmed therefore ( though many excellent men be of this opinion ) that no reason else can be given , why the union , whereof wee have treated , should bee after such a manner , but , onely , because it pleased God it should so be : For the very nature of the things is cause thereof . We may justly say , that it came to passe meerely by GOD's good pleasure , and choise , that the SON should take a Bodie unto himselfe : But , it commeth not meerely of the good pleasure of GOD ( though it be also his good pleasure it should be so ) but of the proper nature of the Godhead , that when it is united , it should not bee confounded with the Man-hood . Wee will speake nothing of the degrees of soules , nor of their ascending and descending , mentioned by Origen . For we finde in holy Scriptures nothing warranting the same ; neither are they agreeable to the doctrines commonly received among Christians . CAP. 4. SECT . 1. I. Of the Body , and of the mediate and immediate composition thereof . II. Of those parts of a living-creature , every portion wherof taketh the name of the whole ; and of those parts which take not the name of the whole . III. MAN only hath every part belonging to the Body of a perfect LIVING-CREATVRE whereas all others are defective in some of the parts ; and many in the Situation of them . RIghtly may we affirme that every corporeall Essence is a composition proceeding from the foure Elements , and made up of them . The bodies of living-creatures having blood in them , are cōpacted immediatly of the four humors , Blood , flegm , Choller , & Melancholy : But the Bodies of such as are without blood , are made of the other three humours , and of somewhat in them answering proportionably unto blood We call that immediately , when any thing is made of the selfe-same things without any other thing comming between them : As the foure humours are made of the foure Elements ; and those things are compounded of the foure humours , which consist of like parts , and are parts also of the body ( that is , things having such parts , every part of which parts , may bee called by the same name which is given unto the whole ; as when every part of the flesh , is called flesh . ) Melancholy , is likned to Earth , Flegme to water ; Blood to Ayre ; Choller to Fire ; and , every thing which is compounded of the Elements , is either a Masse , or Moisture , or Spirits . Aristotle thought that the bodies of living-creatures were made immediately of Blood onely ; because the seed is ingendred of blood , and all the parts of a living-creature nourished thereby . But , because it seemed somewhat absurd to imagine that both hardest bones , and the tenderest flesh and fatnesse , should proceed all of one thing ; It pleased Hippocrates to affirme that the bodies of living-creatures , were immediately compacted of the foure Elements ; the thicke and sollid parts of the more earthly Elements , and the soft parts , of such Elements as are softest . Oftentimes , all the foure humours are found in the blood ; whereof wee have experience in Phlebotomy : For , sometime a certaine flegme like whey doth abound in it ; otherwhile Melancholy , and sometime , againe , Choller . Whereupon , it commeth to passe that all men seem in some sort , to agree with one another . Now , of the parts of living-creatures ; some parts there be , every portion of which parts hath the same name which is given unto the whole part : Othersome there are , which cannot bee called by the same name whereby the whole is called . As for example ; Every part of the Braine is called Braine ; In like maner of the sinewes , of the marrow , of the bones , of the teeth , of the grissells , of the nayles , of the thin muscles that binde the Ioynts together , of all the skins ( throughout the body ) of the strings ( which are in the bloody flesh ) of the haires , of the flesh , of the veines , of the arteries , of the pores , of the fat , and of those foure which are in maner of Elemēts , yeelding matter out of which the things aforesaid are immediately made , pure Blood , Flegme , Melancholy , and Choller . Except from these , the Muscle , which is compounded of those thinner Muscles which knit our joynts together , and of the strings which are of the nature of sinewes . The parts of the body , consisting of portions , whereof every one taketh not the name of the whole ; are these that follow ; viz. the head , the breast , the hands , the feet , and such other members of Mans body . For , if you divide the head into severall parts , every part of it is not called a Head : but if you divide a sinew into severall portions , every portion of it shall have the denomination of a sinew ; and so shall it be likewise , if you divide ( or subdivide ) a veine or flesh . Every whole thing , whose severall parts have not the same name with the whole , is made of such things as impart the name of the whole to the parts , when they are compounded together ; as the head is made of sinewes , and flesh , and bone , and such like , which are called the instrumentall parts . The definition therefore of such things as the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , things which consist of like parts , is thus made ; They are things whose parts are like both to the whole , and to each other ; ( as flesh , braine , &c. ) and by the word like , in this place , we meane the same with the whole ; for a piece of a mans flesh , is as truly flesh as the whole masse . Now , every living-creature , hath not all the parts of a body ; but , some of them are defective in one part , and some in others ; for , some lack feet , as fishes , and Serpents ; Some have no head , as Crabs and Lobsters , and certaine other water-creatures ; and because they want a head , the seat of their sense is in the breast . Some living-creatures have no Lungs ; namely , all such as breath no Ayre ; some are without a bladder , as birds , and all such as void not urine . And creatures which have thick shells , are destitute of so many members , that some of them , have but few appearances of being living-creatures . There bee also some living-creatures , which although they have such things as are in our bodies , yet seeme to want them . As the Stag which seemes to have no choller , because hee hath it not in one place , but so dispersed abroad in his entrailes , that it is no where apparant . But , MAN hath all the parts of a living-creature ; every part also , perfect ; and all in so goodly order , that it could not possibly have beene better composed . Beside their want of some parts , there is likewise among other living-creatures , much difference in the scituation of the parts . For , some have their dugs in the breast ; some , on their bellies ; and some under their thighes : Some againe , have two dugs ; some foure ; and some have more . Nature hath so provided ( for the most part ) that the number of dugges is answerable to the number of young-ones which every creature brings forth at a time . But let him that would bee more exactly informed of these things , reade the hystory which Aristotle hath written of living-creatures . For , it pertaineth not unto the discourse which I now purpose , to treate at large of such things ; but , only to point at them , or , to speak briefly of them . CAP. 5. SECT . 1. I. Of the foure Elements : of their simple and mixt Nature ; of their foure qualities , Heat , Cold , Moisture , and Drinesse ; of their contrarieties , and of the meanes of uniting them into one body . II. Of the Circular motion , and changeablenesse of the Elements one into another ; and a reason why God made them of such a nature . III. The opinion of Aristotle , concerning the nature of the Ayre , &c. GOe we now on , to the Elemēts , which are consequently to be next handled in this Treatise . An Element of the world , is a most small part in the composition of bodies . They are these foure ; Earth , water , ayre , and fire , and if you begin at the lowest , and so passe to the highest body of them , they are placed in such order , as I have named them . The bodies of these Elements , are the first bodies , and simple bodies , in respect of other bodies : And every Element is of the same kinde , with those things , whose Element it is . For , principles ( as matter , forme , and privation ) are not of the same kinde with the things which are made of them : But , an Element is necessarily of the same kinde . Now , it is manifest that these foure , Earth , water , ayre , and fire are the Elements ; and it is as evident that the ( foure first ) qualities ( that is to say ) Hot , cold , moist , and dry , bee in those Elements , in the highest degree , both potentially and actually also . And , yet , there is not one of these Elements , which we can discerne by our senses , to bee altogether void of temperature , and mixture with some other Element : For indeed , all those which wee are sensible of , are in a sort somewhat counterfeit , and participate each of other , more or lesse ; even when in their mixture , their severall natures continue most apparant . Moreover , every one of these Elements , hath two coupled qualities , which constitute the species , or nature of it . For , EARTH is dry and cold ; WATER is cold and moist ; AIRE is hot and moist ; and FIRE is hot and dry . Yet , these qualities , by themselves , cannot be Elements : For , qualities are void of bodie ; and of things incorporeall , things corporeall cannot be made . Neither is it possible , that other bodies should be actually Elements , w ch have not actually each of these qualities in the highest degree : For , if those things which have these qualities , more or lesse , should bee Elements , there would be an infinite number of Elements ; and we should never bee able to discerne the Elements of each particular thing : because every thing hath some quality in it , more or lesse . It followes therefore necessarily , that every Element is a BODIE and a simple-body ; and such a one as hath actually in it , in the highest degree , these qualities , HEAT , COLD , MOISTURE , and DRINESSE : because , of all qualities , these onely and no other doe make a whole change in the whole substance . Whitenesse comming neare unto a Body cannot make it white thorow and thorow ( as wee say ) neither can such a change bee wrought by any other thing ; whereas Heat or cold , can warme or coole a body , not onely superficially , but quite throughout the same . Those Elements are accounted contraries , which are directly contrary to one another , in both their qualities . Thus WATER is contrary to FIRE : For , water is cold and moist ; and Fire is hot and dry . In like maner , EARTH is contrary to AIRE : For , Earth is cold and dry ; and Aire is hot and moist . And , forasmuch as things which are so repugnant , could not bee fitly joyned one unto another , without a middle-band ordained to knit them together : The wise Creator hath placed water as a meane between the Earth and the Aire ( which are contraries ) induing it with her two qualities , cold and moist , that being the medium betweene those , which extreamely differ , they might be united thereby : For , by reason of the cold , it agrees naturally with the earth ; and by meanes of moisture , it is fitly joyned unto the aire . Againe , in the middle betweene the water and the fire , ( which are also contraries in themselves ) hee hath placed the aire , which by his moist-qualitie doth very well accord with water , and with fire , by the quality of heat . Thus , God hath linked every one of them each to other ( as in a chaine ) by placing betweene things contrary , such other things as may both unite the said contraries to themselves , and to such things also , as are bound one to another by them : Yea , ( which is an excellent kind of band ) hee hath joyned together every one of the Elements , by the one of his qualities to that which went before ; and by the other to that which followed after . For example , the water , being cold and moist , is joyned unto the earth ( which if you beginne at the lowest , and ascend , is next beneath it ) by his coldnesse ; and by his moisture , to the aire which is next above it . The aire likewise by the moistnes of it , is joyned to the water , which is next beneath it ; and by heat , to the fire which is above it . The fire also by the heat thereof , is joyned to the aire which is beneath it ; and by drynesse to the earth ; to which , being the lowest , it declineth it selfe ( as it were in a circular motion . ) The earth by coldnesse , is united to the water ; and by drynesse to the fire , which declineth towards it . For , that the Elements , should not have onely an inclination to ascend and descend directly upward and downeward ; but incline also to a circular motion : God bowed them ( as it were ) and made the two extreame Elements , fire and earth to turne one toward the other . For , the fire if it lose heat , is no longer fire ; but becommeth earth , as is manifestly proved by thunder-bolts , which being thrown downe and cooled , are converted into stones : For , every thunder-bolt consists of stone and brimstone , The stone is ( as it were ) the brimstone over-baked , ) Brimstone is ( as it were ) fire cooled : and no more actually hot , but , having a neare possibility of heat ; and being also , actually dry : For , the Elements only , have the qualities actually ; wheras , all other things have them but in possibility , except they come near unto some Elements . But , to the end , that neither the Elements should faile , nor the Bodies which are to be compounded of those Elements , the Creator did providently devise , that they should be convertible , both one into another ; and also , into compound-bodies : and that the compound-bodies should be againe resolved into their Elements . By which meanes , it commeth to passe , that they are continually engendered one of another , and perpetually preserved from being wasted . For , Earth being first dissolved into a mirie moistnesse , becommeth water . Water being thickned and congealed , becommeth earth . Water also , being heated and resolved into vapours , vanisheth into aire . Aire being collected and condensed , is turned into water . The same aire being dryed changeth into fire . Fire , if it be quenched , and water also if it be evaporated , become aire : For , aire is the quenchings of fire , and the moisture arising from water being heated ; even by both of these is the aire generated : For , experience doth shew us , that whensoever fire is quenched , or water heated , aire is encreased thereby : Therefore aire is naturally hot ; and cooled by being scituated so neare unto the water , and the earth ; which coole the lower parts thereof , as the fire heateth also the upper parts of the same . And this hapneth unto the aire by reason of the softnesse thereof ; and the easinesse which it hath to receive impressions , makes it quickly depart from its proper nature , and very apt to be changed . But , Aristotle is of opinion that there bee two sorts of aire ; one like unto vapours , and generated by the exhalations of waters : The other , smoakie , and bred out of the fire , when it is quenched . The aire which commeth of smoke , he conceiveth to bee hot ; and that also which proceedeth from vapours , when it is first bred ; but , in continuance of time , that aire ( as he saith ) cooleth , by little and little ; untill it is converted into water . This supposition of Aristotles , that the aire is of two sorts , was by him devised , that he might escape some absurdities which he knew not otherwise how to avoid ; and that things which are somewhat high , and farre distant from the earth , might seeme hot , and that such as are very low might seeme colder . SECT . 2. I. Of the uniting of the Elements into a naturall body ; what maner of composition it is , and why those bodies are againe resolved into Elements . II. Plato's opinion concerning the Element of earth ; as also , concerning the other three Elements . III. Of the division of the Elements according to the Stoicks : The opinion of Aristotle , touching a fifth body , out of which hee thinkes the heavens were made ; and of the contrary opinion of Plato . NOw , all Bodies are made by the conjunction of these foure Elements , both the Bodies of Plants , and of living-creatures also : to the composition of which bodies , nature drawes together the purest parts of those Elements . These are called by Aristotle , naturall bodies ; being compounded , not by heaping of the Elements one upon another ; but by tempering all together ( throughout the whole ) so much of every Element , as is in the Body , in the uniting therof ; and by making of them one certaine BODIE , differing from what they were , before that composition . For , they are so united , that impossible it is to sever them , or to see Earth by it selfe , or Water alone , or Ayre , or Fire , distinctly from the rest ; because , one intire thing , and a thing differing from the Elements , is made by the tempering of all foure of them together ; As a medicine , consisting of foure Ingredients , being once made up , is a thing differing from those Ingredients . But , yet the composition of a naturall body is not in all things like those artificiall composures : For , the Elements do not make the bodies , by the scituation of the thinnest parts , one by another , as it falleth out in a medicine , compounded of foure ingredients ; but , it is effected , rather , by altering themselves , and by uniting of all into One. All Bodies are again resolved , also , into these Elements ; by which means it commeth to passe , that all the Elements remaine continually unwasted , and are kept sufficient for the making of all things , in regard they neither are diminished , nor abound . And from hence arises this generall proposition , That , the generation of one thing is the corruption of another ; And the corruption of one , the generation of another ; not referring ( this perpetuity ) to the Soul , as is aforesaid , but to the Bodie onely . Plato is of opinion that the three other Elements are changed one into each other , and that the Earth remains altogether without mutation ; as may appeare by his comparing of the firmnesse of figures , consisting of streight-lines , with every Element . To the Earth he compares the figure called a Cube ; because of all other figures that is least moveable . The figure Icosaedron , which is hardliest moved of all the rest , ( and consisting of twenty bases ) he likeneth unto water . The Pyramide , whose motion is easiest of all the rest , he resembleth to fire . And Octaedron , ( the figure consisting of eight bases ) hee compareth unto the Aire , whose motion is easier then that of the water , and more hard then fire . By these figures , he endevors to prove demonstratively that the three other Elements are changed one into another , but that no change hapneth to the Earth : For , ( saith he ) three of these figures , that is to say , the Pyramide , the Octaedron and the Icosaedron , are made of Triangles , whose sides are unequall , whereas the Cubicall figure is made of Triangles , whose sides are equall : now things which are made of Triangles whose sides are unequall , being dissolved and meeting together again , may be changed into another ; but , the Cubicall-figure being dissolved cannot be changed into any other ; because it is made of equall-sided - Triangles , whereof none of the other three can be made . In like manner none of the other figures can be changed into a Cube . And , for these reasons it is necessary that the Bodies formed of these species , and the species whereof they are formed , should in respect of one another be such as they were . And , yet , the Earth remaineth not altogether impassible ; but , is divided by bodies , having thinner parts then it selfe ; being after a manner altered from Element to Element , and yet not changed into those things which doe divide it : For , when it is recollected againe unto it selfe , it recovereth the state which it formerly had , as appeares by it , in the water . For , if you cast a little earth into the water , and stir it often up and down , that earth dissolves into water ; but , if you leave stirring of the same , the water settles , and the earth sinks to a residence : The like is to be thought of the whole earth : and this is not a changing , but a dissevering of such things as were mingled together . Plato affirmes that the earth is also severed by the sharpnesse of the fire , and being so dissolved is elevated and carryed away in the fire : So likewise in the masse of the Aire , when Aire dissolves it ; and , in the water , when it is dissolved , in the water . Moreover , Plato mentioneth another division of the Elements , affirming every one of them to have three Qualities . The fire to have sharpnesse , rarenesse , and motion ; The Element which is directly in the extreame thereunto , ( that is to say ) the earth , to have dulnesse , thicknesse , and rest : So , in respect of these Qualities , the earth and the fire , be cleane contrary to each other ; whereas , they were not so , by those two qualities , whereof we had formerly spoken . He holdeth likewise , that , by qualities taken from the two extreames , those Elements were made which are in the middle betweene these two : For ( saith he ) two qualities ( to wit ) rarenesse and motion , being taken from the fire ; and one ( that is to say ) dulnesse , being assumed from the Earth , Aire is thereof composed , whose effecting Qualities , are rarenesse , motion , and dulnesse . In like manner , two Qualities are taken from the earth , namely , dulnesse and thicknesse ; and one from the fire , ( to wit ) motion , whereof proceeds water , which getteth also his forme , by thicknesse , dulnesse , and motion . Therefore , the same that sharpnesse is in respect of dulnesse , the same is fire in respect of aire : such as rarenesse is , in respect of thicknesse , such is aire in respect of water . That which motion is , in respect of rest , that water is , in respect of earth . Look what fire is , in respect of aire , the like is aire in respect of water . And as aire is in respect of water , so is water in respect of earth . For , it is the nature of things having a plaine thin ground , to bee held together by one medium ; ( that is to say ) by a proportion betweene them ; whereas , firme and sollid Bodies are not kept fast together , but , by two mediums . There are , yet other qualities ascribed unto the Elements . Namely , to the earth and water , WEIGHTINESSE , whereby they doe naturally incline downeward ; and to aire , and fire , LIGHTNESSE , whereby they are naturally given to mount upward . The Stoicks have moreover , another way of dividing the Elements ; for , some they affirme to be active , and some passive . By active they meane the more stirring Elements , such as are the fire and the aire : By passive they understand the duller Elements , that is to say , the earth and water . But Aristotle , besides these Elements , bringeth in a Fifth BODIE , which he tearmes Aethereall ; and this bee fancies to bee a BODIE having in it a circular motion ; because , it pleaseth him not to say that the heavens are composed of the foure Elements : And he calls the Fifth , a Body moved circularly ; because , it is ( as he imagines ) caried circularly round about the earth . Plato is of another opinion ; and affirmes directly , that the heavens are made of fire , and of earth . His words are these : Every bodily shape which is made , must be visible and subject unto touching ; but , nothing can bee visible without some fire in it ; not subject unto touching without some firmenesse ; nor can any thing be firm , without earth : And therupon in the beginning , God caused the body of the whole world to bee composed of earth and fire . Now it is not possible that two things alone should bee made to unite and agree well together , without a third , which must be as it were a band betweene them , to bring them both together ; and of all bands , that is the chief which can most perfectly bring into an unity , both it selfe , and such things as are united by the same . And this , the nature of proportion doth best performe . By the band here mentioned , hee intends the two middle-Elements , taken according to the proportion , whereof we spake before . SECT . 3. I. The opinion of the Hebrewes , and of Apollinarius touching the making of the heavens and of the earth . II. Arguments out of Hippocrates against Thales , Anaximenes , and Heraclitus , who say that there is but one onely Element . III. The body being an instrument for the soul , is made fit for the operations thereof . THe Hebrewes , in their opinions concerning the making of the heavens and the earth , differ so much from all others , that but few have conceived thereof as they doe : For they affirme that they were created of no fore existing matter ; according to Moses , who said , In the beginning , God made the heaven and the earth . But , Apollinarius thinks that God made the heaven and the earth , of the depth of waters . For , Moses in his description of the worlds creation , doth not so make mention of the depth of waters , as if it had beene created ; but , in Iob these words are to bee found ; He made the depth of waters . Therefore , hee affirmed , that all other things were made out of that , as out of a matter common to all . Hee doth not say that this depth of waters , was never made ; but , that it was laid downe by the Creator , as a foundation , before any other bodily-thing was made , that other things might bee made thereof : For , the very name of depth , declares the infinitenesse of the matter . And indeed , whether it bee this or that way taken , it is not much materiall ; For even by this opinion also , God is confessed the sole Creator of all things ; and that hee made every thing of nothing . Now , there bee some who say , that there is but one onely Element ; either Fire , or Aire , or Water , ( For Thales affirmes that fire only ; Anaximenes that aire onely ; and Heraclitus , with Hipparchus Metapontinus , that water onely is an Element ) against whom it shall be sufficient to alleage what Hippocrates hath said in that behalfe . If ( saith he ) MAN were composed but of one onely thing hee could never feele any griefe ; For , hee being but One thing , nothing could procure paine unto him ; or if hee should feele any griefe , there could be but one thing which might heale him : For , that which feeleth griefe , must needs bee in a mutation with some sense : And , if there bee but one Element , there can then bee nothing whereinto the living-creature should be changed : And if it were not altered , but continued setled in the same state , it could not possibly feele paine , though it were never so sensible . He saith further : It is necessary that the thing which any body suffereth should proceed from some other thing : but if there bee but one onely Element , there can be no quality , beside the quality of one Element , whereby the living-creature may be afflicted : And , if neither can bee changed nor suffer any thing , how can it bee grieved ? After hee had thus declared the impossibility thereof , he supposeth , neverthelesse , the same to be granted ; and thereupon thus inferreth . Grant ( saith hee ) it could suffer griefe , and then it will follow , that there is but one thing onely which can cure the same ; but experience hath taught us that there is not one thing only , but many things to cure every disease ; and therefore Man cannot be one onely intire thing . It may be further proved , that there are foure Elements , by the reason wherewith every one of them endeavoureth to confirme his owne opinion ( who affirme that there is but one onely Element . ) For when Thales affirmed that water onely was to bee accounted an Element , hee endeavoured to shew that all the other three were made of it ; saying that the faeces of it become earth , the thin parts become aire , and that the thinnest parts of that aire are turned into fire . Anaximenes , holding opinion that aire onely is an Element ; goes about to prove likewise , that all the rest of the Elements are made of aire . Heraclitus and Hipparchus Metapontinus affirming that there is no Element but fire , use likewise the very same demonstration , to make their argument seeme reasonable . Now , it will become evident by the reasons which these men give to justifie their assertion ; that every one of them is an Element : For by some it is demonstrated , that all other Elements are made of the fire ; by another , that all the rest are made of water ; and by a third that they are all of aire ; which make it plaine that all the Elements are changed one into another ( by their generall consent , who otherwise disagree . ) And if they can all bee changed one into another , it will necessarily follow that they must all be Elements ; because which of the foure soever shall bee taken , it will appeare that even that is made of some other . The Body ( which is composed of these Elements ) being an instrument for the SOUL , is divided together with the powers of the same : For , it was framed to be convenient and fit for them , in such maner , that no power of the SOUL should be hindered through the Bodies defect . And therefore to every power of the SOUL , there are proper parts of the Body assigned , for his operation ; as I will more particularly declare in the following Chapters . The SOUL exercises the part of an Artificer ; the BODIE is as it were his instrument : It is also the matter wherein the actions are conversant ; and the effect which is wroght thereby , is the action it selfe . The matter is as the woman , the act is that which is conversant about her ; either whoredome , incest , or lawfull copulation . The powers of the Soul , are divided into these three ; phantasie , judgement , and memory . CAP. 6. I. Of the phantasie , or imagination ; what it is ; by what Names expressed ; and by what instruments it worketh . II. Of the seats and nature of the senses ; and why being but foure Elements , there are five senses . III. The definitions of sense , according to Plato and others ; and distinctions betweene such faculties in the Soul , as are appointed to beare rule ▪ and to obey . EXpresse we will in the next place , such things as concerne the phantasie or imagination . The faculty of imagining , is a power of that part of the soule which is void of Reason , and worketh by those instruments wherein the senses are placed . The thing subject to imagination , is that whereabout our imagination is conversant , and may bee called imaginable , as that which is felt is termed sensible . Imagination it selfe ( called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) is a passion of that part of the soul which is irrationall , procured by something which is subject to our imagination . A vaine imagination ( called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) is a void passion in the parts of the soule which are destitute of reason , being procured of no certaine thing whereof an imagination should arise . But , the Stoick Philosophers doe set downe those foure in this maner ; The imagination it selfe , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; The thing wherby the imagination is moved , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; A voide drawing away of our imagination , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; And that which moveth our imagination to bee vainely drawne away , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Imagination is a passion representing unto us both it selfe , and the thing moving our Imagination ; For , when we see some white thing , there is ingendred some passion in the Soule by the reception thereof . Even as there is some passion begotten in the seats of the Sense when it feeleth any thing ; So , there is then something engendred in the Soule when it conceiveth any thing ; & it receiveth an Image or impression of the thing understood . The fancie or the thing wherby Imaginatiō is moved , is , any sensible-thing , which hath caused the Imagination ; as it may bee some white thing , or any other object which may move the SOVL. The Fantastick or void drawing away of our Imagination , is a needles ( or causuall ) seducing ( or distracting ) of the Imagination , without any certaine thing which may move the same . The Fantasme or thing it selfe , whereby wee are idely drawne away , is the very attraction whereby wee are attracted , according to our vain Imagination ; which falleth out in those that are Mad or Melancholy . Betweene these Opinions there is no difference , but only , in the alteration of some Names . The Instruments of the Imagination , are the former Panns of the braine ; The Vitall spirits , which are in them ; The sinewes proceeding from the braine ; The nerves moistned by the Vitall spirits , and the very frame of the places , wherein the Senses are seated . There are five seats for the senses ; but all are properly but one sense , which is the SOUL it self , who , by the seats of the senses , discernes all such things as fall out in them . It discernes , or taketh knowledge of an Earthy nature . by that sense , which is most Earthie and Bodily , namely the Touching : It perceiveth perspicuous ( or bright shining things ) by that sense which is most perspicuous , that is to say , the sight : It judgeth such things as are pertinent to aire by that seat which is ordained for the aire ; for the very substance of the voice is aire , or the smiting of the aire : and it receiveth every tast by a certaine quality of the instrument of the sense of tasting ; which attracts , by its waterish and spongy nature . For it is the nature of every sensible thing , to be discerned by some thing which hath a nature like unto it : and by this reason it should seeme that there being onely foure Elements there should bee no more but foure senses . But , because there is a kinde of vapour , and certaine smells which have a middle-nature betweene aire and water ; the parts whereof are somewhat thicker then aire , & thinner then water ( which appeares by them who are sick of a heavinesse in the head , by rhumes , and stoppings ; for they drawing the aire by respiration , have no feeling of the vapour , by reason the fatnesse of the odour is hindered by obstructions , from approaching the sense ) therefore , a fifth-seat of the sense , namely , smelling , was provided by nature , that no such thing as may bee brought unto our knowledge , should be hidden from the sense . Yet the sense is not an alteration , but the discerning of alterations : Indeed the seats of the sense are altered , and the sense discernes this alteration . Now , many times the name of the sense , and of the seats of the sense are confounded . But , sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense : Yet this seemeth not to bee the definition of sense it selfe , but of the workings of the sense ; And therefore some define it thus : Sense is a certaine intellectual spirit extended from the principall part of the minde , unto the bodily instruments . It is thus also defined : Sense is a power of the soule , which taketh hold of sensible things ; and the seat of the sense , is the instrument whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible . Plato sayes thus ; Sense is that wherein the Soule and the body communicate together concerning outward things : For , the very power it selfe belongs unto the soule ; but , the instrument pertaines to the body ; and both together take hold of such outward things as may bee offered to imagination . Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded ; othersome to rule and bear sway . The part which hath in it understanding , and knowledge , was ordained to rule . Those which appertaine to sense , and to the motions by appetite , as also , our ability of speaking , are made to serve and bee at command : For , our voice , and our motion by appetite , are obedient to reaon , most speedily , and almost in a momēt of time . For , wee Will and are moved together , and at once ; so that we need no time to come betweene our Will and our motion , as we may see in the moving of our fingers . Some naturall things are placed under the command of Reason , as those which wee call perturbations . CAP. 7. SECT . 1. I. Of the sense of sight , and the opinions of Hipparchus , of the Geometricians , of Epicurus , and Aristotle concerning the same . II. The opinions of Plato , and of Galen , touching the same sense ; and of the cause of seeing . III. The opinion of Porphyrie also touching that sense . WE finde that this word fight hath a divers signification ; for ▪ sometime it signifieth the seat of the sight ; and some time the power of the sense ( it selfe . ) Hipparchus affirmes that the beams being shot forth from the eyes , take hold ( as it were ) of outward things with the farthest ends of them ( even as if a man should lay his hand on them ) and presents ( or yeelds ) those things , whereof they have so taken hold , to our sight . But the Geometricians describe unto us Figures ( which are called Cones ) broad at the first and growing to a narrow top , made by the meeting of the eye-beames ▪ in one point . And they hold opinion that the beames of the right-eye , being darted forth to the left-side , and the beames of the left-eye toward the right-side , the Figure CONOS is made by the uniting of them in one ; and that thereby it comes to passe that the sight comprehends many visible things together , at one view ; and then more exactly perceives them , when the beames are met closely one with another . And this is the cause , that oftentimes , when we looke upon the pavement we see not a piece of money lying plainly visible thereupon , though wee settle our eyes upon the same with diligence : For , untill it so fall out , that the beames meet in that very place , where the money lyeth , wee still overlooke the same ; but then , wee presently attaine the sight of it , as if that had beene the beginning of our looking for it in that place . The Epicures think that the shapes of such things as appeare unto us , are brought to our eyes . Aristotle is of opinion that it is not a bodily shape which appeares , but a certaine quality rather conveyed from things visible , unto the sight , by an alteration of the aire which is round about . Plato sayes , that the sight is caused by the meeting of all the severall brightnesses together ( that is to say ) partly by the light of the eyes , which flowing out some part of the way into the aire , which is of like nature with it selfe ; partly by that which is retorted back againe from the bodies which are seene ; and partly by the force of that which is extended out together with the fierynesse of the eye , affecting the aire which comes betweene them ; and easily spreading every way , or turning to any side . Galen agreeing with Plato , speaketh of the sight ( here and there in some places of his seventh booke of the agreement of parts ) much to this purpose If ( saith hee ) any part or power , or quality of bodies that are visible , should come unto the eye , wee could not know the quantity of the thing seen . For , if a very great mountaine were the object , it were quite contrary to reason , to imagine that the shape of so huge a thing should enter wholly into our eyes : yea , and the spirit belonging to the sight , being darted forth could not bee able to collect together so much vigour , as would bee requisite to comprehend the whole visible object . It remaines therefore that the aire , wherewith we are encompassed , is after a sort such an instrument unto us when we see , as the nerve which belongeth unto the sight is to the body ; and some such thing seemeth to happen to the aire , which encloseth us round : For , the bright shining Sun having touched the upper limits of the aire , distributes his power into the whole aire : And the splendor which is caried through the sinewes called the optick nerves which belong unto the sight , hath his essence of the nature of the spirits : This falling into the aire which is dilated round about us , makes an alteration even at the very first injection , and shootes forth very farre : yet so , that it containes it self undispersed , untill it happen upon a reflecting body . For , the aire is such an instrument unto the eye , to discerne visible objects , as the sinew is unto the braine : and look in what case the braine is , in respect of his sinew ; in like case is the eye in respect of the aire , after it is quickned by the bright shining of the Sun. Now , that it is the nature of the aire , to become like unto those things which enter into it , appeares manifest by this , that whensoever any bright thing , ( be it red or blew , or of the colour of silver ) shall bee conveyed through the aire , when it is light , the colour of the aire will bee changed according to that thing which is caried through the same . But , Porphyrie in his book which hee wrote of the senses , affirms , that neither the making of the Figure Conos , neither any shape , nor any other thing , is cause of our seeing , but only this ; that the soul her selfe meeting with such objects as are visible , doth perceive and know , that all those things which are seene , be contained in her selfe ; because it is she only which holds them together , to their preservation . For , ( as he saith ) whatsoever is in the world , is nothing else , but the soul holding together divers bodies . And it were not untruly said , that the soul commeth to the knowledge of it selfe , by the view of every thing which is in the world ; if his opinion be allowed : for according to his tenet , there is but one soul for all things , even the reasonable-soul . SECT . 2. I. Of the proper object of sight , and of such other meanes and circumstances as are usefull in seeing . II. Though colour and shape are onely the proper objects of sight ; yet by cogitation and memory , it commeth to the knowledge of other qualities in the thing seene . III. Of such senses as are conversant about things at a distance ; and in what cases the sight erres , or needs the aide of other senses . THe sight seeth by straight lines ; but it feeleth first & principally the colours of things ; and together with thē , discerneth also the body that is coloured , the magnitude , the shape , the place , wherein it is ; the distance , the number , the motion , and the rest thereof ; as like wise , whether it be rough , or smooth , or unequall , or even , or sharpe , or dull , or what element is predominant therin ; and whether it be waterish , or earthy ; moist or dry . Yet that which is the proper object of this sense , is colour onely ; for wee no way attaine the knowledge of colours but by our sight : and assoone as wee behold the colour , wee therewithall do immediately perceive also the coloured body ; the place wherein the visible object abideth ; and the distance , which is between the se●r and the thing seene . Looke in how many senses wee receive the knowledge of b●dily things ; even in so many wee come to the knowledge of a place , together with the body ; as it is in touching , and tasting : but these two , feele them onely when they are joyned neare unto the body ( except in those things which we shall speake of anon ) whereas the sight , beholds things at a great distance . Now in that the sight laies hold of such things , as are visible , when they be far off , it must necessarily follow that it receives a sight only of the distance of things : and it is then only capable of the magnitude of things , when it is able at one view to comprehend the thing which appeareth ; but whensoever the visible body is too large to bee apprehended at one aspect , then the sight needeth memory and cogitation to assist it . For , the sight beholding so great an object by peece-meale ( and not at one whole view ) must necessarily passe from one part thereof to another ; and in that passage , so much onely is apprehended by the proper faculty of the sight , as is present in view ; the rest which was viewed before , is kept by the memory , untill our understanding hath brought together , both that which was before seen and that which is present likewise , in our sight . Moreover , sight apprehends the magnitude of bodies two maner of wayes ; Sometime by it selfe alone ; and sometime again by the aide of memory and cogitation : But by it selfe alone , it never taketh notice of the number of things visible if they exceed three or foure ; seeing the number of them cannot not be discerned at one attempt ; neither can it lay hold on the motions of things ; neither on Figures which have many corners , without it have the helpe of memory and cogitation to assist it . For sight is not able to bring together , five or sixe or seaven , or more , without the helpe of memory ; neither can it bring together figures that have six , eight , or many corners . The motion also that commeth by passing from one great thing , to another , hath in the same , some what preceding , and somewhat following after ; and wheresoever things are found to bee some first , some second , and some third ; there memory onely is the preserver of them together : But these qualities , high and low , equall and unequall , rough and smooth , sharpe and dull , bee communicable both to the touching , and to the sight ; for that they onely can discerne of place ; and yet they stand in some need also of our understanding . For , that thing onely which moves the sense by one only attempt , is wrought by the sense alone ( without the helpe of memory and cogitation : ) but , such things as are felt at divers times are not wrought by the sense onely , but by the aide of memory and cogitation , as is aforesaid . Such is the nature of sight , that it can pierce even unto the bottome of transparant things ; and first , and specially of the Aire : For it can passe quite through it . Secondly , it can passe through water when it is cleare ; insomuch that wee may see fishes swimming in the same : And ; ( though somwhat more hardly ) it passes through earth , being of a glassie or such like transparant nature . Yet , this is alwayes to be supposed , that these things must be enlightned , when they become the proper object of sight , without the aide of any other assistant . But let no man bee so deceived , as to imagine that the sight may of it selfe discerne hot things ; because when wee see fire , we know that it is hot ; for if you refer that speech to the first function of sight , you shall finde that when the sight first beheld the fire , it perceived nothing but the shape and colour thereof . After that , wee comming to touch it , and thereby knowing the same to be hot , our memory preserves in us the knowledge which wee first gained by the touch : and ever since ; when wee behold fire ( though wee see nothing in it but the shape and colour ) our understanding by the helpe of memory , conceives the hear of the fire to be in the same , as well as the things which are properly seene . The like may be said of an apple ; For seeing the whole forme thereof consisteth not onely in the colour and the shape , but in the smell also and in the tast ; it followes not that it is the sight onely , whereby we know the same to bee an apple ( because we saw the shape and colour of it ) for , our memory had preserved in our understanding the experience which we had formerly collected from the smell and tast ; and these being added unto that , whereof the eye tooke notice , perfited our knowledge . Therefore , when wee thinke an apple made of waxe to be a true apple , it is our understanding which erreth , and not our sight ; for the sight failed not to informe rightly , so much as pertained unto her sense ; when it perceived the true colour and shape of an apple . Now , these three senses , sight , hearing , and smelling , are conversant about things at a distance , and such as are not joyned close unto them by means of the aire comming between them . But the tast cannot possibly feele any thing but that whereunto it is nearely joyned ; and the touching taketh part of both : for sometime wee touch things bodily , without any intermedium betweene us and them ; somtime againe , wee touch them with a staffe betwixt us , and the things touched . Moreover , the sight hath now and then , want of some other of the senses to witnesse unto it the certainty of that which it perceiveth , when things are artificially wrought to deceive the sight ; as it falleth out in painting : For , it is the painters cunning to deceive the eye , with counterfeit shadowings , either of an Embost or hollow ▪ worke , as the nature of the things requires : To the discerning whereof , the sense of touching is especially usefull , and sometime of the tast and smell also ; as appeared in the example of the apple made of wax . Yea , and otherwhile ( at no great distance ) the sight it selfe maketh some things appeare unto us to bee that which they are not : For , if a towne which is foure-square bee but a pretty distance from us , it will seeme unto the sight to be round . The sight erres likewise , when wee looke through a thick aire , or through smoake , or some such things as otherwise trouble the sight by the thicknesse thereof . In like maner , when we see things in the water , being stirred ; for in the Sea an Oare seemeth broken when it is whole . So is it also when wee looke in or through some transparant ▪ bodie ; as looking-glasses , or other glasses and the like things ; or when the visible object is moved swiftly : For , a swift-motion so distempers the sight ; that those things are thereby made appeare to be round which are nothing so , and those to bee fixed , which are moved . The same happeneth , when the minde is busied about other matters ; as when a man ( purposing to meet his friend ) passeth by without heeding him whom hee went to meet , ( though hee met him in the way ) by reason he had his minde busied with other thoughts : But , indeed this is not properly an error of the sight , but of the minde : For , the sight beheld his friend , and gave warning ; but the minde heeded not that which was brought unto it . Finally , the sight needeth foure things for the cleare discerning of all visible objects , namely ; A whole and sound seat for that sense ; a proportionable measure of motion ; a fit distance ; and the aire to bee pure and cleare . CAP. 8. I. Of the sense of touching ; why the seat of it is in all parts of the body , and why every living-creature enjoyes that sense , whereas many are defective in other of the senses . II. Of the proper objects of this sense ; and of such as it hath in common with other senses . III. In which of the senses Man excelleth ; and in what senses , other creatures excell him . IT was by the Creator of the world , so ordered , that hee made the seats of all the other senses two-fold , and confined them to a certaine circuit of place in some parts of the body ; For example , hee hath made two eyes , two eares , two passages for the sense scituate in the nostrill ; yea , and hee hath planted in every living-creature , as it were , two tongues . In some they are evidently parted , ( as in serpents ) and in some other , they are joyned and united , as in men : And for this cause , hee made onely two former-pans of the braine , that the sinewes which serve for the senses , being sent downe from either of these braine-pans might make the seats of the senses to be twofold . Now , hee made them twofold , in respect of that exceeding tender love which hee bare unto us ; that when the one of them tooke harme , the other which remained might preserve the sense . And yet , though most of the seats of the other senses perish , the living-creature may be alive : but as soone as the sense of touching is extinct , the living-creature doth instantly perish . For onely the sense of touching , among all the rest of the senses is common to all livingcreatures ; and every living-creature is indued therewith ; whereas all of them have not every one of the other senses ; but some have these , and some have others , ( except those which wee call the more perfect creatures , and they indeed have all the senses . ) Now , seeing the living-creature loseth life by the losse of this sense ; the Creator hath allotted unto the sense of touching , not one part of the body onely ; but almost the whole body of the living-creature : For , except the bones , and the hornes , and the nailes , and the binding-sinewes , and the haires , and certaine other such like things , each part of the body is partaker of the sense of touching Thereupon it hath so hapned that the seat of every sense hath two senses in it ; one of such things as are properly the object of every particular sense , and another in respect of the sense of touching : For the sight discerneth colours , and yet is partaker both of hot and cold things ; participating of heat and cold as it is a body , and discerning of colours , as it is the sense of sight . The like may be thought also of the tast , of the smelling , and of the hearing . It may hereupon bee questioned how the touching can bee spred over the whole body , seeing that the senses proceed from the former braine-pans : for indeed the sinewes come downe from the braine , and being dispersed into every part of the body , doe there occasion the sense of touching . And some were of opinion ( because the haire stands up as it were , with a sudden horror , when the foot is casually pricked with a thorne ) that the griefe , or at least , the feeling of the griefe , ascended up unto the brain , and was there felt . Which being true , it might then be concluded , that there could bee no griefe in any part of the body , that were wounded , but in the brain only . It were better therefore to make this answer , that the sinewes ( which bee dispersed as aforesaid ) are the braine it selfe . For , they are a certaine portion of the braine , containing in them the vitall spirits , and diffusing them throughout the whole body of the living-creature , in such manner as fire is contained in burning-iron : And wheresoever such a sensible-sinew is planted , it makes the part wherein it is ingraffed to be partaker of sense ; and to be so qualified , that it may feele things . Neither were it improperly spoken , to say that not the passion , but rather a certaine partaking of the griefe , and a denunciation of the same is conveyed up to the braine , where all the sinewes have their beginning . Now the proper objects of the sense of touching are hot , cold , soft , hard , slimy , stiffe , heavy , and light : For , by touching only , we attaine the knowledge of these things ; whereas these next following are common both to the touching and the sight , ( to wit ) sharp , dull , rough , plaine , dry , moist , thick , thin , high , low , yea , and place it selfe . So likewise is magnitude ( when it can bee comprised within one attempt of the touching ) fogginesse , clearenesse , roundnesse , ( if it be but in small things ) as also the shape of other figures ; yea , and it fooleth likewis the motion of bodies comming neare unto it , being assisted by memory , and understanding . Moreover , it is sensible of number , as farre as two or three , but no farther ; and those things must also be of no larger magnitude , then may easily bee comprehended by the touch . And these are better discerned by sight then touching ; as are also such things as bee equall or unequall ( they being of the same kinde with smooth and rough things ) for unequality being mingled with hardnesse , causeth a roughnesse ; and equalnesse added unto thicknesse , maketh a smoothnesse . By that which we have here delivered , it is evident that the senses communicate each with other in many things : and that if one sense erre , the error if it may bee rectified by some other senses ; As wee perceive in Pictures : For , the sight beholdeth things as if they stood out from the rest of the peece , as the Nose and such other parts of the Picture ; but , by the sense of touching , the error of the sight is discovered . As the sight useth at all times the aire for a meanes to behold all things ; So the sense of touching feeleth some things by a staffe ( or other instrument ) as by a meane ; ( to wit ) hard , soft , and moist things . being aided by understanding , and the discourse of reason . In the sense of touching as also in tasting , Man excelleth all other living-creatures ; and the beasts excell him , in the other three senses : for there be divers creatures that doe surpasse man in some one of the other three senses ; but a Dog excelleth him in every one of these three , hearing , seeing , and smelling , as appeareth by hounds which hunt by foot . The whole body ( as wee said before ) is the seat wherein the sense of touching is placed ; but in man the inside of the hands , and the tops of the fingers , are the principall seats there of , and were appointed by our Creator , not onely to lay hold on things ; but to be exact instruments also , serviceable to the sense of touching . And the cause why the skin of them is somewhat thin ; why certaine muscles are laid under them throughout the inside ; and why there groweth no haire on them ( whereof the muscles are cause ) is by reason they should the better feele and take hold on small things . Such hands as are hardest , are the more strong to hold things ; and such as are softest are most apt for exact touching . In like maner , the sinewes which are hard , be fittest for motion , and those which are soft , more convenient for feeling ; for the sinewes also are instruments of touching ; yea and the chiefe instruments of that sense . CAP. 9. I. Of the Tasting ; by what wayes , on what matter , and with what instrument it worketh . II. The names of the simple qualities pertaining to the tast . III. Of the compound qualities belonging to the same sense , &c. THat the sight beholds things by direct lines ; that the senses of hearing and smelling attain the knowledge of their objects , as well divers other wayes , as by direct lines ; and that touching and tasting doe nei-neither by direct lines , nor by any other meanes become sensible of their proper objects , but then onely , when they come neare to such things as are subject to their sense ( except in such cases as are before expressed , ) wee have already declared . The matter whereupon the tast worketh is the humors , or Iuices which are tasted . The instruments of tasting , are the tongue ( chiefly the very tip of the tongue ) and the roofe of the mouth : For in these are dispersed the sinewes descending from the braine , and they denounce to the principall part of the soule , what that tast is which they have received . The name of the qualities pertaining to the tast , and which are found in the Iuices , are these . Sweetnesse , sharpnesse , tartnesse , a binding bitternesse , a bitternesse lesse binding , a quality bringing a bitternesse by drought and heat ; saltnesse ▪ fatnesse : For these are the qualities which tast discerneth ; and it is in respect of these qualities that the water is said to be void of qualities ; because if you tast water , it offers none of these qualities to your sense ; whereas , if you have respect to other qualities , as cold and moisture , they are ingraffed therein . The two bitternesses differ from each other in their being more or lesse astringent . These aforenamed are in a maner all the simple-qualities which belong unto the sense of tasting ; but the compound-qualities , are infinite ; in regard there is a proper tast belonging to every living-creature , and to every plant . There is one tast in swines flesh , another in Goats flesh , and when wee would know what flesh it is which commeth to be tasted , we distinguish the same by the quality of the tast , which could not be done except there were a divers quality in every thing that is tasted . Now because those things are infinite , and utterly divers one from another , wee cannot comprise or distinguish them under particular tearmes : For even in those things , wherein some one of the simple qualities beareth rule , there is a plaine difference of that which is the object of tast . For , though in dry figs , and in grapes , and in the fruit of the Palme , there is one predominant quality , to wit , sweetnesse , yet in every one of them the tast discernes a difference . CAP. 10. I. Of the Hearing ; of the object of that sense ; of the instruments thereof ; and of such living-creatures as move not their eares . HItherto of the tast . The sense of Hearing is employed about voices and sounds ; and in them it discernes the shrilnesse , the basenesse , the softnesse , the harshnesse , and the loudnesse . The instruments thereof are a soft kind of sinews which proceed from the braine ; the forme of the eares ; and chiefly that part of them which is grisly : for the grisles are fitted for sounds and noises . Onely Man and the Ape , are thought to have eares unmoveable , and all other living-creatures to have moveable eares . CAP. 11. Of the Smelling ; of the instruments thereof ; of the matter whereupon it layes hold ; and of the difference which is betweene the vapours , or fumes , from whence the Smell ariseth . EVery one of those places which are seats of the senses ( as wee have said before ) takes hold of such things as are the proper objects of their senses , by meanes of a certaine likenesse and agreeablenesse which is betweene them and their sensible objects ; and therefore the Smelling ( though it be first begunne by the nostrils ) is perfected at the bounds of the former-braine-pans , which having a naturall affinity with vapours , doe the more easily take hold of them . And yet , whereas the braine in all other senses , sends downe sinewes into the seat of each sense to bee serviceable unto the sense therein placed ; it so dealeth not with our sense of Smelling ; for the bounds of the braine it selfe , are in stead of the sinewes , and the braine receives immediately such vapours , and fumes , as are yeelded up unto it . Of which vapours , the most generall difference is in this , that some of them have a good smell , some an evill sent , and some , that which is neither very good , nor very evill , but in a meane betwixt both . The good smell ariseth from humours exactly concocted : The evill sent , is when they are ill concocted , or not at all ; and the middle smell , is when they are concocted after a midling maner . CAP. 12. Of the Cogitation ; of the things thereunto pertaining ; and of the instrument whereby it worketh , &c. RIght briefly , and according to our ability , we have spoken of the imagining faculty of the soule ; of the instruments thereof , and of those things wherein they agree or differ . To the cogitation these particulars are generally pertinent ; the judgement of things , a consent unto them , a refusall of them , and a desire unto them ; But , those which are specially pertinent , are consideration , vertues , knowledges , the reason of arts , deliberation , and choice . This is that part wherby wee attaine the foresight of things to come , in visions or dreames ; and therein onely , the Pythagorean Philosophers ( following the Iewish opinions ) thinke true prophecying consisteth . The instruments of cogitation , are the middle-pan of the braine , and the vitall spirits , which are in it . CAP. 13. I. Of the memorative part of the Soul , and the definition of memory according to Origen and Plato . II. The difference betwixt remembring of things contained in sense and of things contained in understanding ; as also what recordation is . III. Of the instruments of the memory ; and demonstrations evidently shewing where the fountaines of the senses , of the cogitation , and memory are to be found . THe seat of memory , which the Greekes cal Mnemoneuticon , is the cause and storehouse both of memorie and recordation , or remembrance . Memory ( as Origen saith ) is a certaine appearance left in the minde , by some sense which had wrought actually before . Plato taketh it to be a preservation of things both felt and considered : For , the minde takes hold of things which are subject unto sense , by the seats of the sense , and therof is opinion begotten . But , it layeth hold on things intelligible by understanding ; and thence ariseth consideration . And when the minde retaines the Prints both of things in opinion , and of those also which are in consideration , we then say , that it remembers them . It is likely that Plato doth herein meane , by the name of consideration , not the principall consideration ; but a certaine cogitation : For things contained in sense , are remembred by themselves ; but , things contained in understanding , are accidentally remembred . The remembrance of things thought upon by us , doth remaine in us upon the heed of some appearance which was before in our imagination : And we remember those things which are properly contained in our understanding , in respect that wee have learned them , and heard them ; but as for their substance , wee have no memory thereof . For indeed , the apprehending of things contained in understanding , proceeds not from any preceding imagination ; but commeth to us by learning , and by a naturall notion . If we be said to remember such things as we saw , or heard , or knew heretofore , by some occasion or meanes : This word heretofore ( having relation to the time past ) makes it plaine , that such things as are made and destroyed againe , and such as have their being in time , are comprehended in memory ; and that our memory consisteth of things absent , but is not procured ( or moved ) by those absent things . Recordation ( or remembrance ) called by the Greekes Anamnesis ; is when forgetfulnesse hath interrupted our memory ; for it is a recovering of memory , which was lost , when it failed by forgetfulnesse . Memory is lost , either altogether ( and for ever ) or else , for a space onely ; and when it faileth but for a space , we call the recovery thereof remembrance . But there is another kind of recordation , which is not occasioned by the forgetfulness of such things as proceed from sense or understanding ; but from the forgetfulnesse of those things which wee have even by naturall notions . By naturall notions ( or things naturally conceived ) I meane such as every man hath in him without any teacher ; as that there is a God. This Plato calleth a recordation of Idea's ; and what is meant by Idea's I will hereafter shew . Such things as appeare unto the imagining part , are from thence conveyed unto the cogitation ; and the cogitation , or discoursing part ( when it hath once apprehended such things & judged of them ) sends them to bee stored up in that part of the soule , wherein memory is resident . The instruments used by the memory , are the hinder braine-pan , called by the Greekes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the vitall spirit there placed . But seeing we have affirmed , that the beginnings and roots of the senses , are the former pans of the braine ; The seat of the cogitation , the middle pan ; And of the memory , the hinder-pan ; it will be necessary for us to prove evidently that these things are so . Lest we seeme to give credit to that which hath been spoken , without any reason to be rendred for the same . A plaine demonstration thereof may bee taken from the parts themselves ; for , if by any meanes the former braine-pan be hurt , the senses are much hindred ; but the cogitation remaineth sound . If only the middle-pan be harmed , the cogitation is maymed ; but the seat of sense keepes the senses whole . If any hurt befall both to the former and middle-pan , both sense and cogitation decay . If the hinder-pan be onely disordered , the memory alone perisheth , and neither sense nor cogitation receive harme . But if the former , the middle , and the hinder braine-pans be all together out of order , the party so disturbed is maimed , in sense , in cogitation , and memory , all at once ; and the whole living-creature is in danger of destruction . This is made evident also by many diseases , and accidents which are symptomes of diseases , and especially in frantick men . For in some of them their cogitation onely is hurt , and their senses are preserved whole . Such a frantick man , is mentioned by Galen , who being in a place wherein a wool-winder was at work by him , rose up , and taking certaine glasse vessels which hee found in the roome , ran to the window , and asked such as passed by , whether they would have such or such glasses cast downe unto them , calling every vessell by the right name : And when they who stood below said they would have it so , hee threw them all downe , one after another . Then hee asked them whether they would have the wool-winder throwne downe also ; they ( thinking he had but jested ) replyed yea : whereupon he tooke up the wool-winder and hurled him headlong from a high place . This man had his senses whole enough ; for hee knew which were the glasse-vessels , and which was the wool-winder ; but his cogitation was diseased . Others there be , who deluded by a vaine imagination , suppose that they see such things as indeed are not seene ; whereas in other things , they are not without the direction of reason . In such as these , the former braine-pans are only diseased , and the middle-pan uncrased ; For , by those diseases which follow every part , the course of their operation is accordingly hindred ; and the living-creature is hurt in respect of that operation , to the working wherof the part diseased is naturally serviceable . As for example , if the feet bee hurt , our walking is hindered ; for that is the work whereunto the foot serveth . CAP. 14. I. Of the Reason , from whence we have the denomination of reasonable-creatures . II. Of our speech , and of the severall instruments thereof . HEre is one division of the powers of the soul , ( together with which , there are some parts of the body likewise divided ) whereunto is added another division , and after another maner ▪ For the reasonable-part of the soule is divided into reason which is unexpressed in us , and that which is uttered by our speech . The reason unexpressed ( or setled in us ) is a motion of the soule engendred in that part of the minde , wherein consisteth our discourse of reason , without any utterance by voice : Thereby oftentimes ( although wee say nothing ) wee throughly resolve , and set downe with our selves , the whole reason of a thing ; and otherwhile discourse in our dreames : And it is chiefly in respect thereof that we are called reasonable-creatures ; yea much rather in this respect , then for that which is uttered by our speech . For albeit some are deafe and dumbe from their births , or lose their voices by sicknesse and diseases , yet reasonable-creatures they are , neverthelesse . The utterance of reason is by the voice in the variety of tongues ; and the instruments used in the voice are many ; namely , the muscles which are in the middle of the sides , the breast it selfe , the lungs , the winde-pipe , the throat , ( and in all these , those parts especially which are grisly ) the returning sinews , the cover of the wind-pipe ; yea , and all the muscles which move these parts , are instruments of our speech . The instruments of our various utterance are the mouth : ( for therein the speech is moulded and fashioned ) and the tongue and the wesil-pipe ( which are there in stead of that wherewith wee smite the strings of a Lute or such like instrument ) the roofe of the mouth also , which is as the belly of the Lute , that receives and gives back the sound . The teeth , and the various openings of the mouth , doe stand in stead of strings : yea , and the nose also doth somewhat further the plainenesse , and the pleasingness of speech , as appeares in those that sing . CAP. 15. I. Another division of the soule , being threefold . II. An eightfold division thereof according to Zeno. III. A fivefold , and twofold division of the soul also according to Aristotle . VNto those aforegoing , there is added yet another division of the soule , into the powers , the kindes , and parts thereof ; namely , into a vegitative power , which is the same wherby plants ( and such like ) doe grow ; and this is called also a nourishing , or passive power , secondly into a sensible power ; and thirdly into that whereby it exerciseth reason . Zeno the Stoick assignes unto the soule eight parts ; the reasonable part is the first and principall : the five senses make up sixe , the faculty of speech the seaventh , and the eighth hee affirmes to bee that power whereby things are ingendred one of another . But Panetine the philosopher ( contradicting this opinion ) affirmes that the uttering of our speech is a part of the motion which is in our appetite ; and that the power of ingendring is a part of nature , not of the soule , wherein hee hath said very truly . Aristotle in his Physicks hath divided the Soule into to five parts ; namely , that which is vegitative , sensitive , movable in place , that which belongs to appetite , and that which is intellective . He calls that vegitative , which nourisheth , encreaseth , breedeth , maketh , and formeth bodies ; for under the name of vegitative he comprehends the intire faculty of growing ; calling the whole after the name of that part thereof which is the chiefest therein , and from whence all the other parts of the growing power have their essence . This is Aristotles opinion in his Physicks ; but in his Ethicks he makes but a twofold division of the Soule ; that is to say , into parts rationall , and irrationall . Of the reasonable-part I have already treated ; now therfore I will speak of that which is unreasonable . CAP. 16. I. Of that unreasonable part of the soule which containes the appetite : of concupiscence also ; of anger , and of their severall instruments . II. Of the divers acceptations of this word affection , and the definition of an affection , and of an operation or act . III. The difference betweene an operation , and an affection or passion , &c. SOme hold opinion that irrationality , or to be voide of reason is an intire thing by it self , as though there were a soule void of reason , which were not a part of the rationall soule : and for these causes they thinke so ; First , for that it is found alone by it selfe in unreasonable living creatures ; For thereby it seemes unto them to be perfect of it selfe , and no part of the reasonable soule . Secondly , they so imagine , because it appeares unto them one of the greatest absurdities which may be , to affirme that a power void of reason should be part of a Soule indued with reason . However , Aristotle affirmes it to be both a part , and a faculty of the reasonable soule , dividing it in to two parts , ( as I said before ) and calls those two by this one cōmon name , the appetitive-faculty : To which belongs also the motion of our appetite ; for appetite is the beginning of motion , as appeares in every living creature having a desire to something ; for their desire causes them to move forward , according to their appetite . This unreasonable part of the soule doth either disobey , or obey reason : And that part which is obedient unto reason , is divided into two parts , concupiscence , and anger . The instrument of the concupiscence by which it commeth into sense , is the Liver . But the instrument of anger is the heart , which being a hard part receives a strong motion , and is ordained for a hard service , and for great resistances ; whereas the Liver being a tender entrail , is made the instrument of tender concupiscence . These things are said to be obedient unto reason , because nature hath ordained them to obey reason , and to bee moved , as reason commandeth , in all such men as live answerable to that which nature ( originally ) requires . And these are certaine affections , which constitute our Essence , as it hath life in it ; For life cannot bee maintained without these . But whereas this word affection hath divers acceptations , wee must first distinguish the variety of significations which it hath : for either it pertaineth to the body , as when it is sick or ulcerated , in which cases we say it is so or so affected , or else it belongs to the soul , of which we now speake , and wherunto concupiscence and anger doe pertaine . But universally and generally , in respect of the intire living creature consisting of both parts , it is called an affection , and followeth either , in griefe or pleasure . For griefe doth follow our affection , but the very passion or affection it selfe , is not griefe : for if that were true , then wheresoever passion were found , there should be griefe also : but things void of life may be patients and suffer , yet feele no griefe . Therefore it is not necessarily consequent , that whensoever wee are affected unto a thing , we should also bee grieved , but then onely when wee feele the thing which hapneth unto us . Yea , and that which falleth unto us must bee a thing of such moment likewise , as may bee perceived by our sense . But this is the definition of such affections as are in the soul . An affection is the motion of our power of appetite , subject unto sense , provoked by the appearance of some good or evill . Or else it may bee defined thus : An affection is a motion of the soule , void of reason , supposing either some good or some evill thing . Affection in generall is by some thus defined ; Affection is a motion in one thing , by the commotion of another . The operation ( or action ) is a motion working that which is wrought . And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soule wherein anger is ; but it is an affection of both parts of the soule ; and beside that , of all our body , when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn thereby to any furious act : for this motion chanced in one thing , by the commotion of another thing , which was the definition of an affection . An operation ( or action ) after another sort , is called an affection ; when it disagreeth from nature ; for the operation is a motion according to nature , but the affection is repugnant unto nature : And therefore , an operation when it is not moved according to nature , is called an affection , whether it bee moved of it selfe , or of some other : As for example , the motion which is from the heart in the pulses , is an operation ; but that unseasonable appetite , subject unto sense , provoked by the appearance of some good or evill . Or else it may bee defined thus : An affection is a motion of the soule , void of reason , supposing either some good or some evill thing . Affection in generall is by some thus defined ; Affection is a motion in one thing , by the commotion of another . The operation ( or action ) is a motion working that which is wrought . And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soule wherein anger is ; but it is an affection of both parts of the soule ; and beside that , of all our body , when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn thereby to any furious act : for this motion chanced in one thing , by the commotion of another thing , which was the definition of an affection . An operation ( or action ) after another sort , is called an affection ; when it disagreeth from nature ; for the operation is a motion according to nature , but the affection is repugnant unto nature : And therefore , an operation when it is not moved according to nature , is called an affection , whether it bee moved of it selfe , or of some other : As for example , the motion which is from the heart in the pulses , is an operation ; but that unseasonable motion which commeth by feares or feavers , is an affection or passion . For that great panting proceedeth from the heart it selfe unnaturally ; and from thence also commeth naturally the moderate beating of the pulses . Therefore it is no marvaile if one and the same thing bee called both an affection and an operation . For in respect they bee certaine motions proceeding from the passible part of the soule , they be a kinde of operations ; but in this respect , that they passe measure , and are not agreeable to nature , they are not operations , but affections . Thus you see the motion of that part of the soule which is irrationall , to bee an affection in both significations ; and that neverthelesse , every motion of the passible part is not called a passion ( or affection ) but those which are most vehement , or which ( at least ) proceed so far , that they may bee felt . For , those which are small , and which cannot be felt , are not to be called affections ( or passions ) while they are in that degree ; because there must bee a convenient quantity ( or magnitude ) to make it a passion . And for this reason , that clause ; whose motion is perceived by sense , is annexed to the definition of an affection ; even because small motions , wherunto the sense is not privy , doe not make an affection , as I said before . CAP. 17. I. Of the concupiscence , and of pleasure and griefe , which are the two parts , whereinto the same is divided ; and of another fourfold division thereof . II. Of the meanes wherby evill affections are ingendred , and the meanes also how they might bee cured . THat part of the soule , which ( as we have said before ) is irrationall , and yet obeyeth reason , is divided into these two ; namely , the concupiscible , and irascible part . The coNcupiscence is againe divided into pleasure and griefe : For if our concupiscence attaines to that which is desired , it breedeth a pleasure , and if it misseth of the same , it engendreth griefe . This desire may another way be divided into four parts , the cōcupiscence it selfe being one of the foure . For of those things which are ; some be good , some evill , some present , and some expected ; and after this maner , if two bee multiplied , the parts in the division of the concupiscence will be foure : For you shall there find things good , things bad , things present , and things expected . Now good expected , is this desire : Good when it is present , is pleasure . Evill when it is looked for , begetteth feare ; when it is present , it bringeth griefe . If therefore you have respect to good things , therein consisteth pleasure and desire ; but if you respect evill things , of them proceed feare and griefe . And for these considerations , some have divided affection into these foure parts ; desire , pleasure , feare , grief . We call those things good and bad , that are either so indeed , or else reputed to be such . Evill affections are ingendred in our minde , by these three things ; Evill education , unskilfulnesse ( or ignorance , ) and by an evill constitution of Body . For , if wee be not well educated , even from our childhood , so that wee may learne to master our passions in the beginning , wee soone fall into an immoderation almost incurable . By reason of ignorance also , a certaine perverse judgement is fostered in the reasonable part of our soule , which makes us think evill things to be good ; and good things to be evill . And by meanes of an ill complexion ( or constitution ) of body , somewhat is likewise occasioned to our harme ; For they in whom choller abound are inclined to fretfulnesse ; and they who exceed in heat and moisture , are prone to lasciviousnesse . Wee must endeavour therefore , to cure an evill custome by enuring our selves to good customes ; we must remove ignorance by learning knowledge ; & we must labour to rectifie the evill constitution of our bodies , by such bodily things , as may so much as is possible help to bring it into a meane temperature ; which may be effected by a good dyet , by exercise , and by physick , if need be . CAP. 18. SECT . 1. I. Of the pleasures both of minde and body ; their variety , and different natures . II. Of such pleasures as are to be pursued by good men , and which are properly accounted pleasures . III. What pleasures ( according to the opinion of Plato ) are true or false pleasures : how good pleasures are named ; how defined by some Philosophers ; and what defects are in their definition . RIghtwell may pleasure be divided into corpereall and mentall-pleasures : For , some belong onely to the minde , as to be delighted in knowledge ; or in the contemplation of things . Others are called corporeall-pleasures , because they proceed from the conjunction of soul and body , and they are the pleasures which wee have in eating , drinking , carnall-copulation , and the like . There is no pleasure proper to the body alone : For they that seem to be such , are passions rather then pleasures ; as certaine cuttings , and flawings , qualities pertinent to the temperature of the body : For , all pleasure hath sense joyned with it , and ( as we have shewed before ) all sense belongeth to the soule . There be divers kindes of pleasure : Some are good , some naught ; some false , some true ; some pertaine to the minde only ; some depend upon knowledge ; some belong to the body , and are judged by the sense . Among pleasures tryed by sense , some be naturall , and some not so . To that pleasure which is in drinking , the griefe which commeth by thirst , is opposed ; but to the pleasure which ariseth from contemplation , there is nothing opposite ; And by these things it is manifest that the name of pleasure hath many significations . Among those which we call bodily or corporeall pleasures , some are both necessary and naturall ; and without them it is impossible to live ; such are the pleasures which we take in eating and drinking what is competent , and in necessary clothing . Some are naturall , but not necessary pleasures , as naturall and legitimate copulation : For though this bee necessary for the preservation of the whole kinde ; yet it is not so necessary to the life of any one man , but that he may live in his virginity without it ; but some pleasures are neither necessary nor naturall ; as drunkennesse , lasciviousnesse , and feeding in excesse . For these neither assist in propagating the succession of our kinde , as lawfull copulation , neither become profitable for the maintenance of our life ; but are ( on the contrary ) harmefull unto us . Hee therefore that would live according to the law of God , must pursue those pleasures onely which are both necessary and naturall . But he that will content himself in the second order of vertues , may take in hand both the forementioned pleasures , and therewith such also as are naturall but not necessary ; observing a conveniency in measure , manner , time , and place , the rest hee must by all meanes eschew . Those pleasures are generally to be accounted good , which are neither intangled with griefe , nor occasion repentance , nor procure other harme , nor depart from the mean , nor draw us from good workes , nor bring us into bondage . But those are properly pleasures , w ch are in some sort exercised in the consideration of God , and of knowledge and vertue : And these are to bee placed amōg those pleasures which ought earnestly to be pursued , above all the rest which are profitable unto us ; not because they are pertinent unto our being ( or for the continuation of our kinde ) but for that they constitute our well-being , and make us to bee honest , to bee lovers , and beloved of God , and to have the utmost perfection of man ; which perfection consisteth in the soule and Vnderstanding . These pleasures are neither the remedies to avoid diseases , as eating , drinking , and those other which doe supply our wants ; neither have they any griefe at all , preceding them , following them , or contrary unto them ; but are pure , immixt , and free from every material composition , because they pertaine onely to the soule . For according to plato's opinion of pleasures , there bee some of them false , and some true . Those are false , unto the procuring whereof , sense and a false opinion is needfull ; and such also as have grief annexed unto them . True pleasure is that which pertaines to the soule onely , even the soule by it selfe , together with science , understanding , and prudence ; and such pleasure as is pure without any mixture of griefe , or subsequent repentance at any time . Some call such pleasures as ensue upon contemplation , and good actions , not passions , but sweetnesses ; and others call them Ioy , as by a proper name . They define pleasure to be a generation into a nature subject unto sense . But this definition seemeth to agree onely to corporeall pleasure : Seeing by that pleasure , the wants of our body are supplyed and cured , together with such griefes as we sustained by those wants . For when we be cold or thirsty , wee are delighted in the warmth , and in the drinke , whereby that griefe is cured , which proceeded from cold and thirst . Therefore these pleasures are not good naturally or of themselves , but accidentally : for , as to be in health , is good naturally and by it selfe , whereas to be healed , is but an accidentall good , so these pleasures are onely accidentally good ; because they are but remedies for the curing of other things . But the pleasure taken in contemplation is good naturally , and of it selfe ; because it is not used in respect of any want . Hereby it is plain , that all pleasure is not ordained to supply wants ; and if this be true , that cannot bee a good definition , which defines pleasure to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense ; for it comprehendeth not all pleasure ; but leaveth out the best , even the pleasure that is in contemplation . SECT . 2. I. A definition of pleasure according to Epicurus , and another definition equivolent thereunto . II. A definition of pleasure according to Aristotle . III. Of the sundry sorts of pleasures ; of their operations ; of such as are proper to man as hee is man ; and of such as are common to him , with other living-creatures . EPicurus the Philosopher defines pleasure to be The taking away of every thing which may grieve a man : and in so defining it he sayes the same thing with him , who affirms it to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense . For hee sayes that our deliverance from that which grieveth us is pleasure : But seeing no generation consists of the same proprieties , with those things which proceed thereof , we must not thinke that the generation of pleasure , is pleasure ; but , some other thing beside pleasure . For the generation it selfe is conversant about ingendring ; but of all things which are begotten , there is nothing which is at once in begetting , and perfectly begotten ; seeing it is evident that the acting and the finishing of an act , are distinct things , perfected by degrees . But that which taketh pleasure is delighted all at once ; therefore pleasure cannot be a generation . Furthermore , every generation is a making of things which are not formerly in being ; but pleasure cōcerneth such things as have their being already ; therefore pleasure cannot be a generation . Again , generation may bee said to be speedy or slow ; but so is not pleasure said to be . Moreover , of good things , some be the habit , some the operation , and some the instruments . The habit , as vertues ; the operation , as the action agreeable to vertue . Again , the habit is as the faculty of seeing ; the operation , as the seeing it selfe ; and the instruments whereby wee worke , as the eye , riches , and such like . Now all the powers of the soule which are conversant about good or evill things , are the faculties of some habits or other . Therefore , if pleasure bee a good thing , and not an evill thing ; these are the onely things in which it can bee conversant . But it cannot bee a habit ; neither is it as a vertue ; for then it could not be so easily changed into griefe , which is contrary thereunto : neither as it is contrary to privation ; seeing it is impossible that a habit , and a privation , should meet in the same subject ; as pleasure and griefe may . For there bee some who take pleasure , and are grieved both at once ; as they who are gently scratched when they itch ; therefore pleasure is not a habit . Neither is pleasure an instrument ; For instruments are ordained in respect of other things , not in respect of themselves , now pleasure is not for any other thing , but for it selfe only , and therefore it cannot be an instrument . Pleasure must be therefore an operatiō ; & indeed Aristotle defines the same to be an operation of a habit that is agreeable unto nature : but by this definition , felicitie should bee pleasure , ( seeing felicitie is such an operation as he defineth ; ) and so his definition is false . Therefore Aristotle thus correcteth his definition ; pleasure ( saith hee ) is the end of the operations of a living-creature , which are void of incumbrance , and agreeable to nature : So pleasure may bee , as it were , wrapped up , and coexist , together with felicity ; but felicity cannot be pleasure . Now every operation is not a motion ; for some operation is practised without motion , such was the operation which God used in the first creation ; for the first mover of all things is unmoveable ; such also is the operation of contemplation , which man useth ; for it is exercised without motion ; because the subject of contemplation is alwayes one and the same ; and the minde of him that contemplates , alwayes firmly setled upon that object of contemplation . If then , the pleasure that is in contemplation ( and which is the greatest , the principall , and the onely true pleasure ) be exercised without motion ; it is plaine that such pleasures as have the fewest motions , are by so much the better , and the greater , as their motions are the fewer . Pleasures , together with their operations are diversly distinguished ; for there be so many pleasures , as of their operations : when the operations are good , the pleasures are good also ; and if the operations bee naught , such are the pleasures . That there bee sundry sorts of pleasure in respect of every sense , it is very manifest ; for there be many pleasures both in touching and tasting ; and great diversitie also in the pleasures of the sight , of the hearing , and of the smell : and the purer senses are they which keepe the farthest distance from their objects , which delight them , as the slight , the hearing , and the smell . There bee two sorts of the operations of the minde , the one in practise , the other in contemplation ; and therefore it is evident , that there are two sorts of pleasure which follow these operations ; and that those which follow the contemplation are more pure , then those which follow the practise . The pleasures of the minde ( or understanding ) are proper to man as hee is man ; but they which pertaine to the sense , are common to him with other living-creatures , in respect of his being a living-creature . Now seeing it is thus , and that some are delighted with such pleasures , as pertaine to sense , and others with some other pleasures ; those pleasures onely are to be accounted good of their owne nature , which are judged good , not of evill men , but of good men : For in doubtfull matters , every common fellow is not a competent judge ; but he that is both skilfull , and regulateth himselfe according to the rule of ( undepraved ) nature . CAP. 19. I. Of Griefe , and the severall kindes thereof ; and how farre a good man may be subject thereunto II. Excesse chanceth only in bodily pleasures , not in those which are mentall . ALL Griefe is of one of these kindes ; namely , astonishing griefe , called by the greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , care ; tearmed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , envy and pitty . Astonishing griefe , is that which bereaveth us of the use of our voice ; care is a griefe burthenous unto us . Envy is a griefe , springing from the wel-fare of other men ; and pitty is a griefe arising from the adversity of others . Every griefe is evill in respect of it owne nature ▪ for albeit a good man bee sometime grieved , when hee seeth good men oppressed , or his children or his country spoiled , hee grieveth not for the sorrowes sake , as if it were good in it selfe to grieve ; but for a respect unto other circumstances : Hee that is a delighted in contemplation is not moved with such things , because he hath altogether estranged his minde from earthly affaires , and devoted himselfe wholly unto God. And hee that is otherwise a good man , is moved by the circumstance of grief in such a meane , as never brings him into subjection thereunto ; but rather subdues them unto himselfe . If you make the comparison betweene an evill thing , and a good thing , griefe is then contrary unto pleasure , which is used measurably ; but if the comparison be betweene evill and evill , griefe is the contrary to an immoderate pleasure . But these Excesses happen onely in the pleasures of the body : For the pleasure which is taken in contemplation , ( even when it is in the highest degree , and hath attained unto perfection ) admits no excesse ; neither is there any griefe set in a contrariety thereunto ; nor doth it serve to cure any preceding griefe . CAP. 20. I. Of Feare , and the sixe parts thereof ; with their definitions and differences . II. The cause of feare , and the instrument of that griefe . NExt griefe ( in generall ) wee will describe Feare , which is divided into sixe parts ; Sloth , Bashfulnesse , Shame , Amazednesse , Carefulnesse , and Terror . Sloth is when we feare lest we should be compelled to worke . Amazednesse is a feare which ariseth in us when some huge and unusuall thing appeareth Terror is a trembling , or shuddering , occasioned by some dreadfull object . Carefulnesse is when wee feare losing that which we have , or of missing that which we desire ; for by the fear ▪ of these things , wee are brought into a carefull agony . Bashfulnesse is the feare of some rebuke or disgrace ; and is a very honest passion . Shame is a feare begotten in us upon the remembrance of some evill which we have committed : And where this is found there is remaining some hope of goodnesse and amendment . And this is the difference betwixt bashfulnesse , and shame , he that is ashamed is troubled through feare of such things as hee hath done ; but he that is abashed feares lest some reproach may befall him : But the old writers use the words indifferently , calling shame bashfulnesse ; and bashfulnesse shame . The cause of feare is a cold that generally surprizeth us , by reason our whole heat ( by the sudden apprehension of some thing ) is driven unto the heart , as to the principall part ; even as the people flie to their Governours , when they are frighted . The instrument which this griefe useth , is the belly ( or mouth of the stomach ) For there the biting is first felt : And Galen in his third book of Demonstrations , writeth to this purpose ; When men are grieved ( saith hee ) choller flowes plentifully into the stomach , which causeth a biting ; and that griefe , and biting never ceaseth untill they have vomited out the choller . They feele this biting underneath the gristle which is in the middle of the breast ; which gristle is like a sword , and thereof is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but the heart lyeth much higher . For the Stomach is placed under the midriffe , and the heart above it . The old writers did use also to give the name of the heart to the mouth of the stomach ; as namely , Hippocrates ; & Thucidides , when hee talketh of the plague . His words be these , And when it came with some strength unto the heart , ( meaning the stomach ) it made it give up ; and there came from it as many purgations of choller , as have been named of the Physitians . For , that which is turned up , and forced to vomit , is the mouth of the stomach , and not that bowel which we call the heart . CAP. 21. I. Of Anger , and of the names and nature of the three severall parts thereof Choller , Wrath , and Fury . II. The true office and use of anger . SUch a heating of the blood , about the heart , as is caused by an exhalation of choller troubling the same , is termed Anger , and therefore it is named also choller , and wrath : And sometime it is a desire of revenge ; for if we have beene injured , or but suppose our selves injured , we are then angry ; and that passion is usually mixed , both of anger , and of a desire which wee have to be revenged . Anger is of three sorts or species . The first is called by the greekes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; for it is but the first heat , or beginning , ( as it were ) of anger , and may be named in English choller , or an angry displeasure . The second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , so called of the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which implies a delaying . or tarrying , or a thing-laid up in memory , and meaneth a continuing , or inverterate anger . The last is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , derived of a word signifiing to lye in waite ; and is a revenging anger , waiting opportunities of revenge . Anger , is appointed to waite upon reason ; and when any thing is done wherewithall reason may justly be displeased , anger immediately taketh hold thereof ( as shee ought to doe ) if reason , and anger keep their limits and naturall course . CAP. 22. Of that irrationall part of the Soule , which is not obedient unto reason . LEt us now speake of that part of the soul , which is not subject unto reason : For having declared that part which is obedient unto reason , wee shall in good order proceed to those faculties which are disobedient thereunto ; namely the faculty of nourishing , of ingendring , and of the pulses . The faculties of nourishing , and ingendring are tearmed naturall ; and the faculty of the pulses , is called vitall . CAP. 23. I. Of the nourishing power of the soul , and the foure faculties thereof . II. Of the severall evacuations . III. Of the severall instruments , of nourishment , and of the particular offices of those instruments . ALL the naturall faculties of the nourishing power , are these foure ; an attractive appetite , a retentive power , a distributing , and an expulsive ( or avoiding facultie : for every part of the living-creature , doth naturally draw unto it selfe such nourishment , as is convenient for the same : when it is attracted , it preserveth it : when the same is kept a due time , it changeth the same into it selfe ; and then expelleth whatsoever proveth to be superfluous . These are the faculties which order the nourishment of the parts of the body ; and by these it groweth to an augmentation both in breadth and height . The wayes or passages , by which all superfluities bee avoided , are , by the belly , by urine , by vomits , by sweats , by the mouth , by the nostrils , by the eares , by the eyes , by breathings out , and by invisible pores , and unknowne passages . All the first evacuations are manifestly preceived , as that excrement called the eare-waxe , by the eares ; the teares and the gumme ( which wee call the spethyme ) by the eyes ; and that moisture also which maketh bleare-eyed : the out-breathings likewise , by which a sowltry heat is evaporated from the heart . But by those which we call unknowne passages , there breathes out ( insensibly ) a moisture over all the body , wherewith many humours are evacuated , from the very depth and drawing together of the arteries ; and they are conveyed through the skin where it is rarified . The instruments of the nourishing faculty , are the mouth , the stomach , the belly , the liver , all the veines , the intrailes , both sorts of choller , and the reines . The mouth prepares the food before-hand for the belly , dividing it into small parts , by the teeth and tongue : for in chewing the tongue is very helpfull in gathering the meat together , and in applying it unto the teeth ; and as the women which grinde corne , thrust the graines unto the milstone with their hands ; so the tongue is as it were a hand to assist in the chewing of our meat . The food being thus wrought before-hand , is conveyed into the belly by the stomach ; which is a place not onely ordained to feele what wee want , but to bee a passage-way also , to convey the meat unto our bellies : for the stomach riseth up when wee eat or drinke , and ( drawing unto it that which we swallow down ) sendeth it into the belly . When the belly hath received the same ; it severs that which is profitable for nourishment , from that which is woody , stony , or unfit for nutriment . That which is good , is there changed into humours ; which are thence caried up to the liver by veines ordained for that purpose , and which are as it were certaine rivulets to convey it thither . These veines are in the liver , in the maner of rootes , drawing thither from the belly , the juyce of our food , even as the roots of plants draw nourishment from the earth : And the belly may bee resembled unto the earth , which ministreth nourishment unto the plants : The veines like rootes , cary the humour from the belly , from the intrailes , and from the great doubleskin , which fastneth our bowels , unto the back , unto the gates and to the bunches of the liver . The liver it selfe may be compared unto the stemme or body of the plant . The veines which issue by divers wayes from the hollow veine , springing from the flatt parts of the liver ; are like springs , and boughts . After the liver hath received the humour from the belly , it both concocts it , and makes it also like unto it selfe : for the liver consisting of such flesh as hath a neare allyance unto blood , easily converts that humour into blood . This blood is cleansed by the spleen , by that bladder which receives the gall ; and by the reines : for the spleene attracts unto it all the dregs of the blood , and is nourished thereby . The bladder ( called the gall ) which receives the choller , drawes unto it selfe , the sharpnesse which remained in the juyce of our food . The reines , doe as it were straine out that thin humour which is like whey , and the sharpnesse also which temaineth in that humour : After all which , the blood becomming pure and good , is distributed for a nourishment unto all other parts of the body , by such veines as are dispersed abroad into every mēber . By this meanes every part of the body drawing blood unto it , retaineth and converteth so much thereof as is proportionable , into it own substance ; the rest it sendeth to the next part , and so to the next , that it may yeeld nourishment unto them . Thus , all the body is in every part nourished , and hath growth and continuance by the blood , which is distributed from the liver : And this part is termed irrationall , and said not to bee obedient unto reason ; because that which it performeth , is not executed according to our choice ( or as we our selves will ) but naturally ; and according to it owne nature . CAP. 24. I. Of the pulses , and of their offices . II. Of the excellent and usefull disposition of the sinowes , the veines , and arteries ; and of the severall fountaines of these . III. Of the mutuall benefit and assistance also , which these three are to each other . THe motion of the Pulses is called a vitall power : For , having beginning from the heart ( and especially from the left portion thereof , which is called the place of the spirits ) it distributes unto every part of the body , an ingraffed and a vitall-heat , by meanes of the arteries ; even as the liver distributes food by the veines . If therefore the heart be inflamed above the due measure which nature doth require ; the intire living-creature is forthwith brought into an unnaturall heat : and is in like maner cooled , if the heart be cooled beyond a just proportion ; because the vitall-spirit is dispersed from the heart by the arteries , into every part of the body . For it is ordered in such maner , that ( for the most part ) these three ; the veine , the artery , and the sinew , bee so divided , that they goe all together , proceeding from the three principall parts , which governe the intire living-creature . From the braine , which is the fountaine both of motion and of sense , proceeds the sinew . From the liver , which yeeldeth a beginning to the blood , and the nourishing-faculty , comes the veine , which is the vessell wherein the blood is caried . And from the heart , which is the root of our vitall-faculty , comes the artery , which is that vessell wherein the spirits are conveyed . These three accompany one another , and receive profit and assistance each from other . For the veine administers a certaine nourishment of blood to the sinew , and to the artery . The artery imparts naturall heat , and vitall-spirits to the veine , and therefore it is not possible to finde either an artery altogether voide of a thin kinde of blood : or a veine without spirits , of a vapoury nature . The artery is forcibly opened and contracted againe , with a certain harmony and proportion ; having the beginning of that motion from the heart . And when it is opened , it sucks and draws a thin kinde of blood , from the veines that are neare unto it ; which blood being resolved into exhalations , becommeth a nourishment to the vitall-spirits : when it is closed againe , it empties the sowltry heat which is in it , by certaine invisible pores , throughout the body ; even as the heart sends from it selfe , the sowltry heat which oppresseth it , by evaporations , both at the nostrills , and the mouth . CAP. 25. I. Of the propagating , or generating faculty , and how farre the same is in mans power . II. The instruments of propagation , and their offices . III. The opinions of Aristotle , Democritus , and Galen ; concerning the seed of the Woman . EVen the faculty of generatiō pertaineth also to that part of the soule , which is not obedient unto reason . For we yeeld seed in our dreame ( or sleepe ) whether we will or no ; and our desire of copulation is so naturall , that the desire is moved in us , even against our wills . But the act it selfe is indeed , and without question , in our owne power , and pertaineth to the minde ; for it is brought to passe by those instruments which are serviceable to the naturall-appetite ; and to abstain from our appetite , or to master the same , was ( by God ) naturally placed in our power , ( and may be so continued , if timely endeavour hath not beene omitted . ) The instruments of a potentiall generation , are first the veines and arteries : For in these the first humor ( that is not fully perfected into seed ) is ingendred , and the blood there changed , even as milke in the dugs . And forasmuch as they were first made of seed , this humour is a nourishment unto those vessels ; and the veines and arteries , doe concoct the blood into a moisture , like unto seed , that they might be nourished thereby : And when they have due nourishment , that serveth for generation which remaineth . For it is first caried up into the head by a large circuit , and from thence brought downe againe , by two veines and two arteries . Therefore , if a man cut the veines which are about , or neare the eares , it makes the living-creature unfit for generation . Of these veines and arteries , is compacted that folded skin , which riseth like a swollen veine , in the Cod , and where this moisture ( comming neare unto the nature of seed ) falleth into either of the Testicles . There is one veine , and one artery full of seed : In these it is perfected , and is driven forth by the folded seminall veine , which is behinde the Testicles , by a winde . That winde proves that an artery sends it forth ; and that it is caried by a veine , may appeare by those who are overmuch addicted unto Venerie : For they that use carnall-copulation overmuch , therby wasting their seed , and that seminall humour , which commeth near unto the nature of seed , ( if they further provoke themselves ) pure blood is then strained from them . Women have the same parts which men have : this only is the difference , men have them outwardly , and they inwardly . But Aristotle and Democritus were of opinion that the seed of the woman , is no way usefull in the generation of children . For they conceive that which proceeds from the woman to bee a sweating of the place , rather then any seed of generation . But Galen condemning Aristotles opinion , affirmes that women have their seed also , and that the mingling of both seeds together is the cause of conception ; and thereupon ( saith hee ) their accompanying together in that act is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a copulation . Yet he judgeth not the seed of the woman to be so perfect as the mans ; but to be moister , and somewhat lesse concocted , and as it were a nourishment unto the seed of the man. Of that seed , those parts are composed which are about the utmost places of the wombe , and which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( skin wrapped about the skin wherin the infant lieth ) and ordained for a vessell to receive the superfluities of the childe . In all sorts of living-creatures , the Female takes the male when shee may conceive ; and such as are able to conceive at all times ( as hens , doves , and women ) are at all times desirous to accompany the male : But women only accept of the males company when they have conceived ; for all other creatures usually reject the male after conception . As for hens , they are daily trodden , because they do lay almost every day . Women , as they bee at their own liberty in other things ; so they are at liberty also to accompany with men after conception ; whereas living-creatures void of reason , are governed not of themselves , but by nature ; admitting such a measure , and such times , as are dictated unto them , by a naturall instinct . CAP. 26. This Chapter mentioneth other divisions of the faculties belonging to a living-creature . DIvision is made of those faculties which pertain unto a living-creature in another maner : For it is affirmed that some faculties are mentall , some naturall , and some vitall . They which are mentall are in our owne choice and election ; they which are not in our election , are naturall , and vitall . The faculties belonging unto the minde are two , the motion of appetite , and of sense . To the motion of our appetite , these faculties are appertaining ; Progression from place to place , the motion of the whole body , speech and respiration : For it is in our power to doe , or to omit these things . But the naturall , and vitall faculties are not in our power ; for they goe forward , nill we will we ; as the faculty of nourishing , of growing , and of propagation : all which are naturall faculties , and so doth likewise the facultie of the pulses , which is vitall . As for the instruments ( of these faculties ) mentioned by others , wee have already treated of them , wee will therefore speake of the instruments of those things which belong unto our appetite ( or choice ) CAP. 27. I. Of the motion proceeding voluntarily from us : of the place where it assumeth beginning ; and the instruments which it useth . II. The wise providence of the Creator , in uniting together things naturall & mentall , &c. THe motion which belongeth to our assent ( or choice ) and proceedeth voluntarily from us , taketh beginning from the braine , and from the marrow of the chine , which is it selfe a part of the braine . The instruments thereof are the sinewes that spring from these , the ligaments , and muscles . The composure of these muscles , is flesh , and the strings in the blood ; which are like sinewes and grisles wrapped up together , with sinewie-strings . And some are of opinion , that they are sensible ; because that sense proceedeth from the sinewes , where withall they are folded up . The grisly-end of the muscle is compounded both of a ligament , and of certaine small sinewes ; yet this grisly-end differs from a sinew in this , that every sinew hath sense in it , and is round , and somewhat tender , and assumeth also his beginning from the braine : whereas this grisly end , is more hard , sometime also flat , having likewise his originall from the bone , and is in it selfe void of sense . The hands are an instrument , ordained to lay hold of things , and so convenient for the exercise of arts , above other members , that if the hands , or but the fingers only should be taken away , wee are made unapt for almost every art . And therefore man onely received hands from his Creator , because he onely is indued with reason , which makes him capable of arts . The feet are instruments ordained for going ; for by them wee remove and passe from place to place . And man can sit firmely without a prop , because he only makes two right-angles by the bowing of his legs ; the one inward , the other outward . Whatsoever things therefore ( in man ) are moved by sinewes , and muscles , belong to the minde ; and hee hath a free liberty in the use of them ; Among these ( as we have already shewed ) the senses and the voice are to be accounted ; and therefore this hath beene hitherto a discourse , probably setting forth , as well those things which are mentall , as those which are naturall . For the Creator according to his exceeding wise for-sight , hath folded up things mentall with such as are naturall ; and things naturall , with such as appertaine unto the minde . And whereas the avoiding of superfluities belongs to the expulsive faculty ( which is counted one of those that is naturall ) that wee might not behave our selves filthily in avoiding our excrements , without regarding the time , the place , and such other circumstances as are comely ; he hath appointed the muscles to bee as it were Porters , to order our evacuations ; and of things which were of themselves meerely naturall , hee hath made them to be mentall , and such as depend upon the rule of the minde . And thereupon , when wee are provoked unto any evacuations , we are able ( if cause bee ) to containe them very often , and very long . Certaine sinewes which bee soft and sensible , are sent downe both from the middle-pan , and also from the two former pans of the braine : Other sinewes which are harder , and serve us for motion , proceed from that brain-pan , which is in the hinder part of the head , and from the marrow of the back . Among these , those are the harder which come from the spinall-marrow : and of them , those are the hardest of all , which proceed from the lowest parts of the marrow of the back : For by how much farther the marrow of the chine descendeth from the braine ; so much the more hard is the chine-marrow of it selfe , and the sinews also which doe spring from the same . And as we have received the senses double ; so the sinewes have a twofold springing also from us . For every joynt of the chine sends forth a couple of sinewes ; one issuing toward the rightside , and another toward the left ; yea , and almost our whole body is divided also into two parts , the one on the right , and the other on the left side . Thus likewise are our feet , our hands , the seats of our senses , and other parts divided . CAP. 28. I. Of respiration ; of the instrument , of the use , and of the causes of that faculty . II. Of the composure and use of the Lungs , and of such other parts as are assisting to respiration . III. Of those parts of a living-creature , which are made for themselves alone ; for others , and for themselves ; or altogether for others . HERE wee will treat of respiration , which is also a worke belonging to the minde : For by the muscles the breast is opened , which is the principall instrument of respiration . Our sighing also , and our thick drawing of breath , when any great sorow happeneth unto us , is an evidence , that the operation hereof belongeth unto the minde . Moreover , the variations , and alterings of our breathing , whensoever need requires , are in our power : For if we be grieved in any part serviceable to respiration , or in such parts as are moved by the motion of any of these ; as the midriffe , the liver , the spleene , the stomach , the small-guts , or the lowest-gut , we then breath short and thick . Wee breath short , that we may not over-vehemently smite the grieved part ; we breath also thick , that the often breathing may supply what is wanting in the length of our blast . When our leg is wounded , wee set it forth very leisurely in our going ; which is done to the same end , for which we breath short ; and therefore as to goe from place to place belongs unto the minde , so doth also this operation of respiration . But although we should rest and not goe at all it were possible for us to live a long time , whereas it were impossible for us to hold our breath the tenth part of an houre , without death ; because the naturall heat which is in us , would bee choaked up and quite extinct by a sowltry fume . For it is as if a man should cover a fire within a small vessell , having no vent ; which would be immediately stifled and quenched by it owne fume . For this cause it is very necessary that when wee are asleepe , our soul should worke neverthelesse in this part ; because if it should be idle therein ( though for a very small time ) the living-creature would perish : And in this it is againe manifested , how the endeavour of the minde and of nature are knit together . For the minde exerciseth respiration , by an artery which is a naturall instrument ; and it is alwaies in motion , that neither it owne work , nor the work of the other arteries may be intermitted . This not being perceived by some , ( to wit , how the minde and nature joyne together in this worke ) they supposed respiration to bee onely a naturall faculty . Three things cause respiration , the use , the power , and the instruments . The use is twofold : one for the preservation of our naturall heat , and the other for the nourishment of the vitall-spirits . The preservation of our naturall heat consisteth both of drawing in , and breathing out of aire , For the drawing of the breath doth not onely coole , but ( in a mediocrity ) stirreth up heat also . The breathing out of the aire , drives away the foggy heat which is about the heart ( whereas nourishment of the vitall-spirits , is respiration onely ) for the heart is dilated abroad , and a certaine portion of aire is attracted thereunto . The power ( which is a cause also of respiration ) is that which it hath from the soule : for it is the minde which moves the instruments of respiration , by meanes of the muscles ( and especially by the breast ) wherewith our lungs , and the sharp arteries ( which are also a part of the lungs ) are moved . For that part of the sharp artery , which is gristly , is the instrument of the voice ; the ligaments thereof which are like skinnes , are instruments of respiration : and that which is composed of both together ( which is the forementioned artery ) is the instrument both of respiration , and of the voice . The lungs therefore are a composition folded up together , and consisting of these foure , a sharp artery , a smooth artery , a veine , and of a spumie flesh ; which flesh doth fill up all the void places of the folded skin , as it were a moist bed , ( or the herbe Sleve ) both of the two arteries and of the veine ; so that it becommeth both a seat for them , and a band keeping them together . The flesh of the lungs , doth naturally cōcoct the spirits ; as the liver concocts the humour which commeth from the belly : And as the liver , with his utmost edges or skirts , spreads it selfe about the belly , because it needeth heat , so the lungs inclose even the very middle of the heart ; because it needeth some cooling by respiration . To the sharp artery the gristle of the winde-pipe is immediately joyned , being compounded of three great gristles , whereunto the throat is annexed , and which are continued unto the mouth and nostrils , by both which , we draw the aire that is without us . From the mouth it ascendeth by a bone like unto a sieve , or like a sponge , which is full of holes , that the braine may not be harmed , if there bee any excesse in the qualities of the aire , or if too much winde should enter into it at once . Here hath also the Creator placed the nose both for smelling and respiration , according as hee hath ordained the tongue , for the voice , for the tasting , and for chewing . Thus the most principall parts , serving both for the very being of the living-creature , and for the necessary uses of this life , are divided together with the powers of the minde : and if any thing hath beene formerly omitted , it may bee understood by that which is now expressed . Now as it falls out in all other created things , that some are made onely for their own sakes ; some for themselves and others also ; some onely for the sakes of others ; and that some things fall out accidentally , together with such things as are made ; Even thus you shall find it to be also in the parts of a living-creature . For all the forenamed instruments , of those three principall things which governe the living-creature , are made for their owne sakes : For those things are especially and principally made which are named according to their proper nature ; and are ingendred in the wōb even of the seed it selfe , as the bones are . But the yellow choller is made both in respect of it selfe , & some other thing ; For it helpeth concoction , stirreth up to the avoiding of excrements , and ( in that respect ) is in some sort , one of the parts that serveth for nourishment . Moreover , it ministreth unto the body a certaine heat , as doth our vitall-faculty ; and in respect of all these things , it seemeth to bee made for it owne sake : But in that it purgeth our blood , it seemeth after a sort , to be made in respect of the blood . The spleen also helpeth concoction ; and that not a little : For being tart , and of a sharp astringent nature ; it bindeth the belly by powring out into the same , the avoidance of a black moisture ; Yea , it strengtheneth it also ; assisteth concoction , and purgeth the liver : For which causes , that part also seemeth to have beene ordained in respect of the blood . The reines likewise are a purgation for the blood , and a cause of the desire which we have to carnall copulation : For the veines , which ( as we have declared before ) doe fall down into the cods , passe along by the reines ; and from thence carry with them a certaine sharpnesse , which provoketh lust , even as a certaine sharp moisture which is under the skin , procureth an itch . And looke how much the flesh of the stones , is tenderer then the other skin of the body ; by so much the more , ( being tickled by that sharpnesse ) are they stirred up to the ejaculation of seed . These things therefore and such like , are made both for their owne sakes , and also in respect of other things . But the kernels , and the flesh are only ordained in respect of other things . For the kernells doe serve to cary up and underprop the vessels , that they may not be broken when they are lifted up , or stretched forth with any violent motions . And the flesh was made to be a covering to the other parts ; that it might coole the living-creature in the summer , by being as it were , a morning dew thereunto , and that it might in the winter bee as it were a quilt of wooll to the parts of the body . The skin was ordained as a covering , both for the tender flesh , and all those parts that are inward . The flesh is of a nature hardened like a scar , by reason of the aire which compasseth it about , and by meanes of those other bodies wherewithall it is conversant . The bones are an undersetting to the whole body , and especially the chine of the back , which is termed the foundation of a living creature . The nailes are most commonly used to scratch withall , by every living-creature ( which hath nails ) and they are also for sundry particular uses , to divers living-creatures . For they are given to many for a defence ; as to those which have crooked talons ; and they be as it were an instrument to execute anger . Many have them both for a weapon of defence , and also for a strengthening to their feet , as horses ; and all such as divide not the hoofe . But nailes are bestowed on men , not onely to scratch themselves withall , and that they might by so doing , disperse the sharp moisture which is under the skin : but that they might also take the firmer hold of small things . For by help of them a very small thing may be taken up ; because their meeting one against another at the very ends of the fingers , enables to the taking of firme hold . The haires grow out accidentally with other things , by the meeting together of such fumy vapours as ascend out of the body ; and yet the Creator made not their accidentall generation , without some profitable use ; for they serve both to cover and beautifie living-creatures : They are a covering for goats and sheep ; they are an ornament unto men ; and they are both a covering , and an ornament to Lions . CAP. 29. I. Of things done voluntarily , and against our will. II. Of the definition of an action ; and of the circumstances which accompany , and follow an action . III. Of the marks both of a voluntary , and involuntary action . I Have often made mention of things done voluntarily , and by constraint , of which somwhat must be now expressed , lest errors may be occasioned through want of an exact knowledge of these . But hee that undertaketh to discourse of things done voluntarily and against our will , must in the first place set downe some assured rules , and certaine tokens , wherby it may be well discerned whether the thing done , be ( unquestionably ) voluntary , or against our will. Seeing therefore that every voluntarie thing consisteth in some action ; seeing moreover , that all those things which are said to be done against our will , consist in action also ( as shall bee anon declared ) and seeing likewise , some think that the thing which is done against our will , consisteth both in action & passion ; we wil ( before we proceed further ) define what an action is . An action is the actuall doing of any thing with the use of reason . After all actions , there followeth either praise or dispraise . Some actions are exercised with pleasure , and some with griefe . Some are to bee chosen by the doer , and some are to be avoided . Of thē which are to bee chosen , some are at all times to be made choice of ; some at one time rather then at another . The same circumstances are considerable in such actions as are to bee eschewed also ; and this moreover is observable , that some actions are pittied , some pardoned , some hated , and some punished . Now then , let these be the markes to discern the things which are willingly done ; namely , that praise or dispraise alwaies follow them ; that they are done with pleasure ; and that the actions are to bee chosen by the doers of them , either at all times , or at those times in which they are done . The notes of involuntary actions are these ; They are vouchsafed pardon ; or they are pittied , or they are done with griefe , and they are not done by our owne choice . These things being thus defined and ordered ; wee will first speake of such things as are done against our will. CAP. 30. I. The definition of an involuntary act . II. The solution of certaine questions concerning mixt actions , and an advise what is to bee done , when we know not what action to choose . III. Things done by inconstancy , by intemperancy , or anger , are not to be reputed things done against our will. SUch things as are done against our wil , are either done by constraint , or of ignorance . The beginning of those actions which are done against our will , by force , is without our selves ; that is , some other thing , and not we our selves is the cause thereof : and therefore this is the definition of that thing which is done against our will , by force . It is an action not having the beginning thereof in him which doth it ; and he which is forced thereunto doth nothing to further the same of his owne will. Wee meane , in this place , by the beginning , the cause-effecting the thing done . Hereupon it may bee questioned , when Shipmen cast their lading into the sea , when they are endangered by a tēpest ; ( or when a man is contented to suffer or doe some dishonest thing to save his friend or his country ) whether these actions may be said to bee done against their will , or no. And according to this clause added to the definition ( Hee that is forced , doth nothing to further the matter of his owne will ) these actions do seeme to be voluntary ; because to the executing of such things , the actors doe of themselves move their instrumentall parts , even of their owne accord . Such is their case who cast their lading into the Sea ; and theirs who offer themselves to abide any shame or danger to bring to passe a greater good , as did Zeno , who bitt off his owne tongue , and spit it out into the face of Dionysius the tyrant , because he would not utter unto him what was to bee kept secret ; or as did Anaxarchus the Philosopher , who chose to be tormented unto death , by being rowled up together like a wheele , rather then hee would disclose the secret of his friend unto Nicareon the Tyrant . Therefore , generally , when a man either chooseth a lesse evill , through feare of some greater evil ; or , when a man accepts the lesse Good , in hope of a greater Good , ( which he cannot otherwise attaine according as hee would ) that thing which in such cases he doth or suffereth , is not utterly against his will : for he doth or suffers by his owne advise , and choice ; and such things are to bee made choice of at that time , though they be not to bee chosen of their owne nature . These are mixt actions , partly voluntary , and partly against our will : For , they are voluntary in respect of the circumstances ; but they are involuntary , in regard of the actions themselves ; and were it not for the circūstances , no man would make choice of doing such things . Moreover the praise or dispraise which followes such actions , declare them to be voluntary : for neither praise nor dispraise follow such things as are done absolutely by constraint . It is not easie to discerne what things are to be chosen before others , in some difficult cases : But for the most part , wee must choose rather to abide griefe , then commit any shamefull act ; as did both Ioseph , and Susanna ; and yet this holds not alwayes . For doubtlesse Origen fell grossely when he chose to sacrifice unto Idols , rather then to undergo that dishonestie which the Aethiopians would have put upon him . We see therefore , that the discerning of such things is not easie ; and we finde also , that it is very hard for them that have chosen , to continue in that which they have resolved upon ; because perills to come doe not so amaze or discourage us , as those torments which are presently inflicted . It so happeneth oftentimes , that they who have chosen well , doe depart from their owne choice by persecution ; as it hath happened unto some , who when they should have suffered martyrdome , fell back from their stout and resolute beginnings , by being through tenderness unable to endure the trials , and the torments of adversity , when they were inflicted upon them . Let no man imagine therefore , that either an inconstant falling away from a well chosen resolution , or an intemperate lust , or an angry rage , are to bee accounted among such offences as are to bee judged things done against our will ; by reason there is an efficient cause of those actions without our selves : For though the beauty of an harlot made them that saw her to rush into the execution of an intemperate lust ; and though such as are furiously angry , were so provoked thereunto by another man , that the first beginnings therof may bee truly affirmed to have beene without themselves ; yet the actors of such things doe worke by themselves , and by their instrumentall parts : for which cause their actions come not within the definition of things done by constraint ; even in regard they offered unto themselves the occasions , and beginnings of those actions ; and suffered themselves to bee easily incaptivated by passions , through an evill conversation . Therefore all they who doe such things , are worthily reprehended , as men voluntarily given to evill : and the evill is manifested to be voluntary , when they delight also in the deed ; because every thing done by constraint , hath griefe annexed thereunto . Thus much of things done against our will , by force ; we will now treate of such involuntary actions , as are done through ignorance . CAP. 31. I. Of things done against our will , through ignorance ; and of those actions which are , or are not altogether involuntary . II. The definition and markes of things done quite against our will ; and the difference between things done thorow ignorance , and those which we doe being ignorant . III. A catalogue of such particulars , the ignorance wherof makes an action to be involuntary . BY ignorance many things are done by us , whereof we rejoyce after the deed : As when a man killeth his enemy at unawares ( or against his will ) and yet is glad that he is slaine . These , & such like things , are neither accounted voluntary , nor altogether involuntary . Some things also are done through ignorance , for which we grieve after they are done : And those are usually called things done against our will , after the doing wherof we become grieved for the act . And by this it appeares that there be two sorts of things done by ignorance ; the one not volūtary , & the other quite against our will. It is our purpose therefore , to treat at this time of such things as are altogether against our will : because that which wee call not voluntary ( as aforesaid ) may rather be reduced to those things which are voluntary in regard it is mixt of both . For though it hath a beginning by constraint , yet the end is voluntary ; because by the event , that becomes voluntary , which was first against our will. Therefore a thing done against our will , is defined in this manner ; That is an involuntary act , which is not only against our wil , but hath also griefe & repentance annexed thereunto . Moreover , it is one thing to doe an act through ignorance , and another thing to doe it , being ignorant : For if that thing which caused the ignorance be in our power , we doe it being ignorant ; but not by ignorance . For example , he that is accustomed unto drunkennesse , or to anger , and in his wrath or drunkennesse , committeth an evill ; he hath ( indeed ) drunkennesse , or anger , as a cause of those things which are done by him : But neverthelesse those things were voluntary ( for it was in his power not to have beene drunke ( or so inraged ) and therefore in not suppressing those inordinate appetites , hee himselfe was cause of his own ignorance ; and may in that regard be said to have done that evil being ignorant ; but cannot be truly said to have done it through ignorance : Neither is his act to bee accounted as done , by constraint , but voluntarily ; for that cause he who doth commit such things is justly reprehended by good men : Even because his drunkennesse ( which occasioned that act ) being voluntary , makes the act which was therby occasioned , to be voluntary also . But we are said to doe things through ignorance , when wee our selves gave no cause of that ignorance ; and when the deed was by chance . As if a man should shoot in an usuall shooting place , & happen to hit and slay his father walking thereabout . It is plaine by that which is aforesaid , that the actions of such a man are not to bee accounted as done against his will , who is ignorant of such things as it behooveth him to know ; or which reputes evill things to bee goo : For this ignorance proceeds from his owne wickednesse ; and as his actions are vitious , so his ignorance also is to be accounted as a vice , for which he is worthy of reprehensiō . And reprehension is due only to those things which are voluntarily done . For the ignorance of generall ( or universall ) things ; or of such as are in choice , is not accounted to bee a thing involuntary ; but the ignorance of particular things onely , is esteemed such : For we may be ignorant of particular things against our will. But of universall things , our ignorance is accounted voluntary ; because such an ignorance cannot bee in us without our owne fault ; except we are madmen , or Idiots . This being thus determined , it now resteth to be declared , what those particulars are of which we speake ; and they are the same which the Rhetoricians call the parts or circumstāces of things done . ( To wit ) WHO , WHOM , WHAT , WITH WHAT , WHERE , WHEN , in WHAT MANER , for WHAT CAUSE , ( To which may bee added according to our English game used for an exercise of wit , WHAT FOLLOVVED , or the event of that which was done . ) The persons are either he who did it , or he to whom the thing was done ; as if the Sonne should smite his Father at unawares . The thing done , is the action it selfe ; as if I intended to to give one a little blow on the eare , and thereby struck out his eye . The instrument ; as whē one flings a very stone , and thinkes it but a pommy stone . The place ; as when at the turning of a lane two meet , and one unexpectedly overthrowes the other . The time ; as if in the night a man should kill his friend , supposing him his enemy . The manner ; as if he should give one a small blow , without any great violence , and yet thereby slay him ( for he knew not that one could have dyed by so small a stroke . ) The cause ; as if one should minister a medicine for a cure , which might prove deadly and kill his patient . Of all these particulars together , no man can bee ignorant , except hee that is mad ( or a very Idiot . ) But whosoever is ignorant of the most of these , or in the principall of them , is accounted to doe things through ignorance . And the principall among such circumstances , are ; Wherefore it was done ; and What was done . That is to say ; the cause , and the matter it selfe . CAP. 32. I. Of things done voluntarily ; and the definition of such actions . II. Whether things which have a naturall course , as concoction , and the like , may be termed voluntary , &c. III. They who acknowledge not those actions to be voluntary , which proceed from the passions , doe thereby take away the morall-vertues , &c. OF those things which are done by constraint , there being two sorts ; the one done through ignorance , and the other by compulsiō ; the thing which is voluntary , doth on the contrary answer unto these two , and is neither done by compulsion , nor through ignorance . That action is done without compulsion , wherof the beginning was in the doers ; and an action is voide of ignorance , when none of those particular circumstances , are unknown , in which , and by which , the deed consisteth : And therefore wee joyne both together , and thus define it ; That is voluntary , whereof the beginning is in the doer , who knoweth all those particular circumstances , wherein the deed consisteth . It may now be questioned whether naturall things ( as our concoction , and our growth ) bee to be accounted voluntvry : but , wee answer ( as is before shewed ) that such things are neither voluntary , nor of constraint ▪ because both voluntary things , and such as are by constraint , are esteemed among such things as are in our power ; but our concoction , and our growth are not in our power : therefore though wee are ignorant of the particular circumstances ; yet for that they are not in our power , they are neither to bee accounted things voluntary , nor of constraint . But it hath been declared before , that things done of wrath or concupiscence , are voluntary ; For when these passions are moderated , they are commended who so governe them ; and such as offend in them , are for the same reproved , or hated . Moreover , pleasure or griefe ensue upon the doing of them ; and the beginnings of these actions also , was in the doers themselves , because they were made able so to have governed their appetites , that they might not have beene lightly transported by them , if they had endeavoured according to their power . By practise and custom such passions may be corrected ; for if it were true , that they were absolutely by constraint , then doubtlesse neither unreasonable-creatures , nor infants , doe any thing voluntarily , ( but by constraint ; because they are moved by their appetite . ) But that is not so , for we see them goe to their food of their owne accord without any compulsion thereunto . It is they themselves which make speed unto it of themselves ; yea , and not of ignorance , aswell as not of compulsion : For , they know their food ; they are glad of it , when they see it ; they presently hast toward it upon sight thereof , as unto a thing knowne ; and are grieved if they misse of the same . By this , a voluntary thing is assuredly knowne from that which is involantary ; even by the delight which followes the obtaining that which is desired ; and by the griefe which followes , if the desire be made frustrate : for even beasts doe voluntarily covet ; yea , and are voluntarily angry also , in regard anger hath some pleasure annexed thereunto . He that will not acknowledg those things to be voluntary , whereunto we are moved by anger , and a vehement appetite ; even he taketh away the morall-vertues ; seeing they consist in a mediocritie in respect of passions . If our passions bee of constraint ; then they also are forced actions which are done according to vertue ; because the doing of them belongeth to our passions . But no man will account that to bee of constraint , which is done by reason , by choice , by our owne motion , by our owne desire , with a knowledge also of the particular circumstances and by having the very beginning of the action in our selves , which are evident proofes that the thing done is voluntary , as hath been formerly declared . And now seeing wee have in many places made mention of our choice , and of such things as are in our power , wee will next discourse of such things as are in our choice . CAP. 33. I. Of such things as are in our choice , and what difference there is beewixt them , and things voluntary . II. Choice is neither the concupiscible , nor the irascible appetite , nor will , nor opinion , nor consultation . III. The definition of choice , and about what it is conversant . OF our Choice , the question may perhaps bee asked whether it be not all one with that which wee call voluntary ; because every thing done by choice is voluntary . To which we answer , It is not so ; for they are not termini convertibiles , which they should be , if a thing done by our choice , and a thing voluntary were all one . The thing that is voluntary , is larger then that which is by choice ; for all choice is voluntary ; but every thing that is voluntary , is not done by choice ; as appeares in children , and in unreasonable-creatures , who doe many things voluntarily , but not by choice . Though our friend commeth upon us unexpectedly , and so well contenteth us with his comming , that we are glad of it , yet we cannot say that it came to passe by our choice : and though hee that casually findes treasure , did willingly enough hit upon it , because it was a profitable booty ; yet he did not deliberately think upon such a thing before , therefore it may be from these things concluded , that a thing voluntary , and our choice is not all one . Neither is our appetite and our choice all one . For our appetite is divided into these three , desire , anger , and will. Now , that our choice is neither anger , nor the desire of a thing , it is made evident by this , that man doth therein not agree with irrationall-creatures ; whereas he doth agree with beasts in coveting , and in anger : And if in these last mentioned he agree with beasts , and differs from them in having a choice of things ; then it is manifest , that our choice is one thing , and that our desire and our anger are other distinct things . The same is proved by incontinent men , who are overcome by their lust , and prosecute the same contrary to their owne choice and judgements ; For even the incontinent mans judgement disliketh his lust ( & maketh choice of better things ) whereas if his choice and appetite were all one , neither of them would bee contrary unto the other . That choice and will are not all one , may bee proved by this ; that our Will doth not agree unto all things , whereunto our choice ( or judgement ) doth assent . For we have a will to be in health , or to be rich ; but to be in health , or to bee rich is not in our choice . Our will hath place even in things impossible ; but our choice cōsisteth in those only w ch are in our power . We may say that we would be immortall , but we cannot say , that to bee immortall is at our choice . For our will extendeth unto the end it selfe ; but our choice can reach no further then to the means which are in possibility to attaine that end : and there is betweene them the same proportion which there is betweene the thing subject unto our will , and that thing wherabout we enter into consultation ; for the subject of our will is the end of that which wee would have , and our consultation , is about the meanes , whereby wee may accomplish that end . Wee chuse those things onely which may be effected by us ; but our will extendeth unto such things as are not in our power to accomplish ; as when would that such or such a Commander should obtain the victory . It is then well enough proved that our choice is neither the concupiscible , nor the irascible appetite , nor our will ; and aswell by the same arguments , as by other also , it may bee made manifest ; that it is not opinion . For opinion extendeth not onely to things which are in our power , but to things eternall . Moreover , we say that an opinion is either true or false ; but to say our choice is either true or false , is an absurd saying . Opinion concerneth likewise universall things ; but our choice is conversant in particulars : For , our choice is of things to be undergone , ( enjoyed or done ) which are particular things . Neither is our choice all one with our consultation : For consultation is an advising about such things as are to be done ( suffered or enjoyed ) and that thing is to bee chosen which in consultation is preferred : yea , our consultation debates of things yet in question , whereas our choice reacheth to that which is already concluded most worthy . Wee have hitherto declared what this choice is not ; and we will now shew you what it is . Doubtlesse choice is a thing mixt of consultation , judgement , and appetite ; being neither the one nor the other , but a certaine compound of these . For as wee say that a living-creature , is a compound of soul and body ; and neither a body by it selfe , nor a soule alone ; but a thing made up of both together ; even so say wee also of this our choice . It is plaine by the very Etymologie therof , that it is a certaine counselling , or consultation , with an approbation of some one thing before the rest ; and that it is not altogether the same with consultation : For we are then onely accounted to have made choice , when one thing is taken before another . And no man preferreth any thing in choice , before he hath consulted , neither accepteth before hee hath judged . And seeing we are not willing to execute or admit of all these things , which wee well approve of ; then that which is preferred after consultation , is in choice ; and contained under our choice , when it taketh an appetite thereunto . Hereupon it necessarily followes also , that our choice is conversant in the same thing about which our consultation is imployed . Out of all which it may be concluded , that our Choice is an appetite , consulting of such things as are in our power ; or a Consultation with an appetite unto those things which are in our power . For , when wee chuse , we desire that which was preferred , after our consultation . But seeing wee have said that choice and consultation , are conversant about the self-same things ; we will declare next , what it is , about which this consultation is occupied ; and about what things wee consult . CAP. 34. I. Of consultation , and wherein it differs from a question . II. The definition of consultation , and as illustration thereof , by shewing what things are not proper subjects of consultation . III. Of the proper objects of consultation ; and of such other things as are pertinent thereunto . KEeping close unto our chiefe purpose , wee thinke it best ( before we declare about what things wee consult ) to determine wherein a consultation differs from a question . For a consultation and a question is not all one ; though he that consults calls things into question by his consultation ; but they differ very much . For wee seeke and aske , whether or no the Sunne be greater than the earth : but no man saith I consult whether the Sun bee greater than the Earth . A question is more generall , and as it were genus to consultation ; and the nature of it extends further ; For , every consultation is a kinde of questioning ; but every question is not a consultation , as hath been formerly declared . Our consideration is conversant sometime in consultation ; as when I consider whether I should goe to Sea , or not : and sometime it is conversant in debating things in the mind : as when I consider the liberall sciences ; for it is not proper to say wee consult of the Sciences . But the use of these words without distinction , hath made many to ●●re , and to conceive tho● things to bee the same , which are very different . Which difference being now discovered , wee will proceed to declare what the things are whereof we consult . We consult then of those things which are in our power ; even of such as may bee brought to passe by us ; and whose event is not manifest : That is , such as may fall out divers wayes . We define it to bee of those things which are in our power , because our consultation is onely of those things which are to be undertakē by us ; which things are in our power : For we doe not consult of that kinde of Philosophy , which is called contemplative ; neither of GOD ; nor of things which fall out of necessity ( by necessity I meane those things which fall out alwayes after one maner , as the Circuit of the yeare . ) Neither doe we consult of those things which are not alwayes permanent , and yet fall out to bee alwayes alike , as of the rising and setting of the Sunne . Neither of those things which fall out naturally ; yet not alwayes alike , but so for the most part onely ; as ; that a man of sixty should have gray haires ; or that a man of twenty should begin to have a beard . Neither consult wee of those things which chance naturally , but sometimes thus , and sometimes otherwaies , and not after any certaine time or measure ; as of showers , and droughts , and haile : Neither is consultation of those things which doe fall out by chance , and seldome , one while more , and another while lesse : For in respect of these things , this clause was added , that the thing ( consulted of ) should be in our power . The definition saith further , that it must bee of things which may be done by VS . Because we doe not consult of all men ; neither of every thing , but of those which are in our power to consult of : For we consult not how the common wealth of our enemies may be governed ; nor of them who dwell very far from us , ( albeit this bee a thing which may be consulted of among themselves . ) Neither doe we consult of all things that may bee done by us ; nor of all things that are in our power . And therfore these words , which have an uncertain end were added to the definition : for if the thing bee manifest , and confessed , we deliberate no more thereof . Neither is there any consultation of such works or actions as are according to Science , and Art : For , all their principles are determinately knowne , except a few Arts which are termed conjecturall , as Physick , and the art of Exorcising , and of governing . For , we doe not onely consult of these things ; but of such also as are under our hand , and may be executed by us ; they having such an uncertaine end , that the successe may be as well that , as this . But it hath been declared that our consultation is not of the end ; but of things which tend unto the end : For our consultation is not of being rich , but of the meanes how to be rich . To speake all in briefe ; wee doe consult of those things onely which are doubtfull , and may be either so , or not so : and of those things we must also treate , that in our discourse nothing be wāting which may make things evident . Those qualities are called faculties , whereby we are enabled to the performance of any thing . For , whatsoever we doe , wee have the faculty of it ; and those things wee cannot performe , whereof the faculty is not in us . Therefore our action dependeth upon our faculty , and our faculty upon our essence : yea the action proceedeth from our faculty , and our faculty from our substance , and is in our substance And as I said before , these are three things depending one upon another . The thing able ; the faculty by which it hath ability ; and the thing which is to be done . The thing able to doe it is a substance . The faculty is that whereby wee have ability to doe it . The thing to be done , is that , whose nature may be practised upon , by our faculty . Of things that may bee done , some are necessary , & some contingent . Those are termed necessary which cannot possibly be hindered ; or those , the contrary whereof is unpossible : And that is contingent , which may bee hindered , or whose contrary may possibly fall out . For example ; It is necessary that a man should breath as long as hee liveth ; for it is impossible a man should live and not breath . It is contingent that there should be raine to day ; for it is possible that this day it should not raine , which is contrary to the other . Againe , things contingent are said to fall out sometimes often , sometime seldome , and sometimes indifferently , in this maner or in that . They are frequent , as to have gray haires at three score ; they are seldome , as not to have gray haires at that age : And they are indifferent ; as it is equally in our choice to walke , or not to walke ; or simply to doe any act , or not to doe it . Now our consultation is of those things onely which may indifferently come to passe , or not come to passe ; and a thing is said to fall out equally or indifferently , when wee may in like sort , doe as well the contrary thereof as the thing it selfe : For , if we could not doe both equally , wee should not consult thereof . Because no man consults either of things confessed , or impossible . For if wee were able to doe but one of those things which are contrary ; that should be received without ambiguity ; and the contrary should not , because impossible . CAP. 35. I. of destiny , and of the absurdities , impieties , and blasphemies which follow their opinion , who ascribe the cause of all things to the motion of the Starres , or fatall necessity . II. Of them who affirme that some things are both necessitated by destiny , and yet in mans power . III. An examination of the opinion afore mentioned . OUr opinion is that they who ascribe all things which are done , to the motions and constellations of the Starres , doe not onely oppose the vulgar notions of humane reason ; but teach also ( in effect ) that all governance in common-weales , are to no purpose . For indeed , lawes are in vaine , and judgements superfluous , because they punish innocent men , without cause . If their opinion bee true , it is also a thing unreasonable to reprehend or praise any man : yea , if every thing come to passe by destiny ( or by an inavoidable decree ) our prayers are foolish , and ineffectuall bablings ; and there is neither place nor use for providence or piety . Moreover ( if this were true ) what account is to be made of man ? or what is he more then an instrument serviceable to the motions of the superiour bodies ? Seeing , as they affirme , he is moved by the celestiall influences not only to the performance of all bodily actions ; but to every thought also which is in his minde . They that are of this opinion doe generally take away ( together with such things , as should bee left in our power ) the nature likewise , of all contingent things ; and in a manner subvert and destroy the whole world ; making the Stars injurious homicides , and cuckold-makers , or at least the causers of all adulteries and murthers . Nay God who is the Creator of the starres , is ( by this blasphemous opinion ) made to beare the blame of all which is ill done , rather then the starres ; because hee made them such as should necessarily , and inavoidably , bring , and lay evills upon us . Thus , their absurditie extends not onely to the subversion of common-weales ; but maketh God also to bee the author of all sinne ; and the cause of all mischiefes : Which absurdity & blasphemy is both impossible for them to and intollerable for us to heare . Some there be who affirme , that things may bee in our power , and that there may be destiny also . For , some things ( say these ) is given by destiny to every thing that is made , as to the water to coole ; to every plant to beare such fruit as is according to its kinde ; to a stone to sinke downeward ; to fire to mount upwards ; and to living-creatures to accept or to be desirous of things agreeable unto them . And when nothing ( without us , or belonging to destiny ) opposeth it selfe against that which we endeavour ; then it becomes perfectly in our power to proceed ; yea and then ( say these ) we shall assuredly effect it . They who affirme this are Chrysippus , Philopater , and many other men of great sufficiency and esteem among the Stoicks , and all which they have said ( what shew soever it makes of somewhat else ) proves nothing but this ; that all things are done by destiny . For though they have said that our attempts are given unto us by destiny ; and that they are sometimes hindered by destiny , and sometime left at liberty ; yet ( the matter being well observed ) it is plain that all things are done by destiny ; even those things ( for ought they have yet said ) which they would pretend to be in our owne power . And wee will use against them no other arguments , to declare the absurdity of their opinion , then such as they themselves have made use of . As long as the same causes continue , it is necessary ( as they themselves have said ) that the selfe-same events should alwayes fall out ; and it is impossible that a thing should chance sometimes in one maner , and sometimes in another fashion , when that thing is decreeed from eternity how it shall come to passe . If this bee so , as they have said , it is inavoidably necessary , but that the endeavour of a living-creature , should in all respects and altogether fall out in that one maner , which is agreeable to the unchāgeable course of destiny ; because the selfe-same causes ( doe continue and ) beare rule in it . And if our appetite and our endeavour , doth follow fatall necessity ; where then is that thing which ( they say ) is in our power ; seeing the thing that should bee in our power , must be free ? It is free ; if ( notwithstanding the continuance of the same causes ) it bee still in our power , to endeavour , or not to endeavour . But if our very endeavouring of a thing , bee subject unto a fatall necessity ; it is plaine , that even those things which belong to our desire and appetite doe fall out by destiny , although they bee done by us , according to our nature , our desire , and our judgement . For if it were possible that the same thing should not come to passe which did come to passe ( by the course of destiny ) then that proposition of theirs would be false , which affirmes that , as long as the same causes doe continue about any thing , it is necessary that the selfe same effects should ensue . The like shall happen also to unreasonable-creatures , and to things without life : For , if they say our appetite is in our power ; because wee have it of nature , ( and for not other respect ) why should they not say aswell that fire hath burning in its own power ( seeing fire burneth naturally ) according as Philopater hath in some sort affirmed in his booke of destiny . These arguments considered , wee may affirme , that those things which we doe ( being compelled thereunto ) by destiny , are not things in our owne power . For wee may as truely say , that the harp , the flute , and all other creatures that are unreasonable , or void of life , have in themselves a power to doe some things that wee doe by the use of them ; which were absurdly affirmed . CAP. 36. I. Of their opinion , who say that all was fore-appointed by destiny ; and yet that the effects of destiny are prevented by praiers . II. A quaere , how prayer only , should bee in our power , when all other things are foredecreed . III. Of the inequality , and injustice , of this fained destiny . FRom these , wee will proceed to examine the opinion of the Aegyptian wise men , who say that the destiny proceeding from the constellations hath true effects ; and yet may be prevented by prayers made for the averting thereof . For they teach that there be certaine meanes ordained whereby men may pacifie the Starres , and mitigate their force : and that there are other powers , superiours to them , which are able to change or governe them : and that prayers , and supplications unto the gods for pacification , were devised to that purpose . We will shew you , that in saying thus , they place destiny among contingent things : Now contingent things are indefinite ; and indefinite things are unknowne : therefore by these mens opinion , all divination is overthrowne : and that especially which is by casting nativities , whereof they make most account of all other , as of a thing forceably and infallibly true . If they tells us that the events of the figures ( which they set ) are very manifest , and well known to those who are skilfull ; and that God hath hindered the same , when the figure hath not effect according to his proper vertue ; we will reply , that it is absurd to account praier , and the service of the gods only , to be in our power ; and no other thing . For we will make this quare , and aske them how it come to passe , that all other things ( which are to bee done or accepted by men ) should depend upon such or such a constellation , or affection of the starres ; and that prayer onely should bee in our power ? For it is not onely doubtfull whether this thing it selfe be so ; but as doubtfull also , for what cause , and upon what necessity it should be . If there bee an art , and an orderly way whereby men may attaine to those pacifications , which may hinder such things as are effected by destiny : It may be questioned , whether all men may attaine this method , or some few only . If all may aspire unto it , then there is a possibility , by that meanes to give their destiny an utter overthrow , as soone as all have learned that art , which prevents and hinders the effects thereof . If some onely may attaine this meanes , and not others ; we would willingly know what maner of man , and who he is , that shall determine of this thing . For if destiny it self bee the cause , that some serve GOD , and some do not so ; even that will bee another proofe , that all things are done by destiny , whereas it appeared by their opinion before mentioned , that our praying , and honouring of the Gods , is in our power , not only no lesse then destiny ; but much more also . Now if it be not destiny but some other thing which is cause thereof , then that thing shall rather be destiny : For all the force of destiny consisteth in this , that we either may or may not obtaine that which we petition for in our prayers . If we may , then is destiny of no force ; and if wee may not prevaile by prayer , then all is subject unto destiny : and it will so fall out , that in some , all things are done by destiny , and that in some other , destiny effecteth nothing at all ( because prayer is prevalent for some and not for others . ) And this is evident , that whosoever determines hereof , he is the chiefe destiny : and so it will be another way declared , that all things are done by destiny ( mediately or immediately ) Moreover , ( if truth were in this opinion ) hee which doth distribute things shall be unjust , whether it bee destiny or some other divine power : Seeing the way of serving the gods is not equally and worthily distributed . For why should one be judged worthier then another ? Seeing all are the instruments of destiny ; and seeing no man doth any thing by a foreintended purpose of his owne : or , rather , seeing there is no man which hath any thing left unto his owne choice ( according to their doctrine . ) For in things which are so done , none is either just or unjust ; and therefore neither worthy , nor unworthy of favour : and whosoever maketh his division unequally ( in things of such nature as these ) to them , whose case is alone , he ( even whosoever he bee ) is unjust . CAP. 37. I. Of those who affirme wee have power to chuse what is to be done ; and that the event of our choice depends on destiny . II. Providence and not destiny orders the event of things . III. The strife betweene reason , and lust is made void , if all things be done by destiny NOw they who affirme , that the choice of those things which are to bee done , is in our power , and that the event of the things chosen depends on destiny ( which is the opinion even of the wisest of the Grecians ) their judgement , is partly right , and in some part erroneous : For , whereas they place in our power the choice of things to be done , and yet allow not the events of the same things , to be altogether at our dispose , they doe very rightly : but in that they attribute them unto destiny , they doe not well ▪ and their error shall easily be discovered . For first they impute imperfection unto destiny , in saying it hath some part , but not all power : And secondly , they erre in making it a sequell to our Iudgement , in saying , that the worke of destiny followes our choice . For , if that be so , then destiny seemeth not to move us ; but rather to be moved by us : And then , Man is to bee preferred , as having a greater power then destiny ; because he maketh it , by his choice . It is better therefore to say , that Providence is causer of the event of things ; because it is wrought rather by providence then destiny ; and seeing it is the property of Providence , to distribute unto every one , that which for every one is most expedient . By this meanes also , the event of the things which are chosen , doe fall out sometime in one maner , and sometime in another , according to that which is most expedient . If destiny be ( as the Stoicks define it ) A certaine concatenatiō of causes which may not be avoided ; or a fast knitting together of causes which may not bee altered , and brings to every thing ( & conveyes to and fro ) such effects onely , as are according to the motions , and necessity of destiny it selfe ; and not such effects rather , as are most expedient : What will they say then , of such as are blockish , and so foolish that they cannot direct their owne choice ? whether commeth it of destiny or no , that they are such ? If it proceed not of destiny ; then fooles , and blockheads , are without the compasse of destiny ; and if they have their blockishnesse by destiny , then doth it necessarily follow that our choice also is not in our power : for if the lack of choice be contained under destiny ; then it must needs be , that the faculty of chusing , and the thing to be chosen , must be contained under destiny . And so they run backe againe to them who affirm , that all things are done by destiny . The strife likewise , which is betweene reason , and lust in the continent , and incontinent man , is to no purpose , if all things be subject unto destiny : For , if it bee determined by a fatall necessity , that such a thing must be done and that such a thing must not bee done , what use is there of that strife in us ( which is aforementioned ? ) But if it bee not onely fatally determined , that we shall doe such a thing ; but so ordered also , that wee shall doe it thus , or thus ; what else doe they affirme , who are of this opinion , from this , that even our choice is in the number of those things which are subject unto destiny ? For , it is our will and our choice which opposeth our lust , getting the victory in the continent , and which is overcome in the incontinent . And so , that which they first proposed , as their opinion , is overthrowne ; and by that meanes our choice shall in no case bee in our owne power . CAP. 38. I. Of Plato's opinion concerning destiny ; and how he agrees or dissents from the truth . II. Of the force of prayer , and of the power which the Godhead hath over destiny . III. The opinion of the Stoicks touching the destruction , and restauration of the world , when the planets returne to the point , in which they stood at the Creation . EXamine we will in this Chapter , the opinion of Plato concerning destiny ; for he speakes of a twofold destiny ; one in substance , and another in operation . He calleth destiny in substance , a certaine life , or soule , belonging to the whole world together ; and destiny in operation , a certaine divine law , by an inevitable decree , which hee calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a holy decree , that cannot be escaped ; & he saith it was given by the first & highest God , unto the soul of the world , for the universall garnishing of all things ; and for the governing of all things which are made . That which he calleth destiny in operation , he termeth also Providence . For whatsoever is done by destiny , is done also by Providence ; though ( on the contrary ) all things which are done by Providence , are not effected also by destiny . For , this divine law ( which hee saith is both Providence and destiny ) comprehends all things in it selfe ; some of purpose , and othersome not of set purpose . It comprehends the chiefe , or antecedent causes ( which are as it were principles ) even of purpose ; as our condescending unto any thing ; our judgement , and our appetite , of desire . But whatsoever followeth like things of necessity , is beside purpose ; and that choice of things , to be done , which is in our power , is of purpose . Now after those things be determined , which are in our power ; upon the self-same things ( as it were beside purpose ) follow , saith he , the workes of destiny . As for example ; It is in our power to set saile ; and wee have purposed so to doe ; but saith he , when it is determined that wee will put to sea , other things may follow thereupon , namely , the suffering of shipwrack ; which was not purposed at all . Therefore , hee calleth those things beside purpose , which follow , and are consequēt to those things ( that is to say ) to those beginnings , and actions which are purposed by us . So then the principall things , and such as are in our power , bee done of purpose : whereas the things that follow upon them , are beside our purpose ; and not in our power ; but such as necessarily follow . For the affirmes not that things effected by destiny , are determined from eternity ; but they happen afterward , when things which are in our power have gone before . And hereunto agree those cōmon sayings ; That the fault is in the chuser , and God is blamelesse : that , there is none to over-master vertue ; and , that there bee divinations . For all this intends nothing else , but to shew , that our choice , and some actions according to our choice , are in our power ; and that their events , with such things as happen afterward upon thē , should necessarily pertain to destiny . That this is not truely affirmed , appeares by what is formerly expressed . And yet when hee calleth destiny the Ordinance and will of GOD , making all things to bee subject unto Providence , he differs not much from the divine Scriptures , which teach that Providence alone , is the governesse of all things . But he dissenteth farre from them , when he sayes that the events doe necessarily ensue upon those things which are in our power . For wee say that things wrought by Providence are effected , not as necessary , but as contingent : because , if they followed of necessity , then the greatest part of our prayers would be in vaine ; and according to his opinion our prayers would bee availeable for nothing , but to procure prosperous beginnings to our actions , or to petition that wee may chuse what is best . For after we have preferred one thing before another , all our praying should be fruitlesse , because all things by his opinion ensue of necessity , which doe afterwards follow . But wee affirme , that prayer is forcible even in respect of those events . And wee say , that it is in the choice of Providence , whether wee shall suffer shipwrack or no ( when wee have purposed to set saile ) and that nothing falleth out so necessarily , but that it may either be so , or not so , as GOD pleaseth . For , he is not concluded under any necessity ; neither is it lawfull to say , that his Will is confined by fatall necessity ; seeing he is the Creator of necessity it selfe . It is hee who laid that necessity upon the starres , by which they are constrained to keep the same course . It is hee that set bounds unto the Sea , and who hath appointed a necessary limitation to universall ▪ and generall things ; which if they will call destiny , because in all respects , and altogether it so falleth out of necessity ; as that in successiō all things which are made should also be destroyed ( and the like ) wee will not much contend about the same ; because we will not contest for the bare names . But GOD himselfe is not onely without the compasse of all necessity ; but he is also the Lord and maker thereof : For , in that he himselfe is the absolute power of all things ; and a nature wherein all power is comprehended ; hee doth nothing as one subjected either to the necessity of nature , or decree of Law. But all things are in his hand , to doe , or not to doe ; even those things which were otherwise necessary . And that this might plainely be declared , hee stayed once the courses of the Sun , and of the Moone , which are moved of necessity , and keep alwayes one constant motion : thereby shewing , that nothing done by necessity doth confine him ; but that according to his power all things are contingent . Yet he made such a day but once ( as wee finde it in holy Scripture ) that he might onely set forth his power , and not dissolve that strong law which was made by him at the first , that the motion of the Starres should bee necessary . So likewise , he did preserve some from death , as Enoch , and Elias , who were naturally mortall , and liable to corruption ; that by all these things we might perceive his power and his will to be irresistible . But the Stoicks have taught , that when the Planets have wheeled about unto the same point , both in longitude , and latitude , wherein every one of them stood at the Creation , they shall within a certain limitation of time cause all to be set on fire , and destroyed . And then ( as they also affirme ) the world beginning anew , shall be restored unto the state wherein it was before . Yea , they say further , that forasmuch as the stars shall have againe the same course ; every thing that was in the former circuit shall come to passe againe without any alteration . Socrates shall be as hee was againe , and Plato , and every particular man ; having the same friends , and the same Citizens ; and that the like things shall befall every one ; yea , that every man shall take in hand the same worke which he formerly wrought ; and that every City , Village , and field shall bee brought to the like state againe : And that the whole Vniverse shall be restored unto the former condition againe ; not one time onely , but as often as the revolutions of the Planets do come about to the same point , which revolutions they thinke shall be infinite and without number . They say also , that the gods are not subject to this corruption ; and that when they have observed one whole revolution , they know by that circuit , all things that shall come to passe in every succeeding round . For , there shall be ( as they dreame ) no new thing ; but every thing which was before , shall bee reacted after one and the same sort , without any alteration in the least thing . And some have said , that from this restauration , the Christians tooke occasion to conceive the resurrection : but the were much mistaken ; for the Christian verity doth assure us , that the Resurrection shall bee perfected but once , and not according to the revolutions of the Starres . CAP. 39. I. Of freewill . II. Of those who deny freewill ; To what causes they must of necessity ascribe al things ; and what may be inferred thereupon . III. The many absurdities which will follow , if it be denied that man hath freewill . MAny are of opinion , that there is nothing at all in our power ; and therefore the discourse of freewill ; namely of that which is in our power , doth first occasion this question ; Whether any thing be in our power or no : Then a second question , to wit , What those things bee which are in our power ; or wherein freewill consisteth : and thirdly , it gives occasion to inquire , Why God our maker , made us with freewill . That we may discourse orderly of these things , we will speake first to the first question ; and prove that there is something in our power , even by the confessions of those who have denied the same . They affirme , that of things which are made or done , either GOD , or necessity , or destiny , or nature , or fortune , or chance is the cause . But the proper worke of GOD , is either substance or Providence . The work of necessity is in the motion of those things which are alwayes of one sort . The worke of destiny , is in those things which are to be perfected by it of necessity ; for in it , things are effected of necessity . The workes of nature are generation , augmentation , corruption , plants , and living-creatures . The worke of fortune is in things that are very rare , and unexpected . For they define fortune to be the concurrence , and meeting of two causes , which had their beginning from our will and choice , and yet produce in the end somewhat else then was intended by the thing done . As when hee that is digging of a ditch , findes treasure : For neither hee who there laid the treasure , had any purpose it should be so found ; neither had the finder any intent to dig for treasure ; but the purpose of the one was to take it thence when he himself thought fit ; and the intention of the other was to make a ditch ; and there fell out another thing beside those which were purposed by them . The workes of chance are such as befall unreasonable , and inanimate creatures , without nature , or art . Now if a man bee neither the cause , nor beginning of his owne actions , under which of these may we containe the things which are done by him ? It is not lawfull , nor comely to ascribe unto GOD those actions of men which are uncleane , or unjust . Neither may we ascribe them to necessity ; because they cannot be truly accounted among those things which continue alwayes after one maner . Nor may wee impute them to nature ; for the workes of nature , are living-creatures and plants . Nor to fortune , for the actions of men are not rare or unlooked for . Nor belong they to chance ; because things casuall belong to inanimate and irrationall creatures . Therefore it remaineth undeniable , that the man himself which worketh , & accōplisheth such , or such things , is the beginner of his owne actions , and hath freewill . Moreover , if man bee the beginner of no action of his owne , all consultation is superfluous in him ; for to what end is deliberation , if hee have no action in his owne power ? But it must needs be a very absurd thing to affirme that to bee superflous in man , which is best , and most honourable in him . If then he doe consult , he consults about the doing of some thing ; for all deliberation doth concerne the execution of some action . Moreover , of whatsoever things the faculty of doing the same , is in our power ; the acting also of those things , and the exercising of that faculty is in our power . But , a faculty to worke according to the vertues , is in our power ; therefore the vertues also , are in our power . Now that the faculties to worke according to vertue are in our power , it is very elegantly declared by Aristotle where he treateth of the morall vertues . That saith he ; which wee learne by practise , we practise when wee have learned it : For while we learn to master our pleasures , we become temperate ; and when we are temperate , we become the masters of our pleasures . Wee may argue also in this maner : It is confessed of all , that practise and the exercise of things are in our power : But practise beareth sway in habits ; for custome is as it were a purchased nature . If then practise rule the habit , and if practise bee in our power , then the habit also must be in our power : yea , and the actions also , whose habits are in our power , ( and which are effected according to those habits ) must bee in our power also ; because the actions are conformable to the habits . Hee then which hath the habit of justice , will do just things ; and hee that hath a habit of injurie , will doe injurious things . Therefore God hath given us a power to bee just or unjust . Our counselling also , and our exhorting of one another , doe declare that there bee some things in our power ; for no man doth exhort us not to bee hungry , or not to thirst , or to flye in the ayre ; because these things are not in our power . Therefore it is manifest , that those things whereunto our exhortations doe serve , are in our power . Moreover , if nothing be in our power , then our lawes are superfluous ; but every nation useth some lawes naturally , as knowing , that they have power to doe such things as their lawes injoyne : And many nations have ascribed the making of their lawes to the gods ( as the inhabitants of Crete , to Iupiter ; and the Lacedemonians to Apollo ) therefore the knowledge that such things are in our power is naturally dispersed amōg all men . The like may be inferred upon the praises , or dispraises which follow those things of which wee make choice of ; and of all those other circumstances ( aforementioned ) which disprove that all things are done by destiny . CAP. 40. I. Of such things as are in our power ; and wherein our freewill consisteth . II. A reproofe aswell of them who conceive that mans freewill extendeth to every thing ; as of those who deny him to have any freewill at all . III. The beginnings , or choice both of good and evill things , are in our power , but not their events : that so , neither divine Providence , nor humane faculties , might bee superfluous . EVidently enough appeares it , that some things are in our power , and that wee have some actions at our dispose . It now remains that we declare , What things they are which bee in our power . We say in generall , that all things which wee doe voluntarily be in our power ; because it could not else be truly verified that the things were done voluntarily , which were not in our power : and because generally all those things whereupon ensueth praise or dispraise ; and those also wherein we use exhortation , or law , are in our power ; as is afore declared . But things which are properly in our power ; are all such things as belong unto the minde ; and those whereof we may consult . For our consulting of them doth imply , that it is in our power to execute that which is proposed and consulted of . And wee have declared in the former part of this treatise , that consultation , and deliberation , fall out in such things onely as are contingent : and that such things only are contingent , which may fall out either this way , or that way , or in a contrary manner . It is our minde which maketh choice thereof ; & it is the beginning of our action ; & those are contingent things , which are in our power : To be moved , or not to be moved ; To attempt , or not to attempt ; To desire things unnecessary , or not desire them ; To lie , or speake truth ; To give , or not to give ; To rejoyce in such things as we ought , or not to rejoyce ; and all such other things like unto these , wherein consist the works of vice and vertue : For herein consisteth our free-will . The Arts also are accounted among such things as may alike fall out , or not fall out : For , every Art brings forth such things as may both be done , and left undone ; and such things also , as have the beginning in the doer , and not in the things themselves , which are done : But neither those things which are eternall ( and in that respect , things of necessity ) neither any other things which are done of necessity , can be said to be done by Art. Nor is any of those things said to be done by Art , which are contingent , and may bee done otherwise , if they have their efficient cause in themselves ; as in living-creatures , and in plants , which are made by nature , not by Art. If therefore the efficient cause of things made by Art , is without themselves ; then who is cause of the things made by Art , but the Artificer which made them ? And if the making of them belong unto him , then is he the beginning , and cause of his owne actions . And therefore also , the working according , to Art , and vertue , and all actions of mans minde , and of reason , are in mans power : and what actions they are , I have declared already . Now the most part of men , supposing that wee are said to have this free-will in every thing which wee doe or possesse , are therefore offended at this opinion ; and not without cause . But , some there be , having more acutenesse , who bringing this text of Scripture to refute us ( namely , The wayes of man are not in his own hand ) say thus unto us . Good friends , how is the will of man free , seeing his way is not in his owne hands ? and seeing the thoughts of men are so vaine , that they cannot bring to effect those things which they have devised ? Many such like things they object , not knowing in what sense , wee speake of freewill . For we affirm not that it is in our power to be rich , or poore , or alwayes in health , or of a strong constitution of nature ; or to rule ; or generally to have those good things , which wee count as instruments to worke things by ; or such as are called the gifts of fortune ; neither doe wee account those to be at our dispose which have their event from Providence : But wee affirme those actions onely to be in our power , which are according to vice , or vertue ; as also , our motions or choice of things ; or else such things whereof wee may doe the contrary , aswell as the things themselves . For a certaine will or choice goeth before every action ▪ and not onely the deed , but the affection also is condemned ; as may plainly appeare in that place of the Gospell , which saith , He who lookes upon a woman to lust after her , hath committed adultery already w th her in his heart . And we read that Iob sacrificed unto God , for such offēces as his children might commit in thought . For indeed the beginning , either of sin , or of doing uprightly is in our will ; whereas the doing of the thing it selfe , is otherwhile permitted by Providence , and otherwhile hindered . For , seeing there are some things in our power , and a Providence beside ; it is necessary that such things as are done should bee done by them both : Because , if they were done by either of them alone , the other should be to no purpose . Therefore in regard all actions are mixt , it will sometime happen that they shall be in our power ; another while , that they shall bee as providence alone directeth ; and sometimes againe , both according to Providence , and as wee would also . And whereas likewise there is sometimes a generall , and sometimes a particular Providence ; it is necessary that the same should fall out in particular things , as it doth in things generall . For if the aire about us bee dry , our bodies are dryed also , though not all alike . And if a mother be given to riotous fare , or a distempered dyet ; even thereby shall her children become distempered in body , and perverse in such things as they attempt . It is plaine therefore , by what hath beene said , that men may fall into a distempered estate of body , either by the generall distēperature of the aire ; or by the dyet of parents ; or when they spoil themselves by their owne voluptuousnesse ; and that they may be distempered sometime by such occasions as take their beginnings from themselves ; in such maner , that Providence shall not altogether bee the cause of such things . If then , the Soul shall yeeld her selfe to be overswayed by the temperature of the body , and give place to wrath , or lust ; or bee pressed downe by outward things , as poverty ; or lifted up , by riches , or the like : if any evill commeth to the same thereby ; it so hapned thereunto by the selfe-will of that Soul. Seeing , if shee had not voluntarily yeelded her selfe to those distemperatures , she might have overcome them , and beene in good case . For through well ordering the affections of the minde , by a convenient dyet , and a good conversation , she might have altered that temperature , rather then have beene perverted thereby . This is manifest by the example of such as are in a good condition , and that all such as are not in a good estate , doe sin voluntarily ( and not by constraint : ) And that it is in our power , either to consent , and yeeld our selves unto our bodily distemperatures , or to resist , and overcome them . Neverthelesse , there be many who pretend these distemperatures to bee the cause why we doe such or such things ; and so impute their wickednesse , not unto their owne will , but to necessity . And therefore they cōclude ( though very absurdly ) that the vertues also , are not in our power . CAP. 41. I. Of the cause why man was made with free will ; and that if it had been otherwise , he had neither beene capable of the contemplative , nor practike faculty , nor been a reasonable creature . II. Of the mutability of men and Angels : and of the causes thereof ; and of some inferences thereupon proving freewill . III. It is not through any naturall defect that men are vicious , but by their owne will : And it is here shewne also , that man without freewill , could neither have any vice nor vertue . SOmewhat remaines to be declared , wherby it may bee manifest why man had freewill bestowed upon him . We affirme , that immediately , together with reason this freewill entered into us ; and that together with nature , there is ingraffed into created things a mutability , and alteration ; especially in those things which are a subject made of matter . For there is a mutation even in the very beginning of every thing which is made ; and all making proceedeth from an alteration of the materiall subject . This is evident to any man who considerately beholds the plants , and living-creatures , which have their abiding either in the earth , in the water , or in the aire : For there is in all those a continuall mutability . Moreover , that our freewill enters into us , together with reason , hath beene made plain enough by those things which we have said , to prove that some thing is in our power ; as will appeare to them who have heeded what was delivered to that purpose . But because the sequell of this treatise , doth for some respects require the same ; perhaps it will not be impertinent to repeat some part of that which was formerly declared . Our reason is divided into contemplation , and practise ▪ Contemplative reason , is that which concerneth ( universally ) the nature of things , as they bee really ; and active reason , is that whereby wee deliberate of things , and sets downe the right way of putting them into execution . The contemplative part is called the minde ( or the principall part of the soule ) and the active part is termed reason . The one is likewise called wisdome , and the other prudence . Now every one that deliberates , doth for this cause deliberate , even for that the choice of such things as are to be done , is in his power ; and to the intent that hee might by deliberation , make choice of that which is most worthy ; and that after he hath so chosen , he might execute the same . It is therefore necessary , that he which deliberates should have power over his owne deeds : for if he have not power over his owne actions ; his consultation will be fruitlesse also unto him . And if these things be so ; it will follow , by a necessary consequence , that wheresoever reason is planted , there is likewise freewill . For either he is no reasonable-creature ; or else , if he be a reasonable-creature , he hath power over the beginnings of his owne actions ; and in having that power , hath also freewill . It hath beene declared also , that things composed of a materiall subject , have a mutability in them ; out of which ( together with what hath been said before ) it may bee inferred , that there must , of necessity , be in man both freewill , and mutability . Mutability , because hee is made of matter ; and free-will , because he is indued with reason . Whosoever therefore findes fault with God , for that hee did not so make man at the first , that hee might not fall unto vice , but gave him his owne choice : Surely , those men are not aware , that they reprove GOD for making man reasonable , and not rather an unreasonable-creature . For one of these two is unavoidably necessary . Either man should have beene made void of reason ; or else being indued with reason , and exercised in action , hee must have in him freewill . Yea , and thereupon it followes also of necessity , that every nature endued with reason , hath freewill , and is mutable of his owne nature . But those natures have especially a mutability in them which are made of a materiall subject ; aswell in respect that they were made , as in regard they were made of matter : whereas those natures which were not made of matter ( as the subject ) have mutability in them , but in one respect onely ; namely , in that they were made . Moreover , so many of those immateriall natures as were conversant in earthly matters , and intermedled with such inferiour things , as are to bee done , by reason of communicating with men ; by so much they became more mutable then others ( of that immateriall nature ) And so many of them as directed the excellency of their nature , to approach neare unto God , with an inclination to love him ; and to enjoy a blessed estate in the minding and fruition of him ; so bending themselves inward , and unto GOD only , that they wholly estranged themselves from outward , and materiall things . Those ( by that meanes ) became so familiar with contemplation , and with GOD , that they still remaine without mutation . Having a free-will , in that they are indued with reason ; and yet are not now subject unto alteration , for the forementioned causes . And this need not bee wondred at . For even those men also , which give themselves to contemplation , and sequester themselves from the inordinate love , and medling in worldly affaires , doe and may attaine unto an immutable condition , ( and unto an estate of grace , from which there is no falling away . ) Now I doe suppose , that this ( with what was formerly said ) hath sufficiently proved , that in the beginning , all the reasonable creatures were created in so excellent a condition , that if they had remained such as they were made , they should have beene void of all vice , and that their vitiousnesse ( who have been corrupted ) came unto them by their owne will. For it so falleth out , that they who remaine in the condition wherein they were placed by their creation , are setled in a most blessed estate . Of incorporeall natures , Angels alone have beene altered : yet not all of them : but some part ; even so many onely , as creeping doneward departed from that inclination which they had to supreame things , and the contemplation of GOD. It is made plaine by the things afore proved , that the powers of our will are mutable ; because we are of a mutable nature : And yet no man can blame GOD , as if hee were the cause that we are evill , in regard the faculties are mutable , which he gave unto us . For vices consist not in our faculties ▪ but in habits ; and our habits depend upon our will ▪ and it is therefore the fault of our will , that we are evill , and not ( originally ) of our nature . But our meaning shall be more plainly understood by this that followes . Wee have said hereto fore , that a faculty is a power whereby we are able to put in execution whatsoever we doe . And in all the faculties belonging to our choice , the self-same concerneth both the contraries ( as for example ) there is the same faculty of lying , and of speaking truth ; one and the same faculty of temperance , and wantonnesse . But it cannot bee , that in contrary things there should be the same habit ; as in wantonnesse and temperance ; or in lying , and speaking truth ; because of contrary things , the habits are contrary . For the habit which concernes temperance , belongeth to vertue : but all intemperance is of vice ; and therefore the vices doe not depend upon the faculties , which are in us ; but upon our habits , and our will : And it is not a faculty , which maketh us wantons , or lyars , but our will. For if we would , we might speak the truth , and not lye . Seeing then , vice is not a faculty , but a habit ; God is not cause of our naughtinesse , which giveth us the faculty ; but a habit ( is cause thereof ) which being in us , proceedeth from our selves , and by our selves , & for our selves . For if wee would endeavour thereafter , we might instead of an evill-habit , attaine unto the contrary thereof . Now a faculty doth herein differ from a habit ; all faculties are naturall , but habits are procured by use . Yea ; and here also they differ ; our faculties are in us without teaching , and our habits are gotten by learning , and custome . If therefore the faculties that are in us , be naturall , and without teaching ; and the habits gotten by use and learning ; then it cannot be that our ( originall ) nature should be the cause our wickednesse ; but rather our evill education , whereby wee have gotten an evill habit . For that our habits come unto us by custome , it hath beene already declared ; and that our faculties are in us by nature , it is evident by this ; that all men have the same faculties ( except those which are someway maimed or lame . ) And that the habits are not naturall , is as evident by this , that all have not the same habits ; but some of them habits of one sort , and some of another : whereas things that are naturall , are found in all . CAP. 42. SECT . 1. I. Of Providence ; and first , that there is a providence , and for what good causes , both Jew and Christian ought to beleeve it . II. The same is illustrated to heathen men , by arguments and demonstrations agreeable to their knowledges . III. Proofes thereof , by things also generally confessed . IT is already sufficiently proved , that man hath freewill ; as also wherein his freewill consisteth , and for what cause he was created with free-will . Now forasmuch as every one who purposeth to murther a man , doth not alwayes put the same in execution ; but sometime fulfilleth his murtherous intent , and sometime not , because his purpose being hindered , hath not effect according thereunto : And wheras we have said that providence is cause therof , & not destiny ; It followeth consequently , after the Tract of things which are in our power , that we speak next of Providence . We will divide our discourse into three parts ; the first , proving that there is a Providence ; the second , shewing what Providence is ; and the third , What things belong unto Providence . As for the Iewes , unlesse they be mad , they cannot be ignorant that there is a Providence , knowing the wonders which GOD wrought in Aegypt ; and hearing of those things which hapned unto their Fathers in the wildernesse ; wherein most manifest visions of Providence appeared more clearly unto them , thē by those things which wee now see with our eyes . And they had also many evidēt proofes that things were done by Providence , both in their Prophets , and in their Babylonish captivity , which leave not any just occasion for them , to be doubtfull of the same . As for the Christians ; they have not onely all those things which hapned unto the Iews , to preach unto them that there is a Providence ; but also that admirable work of Providence , above all other most divine , which containeth in it that exceeding great favour towards man , which passeth common beliefe ; I meane , that GOD should take unto him a Body for our sakes . But seeing wee must reason the matter , not with such onely , but also with heathen men . Wee will therefore endeavour to prove there is a Providence by such other things as are also in credit with them . And that there is a Providence , may be proved by those argumēts wherby we prove that there is a God. For concerning the continuance of things ▪ and especially such as are subject to generation , and corruption ; and the scituation , and order of all things that are , being alwayes preserved after one maner ; and the course of the Starres nothing altering at any time ; and the circuit of the yeare , and the returne of the season of the yeare ; and the equality both of the night and of the dayes of the yeare , so that either of them is both increased and diminished in the same proportion of time : how might all this continue under so conformable a government , if it had none to rule it by his Providence ? Moreover , the punishments which follow sin ; or ( which is of more import ) the detecting of murthers , and offences themselves , which are often bewrayed ( when there is no witnesse of the deed ) by some circumstances ; doe shew that there is a Providence . Both the Scriptures of the Hebrewes , and the writings of the Heathen , are full of stories to this purpose . Of this nature is that which is written of Susanna : and in prophane bookes , there is a story to the same purpose of Ibicus the Poet. For , when this Poet was murther●d by certaine ruffians , where none were in presence , either to assist him , or beare witnesse of the assault which they made upon him ; he seeing Cranes not far from him , cryed out and said , oh yee Cranes , be you revengers of this murther . And so it fell out , that when the Magistrates of the City where he lived , endeavoured to seeke out the committers of that murther , and could not finde them : The people being assembled together into a common place for that intent ; the Cranes flew over them ; whereupon the murtherers espying them , laughed outright , and said , loe , where they flie that should revenge the death of Ibicus : which being overheard by one that sate next unto them , and declared to the Magistrates , the said murtherers were thereupon examined , and confessed the fact . There be very many of such like things , recorded by ancient writers , which if a man should collect together , would enlarge this Treatise to an infinite length . And though all offenders be not descried ; but , that some do quite escape the publike stroke of Iustice ; yet let no man for that cause deny that there is a Providence . For the Providence of GOD , taketh care of men , ( and brings thē to repētance ) not one way alone ; but after divers and sundry maners . Furthermore , the composure , and proportionable knitting together of those bodies , which are subject unto generation , and corruption , and there being kept alwaies alike ( according to their severall kinds ) is not the least argument proving that there is a Providence , seeing the great care ( and wisedome ) of divine Providence is very manifest in every part of the body ; as they who will take paines to peruse them , may learne out of those many Treatises , which are made upon that subject . Yea , the varieties which are in the colours of living-creatures , and their keeping alwayes the same comely mixture and proportion , are proofes of a Providence . And among such things as are generally confessed by all men , one evident proofe declaring there is a Providence , is that universall consent of men in all times , and of all nations , that wee ought to serve GOD , both by Prayers , and Oblations . For if there were not a Providence to governe the affaires of this world , who would pray ? or to whom should we make our petitions ? Moreover , that earnest desire which is in us , to do good unto others ( and which they naturally , and very diligently endeavour , whose mindes are not perverted ) is a plaine demonstration that there is a Providence . For having received a benefit which we are not able to recompence , wee are the more desirous to be somway helpfull to them , who are not able to requite us for the same . If Providence were taken away , then every man should be permitted to be injurious , according to the power hee hath to doe wrong . There would also be no giving of almes , nor any feare of GOD among men ; and therewithall vertue and piety would be quite rooted out . For if GOD had not a provident care of every thing ; neither did punish evill-doers ; nor encourage those that were well-disposed nor defended innocents from oppression ; Who would worship GOD ? or who would serve him , that could be no way profitable unto them ? If there bee no Providence , all prophecies , and the fore-knowledge of things , are likewise overthrowne . But even those things which happen out before our eyes , almost every day , are manifestations of the same : For , GOD often appeareth unto us in our necessities ( by supplying our wants in an unexpected maner ) many have beene cured of their infirmities , by that which hath beene revealed unto them in dreames ; many predictions of things to come have beene truely uttered in all ages . And many who have embrued their hands in innocent blood , or committed such like heynous offences , have been horribly terrified night and day . From the goodnesse of God , his Providence may also be inferred ; for hee is the most excellent Good ; and as he is good , he is inclined to bee good and beneficiall to others ; and if he be inclined to be beneficiall to others , he is inclinable also , to have a Providence over others . What need I speake here of those workes which belong unto the Creation ? of their proportion ? of their harmony ? of their scituation ? of their order ? or of the use whereunto every thing serveth in the whole world ? seeing all things may evidently appeare to have beene perfected in such maner , that nothing should have been in good plight , if it had beene otherwise then it is now : and that nothing can well be added , nor any thing be conveniently wanting in any of those things which were made thorowout the world : For , both by wisdome , and providence , all things therein were created in a comely and perfect maner . SECT . 2. I. Of the difference betweene Providence , and Creation ; and of their distinct workes . II. Of the wonderfull Providence of GOD , in the manifold , and unlike visages of men . III. The same Providence is illustrated by the great diversity of colours whereby the severall species of every kind of living-creatures are distinguished . BUt wee will defer the full explanation hereof , untill we shall have occasion to speake of the Creation , lest wee should fall into that oversight whereinto those writers have slipped ; who extoll GOD's creation instead of his Providence ; when his Providence was their Theme . For though indeed Creation gives us an occasion to treat of Providence ; yet so great is the difference betwixt them , that they are farre from being one . It is the worke of Creation to make well those things which are made ; but it is the part of Providence to conserve and take care for such things . And these two are not alwayes altogether in one ; as wee may perceive by those men who are coversant in arts and mysteries . For , some when they have made a thing well , give over there , and take no more care for the thing which they have made ; as Carpenters , and Painters , and the makers of other handy-craft workes : and some other , doe no more but provide , and take care for the preservation of those things which are under their charge ; as heardmen , and shepheards . These things considered , it will become us , when we treat of Creation , to shew that all the things which were made , were exceeding well-made : and to declare when we come to speake of Providence , that God was diligent in the preservation of those things which he had well created . By this providence it comes to passe , that men beget men , that beasts are engendred of beasts ; and that every thing springs from his owne , and not from any strange seed . And whosoever shall averre , that every thing ( after it is once made ) proceeds forward as in a certaine race ; he cannot chuse but confesse also , that after a thing is created , there must be alwayes a providence to governe the same . For in that the thing created proceedeth on in a course , it is even thereby manifested , that together with creation , there was laid a foundation of providence , to whom belongs the governing of al things after they are created : and he saith ( in effect ) that he which first made all things , and he which governes them by his providence , when they are made , is but one , and the same GOD. Whosoever beholds the visages of men , to bee so many thousands , and yet to differ so much from each other , as that no one is like any of the other in all respects ; hee cannot chuse but admire the work ; and if he well consider the cause of it , shall easily find that it is divine providence by whom so many different , and distinct features and countenances , were brought forth . For if our visages should be all of the same forme and moulding without any alteration , how great a confusion would there follow ? In how much darknesse and ignorance should man be kept ? None should know his familiar acquaintance , from a stranger , nor be able to discern a wicked enemy from an honest friend ; but all things would be confounded together in one masse , according to the opinion of Anaxagoras . Moreover , if this had beene so , there had not beene any cause why men should have been forbidden to company with sisters or mothers : neither would many have refrained from theft , rapine , or from offering any open violence or injurie to others , if they could but contrive their present escape : For though afterward they were seene , none should be able to distinguish them from other men . Neither could any law be executed ; nor any common wealth well ordered ; neither could fathers or children know each other ; neither could any thing pertaining to humane affairs be well , or orderly affected ; because men should be as it were blinde , not discerning between man and man ; and bee no way helped by their eyes , except it were in discerning the age or quantity . This benefit we gaine by providence , that it prevents these inconveniences and confusions , by making a variety in the visages of men , alwayes , in all places , and at all times . And it is a strong argument also to prove that this providence extendeth unto every particular ; in that every particular man is known one from another , by his portraiture , by his proportion , by his visage , and by his voice . For mans visage is not the onely marke whereby we may discerne him ; but ( as if that were not enough ) providence hath added another distinction for our more advantage ; even the diversity of colours also , to the intent that the weaknesse of our nature might bee assisted divers wayes : And I suppose likewise , that many of those living-creatures , which in their generall kinde , have in appearance but one shape ( and colour ) as Dawes and Crowes ; yet there may be certaine visible differences , whereby they might bee distinguished by good heed ; and whereby they discerne each other when they should couple together . For though many Dawes and Crowes bee gathered together in one place ; yet in their coupling , they discerne each other ; and every male and female know their owne mate . But how could they know each other , if every one of them had not some proper distinction in the shape ; which ( though not easily perceived by us ) might be well enough discerned by thē , through a naturall instinct ; they being creatures of one kinde ? Lastly , the signes , and oracles , and sooth-sayings , and wonders , which are from above ( for now I direct their discourse to heathen philosophers ) and which ( as they affirme ) doe by their owne force make good the events of such things as are declared by them , have ( no doubt ) their significations , by the vertue of providence ; and have thereby also , a true effect , according to the same significations . CAP. 43. This Chapter declares , what Providence is ; and that it is necessary & convenient the Creator , and ruler of all things should be One. VEry plainly may it be manifested that there is a providence ; both by arguments already produced , and by others which wee shall have occasion to mention hereafter : wee will now therefore , declare what providence is . Providence is a heedfull provision for all things , proceeding from GOD. Some thus define it . Providence is the will of GOD , whereby all created things receive a government fit for them . Now if Providence be the will of GOD , it is necessary that all things should be ordered as reasonably , as excellently , and as decently as the nature of the God-head requires ; which is after so good and perfect a maner as that nothing may possibly receive a better order : For neither is it a thing of good cōsequence nor agreeable to decency , that one should make things , and another take the care of their preservation and government ; seeing it were but an argument of weakness to have it so . Many types and expressions of that which we have said , are ingraffed in living-creatures : For every thing which breedeth ought , provides food also for the thing bred thereby ; and man provides for all other things also , belonging to the life of him whom hee hath begotten , so far forth as his ability doth extend . And all creatures which make not provision for their young , doe therefore not make it , because their weaknesse is a hinderance thereunto . Therefore it is truely declared , that GOD is he whose Providence concerneth all : and that Providence is the will of GOD. CAP. 44. SECT . 1. I. It is here shewed wherein providence consisteth ; Plato's opinion concerning the same , and how far his tenet is allowable . II. The opinions of the Stoicks , of Democritus , Heraclitus , and Epicurus , touching Providence , and the absurdities insuing . III. The opinions also of Aristotle , Euripides , and Menander ; and the refutation of them . SInce we have shewed that there is a Providence , and also what it is ; we will now declare , in what things , that providence beareth sway ; whether in things universall , or things particular , or in both . Plato affirmes that it hath government both of universall , and particular things ; and he divideth his discourse of providence into three parts . The first he calls the providence of the first and supreamest GOD , and that this providence is especially over the IDEAE ( that is , the most beautifull formes of things : ) and in the next place , over the whole world in general , as , over the heavens , the stars , and all generall things ; even over the predicaments of substance , quantity , and quality , with such like : yea , and over all things which are especially contained under those predicaments . His opinion likewise is , that the providence of a second degree of gods , which ( as he conceiveth ) turne about the Sphaeres ; hath rule over the ingendring of all the baser living-creatures , & of plants , and of all things which are subject unto generation , and corruption . Yea , and Aristotle himselfe ascribes the ingendring of such things , to the Sun , and unto the Zodiack circle . That which according to Plato's opinion , is the third providence , hath predominācie over the events and ends of those things which are begun or perfected by us ; as also over the course and condition of mans life ; and over all those naturall and materiall things ; and over such as are called instrument all things , whether they bee good or evill . And the principall agents in this providence , he supposed to bee certaine Angells ( or spirits ) ordained to bee alwayes conversant upon the earth , and to have the charge over those things which men doe . But hee affirmes that the second and the third providence also , have their whole essence from the first ; so that all things are in effect , governed by the power of the chiefest God , who ordained the first , the second , and the third , to be employed in the well-ordering , and governing of things . Now this is praise worthy in Plato , that he referreth all unto GOD , and affirmes all providence to depend upon his will. But whereas he sayes there is a second providence , committed unto those which turne the heavens about ( as he hath said ) we commend him not in so affirming . For ( if any such were ) that which they performed , is not a worke of providence ; but rather , a worke of necessity , whereunto they were destinated . For , let them be figured how they will , it must necessarily follow , that things must both be done as they were done ; and that they might not be in any other maner then they are . And I have already shewed , that nothing done by providence , is subject unto necessity . Now the Stoick Philosophers ( who defend as an undeniable truth , that there is a destiny , necessitating all things , and that some things are also in our power ) doe leave no place at all for providence ; and indeed they overthrow ( as is before declared ) by affirming there is destiny , so much of their owne opinion , as averrs that things are in our power . Democritus , Heraclitus , and Epicurus , are of opinion that there is no providence either of universall , or of particular things . And Epicurus hath expressed his meaning to this purpose . The nature ( saith hee ) which is blessed and incorruptible ; neither is of it selfe troubled with any businesse ; neither occasioneth any other to be troublesomely imployed : and therefore , neither is angry for any thing ; nor favoureth any thing ; because all such like things , doe betoken weaknesse . Yea the gods cannot bee angry , in regard anger never chanceth unto any , but when something succeedeth contrary unto their will , which thing cannot at any time happen unto the gods . The opinion of these men is conformable to the principles which are devised by themselves . For , it is no wonder if they hold opinion that there is no providence to governe any thing , who affirme that the world was made by hap-hazzard . For how should those things which had no Creator , have any providence to preserve or governe them ? Seeing it is plaine that such things must be confusedly caried to & fro , by hap-hazzard , which were made by chance , and at adventure , in the beginning . Wee must therefore withstand them in their first opinion , as wee have done already ( and so disprove the same ) that it may be well manifested there is a providence . And for that cause wee will refer the confutation of these men , unto a fitter opportunity ; and proceed to examine the opinion of Aristotle ; and others , who say that particular things are not governed by any providence . For Aristotle in the sixth booke of his Ethicks to Nichomachus , hath covertly delivered that particular things are governed by nature onely . For , nature being ( saith he ) divine , and ingraffed in all things which are ingendred , doth naturally administer a way unto each , to chuse which is most expedient for it , and to avoid such things as are hurtfull thereunto . And ( indeed ) every living-creature ( as we have shewed heretofore ) maketh choice of such nourishment , as is agreeable unto it ; earnestly pursuing what is convenient for it ; and naturally knowing what cures are pertinent unto the diseases thereof . Euripides , and Menander , have in some places affirmed , that the principall parts of the minde , which is in every man , doth by providence governe each man , and no GOD at all . But the minde is conversant in those things onely which are in our power ; and they are either in actions which may be done , or in the arts , or in contemplation : Whereas providence is busied in things which are not in our power ; as to be rich , or to be poore ; to be in health , or to be sick ; wherewith neither the minde , nor nature , ( as Aristotle himselfe holdeth opinion ) have any thing to doe , in that sense . For the workes of nature are evident : and if a murtherer bee sometime punished , and sometime let goe without punishment , here is that pertinent either to the minde , or unto nature ( as it is unto providence ? ) except some will affirme that things belonging to nature , and unto the minde , are pertinent unto providence ; and that things which follow upon the choice of the minde , and operations of nature , doe afterward belong unto destiny ; which being granted , all that should bee in our power , would be quite overthrowne . But the matter is not at that point . For ( as hath beene already declared ) every thing belonging unto the minde ( whether it be for practise or contemplation ) is all in our power . Neither doe all things which are contained under providence , belong to nature ; though every thing belonging to nature , is governed by providence . For many things wrought by providence , are not the workes of nature ; as I have declared in discovering the murtherer ; neither is nature in all points , the same with providence , though it be ( as indeed it is ) a part of providence . And therefore these men doe ascribe the providence over particular things both to nature , and unto the minde . SECT . 2. I. Of their absurd opinion , who affirme that GOD hath care of universall , but not of particular things . II. The error of the vulgar , concerning blessednesse ; and of their causelesse , and impious reprehension of GODS Providence . III. Of the blasphemies which must consequently follow the deniall of GODS Providence , over particular things . THere be some who affirme , that God so provides for the continuance of all things which hee hath created , that nothing shall faile which hee hath made ; and that his providence extends to this thing alone , without regarding particulars , which are left by him to succeed as meer casualty shall bring them about . Hereupon ( as they conceive ) it commeth to passe , that so many injuries , so many murthers , and ( in briefe ) that so much wickednesse , and oppression is increased among men : yea , thereupon it commeth ( say they ) to passe , that some of them are punished , some unpunished , and that little or nothing is performed , either according to right reason , or the Canons of Law. For , how ( as they think ) can it be possible that God hath care of any thing , when as neither law , nor true judgement beareth sway ? but where the contrary hath rather the chief rule ? and where the best men are for the most part wronged , oppressed , and plunged into innumerable afflictions ; while Tyrants and wicked men are advanced to offices , to powerfull dignities , to riches , and to all such things as are well esteemed of in this life ? But they who speake in this maner , are not onely ignorant of many other things , that are expressed in our discourse of providence ; but estranged also to the immortality of the soule : For , supposing the soule to bee mortall they shut up all things belonging unto man within the compasse of this life ; and ( judging perversly of those things which are good ) they imagine that such as abound in riches , and beare great sway by the places of authority , and vaunt of other such like temporall ( or materiall ) commodities , are the only blessed and happy men . But of the vertues of the minde ( which exceed by many degrees all bodily and externall things ) they make no account at all . Howsoever those commodities are the best , which belong unto the best things . And in that respect , vertue as far surpasseth riches and health , and such like , as the soule is more excellent then the body : And therefore also , vertue aswell alone , as together with other things , makes a man to be blessed . Vertue with other things is considered according to a finite amplitude , as a thing of two ells , or the like ; but alone , and by it selfe , it is considerable according to an indefinite circumscription , as a heape . For if from a heape ( which is a thing having an indefinite circumscription ) you may take away two bushels ( which is a finite quantity ) two bushels is indeed taken from the heape : yet that which is left continueth still to be an an heape . In like maner , if from vertue ( considered in its own indefinite amplitude ) you take away all the good things that are bodily or externall ( which are but finite things ) and leave the vertue onely , ( which is an indefinite good ) the blessednesse remaineth still intire ; because vertue , even of it selfe , is perfectly sufficient to blessednesse . And therefore every good man is blessed ( though no externall good be left him ) and every wicked man is miserable , though he hath all those things hapned together , which are called the goods of Fortune . The multitude not knowing thus much , doe think that they onely are blessed , who have all things at will , for their bodily delight , and abound in riches ; and they can oft finde fault with providence which governeth our affaires , not with respect unto those things onely which are apparent unto us , but with regard unto those also , which are according to the fore-knowledge of GOD. For GOD foreseeing , that it would be expedient for him to bee poore , who is now honest and good , ( and that riches comming fast upō him , would corrupt his minde ) doth keep him in that poverty , which is most convenient for the chiefe good of that man. And in regard God foresaw also , that the rich , man would be grievous to others in the want of riches ( by committing robberies , murthers , and other great outrages ) hee suffered him to enjoy riches . Poverty hath been many times profitable also , in making us to beare the losse of our children with more contentednesse ; and in preventing the vexations which might happen by wicked servants ; and perhaps their lives would have beene more bitter to us then their deaths , if our children had lived to bee wicked ; or if wee should have had false and thee-vish servants . We foreseeing nothing that is to come ; but beholding only the things present , cannot judge rightly of that which may fall out ; but unto GOD all future things are as evident as those which are present . Thus much wee have spoken against those who have presumed to blame GODS providence ; and against whom this part of Scripture may well be applyed , Shall the clay say to the potter , why hast thou made me thus ? For it is an arrogance to be abhorred , that he who dares not finde fault with an earthly Law-giver , should prescribe lawes to GOD , and object against the workes of his providence . But we will forbeare to meddle further with such extravagancies , ( or to speake more properly , with such impieties ) and proceed in disproving them , who say , that particular things are not governed by any providence , and yet allow that universall , and generall things , are governed by a providence . For no man can alleadge more then these three causes , to prove that there is no providence of God over particular things . Either it must bee because GOD knoweth not that it is good to take care for such things ; or because he will not ; or because he cannot . But nothing is more estranged from that blessed Essence , then ignorance , and unskilfulnesse : For It is knowledge , and science , and wisdome it selfe . Nay , there is none among men , so ignorant ( if he be in his wits ) but knowes , that if all particular things should be destroyed , the generall things could not possibly consist ; seeing universall things , are made up of particulars . Yea , all the particular things , and the generall things are equall , and converted , & destroyed , and preserved together . If therfore particular things perish , the universall will also perish . And there is no reason why wee should imagine that all singular things could escape destruction , if no care were taken of them from above . Now whereas to avoid this objection , they grant that GODS providence extendeth to this onely ; that individualls shall bee providently preserved , so far forth as may conduce to the preservation of generall things ; they have said enough ( though they bee not aware thereof ) to prove that there is , also , some providence over individualls . For ( as they themselves have said in effect ) GOD by preserving the species , preserveth also the kindes . SECT . 3. I. Of the unreasonablenesse of their opinion , who thinke that God despiseth to take care of particular things . II. Of Gods undeniable ablenesse to governe individualls ; and of the capablenesse which particulars have of the divine providence . III. Mans readinesse to call upon God in suddain extremities ( as it were by naturall instinct ) is an argument of providence . SOme there be who ( although they confesse that GOD is not ignorant how to provide for particular things ) doe affirme , that he will not assume the care of them . Now every one that will not doe a thing ; either will not doe it , because of sloth , or else for that it is not comely for him so to doe . No man will be so mad as to impute sloth to GOD ; For sloth is bred of these two ; pleasure , and feare ; and every one that is slothfull , is thereby drawn away by the love of some ease ( or pleasure ) or else discouraged by feare : and to cōceive either of these to be in GOD , were an impious absurdity . If they that will not be so prophane to lay slothfulnesse to GODS charge , shall say it is undecent for GOD , and unworthy the majesty of so high a blessednesse , to descend so low and unto such vile & smal things ( or to be as it were prophaned by the absurdities , and obscenities of those materiall things which depend upon the will of man ; and that therefore he will not take upon himselfe the government of such matters ) they ( not heeding it ) impute unto GOD , in so saying , two very faulty things , pride , and impurity . For either the Creator despiseth to take on himselfe the government and administration of individualls through haughtiness : ( which is most absurd to affirme ) or else through feare of being defiled , as they speake . And that is no lesse absurd then the other . For if they know the nature of the Sunne-beams to be such , that they can exhale naturally all moisture , even from dung-hills when they shine upon them , and that neither the Sunne , nor his beames are any whit contaminated , or defiled thereby , but keepe neverthelesse their owne purity : how can they conceive that GOD should be polluted , by those things which are below ? Surely these cannot be the conjectures of men , that have any knowledge of what is pertinent unto the nature of GOD. For the God-head is untouchable , uncorruptible , not possibly to be contaminated , and above all alteration : But pollution and such like things are the workes of change , and betoken alteration . And how can it bee counted other then most absurd , that an artificer ( of what art soever ) and especially a Physitian , taking care of generall things , should heedlesly passe over things particular ? without caring to shew his art in them ( though things of the least consequence ) seeing hee cannot chuse but know that every part standeth in some stead unto the whole ? much more absurd were it for any man to be of opinion ; that God who is the Creator of all , should be more unskilfull then an artificer ; and what else can be alleaged , if he be willing , but that hee cannot take the care of particulars ? And what can be affirmed more manifestly repugnant to the nature of GOD , then to say he is weak , and lacketh ability to doe well ? For two other causes , GODS providence is by some judged not to be exercised in particular things . The one is , because the nature of God ( as they thinke ) serveth not thereunto ; the other is , for that they conceive particular things to be incapable of his providence . But that it is agreeable to the nature of GOD to governe by his providence , they themselves ( who have denied it ) doe implicitly confesse , when they affirme that his providence ruleth universall things ; especially seeing the inferiour things are not able to mount up , unto such as are much above them ; whereas the power of those which are superiour , descendeth even unto the lowest , ( even to things insensible ) for their preservation : yea , all things depend upon the will of GOD , and draw from thence , their continuance , and well-being . And that the nature of individualls ( though infinitely multiplyed ) is capable of being governed by Providence ; it is plaine by those living creatures which are ordered by Rule and Authority . For , some of them , as Bees and Ants , and divers others , which being assembled together , are continued under certaine Captaines ( or guides ) whom they obediently follow : But this is best perceived if we looke into the government of common-wealths ▪ and the conversation that is amongst men : For it is plaine , that it admits the administration and care , both of Lawgivers , and also of subordinate magistrates ; and how can that which is capable of such things , be unfit , to receive an orderly government from the providence of the Creator ? This also is no small argument , that there is providence over particular things , even that the knowledge thereof is naturally ingraffed in men : which is evident , when wee are brought to any great extremity ; for wee then slie immediately unto GOD by prayer , as if without teaching , it were naturally written in our hearts , that help were to be sought of GOD. Nature except it have beene taught , cannot of it selfe lead us unto that , the doing whereof is not according to nature : neither doth it move us to fly thither for assistance , where none is to be had : yet when any great affliction , or feare suddenly oppresseth us ; we cry out unto GOD before we be aware ; and before we have had time to bethinke our selves what wee have to doe . Now , every naturall consequence , is a forcible evidence admitting no contradiction . SECT . 4. I. Of the occasion and grounds of their error , who thought there was no Providence ruling individualls . II. How men ought to behave themselves in the search of Gods providence , which is beyond their comprehension . III. Of Divine permission , and the manifold species thereof . THe occasions & ground of their error who say there is no providence over particular things , are these . First , they conceived the soule to bee mortall , and that it perished with the body . And secondly , because these men could not comprehend by their understanding and reason , how there should bee any providence ruling individualls . But that the soule is not mortall , and that all things pertaining unto man , are not shut up within the compasse of this life , it appeareth ( even to heathen men ) both by the opinions of the wisest among the Grecians , who taught the transmigration of soules from body to body ; as also by the places which they affirmed to bee allotted out , unto the Soules departed , according to their good or evill course in this life ; and by those punishments wherwith soules are ( as they hold ) punished by themselves , for the offences they have committed . For these things , although they be erroneous in other circumstances and respects ; yet in this they are true , and their authors do all agree therein , that the soule remaineth after this life , and shall come to Iudgement . But if wee cannot attaine unto the reason of that governance which providence hath over particular things ; which indeed we cannot , as is implyed by this text : How unsearchable are thy judgements , and thy wayes past finding out ! Let us not therupon conclude , there is no such providence : For no man ought to affirme there is neither sea , not sand , because he is ignorant of the limits of the Sea , and of the number of the sands : seeing by the same rule , they might aswell say that there is neither man , nor any other living-creature , because they know not the number either of the men , or of the living-creatures . Particular things are to us infinite : Things which are unto us infinite , and also unknowne unto us ; and therefore , though universalls may be ( oftentimes ) comprehended by our understanding , yet individualls are not possibly comprehensible thereby . There is in every man a double difference ; one in respect of other men ; and another in respect of himselfe : yea , there is in every man great differences , and alterations even in respect of himselfe . Every day ; as , in the maner of his life ; in his actions , ( or affaires ) in his necessities , in his desires ; and in all things which doe happen , or pertaine unto him . It is not much otherwise with an irrationall-creature ; for according to the manifold necessities , and occasions thereof , it is very speedily caried hither and thither ; and soon altered againe as other opportunities require . These things considered , that Providence which is able to keep a continuall course with every one of those infinite and incomprehensible particulars ( which are so differing also , so changeable , and of so many fashions ) must needs be such a Providence as is agreeable to all , and every one of those individualls : and extended more infinitely then those things are , whereunto it should reach . And if this Providence must be so fit , and so infinite in regard of the infinite difference of individualls : no doubt but the reason and method of this Providence is as infinite ; and if it be infinite , it cannot possibly bee comprehended by us . And it becomes not us to deny that gracious providence which governes all things , because our ignorance is unable to comprehend it . For those things which wee suppose to be amisse , are knowne well enough unto the wisdome of the Creator , to be well ordered . Because wee are ignorant of their occasions , we causelesly judge many things to be imprudently done ; and that which chanceth unto us in other things , by reason of our ignorance , falleth out also in the workes of providence ; for we doe after the same sort cōceive of those things which belong to providence ; receiving by obscure likelihoods , and by conjectures , certaine formes or shadowes of the workes thereof , by such things as we have seene . Wee say therefore , that some things are done by Gods permission ; and this permission is of many sorts : For he sometime permits that even the just man shall fall into misery , to declare unto others , that vertue which is concealed as in Iob. Hee doth also permit some absurd things ; that by the act which appeareth to bee absurd , some great and wonderfull matter may bee brought to passe , as the salvation of men by the Crosse . Hee permits likewise the blessed Saints to be afflicted for another end ; as that they might not fall from a sincere conscience , and that the loftinesse of the minde might be abated ; as when S t. Paul was buffetted by Satan . Sometimes also , one man is rejected , and left as desolate for a time ; that others considering his case , might be instructed , and amended thereby . As in the example of Lazarus and the rich man ; for , when we see any man afflicted , our hearts are naturally touched therewith , according as Menander hath very well expressed : By seeing others feele the Rod , We tremble with a fear of GOD. Otherwhile , again , one man is afflicted for the glory of another ; and neither for his owne sin , nor the sinne of his Parents : as , he that was blind from his birth , for the glorifying of the Son of man. It is permitted also that some should be persecuted , to be a pattern of constancy unto others ; and that when their glory is exalted , others might be incouraged to suffer in the like case , in hope of the glory to come ; and for the blessednesse which is expected after this life ; as in the Martyrs , and in those who have yeelded up their lives for their Country , for their kinred , or for their masters . SECT . 5. I. One may otherwhile be afflicted for the good of another , without infringing the Justice of divine Providence . Why holy men suffer bitter deaths and persecutions . II. Death , or sufferings are no disadvātages to good men ; neither are the unlawfull actions of the wicked , justifiable , though Providence convert thē to good ends . NOw , if any one thinke it against reason , that one man should be afflicted for the amendment of another ; let him know that this life , is ( not the perfection of mans happinesse ) but a place of wrestlings , and of striving for mastery , in respect of Vertue : And the greater the labours and sufferings are , the more glorious Crown of Glory shall be obtained : because the recompence of Rewards , is according to the measure of Patience . Saint Paul was contented to undergoe the manifold afflictions and tribulations which he suffered , that he might obtain the greater , and more perfect Crown of a Conquerour : ( which he himself confesseth to be more then all our sufferings can merit ) and therefore the works of Providence are justly and very decently performed . A man may the better allow this to be so , ( and conceive that GOD governs all things , so well and so fitly , that the nature of each thing cannot more desire ) if he doe but propose unto himself the beleeving of these two things which are generally confessed among men : namely , that GOD , onely , is good and wise : For , in that he is Good , it is agreeable unto his goodnesse to employ his providence over all things ; and in that he is wise , he hath a regard to performe them wisely and exactly : because , if he used not his Providence , he could not be good : and if he did not use it well , hee could not be wise . He therefore , that gives his minde to consider discreetly of these matters , will not misesteem of any thing which is wrought by divine providence ; neither speak evill thereof without due examination : but rather accept of all things , as exceeding well performed : and marvaile at their admirable decency and perfection , though the ignorant multitude judge according to a false appearance : For in conceiving otherwise , wee bring upon our heads ( besides the guilt of blasphemy ) great blame for our sottish presumption . Now , in that wee say , all things are done well , wee justifie not the naughtinesse of men , or of such evill works as are in our power to doe , or leave undone ; but , we speak it of the works of Providence which are not in our power . For , if any man object and say , How falls it out that holy men are put cruelly to death without desert ? why , if they were unjustly condemned , did not Gods just providence hinder those murthers ? and if they deserved to be so put to death , why are not they without blame who caused them to bee slaine ? To this we answer , that the murtherers of such men were injurious in slaying them ; and that they which were so slain , were slain either for their desert , or their profit Somtime deservingly , for evills committed by them in secret : and sometimes for their profit : Gods providence , thereby preventing either future sins , or worse mischiefes to come ; and in those respects it was good for them that their life should be shortned . Thus was it with Socrates , and the Saints . But , they who slew these men , did not slay them for any such cause ; neither was it lawfully done ; but out of the corruption of their owne minds , and for gain and robbery : For , the Act is in mans power ; but what shall follow upon the Act , ( as whether we shall be slain or no ) is not as he will : neither is any death evill , except for sinne onely , as is manifest by the death of the Saints . But , wicked men , although they die in their beds on a sudden , and without pain , doe neverthelesse die an evill death , which brings them unto an evill buriall : I meane , to bee buried in their sinne ; yet whosoever killeth any man murtherously , doth wickedly in so doing . If hee killeth any one for that which deserveth death ; he is then to be accounted among hangmen and executioners . If it be for the gaining of some profit by them that are slaine , he is to be reputed among cruell and wicked murtherers . The like may be said of them who murther their enemies , or oppresse them by extreame servitude , or use any manner of inhumane cruelty , against them whom they have overcome . They also are as little to be justified , who seeke the inriching of themselves , by extorting other mens goods : for , though it may be expedient for those , from whom they were extorted , that they should be deprived of them ; yet , they which wrested away more then their owne , were unjust , in so so doing . For , they take them out of a covetous desire of those good , and not for that it was expedient for them , whō they dispossessed of such things . Glory be to God. FINIS .