Summary of your 'study carrel' ============================== This is a summary of your Distant Reader 'study carrel'. The Distant Reader harvested & cached your content into a collection/corpus. It then applied sets of natural language processing and text mining against the collection. The results of this process was reduced to a database file -- a 'study carrel'. The study carrel can then be queried, thus bringing light specific characteristics for your collection. These characteristics can help you summarize the collection as well as enumerate things you might want to investigate more closely. Eric Lease Morgan May 27, 2019 Number of items in the collection; 'How big is my corpus?' ---------------------------------------------------------- 27 Average length of all items measured in words; "More or less, how big is each item?" ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 37284 Average readability score of all items (0 = difficult; 100 = easy) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 78 Top 50 statistically significant keywords; "What is my collection about?" ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 Plato 13 SOCRATES 10 Socrates 9 man 7 God 5 true 5 thing 5 good 5 Republic 3 soul 3 nature 3 like 3 great 3 art 3 Greek 3 Gods 3 Critias 3 Aristotle 2 truth 2 stranger 2 state 2 mind 2 law 2 god 2 cleinia 2 body 2 THEAETETUS 2 Sophist 2 Protagoras 2 Parmenides 2 Menexenus 2 Homer 2 Hellenes 2 Gorgias 2 Athenians 2 ALCIBIADES 1 world 1 word 1 virtue 1 theodorus 1 temperance 1 socrate 1 sense 1 rhetoric 1 protarchus 1 polus 1 pleasure 1 phaedrus 1 opinion 1 megillus Top 50 lemmatized nouns; "What is discussed?" --------------------------------------------- 4142 man 3749 socrate 2511 thing 1783 one 1640 law 1597 nature 1529 word 1501 time 1419 art 1405 soul 1394 knowledge 1342 mind 1305 part 1199 state 1166 way 1145 name 1139 life 1085 body 1055 pleasure 1023 STRANGER 992 other 935 world 920 truth 912 place 885 cleinia 848 idea 831 opinion 798 question 785 virtue 779 friend 766 power 748 form 743 reason 703 sort 697 case 677 person 675 kind 669 evil 668 sense 662 argument 651 language 648 manner 645 philosophy 645 love 633 class 626 city 625 order 618 principle 614 number 613 good Top 50 proper nouns; "What are the names of persons or places?" -------------------------------------------------------------- 1966 Socrates 1398 Plato 994 THEAETETUS 891 ATHENIAN 648 God 539 ALCIBIADES 369 Protagoras 364 SOCRATES 364 Republic 314 Gods 261 Laws 259 Theaetetus 230 Phaedrus 225 Sophist 210 MENO 204 Gorgias 200 Athens 194 Homer 193 heaven 185 Greek 184 Parmenides 182 Aristotle 178 Stranger 150 Alcibiades 141 Timaeus 138 POLUS 134 Zeus 133 Philebus 125 Euthydemus 125 Athenians 121 Critias 118 EUTHYPHRO 116 Meno 116 Cratylus 113 Phaedo 113 Hippias 113 HIPPIAS 113 Callicles 111 Simmias 104 Theodorus 104 Agathon 103 Hellenes 101 Statesman 98 GORGIAS 96 Cleinias 95 Laches 95 CRATYLUS 93 god 90 MEGILLUS 89 Polus Top 50 personal pronouns nouns; "To whom are things referred?" ------------------------------------------------------------- 10831 he 8553 i 8179 you 6712 we 6658 they 5744 them 3053 him 3041 it 2325 us 1689 me 945 himself 540 themselves 417 she 402 itself 262 ourselves 208 myself 171 her 157 yourself 156 one 105 herself 50 yours 30 theirs 30 ours 25 mine 20 his 9 thyself 5 yourselves 3 oneself 3 hers 2 ye 2 whence 2 --they 1 themselves,--the 1 thee 1 repeated,-- 1 pain;--they 1 overcome--''what 1 nothing;--you 1 not;--you 1 it,--e.g 1 interests,''--declaring 1 illusion,--they 1 him:--he 1 him:--''to 1 heaven:--you 1 forgotten:-- 1 dishonour;--they 1 discuss.--this 1 break 1 ''here Top 50 lemmatized verbs; "What do things do?" --------------------------------------------- 52755 be 12575 have 5177 say 5142 do 2379 make 2173 know 1619 let 1520 give 1506 think 1267 see 1250 speak 1233 take 1030 go 1001 call 971 come 944 suppose 906 become 904 find 900 mean 848 tell 848 ask 748 appear 735 seem 622 hear 610 follow 549 admit 541 answer 529 consider 516 compare 508 agree 501 show 486 begin 484 allow 482 use 470 learn 460 bring 455 receive 428 pass 426 want 423 understand 423 leave 422 accord 419 live 405 proceed 394 regard 387 reply 375 remain 373 like 372 teach 372 describe Top 50 lemmatized adjectives and adverbs; "How are things described?" --------------------------------------------------------------------- 11813 not 3628 other 2759 then 2633 good 2368 only 2259 true 2222 more 2154 great 1941 same 1877 well 1729 also 1704 now 1591 first 1482 very 1453 so 1416 many 1277 as 1259 own 1135 such 1078 certainly 1025 most 925 young 863 again 820 up 811 therefore 788 just 783 always 778 far 764 yet 732 never 667 even 665 still 660 human 658 too 639 old 626 right 625 bad 615 less 608 much 561 rather 539 ever 526 out 505 long 488 wise 478 different 475 quite 471 high 471 away 457 whole 448 able Top 50 lemmatized superlative adjectives; "How are things described to the extreme?" ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 559 good 423 great 173 least 169 most 143 high 76 noble 70 bad 57 fair 49 wise 44 eld 32 true 31 simple 30 near 24 small 22 strong 18 large 18 happy 17 Most 15 rich 15 old 14 j 13 late 13 easy 12 young 12 pure 12 low 11 brave 10 short 10 manif 10 early 9 few 8 slow 8 safe 7 swift 7 pleasant 7 mighty 7 mean 7 just 6 long 6 l 6 fine 6 divine 6 dear 6 common 6 chief 6 bright 5 holy 5 gentle 5 fit 5 bl Top 50 lemmatized superlative adverbs; "How do things do to the extreme?" ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 856 most 57 well 31 least 3 soon 2 fast 1 worst 1 sayest 1 manner:-- 1 lest 1 classes:--the Top 50 Internet domains; "What Webbed places are alluded to in this corpus?" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Top 50 URLs; "What is hyperlinked from this corpus?" ---------------------------------------------------- Top 50 email addresses; "Who are you gonna call?" ------------------------------------------------- Top 50 positive assertions; "What sentences are in the shape of noun-verb-noun?" ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48 one is not 18 plato does not 14 man is not 11 knowledge is perception 10 knowledge is not 9 plato is not 9 time went on 8 art is not 8 socrates is not 8 soul is prior 8 things are not 7 men are always 7 plato has not 7 pleasure is not 7 soul is immortal 6 one is other 6 pleasures are good 5 knowledge is sensible 5 knowledge is true 5 life is not 5 man is better 5 man is good 5 mind is not 5 one has ever 5 things are good 5 things are useful 5 words are not 5 world is not 4 ideas are not 4 knowledge is sensation 4 man be able 4 man does not 4 man is dead 4 man is man 4 men do not 4 name is not 4 one does not 4 one is always 4 other is not 4 others are other 4 plato is more 4 soul is not 4 time goes on 4 time had not 4 time has not 4 words is not 3 body is not 3 knowledge is more 3 law is not 3 life be immortal Top 50 negative assertions; "What sentences are in the shape of noun-verb-no|not-noun?" --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 time had not yet 3 time has not yet 2 law gives no protection 2 plato is not altogether 2 truths have no outward 1 art be not also 1 art did not at 1 art is no respecter 1 art is not always 1 art is not easy 1 art is not knowledge 1 art was not real 1 body is no way 1 idea is not only 1 ideas are not only 1 ideas are not valid 1 ideas did not accurately 1 ideas has no foundation 1 knowledge is not new 1 knowledge is not perception 1 knowledge is not true 1 law does not perfectly 1 law had not yet 1 law have no basis 1 law is not merely 1 laws are not polities 1 life be not death 1 life is not dependent 1 life is not life 1 life is not worth 1 man does not always 1 man has no base 1 man has no children 1 man has no interest 1 man has no love 1 man has no real 1 man has no sense 1 man have no existence 1 man is no better 1 man is not better 1 man is not happy 1 man is not likely 1 man is not therefore 1 man is not unjust 1 men are not easily 1 men are not opposed 1 men do not always 1 men have no need 1 men have no regard 1 men have no shame Sizes of items; "Measures in words, how big is each item?" ---------------------------------------------------------- 239974 1750 73125 1572 66182 1726 59621 1672 53085 1616 45691 1735 45601 1744 43005 1658 40342 1738 38382 1636 36232 1687 32810 1600 28115 1591 22294 1643 21869 1580 21080 1598 18733 1676 12557 1579 12295 1584 10174 1682 9885 1571 9440 1673 9242 1642 7121 1681 6556 1635 5977 1677 1657 Readability of items; "How difficult is each item to read?" ----------------------------------------------------------- 85.0 1635 85.0 1584 85.0 1677 84.0 1579 84.0 1676 84.0 1681 83.0 1642 83.0 1643 81.0 1672 81.0 1598 80.0 1735 79.0 1687 79.0 1744 78.0 1738 78.0 1726 76.0 1616 76.0 1591 76.0 1673 75.0 1636 74.0 1658 73.0 1750 72.0 1580 71.0 1600 67.0 1682 63.0 1572 63.0 1571 1657 Item summaries; "In a narrative form, how can each item be abstracted?" ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1571 division of the earth Poseidon obtained as his portion the island of in size, two of land and three of sea, which his divine power readily and him he made king of the centre island, while to his twin brother, through the zones of land from the island to the sea. on a column of orichalcum in the temple of Poseidon, at which the kings inhabitants with the barbaric greatness of the island of Atlantis, Plato flows off the bare earth into the sea, but, having an abundant supply receiving for his lot the island of Atlantis, begat children by a mortal king, he named Atlas, and after him the whole island and the ocean many things were brought to them from foreign countries, and the island middle of the island, at the temple of Poseidon, whither the kings were Poseidon; and the ten kings, being left alone in the temple, after they 1572 fairest work in the order of nature, and the world became a living soul which is time, having an uniform motion according to number, parted into planets; and he ordered the younger gods to frame human bodies for them the world portions of earth, air, fire, water, hereafter to be returned, In the next place, the gods gave a forward motion to the human body, air, earth, and water are bodies and therefore solids, and solids a briny nature then two half-solid bodies are formed by separating the particles of earth and air, two kinds of globules are formed--one of The gods also mingled natures akin to that of man with other forms and of men, whom God placed in the uttermost parts of the world in return elements which are in number four, the body of the world was created, say, was their nature at that time, and God fashioned them by form and 1579 Laches; and Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys, Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend indifferent becomes a friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of unsolved, and the three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, are Yes, he said, your old friend and admirer, Miccus. Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for, as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good. now become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship 1580 Socrates of any definition of temperance in which an element of science I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that he said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: for he who has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the Say that he knows health;--not wisdom or temperance, but the art of 1584 Socrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers to SOCRATES: And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, SOCRATES: Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of LACHES: Yes. SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell? LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a man NICIAS: I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not LACHES: Yes. SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you NICIAS: I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that NICIAS: Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? LACHES: Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the SOCRATES: Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is. 1591 know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? the help of Protagoras in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is, adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that passage--e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure--Plato is inconsistent with Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that ''pleasure is the only good,'' SOCRATES: Yes; and I have heard and said many things. incurable--if what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I, 1598 Crito, Cleinias, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus. and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; our art will do both. Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said. Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this? SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good? Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance. Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing? 1600 the gods, who honour the love of the beloved above that of the lover, is the good, and therefore, in wanting and desiring the beautiful, love wise woman of Mantinea, who, like Agathon, had spoken first of love and Socrates, like Agathon, had told her that Love is a powers of Socrates and his love of the fair, which receive a similar love is of the good, and no man can desire that which he has. Many things were said by Phaedrus about Love in ''And how, Socrates,'' she said with a smile, ''can Love be acknowledged to rejoined, ''are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of nothing.'' ''Then,'' she said, ''the simple truth is, that men love the ''Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,'' she said, Well then, said Eryximachus, if you like praise Socrates. 1616 Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature of names is HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word ''man'' implies that other animals HERMOGENES: Yes. SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names, CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is CRATYLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things? 1635 rhapsodes, like Ion, are the interpreters of single poets. rejoins Socrates, when Homer speaks of the arts, as for example, of SOCRATES: And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod ION: Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer. ION: Yes. SOCRATES: And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who ION: Yes. SOCRATES: And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as Hesiod and ION: Yes. SOCRATES: And when any one acquires any other art as a whole, the same SOCRATES: Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts? ION: Yes. SOCRATES: And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the ION: Yes. SOCRATES: Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the ION: Yes. SOCRATES: And in judging of the general''s art, do you judge of it as a 1636 of philosophy to love and to art in general, and to the human soul, will PHAEDRUS: My tale, Socrates, is one of your sort, for love was the theme PHAEDRUS: What do you mean, my good Socrates? PHAEDRUS: I should like to know, Socrates, whether the place is not PHAEDRUS: Now don''t talk in that way, Socrates, but let me have your SOCRATES: Your love of discourse, Phaedrus, is superhuman, simply SOCRATES: Only think, my good Phaedrus, what an utter want of delicacy PHAEDRUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And a professor of the art will make the same thing appear to PHAEDRUS: I quite admit, Socrates, that the art of rhetoric which these SOCRATES: And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul PHAEDRUS: You may very likely be right, Socrates. PHAEDRUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a 1642 Euthyphro replies, that ''Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety SOCRATES: A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in SOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of 1643 Socrates said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza would have maintained MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue. MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable? MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it 1657 1658 there is no God, there is no existence of the soul after death.'' For Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say. dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems Yes. Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before Yes. Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen? Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the Very good, Socrates, said Simmias; then I will tell you my difficulty, soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body. 1672 Polus asks, ''What thing?'' and Socrates answers, An experience or routine SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that. GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, 1673 Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic The Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias. SOCRATES: I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning HIPPIAS: Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he is HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it? HIPPIAS: There you are wrong, Socrates; for in so far as Achilles speaks HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man 1676 ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:--In time of war, men ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the good is expedient? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who SOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would 1677 PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates and Alcibiades. SOCRATES: Are you going, Alcibiades, to offer prayer to Zeus? ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates, but you are speaking of a madman: surely you ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And every disease ophthalmia? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: The senseless are those who do not know this? ALCIBIADES: Good words, Socrates, prithee. ALCIBIADES: No. SOCRATES: That ignorance is bad then, it would appear, which is of the ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: The many are foolish, the few wise? SOCRATES: Nor again, I suppose, a person who knows the art of war, but ALCIBIADES: No. SOCRATES: Nor, once more, a person who knows how to kill another or to ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And if a person does that which he knows or supposes that he ALCIBIADES: But I do not think that it has, Socrates: at least, if the ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates, with you and with the God, whom, indeed, 1681 PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Eryxias, Erasistratus, Critias. ask, Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus, can you tell me what Yes, said Eryxias, interposing, but what use would it be if a man had And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is like SOCRATES: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to SOCRATES: My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given you the SOCRATES: And would you say that those things are useful which are SOCRATES: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things SOCRATES: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose? SOCRATES: And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for CRITIAS: No. SOCRATES: Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the SOCRATES: And he to whom the greatest number of things are useful 1682 genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature Plato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic The author of the Menexenus, whether Plato or not, is evidently character of Socrates, Plato, who knows so well how to give a hint, or Whether the Menexenus is a genuine writing of Plato, or an imitation PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates and Menexenus. MENEXENUS: Nay, Socrates, let us have the speech, whether Aspasia''s or MENEXENUS: Far otherwise, Socrates; let us by all means have the speech. for the men of Marathon only showed the Hellenes that it was possible to MENEXENUS: I have often met Aspasia, Socrates, and know what she is 1687 ideas of likeness, unity, and the rest, exist apart from individuals so of other ideas?'' ''Yes, that is my meaning.'' ''And do you suppose the having also measures or parts or numbers equal to or greater or less objects of sense--to number, time, place, and to the higher ideas of I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if idea, parting it off from other things. Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are these and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did 1726 answer to Socrates, proceeds to define knowledge as true opinion, with THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge? THEAETETUS: No. SOCRATES: And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And ''appears to him'' means the same as ''he perceives.'' THEAETETUS: I should say ''No,'' Socrates, if I were to speak my mind THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory? SOCRATES: Yet perception is knowledge: so at least Theaetetus and I were THEAETETUS: I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man''s not knowing THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about 1735 STRANGER: Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having art or not THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And controversy may be of two kinds. THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And in the soul there are two kinds of evil. THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were? 1738 rules, but by making his art a law, and, like him, the true governor YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: Then the sciences must be divided as before? YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge? YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: In that case, there was already implied a division of all YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts, YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. STRANGER: So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any 1744 SOCRATES: Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus. SOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any PROTARCHUS: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class SOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains? PROTARCHUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure? PROTARCHUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often PROTARCHUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real SOCRATES: Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a SOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which PROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in 1750 simple law would be as follows:--A man shall marry between the ages of habits of law, that they may form a right judgment of good and bad men. our legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall run as God; and let the law follow:--He who fails in his undertaking shall pay well-ordered state; and therefore our law shall be as follows:--No one thoughts like these; and let him hear the law:--He who is enrolled shall ATHENIAN: Then in a city which has good laws, or in future ages is to ATHENIAN: In the first place, let us speak of the laws about ATHENIAN: But what shall be our next musical law or type? Let us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall be called And let this be the simple form of the law: No man shall have