Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject / by Thomas Hobs.
         Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.
      
       
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             Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject / by Thomas Hobs.
             Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.
          
           [16], 80 p.
           
             Printed by W.B. for F. Eaglesfield ...,
             London :
             1654.
          
           
             Reproduction of original in Bodleian Library.
          
        
      
    
     
       
         eng
      
       
         
           Bramhall, John, 1594-1663. -- Defence of true liberty.
           Free will and determinism -- Early works to 1800.
        
      
    
       A44006  R20187  (Wing H2252).  civilwar no Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, Hobbes, Thomas 1654    15829 18 0 0 0 0 0 11 C  The  rate of 11 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the C category of texts with between 10 and 35 defects per 10,000 words. 
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           OF
           LIBERTIE
           AND
           NECESSITIE
           A
           TREATISE
           ,
           Wherein
           all
           Controversie
           concerning
           Predestination
           ,
           Election
           ,
           Free-will
           ,
           Grace
           ,
           Merits
           ,
           Reprobation
           ,
           &c.
           is
           fully
           decided
           and
           cleared
           ,
           in
           answer
           to
           a
           Treatise
           written
           by
           the
           Bishop
           of
           
             London-derry
             ,
          
           on
           the
           same
           subject
           .
        
         
           By
           
             Thomas
             Hobs.
             
          
        
         
           Dedicated
           to
           the
           Lord
           Marquess
           of
           
             Newcastle
             .
          
        
         
           LONDON
           ,
           Printed
           by
           
             W.
             B.
          
           for
           
             F.
             Eaglesfield
          
           at
           the
           Marygold
           in
           S.
           
             Pauls
          
           Church-yard
           .
           1654.
           
        
      
       
       
       
         
           To
           the
           Sober
           and
           Discreet
           Reader
           .
        
         
           IT
           made
           
             S.
             Chrysostom
          
           tremble
           when
           ever
           he
           reflected
           on
           the
           proportion
           ,
           which
           those
           that
           went
           the
           
             narrow
          
           way
           ,
           bore
           to
           those
           which
           marched
           in
           the
           
             broad
             ,
          
           how
           
             many
          
           were
           the
           Called
           ,
           &
           how
           
             few
          
           the
           Chosen
           ,
           how
           many
           they
           were
           that
           were
           created
           for
           and
           in
           a
           capacitie
           of
           eternal
           beatitude
           ,
           and
           how
           few
           attained
           it
           .
           This
           consideration
           certainly
           would
           make
           a
           man
           look
           upon
           the
           holy
           
             Scriptures
             ,
          
           among
           
             Christiās
             ,
          
           as
           the
           greatest
           indulgence
           of
           heaven
           ,
           being
           all
           the
           directions
           it
           hath
           been
           pleased
           to
           afford
           poor
           
             man
          
           in
           so
           difficult
           a
           journey
           as
           that
           of
           his
           eternal
           bliss
           or
           miserie
           .
           
           But
           when
           a
           man
           cometh
           to
           look
           into
           those
           transcendent
           writings
           ,
           he
           finds
           them
           to
           be
           the
           works
           of
           a
           sort
           of
           innocent
           harmless
           men
           ,
           that
           had
           little
           acquaintance
           or
           familiaritie
           with
           the
           world
           ,
           and
           consequently
           not
           much
           interessed
           in
           the
           troubles
           and
           quarrels
           of
           several
           Countries
           ;
           That
           though
           they
           are
           all
           but
           necessarie
           ,
           yet
           were
           they
           written
           occasionally
           ,
           rather
           than
           out
           of
           design
           ;
           and
           lastly
           ,
           that
           their
           main
           business
           is
           ,
           to
           abstract
           man
           from
           this
           world
           ,
           and
           to
           perswade
           him
           to
           preferr
           the
           bare
           hope
           of
           what
           he
           can
           neither
           
             see
             ,
             hear
             ,
          
           nor
           
             conceive
             ,
          
           before
           all
           the
           present
           enjoyments
           this
           world
           can
           afford
           .
           This
           begat
           a
           reverence
           and
           esteem
           to
           them
           in
           all
           those
           who
           endeavor
           to
           work
           out
           their
           salvation
           o●
           of
           them
           .
           But
           if
           a
           man
           ,
           not
           weighin●
           them
           in
           themselves
           ,
           shall
           consider
           the
           practices
           of
           those
           ,
           who
           pretend
           to
           be
           the
           interpreters
           of
           them
           ,
           &
           to
           make
           them
           fit
           meat
           for
           the
           people
           ,
           how
           that
           instead
           
           of
           renouncing
           the
           world
           ,
           they
           endeavour
           to
           raise
           themselves
           into
           the
           greatest
           promotions
           ,
           leisure
           ,
           and
           luxurie
           ;
           that
           they
           make
           them
           the
           decoys
           of
           the
           people
           ,
           to
           carrie
           on
           designes
           and
           intriques
           of
           State
           ,
           and
           studie
           the
           enjoyments
           of
           this
           world
           more
           than
           any
           other
           people
           ,
           he
           will
           find
           some
           grounds
           to
           conclude
           ,
           the
           practices
           of
           such
           men
           to
           be
           the
           greatest
           disturbance
           ,
           burden
           ,
           and
           vexation
           of
           the
           Christian
           part
           of
           the
           world
           .
           The
           complaint
           is
           as
           true
           as
           sad
           ;
           Instead
           of
           acquainting
           the
           credulous
           vulgar
           ,
           with
           the
           main
           end
           of
           their
           functions
           ,
           and
           the
           great
           business
           of
           their
           embassy
           ,
           what
           a
           great
           measure
           of
           felicitie
           is
           prepared
           for
           them
           ,
           and
           how
           easily
           it
           may
           be
           forfeited
           ?
           they
           involve
           their
           consciences
           in
           the
           bryars
           of
           a
           thousand
           needless
           scruples
           ,
           they
           spin
           out
           volumes
           out
           of
           half
           sentences
           ,
           nay
           ,
           out
           of
           points
           and
           accents
           ,
           and
           raise
           endless
           Controversies
           about
           things
           (
           were
           men
           free
           from
           passion
           ▪
           &
           
           prejudice
           )
           in
           themselves
           clear
           enough
           ,
           and
           when
           they
           have
           canvas'd
           their
           questions
           ,
           till
           they
           are
           wearie
           themselves
           ,
           and
           have
           wearied
           hearers
           ,
           and
           readers
           ,
           and
           all
           they
           have
           to
           do
           with
           ,
           every
           one
           sits
           down
           under
           his
           own
           vine
           ,
           and
           hugs
           his
           own
           apprehensions
           ,
           so
           that
           after
           all
           their
           pains
           ,
           bandings
           ,
           and
           implacable
           adhesion
           to
           parties
           ,
           the
           inconvenience
           remains
           still
           ,
           and
           we
           as
           far
           from
           any
           solid
           conviction
           ,
           as
           at
           first
           setting
           out
           .
        
         
           The
           Controversies
           betwixt
           
             Rome
          
           and
           the
           
             Reformation
             ,
          
           are
           long
           since
           beaten
           out
           of
           the
           pit
           ,
           by
           other
           cōbatants
           of
           their
           own
           brood
           ,
           so
           that
           if
           we
           speak
           of
           
             Protestant
          
           and
           
             Catholick
             ,
          
           they
           are
           in
           a
           manner
           content
           to
           sit
           down
           with
           their
           present
           acquests
           ;
           for
           as
           to
           conviction
           he
           certainly
           is
           a
           rare
           
             Prosolite
             ,
          
           at
           whose
           conversion
           ,
           
             interest
             ,
             humour
             ,
             discontent
             ,
             inclination
             ,
          
           are
           not
           admitted
           to
           the
           debate
           .
        
         
           But
           to
           come
           yet
           nearer
           our
           purpose
           ,
           
           Let
           us
           consider
           our
           own
           fractions
           ,
           of
           fractions
           of
           
             Religion
          
           here
           in
           
             England
             ,
          
           where
           if
           that
           saying
           ,
           That
           ,
           
             It
             is
             better
             to
             live
             where
             nothing
             is
             lawfull
             ,
             than
             where
             all
             things
             ,
          
           be
           as
           true
           in
           
             Religion
          
           as
           
             Policie
             ,
          
           Posteritie
           may
           haply
           feel
           the
           sad
           consequence
           of
           it
           .
           What
           I
           pray
           is
           the
           effect
           of
           so
           many
           
             sermons
             ,
             teachings
             ,
             preachings
             ,
             exercises
             ,
          
           and
           
             exercising
             of
             gifts
             ,
             meetings
             ,
             disputations
             ,
             conferences
             ,
             conventicles
             ,
             Printed
             books
             ,
          
           written
           with
           so
           much
           distraction
           and
           presumption
           upon
           God
           Almightie
           ,
           and
           abuse
           of
           his
           holy
           Word
           ?
           Marry
           this
           ,
           It
           is
           the
           seminarie
           of
           a
           many
           vexatious
           ,
           endless
           and
           fruitless
           controversies
           ,
           the
           consequence
           whereof
           ,
           are
           jealousies
           ,
           heart-burnings
           ,
           exasperation
           of
           parties
           ,
           the
           introduction
           of
           factions
           ,
           and
           National
           quarrels
           into
           matters
           of
           Religion
           ,
           and
           consequently
           all
           the
           calamities
           of
           war
           and
           devastation
           .
           Besides
           ,
           they
           are
           good
           lawfull
           diversions
           for
           
           the
           duller
           sort
           of
           
             Citizens
             ,
          
           who
           contract
           diseases
           for
           want
           of
           motion
           ;
           They
           supply
           the
           building
           of
           Pyramids
           among
           the
           
             Egyptians
             ,
          
           by
           diverting
           the
           thoughts
           of
           the
           people
           from
           matters
           of
           State
           ,
           and
           consequently
           from
           Rebellion
           .
        
         
           They
           find
           work
           for
           
             Printers
             ,
          
           &c.
           if
           the
           parties
           interessed
           are
           troubled
           with
           the
           itch
           of
           popularitie
           ,
           and
           will
           suffer
           themselves
           to
           be
           scratch'd
           out
           of
           somewhat
           by
           way
           of
           Contribution
           to
           the
           Impression
           .
           Hence
           are
           the
           
             Stationer's
          
           shop
           furnished
           ,
           and
           thence
           the
           
             Minister's
          
           studie
           in
           the
           Countrey
           ,
           who
           ,
           having
           found
           out
           the
           humour
           of
           his
           auditorie
           ,
           consults
           with
           his
           Stationer
           ,
           on
           what
           Books
           his
           money
           is
           best
           bestowed
           ,
           who
           very
           gravely
           ,
           it
           may
           be
           ,
           will
           commend
           
             Cole
          
           upon
           the
           
             Philippians
          
           before
           the
           excellent
           (
           but
           borrowed
           )
           
             Caryll
          
           upon
           
             Job
             .
          
           But
           as
           to
           any
           matter
           of
           conviction
           ,
           we
           see
           every
           one
           
             acquiesces
          
           in
           his
           own
           sentiments
           ,
           
           every
           one
           hears
           the
           Teacher
           who
           is
           most
           to
           his
           humour
           ,
           and
           when
           he
           hath
           been
           at
           Church
           ,
           and
           pretends
           to
           have
           sat
           at
           his
           feet
           ,
           comes
           home
           &
           censures
           him
           as
           he
           pleases
           .
        
         
           To
           be
           yet
           a
           little
           more
           particular
           ,
           what
           shall
           we
           think
           of
           those
           vast
           and
           involuble
           volumes
           concerning
           
             Predestination
             ,
             Free-wil
             ,
             Free-grace
             ,
             Election
             ,
             Reprobation
             ,
          
           &c.
           which
           fill
           ,
           not
           onely
           our
           Libraries
           ,
           but
           the
           world
           with
           their
           noise
           and
           disturbance
           ,
           whereof
           the
           least
           thing
           we
           are
           to
           expect
           is
           
             conviction
             ;
          
           every
           side
           endeavouring
           to
           make
           good
           their
           own
           grounds
           ,
           and
           keep
           the
           cudgels
           in
           their
           hands
           as
           long
           as
           they
           can
           ?
           What
           Stir
           is
           there
           between
           the
           
             Molinists
          
           and
           
             Jansenists
          
           about
           
             Grace
          
           and
           
             Merits
             ,
          
           and
           yet
           both
           pretend
           
             S.
             Augustin
             ?
          
        
         
           Must
           we
           not
           expect
           ,
           that
           the
           Jesuits
           will
           ,
           were
           it
           for
           no
           other
           end
           but
           to
           vindicate
           that
           reputation
           of
           Learning
           they
           have
           obtained
           in
           the
           world
           ,
           
           endeavour
           to
           make
           good
           their
           Tenets
           ,
           though
           the
           other
           were
           the
           truer
           opinion
           ?
           Is
           Truth
           then
           retired
           to
           that
           inaccessible
           rock
           that
           admits
           no
           reproches
           ?
           or
           are
           we
           all
           turn'd
           
             Ixion's
             ,
          
           and
           instead
           of
           enjoying
           that
           
             Juno
             ,
          
           entertain
           our selves
           with
           the
           
             clouds
          
           of
           our
           own
           perswasions
           ,
           of
           which
           unnatural
           coition
           ,
           what
           other
           issue
           can
           there
           be
           but
           
             Centaurs
          
           and
           monstrous
           opinions
           ?
           To
           these
           questions
           I
           shall
           not
           presume
           to
           answer
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           words
           of
           this
           great
           Author
           ,
           who
           answering
           the
           charge
           of
           
             Impietie
             ,
          
           laid
           upon
           the
           holding
           of
           
             Necessitie
             ,
          
           says
           thus
           ;
           
             If
             we
             consider
             the
             greatest
             part
             of
             Mankind
             ,
             not
             as
             they
             should
             be
             ,
             but
             as
             they
             are
             ,
             that
             is
             ,
             as
             men
             ,
             whom
             either
             the
             studie
             of
             acquiring
          
           wealth
           and
           preferment
           ,
           
             or
             whom
             the
             appetite
             of
          
           sensual
           delights
           ,
           
             or
             the
             impatience
             of
          
           meditating
           ,
           
             or
             the
          
           rash
           
             embracing
             of
          
           wrong
           
             Principles
             ,
             have
             made
             unapt
             to
             discuss
             the
          
           truth
           
             of
             things
             ,
             I
             must
             confess
             ,
          
           &c.
           
        
         
         
           Certainly
           we
           have
           some
           reason
           to
           expect
           an
           effectual
           cure
           from
           this
           man
           ,
           since
           he
           hath
           so
           fortunately
           found
           out
           the
           disease
           .
           Now
           if
           he
           in
           so
           few
           sheets
           hath
           performed
           more
           than
           all
           the
           voluminous
           works
           of
           the
           
             Priests
             &
             Ministers
             ,
          
           and
           that
           in
           points
           of
           soul-concernment
           and
           Christian
           interest
           ,
           as
           
             Predestination
             ,
             Free-will
             ,
             Grace
             ,
             Merits
             ,
             Election
             ,
             Reprobation
             ,
             Necessitie
             ,
          
           and
           
             Libertie
          
           of
           actions
           ,
           and
           others
           ,
           the
           main
           hinges
           of
           human
           
             Salvation
             ,
          
           and
           to
           do
           this
           ,
           being
           a
           person
           ,
           whom
           not
           onely
           the
           aversness
           of
           his
           nature
           to
           engage
           himself
           in
           matters
           of
           Controversie
           of
           this
           kind
           ,
           but
           his
           severer
           studie
           of
           the
           
             Mathematicks
             ,
          
           might
           justly
           exempt
           from
           any
           such
           skirmishes
           ;
           We
           may
           not
           stick
           to
           infer
           ,
           that
           the
           
             Black-Coats
             ,
          
           generally
           taken
           ,
           are
           a
           sort
           of
           ignorant
           
             Tinkers
             ,
          
           who
           in
           matters
           of
           their
           own
           profession
           ,
           such
           as
           is
           the
           
             mending
          
           and
           
             sodering
          
           of
           mens
           
             consciences
             ,
          
           have
           made
           more
           
           
             holes
          
           than
           they
           sound
           ;
           nay
           ,
           what
           makes
           them
           more
           impardonable
           ,
           they
           have
           neither
           the
           gratitude
           nor
           ingenuitie
           to
           acknowledge
           this
           repairer
           of
           their
           breaches
           ,
           and
           assertor
           of
           their
           reputation
           ,
           who
           hath
           now
           effected
           what
           they
           all
           this
           while
           have
           been
           tampering
           about
           .
           I
           know
           this
           Author
           is
           little
           beholding
           to
           the
           
             Ministers
             ,
          
           &
           they
           make
           a
           great
           part
           of
           the
           Nation
           ,
           and
           besides
           them
           ,
           I
           know
           there
           are
           a
           many
           illiterate
           ,
           obstinate
           ,
           and
           inconvincible
           spirits
           ,
           yet
           I
           dare
           advance
           this
           proposition
           ,
           how
           bold
           soever
           it
           may
           seem
           to
           some
           ;
           That
           this
           Book
           ,
           how
           little
           and
           contemptible
           soever
           it
           may
           seem
           ,
           contains
           more
           evidence
           and
           conviction
           in
           the
           matters
           it
           treats
           of
           ,
           than
           all
           the
           volumes
           ,
           nay
           Libraries
           ,
           which
           the
           
             Priests
             ,
             Jesuits
             ,
          
           and
           
             Ministers
          
           have
           ,
           to
           our
           great
           charge
           ,
           distraction
           ,
           and
           loss
           of
           precious
           time
           ,
           furnished
           us
           with
           .
           Which
           if
           so
           ,
           I
           shall
           undertake
           for
           any
           rational
           man
           ,
           That
           all
           the
           controversial
           
           Labors
           concerning
           Religion
           in
           the
           world
           ,
           all
           the
           Polemical
           Treatises
           of
           the
           most
           antient
           or
           modern
           ,
           shall
           never
           breed
           any
           maggots
           of
           scruples
           ,
           or
           dissatisfactions
           in
           his
           brains
           ,
           nor
           shall
           his
           eyes
           or
           head
           ever
           ake
           with
           turning
           them
           over
           ,
           but
           he
           shall
           be
           so
           resolved
           in
           mind
           ,
           as
           never
           to
           importune
           God
           Almighty
           with
           impertinent
           addresses
           ,
           nor
           ever
           become
           any
           of
           those
           Enthusiastical
           
             spiritati
             ,
          
           who
           as
           the
           most
           Learned
           M.
           
             White
          
           says
           ,
           
             expound
             Scripture
             without
             sence
             or
             reason
             ,
          
           (
           and
           are
           not
           to
           be
           disputed
           with
           ,
           but
           with
           the
           same
           success
           ▪
           as
           men
           write
           on
           sand
           )
           and
           trouble
           their
           neighbours
           with
           their
           dreams
           ,
           revelations
           ,
           and
           spiritual
           whimsies
           .
           No
           ;
           here
           is
           solid
           conviction
           ,
           at
           least
           ,
           so
           far
           as
           the
           Metaphysical
           Mysteries
           of
           our
           Religion
           will
           admit
           .
           If
           God
           be
           
             omnipotent
             ,
          
           he
           is
           
             irresistible
             ;
          
           if
           so
           ,
           
             just
          
           in
           all
           his
           actions
           ,
           though
           we
           (
           who
           have
           as
           much
           capacitie
           to
           measure
           the
           justice
           of
           
           Gods
           actions
           as
           a
           man
           born
           blind
           to
           judge
           of
           colours
           )
           haply
           may
           not
           discern
           it
           .
           What
           then
           need
           any
           man
           trouble
           his
           head
           whether
           he
           be
           Predestinated
           or
           no
           ?
           Let
           him
           live
           justly
           and
           honestly
           according
           to
           the
           
             Religion
          
           of
           his
           
             Countrey
             ,
          
           and
           refer
           himself
           to
           God
           for
           the
           rest
           ,
           since
           he
           is
           the
           Potter
           ,
           and
           may
           do
           what
           he
           please
           with
           the
           vessel
           .
           But
           I
           leave
           the
           Reader
           to
           finde
           his
           satisfaction
           in
           the
           Treatise
           it self
           ,
           since
           it
           may
           be
           I
           derogate
           from
           it
           by
           saying
           so
           much
           before
           it
           .
           This
           Book
           ,
           I
           doubt
           not
           will
           find
           no
           worse
           entertainment
           than
           the
           
             Leviathan
             ,
          
           both
           in
           regard
           of
           its
           bulk
           ,
           and
           that
           it
           doth
           not
           strike
           so
           home
           at
           the
           
             Ministers
          
           and
           
             Catholick
          
           partie
           as
           that
           did
           .
           And
           yet
           here
           we
           must
           complain
           of
           want
           of
           sufficiencie
           or
           ingenuitie
           ,
           to
           acknowledge
           the
           truths
           ,
           or
           confute
           the
           errors
           of
           that
           book
           ,
           which
           till
           it
           is
           done
           ,
           we
           shall
           not
           count
           the
           Author
           an
           Heretick
           .
           On
           this
           side
           the
           sea
           ,
           besides
           the
           dirt
           and
           slander
           
           cast
           on
           him
           in
           
             Sermons
          
           &
           private
           meetings
           ,
           none
           hath
           put
           any
           thing
           in
           Print
           against
           him
           ,
           but
           Mr.
           
             Rosse
             ,
          
           one
           who
           may
           be
           said
           to
           have
           had
           so
           much
           Learning
           as
           to
           have
           been
           perpetually
           barking
           at
           the
           works
           of
           the
           most
           learned
           .
           How
           he
           hath
           been
           received
           beyond
           Seas
           I
           know
           not
           ,
           but
           certainly
           ,
           not
           without
           the
           regret
           of
           the
           
             Catholicks
             ,
          
           who
           building
           their
           
             Church
          
           on
           other
           foundations
           than
           those
           of
           the
           
             Scriptures
             ,
          
           and
           pretending
           
             infallibilitie
             ,
             certitude
             ,
          
           and
           
             unitie
          
           in
           
             Religion
             ,
          
           cannot
           but
           be
           discontented
           that
           these
           Prerogatives
           of
           Religion
           are
           taken
           away
           ,
           not
           onely
           from
           
             Tradition
             ,
          
           that
           is
           to
           say
           ,
           from
           the
           
             Church
             ,
          
           but
           also
           from
           the
           
             Scriptures
             ,
          
           and
           are
           invested
           in
           the
           
             Supream
             power
          
           of
           the
           Nation
           ,
           be
           it
           of
           what
           perswasion
           it
           will
           .
        
         
           Thus
           much
           ,
           
             Reader
             ,
          
           I
           have
           thought
           fit
           to
           acquaint
           thee
           with
           ,
           that
           thou
           mightest
           know
           what
           a
           jewel
           thou
           hast
           in
           thy
           hands
           ,
           which
           thou
           must
           accordingly
           
           value
           ,
           not
           by
           the
           bulk
           ,
           but
           the
           preciousness
           .
           Thou
           hast
           here
           in
           a
           few
           sheets
           what
           might
           prove
           work
           enough
           for
           many
           thousand
           sermons
           and
           exercises
           ;
           and
           more
           than
           the
           
             Catachisms
          
           and
           
             Confessions
          
           of
           a
           thousand
           
             Assemblies
          
           could
           furnish
           thee
           with
           ;
           Thou
           hast
           what
           will
           cast
           an
           eternal
           blemish
           on
           all
           the
           
             corner'd
          
           caps
           of
           the
           
             Priests
          
           and
           
             Jesuits
             ,
          
           and
           all
           the
           
             black
          
           &
           
             white
          
           caps
           of
           the
           
             Ministers
             ;
          
           to
           be
           short
           ,
           Thou
           art
           now
           acquainted
           with
           that
           Man
           ,
           who
           ,
           in
           matters
           of
           so
           great
           importance
           as
           those
           of
           thy
           salvation
           ,
           furnishes
           thee
           with
           better
           instructions
           ,
           than
           any
           thou
           hast
           ever
           yet
           been
           acquainted
           with
           ,
           what
           
             profession
             ,
             perswasion
             ,
             opinion
             ,
          
           or
           
             Church
          
           soever
           thou
           art
           of
           ;
           of
           whom
           and
           his
           works
           make
           the
           best
           use
           thou
           canst
           ,
           
             &c.
             Farewell
             .
          
        
      
    
     
       
       
         
           
             RIGHT
             HONOURABLE
          
        
         
           I
           Had
           once
           resolved
           to
           answer
           my
           
             Lord
             Bishops
          
           Objections
           to
           my
           Book
           
             De
          
           CIVE
           in
           the
           first
           place
           as
           that
           which
           concerns
           me
           most
           ,
           and
           afterwards
           to
           examine
           his
           discourse
           of
           LIBERTY
           and
           NECSSITY
           ,
           which
           (
           because
           I
           had
           never
           uttered
           my
           opinion
           of
           it
           )
           concerned
           me
           the
           less
           .
           But
           seeing
           it
           was
           your
           Lordships
           and
           my
           Lord
           Bishops
           desire
           that
           I
           should
           begin
           with
           the
           
             latter
             ,
          
           I
           was
           contented
           so
           to
           do
           ,
           and
           here
           I
           present
           and
           submit
           it
           to
           your
           Lordships
           judgement
           .
        
         
           And
           first
           I
           assure
           your
           Lordship
           
           I
           finde
           in
           it
           no
           new
           argument
           neither
           from
           
             Scripture
          
           nor
           from
           
             Reason
             ,
          
           that
           I
           have
           not
           often
           heard
           before
           ,
           which
           is
           as
           much
           as
           to
           say
           ,
           I
           am
           not
           surprized
           .
        
         
           The
           
             preface
          
           is
           a
           handsome
           one
           ,
           but
           it
           appeareth
           even
           in
           that
           ,
           that
           he
           hath
           mistaken
           the
           question
           .
           For
           whereas
           he
           sayes
           thus
           ,
           
             If
             I
             be
             free
             to
             write
             this
             discourse
             ,
             I
             have
             obtained
             the
             Cause
             ,
          
           I
           deny
           that
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           for
           't
           is
           enough
           to
           his
           freedom
           of
           writing
           ,
           that
           he
           had
           not
           written
           it
           unless
           he
           would
           himself
           .
           If
           he
           will
           obtain
           the
           cause
           ,
           he
           must
           prove
           that
           before
           he
           writ
           it
           ,
           it
           was
           not
           necessary
           he
           should
           〈◊〉
           it
           afterward
           .
           It
           may
           be
           his
           Lordship
           thinks
           it
           all
           one
           to
           say
           ;
           
             I
             was
             free
          
           to
           write
           it
           ,
           and
           
             It
             was
             not
             necessary
          
           I
           should
           write
           it
           ,
           but
           I
           think
           otherwise
           ;
           for
           he
           is
           
             free
          
           to
           do
           a
           thing
           that
           may
           do
           it
           if
           he
           have
           the
           will
           to
           do
           it
           ,
           and
           may
           forbear
           ,
           if
           he
           have
           the
           will
           to
           forbear
           .
           
           And
           yet
           if
           there
           be
           a
           
             necessity
          
           that
           he
           shall
           have
           the
           
             will
          
           to
           do
           it
           ,
           the
           action
           is
           necessarily
           to
           follow
           ;
           and
           if
           there
           be
           a
           
             necessity
          
           that
           he
           shall
           have
           the
           
             will
          
           to
           forbear
           ,
           the
           forbearing
           also
           will
           be
           necessary
           .
           The
           Question
           therefore
           is
           not
           whether
           a
           
             man
          
           be
           a
           
             free
             Agent
             ,
          
           that
           is
           to
           say
           ,
           whether
           he
           can
           write
           or
           forbear
           ,
           speak
           or
           be
           silent
           according
           to
           his
           
             will
             ,
          
           but
           whether
           the
           
             will
          
           to
           write
           and
           the
           
             will
          
           to
           forbear
           come
           upon
           him
           according
           to
           his
           
             will
             ,
          
           or
           according
           to
           any
           thing
           else
           in
           his
           own
           power
           .
           I
           acknowledge
           this
           
             Liberty
          
           that
           I
           
             can
          
           do
           if
           I
           
             will
             ,
          
           but
           to
           say
           ,
           I
           can
           
             will
          
           if
           I
           
             willt
             .
          
           I
           take
           to
           be
           an
           absurd
           speech
           ,
           wherefore
           I
           cannot
           grant
           my
           Lord
           the
           cause
           upon
           his
           
             preface
             .
          
        
         
           In
           the
           next
           place
           he
           maketh
           certain
           distinctions
           of
           
             Libertie
             ,
          
           and
           saies
           he
           meaneth
           not
           
             Libertie
          
           from
           
             sin
             ,
          
           nor
           from
           
             servitude
             ,
          
           nor
           from
           
           
             violence
             ,
          
           but
           from
           
             Necessitie
             Necessitation
             ,
             inevitabilitie
             ,
          
           and
           
             determination
             to
             one
             .
          
        
         
           It
           had
           been
           better
           to
           
             define
             Liberty
          
           than
           thus
           to
           
             distinguish
             ,
          
           for
           I
           understand
           never
           the
           more
           what
           he
           means
           by
           
             Libertie
             ,
          
           and
           though
           he
           say
           he
           means
           
             Libertie
          
           from
           
             necessitation
             ,
          
           yet
           I
           understand
           not
           how
           such
           a
           
             Libertie
          
           can
           be
           ,
           and
           t
           is
           a
           taking
           of
           the
           Question
           without
           proof
           ,
           for
           what
           is
           else
           the
           Question
           between
           us
           ,
           but
           whether
           
             such
          
           a
           Liberty
           be
           possible
           or
           not
           ?
        
         
           There
           are
           in
           the
           same
           place
           other
           distinctions
           ,
           as
           a
           Liberty
           of
           
             Exercise
             onely
          
           (
           which
           he
           calls
           a
           
             Libertie
             of
             contradiction
             ,
          
           namely
           of
           doing
           not
           good
           or
           evil
           
             simply
             ,
          
           but
           of
           doing
           this
           or
           that
           good
           ,
           or
           this
           or
           that
           evil
           
             respestively
          
           )
           and
           a
           
             Libertie
             of
             specification
             and
             exercise
             also
          
           (
           which
           he
           calls
           a
           Liberty
           of
           
             contrarietie
          
           )
           namely
           a
           Liberty
           not
           onely
           to
           do
           
           good
           or
           evil
           ,
           but
           also
           to
           do
           or
           not
           do
           this
           or
           that
           good
           or
           evil
           .
        
         
           And
           with
           these
           
             Distinctions
          
           his
           Lordship
           saies
           he
           
             clears
             the
             coast
             ,
          
           whereas
           in
           truth
           ,
           he
           darkneth
           his
           own
           meaning
           and
           the
           Question
           ,
           not
           onely
           with
           the
           jargon
           of
           
             exercise
             onely
             ,
             specification
             also
             ,
             contradiction
             ,
             contrarietie
             ,
          
           but
           also
           with
           pretending
           distinction
           where
           none
           is
           ;
           For
           how
           is
           it
           possible
           that
           the
           
             Libertie
          
           of
           doing
           or
           not
           doing
           this
           or
           that
           good
           or
           evil
           ,
           can
           consist
           (
           as
           he
           saies
           it
           does
           in
           God
           and
           good
           Angels
           )
           without
           a
           Liberty
           of
           doing
           or
           not
           doing
           good
           or
           evil
           ?
        
         
           The
           next
           thing
           his
           Lordship
           does
           ,
           after
           clearing
           of
           the
           coast
           ,
           is
           the
           dividing
           of
           his
           forces
           (
           as
           he
           calls
           them
           )
           into
           
             two
          
           squadrons
           ,
           
             one
          
           of
           places
           of
           
             Scriptures
             ,
          
           the
           
             other
          
           of
           
             Reasons
             ,
          
           which
           allegory
           he
           useth
           I
           suppose
           ,
           because
           he
           addresseth
           the
           discourse
           to
           your
           Lordship
           ,
           who
           is
           
           military
           man
           ,
           All
           that
           I
           have
           to
           say
           touching
           this
           is
           ,
           that
           I
           observe
           a
           great
           part
           of
           those
           his
           
             forces
          
           do
           look
           and
           
             march
          
           another
           way
           ,
           and
           some
           of
           them
           
             fight
          
           amongst
           themselves
           .
        
         
           And
           the
           first
           place
           of
           
             Scripture
          
           taken
           from
           
             Numb.
          
           30.14
           .
           Is
           one
           of
           those
           that
           look
           another
           way
           ;
           the
           words
           are
           .
           
             If
             a
             wife
             make
             a
             vow
             it
             is
             left
             to
             her
             husbands
             choice
             either
             to
             establish
             it
             or
             make
             it
             void
             .
          
           For
           it
           proves
           no
           more
           but
           that
           the
           husband
           is
           a
           
             free
          
           and
           
             voluntary
             Agent
             ,
          
           but
           not
           that
           his
           
             choice
          
           therein
           is
           not
           
             necessitated
          
           or
           not
           
             determined
          
           to
           what
           he
           shall
           choose
           ,
           by
           precedent
           
             necessary
          
           causes
           .
        
         
           For
           if
           there
           come
           into
           the
           husbands
           minde
           greater
           good
           by
           establishing
           than
           abrogating
           such
           a
           vow
           ,
           the
           establishing
           will
           follow
           necessarily
           ,
           and
           if
           the
           evil
           that
           will
           follow
           in
           the
           husbands
           opinion
           out-weigh
           the
           good
           ,
           the
           contrary
           must
           
           needs
           follow
           ,
           and
           yet
           in
           this
           following
           of
           ones
           
             hopes
          
           and
           
             fears
          
           consisteth
           the
           nature
           of
           
             Election
             .
          
           So
           that
           a
           man
           may
           both
           choose
           this
           ,
           and
           cannot
           but
           choose
           this
           ,
           and
           consequently
           
             choosing
          
           and
           
             necessity
          
           are
           joyned
           together
           .
        
         
           The
           second
           place
           of
           Scripture
           is
           
             Joshua
          
           24.15
           .
           The
           third
           is
           2
           
             Sam.
          
           24.12
           .
           whereby
           't
           is
           clearly
           proved
           ,
           that
           there
           is
           
             election
          
           in
           
             man
             ,
          
           but
           not
           proved
           ,
           that
           such
           
             election
          
           was
           not
           
             necessitated
          
           by
           the
           
             hopes
             ,
          
           and
           
             fears
             ,
          
           and
           considerations
           of
           
             good
          
           and
           
             bad
          
           to
           follow
           ,
           which
           depend
           not
           on
           the
           
             will
             ,
          
           nor
           are
           subject
           to
           
             election
             .
          
           And
           therefore
           one
           answer
           serves
           all
           such
           places
           ,
           if
           there
           were
           a
           thousand
           .
        
         
           But
           his
           Lordship
           supposing
           ,
           it
           seems
           ,
           I
           might
           answer
           as
           I
           have
           done
           ,
           that
           
             necessity
          
           and
           
             election
          
           might
           stand
           together
           ,
           and
           instance
           in
           the
           actions
           of
           
             children
             ,
             fools
             ,
          
           or
           
             bruit
             beasts
             ,
          
           whose
           
             fancies
             ,
          
           I
           might
           say
           ,
           are
           
           
             necessitated
          
           and
           
             determined
          
           to
           
             one
          
           ;
           before
           these
           his
           proofs
           out
           of
           Scripture
           desires
           to
           prevent
           that
           instance
           ,
           and
           therefore
           saies
           that
           the
           actions
           of
           
             children
             ,
             fools
             ,
             mad
             men
             ,
          
           and
           
             beasts
             ,
          
           are
           indeed
           
             determined
             ,
          
           but
           that
           they
           proceed
           not
           from
           
             election
             ,
          
           nor
           from
           
             free
             ,
          
           but
           from
           
             Spontaneous
             Agents
             .
          
           As
           for
           example
           that
           the
           
             Bee
             ,
          
           when
           it
           maketh
           hony
           ,
           does
           it
           
             Spontaneously
             ,
          
           and
           when
           the
           
             Spider
          
           makes
           his
           web
           ,
           he
           does
           it
           
             Spontaneously
          
           but
           not
           by
           
             election
             .
          
        
         
           Though
           I
           never
           meant
           to
           ground
           my
           Answer
           upon
           the
           experience
           of
           what
           
             Children
             ,
             Fools
             ,
             Mad
             men
             ,
          
           and
           
             Beasts
          
           do
           ,
           yet
           that
           your
           Lordship
           may
           understand
           what
           can
           be
           meant
           by
           
             Spontaneous
             ,
          
           and
           how
           it
           differeth
           from
           
             voluntary
             ,
          
           I
           will
           answer
           that
           
             distinction
             ,
          
           and
           shew
           that
           it
           
             fighteth
          
           against
           its
           fellow
           Arguments
           .
        
         
           Your
           Lordship
           therefore
           is
           to
           
           consider
           ,
           that
           all
           
             voluntary
          
           actions
           ,
           where
           the
           thing
           that
           induceth
           the
           
             will
          
           is
           not
           
             fear
             ,
          
           are
           called
           also
           
             spontaneous
             ,
          
           and
           said
           to
           be
           done
           by
           a
           mans
           
             own
          
           accord
           .
           As
           when
           a
           man
           giveth
           money
           voluntarily
           to
           another
           for
           Merchandise
           or
           out
           of
           affection
           ,
           he
           is
           said
           to
           do
           it
           of
           his
           own
           accord
           ,
           which
           in
           
             latine
          
           is
           
             sponte
             ,
          
           and
           therefore
           the
           action
           is
           
             spontaneous
          
           (
           though
           to
           give
           ones
           mony
           willingly
           to
           a
           thief
           to
           a
           void
           killing
           ,
           or
           throw
           it
           into
           the
           Sea
           to
           avoid
           drowning
           ,
           where
           the
           motive
           is
           
             fear
             ,
          
           be
           not
           called
           
             spontaneous
             .
          
           )
           But
           every
           
             spontaneous
          
           action
           is
           not
           therefore
           
             voluntary
             ,
          
           for
           
             voluntary
          
           presupposes
           some
           precedent
           
             deliberation
             ,
          
           that
           is
           to
           say
           ,
           some
           
             consideration
          
           and
           
             meditation
             ,
          
           of
           what
           is
           likely
           to
           
             follow
             ,
          
           both
           upon
           the
           doing
           and
           abstaining
           from
           the
           action
           deliberated
           of
           ;
           whereas
           many
           actions
           are
           done
           of
           our
           
             own
          
           accord
           ,
           
           and
           are
           therefore
           
             spontaneous
             ,
          
           for
           which
           nevertheless
           ,
           as
           my
           Lord
           thinks
           ,
           we
           never
           
             consulted
          
           nor
           
             deliberated
          
           in
           our selves
           .
           As
           when
           making
           no
           question
           nor
           any
           the
           least
           doubt
           in
           the
           world
           ,
           but
           the
           thing
           we
           are
           about
           is
           good
           ,
           we
           
             eat
          
           and
           
             walk
             ,
          
           or
           in
           anger
           
             strike
          
           or
           
             revile
             ,
          
           which
           my
           Lord
           thinks
           
             spontaneous
             ,
          
           but
           not
           
             voluntary
          
           nor
           
             elective
          
           actions
           ,
           and
           with
           
             such
          
           kinde
           of
           actions
           he
           saies
           
             necessitation
          
           may
           stand
           ,
           but
           not
           with
           such
           as
           are
           
             voluntary
          
           and
           proceed
           upon
           
             election
          
           and
           
             deliberation
             .
          
           Now
           if
           I
           make
           it
           appear
           to
           your
           Lordship
           ,
           that
           those
           actions
           ,
           which
           he
           saies
           ,
           proceed
           from
           
             spontanity
             ,
          
           and
           which
           he
           ascribes
           to
           
             Children
             ,
             Fools
             ,
             Madmen
          
           and
           
             Beasts
             ,
          
           proceed
           from
           
             election
          
           and
           
             deliberation
             ,
          
           and
           that
           actions
           
             inconsiderate
             ,
             rash
             ,
          
           and
           
             spontaneous
          
           are
           ordinarily
           found
           in
           those
           ,
           that
           are
           by
           themselves
           and
           many
           more
           
           thought
           as
           
             wise
             ,
          
           or
           wiser
           than
           ordinarily
           men
           are
           ,
           then
           my
           Lord
           Bishops
           Argument
           concludeth
           ,
           that
           
             necessity
          
           and
           
             election
          
           may
           stand
           together
           ,
           which
           is
           contrary
           to
           that
           which
           he
           intendeth
           by
           all
           the
           rest
           of
           his
           Arguments
           to
           prove
           .
        
         
           And
           first
           your
           Lordships
           own
           experience
           furnishes
           you
           with
           proof
           enough
           ,
           that
           
             Horses
             ,
             Doggs
             ,
          
           and
           other
           Bruit
           
             Beasts
             ,
          
           do
           
             demur
          
           oftentimes
           upon
           the
           way
           they
           are
           to
           take
           ,
           the
           Horse
           retiring
           from
           some
           strange
           figure
           that
           he
           sees
           ,
           and
           coming
           on
           again
           to
           avoid
           the
           spur
           .
           And
           what
           else
           doth
           a
           man
           that
           
             deliberateth
             ,
          
           but
           one
           while
           
             proceed
          
           toward
           action
           ,
           another
           while
           
             retire
          
           from
           it
           ,
           as
           the
           
             hope
          
           of
           greater
           
             good
          
           draws
           him
           ,
           or
           the
           
             fear
          
           of
           greater
           evil
           
             drives
          
           him
           away
           .
        
         
           A
           
             Child
          
           may
           be
           so
           young
           as
           to
           do
           what
           it
           does
           without
           all
           
             deliberation
             ,
          
           but
           that
           is
           but
           till
           it
           have
           the
           
           chance
           to
           be
           hurt
           by
           doing
           of
           somewhat
           ,
           or
           till
           it
           be
           of
           age
           to
           understand
           the
           rod
           ,
           for
           the
           actions
           ,
           wherein
           he
           hath
           once
           had
           a
           check
           ,
           shall
           be
           
             deliberated
          
           on
           the
           second
           time
           .
        
         
           
             Fools
          
           and
           
             Madmen
          
           manifestly
           
             deliberate
          
           no
           less
           than
           the
           
             wisest
          
           men
           ,
           though
           they
           make
           not
           so
           good
           a
           
             choice
             ,
          
           the
           images
           of
           things
           being
           by
           disease
           altered
           .
        
         
           For
           
             Bees
          
           and
           
             Spiders
             ,
          
           if
           my
           Lord
           Bishop
           had
           had
           so
           little
           to
           do
           as
           to
           be
           a
           spectatour
           of
           their
           actions
           ,
           he
           would
           have
           confessed
           not
           onely
           
             election
          
           but
           
             art
             ,
             prudence
          
           and
           
             policy
          
           in
           them
           ,
           very
           near
           equal
           to
           that
           of
           mankinde
           .
           Of
           
             Bees
             ,
             Aristotle
          
           saies
           ,
           
             their
             life
             is
             Civil
             .
          
        
         
           Again
           ,
           his
           Lordship
           is
           deceived
           if
           he
           think
           any
           
             spontaneous
          
           action
           after
           once
           being
           checked
           in
           it
           ,
           differs
           from
           an
           action
           
             voluntary
          
           and
           
             elective
             ,
          
           for
           even
           the
           setting
           of
           a
           mans
           foot
           ,
           in
           the
           posture
           for
           
             walking
             ,
          
           
           and
           the
           action
           of
           ordinary
           
             eating
          
           was
           once
           
             deliberated
          
           of
           how
           and
           when
           it
           should
           be
           done
           ,
           and
           though
           afterward
           it
           became
           
             easie
          
           &
           
             habitual
          
           so
           as
           to
           be
           done
           without
           
             fore-thought
             ,
          
           yet
           that
           does
           not
           hinder
           but
           that
           the
           act
           is
           
             voluntary
          
           and
           proceedeth
           from
           
             election
             .
          
           So
           also
           are
           the
           
             rashest
          
           actions
           of
           
             cholerick
          
           persons
           
             voluntary
          
           and
           upon
           
             deliberation
             ,
          
           for
           who
           is
           there
           but
           very
           young
           children
           ,
           that
           hath
           not
           
             considered
          
           when
           and
           how
           farr
           he
           
             ought
             ,
          
           or
           safely
           
             may
          
           strike
           or
           revile
           ?
           Seeing
           then
           his
           Lordship
           agrees
           with
           me
           that
           such
           actions
           are
           
             necessitated
             ,
          
           and
           the
           
             fancie
          
           of
           those
           that
           do
           them
           
             determined
          
           to
           the
           action
           they
           do
           ,
           it
           follows
           ,
           out
           of
           his
           Lordships
           own
           doctrine
           ,
           that
           the
           liberty
           of
           
             election
          
           does
           not
           take
           away
           the
           
             necessitie
          
           of
           
             electing
          
           this
           or
           that
           
             individual
          
           thing
           .
           And
           thus
           one
           of
           his
           Arguments
           fights
           against
           another
           .
        
         
         
           The
           2
           Argument
           from
           
             Scripture
          
           consisteth
           in
           histories
           of
           men
           that
           did
           one
           thing
           ,
           when
           if
           they
           would
           ,
           they
           might
           have
           done
           another
           ,
           the
           places
           are
           two
           .
           One
           is
           1
           
             Kings
          
           3.11
           .
           where
           the
           history
           saies
           ,
           God
           was
           pleased
           that
           
             Solomon
             ,
          
           who
           might
           if
           he
           would
           ,
           have
           asked
           
             Riches
             ,
          
           or
           
             Revenge
             ,
          
           did
           nevertheless
           aske
           
             wisdom
          
           at
           Gods
           hands
           ;
           the
           other
           is
           the
           words
           of
           S.
           
             Peter
          
           to
           
             Ananias
             ,
          
           Acts
           5.4
           .
           
             After
             it
             was
             sold
             ,
             was
             it
             not
             in
             thine
             own
             power
             ?
          
        
         
           To
           which
           the
           answer
           is
           the
           same
           with
           that
           I
           answered
           to
           the
           former
           places
           ,
           that
           they
           prove
           there
           is
           
             elction
             ,
          
           but
           do
           not
           disprove
           the
           
             necessity
             ,
          
           which
           I
           maintain
           of
           what
           they
           so
           elect
           .
        
         
           The
           fourth
           Argument
           (
           for
           to
           the
           3
           and
           fifth
           I
           shall
           make
           but
           one
           answer
           )
           is
           to
           this
           effect
           .
           
             If
             the
             decree
             of
             God
             ,
             or
             his
             foreknowledge
             ,
             or
             the
             influence
             of
             the
             stars
             ,
             or
             the
             concatenation
             of
             causes
             ,
             or
             the
             physical
             or
             
             moral
             efficacy
             of
             causes
             ,
             or
             the
             last
             dictate
             of
             the
             understanding
             ,
             or
             whatsoever
             it
             be
             ,
             do
             take
             away
             true
             liberty
             ,
             then
          
           Adam
           
             before
             his
             fall
             had
             no
             true
             liberty
             .
             Quicquid
             ostendes
             mihi
             sic
             incredulus
             odi
             .
          
        
         
           
             That
          
           which
           I
           say
           
             necessitateth
             and
             determinateth
             every
             action
             ,
          
           (
           that
           his
           Lordship
           may
           no
           longer
           doubt
           of
           my
           meaning
           )
           is
           the
           
             summ
             of
             all
             things
             ,
             which
             being
             now
             existent
             ,
             conduce
             and
             concurr
             to
             the
             production
             of
             that
             action
             hereafter
             ,
             whereof
             if
             any
             one
             thing
             now
             were
             wanting
             ,
             the
             effect
             could
             not
             be
             produced
             .
          
           This
           
             concourse
          
           of
           
             causes
             ,
          
           whereof
           every
           one
           is
           
             determined
          
           be
           such
           as
           it
           is
           by
           a
           like
           concourse
           of
           
             former
          
           causes
           ,
           may
           well
           be
           called
           (
           in
           respect
           they
           were
           all
           set
           and
           ordered
           by
           the
           eternal
           cause
           of
           all
           things
           ,
           God
           Almighty
           )
           the
           
             Decree
          
           of
           God
           .
        
         
           But
           that
           the
           
             foreknowledge
          
           of
           God
           should
           be
           a
           cause
           of
           any
           thing
           ,
           
           cannot
           be
           truely
           said
           ,
           seeing
           fore-knowledge
           is
           knowledge
           ,
           and
           knowledge
           depends
           on
           the
           existence
           of
           the
           things
           known
           and
           not
           they
           on
           it
           .
        
         
           The
           
             influence
             of
             the
             Starres
          
           is
           but
           a
           small
           part
           of
           the
           whole
           cause
           ,
           consisting
           of
           the
           concourse
           of
           all
           Agents
           .
        
         
           Nor
           does
           the
           
             concourse
             of
             all
             causes
          
           make
           one
           simple
           
             chain
          
           or
           concatination
           ,
           but
           an
           innumerable
           number
           of
           chains
           ,
           joyned
           together
           ,
           not
           in
           all
           parts
           ,
           but
           in
           the
           first
           link
           God
           Almighty
           ,
           and
           consequently
           the
           whole
           cause
           of
           an
           event
           ,
           doth
           not
           always
           depend
           on
           one
           single
           chain
           ,
           but
           on
           many
           together
           .
        
         
           
             Natural
          
           efficacy
           of
           
             objects
          
           does
           
             determine
             voluntary
          
           Agents
           and
           
             necessitates
          
           the
           
             will
             ,
          
           and
           consequently
           the
           
             action
          
           ;
           but
           for
           
             moral
          
           efficacy
           ,
           I
           understand
           not
           what
           he
           means
           .
        
         
           
             The
             last
             dictate
             of
             the
             judgement
             ,
          
           
           concerning
           the
           good
           or
           bad
           that
           may
           follow
           on
           any
           action
           ,
           is
           not
           properly
           the
           
             whole
             cause
             ,
          
           but
           the
           last
           part
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           yet
           may
           be
           said
           to
           Produce
           the
           effect
           
             necessarily
             ,
          
           in
           such
           manner
           as
           the
           last
           feather
           may
           be
           said
           to
           break
           a
           horses
           back
           ,
           when
           there
           were
           so
           many
           laid
           on
           before
           as
           there
           wanted
           but
           that
           one
           to
           do
           it
           .
        
         
           Now
           for
           his
           
             Argument
          
           that
           
             if
             the
             concourse
             of
             all
             the
             causes
             necessitate
             the
             effect
             ,
             that
             then
             it
             follows
             ,
          
           Adam
           
             had
             no
             true
             liberty
             ,
          
           I
           deny
           the
           consequence
           ,
           for
           I
           make
           not
           onely
           the
           
             effect
             ,
          
           but
           also
           the
           
             election
          
           of
           that
           particular
           effect
           
             necessary
             ,
          
           in
           as
           much
           as
           the
           will
           it self
           ,
           &
           each
           propension
           of
           a
           man
           during
           his
           deliberation
           ,
           is
           as
           much
           necessitated
           ,
           and
           depends
           on
           a
           sufficient
           cause
           as
           any
           thing
           else
           whatsoever
           .
           As
           for
           example
           ,
           it
           is
           no
           more
           necessary
           that
           fire
           should
           burn
           than
           that
           a
           man
           or
           other
           creature
           ,
           
           whose
           limbs
           be
           moved
           by
           fancy
           ,
           should
           have
           
             election
             ,
          
           that
           is
           
             liberty
             ,
          
           to
           do
           what
           he
           hath
           a
           fancy
           to
           do
           ,
           though
           it
           be
           not
           in
           his
           
             will
          
           or
           
             power
          
           to
           
             choose
          
           his
           
             fancie
             ,
          
           or
           choose
           his
           
             election
          
           and
           
             will
             .
          
        
         
           This
           doctrine
           ,
           because
           my
           Lord
           Bishop
           saies
           he
           hates
           ,
           I
           doubt
           had
           better
           been
           suppressed
           ,
           as
           it
           should
           have
           been
           ,
           if
           both
           your
           Lordship
           and
           he
           had
           not
           pressed
           me
           to
           an
           answer
           .
        
         
           The
           Arguments
           of
           greatest
           consequence
           ,
           are
           the
           third
           and
           the
           fifth
           ,
           and
           they
           fall
           both
           into
           one
           ,
           namely
           ;
           
             If
             there
             be
             a
             necessity
             of
             all
             events
             ,
             that
             it
             will
             follow
             ,
             That
             praise
             and
             reprehension
             ,
             and
             reward
             and
             punishment
             are
             all
             vain
             and
             unjust
             ,
             and
             that
             if
             God
             should
             openly
             forbid
             ,
             and
             secretly
             necessitate
             the
             same
             action
             ,
             punishing
             men
             for
             what
             they
             could
             not
             avoid
             ,
             there
             would
             be
             no
             belief
             among
             them
             of
             Heaven
             and
             Hell
             .
          
        
         
         
           To
           oppose
           hereunto
           I
           must
           borrow
           an
           answer
           from
           S.
           
             Paul
             ,
          
           Rom.
           9.11
           .
           From
           the
           11
           
             verse
          
           of
           the
           Chapter
           to
           the
           18
           is
           laid
           down
           the
           very
           same
           objection
           in
           these
           words
           .
           
             When
             they
          
           (
           meaning
           
             Esau
          
           and
           
             Jacob
             )
             were
             yet
             unborn
             ,
             and
             had
             done
             neither
             good
             nor
             evil
             ,
             that
             the
             purpose
             of
             God
             according
             to
             election
             ,
             not
             by
             works
             ,
             but
             by
             him
             that
             calleth
             ,
             might
             remain
             firm
             ,
             it
             was
             said
             unto
             her
             (
             viz
          
           Rebecca
           )
           
             that
             the
             elder
             should
             serve
             the
             younger
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           
             What
             then
             shall
             we
             say
             ?
             Is
             there
             injustice
             with
             God
             ?
             God
             forbid
             .
             It
             is
             not
             therefore
             in
             him
             that
             willeth
             ,
             nor
             in
             him
             that
             runneth
             ,
             but
             in
             God
             that
             sheweth
             mercy
             .
             For
             the
             Scripture
             saith
             to
             Pharaoh
             ,
             I
             have
             stirred
             thee
             up
             that
             I
             might
             shew
             my
             power
             in
             thee
             ,
             and
             that
             my
             name
             might
             be
             set
             forth
             in
             all
             the
             earth
             .
             Therefore
             whom
             God
             willeth
             he
             hath
             mercy
             on
             ,
             and
             whom
             he
             willeth
             he
             hardeneth
             .
          
           Thus
           you
           
           see
           the
           case
           put
           by
           S.
           
             Paul
             ,
          
           is
           the
           same
           with
           that
           of
           my
           Lord
           Bishop
           ,
           and
           the
           same
           objection
           in
           these
           words
           following
           .
        
         
           
             Thou
             wilt
             aske
             me
             then
             ,
             why
             does
             God
             yet
             complain
             ,
             for
             who
             hath
             resisted
             his
             will
             ?
          
        
         
           To
           this
           therefore
           the
           Apostle
           answers
           ,
           not
           by
           denying
           it
           was
           Gods
           
             will
             ,
          
           or
           that
           the
           decree
           of
           God
           concerning
           
             Esau
          
           was
           not
           before
           he
           had
           sinned
           ,
           or
           that
           
             Esau
          
           was
           not
           necessitated
           to
           do
           what
           he
           did
           ;
           but
           thus
           ;
           
             Who
             art
             thou
             O
             man
             that
             interrogatest
             God
             ?
             shall
             the
             work
             say
             to
             the
             workman
             ,
             why
             hast
             thou
             made
             me
             thus
             ?
             Hath
             not
             the
             Potter
             power
             over
             the
             clay
             ,
             of
             the
             same
             stuff
             to
             make
             one
             vessel
             to
             honour
             another
             to
             dishonour
             ?
          
           According
           therefore
           to
           this
           answer
           of
           S.
           
             Paul
          
           I
           answer
           my
           Lords
           Ojection
           ,
           and
           say
           ,
           the
           
             power
          
           of
           God
           alone
           without
           other
           helps
           is
           sufficient
           
             justification
          
           of
           any
           action
           he
           
           doth
           .
           That
           which
           men
           make
           amongst
           themselves
           here
           by
           pacts
           and
           covenants
           ,
           and
           call
           by
           the
           name
           of
           justice
           ,
           and
           according
           whereunto
           men
           are
           accounted
           and
           tearmed
           rightly
           just
           or
           unjust
           ,
           is
           not
           that
           by
           which
           God
           Almighties
           actions
           are
           to
           be
           measured
           or
           called
           just
           ,
           no
           more
           than
           his
           counsels
           are
           to
           be
           measured
           by
           humane
           wisdom
           .
           That
           which
           he
           does
           is
           made
           just
           by
           his
           doing
           it
           ,
           just
           I
           say
           in
           him
           ,
           though
           not
           always
           just
           in
           us
           .
        
         
           For
           a
           man
           that
           shall
           command
           a
           thing
           openly
           ,
           and
           plot
           secretly
           the
           hinderance
           of
           the
           same
           ,
           if
           ▪
           he
           punish
           him
           that
           he
           so
           commandeth
           for
           not
           doing
           it
           ,
           it
           is
           unjust
           .
           So
           also
           ,
           his
           counsels
           are
           therefore
           not
           in
           vain
           ,
           because
           they
           be
           his
           ,
           whether
           we
           see
           the
           use
           of
           them
           or
           not
           .
           When
           God
           afflicted
           
             Job
             ,
          
           he
           did
           object
           no
           sin
           unto
           him
           ,
           justified
           his
           afflicting
           of
           him
           by
           telling
           him
           of
           his
           
             power
             .
             Hast
             
             thou
             ,
             saith
             God
             ,
             an
             arm
             like
             mine
             ?
             Where
             wert
             thou
             when
             I
             laid
             the
             foundations
             of
             the
             earth
             ?
             and
             the
             like
             .
          
           So
           our
           
             Saviour
             ,
          
           concerning
           the
           man
           that
           was
           born
           blinde
           ,
           said
           it
           was
           not
           for
           his
           sin
           ,
           or
           for
           his
           Parents
           sin
           ,
           but
           that
           the
           power
           of
           God
           might
           be
           shewn
           in
           him
           .
           
             Beasts
          
           are
           subject
           to
           death
           and
           torments
           ,
           yet
           they
           cannot
           sin
           ,
           it
           was
           Gods
           will
           they
           should
           be
           so
           .
           
             Power
             irresistible
             justifies
             all
             actions
             ,
             really
             and
             properly
             ,
          
           in
           whomsoever
           it
           be
           found
           ,
           less
           power
           does
           not
           ,
           and
           because
           such
           power
           is
           in
           God
           onely
           ,
           he
           must
           needs
           be
           just
           in
           all
           his
           actions
           ,
           and
           we
           ,
           that
           not
           comprehending
           his
           Counsels
           call
           him
           to
           the
           Barr
           ,
           commit
           injustice
           in
           it
           .
        
         
           I
           am
           not
           ignorant
           of
           the
           usual
           reply
           to
           this
           answer
           ,
           by
           distinguishing
           between
           
             will
          
           and
           
             permission
             ,
          
           as
           that
           God
           Almighty
           does
           indeed
           sometimes
           
             permit
          
           sins
           ,
           and
           that
           he
           
           also
           foreknoweth
           that
           the
           sin
           he
           permitteth
           shall
           be
           committed
           ,
           but
           does
           not
           
             will
          
           it
           ,
           nor
           
             necessitate
          
           it
           .
        
         
           I
           know
           also
           they
           distinguish
           the
           action
           from
           the
           sin
           of
           the
           action
           ,
           saying
           ,
           that
           God
           Almighty
           does
           indeed
           cause
           the
           
             action
          
           whatsoever
           action
           it
           be
           ,
           but
           not
           the
           
             sinfullness
          
           or
           
             irregularity
          
           of
           it
           ,
           that
           is
           ,
           the
           
             discordance
          
           between
           the
           
             action
          
           and
           the
           
             Law
             .
          
           Such
           distinctions
           as
           these
           dazle
           my
           understanding
           ;
           I
           finde
           no
           difference
           between
           the
           
             will
          
           to
           have
           a
           thing
           done
           ,
           and
           the
           
             permission
          
           to
           do
           it
           ,
           when
           he
           that
           permitteth
           can
           hinder
           it
           ,
           and
           knows
           that
           it
           will
           be
           done
           unless
           he
           hinder
           it
           .
           Nor
           finde
           I
           any
           difference
           between
           an
           
             action
          
           &
           the
           
             sin
          
           of
           that
           action
           ,
           as
           for
           example
           ,
           between
           the
           killing
           of
           
             Vriah
             ,
          
           and
           the
           sin
           of
           
             David
          
           in
           killing
           
             Vriah
             ,
          
           nor
           when
           
             one
          
           is
           
             cause
          
           both
           of
           the
           
             Action
          
           and
           of
           the
           
             Law
             ,
          
           how
           
             another
          
           can
           ,
           because
           
           of
           the
           
             disagreement
          
           between
           them
           ,
           no
           more
           than
           how
           one
           man
           making
           a
           longer
           and
           a
           shorter
           garment
           ,
           another
           can
           make
           the
           inequality
           that
           is
           between
           them
           .
           This
           I
           know
           ,
           God
           cannot
           sin
           ,
           because
           his
           doing
           a
           thing
           makes
           it
           just
           and
           consequently
           ,
           no
           sin
           ,
           as
           also
           because
           whatsoever
           can
           sin
           is
           subject
           to
           anothers
           Law
           ,
           which
           God
           is
           not
           .
           And
           therefore
           't
           is
           blasphemy
           to
           say
           God
           can
           sin
           ;
           but
           to
           say
           ,
           that
           God
           can
           so
           order
           the
           world
           ,
           as
           a
           sin
           may
           be
           necessarily
           caused
           thereby
           in
           a
           man
           ,
           I
           do
           not
           see
           how
           it
           is
           any
           dishonour
           to
           him
           .
           Howsoever
           ,
           if
           such
           or
           other
           
             distinctions
          
           can
           make
           it
           clear
           ,
           that
           S.
           
             Paul
          
           did
           not
           think
           
             Esaus
          
           or
           
             Pharaohs
          
           actions
           proceeded
           from
           the
           
             will
          
           and
           
             purpose
          
           of
           
             God
             ,
          
           or
           that
           proceeding
           from
           his
           will
           ,
           could
           not
           therefore
           without
           injustice
           be
           blamed
           or
           punished
           ,
           I
           will
           ,
           assoon
           as
           I
           understand
           them
           ,
           
           turn
           unto
           my
           Lords
           Opinion
           ,
           for
           I
           now
           hold
           nothing
           in
           all
           this
           question
           betwixt
           us
           ,
           but
           what
           seemeth
           to
           me
           ,
           not
           obscurely
           ,
           but
           most
           expressely
           said
           in
           this
           place
           by
           S.
           
             Paul
             ,
          
           And
           thus
           much
           in
           answer
           to
           his
           places
           of
           Scripture
           .
        
         
           
             To
             the
             Arguments
             from
             Reason
             .
          
           
             OF
             the
             Arguments
             from
             
               Reason
               ,
            
             the
             first
             is
             that
             which
             his
             Lordship
             saith
             is
             drawn
             from
             
               Zeno's
            
             beating
             of
             his
             man
             ,
             which
             is
             therefore
             called
             
               Argumentum
               baculinum
               ,
            
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             a
             wooden
             Argument
             .
             The
             story
             is
             this
             ,
             
               Zeno
            
             held
             ,
             that
             all
             actions
             were
             necessary
             ,
             his
             man
             therefore
             being
             for
             some
             fault
             beaten
             ,
             excused
             himself
             upon
             the
             necessity
             of
             it
             ,
             to
             avoid
             this
             excuse
             ,
             his
             Master
             pleaded
             likewise
             the
             necessity
             of
             beating
             
             him
             .
             So
             that
             not
             he
             that
             maintained
             ,
             but
             he
             that
             derided
             the
             necessity
             ,
             was
             beaten
             ,
             contrary
             to
             that
             his
             Lordship
             would
             inferr
             .
             And
             the
             Argument
             was
             rather
             withdrawn
             than
             drawn
             from
             the
             story
             .
          
           
             The
             second
             Argument
             is
             taken
             from
             certain
             inconveniences
             which
             his
             Lordship
             thinks
             would
             follow
             such
             an
             opinion
             .
             It
             is
             true
             that
             ill
             use
             might
             be
             made
             of
             it
             ,
             and
             therefore
             your
             Lordship
             and
             my
             Lord
             Bishop
             ,
             ought
             at
             my
             request
             to
             keep
             private
             what
             I
             say
             here
             of
             it
             .
             But
             the
             inconveniences
             are
             indeed
             none
             ,
             and
             what
             use
             soever
             he
             made
             of
             truth
             ,
             yet
             truth
             is
             truth
             ,
             and
             now
             the
             question
             is
             not
             ,
             what
             is
             fit
             to
             be
             preached
             ,
             but
             what
             is
             true
             .
          
           
             The
             first
             inconvenience
             he
             saies
             is
             this
             .
             
               That
               the
               Laws
               ,
               which
               prohibit
               any
               action
               ,
               will
               be
               unjust
               .
            
          
           
             2.
             
             
               That
               all
               consultations
               are
               vain
               .
            
          
           
             3.
             
             
               That
               admonitions
               to
               men
               of
               
               understanding
               ,
               are
               of
               no
               more
               use
               ,
               than
               to
               children
               ,
               fools
               ,
               and
               mad
               men
               .
            
          
           
             4.
             
             
               That
               praise
               ,
               dispraise
               ,
               reward
               and
               punishment
               are
               in
               vain
               .
            
          
           
             5.6
             .
             
               That
               Counsels
               ,
               Acts
               ,
               Arms
               ,
               Books
               ,
               Instruments
               ,
               Study
               ,
               Tutours
               ,
               Medicines
               ,
               are
               in
               vain
               .
            
          
           
             To
             which
             arguments
             his
             Lordship
             expecting
             I
             should
             answer
             ,
             by
             saying
             ,
             the
             ignorance
             of
             the
             event
             were
             enough
             to
             make
             us
             use
             the
             means
             ,
             adds
             (
             as
             it
             were
             a
             reply
             to
             my
             answer
             foreseen
             )
             these
             words
             .
             
               A
               lass
               !
               how
               should
               our
               not
               knowing
               the
               event
               be
               a
               sufficient
               motive
               to
               make
               us
               use
               the
               means
               ?
            
             Wherein
             his
             Lordship
             saies
             right
             ,
             but
             my
             answer
             is
             not
             that
             which
             he
             expecteth
             ,
             I
             answer
             .
          
           
             First
             ,
             that
             the
             
               necessity
            
             of
             an
             
               action
            
             doth
             not
             make
             the
             
               Laws
            
             that
             prohibit
             it
             
               unjust
               .
            
             To
             let
             pass
             that
             not
             the
             
               necessity
               ,
            
             but
             the
             
               will
            
             to
             break
             the
             
               Law
               ,
            
             maketh
             the
             action
             
               unjust
               ,
            
             because
             the
             
               Law
            
             regardeth
             the
             
               will
            
             
             and
             no
             other
             precedent
             causes
             of
             action
             .
             And
             to
             let
             pass
             ,
             that
             no
             
               Law
            
             can
             possibly
             be
             
               unjust
               ,
            
             in
             as
             much
             as
             every
             man
             maketh
             (
             by
             his
             consent
             )
             the
             Law
             he
             is
             bound
             to
             keep
             ,
             and
             which
             consequently
             must
             be
             just
             ,
             unless
             a
             man
             can
             be
             unjust
             to
             himself
             .
             I
             say
             what
             
               necessary
            
             cause
             soever
             precede
             an
             
               action
               ,
            
             yet
             if
             the
             action
             be
             
               forbidden
               ,
            
             he
             that
             doth
             it
             
               willingly
            
             may
             justly
             be
             punished
             .
             For
             instance
             ,
             suppose
             the
             Law
             on
             pain
             of
             death
             prohibit
             stealing
             ,
             and
             that
             there
             be
             a
             man
             ,
             who
             by
             the
             strength
             of
             temptation
             is
             
               necessitated
            
             to
             steal
             ,
             and
             is
             thereupon
             put
             to
             death
             ,
             does
             not
             this
             punishment
             deter
             others
             from
             Theft
             ?
             is
             it
             not
             a
             cause
             that
             others
             steal
             not
             ?
             Doth
             it
             not
             frame
             and
             make
             their
             wills
             to
             justice
             ?
          
           
             To
             make
             the
             
               Law
               ,
            
             is
             therefore
             to
             make
             a
             
               Cause
            
             of
             
               Justice
               ,
            
             and
             to
             
               necessitate
            
             Justice
             ,
             and
             consequently
             
             't
             is
             no
             injustice
             to
             make
             such
             a
             Law
             .
          
           
             The
             intention
             of
             the
             
               Law
            
             is
             not
             to
             grieve
             the
             
               Delinquent
            
             for
             that
             which
             is
             past
             ,
             and
             not
             to
             be
             undone
             ,
             but
             to
             make
             him
             and
             others
             
               just
               ,
            
             that
             else
             would
             not
             be
             so
             ,
             and
             respecteth
             not
             the
             evil
             act
             
               past
               ,
            
             but
             the
             
               good
               to
               come
               ,
            
             in
             so
             much
             as
             without
             the
             good
             intention
             for
             the
             future
             ,
             no
             past
             act
             of
             a
             Delinquent
             could
             justifie
             his
             killing
             in
             the
             sight
             of
             God
             .
             But
             you
             will
             say
             how
             is
             it
             just
             to
             kill
             one
             man
             to
             amend
             another
             ,
             if
             what
             were
             done
             were
             
               necessary
               ?
            
             To
             this
             I
             answer
             ,
             that
             men
             are
             justly
             killed
             ,
             not
             for
             that
             their
             
               actions
            
             are
             not
             
               necessitated
               ,
            
             but
             because
             they
             are
             
               noxious
               ,
            
             and
             they
             are
             spared
             and
             preserved
             whose
             actions
             are
             not
             noxious
             .
             For
             where
             there
             is
             no
             Law
             ,
             there
             no
             killing
             nor
             any
             thing
             else
             can
             be
             unjust
             ,
             and
             by
             the
             right
             of
             nature
             ,
             we
             destroy
             (
             without
             being
             unjust
             )
             all
             that
             is
             noxious
             both
             
             Beasts
             and
             Men
             ,
             and
             for
             Beasts
             we
             kill
             them
             justly
             when
             we
             do
             it
             in
             order
             to
             our
             own
             preservation
             ,
             and
             yet
             my
             Lord
             himself
             confesseth
             ,
             that
             their
             actions
             ,
             as
             being
             onely
             
               spontaneous
               ,
            
             and
             not
             
               free
               ,
            
             are
             all
             
               necessitated
            
             and
             determined
             to
             that
             one
             thing
             they
             shall
             do
             .
             For
             men
             ,
             when
             we
             make
             Societies
             or
             Common-Wealths
             we
             lay
             not
             down
             our
             right
             to
             kill
             ,
             excepting
             in
             certain
             cases
             ,
             as
             murther
             ,
             theft
             or
             other
             offensive
             action
             ;
             so
             that
             the
             right
             ,
             which
             the
             
               Common-Wealth
            
             hath
             to
             put
             a
             man
             to
             death
             for
             crimes
             is
             not
             created
             by
             the
             
               Law
               ,
            
             but
             remains
             from
             the
             first
             right
             of
             
               nature
               ,
            
             which
             every
             man
             hath
             to
             preserve
             himself
             ,
             for
             that
             the
             Law
             doth
             not
             take
             the
             right
             away
             in
             the
             case
             of
             Criminals
             ,
             who
             were
             by
             the
             Law
             excepted
             .
             Men
             are
             not
             therefore
             put
             to
             death
             ,
             or
             punished
             for
             that
             their
             theft
             proceedeth
             from
             
               election
               ,
            
             but
             because
             it
             was
             
             
               noxious
            
             and
             contrary
             to
             mens
             preservation
             ,
             and
             the
             punishment
             conducing
             to
             the
             preservation
             of
             the
             rest
             ,
             in
             as
             much
             as
             to
             punish
             those
             that
             do
             voluntary
             hurt
             ,
             and
             none
             else
             ,
             frameth
             and
             maketh
             mens
             
               wills
            
             such
             as
             men
             would
             have
             them
             .
             And
             thus
             it
             is
             plain
             ,
             that
             from
             the
             
               necessity
            
             of
             a
             
               voluntary
            
             action
             ,
             cannot
             be
             inferred
             the
             
               injustice
            
             of
             the
             
               Law
            
             that
             forbiddeth
             it
             ,
             or
             the
             Magistrate
             that
             punisheth
             it
             .
          
           
             Secondly
             ,
             I
             deny
             that
             it
             maketh
             
               consultations
            
             to
             be
             in
             
               vain
               ,
            
             't
             is
             the
             
               consultation
            
             that
             
               causeth
            
             a
             man
             ,
             &
             
               necessitateth
            
             him
             to
             
               choose
            
             to
             do
             one
             thing
             rather
             than
             another
             ,
             so
             that
             unless
             a
             man
             say
             that
             that
             cause
             is
             in
             vain
             which
             necessitateth
             the
             effect
             ,
             he
             cannot
             infer
             the
             superfluousness
             of
             consultation
             out
             of
             the
             necessity
             of
             the
             election
             proceeding
             from
             it
             .
             But
             it
             seemeth
             his
             Lordships
             reasons
             thus
             ,
             If
             I
             must
             do
             this
             rather
             than
             
             that
             ,
             I
             shall
             do
             this
             rather
             than
             that
             ,
             though
             I
             consult
             not
             at
             all
             ,
             which
             is
             a
             false
             proposition
             and
             a
             false
             consequence
             ,
             and
             no
             better
             than
             this
             ,
             if
             I
             shall
             live
             till
             to
             morrow
             ,
             I
             shall
             live
             till
             to
             morrow
             ,
             though
             I
             run
             my self
             through
             with
             a
             sword
             to
             day
             .
             If
             there
             be
             a
             
               necessity
            
             that
             an
             action
             shall
             be
             done
             ,
             or
             that
             any
             effect
             shall
             be
             brought
             to
             pass
             ,
             it
             does
             not
             therefore
             follow
             ,
             that
             there
             is
             nothing
             necessarily
             requisite
             as
             a
             means
             to
             bring
             it
             to
             pass
             ,
             and
             therefore
             when
             it
             is
             determined
             ,
             that
             one
             thing
             shall
             be
             chosen
             before
             another
             ,
             't
             is
             determined
             also
             for
             what
             
               cause
            
             it
             shall
             so
             be
             chosen
             ,
             which
             cause
             ,
             for
             the
             most
             part
             ,
             is
             
               deliberatiō
            
             or
             
               consultation
               ,
            
             and
             therefore
             consultation
             is
             not
             in
             vain
             ,
             and
             indeed
             the
             less
             in
             vain
             by
             how
             much
             the
             election
             is
             more
             necessitated
             ,
             if
             
               more
            
             and
             
               less
            
             had
             any
             place
             in
             
               necessity
               .
            
          
           
             The
             same
             answer
             is
             to
             be
             given
             
             to
             the
             third
             supposed
             inconvenience
             ,
             namely
             that
             
               admonitions
            
             are
             in
             
               vain
               ,
            
             for
             the
             Admonitions
             are
             parts
             of
             consultation
             ,
             the
             admonitor
             being
             a
             Councellour
             for
             the
             time
             to
             him
             that
             is
             admonished
             .
          
           
             The
             fourth
             pretended
             inconveence
             is
             ,
             that
             
               praise
               ,
               dispraise
               ,
               reward
            
             and
             
               punishment
            
             will
             be
             in
             
               vain
               .
            
             To
             which
             I
             answer
             ,
             that
             for
             
               praise
            
             and
             
               dispraise
               ,
            
             they
             depend
             not
             at
             all
             on
             the
             
               necessity
            
             of
             the
             action
             praised
             or
             dispraised
             .
             For
             what
             is
             it
             else
             to
             
               praise
               ,
            
             but
             to
             say
             a
             thing
             is
             good
             ?
             good
             I
             say
             for
             me
             ,
             or
             for
             some
             body
             else
             ,
             or
             for
             the
             State
             and
             Common-Wealth
             ?
             And
             what
             is
             it
             to
             say
             an
             action
             is
             good
             ,
             but
             to
             say
             it
             is
             as
             I
             would
             wish
             ?
             Or
             as
             another
             would
             have
             it
             ,
             or
             according
             to
             the
             will
             of
             the
             State
             ?
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             according
             to
             the
             Law
             .
             Does
             my
             Lord
             think
             that
             no
             action
             can
             please
             me
             ,
             or
             him
             ,
             or
             the
             Common-Wealth
             that
             
             should
             proceed
             from
             
               necessity
            
             ?
             things
             may
             be
             therefore
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             and
             yet
             
               praise
               worthy
               ,
            
             as
             also
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             and
             yet
             
               dispraised
               ,
            
             and
             neither
             of
             them
             both
             in
             vain
             ,
             because
             
               praise
            
             and
             
               dispraise
               ,
            
             and
             likewise
             
               Reward
            
             and
             
               Punishment
               ,
            
             do
             by
             example
             make
             and
             conform
             the
             will
             to
             good
             and
             evil
             .
             It
             was
             a
             very
             great
             praise
             in
             my
             opinion
             ,
             that
             
               Velleius
               Paterculus
            
             gives
             
               Cato
               ,
            
             where
             he
             saies
             that
             he
             was
             good
             by
             
               nature
               ,
               Et
               quia
               aliter
               esse
               non
               potuit
               .
            
          
           
             To
             the
             fifth
             and
             sixth
             inconveniences
             ,
             that
             
               Counsels
               ,
               Arts
               ,
               Arms
               ,
               Instruments
               ,
               Books
               ,
               Study
               ,
               Medicines
            
             and
             the
             like
             would
             be
             
               superfluous
               ,
            
             the
             same
             answer
             serves
             as
             to
             the
             former
             ,
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             that
             this
             consequence
             ,
             
               If
               the
               effect
               shall
               necessarily
               come
               to
               pass
               ,
               then
               it
               shall
               come
               to
               pass
               without
               its
               causes
            
             is
             a
             false
             one
             ,
             and
             those
             things
             named
             Counsels
             ,
             Arts
             ,
             Arms
             ,
             
               &c.
            
             are
             the
             causes
             of
             these
             effects
             .
          
           
           
             His
             Lordships
             
               third
            
             Argument
             consisteth
             in
             other
             
               inconveniences
               ,
            
             which
             he
             saith
             will
             follow
             ,
             namely
             
               Impiety
            
             and
             
               negligence
            
             of
             religious
             duties
             ,
             as
             Repentance
             ,
             and
             
               Zeal
            
             to
             Gods
             service
             ,
             
               &c.
               
            
          
           
             To
             which
             I
             answer
             as
             to
             the
             rest
             ,
             that
             they
             follow
             not
             .
             I
             must
             confess
             ,
             if
             we
             consider
             the
             greatest
             part
             of
             Mankinde
             ,
             not
             as
             they
             should
             be
             ,
             but
             as
             they
             are
             ,
             that
             is
             ,
             as
             men
             ,
             whom
             either
             the
             study
             of
             acquiring
             wealth
             ,
             or
             preferment
             ,
             or
             whom
             the
             appetite
             of
             sensual
             delights
             ,
             or
             the
             impatience
             of
             meditating
             ,
             or
             the
             rash
             embracing
             of
             wrong
             principles
             have
             made
             unapt
             to
             discuss
             the
             truth
             of
             things
             ,
             I
             must
             I
             say
             confess
             ,
             that
             the
             dispute
             of
             this
             question
             will
             rather
             hurt
             than
             help
             their
             piety
             ,
             and
             therefore
             if
             his
             Lordship
             had
             not
             desired
             this
             answer
             ,
             I
             should
             not
             have
             written
             it
             ,
             nor
             do
             I
             write
             it
             but
             in
             hopes
             your
             Lordship
             and
             his
             will
             keep
             it
             
             private
             .
             Nevertheless
             in
             very
             truth
             ,
             the
             
               necessity
            
             of
             events
             does
             not
             of
             it self
             draw
             with
             it
             any
             
               impiety
            
             at
             all
             .
             For
             
               piety
            
             consisteth
             onely
             in
             
               two
            
             things
             ;
             one
             that
             we
             honour
             God
             in
             our
             hearts
             ,
             which
             is
             ,
             that
             we
             think
             as
             highly
             of
             his
             
               power
            
             as
             we
             can
             ,
             (
             for
             to
             honour
             any
             thing
             is
             nothing
             else
             but
             to
             think
             it
             to
             be
             of
             great
             power
             .
             )
             The
             other
             is
             ,
             that
             we
             signifie
             that
             honour
             and
             esteem
             by
             our
             words
             and
             actions
             ,
             which
             is
             called
             ▪
             
               Cultus
               ,
            
             or
             
               worship
               of
               God
               .
            
             He
             therefore
             that
             thinketh
             that
             all
             things
             proceed
             from
             Gods
             
               eternal
               will
               ,
            
             and
             consequently
             are
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             does
             he
             not
             think
             God
             
               Omnipotent
            
             ?
             Does
             he
             not
             esteem
             of
             his
             
               power
            
             as
             highly
             as
             is
             possible
             ?
             which
             is
             to
             honour
             God
             as
             much
             as
             may
             be
             in
             his
             heart
             .
             Again
             ,
             he
             that
             thinketh
             so
             ,
             is
             he
             not
             more
             apt
             by
             
               external
            
             acts
             and
             words
             to
             acknowledge
             it
             ,
             than
             he
             that
             thinketh
             otherwise
             ?
             yet
             is
             
             this
             external
             acknowledgement
             the
             same
             thing
             which
             we
             call
             
               worship
               .
            
             So
             that
             this
             opinion
             fortifies
             
               piety
            
             in
             both
             kinds
             ,
             external
             and
             internal
             ,
             therefore
             is
             far
             from
             destroying
             it
             .
             And
             for
             
               Repentance
               ,
            
             which
             is
             nothing
             else
             but
             a
             glad
             returning
             into
             the
             right
             way
             after
             the
             grief
             of
             being
             out
             of
             the
             way
             ;
             though
             the
             cause
             that
             made
             him
             go
             astray
             were
             necessary
             ,
             yet
             there
             is
             no
             reason
             why
             he
             should
             not
             grieve
             ;
             and
             again
             though
             the
             cause
             why
             he
             returned
             into
             the
             way
             were
             necessary
             ,
             there
             remained
             still
             the
             causes
             of
             joy
             .
             So
             that
             the
             
               necessity
            
             of
             the
             actions
             taketh
             away
             neither
             of
             those
             parts
             of
             
               Repentance
               ,
            
             grief
             for
             the
             errour
             ,
             and
             joy
             for
             returning
             .
          
           
             And
             for
             
               prayer
               ,
            
             whereas
             he
             saith
             that
             the
             
               necessity
            
             of
             things
             destroy
             
               prayer
               ,
            
             I
             deny
             it
             ,
             for
             though
             
               prayer
            
             be
             none
             of
             the
             
               causes
            
             that
             
               move
            
             Gods
             
               will
            
             (
             his
             will
             being
             unchangeable
             )
             
             yet
             since
             we
             finde
             in
             Gods
             word
             ,
             he
             will
             not
             give
             his
             blessings
             but
             to
             those
             that
             aske
             ,
             the
             motive
             of
             prayer
             is
             the
             same
             .
             
               Prayer
            
             is
             the
             gift
             of
             God
             no
             less
             than
             the
             
               blessing
               ,
            
             and
             the
             prayer
             is
             decreed
             together
             in
             the
             same
             decree
             wherein
             the
             blessing
             is
             decreed
             .
             'T
             is
             manifest
             that
             
               Thanksgiving
            
             is
             no
             cause
             of
             the
             blessing
             past
             ,
             and
             that
             which
             is
             past
             is
             sure
             and
             necessary
             ,
             yet
             even
             amongst
             men
             thanks
             is
             in
             use
             as
             an
             acknowledgement
             of
             the
             benefit
             past
             ,
             though
             we
             should
             expect
             no
             new
             benefit
             for
             our
             gratitude
             .
             And
             prayer
             to
             God
             Almighty
             is
             but
             thanksgiving
             for
             Gods
             blessings
             in
             general
             ,
             and
             though
             it
             precede
             the
             particular
             thing
             we
             ask
             ,
             yet
             it
             is
             not
             a
             cause
             or
             means
             of
             it
             ,
             but
             a
             signification
             that
             we
             expect
             nothing
             but
             from
             God
             ,
             in
             such
             manner
             ,
             as
             he
             ,
             not
             as
             we
             ,
             will
             ,
             and
             our
             Saviour
             by
             word
             of
             mouth
             bids
             us
             pray
             
               thy
               will
               ,
            
             
             not
             our
             will
             ,
             
               be
               done
               ,
            
             and
             by
             example
             teaches
             us
             the
             same
             ,
             for
             he
             prayed
             thus
             ,
             
               Father
               if
               it
               be
               thy
               will
               let
               this
               cup
               pass
               ,
            
             &c.
             
             The
             end
             of
             prayer
             ,
             as
             of
             thanksgiving
             ,
             is
             not
             to
             
               move
            
             but
             to
             
               honour
            
             God
             Almighty
             ,
             in
             acknowledging
             that
             what
             we
             ask
             can
             be
             effected
             by
             him
             onely
             .
          
           
             
               The
               fourth
               Argument
               from
               Reason
               is
               this
               ,
               The
               order
               ,
               beauty
               and
               perfection
               of
               the
               world
               requireth
               that
               in
               the
               universe
               should
               be
               Agents
               of
               all
               sorts
               ;
               some
               necessary
               ▪
               some
               free
               ,
               some
               contingent
               .
               He
               that
               shall
               make
               all
               things
               necessary
               ,
               all
               things
               free
               ,
               or
               all
               things
               contingent
               doth
               overthrow
               the
               beauty
               and
               perfection
               of
               the
               world
               .
            
          
           
             In
             which
             Argument
             I
             observe
             first
             a
             
               Contradiction
               ,
            
             for
             seeing
             he
             that
             
               maketh
            
             any
             thing
             in
             that
             he
             maketh
             it
             ,
             maketh
             it
             to
             be
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             it
             followeth
             that
             he
             that
             maketh
             all
             things
             ,
             maketh
             all
             things
             necessarily
             to
             be
             ;
             As
             if
             a
             work-man
             make
             a
             garment
             
             the
             garment
             must
             necessarily
             be
             ,
             so
             if
             God
             make
             every
             thing
             ,
             every
             thing
             must
             necessarily
             be
             .
             Perhaps
             the
             beauty
             of
             the
             world
             requireth
             (
             though
             we
             know
             it
             not
             )
             that
             some
             Agents
             should
             work
             without
             deliberation
             (
             which
             his
             Lordship
             calls
             
               necessary
            
             Agents
             )
             and
             some
             Agents
             with
             deliberation
             (
             and
             those
             both
             he
             and
             I
             call
             
               free
            
             Agents
             )
             and
             that
             some
             Agents
             should
             work
             ,
             and
             we
             not
             know
             how
             (
             and
             their
             effects
             we
             both
             call
             
               Contingents
            
             )
             but
             this
             hinders
             not
             but
             that
             he
             that
             electeth
             may
             have
             his
             
               election
            
             necessarily
             determined
             to
             
               one
            
             by
             
               former
            
             causes
             ,
             and
             that
             which
             is
             
               contingent
            
             and
             imputed
             to
             fortune
             ,
             be
             nevertheless
             
               necessary
            
             and
             depend
             on
             
               precedent
            
             necessary
             causes
             .
             For
             by
             
               contingent
               ,
            
             men
             do
             not
             mean
             that
             which
             hath
             
               no
            
             cause
             ,
             but
             that
             which
             hath
             not
             for
             cause
             any
             thing
             that
             we
             perceive
             ;
             As
             for
             example
             ,
             
             when
             a
             Traveller
             meets
             with
             a
             shower
             ,
             the
             journey
             had
             a
             cause
             ,
             and
             the
             rain
             had
             a
             cause
             sufficient
             to
             produce
             it
             ,
             but
             because
             the
             journey
             caused
             not
             the
             rain
             ,
             nor
             the
             rain
             the
             journey
             ,
             we
             say
             they
             were
             contingent
             one
             to
             another
             .
             And
             thus
             you
             see
             that
             though
             there
             be
             three
             sorts
             of
             events
             ,
             
               necessary
               ,
               contingent
               ,
               and
               free
               ,
            
             yet
             they
             may
             be
             
               all
            
             necessary
             without
             destruction
             of
             the
             beauty
             or
             perfection
             of
             the
             universe
             .
          
           
             To
             the
             first
             Argument
             from
             Reason
             ,
             which
             is
             ,
             
               that
               if
               liberty
               be
               taken
               away
               ,
               the
               nature
               and
               formel
               reason
               of
               sin
               is
               taken
               away
               ,
            
             I
             answer
             by
             denying
             the
             consequence
             ;
             The
             nature
             of
             sin
             consisteth
             in
             this
             ,
             that
             the
             
               action
            
             done
             proceed
             from
             our
             
               will
            
             and
             be
             against
             the
             
               Law
               .
            
             A
             Judge
             in
             judging
             whether
             it
             be
             sin
             or
             no
             which
             is
             done
             against
             the
             Law
             ,
             looks
             at
             no
             higher
             cause
             of
             the
             action
             ,
             than
             the
             will
             of
             the
             doer
             .
             
             Now
             when
             I
             say
             the
             action
             was
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             I
             do
             not
             say
             it
             was
             done
             
               against
            
             the
             will
             of
             the
             doer
             ,
             but
             
               with
            
             his
             will
             ,
             and
             
               necessarily
               ,
            
             because
             mans
             will
             ,
             that
             is
             every
             volition
             or
             act
             of
             the
             will
             and
             purpose
             of
             man
             had
             a
             
               sufficient
               ,
            
             and
             therefore
             a
             
               necessary
            
             cause
             ,
             and
             consequently
             every
             
               voluntary
            
             action
             was
             
               necessitated
               .
            
             An
             action
             therefore
             may
             be
             
               voluntary
            
             and
             a
             
               sin
               ,
            
             and
             nevertheless
             be
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             and
             ,
             because
             God
             may
             afflict
             by
             a
             right
             derived
             from
             his
             
               Omnipotence
               ,
            
             though
             sin
             were
             not
             ,
             and
             because
             the
             example
             of
             punishment
             on
             voluntary
             sinners
             ,
             is
             the
             cause
             that
             produceth
             justice
             ,
             and
             maketh
             sin
             less
             frequent
             ,
             for
             God
             to
             punish
             such
             sinners
             (
             as
             I
             have
             said
             before
             )
             is
             no
             injustice
             .
             And
             thus
             you
             have
             my
             answer
             to
             his
             Lordships
             Objections
             both
             out
             of
             Scripture
             and
             from
             Reason
             .
          
        
         
         
           
             
               Certain
               Distinctions
            
             which
             his
             Lordship
             supposing
             might
             be
             brought
             to
             
               evade
            
             his
             Arguments
             are
             by
             him
             removed
             .
          
           
             HE
             saies
             a
             man
             may
             perhaps
             answer
             ,
             that
             the
             
               necessity
            
             of
             things
             held
             by
             him
             ,
             is
             not
             a
             
               Stoicall
            
             necessity
             ,
             but
             a
             
               Christian
            
             necessity
             ,
             
               &c.
               
            
             But
             this
             
               distinction
            
             I
             have
             not
             used
             ,
             nor
             indeed
             ever
             heard
             before
             ,
             nor
             could
             I
             think
             any
             man
             could
             make
             
               Stoicall
            
             and
             
               Christian
            
             two
             kindes
             of
             
               necessity
               ,
            
             though
             they
             may
             be
             two
             kindes
             of
             
               Doctrine
               .
            
             Nor
             have
             I
             drawn
             my
             Answer
             to
             his
             Lordships
             Arguments
             from
             the
             authority
             of
             any
             Sect
             ,
             but
             from
             the
             nature
             of
             the
             things
             themselves
             .
          
           
             But
             here
             I
             must
             take
             notice
             of
             certain
             words
             of
             his
             Lordships
             in
             this
             place
             ,
             as
             making
             against
             his
             own
             Tenet
             .
             
               Where
               all
               the
               causes
               ,
               saith
               he
               
               being
               joyned
               together
               and
               subordinate
               one
               to
               another
               do
               make
               but
               one
               total
               cause
               ,
               if
               any
               one
               cause
               (
               much
               more
               the
               first
               )
               in
               the
               whole
               series
               or
               subordination
               of
               causes
               be
               necessary
               ,
               it
               determines
               the
               rest
               ,
               and
               without
               doubt
               maketh
               the
               effect
               necessary
               .
            
             For
             that
             which
             I
             call
             the
             
               necessary
            
             cause
             of
             any
             effect
             ,
             is
             the
             
               joyning
            
             together
             of
             all
             causes
             subordinate
             to
             the
             first
             into
             one
             total
             cause
             .
             
               If
               any
               of
               these
            
             saith
             he
             ,
             
               especially
               the
               first
               ,
               produce
               its
               effect
               necessarily
               ,
               then
               all
               the
               rest
            
             are
             determined
             .
             Now
             it
             is
             manifest
             ,
             that
             the
             first
             cause
             is
             a
             necessary
             cause
             of
             all
             the
             effects
             that
             are
             next
             and
             immediate
             to
             it
             ,
             and
             therefore
             by
             his
             Lordships
             own
             reason
             all
             effects
             are
             necessary
             .
          
           
             Nor
             is
             that
             distinction
             of
             necessary
             in
             respect
             of
             the
             
               first
               cause
               ,
            
             and
             necessary
             in
             respect
             of
             
               Second
               causes
            
             mine
             ,
             it
             does
             (
             as
             his
             Lordship
             well
             notes
             )
             imply
             a
             contradiction
             .
             
             But
             the
             distinction
             of
             
               free
            
             into
             
               free
               from
               compulsion
            
             and
             
               free
               from
               Necessitation
               ,
            
             I
             acknowledge
             ,
             for
             to
             be
             
               free
               from
               compulsion
            
             is
             to
             do
             a
             thing
             so
             as
             
               terror
            
             be
             not
             the
             cause
             of
             his
             
               will
            
             to
             do
             it
             ;
             for
             a
             man
             is
             then
             onely
             said
             to
             be
             compelled
             ,
             when
             fear
             makes
             him
             willing
             to
             it
             .
             As
             when
             a
             man
             willingly
             throws
             his
             goods
             into
             the
             sea
             to
             save
             himself
             ,
             or
             submits
             to
             his
             enemie
             for
             fear
             of
             being
             killed
             .
             Thus
             all
             men
             that
             do
             any
             thing
             for
             
               love
               ,
            
             or
             
               revenge
               ,
            
             or
             
               lust
            
             are
             
               free
               from
               compulsion
               ,
            
             and
             yet
             their
             actions
             may
             be
             as
             necessarie
             as
             those
             that
             are
             done
             by
             compulsion
             ;
             for
             sometimes
             other
             passions
             work
             as
             forcibly
             as
             fear
             .
             But
             
               free
               from
               Necessitation
               .
            
             I
             say
             ,
             no
             man
             can
             be
             ,
             and
             't
             is
             that
             which
             his
             Lordship
             undertook
             to
             disprove
             .
          
           
             This
             
               distinction
               ,
            
             his
             Lordship
             says
             ,
             uses
             to
             be
             
               fortified
            
             by
             two
             reasons
             (
             but
             they
             are
             not
             mine
             .
             )
             The
             first
             
             he
             says
             ,
             is
             ,
             that
             it
             is
             granted
             by
             all
             Divines
             ,
             that
             an
             
               Hypothetical
               necessitie
               ,
            
             or
             Necessitie
             upon
             supposition
             ,
             may
             stand
             with
             
               Libertie
               .
            
             That
             you
             may
             understand
             this
             ,
             I
             will
             give
             you
             an
             example
             of
             
               Hypothetical
               necessity
               .
            
             If
             
               I
               shall
               live
               ,
               I
               shall
               eat
               .
            
             This
             is
             an
             
               Hypothetical
               necessitie
               .
            
             Indeed
             it
             is
             a
             necessarie
             proposition
             ,
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             it
             is
             necessarie
             that
             that
             proposition
             should
             be
             true
             whensoever
             uttered
             ,
             but
             't
             is
             not
             the
             necessitie
             of
             the
             thing
             ,
             nor
             is
             it
             therefore
             necessarie
             that
             the
             man
             should
             live
             ,
             nor
             that
             the
             man
             should
             eat
             .
             I
             do
             not
             use
             to
             
               fortifie
            
             my
             distinctions
             with
             such
             reasons
             ,
             let
             his
             Lordship
             confute
             them
             how
             he
             will
             ,
             it
             contents
             me
             ;
             but
             I
             would
             have
             your
             Lordship
             take
             notice
             hereby
             ,
             how
             easie
             and
             plain
             a
             thing
             ,
             (
             but
             withal
             false
             )
             with
             the
             grave
             usage
             of
             such
             terms
             as
             
               Hypothetical
               necessitie
               ,
            
             and
             
               Necessitie
            
             upon
             
               supposition
               ,
            
             and
             such
             like
             terms
             
             of
             School-men
             may
             be
             obscured
             and
             made
             to
             seem
             
               profound
               learning
               .
            
          
           
             The
             second
             reason
             that
             may
             confirm
             the
             distinction
             of
             
               free
               from
               compulsion
               ,
            
             and
             
               free
               from
               necessitation
               ,
            
             he
             says
             is
             ,
             that
             God
             and
             good
             Angels
             do
             good
             necessarily
             ,
             and
             yet
             are
             more
             free
             than
             we
             .
             This
             reason
             ,
             though
             I
             had
             no
             need
             of
             ,
             yet
             I
             think
             it
             so
             farforth
             good
             ,
             as
             it
             is
             true
             that
             God
             and
             good
             Angels
             do
             good
             necessarily
             ,
             and
             yet
             are
             free
             ;
             but
             because
             I
             find
             not
             in
             the
             Articles
             of
             our
             Faith
             ,
             nor
             in
             the
             decrees
             of
             our
             Church
             ,
             set
             down
             in
             what
             manner
             I
             am
             to
             conceive
             God
             and
             good
             Angels
             to
             work
             by
             necessitie
             ,
             or
             in
             what
             sence
             they
             work
             
               Freely
               ,
            
             I
             suspend
             my
             sentence
             in
             that
             point
             ,
             and
             am
             content
             that
             there
             be
             a
             
               freedom
               from
               Compulsion
               ,
            
             and
             yet
             no
             
               freedom
               from
               Necessitation
               ,
            
             as
             hath
             been
             proved
             ,
             in
             that
             a
             man
             may
             be
             necessitated
             to
             some
             action
             without
             threats
             
             and
             without
             fear
             of
             danger
             .
             But
             how
             my
             Lord
             can
             avoid
             the
             consisting
             together
             of
             
               freedom
            
             and
             
               necessitie
               ,
            
             supposing
             God
             and
             good
             Angels
             are
             freer
             than
             men
             ,
             and
             yet
             do
             good
             necessarily
             ,
             that
             we
             must
             examin
             .
             I
             confess
             ,
             saith
             he
             ,
             
               that
               God
               &
               good
               Angels
               are
               more
               free
               than
               we
               ,
               that
               is
               ,
               intensively
               in
               degree
               of
               Freedom
               ,
               not
               extensively
               in
               the
               latitude
               of
               the
               object
               ,
               according
               to
               a
               libertie
               of
               exercise
               ,
               not
               of
               specification
               .
            
          
           
             Again
             ,
             we
             have
             here
             two
             distinctions
             that
             are
             no
             distinctions
             ,
             but
             made
             to
             seem
             so
             by
             terms
             invented
             by
             I
             know
             not
             whom
             ,
             to
             cover
             ignorance
             ,
             and
             blind
             the
             understanding
             of
             the
             Reader
             :
             For
             it
             cannot
             be
             conceived
             that
             there
             is
             any
             libertie
             greater
             ,
             than
             for
             a
             man
             to
             do
             what
             he
             will
             .
             One
             heat
             may
             be
             more
             intensive
             than
             another
             ,
             but
             not
             one
             libertie
             than
             another
             ;
             he
             that
             can
             do
             what
             he
             will
             ,
             hath
             all
             libertie
             possible
             ,
             
             and
             he
             that
             cannot
             hath
             none
             at
             all
             .
             Also
             
               Libertie
            
             (
             as
             his
             Lordship
             says
             the
             Schools
             call
             it
             )
             of
             
               exercise
               ,
            
             which
             is
             as
             I
             have
             said
             before
             ,
             a
             libertie
             to
             do
             or
             not
             to
             do
             ,
             cannot
             be
             without
             a
             
               Libertie
            
             (
             which
             they
             call
             )
             of
             
               Specification
               ,
            
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             a
             libertie
             to
             do
             ,
             or
             not
             to
             do
             this
             or
             that
             in
             particular
             .
             For
             how
             can
             a
             man
             conceave
             he
             hath
             libertie
             to
             do
             any
             thing
             ,
             that
             hath
             not
             libertie
             to
             do
             this
             ,
             or
             that
             ,
             or
             somewhat
             in
             particular
             ?
             If
             a
             man
             be
             forbidden
             in
             Lent
             to
             eat
             this
             ,
             and
             that
             ,
             and
             every
             other
             particular
             kind
             of
             flesh
             ,
             how
             can
             he
             be
             understood
             to
             have
             a
             libertie
             to
             eat
             flesh
             ,
             more
             than
             he
             that
             hath
             no
             licence
             at
             all
             ?
             You
             may
             by
             this
             again
             see
             the
             vanitie
             of
             distinctions
             used
             in
             the
             
               Schools
               ,
            
             and
             I
             do
             not
             doubt
             but
             that
             the
             imposing
             of
             them
             ,
             by
             Authoritie
             of
             
               Doctors
            
             in
             the
             
               Church
               ,
            
             hath
             been
             a
             great
             cause
             that
             men
             have
             labored
             ,
             
             though
             by
             Sedition
             and
             evil
             courses
             ,
             to
             shake
             them
             off
             ,
             for
             nothing
             is
             more
             apt
             to
             beget
             hatred
             ,
             than
             the
             tyrannizing
             over
             mens
             reason
             and
             understanding
             ,
             especially
             when
             it
             is
             done
             ,
             not
             by
             the
             Scriptures
             ,
             but
             by
             the
             pretence
             of
             Learning
             ,
             and
             more
             judgement
             than
             that
             of
             other
             men
             .
          
           
             In
             the
             next
             place
             his
             Lordship
             bringeth
             two
             Arguments
             against
             distinguishing
             between
             
               free
               from
               compulsion
            
             and
             
               free
               from
               necessitation
               .
            
          
           
             The
             first
             is
             ,
             that
             
               election
            
             is
             opposite
             not
             onely
             to
             
               Coaction
            
             or
             
               compulsion
               ,
            
             but
             also
             
               Necessitation
            
             or
             determination
             to
             one
             .
             This
             is
             it
             he
             was
             to
             prove
             from
             the
             beginning
             ,
             and
             therefore
             bringeth
             no
             new
             Argument
             to
             prove
             it
             ,
             and
             so
             those
             brought
             formerly
             I
             have
             already
             answered
             .
             And
             in
             this
             place
             I
             deny
             again
             ,
             that
             election
             is
             opposite
             to
             either
             ,
             For
             ,
             when
             a
             man
             is
             compelled
             for
             example
             to
             subject
             himself
             to
             an
             enemy
             or
             to
             die
             ,
             he
             hath
             
             ●till
             election
             left
             him
             ,
             and
             a
             deliberation
             to
             bethink
             which
             of
             the
             two
             he
             can
             better
             endure
             .
             And
             he
             that
             ●●led
             to
             prison
             by
             force
             hath
             election
             ●nd
             may
             deliberate
             whether
             he
             will
             ●e
             hal'd
             and
             traind
             on
             the
             ground
             ,
             ●r
             make
             use
             of
             his
             own
             feet
             :
             Likewise
             when
             there
             is
             no
             
               compulsion
               ,
            
             but
             the
             strength
             of
             
               temptation
            
             to
             do
             ●n
             evil
             action
             ,
             being
             greater
             than
             the
             motives
             to
             
               abstain
               ,
            
             it
             necessarily
             determines
             him
             to
             the
             doing
             of
             it
             ,
             ●et
             he
             deliberates
             while
             sometimes
             the
             motives
             to
             do
             ,
             sometimes
             the
             motives
             to
             forbear
             are
             working
             on
             ●im
             ,
             and
             consequently
             he
             
               electeth
            
             which
             he
             will
             .
             But
             commonly
             when
             we
             see
             and
             know
             the
             strength
             that
             moves
             us
             ,
             we
             acknowledge
             
               necessity
            
             ;
             but
             when
             we
             see
             not
             or
             mark
             not
             the
             force
             that
             moves
             us
             ,
             we
             then
             think
             there
             is
             none
             ,
             and
             that
             it
             is
             not
             
               causes
            
             but
             
               liberty
            
             that
             produceth
             the
             
               action
               .
            
             Hence
             it
             is
             that
             they
             think
             he
             does
             not
             choose
             this
             that
             of
             necessity
             
             choose
             it
             ,
             but
             they
             might
             as
             well
             say
             ,
             fire
             doth
             not
             burn
             because
             it
             burns
             of
             necessity
             .
          
           
             The
             second
             Argument
             is
             not
             so
             much
             an
             argument
             as
             a
             distinction
             ,
             to
             shew
             in
             what
             sence
             it
             may
             be
             said
             that
             
               voluntary
            
             actions
             are
             
               necessitated
            
             and
             in
             what
             sence
             not
             .
             And
             therefore
             his
             Lordship
             alledgeth
             as
             from
             the
             authority
             of
             the
             
               Schools
            
             (
             and
             that
             which
             rippeth
             up
             the
             bottom
             of
             the
             
               Question
            
             )
             that
             there
             is
             a
             double
             act
             of
             the
             
               will
               .
            
             The
             one
             he
             says
             is
             
               Actus
               imperatus
               ,
            
             an
             act
             done
             at
             the
             command
             of
             the
             will
             ,
             by
             some
             inferiour
             faculty
             of
             the
             soul
             ;
             As
             to
             open
             or
             shut
             ones
             eyes
             ,
             and
             this
             act
             may
             be
             compell'd
             ,
             the
             other
             he
             saies
             ,
             is
             
               Actus
               elicitus
               ,
            
             an
             act
             allured
             or
             drawn
             forth
             by
             allurement
             out
             of
             the
             will
             ,
             as
             to
             
               will
               ,
            
             to
             
               choose
               ,
            
             to
             
               elect
               ,
            
             this
             he
             saies
             cannot
             be
             compelled
             .
             Wherein
             (
             letting
             pass
             that
             metaphorical
             speech
             
             of
             attributing
             command
             and
             subjection
             to
             the
             faculties
             of
             the
             soul
             ,
             as
             if
             they
             made
             a
             Common-Wealth
             or
             family
             within
             themselves
             ,
             and
             could
             speak
             one
             to
             another
             ,
             which
             is
             very
             improper
             in
             searching
             the
             truth
             of
             a
             question
             )
             you
             may
             observe
             ,
             first
             ,
             that
             to
             compel
             a
             
               voluntary
            
             act
             ,
             is
             nothing
             else
             but
             to
             will
             it
             ,
             for
             it
             is
             all
             one
             to
             say
             ,
             my
             will
             commands
             the
             shutting
             of
             my
             eyes
             ,
             or
             the
             doing
             of
             any
             other
             action
             ,
             and
             to
             say
             ,
             I
             have
             the
             will
             to
             shut
             my
             eyes
             ;
             so
             that
             
               Actus
               imperatus
               ,
            
             here
             ,
             might
             as
             easily
             have
             been
             said
             in
             English
             a
             
               voluntry
               action
               ,
            
             but
             that
             they
             that
             invented
             the
             term
             understood
             not
             any
             thing
             it
             signified
             .
          
           
             Secondly
             ,
             you
             may
             observe
             ,
             that
             
               Actus
               elicitus
               ,
            
             is
             exemplified
             by
             these
             words
             ,
             to
             
               will
               ,
            
             to
             
               elect
               ,
            
             to
             
               choose
               ,
            
             which
             are
             all
             one
             ,
             and
             so
             to
             will
             is
             here
             made
             an
             act
             of
             the
             will
             ;
             and
             
             indeed
             as
             the
             will
             is
             a
             faculty
             or
             power
             in
             a
             mans
             soul
             ,
             so
             to
             will
             is
             an
             act
             of
             it
             according
             to
             that
             power
             ;
             but
             as
             it
             is
             absurdly
             said
             ,
             that
             to
             dance
             is
             an
             act
             allured
             or
             drawn
             by
             fair
             means
             out
             of
             the
             ability
             to
             dance
             ,
             so
             is
             it
             also
             to
             say
             ,
             so
             that
             to
             will
             is
             an
             act
             allured
             or
             drawn
             out
             of
             the
             power
             to
             will
             ,
             which
             power
             is
             commonly
             called
             the
             will
             .
             Howsoever
             it
             be
             ,
             the
             sum
             of
             his
             Lordships
             distinction
             ,
             is
             ,
             that
             a
             
               voluntary
            
             act
             may
             be
             done
             by
             
               compulsion
               ,
            
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             by
             foul
             means
             ,
             but
             to
             will
             that
             or
             any
             act
             cannot
             be
             but
             by
             
               allurement
               ,
            
             or
             fair
             means
             .
             Now
             seeing
             fair
             means
             ,
             allurements
             ,
             and
             enticements
             produce
             the
             action
             which
             they
             do
             produce
             ,
             as
             
               necessarily
            
             as
             foul
             means
             and
             threatening
             ,
             it
             follows
             ,
             that
             to
             
               will
            
             may
             be
             made
             as
             
               necessarie
            
             as
             any
             thing
             that
             is
             done
             by
             
               compulsion
               .
            
             So
             that
             the
             distinction
             of
             
               Actus
               imperatus
               ,
            
             and
             
             
               Actus
               elicitus
            
             are
             but
             words
             ,
             and
             of
             no
             effect
             against
             necessitie
             .
          
           
             His
             Lordship
             in
             the
             rest
             of
             his
             discourse
             ,
             reckoneth
             up
             the
             opinion
             of
             certain
             professions
             of
             men
             ,
             touching
             the
             causes
             wherein
             the
             necessitie
             of
             things
             (
             which
             they
             maintain
             )
             consisteth
             .
             And
             first
             he
             saith
             ,
             the
             
               Astrologer
            
             deriveth
             his
             
               necessitie
            
             from
             the
             
               stars
            
             ;
             Secondly
             ,
             that
             the
             
               Physitian
            
             attributeth
             it
             to
             the
             
               temper
            
             of
             the
             bodie
             .
             For
             my
             part
             ,
             I
             am
             not
             of
             their
             opinion
             ,
             because
             ,
             neither
             the
             stars
             alone
             ,
             nor
             the
             temperature
             of
             the
             Patient
             alone
             is
             able
             to
             produce
             any
             effect
             ,
             without
             the
             concurrence
             of
             all
             other
             Agents
             .
             For
             there
             is
             hardly
             any
             one
             action
             ,
             how
             casual
             soever
             it
             seem
             ,
             to
             the
             causing
             whereof
             concur
             not
             whatsoever
             is
             in
             
               rerum
               natura
               ,
            
             which
             because
             it
             is
             a
             great
             paradox
             ,
             and
             depends
             on
             many
             antecedent
             speculations
             ,
             I
             do
             not
             press
             in
             this
             place
             .
             
             Thirdly
             ,
             he
             disputeth
             against
             the
             opinion
             of
             them
             that
             say
             ,
             
               external
               objects
            
             presented
             to
             men
             of
             such
             and
             such
             temparatures
             ,
             do
             make
             their
             actions
             
               necessarie
               ,
            
             and
             says
             ,
             the
             power
             such
             objects
             have
             over
             us
             ,
             proceeds
             from
             our
             own
             fault
             ,
             but
             that
             is
             nothing
             to
             the
             purpose
             ,
             if
             such
             fault
             of
             ours
             proceedeth
             from
             causes
             not
             in
             our
             own
             power
             ,
             and
             therefore
             that
             opinion
             may
             hold
             true
             for
             all
             that
             answer
             .
          
           
             Further
             he
             says
             ,
             
               Prayer
               ,
               Fasting
               ,
            
             &c.
             may
             alter
             our
             
               habits
            
             ;
             't
             is
             true
             ,
             but
             when
             they
             do
             so
             ,
             they
             are
             
               causes
            
             of
             the
             contrarie
             
               habit
               ,
            
             and
             make
             it
             
               necessarie
               ,
            
             as
             the
             former
             habit
             had
             been
             necessarie
             if
             
               Prayer
               ,
               Fasting
               ,
            
             &c.
             had
             not
             been
             .
             Besides
             ,
             we
             are
             not
             moved
             or
             disposed
             to
             prayer
             or
             any
             other
             action
             ,
             but
             by
             outward
             objects
             ,
             as
             pious
             company
             ,
             godly
             preachers
             ,
             of
             something
             equivolent
             .
             Fourthly
             ,
             he
             says
             a
             resolved
             mind
             is
             
             not
             easily
             surprised
             ,
             as
             the
             mind
             of
             
               Vlysses
               ,
            
             who
             when
             others
             wept
             ,
             alone
             wept
             not
             ,
             and
             of
             the
             
               Phylososopher
               ,
            
             that
             abstained
             from
             striking
             ,
             because
             he
             found
             himself
             angrie
             ;
             and
             of
             him
             that
             poured
             out
             the
             water
             when
             he
             was
             thirstie
             ,
             and
             the
             like
             .
             Such
             things
             I
             confess
             have
             ,
             or
             may
             have
             been
             done
             ,
             and
             do
             prove
             onely
             that
             it
             was
             not
             necessarie
             for
             
               Vlysses
            
             then
             to
             weep
             ,
             nor
             for
             that
             
               Philosopher
            
             to
             strike
             ,
             nor
             for
             that
             other
             man
             to
             drink
             ,
             but
             it
             does
             not
             prove
             that
             it
             was
             not
             necessarie
             for
             
               Vlysses
            
             then
             to
             abstain
             (
             as
             he
             did
             )
             from
             weeping
             ,
             nor
             for
             the
             
               Philosopher
            
             to
             abstain
             (
             as
             he
             did
             )
             from
             striking
             ,
             nor
             for
             the
             other
             man
             to
             forbear
             drinking
             ,
             and
             yet
             that
             was
             the
             thing
             his
             Lordship
             ought
             to
             have
             proved
             .
             Lastly
             ,
             his
             Lordship
             confesses
             ,
             that
             the
             
               dispositions
            
             of
             objects
             may
             be
             
               dangerous
            
             to
             
               libertie
               ,
            
             but
             cannot
             be
             
               destructive
               .
            
             To
             which
             I
             answer
             ,
             it
             
             is
             impossible
             ;
             for
             
               libertie
            
             is
             never
             in
             any
             other
             danger
             than
             to
             be
             lost
             ,
             and
             if
             it
             cannot
             be
             lost
             (
             which
             he
             confesses
             )
             I
             may
             infer
             it
             can
             be
             in
             no
             danger
             at
             all
             .
          
           
             The
             fourth
             opinion
             his
             Lordship
             rejecteth
             ,
             is
             of
             them
             that
             make
             the
             will
             necessarily
             to
             follow
             the
             last
             dictate
             of
             the
             understanding
             ;
             but
             it
             seems
             his
             Lordship
             understands
             that
             Tenet
             in
             another
             sence
             than
             I
             do
             ;
             for
             he
             speaketh
             as
             if
             they
             that
             held
             it
             ,
             did
             suppose
             men
             must
             dispute
             the
             sequel
             of
             every
             action
             they
             do
             ,
             great
             and
             small
             ,
             to
             the
             least
             grain
             ,
             which
             is
             a
             thing
             his
             Lordship
             (
             with
             reason
             )
             thinks
             untrue
             .
             But
             I
             understand
             it
             to
             signifie
             ,
             that
             the
             
               will
            
             follows
             the
             
               last
            
             opinion
             or
             
               judgement
            
             immediately
             proceding
             the
             
               action
               ,
            
             concerning
             whether
             it
             be
             good
             to
             do
             it
             or
             not
             ,
             whether
             he
             have
             weighed
             it
             long
             before
             ,
             or
             not
             at
             all
             ,
             and
             that
             I
             take
             to
             be
             the
             meaning
             of
             them
             that
             hold
             it
             .
             As
             for
             example
             ,
             when
             
             a
             man
             strikes
             ,
             his
             will
             to
             strike
             follows
             necessarily
             that
             thought
             he
             had
             of
             the
             sequel
             of
             his
             stroak
             ,
             immediately
             before
             the
             lifting
             up
             of
             his
             hand
             .
             Now
             if
             it
             be
             understood
             in
             that
             sence
             ,
             the
             
               last
            
             dictate
             of
             the
             understanding
             does
             
               necessitate
            
             the
             
               action
               ,
            
             though
             not
             as
             the
             whole
             cause
             ,
             yet
             as
             the
             last
             cause
             ,
             as
             the
             last
             feather
             necessitates
             the
             breaking
             of
             a
             horses
             back
             ,
             when
             there
             are
             so
             many
             laid
             on
             before
             ,
             as
             there
             needed
             but
             the
             addition
             of
             one
             to
             make
             the
             weight
             sufficient
             .
          
           
             That
             which
             his
             Lordship
             alleadgeth
             against
             this
             ,
             is
             ,
             First
             out
             of
             a
             
               Poet
               ,
            
             who
             in
             the
             person
             of
             
               Medea
            
             says
             ,
             
               
                 —
                 Video
                 meliora
                 ,
                 proboque
              
               
                 Deteriora
                 sequor
                 .
              
            
             but
             that
             saying
             (
             as
             prettie
             as
             it
             is
             )
             is
             not
             true
             :
             for
             though
             
               Medea
            
             saw
             many
             reasons
             to
             forbear
             killing
             her
             children
             ,
             yet
             the
             last
             dictate
             of
             her
             judgement
             was
             ,
             that
             the
             present
             revenge
             on
             her
             husband
             out-weighed
             them
             all
             ,
             and
             thereupon
             the
             wicked
             
             action
             
               necessarily
            
             followed
             .
             Then
             the
             story
             of
             the
             
               Roman
               ,
            
             who
             of
             two
             competitors
             ,
             said
             ,
             one
             had
             the
             better
             reason
             ,
             but
             the
             other
             must
             have
             the
             office
             .
             This
             also
             maketh
             against
             his
             Lordship
             ,
             for
             the
             last
             dictate
             of
             his
             judgement
             that
             had
             the
             bestowing
             of
             the
             office
             ,
             was
             this
             ,
             That
             it
             was
             better
             to
             take
             a
             great
             bribe
             ,
             than
             reward
             a
             great
             merit
             .
          
           
             Thirdly
             ,
             he
             objects
             that
             things
             nearer
             the
             sence
             move
             more
             powerfully
             than
             reason
             ;
             what
             followeth
             thence
             but
             this
             ,
             the
             sence
             of
             the
             present
             good
             is
             commonly
             more
             immediate
             to
             the
             action
             than
             the
             foresight
             of
             the
             evil
             consequence
             to
             come
             ?
             Fourthly
             ,
             whereas
             his
             Lordship
             saies
             that
             do
             what
             a
             man
             can
             ,
             he
             shall
             sorrow
             more
             for
             the
             death
             of
             his
             Son
             than
             for
             the
             sin
             of
             his
             soul
             ,
             makes
             nothing
             to
             the
             last
             dictate
             of
             the
             understanding
             ,
             but
             it
             argues
             plainly
             that
             sorrow
             for
             sin
             is
             not
             
               voluntary
               ,
            
             and
             by
             consequence
             ,
             
             that
             
               Repentance
            
             proceedeth
             from
             
               Causes
               .
            
          
           
             The
             last
             part
             of
             this
             discourse
             containeth
             his
             Lordships
             opinion
             about
             reconciling
             
               liberty
            
             with
             the
             
               prescience
            
             and
             
               decree
            
             of
             
               God
               ,
            
             otherwise
             than
             some
             
               Divines
            
             have
             done
             ,
             against
             whom
             ,
             he
             saies
             ,
             he
             had
             formerly
             written
             a
             Treatise
             ,
             out
             of
             which
             he
             repeateth
             onely
             two
             things
             .
             One
             is
             ,
             
               that
               we
               ought
               not
               to
               desert
               a
               certain
               truth
               ,
               for
               not
               being
               able
               to
               comprehend
               the
               certain
               manner
               of
               it
               .
            
             And
             I
             say
             the
             same
             ,
             as
             for
             example
             ,
             that
             his
             Lordship
             ought
             not
             to
             desert
             this
             certain
             truth
             ,
             
               That
               there
               are
               certain
               and
            
             necessary
             causes
             
               which
               make
               every
               man
               to
            
             will
             
               what
               he
               willeth
               ,
               though
               he
               do
               not
            
             yet
             conceive
             in
             what
             manner
             the
             
               will
            
             of
             man
             is
             
               caused
               .
            
             And
             yet
             I
             think
             the
             manner
             of
             it
             is
             not
             very
             hard
             to
             conceive
             ,
             seeing
             we
             see
             daily
             ,
             that
             
               praise
               ,
               dispraise
               ,
               reward
               and
               punishment
               ,
               good
            
             and
             
               evil
            
             sequels
             of
             mens
             
             
               actions
            
             retained
             in
             
               memory
               ,
            
             do
             frame
             and
             make
             us
             to
             the
             
               election
            
             of
             whatsoever
             it
             be
             that
             we
             elect
             ,
             and
             that
             the
             
               memory
            
             of
             such
             things
             proceeds
             from
             the
             
               sences
               ,
            
             and
             
               sence
            
             from
             the
             operation
             of
             the
             
               objects
            
             of
             sence
             (
             which
             are
             external
             to
             us
             and
             governed
             onely
             by
             God
             Almighty
             )
             and
             by
             consequence
             all
             
               actions
               ,
            
             even
             of
             
               free
            
             and
             
               voluntary
            
             Agents
             are
             
               necessary
               .
            
          
           
             The
             other
             thing
             that
             he
             repeateth
             is
             ,
             that
             the
             best
             way
             to
             reconcile
             
               contingence
            
             and
             
               liberty
            
             with
             
               Prescience
            
             and
             the
             
               decrees
            
             of
             
               God
               ,
            
             is
             to
             subject
             future
             
               contingencies
            
             to
             the
             
               Aspect
               of
               God
               .
            
             The
             same
             is
             also
             my
             opinion
             ,
             but
             cōtrary
             to
             what
             his
             Lordship
             all
             this
             while
             laboured
             to
             prove
             .
             For
             hitherto
             he
             held
             
               liberty
            
             and
             
               necessity
               ,
            
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             
               liberty
            
             and
             the
             
               decrees
            
             of
             
               God
            
             irreconcileable
             ,
             unless
             the
             
               Aspect
               of
               God
            
             (
             which
             word
             appeareth
             now
             the
             first
             time
             in
             this
             discourse
             )
             signifie
             somewhat
             else
             besides
             
               Gods
               
               will
            
             and
             
               decree
               ,
            
             which
             I
             cannot
             understand
             .
             But
             he
             adds
             that
             we
             must
             subject
             them
             ,
             according
             to
             that
             
               presentiality
            
             which
             they
             have
             in
             
               eternity
               ,
            
             which
             he
             saies
             cannot
             be
             done
             by
             them
             that
             conceive
             
               Eternity
            
             to
             be
             an
             
               everlasting
               succession
               ,
            
             but
             onely
             by
             them
             ,
             that
             conceive
             it
             as
             an
             
               Indivisible
               point
               .
            
             To
             which
             I
             answer
             ,
             that
             assoon
             as
             I
             can
             conceive
             
               Eternity
            
             to
             be
             an
             
               Indivisible
               point
               ,
            
             or
             any
             thing
             ,
             but
             an
             
               everlasting
               succession
               ,
            
             I
             will
             renounce
             all
             ,
             that
             I
             have
             written
             on
             this
             subject
             .
             I
             know
             S.
             
               Thomas
               Aquinas
            
             calls
             
               Eternity
               ,
               Nunc
               .
               stans
               .
               ,
            
             an
             ▪
             
               ever-abiding
               now
               ,
            
             which
             is
             easie
             enough
             to
             say
             ,
             but
             though
             I
             fain
             would
             ,
             yet
             I
             could
             never
             conceive
             it
             ,
             they
             that
             can
             ,
             are
             more
             happy
             than
             I.
             But
             in
             the
             mean
             time
             his
             Lordship
             alloweth
             all
             men
             to
             be
             of
             my
             opinion
             save
             onely
             those
             that
             can
             conceive
             in
             their
             minds
             a
             
               nunc
               stans
               ,
            
             which
             I
             think
             are
             none
             .
             I
             understand
             as
             little
             
             how
             it
             can
             be
             true
             his
             Lordship
             saies
             ,
             that
             
               God
            
             is
             not
             
               just
            
             but
             
               justice
            
             it self
             ,
             not
             
               wise
               ,
            
             but
             
               wisdom
            
             it self
             ,
             not
             
               Eternal
               ,
            
             but
             
               Eternity
            
             it self
             ,
             nor
             how
             he
             concludes
             thence
             that
             
               Eternity
            
             is
             a
             
               point
               indivisible
               ,
            
             and
             not
             a
             
               succession
               ,
            
             nor
             in
             what
             sence
             it
             can
             be
             said
             ,
             that
             an
             
               infinite
               point
               ,
            
             and
             wherein
             is
             no
             
               succession
               ,
            
             can
             comprehend
             all
             
               time
               ,
            
             though
             time
             be
             
               successive
               .
            
             These
             phrases
             I
             finde
             not
             in
             the
             
               Scripture
               ,
            
             I
             wonder
             therefore
             what
             was
             the
             design
             of
             the
             
               School-men
            
             to
             bring
             them
             up
             ,
             unless
             they
             thought
             a
             man
             could
             not
             be
             a
             true
             
               Christian
            
             unless
             his
             understanding
             be
             first
             strangled
             with
             such
             hard
             sayings
             .
             And
             thus
             much
             for
             answer
             to
             his
             Lordships
             discourse
             ,
             wherein
             I
             think
             not
             onely
             his
             
               Squadrons
            
             of
             
               Arguments
               ,
            
             but
             also
             his
             
               Reserve
            
             of
             
               Distinctions
            
             are
             defeated
             .
             And
             now
             your
             Lordship
             shall
             have
             my
             doctrine
             concerning
             the
             same
             question
             ,
             with
             my
             
               Reasons
            
             
             for
             it
             ,
             positively
             ,
             and
             as
             briefly
             as
             I
             can
             ,
             without
             any
             terms
             of
             
               Art
            
             in
             plain
             
               English
               .
            
          
        
         
           
             My
             Opinion
             about
             LIBERTIE
             and
             NECESSITIE
             .
          
           
             FIrst
             I
             conceive
             ,
             that
             when
             it
             cometh
             into
             a
             mans
             mind
             to
             do
             or
             not
             to
             do
             some
             certain
             action
             ,
             if
             he
             have
             no
             time
             to
             
               deliberate
               ,
            
             the
             doing
             it
             or
             abstaining
             
               necessarily
            
             follow
             the
             
               present
            
             thought
             he
             hath
             of
             the
             
               good
            
             or
             
               evil
            
             consequence
             thereof
             to
             himself
             .
             As
             for
             example
             ,
             In
             sudden
             
               anger
               ,
            
             the
             
               action
            
             shall
             follow
             the
             thought
             of
             
               revenge
               ,
            
             in
             sudden
             
               fear
            
             the
             thought
             of
             
               escape
               .
            
             Also
             
             when
             a
             man
             hath
             time
             to
             
               deliberate
               ,
            
             but
             deliberates
             not
             ,
             because
             never
             any
             thing
             appeared
             that
             could
             make
             him
             doubt
             of
             the
             consequence
             ,
             the
             
               action
            
             follows
             his
             opinion
             of
             the
             
               goodness
            
             or
             
               harm
            
             of
             it
             .
             These
             actions
             I
             call
             VOLUNTARY
             ,
             (
             my
             Lord
             )
             if
             I
             understand
             him
             aright
             that
             calls
             them
             SPONTANEOUS
             .
             I
             call
             them
             
               voluntarie
               ,
            
             because
             those
             
               actions
            
             that
             follow
             immediately
             the
             
               last
            
             appetite
             are
             
               voluntarie
               ,
            
             and
             here
             where
             is
             one
             onely
             appetite
             ,
             that
             one
             is
             the
             last
             .
             Besides
             ,
             I
             see
             't
             is
             reasonable
             to
             punish
             a
             
               rash
            
             Action
             ,
             which
             could
             not
             be
             justly
             done
             by
             man
             to
             man
             ,
             unless
             the
             same
             were
             
               voluntarie
               .
            
             For
             no
             
               action
            
             of
             a
             man
             can
             be
             said
             to
             
             be
             without
             
               deliberation
               ,
            
             though
             never
             so
             sudden
             ,
             because
             it
             is
             supposed
             he
             had
             time
             to
             
               deliberate
            
             all
             the
             precedent
             time
             of
             his
             life
             ,
             whether
             he
             should
             do
             that
             kind
             of
             action
             or
             not
             .
             And
             hence
             it
             is
             ,
             that
             he
             that
             killeth
             in
             a
             sudden
             passion
             of
             
               Anger
               ,
            
             shall
             nevertheless
             be
             justly
             put
             to
             
               death
               ,
            
             because
             all
             the
             time
             ,
             wherein
             he
             was
             able
             to
             consider
             whether
             to
             kill
             were
             good
             or
             evil
             ,
             shall
             be
             held
             for
             one
             continual
             
               deliberation
               ,
            
             and
             consequently
             the
             killing
             shall
             be
             judged
             to
             proceed
             frōelection
             .
             
          
           
             Secondly
             ,
             I
             conceive
             when
             a
             man
             
               deliberates
               ,
            
             whether
             he
             shall
             do
             a
             thing
             or
             not
             do
             it
             ,
             that
             he
             does
             nothing
             else
             but
             consider
             whether
             it
             be
             better
             for
             himself
             to
             do
             it
             or
             not
             to
             
             do
             it
             .
             And
             to
             
               consider
            
             an
             action
             ,
             is
             to
             imagine
             the
             
               consequences
            
             of
             it
             both
             
               good
            
             and
             
               evil
               .
            
             From
             whence
             is
             to
             be
             inferred
             ,
             that
             
               Deliberation
            
             is
             nothing
             else
             but
             
               alternate
            
             imagination
             of
             the
             
               good
            
             and
             
               evil
            
             sequels
             of
             an
             
               action
               ,
            
             or
             (
             which
             is
             the
             same
             thing
             )
             alternate
             
               hope
            
             and
             
               fear
               ,
            
             or
             alternate
             
               appetite
            
             to
             do
             or
             quit
             the
             action
             of
             which
             he
             
               deliberateth
               .
            
          
           
             Thirdly
             ,
             I
             conceive
             that
             in
             all
             
               deliberations
               ,
            
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             in
             at
             alternate
             
               succession
            
             of
             contrary
             
               appetites
               ,
            
             the
             last
             is
             that
             which
             we
             call
             the
             WILL
             ,
             &
             is
             immediately
             next
             before
             the
             doing
             of
             the
             action
             ,
             or
             next
             before
             the
             doing
             of
             it
             become
             impossible
             .
             All
             other
             
               Appetites
            
             to
             do
             ,
             and
             to
             quit
             ,
             
             that
             come
             upon
             a
             man
             during
             his
             deliberations
             ,
             are
             called
             
               Intentions
               ,
            
             &
             
               Inclinations
               ,
            
             but
             not
             
               Wills
               ,
            
             there
             being
             but
             
               one
            
             will
             ,
             which
             also
             in
             this
             case
             may
             be
             called
             the
             
               last
            
             will
             ,
             though
             the
             
               Intentions
            
             change
             often
             .
          
           
             Fourthly
             ,
             I
             conceive
             that
             those
             
               actions
               ,
            
             which
             a
             man
             is
             said
             to
             do
             upon
             
               deliberation
               ,
            
             are
             said
             to
             be
             
               voluntarie
               ,
            
             and
             done
             upon
             
               choice
            
             and
             
               election
               ,
            
             so
             that
             
               voluntarie
            
             action
             ,
             and
             action
             proceeding
             from
             
               election
            
             is
             the
             same
             thing
             ,
             and
             that
             of
             a
             
               voluntarie
               Agent
               ,
            
             it
             is
             all
             one
             to
             say
             ,
             he
             is
             
               free
               ,
            
             and
             to
             say
             ,
             he
             hath
             not
             made
             an
             end
             of
             
               deliberating
               .
            
          
           
             Fifthly
             ,
             I
             conceive
             
               Libertie
            
             to
             be
             rightly
             defined
             in
             this
             manner
             ;
             
               Libertie
               is
               the
               absence
               
               of
               all
               the
               impediments
               to
               Action
               that
               are
               not
               contained
               in
               the
               nature
               and
               intrinsecal
               qualitie
               of
               the
               Agent
               .
            
             As
             for
             example
             ,
             the
             water
             is
             said
             to
             descend
             
               freely
               ,
            
             or
             to
             have
             
               libertie
            
             to
             descend
             by
             the
             channel
             of
             the
             river
             ,
             because
             there
             is
             no
             impediment
             that
             way
             ,
             but
             not
             across
             ,
             because
             the
             banks
             are
             impediments
             .
             And
             though
             the
             water
             cannot
             ascend
             ,
             yet
             men
             never
             say
             it
             wants
             the
             
               libertie
            
             to
             ascend
             ,
             but
             the
             
               faculty
            
             or
             power
             ,
             because
             the
             impediment
             is
             in
             the
             nature
             of
             the
             water
             ,
             and
             intrinsecal
             .
             So
             also
             we
             say
             ,
             he
             that
             is
             tied
             wants
             the
             
               libertie
            
             to
             go
             ,
             because
             the
             impediment
             is
             not
             in
             him
             ,
             but
             in
             his
             bands
             ,
             whereas
             we
             say
             not
             so
             of
             him
             that
             is
             sick
             or
             
             lame
             ,
             because
             the
             impediment
             is
             in
             himself
             .
          
           
             Sixthly
             ,
             I
             conceive
             that
             nothing
             taketh
             beginning
             from
             
               it self
               ,
            
             but
             from
             the
             
               Action
            
             of
             some
             other
             immediate
             
               Agent
            
             without
             it self
             .
             And
             that
             therefore
             ,
             when
             first
             a
             man
             hath
             an
             
               appetite
            
             or
             
               will
            
             to
             something
             ,
             to
             which
             immediately
             before
             he
             had
             no
             appetite
             nor
             will
             ,
             the
             
               cause
            
             of
             his
             
               will
               ,
            
             is
             not
             the
             
               will
            
             it self
             ,
             but
             
               something
            
             else
             not
             in
             his
             own
             disposing
             .
             So
             that
             whereas
             it
             is
             out
             of
             controversie
             ,
             that
             of
             
               voluntarie
            
             actions
             the
             
               will
            
             is
             the
             
               necessarie
            
             cause
             ,
             and
             by
             this
             which
             is
             said
             ,
             the
             
               will
            
             is
             also
             
               caused
            
             by
             other
             things
             whereof
             it
             disposeth
             not
             ,
             it
             followeth
             ,
             that
             
               voluntarie
            
             actions
             have
             all
             of
             them
             
             
               necessarie
            
             causes
             ,
             and
             therefore
             are
             
               necessitated
               .
            
          
           
             Seventhly
             ,
             I
             hold
             that
             to
             be
             a
             
               sufficient
               cause
               ,
            
             to
             which
             nothing
             is
             wanting
             that
             is
             needfull
             to
             the
             producing
             of
             the
             
               effect
               .
            
             The
             same
             also
             is
             a
             
               necessarie
            
             cause
             .
             For
             if
             it
             be
             possible
             that
             a
             
               sufficient
            
             cause
             shall
             not
             bring
             forth
             the
             
               effect
               ,
            
             then
             there
             wanteth
             somewhat
             which
             was
             needfull
             to
             the
             producing
             of
             it
             ,
             and
             so
             the
             
               cause
            
             was
             not
             
               sufficient
               ,
            
             but
             if
             it
             be
             impossible
             that
             a
             
               sufficient
            
             cause
             should
             not
             produce
             the
             
               effect
               ,
            
             then
             is
             a
             
               sufficient
            
             cause
             a
             
               necessary
            
             cause
             (
             for
             that
             is
             said
             to
             produce
             an
             effect
             
               necessarily
            
             that
             cannot
             but
             produce
             it
             .
             )
             Hence
             it
             is
             manifest
             ,
             that
             whatsoever
             is
             produced
             is
             produced
             
               necessarily
               ,
            
             
             for
             whatsoever
             is
             produced
             hath
             had
             a
             
               sufficient
            
             cause
             to
             produce
             it
             ,
             or
             else
             it
             had
             not
             been
             ,
             and
             therefore
             also
             
               voluntarie
            
             actions
             are
             
               necessitated
            
          
           
             Lastly
             ,
             should
             that
             Ordinary
             
               Definition
            
             of
             a
             
               free
               Agent
               ,
            
             namely
             ,
             
               That
               a
            
             free
             Agent
             
               is
               that
               ,
               which
               ,
               when
               all
               things
               are
               present
               which
               are
               needfull
               to
               produce
               the
            
             effect
             ,
             
               can
               nevertheless
               not
               produce
               it
               ,
            
             implies
             a
             contradiction
             ,
             and
             is
             non-sence
             ,
             being
             as
             much
             as
             to
             say
             ,
             The
             cause
             may
             be
             
               sufficient
               ,
            
             that
             is
             to
             say
             ,
             
               necessarie
               ,
            
             and
             yet
             the
             
               effect
            
             shall
             not
             follow
             .
          
        
         
         
           
             My
             Reasons
             .
          
           
             FOr
             the
             first
             five
             points
             ,
             wherein
             it
             is
             explicated
             1.
             what
             
               Spontanity
            
             is
             .
             2.
             what
             
               Deliberation
            
             is
             .
             3.
             what
             
               Will
               ,
               propension
            
             and
             
               appetite
            
             is
             .
             4.
             what
             a
             
               free
               Agent
            
             is
             .
             5.
             what
             
               Liberty
            
             is
             ,
             there
             can
             no
             other
             proof
             be
             offered
             but
             every
             mans
             own
             experience
             ,
             by
             reflection
             on
             himself
             ,
             and
             remembring
             what
             he
             useth
             in
             his
             minde
             ,
             that
             is
             ,
             what
             he
             himself
             meaneth
             when
             he
             saith
             an
             action
             is
             
               Spontaneous
               ,
            
             a
             man
             
               deliberates
            
             ;
             such
             is
             his
             
               will
               ,
            
             that
             
               Agent
            
             or
             that
             
               action
            
             is
             
               free
               ,
            
             Now
             he
             that
             ,
             reflecteth
             so
             on
             himself
             ,
             cannot
             but
             be
             satisfied
             ,
             that
             
               Deliberation
               ,
            
             is
             the
             
               consideration
               of
               the
               good
               and
               evil
               sequels
               of
               an
               action
               to
               come
            
             ;
             that
             by
             
               Spontanity
            
             is
             meant
             
               inconsiderate
               action
            
             (
             or
             else
             nothing
             is
             meant
             by
             it
             )
             that
             
               will
            
             is
             the
             
               last
               act
               of
               our
               Deliberation
               ,
            
             that
             a
             
               free
               Agent
            
             is
             he
             
               that
               can
               do
               if
               he
               will
               ,
            
             and
             
               forbear
               if
               
               he
               will
               ,
            
             and
             that
             
               Liberty
            
             is
             ,
             
               the
               absence
               of
               external
               impediments
               .
            
             But
             ,
             to
             those
             that
             out
             of
             custom
             speak
             not
             what
             they
             conceive
             ,
             but
             what
             they
             hear
             ,
             and
             are
             not
             able
             ,
             or
             will
             not
             take
             the
             pains
             to
             consider
             what
             they
             think
             when
             they
             hear
             such
             words
             ,
             no
             Argument
             can
             be
             sufficient
             ,
             because
             
               experience
            
             and
             
               matter
               of
               fact
            
             is
             not
             verified
             by
             other
             mens
             Arguments
             ,
             but
             by
             every
             mans
             own
             
               sence
            
             and
             
               memory
               .
            
             For
             example
             ,
             how
             can
             it
             be
             proved
             that
             to
             
               love
            
             a
             thing
             and
             to
             think
             it
             
               good
            
             is
             all
             one
             ,
             to
             a
             man
             that
             doth
             not
             mark
             his
             own
             meaning
             by
             those
             word
             ?
             Or
             how
             can
             it
             be
             proved
             that
             
               Eternity
            
             is
             not
             
               nunc
               stans
            
             to
             a
             man
             that
             saies
             those
             words
             by
             custom
             ,
             and
             never
             consider
             how
             he
             can
             conceive
             the
             thing
             in
             his
             minde
             ?
          
           
             Also
             the
             sixth
             point
             ,
             that
             a
             man
             cannot
             imagine
             any
             thing
             to
             begin
             
               without
               a
               cause
               ,
            
             can
             no
             other
             way
             be
             made
             known
             ,
             but
             by
             trying
             how
             
             he
             can
             imagine
             it
             ,
             but
             if
             he
             try
             ,
             he
             shall
             finde
             as
             much
             reason
             (
             if
             there
             be
             no
             cause
             of
             the
             thing
             )
             to
             conceive
             it
             should
             begin
             at
             one
             time
             as
             another
             ,
             that
             ,
             he
             hath
             equal
             reason
             to
             think
             it
             should
             begin
             at
             all
             times
             which
             is
             impossible
             ,
             and
             therefore
             he
             must
             think
             there
             was
             some
             special
             cause
             why
             it
             began
             then
             ,
             rather
             than
             sooner
             or
             later
             ;
             or
             else
             that
             it
             began
             never
             ,
             but
             was
             
               eternal
               .
            
          
           
             For
             the
             seventh
             point
             ,
             which
             is
             that
             all
             
               events
            
             have
             
               necessary
            
             causes
             ,
             it
             is
             there
             proved
             in
             that
             they
             have
             
               sufficient
            
             causes
             .
             Further
             let
             us
             in
             this
             place
             also
             suppose
             any
             event
             never
             so
             casual
             ,
             as
             the
             throwing
             (
             for
             example
             .
             )
             
               Ames
               Ace
            
             upon
             a
             pair
             of
             dice
             ,
             and
             see
             ,
             if
             it
             must
             not
             have
             been
             
               necessary
            
             before
             't
             was
             thrown
             .
             For
             seeing
             it
             was
             thrown
             it
             had
             a
             
               beginning
               ,
            
             and
             consequently
             a
             
               sufficient
            
             cause
             to
             produce
             it
             ,
             consisting
             partly
             in
             the
             
               dice
               ,
            
             partly
             in
             outward
             things
             ,
             as
             the
             posture
             of
             the
             
             parts
             of
             the
             
               hand
               ,
            
             the
             measure
             of
             
               force
            
             applied
             by
             the
             caster
             ,
             the
             posture
             of
             the
             parts
             of
             the
             
               Table
               ,
            
             and
             the
             like
             .
             In
             sum
             there
             was
             nothing
             wanting
             which
             was
             necessarily
             requisite
             to
             the
             producing
             of
             that
             particular
             cast
             ,
             and
             consequently
             the
             cast
             was
             necessarily
             thrown
             ,
             for
             if
             it
             had
             not
             been
             thrown
             ,
             there
             had
             wanted
             somwhat
             requisite
             to
             the
             throwing
             of
             it
             ,
             and
             so
             the
             cause
             had
             not
             been
             
               sufficient
               .
            
             In
             the
             like
             manner
             it
             may
             be
             proved
             that
             every
             other
             ac●ident
             how
             
               contingent
            
             soever
             it
             seem
             ,
             or
             how
             
               voluntary
            
             soever
             it
             be
             ,
             is
             produced
             
               necessarily
               ,
            
             which
             is
             that
             that
             my
             L.
             Bishop
             disputes
             against
             .
             The
             same
             may
             be
             proved
             also
             in
             this
             manner
             .
             Let
             the
             case
             be
             put
             ,
             for
             example
             ,
             of
             the
             weather
             .
             
               'T
               is
               necessary
               that
               to
               morrow
               it
               shall
               rain
               or
               not
               rain
               .
            
             If
             therefore
             it
             be
             not
             
               necessary
            
             it
             shall
             rain
             ,
             it
             is
             
               necessary
            
             it
             shall
             not
             rain
             ,
             otherwise
             there
             is
             no
             necessity
             that
             the
             proposition
             ,
             
               It
               shall
               rain
               or
               not
               rain
               ,
            
             
             should
             be
             true
             .
             I
             know
             there
             be
             some
             that
             say
             ,
             it
             may
             necessarily
             be
             true
             that
             one
             of
             the
             two
             shall
             come
             to
             pass
             ▪
             but
             not
             ,
             singly
             that
             it
             shall
             rain
             ,
             or
             that
             it
             shall
             not
             rain
             ,
             which
             is
             as
             much
             as
             to
             say
             ,
             
               one
            
             of
             them
             is
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             yet
             
               neither
            
             of
             them
             is
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             and
             therefore
             to
             seem
             to
             avoid
             that
             absurdity
             ,
             they
             make
             a
             distinction
             ,
             that
             neither
             of
             them
             is
             true
             
               determinate
               ,
            
             but
             
               indeterminate
               ,
            
             which
             distinction
             either
             signifies
             no
             more
             but
             this
             ,
             One
             of
             them
             is
             true
             but
             we
             know
             not
             which
             ,
             and
             so
             the
             necessity
             remains
             ,
             though
             we
             know
             it
             not
             ,
             or
             if
             the
             meaning
             of
             the
             distinction
             be
             not
             that
             ,
             it
             hath
             no
             meaning
             ,
             and
             they
             might
             as
             well
             have
             said
             ,
             One
             of
             them
             is
             true
             
               Titirice
            
             but
             neither
             of
             them
             ,
             
               Tu
               patulice
               .
            
          
           
             The
             last
             thing
             in
             which
             also
             consisteth
             the
             whole
             controversie
             ,
             namely
             that
             there
             is
             no
             such
             thing
             as
             an
             Agent
             ,
             
               which
               when
               all
               things
               requisite
               to
               action
               are
               present
               ,
               can
               nevertheless
               
               forbear
               to
               produce
               it
               ,
               or
            
             (
             which
             is
             all
             one
             )
             that
             there
             is
             no
             such
             thing
             as
             
               freedom
               from
               necessity
               ,
            
             is
             easily
             inferred
             from
             that
             which
             hath
             been
             before
             alledged
             .
             For
             if
             it
             be
             an
             
               Agent
            
             it
             can
             
               work
               ,
            
             and
             if
             it
             
               work
               ,
            
             there
             is
             nothing
             wanting
             of
             what
             is
             requisite
             to
             produce
             the
             
               action
               ,
            
             and
             consequently
             the
             cause
             of
             the
             action
             is
             
               sufficient
               ,
            
             &
             if
             
               sufficient
               ,
            
             then
             also
             
               necessary
               ,
            
             as
             hath
             been
             proved
             before
             .
          
           
             And
             thus
             you
             see
             how
             the
             
               inconveniences
               ,
            
             which
             his
             Lordship
             objecteth
             must
             follow
             upon
             the
             holding
             of
             
               necessity
               ,
            
             are
             avoided
             ,
             and
             the
             
               necessity
            
             it self
             
               demonstratively
            
             proved
             .
             To
             which
             I
             could
             add
             ,
             if
             I
             thought
             it
             good
             
               Logick
               ,
            
             the
             
               inconvenience
            
             of
             denying
             
               necessity
               ,
            
             as
             that
             it
             destroyeth
             both
             the
             
               decrees
            
             and
             the
             
               prescience
            
             of
             
               God
               Almighty
            
             ;
             for
             whatsoever
             
               God
            
             hath
             
               purposed
            
             to
             bring
             to
             pass
             by
             
               man
               ,
            
             as
             an
             instrument
             ,
             or
             foreseeth
             shall
             come
             to
             pass
             ,
             a
             man
             ,
             
             if
             he
             have
             
               Liberty
            
             (
             such
             as
             his
             Lordship
             affirmeth
             )
             from
             
               necessitation
               ,
            
             might
             frustrate
             and
             make
             not
             to
             come
             to
             pass
             ,
             and
             
               God
            
             should
             either
             not
             
               foreknow
            
             it
             ,
             and
             not
             
               decree
            
             it
             ,
             or
             he
             should
             
               foreknow
            
             such
             things
             shall
             be
             ,
             as
             shall
             never
             be
             ,
             and
             
               decree
            
             that
             which
             shall
             never
             
               come
               to
               pass
               .
            
          
           
             This
             is
             all
             hath
             come
             into
             my
             minde
             touching
             this
             question
             since
             I
             last
             considered
             it
             .
             And
             I
             humbly
             beseech
             your
             Lordship
             to
             communicate
             it
             onely
             to
             my
             Lord
             Bishop
             .
             And
             so
             praying
             God
             to
             prosper
             your
             Lordship
             in
             all
             your
             designes
             ,
             I
             take
             leave
             and
             am
             ,
          
           
             My
             most
             Noble
             and
             most
             obliged
             Lord
          
           
             
               Your
               most
               humble
               servant
               
                 Thomas
                 Hobbs
                 .
              
            
             
               Roven
               
                 
                   Aug.
                
                 20.
                 
                 〈◊〉
                 .
              
            
          
        
         
           FINIS
           .