Reflections upon Monsieur Des Cartes's Discourse of a method for the well-guiding of reason, and discovery of truth in the sciences. Written by a private pen in French, and translated out of the original manuscript, by J.D. This text is an enriched version of the TCP digital transcription A92327 of text R208515 in the English Short Title Catalog (Thomason E1491_3). Textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. The text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with MorphAdorner. The annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). Textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. This text has not been fully proofread Approx. 108 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 55 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. EarlyPrint Project Evanston,IL, Notre Dame, IN, St. Louis, MO 2017 A92327 Wing R720 Thomason E1491_3 ESTC R208515 99867461 99867461 119773 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A92327) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 119773) Images scanned from microfilm: (Thomason Tracts ; 191:E1491[3]) Reflections upon Monsieur Des Cartes's Discourse of a method for the well-guiding of reason, and discovery of truth in the sciences. Written by a private pen in French, and translated out of the original manuscript, by J.D. Davies, John, 1625-1693. [14], 93, [1] p. Printed by Tho. Newcomb., London, : 1655. The epistle dedicatory signed: Jo. Davies. Annotation on Thomason copy: "1654. Febr. 2."; the second 5 in the imprint date has been crossed out and replaced with a "4". Reproduction of the original in the British Library. eng Descartes, René, 1596-1650. -- Discours de la m'ethode -- Early works to 1800. A92327 R208515 (Thomason E1491_3). civilwar no Reflections upon Monsieur Des Cartes's Discourse of a method for the well-guiding of reason, and discovery of truth in the sciences.: Writt Davies, John 1655 19235 25 55 0 0 0 0 42 D The rate of 42 defects per 10,000 words puts this text in the D category of texts with between 35 and 100 defects per 10,000 words. 2007-05 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2007-05 Apex CoVantage Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2007-06 Robyn Anspach Sampled and proofread 2007-06 Robyn Anspach Text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-02 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion REFLECTIONS UPON Monsieur Des Cartes's DISCOURSE OF A METHOD for the well-guiding of Reason , and Discovery of Truth in the Sciences . Written by a private Pen in French , and translated out of the original Manuscript , By J. D. LONDON ▪ Printed by Tho. Newcomb . 16●…4 TO THE Right Honorable , BULSTRODE WHITLOCK , One of the Lords Commissioners for the Great Seal of England , &c. MY LORD , HAd I been so fortunate as to have brought your Lordship somwhat equal unto you , that is to say , great , excellent , and worthy the eyes of all Europe , I should not have need to begin this address with a prayer for pardon ; which now I must needs do , since , my Lord , I only beseech you to be a tutelar Angel to a poor Orphan , whose Parents are unknown , and which is like to perish , if not shelter'd by your Lordships shadow . Those who have had the honour to converse with your Lordship , very well know how much , among your other vertues , your Candor and humanity are conspicuous , and what Goodness and Tenderness resides in that high and noble Soul of yours , which makes you so universal a Patron to all liberal Studies , and a Fosterer of every thing vertuous , animating and quickening the inferior Bodies with that great Light which continually dwels in your own Sun . And , my Lord , more particularly , since I fear you have that admirable defect of forgetting the favors you confer , give me leave to put your Lordship in mind of what you have done to me , both in doing me the honour to think I might be somewhat serviceable to you , as also in encouraging my poor studies ; which having received warmth and life from your protection , bring this poor offering as the first fruits , which I beseech your Lordship to accept with the same easiness as that great Prince did the hand-full of water , since it is the heart that proportions and estimates every gift . In the mean while , my Lord , I shall not cease , by my prayers and actions , to make appeare that high reverence that I carry towards you ; and though I be the meanest among your innumerable Adorers , yet is there none more cordial , more fervent , more sincere , then My Lord , Your most humble , most devoted , and most obedient Servant , JO . DAVIES . THE PUBLISHER TO THE Impartial READER . IF a man should look on all Books , since there were any , he shall finde that few Authors have been so fortunate in their Writings , but they have left somewhat for those that should come after them to except against ; and so consequently few have been transmitted to Posterity , without the castigations and censorious remarks of other men ; and these not proceeding from envious emulation , but from sober and serious enquiry after Truth . But if any have been thought so transcendent , as to have been able to escape these , yet whether Posterity have not been abus'd by a servility of imitation of them , or precipitate superstruction on them , is much to be question'd . However it be , all these kinde of Labors have ever been encourag'd and rewarded as such , as have both as to Religion and Policy not meanly oblig'd Mankinde : Nor indeed can we look on those that decry such endeavors , but as such as seek Fig-leaves to cover some secret Errors , or are too fondly enamor'd of their own opinions . Truth , as it is a Mettal that cannot be counterfeited , so doth it not decline , but endure the severest test , and reckons its triumphs by its tryals , which do not consume , but refine it . Nature certainly is not grown old to feebleness and sterility ; or if it produce now as great ingenuities as it hath formerly , can it possibly be , that she will not finde employment for them ? otherwise a Traditional acquiescence were as commendable as all the Disquisitional recherches after Truth . What excellent discoveries are there daily found out , even in things wherin our ordinary subsistence is concern'd , which yet we are not content onely to embrace , but endeavor to improve and advance ? And why may not the same thing happen also in Philosophy , which is of that extent , that she is not limited but by the universe ? It is indeed our weakness and our unhappiness together , to attribute to some men that Authority over our Reason , which our Passions are not able to recal ; nor are we easily reduced to hearken to others , who shall tell us truer things , though different from what we knew before . But how little do we herein consider how often Error and Humanity may lodge in the same Inn ; whereas Infallibility is a thing , that , in this World , hath not what the Foxes , nor the Fowls of the Air have , neither hole nor nest . It is a Negative Attribute of the Divine Majesty , one of the Regalia of Omnipotency , which it is Treason in any thing that is Humane to assume . Religion it self , which of all things hath the greatest participation of , and correspondence with the Divine Being , is hardly allow'd infallible , when we look on it with relation to the Humane dispensation thereof . Heresies , Schisms , Errors , &c. are not certainly the Motes that render that great Beauty the fairer ; but the Black Patches , the Imperfections , and the acknowledgment of our Humanity , and the then consequent presumption of our Error . Now if this happen in that affair , wherein our precious and immortal Souls are embark'd ; what may we expect in things which have onely an alliance and conjunction with our external happiness ? But as it happens in Religion , that the most eminent Hereticks have been men of excellent Learning and Endowments ; so it must be supposed , that those onely can be Hereticks in Philosophy , who are indeed great Philosophers , and such as imagined in themselves , that they had something to acquaint the World that should astonish it more then any thing it knew before . But he that undertakes such a thing , ought to conclude with himself , that he intends to quarrel with the common opinion , and therefore ought to presuppose whatsoever may make good the ground of the received Tenets , which must be taken away to facilitate the charge of a new , and , before , unheard of Assertion . It is no easie matter for one man to foresee what a many may be able to object ; and yet this was the case of the great Author of the DISCOURSE concerning the conduct of our Reason , &c. the truly great DES CARTES , the prodigy of his Age , and whose departure hence so soon is yet the regret of the Philosophical World . But being withal but a Man , it were an injury to the Divinity to think him inerrable ; we may well place him among the Heroes , but not among the Gods . Nor ought any man to think it a thing any ways injurious to him , to reflect on what he hath done , since it is a thing he is so far from declining , that it is his invitation , as who thought that Learning gained no small advantages by communication and correspondence , and hath obliged the world with his Labors , with this Caution , that others by their experiments might advance his discoveries . Some there have been , who have wrestled the World out of some tenet of Publick Faith , who yet in some other things , have that weakness which is the most adequate attribute of mankinde ; and that it hath far'd thus with our great Author , may partly appear by these REFLECTIONS on his DISCOURSE . I am in some doubt , whether he might have seen them before he died , much more , before the publishing of his Discourse , ( it being his custom to communicate all things to be strictly examined by his Friends and Correspondents , before he committed them to the Press ) for however he might haply think them slight , yet certainly we should somewhere have met with his resentment . As for the Author of these Reflections , I cannot do him so much honor as tell the World his name , for I never knew it , having met with them accidentally in a Manuscript . If I have done him right ( as I believe ) in the Translation I have perform'd what I undertook . If any man will reflect upon these Reflections , he is at liberty , and will shew himself a Philosopher , by engaging Ingenuities into those Olympick exercises , where the prize is TRUTH . J. D. ERRATA . PAg. 19. l. 3. r. Ancients , p. 28. l. 2. r. of those , p. 38. l. 19. r. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} , p. 45. l. 1. r. which it , p. 46. l. 23. r. internal , p. 53. l. 15. r. depend , p. 59. l. ult. r. conceive , p. 74. l. 20. r. t. REFLECTIONS UPON Monsieur DES CARTES'S Discourse of a Method for the well-guiding of Reason , and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences , &c. WHenever I have to deal with any work of Monsieur Des Cartes , I rowse my self up to all the attention and vigilance possible : And this I do , not only out of the justice which obliges a man to use the nicest scrutiny and ponderation of Reason , where nothing can be obtained but by the irrefragable conviction thereof ; but also , to examine how deservedly this man is plac'd in that extraordinary esteem wherein we find him in the world , even amongst the greatest men ; which is as much as to say , whether Fame be not in great part out of his debt . As for his Dioptriques and his Geometry , I can pass no other censure upon them , then what Socrates pass'd on a Book of Heraclitus in these words ; {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} . But for his doctrine of the Nature of Light , which he inserts in his D●optriques , and the Hypotheses he hath at the beginning of his Meteors , he must pardon me , if in stead of calling them {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} . I name them {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} . And seeing he prostitutes them in their nakedness , without the least shadow of proof , he is unjust according to his own rule : For how can he expect I should receive them as true , when he hath tyed me to this general rule , viz. Never to admit any thing into perswasion , but by the sufficient evidence of Reason ? And though he have made a handsom superstructure of doctrine upon them , ( as may , and ought to be acknowledged ) yet have they no dependance on those principles , nor is any thing that is said advanc'd out of any design to prove them . But I shall not at the present give you my particular opinion of them , but shall content my self to send you certain REFLECTIONS on the same Authors DISCOURSE of a Method , as he calls it , for the well-guiding and conduct of our Reason , in the discovery of truth in the Sciences . The Piece , resembling the great Author that brought it forth , must be noble and excellent ; and if there be any thing deficient , it is the more excusable , in regard he protesteth that he hath only advanced it as a proposition , which he exposes to the battery of other mens judgments . And therefore whatever I shall say of it , shall carry that reverence as shall witness I have done no violence to that deserved respect which the world beares him , and shall calmly give my judgment of it , which is that he himself desires all men should do , who any ways conceive themselves able to be contributors to the Commonwealth of Learning . To the first Part. THe first Part of his Discourse may be reduced to these heads . That that which ( according to the French word ) is called bon sens , that is to say , Reason , or sound judgment , or ( as the English Translation of the said Discourse hath it ) Right understanding is naturally equally distributed among all men , so that one man ought ▪ not to be called more rational or more understanding then another ; yet with this restriction , That all had not the same conduct of their reason ; and that therefore it were necessary there were a certain Method contrived for the regulation and conduct thereof . That he had form'd to himself an Idaea of such a Method , as if there be any thing solidly good and of importance , it must be that ; and by the assistance thereof his progress in the Sciences hath been mightily advanced ; That he hath been so liberal as to communicate this Method unto us , that we might judg of it . That having studied in the most famous Universities in Europe , and arrived to as great reputation of Learning as any of his Contemporaries whatsoever ; when yet he came seriously to cast up his accounts , he found the summa totalis to amount to this , that all the advantage he had made , was , That he had only more and more discover d his own ignorance ; That he had not found any thing in Philosophie ( though cultivated by the most excellent wits that have lived these many ages ) which was certain and indisputable , nothing but doubt , ambiguity and sophistry : And , That in regard there were so many different opinions about the same thing , he thought himself sufficiently disobliged from any further prosecution of his studies , and consequently resolved to seek no other knowledge but what he should find in himself and the great volume of the world . It hath been ever generally observed , that those men who either out of restlesness of humor , or contempt of what is past , have been most busie and agitating in the introduction of any new doctrines or opinions , have ever observed this rule , to make their advances very gradual at the first , and to temper their propositions with so much plausibility , as a doctrine which comes to quarrel with the common Tenent can bear , so for a while to support the spirits of those they have to deal with . But Monsieur des Cartes , to my great astonishment , begins his Discourse with a Paradox ▪ which not only causes the Reader to make a halt at the first step , but is withall so slenderly proved , that I wonder it could proceed from one who admits nothing for current but what hath undergone the grand test of Reason , and desies all perswasion which is not induc'd by irrefragability and demonstration . But that we shall here first examine , shall be these two Questions , which are easily started out of the foregoing words . 1. Whether Reason , sound judgment , or right understanding be equally distributed ? 2. Whether there be not some presumption in that assertion of his ; That there is nothing in Philosophy which is not doubtful ? Since we must confess that all things that God hath made are good , we cannot without a quarrel with his providence doubt , but that Reason or right understanding , or as the Author cals it elswhere , The faculty of right judging and distinguishing truth from falshood , is excellently well divided and distributed among men . This is one reason produc'd by the Author for the proof of the first question ; but how strongly , we shall see anon : At present it shall suffice to say , that it doth not hence follow , that right understanding is equally distributed . The omnipotence of God may be as much or more acknowledg'd and admired in the great inequality which there is of right understanding among men , as if it were equally weigh'd to everyone . And therefore this proposition lies open to the battery of 1. The common opinion of all men . 2. Experience . 3. The Author himself . First , That it crosses the common opinion , we need but consider what we say of those men whom we desire to commend or prefer before others : we say they are rational , knowing , understanding men ; or they are such as can judg or distinguish so rightly of things , that they will not be easily surprised by misrepresentations . Now , if the right understanding were equal in all , this manner of speaking were impertinent and ridiculous , and would signifie as much , as if being to commend a Beauty , we should say that she had two eyes , and that her nose were in the midst of her face . 2. That it stands not the charge of Experience , we are only to look on our selves as men . Some have such and such endowments and excellencies , others have others : Some are of a quick and nimble ratiocination ; others are so dull and flegmatick , that they seem not to reason at all ; and these are they which Aristotle in his Politicks calls {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} , as if nature for want of ratiocination had designed them for slaves and subjects to others . There are others ▪ that are more discoursive and understanding by the simple liberality of Nature , then some others , who with all the assistance and advantages of Books , Study , Precepts , &c. can hardly arrive to mediocrity . 3. The Author in this very point is as unfortunate as other men that maintain Paradoxes ; that is , when they have rack'd their wits and inventions to make good a Paradox , they in treating of some other question insensibly contradict their former Hypothesis . For in another place of this discourse he sayes , * That Philosophy us the means to speak of all things with probability , and makes herself to be admired by the least knowing men . Here while he is wrapt into the exaltations of those reasonings which a man of right understanding may naturally arrive to , he presupposes that all have not that right understanding . Besides he also allowes that mens knowledge or right understanding may admit of comparison ( which utterly destroyes equality ) and according as it is more or less in men , accordingly do they more or less admire Philosophy . In another ( pag. 11. ) he says , That those who have the strongest reasoning faculties , and who bestdigest their thoughts to render them more cleer & intelligible , are more fit to perswade then great Masters of Rhetorick . Here he admits & applauds the strength of reasoning faculties , which he certainly would not , did he not suppose there were some weaker reasoning faculties ; and this I think makes against the equality of Right understanding . Nor doth he only commend the subtle ratiocinations which a man of right understanding , or a right judging man may have , but elswhere , viz. pag. 25. he confesses that some have reason and modesty enough to judge that they are less able to distinguish truth from falshood then others , and that they ought much rather to follow others mens opinions then seek after better themselves . In another place he says , Some men are stupid , dull and insensible . If this does not evince a graduality of understanding in men , I know not what does ; or else we must say that stupid and dull men are very good understanding , and very right judging men . Now to prove this equal distribution of right understanding , the Author of the Discourse , besides what is above alleadged , insists on two other reasons . The first immediately follows his proposition in these words : For that every one believes himself so well stored with it , that even those who in all other things seem the hardest to be pleas'd , seldom desire more of it then they have . This reason to me seems to want many grains to make it weight ; for a distribution may be very good and well done , though all are not content with their shares . But that which he subjoins , I much more wonder at , where he says , that 't is not likely all men should be deceiv'd in this ; but that this is the very thing that witnesses that the faculty of right judging and distinguishing truth from falshood ( which is properly called reason or understanding ) is naturally equal in all men . But to answer this , I deny that all men are so well contented with their portions of right understanding ; nay it may be affirm'd that they would willingly have more if they could ; nor want there those , were the division to be made again , who would be glad of more then they have , though they do not openly complain of their deficiencie at the present . Besides , there are many that will not complain , only to avoid the contempt which may be consequential to the want of right understanding : As we see divers who are very sensible of their poverty and exigencies , and privately bewail their wants , who yet set the best face on it to the world , because they will not be slighted and treated below themselves . 'T is upon this account , that it is natural to women to wear black patches , and to hide their other deformities by all the artifice humane invention can furnish them with . The other reason which the Author makes use of , seems at first sight to be more forcible to his purpose . For , pag. 4. he says , That Reason or right understanding is the only thing which makes us men , and distinguisheth us from Beasts ; and this he believes to be entire in every man . To which my answer peremptorily is this , That right understanding is not that which makes us men , as he affirms ; for we may be men without it ; and I believe no man will deny but that the stupid , the dull , nay the distracted are equally men with others . But to disperse those clouds of imaginations which may darken this question , we are to distinguish the cause and principle of this Rationation from the state or condition wherein a man ought to be when he is to execute his functions . He that hath his eys bound about with a cloth , can make no use of them till the cloth be taken away : In like manner he that hath good legs is not in a condition to walk if he be fetter'd , unless you take away the fetters . The principle then of this ratiocination , which the Philosophers call {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} , is that which distinctively makes us men , and in that I do confess that all men are equal ; but right understanding is not absolutely that principle , but is the state or condition wherein our understanding ought to be for to exercise its functions . Now for an interemptory conclusion to this point , I need say but this , That the state or condition before mentioned , which is the constitutive and distinctive difference between man and beast , hath no dependance on the understanding ▪ but on the disposition and temperament of the Body , whereof there being a great diversity , it will follow , that the Author , to prove an equal division of right understanding among men , should have built it upon this Paradox , That the disposition and temperament of all mens bodies is one and the same . Before I break open the other question , I shall beg the Authors favor to tell him , that though he had made it his design to ▪ bring Philosophy into disrepute as much as lay in his power , yet cannot he do it without commending it , and that more then he intended . For first of all , he confesses that by the assistance of it He hath discovered his own ignorance , that is to say , it hath been his Collyrium whereby he hath seen the difficulty which is in the acquisition of the knowledge of things . But there are many degrees of Ignorance . For the present it shall suffice us to observe ▪ that there is a kind of gross beastly ignorance , which Philosophy abhors ; and another kind which in respect of this may be said to be knowing , and such as wherein Philosophy many times leaves us . The first is in those who are utterly ignorant of the state of a Question ; the second is in those that know it well enough , but finding that many things may be brought both for , and against it , they are not convinc'd whether opinion to cleave to . As for example , to make a square to a circle , would be thought by those that are not acquainted with the Mathematicks , a very easie thing to do , and that a Carpenter or a Bricklayer would not stick at it ; but a good Mathematician will tell you he cannot doe it , nay haply will question whether it can be done at all . Secondly , the Author confesses that Philosophy affords us the means to speak of all things with probability . If it do so , then certainly it hinders us from advancing propositions that are ridiculous or impertinent . To which I may adde this , that as in consultation or deliberation , though we cannot be assured of the success of what we design , we ought not to hold our arms across , but put that in execution which seems most conformable to reason ; so in the speculative Sciences we must not always suffer our minds to be gravel'd in an indifferencie or aequilibrium as to all opinions like Scepticks , but embrace that which carries with it most probability . But what shall we say of the procedure of the Author in this case ? As soon as he had gone through the ordinary course of Philosophy in the Schools , because he found not the satisfaction he expected , he perswades himself , that there is nothing in all Philosophy which is not disputable , and by consequence not doubtful ; and thereupon quits the reading of all books of Philosophy , resolving to seek no other knowledge but what he could find in himself and the great volume of the world . But is not this resolution a little too precipitate ? I would gladly ask him , whether when he had finished his course of Philosophy , he had read all Aristotles works leisurely , and with that attention of mind which were requisite , and with the necessary helps for the understanding of them ? When he had done this , whether he had consulted Alexander , Themistius , Simplicius , Philoponus , and other Greek Philosophers , for their opinions concerning what he thought of most importance , to see whether they agreed among themselves , and with their great Master ? I am confident he will not affirm that he had done all this at that time . Besides that , I know these books are not so common among young Students , nay many times their Tutors and Professors read them not but upon the reputation of others . But let us put the case , that Aristotle and his disciples should never have done any thing but gull'd us , I doe not perceive how a man could thence infer that there is nothing certain in all Philosophy , before he had read Plato's works , were it only to see whether the Antiens had with just reason entitled him divine : but especially before he had decipher'd his Timaeus , to see if there were any thing more solid in that then in the works of Aristotle And when both Aristotle and Plato should have been deceived , had it been amiss , or was it not necessary to have sifted the Philosophy of Epicurus , as also that of the Stoicks , before the pronouncing of this severe sentence against all Philosophy ? Not to mention , that it had not been any crime to have turn'd over the writings of Hippocrates , to see on what princiciples of Philosophy he had built his Physicks . But to rip up the bottom of the question : If the Author had contented himself to say that there were but few things in Philosophy that were certain and indisputable , he would have had that advantage of ground of me , that I durst not have set upon him ; but since he flies so high as to declare absolutely and without any exception , that there is not any thing in all Philosophy which is not doubtful , I think there needs no great forces to encounter with him . I shall say nothing of the certainty and clearness of the Demonstrations of Geometry , because he seems not to reckon it as any part of Philosophy ; but as for Logick , he doth her the honor to make her one of the children , or at least the handmaid of Philosophy . When I seriously consider it , I cannot but wonder how he should , without any exception , say that there were nothing certain in Philosophy . For not to speak of the other parts of Logick , those very precepts which Aristotle gives us of Opposition , Conversion , and the Transposition of the three Figures of Syllogisms , and the manner how to reason in any of them , and of the Reduction of the Syllogisms of the second and third figures to the first ▪ all which are as firm and indisputable as any Demonstrations of Geometry , and so generally received , that no man hath hitherto call'd them into the least question : And to produce one conclusive proof hereof , let us see what the Author himself confesses pag. 28. of his Discourse , where he says , That Logick contains divers most true and good Precepts , and teaches us to speak with judgment of the things we are ignorant of . To pass from Logick to Moral Philosophy , which forasmuch as it may be treated of two manner of ways , the one Parainetick , the other Dogmatick , the former he honours with those elogies and commendations it deserves ; but for the latter , he taxes it with a deficiencie as to the teaching of the vertues , and lays it to his charge , that many times it bestows that fair name on what might more properly be termed Insensibility , Pride , Despair , or a Parricide . Wherein I confess I have no great quarrel with him , if we speak of the moral Philosophy of the Stoicks which indeed sometimes would make us too insensible , sometimes equals us to God , nay in a manner prefers us before him . But as for Aristotle , in the writings he hath left us of this part of Philosophy , he hath so excellently well describ'd the Vertues and Vices , and hath been so fortunate in it , that there are very few things to be carp'd at in him , unless it be this one grand omission , Not to have left any one word of mans duty towards God . As for his Politicks , it cannot be denied , but that the rules and maxims he gives are fallible , the nature of the thing being such as will not admit infallibility : yet shall I not stick to say , that he that shall find nothing in them that satisfies him , is a man of a very odd stomach . But it may be it is his Physicks that the Author particularly quarrels at . I must indeed confess that it is like a great Forrest , where there are so many cross paths , that it is no hard thing for a man to lose his way in them . Truth may be compar'd to those birds which build their nests on the tops of the highest rocks , such as are almost inaccessible by reason of their horrid precipices , and such as it is very hard , if not impossible to climbe up to . Or if you will have it , suppose Truth scattered and lost in a great Forrest , it may be presumed some Huntsmen may be so fortunate as to give her a start● but in their chase of her they must expect to meet with bushes and quicksets , which are so thick , that it is none of the easiest things to make way through them . It is the pleasure of God to keep Nature under a cloud undiscovered , the more to oblige us to humility by a sense and an acknowledgment of our ignorance . Yet all this suppos'd and granted , it is not to be thought that so many great and eminent personages , who made it their only business in their several ages to study and find out Nature , should have taken all that pains to no purpose , and after all their pursuit to have discovered nothing at all . And it is on the other side an injurious and dishonorable disesteem of reverend Antiquity , and an overweening opinion of our selves , to imagine that one of us now living , contracting all study into himself , and thence directing it to the great volume of the world , ( which yet must be acknowledg'd to have been equally open at all times and in all ages ) can without the least external assistance or advantage doe more then all others , though furthered and advanced by mutual helps and endeavours . Nor shall I stick to say , that the fairest stones of this our Authors new building , will be found to be such as he shall have reserved out of the rubbidge and ruines of Aristotles Physicks . Nor is it hard to make this appear , if by a pattern we may judge of the whole peece . For let a man but read his explication of the Motion of the Heart , which we have in the fift Part of this Discourse ; There he would maintain the moving of the Heart to proceed from the heat which is within it . Now this great point , which he conceives to be grounded upon the evidence of Reason , is borrowed from Aristotle . But that we may exempt so great and eminent a person from the indiscretion of holding any thing which is inconvenient or incoherent , I am perswaded that , however he may speak of the Philosophy taught in the Schools , as slightingly and disadvantageously as may be , he intended to assume no more then I am willing to grant him . But to come yet a little nearer , let it be granted that there is nothing but what is doubtful in Philosophy , yet the Author proves this assertion but very weakly . There is nothing , says he , in Philosophy which is not disputable , therefore nothing which is not doubtful . Do we not know that there are many who endeavour to perswade others to what they themselves believe not ? And there want not those who will dispute about what they nothing at all doubt of . To which I shall add thus much to make it overweight ; That to say that any thing is doubtful , because some men doubt of it , argues a not full understanding of the definition of doubtful . For as all that 's admitted into the creed and approbation of some certain men , is not for that reason esteemed probable , but only that which hath pass'd the approbation and allowance of the most learned , or greatest part of the wisest and most knowing men , or at least the most eminent among them . To the second Part. THat which we shall think fit to epitomise out of the second Part , amounts to thus much . There is not , sayes he , so much perfection in those works whereto divers have contributed their helps and endeavors , as in those wherein one particular man hath disposed of all things : As may be observ'd in t●ose edifices which have their designations and perfection from one particular Architect , as being commonly more regular and uniform then those wherein divers have endeavered to reedifie , who haply have been oblig'd to make use of old walls to such or such purpose , which had been built for some other different purposes . He consequently is of opinion , that he should more fortunately advance into Philosophy , if he should first rase out of his Creed all those opinions which he had received in the Schools , then if he should build on those old foundations . That being a private person , his design is not to reform the body of the Sciences , nor to offer any violence to the Method established in the Schools of the delivery ▪ and tradition of them , but only to reform his own thoughts . That in enquiring after a fit method for the advancement of his design , he hath found out that as to Logick , and the most part of its instructions , he knew no other use of them , then that they served only to explicate to another those things which one knows , or rather to discourse without judgment those things whereof we are ignorant , then to attain the knowledg of any thing not known before . And though it contain a many most true and most necessary instructions , yet there were so many other things intermingled which were hurtful or superfluous , that it was as difficult a matter to distinguish the one from the other , as to draw a Diana or Mercury out of an unhewen stone . So that in stead of the great and infinite number of Logical precepts , he contented himself with these four following . 1. Never to admit any thing for true , but upon evident discovery that it were so indeed . 2. To divide each of the difficulties that occurr'd , into as many parcels as could be , and as was requisite , the better to resolve them . 3. To begin with the most simple objects , and the most easie to be known , and so to proceed by little and little to the knowledge of such as were most opposite . 4. To make such exact and perfect calculations , as to be assured to have omitted nothing . It must indeed be acknowledged , that this design is high and noble ; and it is extremely to be wished , that one particular man had at first laid the foundations of Philosophy , and consequently built it up to its perfection . Nor can I but with the Author heartily wish , that some one man would undertake the reformation of Philosophy , whereof he having conceiv'd so noble and heroick a design , I wish him so much life , and that vigor of body and mind , as that he may see it accomplished . But in case he leave his work imperfect , can he expect any better handling from those that shall come after him , then he hath afforded those that have gone before him ? Is it not probable that som eminent wit , like his own , may even in his edifice find somewhat which his understanding should not admit for good contrivance , and consequently would not oblige himself to his designations , but after his example would build upon new foundations . But whereas he says , that being a private person , he doth not undertake the reformation of the Sciences , nor intends to invert the established Method of the Schools for the dispensation of them ; he should have remembred , that not only those who actually embroil a State into seditions and disorders are guilty of treason , but also those who by libellous writings calumniate the present government thereof . If therfore there be reason to blame any particular man that should undertake rashly to reform the Schools , he surely cannot be altogether exempt from censure , who shall , Medea-like , cut in peeces the Philosophy commonly and universally received in the Schools , and not propose any means to recompose it . But to come to an examination of the particular charge he hath against Logick , we must in every Art or Science distinguish the truth and certainty of its precepts from the use of them . He doth not condemn any of its precepts of falshood , nor indeed could have done with reason , but he censures the most part as superfluous and hurtful . If he had contented himself to have said that there were many superfluous , I should not have had much to say to the contrary ; for I acknowledg that Aristotle had sometimes reason to compare Logick to a feast of Crabs , where there is much shell , and little meat , but that little is both delicate and wholsom . But if this be admitted of Logick , all other Arts and Sciences will fall under the same lash . Those hardy dashes and circumvolutions , and the cadences of the Pen , wherewith Writing-masters do incircle the Copies they give to their Scholars , are of little or no use at all ; and I have heard say , that those who learn Academical Horsmanship are taught many tricks , which haply they will never have occasion to make use of in a battel ; yet both these have their several , though it may be insensible helps and advantages . By the same reason may Nature it ▪ self be taxed with superfluity , because men must sow , thrash , winnow and grind the grain ▪ before it can be made into bread for their nourishment . And after all this , neither the bread nor any thing else we eat is so clearly converted into nourishment , but that there must be some excrement● This doctrine should also reduce the houses of great men to a wonderful simplicity , if they should be indulged nothing which were superfluous , and were not of present use , nor should admit of more dishes of meat on their tables then were necessary for the pure satisfaction of those they have to entertain . But above all , I am somewhat amazed that the Author should say , that the Syllogisms and other instructions of Logick should serve us to no other purpose then to discourse without judgment of those things whereof we are ignorant . Certainly he cannot forget that Logick gives us this precept , That we should not admit as principles of a ratiocination , any Propositions which were not true , or at least probable . Now I cannot believe , that to discourse probably of a thing , is the same thing as to speak of it without judgment . If therefore one that hath read Logick , discourse without judgment of a thing whereof he is ignorant , the fault is not to be imputed to Logick , but to the Logician ; and 't is the same case as when a musty cask spoils good wine . Moreover , how can he deny but that the Syllogisms assist us in what we are to learn , and not only enable us to teach others what we already know ? Can we attain the Sciences without Reasoning , or can we reason without Syllogisms ? Those demonstrations of Geometry , by the means and aid whereof he hath learn'd so much , are they not Syllogisms ? But he will say , Nature hath taught us to reason : But it doth not thence follow , that the Precepts which Nature hath furnished us with for the direction and conduct of our reasoning , are superfluous and unprofitable . By this kind of reasoning , he shews us by his own example that we do not reason well . And therefore are we so much the more obliged to those wise men and Philosophers , who reflecting both on their own and other mens reasonings , have observed the faults which might happen in them , and have left us instructions to shun them . In the last place , it seems to me very strange , that he should say that Syllogisms should assist us rather in explicating to another what one knows , then to learn what one knows not ; for to explicate to another what one knows , is nothing else but to suppose it to another in such a manner as that he may learn it . But it being granted , that Syllogisms stand us in no stead but to explicate that to another which we know , it follows they are helpful to him that doth learn of us : But it may be rahter said , that as the same light serves me to shew something to another which I see my self , and serves him to perceive that which I shew him , so may it be said of Syllogisms . But can we believe he is serious with us , when he would only oblige us to four Precepts of Logick , seeming to esteem the rest as worth nothing ; since it will appear that these four precepts cannot be put in practice , but only by such as have learned for the most part all the other which Aristotle and his Interpreters have delivered ? I may with as much reason say , that for a man to approve himself to be a good and able Physitian , he shall need observe but these three precepts ; To expel diseases , abate the violence of their symptoms , and never undertake the cure of any incurable disease . But now to put these precepts in practice , it must first be enquired what are the causes of every disease whereto man is subject , as also what their symptoms are , by what remedies they are to be overcome , and by what means it may be known whether the Patient be desperate or no , which I take it is a business of longer breath . It is certain there is nothing so unworthy a Philosopher , as to be too credulous ; and therefore Epicharmus , with much reason , said , Nervos atque arcus sapientia esse , nihil temerè credere . Now there are two sorts of Propositions , whereof a man may arrive to a clear and distinct knowledge . Some are clear and evident in themselves , as being the first ; others have need of proof : As it is in bodies , some are perceiv'd by that light which they have in themselves , as the Sun and the Fire ; others , that they may be seen , have need of some exterior light , and such are all colour'd and illuminous bodies . The first Propositions , as they are but few in number in every Science , so they cause us no great trouble , but are acknowledged by all those that are arriv'd at discretion ▪ in which state being proposed to us by our masters , and we understanding only the sense of them , and considering it attentively , they force us to acknowledg them for true . The number of the Propositions of the other kind is infinite ; and though they depend of the first by certain concatenations which are most strong , nay , such as are impossible to be broken , yet the links of that chain whereby they are ty'd together , are in a manner imperceptible , unless it be to those who are very clear-sighted ; and the reasonings whereby we discover them are called Demonstrations . Whence it may be inferred , that that which makes the greatest difficulty in the Sciences , is to find out the demonstrations of this sort of Propositions , and to proceed methodically in the search of them : Whence it is to be inferr'd , that it must be known what Demonstration is , and how many sorts there are of it , and what are the qualities and conditions of their Principles . And this is it that Aristotle teaches us in his Analyt . posterior . For what concerns the Division he speaks of ; it is certainly a thing very necessary , to divide the matters which we would treat of into many words , that so we the more easily come to a clear understanding of what we are to enquire into . As we find there is a necessity of cutting our meat before we put it into our mouths , and besides of chewing it with our teeth , so to ease our stomachs , which otherwise would have the harder task to digest it . But it is a hard matter to divide well ; and for that reason Plato in his Phaedr ▪ said , that if he met with one that could divide well , he would follow his steps as those of some God ; {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} . The search of truth would therefore be so much the harder to one that hath not learn'd the art to divide ; for a thing must be divided into as many words as it may possibly , and the denumeration of the parts must be perfect . Otherwise it will be all one , as if at a table where there were much Fowl , they should intreat one to carve , who should understand so little in carving , as that by reason of his ignorance of the joynts , he should endeavour to cut athwart the bones . To the third Part. THe third part of the Authors discourse contains nothing but that Platform of Moral Philosophy which he hath framed to himself : which I do not pretend to examine , seeing he professes that he hath not set it forth but with a proviso ; for haply when he comes to his second or after-thoughts , or to the definitive sentence whether they shall stand or no , he will rase it down , not leaving one stone upon another , and afterwards build up another a new . And that this is not improbable , may be presumed out of his own words . For , sayes he , I should have thought my self guilty of a great fault against right understanding , if because then I approved any thing , I were also afterwards obliged to take it for good , when perhaps it ceased to be so , or that I had ceased to esteem it so . To the fourth Part. IN the fourth Part of this Discourse he entertains us with the first fruits of his Metaphysical meditations : And to the end we might be our own Judges , whether the foundations he hath laid be not strong enough , he discovers even the corner-stone of it . He sayes therefore , that he could not safely build any thing upon the testimony of the Senses . But because they sometimes deceive us , he supposes they deceive us always ; and because there are some men who mistake themselves in reasoning , that therefore he was obliged to reject all those reasons as false , which he had before received as demonstrations . And lastly , because that the same thoug his which we have waking may happen to us sleeping , and yet not any of them be true , he resolved to imagine that all those things which ever entred into his mind , were no more true then the illusions of his dreams . But a while after , reflecting on the judgment he had made that every thing is false , he observed that this truth , I think , therefore I am , was so firm and immoveable , that he might lay it down for the first Principle of his Philosophy . And this is the summary of the first part of this Part of his Discourse . According then to the Authors judgment , To appeal from the testimony of the senses , is to quit the quick sands and the quag ▪ mire , and to come to the rock and solid ground . But I cannot but say with Lucretius , that this is rather violare fidem primam , & convellere tota fundamenta , quibus nitatur vita salusque . The testimony of the Senses is the true and natural foundation of all Philosophy , and that in two manner of wayes . First , the Senses judge of all objects which are presented to them , and their judgments are registred among the records of Memory , where Reason makes a review of them , ( which the Schools call Induction ) by the way of universal propositions . Just as if there were no written Law in France , and that a Law-maker should turn over the Parlament-Rolls , and from the Acts and Ordinances which had been enacted at several times and upon several occasions , should extract certain laws , which being conformable to the common practice of the Courts of Justice , would not cause any trouble to the State in general , nor incommodate any particulars in the possession of their respective rights and priviledges . Secondly , The effects of all natural things being for the most part sensible , and the senses having taken cognisance of them , the Reason , without controlling the judgments made by the senses , besets it self to the search of their causes . For the proof of this assertion , we will content our selves with what the force of truth hath wrested from the Author himself ; who having forgoten his Hypothesis of the uncertainty of the judgment of the Senses , is strangely surpris'd : For in the last part of this Discourse he speaks of nothing so much as of those experiences which are necessary for the perfection of Philosophy , and professes that he hath need of an infinite number more then he hath , which he could not compass without the assistance of some other . And elswhere , he invites all those who profess any tenderness or affection to Vertue , to communicate unto him those which they have made . Now I humbly conceive these experiences are not reasonings , but sensitive observations . How came he to know that the heart hath motion within it self , if not by the senses ? And to what purpose doth he take so much pains to teach us to make spectacles for to assist us in the contemplation of the stars , if after all our star-gazing we may not give any credit to our senses ? To what hath been said , I dare presume to add thus much ; That to reject altogether the testimony of the Senses , is to be ungratefull and injurious to God and nature who have bestowed them on us , certainly out of a design and knowledge that they were necessary , and that we should find employment for them . For every sense hath its proper and peculiar object , whereof it is the sole and absolute Iudge without appeal . As for instance , it is only the Sight that can judge of colours , and reason in that judgment concurs not nor contributes any thing at all . In like manner , the Hearing only distinguishes the divers tones and accents of the voice , and the greatest wit in the world could never doe it by ever so many reasonings . But , sayes he , the Senses deceive us sometimes ; and to strengthen his Argument I will adde , That whosoever is once convinc'd of having borne false witness , may never again be admitted to bear any . To which it is easie to answer . For if they deceive us sometimes , they afterwards undeceive us again , and suffer us not to continue long in our error . They are not like the false witnesses who witingly and willingly speak against their consciences , but would always render a true testimony if they could , and they always can do it , when the question is of their proper objects ; for all that wherein one of our senses is deceived , is not its particular object . For there are some objects which are common to divers senses , as Quantity , Figure , Motion and Rest , Unity , Multitude , Continuity or Discontinuity . There are moreover some things which considered in themselves cannot move the Senses , which yet are sensible , by how much as they have a relation to those things , which of themselves and according to their proper nature operate on the Senses . I say therefore , that those things which operate not by election , but by that invincible inclination which they receive from Nature , and as they express it in the Schools , ex necessitate naturae , do always operate as strongly as they can , and they are by Natnre provided of those forces which shall be sufficient to make them attain the end whereto they aspire in operating . But it is most evident that our Senses do not operate by election or choice , but by that invincible inclination which Nature hath bestowed on them ; and consequently Nature having assigned to each of them its proper and peculiar object , whereof it should be alone able to discern , it is impossible but that they should judge thereof , if there happen not some hinderance or impediment in their operations . These hindrances are either internal or external : Inrernal I call the defaults and indispositions of the Organs ; the external can consist but in two things ; the one , when the object is at too great a distance , and that the organ which it should smite is out of its just reach , and that the object is not represented but as it were ttansiently , so that the sense hath not the leisure to discern it . The other is , when the space between the sense and the object is not well disposed ; as when we look through a coloured glass , or when the air is not clear enough . Whence it may be inferr'd , that it is impossible that our senses should deceive us in the discernment of their proper and particular objects , if their organs are well disposed , and that the objects are well and duly represented unto them , and lastly when the space is in the requisite condition . If therefore the eye when it is hurt doth not perfectly discern the colours , we must expect the judgment it shall make of them when it is well . If it cannot distinctly discern them by the light of a candle , or in the twilight , we must suspend our censure till we see how it will judge of them when it hath full day ▪ light . And if it be not able to discern the objects when they are at too far a distance , we must endeavour to bring them nearer to it . When therefore the sense is to judge of its proper object , it is the charge of the intellectual faculty to judge whether there want not any of the requisite conditions ; and if any of them be awanting , it ought to suspend its satisfaction until there be a concurrence of them altogether . The understanding therefore never pretends to any jurisdiction over the senses , unless it be that it enjoins them to repeat their judgments about their proper objects , which hinders not at all but that they are always the soveraign Iudges thereof : As when the King enjoins the Parlament to take a review of any business which before had past their votes , he doth not by that action take away from it the quality of a soveraign Court . Whereas he says , that because those things which we imagine being asleep are false , we can have no assurance but that those thoughts which we have when we are awake are also to be rejected as equally false , we shall examine it more fully anon . For the present we shall take into consideration , how the chief corner-stone of this Philosophy is laid . He says , that he hath at last observed this truth , I think , therefore I am , to be so firm , that it only deserved to be receiv'd for the first principle of his Philosophy . However I take no great pleasure to pnnctiliate and criticize about words , yet I cannot but take notice by the way , that it is not handsomly nor properly spoken to call this either a verity or principle . For there are certain truths which he himself formally distinguishes , making use of some for the demonstration of others . Therefore to speak properly , this proposition , I think , is a principle , and I am , is a proposition : I think , is the first principle ; and I am , is the conclusion which he thence infers . Yet can I not be assured that this proposition ▪ I think , may be made a first principle , according to the Author 's own doctrine , seeing all the force of the consequence depends on another principle mentioned afterward , that is to say , on this universal proposition , That for to think , there is a necessity to be . Methinks an excellent Metaphysitian , such as is the Author , should not have put it down nakedly for a first principle , for the truth of it doth not proceed from its own nature , or from the specifical difference of thinking , but generally every action whatsoever presupposes the existence of the Agent . He should therefore , in my judgment , have gone a little higher to the mother-truth ( as I may so call it ) and say , that to act , there is a necessity to be . Just as when we would clear the pretension of any mans succession , we ascend upwards , and examine whence he derives his right . Moreover the Reader may take notice , that in laying down the proposition , I think , for a first principle , he unawares founds his Philosophy upon the testimony of the Senses . For notwithstanding that to judge of the truth or falshood of a Proposition , it is necessary to understand well the terms whereof it consists , yet I would withall gladly ask him what he means when he sayes , I think ; and I am confident that he will not deny , but that the first knowledge which he hath had of the difference between me and thee ▪ hath proceeded from the Sense . Lastly , this way of reasoning , I think , therefore I am , cannot any way be acknowledg'd for a Demonstration ; because this Principle , I think , is not more clear and evident , then the conclusion which he draws from it ; for as my existence hath preceded my thinking , so the assurance which I have of my existence is upon the credit and testimony of my Senses , and that without any assistance of my Reason , and before I had made any reflection at all on my thoughts . But the Author being in this manner assured of his existence , he undertakes to shew wherein the nature and essence of man consists . Seeing says he , I can fain that I had no body at all , and that there were no world , and that there were no place wherein I was ; yet I cannot imagine I should be able to think , unless I were . And thence he would infer , that his thinking was the only means wherehy he was assured of his being ; and from thence , says he , I learned that MY SELF , that is to say , my Soul , whereby I am what I am , was a substance whose essence consists only in thinking , and which , as concerning its being , doth not depeud of any thing that is material . Nay , he advances yet farther , where he affirms that the Soul is more easily known then the Body . In this ratiocination methinks there are many things lie very open to censure . First he seems to Platonise , and to make the soul of a man to be the man , without alledging any thing for the proof thereof . If that be granted , we cannot call a man a rational creature , since the soul cannot be call'd a creature . By the same reason we may not say that a man is mortal , seeing the soul is immortal . But though sometimes the soul of a man be called the man , yet is it not properly spoken , but Synechdochically , which is a manner of speaking whereby we give the name of the whole to some part , especially to the more principal part . And it is in this sense that Aristotle in the 10 book of his Ethicks says , that the understanding of a man , {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} , is principally the man : {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} , sayes he , {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} . And if the Scripture in one place sayes , This day shalt thou be with me in paradice , it sayes in another , that God formed man of the dust of the earth , and that he shall return into the earth . For if in the former of these passages the denomination of man be given to the soul , as the more noble part , in the latter the name of man is attributed to the body , though it be the more ignoble part : And it is in this sense that we say that such a one is interr'd , meaning that his body is so . But this error were in some sort tolerable in some other person who should not make so severe a profession , not to acknowledge any thing upon the account of any mans authority , how great soever he may be , as the Author pretends to doe , though Plato had obtained that esteem and opinion of infallibility amongst the Ancients , that Cicero blush'd not to say , That he should not be asham'd to erre with Plato . But this assertion methinks is more strange , That the whole nature or essence of the Soul consists in thinking . If the essence of the Soul consisted altogether in thinking , it hath thence forward neither existence nor essence . Moreover , if thinking , which is the action of the soul , be not a thing different from its essence , the soul must be thought to have attained the highest degree of simplicity , which appertains not but to the highest intelligence , and by consequence we may say that Anima est actus purus . But granting that it were true that the whole essence of the soul consisted only in thinking , yet we may say that the proof which the Author brings for it is weak and insufficient ; for from this principle , That thinking is the only thing which assures us of the essence of the soul , it does not follow that the whole essence of the soul is nothing else but thinking , unless it must be also granted that I cannot assure my self of the existence of any thing but by that thing wherein consists its essence ; which is a proposition so remote from reason , that I believe the Author will not presume to maintain it . Moreover he lays down for a Principle a Proposition which I cannot by any means grant him , which is , that thinking is the only means whereby I can assure my self of the existence of my soul . I would gladly know of him whether these reasonings , I rejoice , I love , I hate , I fear , therefore I am , be not as firm and immoveable as that of his , I think , therefore I am ? For when I rejoice , or when I love , I am assur'd that I think : And these propositions , for to rejoice I must needs be , and to love I must needs be , are as certain as this , To think I must needs be . The second part of his doctrine of the essence of the soul , to wit , that it depends not on the body , nor on any other material thing , is true ; but the reason whereby he pretends to prove it , is not satisfactory . For from that supposition , that I can imagine that my soul is not clothed with any body , there doth not follow any other thing , but that it depends not of the body by any essential and absolutely necessary dependance . For there is another kind of dependance between natural things , which yet God by his omnipotence may dissolve ; such is the dependance of my life on the air which I breathe , on the earth which bears me up , as also of the other elements which concur to my composition . Now that which hath puzzled the Philosophers in this business , hath not been to know whether the soul of a man depends in such a manner on the body , that it is altogether impossible that it can subsist without it ; but to prove by demonstration clearly and evidently , that it can naturally subsist , and that in effect it doth subsist after its separation from the body . And here it was that the Author should have shewn whether he knew any thing more then others who have entangled themselves in that question . Nay further , when I should have granted him that the essence of the soul were nothing but to think , the controversie were not thereby decided , because our thoughts ordinarily depend on the body ; in as much as we cannot think on any thing , if the imagination , which is fasten'd to the organ of the Body , do not represent to the understanding the image of some material thing , as we shall prove anon . The last part of his discourse of the essence of the soul hath this assertion ; That the soul is more easily known and discovered then the body : A Paradox which he offers not to prove by any reason at all . If all what is above spoken were granted him , yet could he not from thence draw this conclusion , but the contrary rather , that is , that men have but a very confused knowledge of their bodies , even before they have once considered whether they have any souls or no . And as to the distinct and perfect knowledge of the soul , I do not think the Author will presume to boast he hath attain'd it . In the next place he makes it his task to find out and determine that which is requisite in a Proposition to make it true and infallible , and gives us this rule , That those things which we conceive the most clearly and most distinctly are all of them true . The clear and distinct knowledge which we can have of a Proposition , consists in two points . The first is , when we conceive clearly and distinctly the parts whereof it is composed . The second , when we clearly perceive their alliance and union , or their antipathy and incompatibility . If the Author speak of the former manner of conceiving , I shall presume to declare his rule utterly false ; for we can as well , and as clearly conceive the parts of a Proposition that is false , as those of one that is true . As for example , I have a clear and distinct knowledge of the parts of this Proposition , though it be a false ; Latus & diameter Quadrati sunt commensurabilia . But if his meaning be of the second manner of conceiving and knowing , his rule signifies no more then this , viz. That those Propositions which we conceive clearly and distinctly to be true , are indeed and really true , whereof never any man yet doubted . But it were only to fight with shadows to bestow any further examination on this rule of the Authors , since he himself confesses elswhere , That there is great difficulty to discern certainly those Propositions which we conceivc most clearly and distinctly . For every man that is fully convinced that such a proposition is true , how false soever it may be , will say that he conceives it clearly and distinctly in one of these two manners . But the Author proceeds , and entertains us with an essay of his Philosophy concerning the nature of God : wherein I must ingenuously confess I have found no more satisfaction then in what he hath delivered of the nature of man . And here he advances this Proposition , making it his business to find out whence he had learned to think anything more perfect then himself ; and at last he evidently discovers , that it must have proceeded from some nature that were effectually more perfect then his own , whereof the Idea should be infus'd into him ; and in a word , that that Nature can be no other then God , because , saith he , that I could not entertain within my self the Idaea of a Being more perfect then my own , and that that which is more perfect cannot proceed from that which is less perfect . Now from hence in my opinion it should rather have been inferr'd , that the contemplation of things which were less perfect then himself , should have given him occasion to examine whether there were not some nature more perfect then his own . For considering that the Plants are more perfect then inanimate creatures , and among animals Dogs and Horses are more perfect then Shelfish , and Men arrive to a higher degree of perfection then all the other creatures ; he might by the consideration of such a dependence have been induced to consider and examine whether there were not yet some other nature more perfect then this rational nature of ours : And to bring him to this , he needed but only have compared himself with the other creatures . For , I conceive my self to know some things , and I doubt of many others , nay there are an infinite number of things whereof I am utterly ignorant . There are others in the world who know less then I do , and there are those also who know much more ; but there is not any man who doubts not of somewhat . Now this consideration I should think sufficient to excite any rational soul to examine whether there were not some intelligent nature altogether exempt from all error , doubt and ignorance , and that for to advance into such an examination , there should be no need that God should infuse into me the Idaea of any thing more perfect then my self , nor should I have wanted any more particular assistance of God in this , no more then in any other ratiocination . For as it is as natural to us to lift up our eyes to heaven to contemplate the sun and moon , as to look down upon the earth ; in the same manner , it is as natural for a man to endeavour to find out the most perfect nature in the universe , as to entertain his mind with things below ; just as when we see a river , it is as natural for us to seek out the source from whence it springs , as the place where it disembogues it self . But it being admitted that the Proposition were true , yet is the proof of it weak and insufficient : for though it be true , that a thing which is more perfect cannot depend of a thing which is less perfect , yet it is not equally true that the Idaea of a nature more perfect then mine may not depend on mine ; for the Idaea which I have of a thing which is more perfect then my self , is not more perfect then I . All the Idaea's whereof my mind is susceptible , whencesoever they proceed , are but accidents are representations , and therefore cannot come into the ballance , as to perfection , with the rational soul , which is a substance . Moreover , if to know God , it be necessary that he must have infused into us some Idaea of his nature , I demand whether he have bestowed that Idaea on all , or only on some in partieular ? If he have bestow'd it equally on all , how comes it to pass that so many have such extravagant thoughts of God , and so disproportionable to his nature ? If this indulgence of heaven reaches but some in particular , it makes nothing to the present purpose , it being here a question of Philosophy , and not of visions , inspirations , revelations , or any other such lights . But how then shall we satisfie or convince the Author in this point ? Certainly it cannot be , but he well understands the doctrine of the Schools touching the necessity which the Understanding hath of the senses and the imagination , in all things whereof it undertakes the consideration . Or is it that he dissembles it , out of the aversion which he bears to that more then any other Tenet of the Schools ; and does as the French do , who can never be perswaded that the plot of a Play is well laid , if a Spaniard be not introduc'd in some extravagant and ridiculous posture ? Hower it may be , I doubt not to make it appear that he hath not had reason to speak so disadvantageously ; nay , and what is more , that all the Idaea's which we have of the nature of God , do but too much betray and discover the imperfection of the nature whence they proceed ; so far are we from having any cause to affirm that God should infuse them into us . Our Saviour cals God Creator , Preserver , Lord , Judge , Revenger , Rewarder , &c. But all those attributes do not discover what he is in himself , but only denote him such as he expresses himself towards us , and consequently make no representation of his essence , seeing he may be without us . We call him most good , most wise , almighty , and in like manner attribute to him all the other perfections , which are not in us but imperfectly : but in so doing we imploy divers thoughts to represent , that all these in him are but one ; and further to rectifie all these Idaea's and notions , we must adde , that he is all these incomprehensibly . So that the most proper notions we can have of him are negative , as that he is invisible , incomprehensible , infinite , incorruptible : All which give us to understand what he is not , but acquaint us not what he is . For as concerning the affirmative notions we have of him , a day will come when we shall find how gross and rustick they were , and shall do as Tityrus in Virgil , who when he came to see Rome , condemned all the Idaea's which he had conceived of it before , saying , Urbem quam dicunt Romam , Melibaee , putavi Stultus ego huic nostrae similem , &c. As for the rest of his ratiocinations concerning God , they seem to me good and solid : but I must withall tell him , he is not the first Author of them , but Scotus and most Authors who have written of Metaphysicks have made use of them . If he have borrowed them of others , he is justly censureable , since he affirms that he found nothing that was firm and certain in Philosophy . If he have been ignorant that any others before him had made use of them , he must needs acknowledg that he hath been guilty of some precipitation in condemning the writings of the Philosophers without any previous perusal of them . In the fifth Section , where he speaks of Geometrical truths , I have not observed any thing remarkable ; unless it be , that in speaking of a Sphere , he hath unawares let slip this , That all the parts are equally distant from the centre . In the sixth Section , he says that the reason why there are so many who perswade themselves that there is much difficulty to know God and the Soul , is because they are so accustomed never to consider any thing but through the imagination , that they conclude that whatsoever is not imaginable , is not intelligible : Which is manifest , says he , in that the Philosophers themselves hold , That nothing enters into the Understanding , which before had not pass'd through the Sense . Where it is to be observed , the Idaea's of God and the Soul have never been admitted . To which he adds ▪ That those who would make use of their imagination to comprehend them , are of the same opinion . Although it be on all sides confess'd that the soul of man is immortal , yet in regard it is , in such a manner as it is , joyned to the body , the soveraign faculty thereof , which we call the intellect or the understanding , cannot , in its operations , be without some dependance on the senses & the imagination . And that is it which hath given occasion to the Philosophers to say , that there is nothing in the understanding , which hath not before been in the sense ; and that the understanding doth not know nor comprehend any thing without the assistance of the imagination . As concerning the former of these Maxims , I could wish that those whose authority first brought it into reputation , had bethought themselves of some other manner of expression , and that they had contented themselves to have said with Aristotle , that he which had no sense could never comprehend any thing . But the interpretation which they give of it is indubitably true . Now in my judgment there is nothing less becoming a Philosopher , then to be too nice and critical about words , when it is fully agreed about the things themselves . The authors therefore of this Maxim , That there is nothing in the understanding , &c. did not mean thereby , that there is nothing intelligible but what is sensible , but hold forth two things for us to observe . The first is , that the understanding cannot think of any thing , unless somewhat have before smitten the senses ; and consequently , that the first thoughts of the understanding have for their object something that is sensible . For the understanding , before it have conceived any thing , being of it self indifferent as to all sorts of objects , it cannot be determined to one object rather then to another , but by the mediation of the senses . The second thing is , that the notions which we have of sensible things do produce in us others , being as it were the seed which is cast into the ground , nay leads us to the knowledg of immaterial things which are not under the reach of our senses . And so by consequence , all the Notions and Idaea's which the Understanding can have of the nature of God and the soul , and all other things which fall not under our senses , have had their conception of these former , after the same manner as the Conclusions are said to be in their principles , or a great tree with its fruit and its leaves may be said to be contained in a kernel . Now the understanding multiplies its first discoveries two manner of ways , that is to say , by Abstraction , as when from the notion of Individuals , which are material and sensible , it advances to the occult causes of things ; and when in Geometry , from a small number of principles it draws so many admirable conclusions . As concerning the second Maxim , it is capable of two interpretations . The first is , that nothing is intelligible but what is imaginable ; or , that the understanding cannot conceive any thing , whereof the imagination doth not furnish it with a representation . The second is , that so often and whensoever the understanding is busied about any thing , the imagination also acts its part by presenting it with the image of the same thing or some other . And this sense , and not the other , is held by the Schools of this opinion . Now this sense may yet be divided into two ; the first is , that the imaginative faculty always accompanies the Understanding , as a Dog follows his Master every where , though he be not every foot called to that duty , nay sometimes whether the Master will or no , so far is it from that there should be a necessity . And that is it which Philoponus sayes ; {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} . The other is , that the understanding cannot comprehend any thing without the assistance of the imagination . Now here we are to make a difference between the state of the Understanding while it is as it were in its apprentiship , and its state of perfection : For the Peripateticks hold , that to the learning of any thing , the Understanding stands in need of the Imagination . But some of them have been of opinion , that the Understanding may arrive to such a degree of perfection , that it may dispence with this assistance of the Imagination . Like as the scaffolds are necessary , while the walls of an edifice are a raising ; but those being once perfected , there is not any further need of them , nay they hinder the outward appearance of the walls : Or as young swimmers make use of bladders for some while , whereof they afterwards slight the assistance . By this time it may be easily discovered whether the Author have dealt justly with the Schoolmen in this particular . For if there are some people who understand not any elevation of their spirits above sensible things , and who believe that that wch is not imaginable , is consequently not intelligible ; the Schools reprove them as much as may be ; and the manner how it is understood , that whatsoever enters into the understanding , hath before been in the senses , cannot be any more civilly called into doubt . As to the objection which he proposes in the last place , where he says , that to make use of our imagination to comprehend immaterial things , were as if to hear sounds we should make use of our eyes , is , without any great difficulty avoided : for who doth not see the disparity that is between these things ? Of the outward senses , some have not been made to exercise the functions of the others , and their proper and peculiar objects are different ; so that what is discerned by any one , falls not under the discernment of another . But the imagination hath been bestow'd on man for the service of the Understanding ; and though the imagination cannot advance to whatever is intelligible , yet the understanding judges of whatever is imaginable . Now this proposition , That the imagination assists us in the comprehension of immaterial things , may be interpreted two manner of ways ; whereof the one is true , the other false . For , to see my self , I make use of my eyes , not of a looking-glass , yet I see my self in the glass , and without it I cannot behold my self . In like manner , for to comprehend immaterial things , I make use of my understanding and of my imagination too , but in divers manners ; for 't is by the help of my understanding th at comprehend them , and not by the imagination : but my understanding would not be able to comprehend them without the assistance of my imagination , nay stands me in no stead , if the imagination should not represent to the understanding standing the Idaea's of material things . For when I cast my eys on the Picture of the King of Sweden , which represents to me no more then the lineaments of his face , my mind goes beyond that , and entertains it self with his generous and heroick actions . I see no more in a book but figures , letters and characters ; but my mind contents not it self with that , but is carried to the consideration of the words and things which those letters are designed to signifie . In like manner , when I read the fables of Aesop , I do not acquiesce in the literal sense , as children use to do , but I thence make moral inferences . Why therefore should we say that the representation of a material thing presented to the understanding by the imagination , may not be helpful to it , to make it understand an immaterial thing ? From what hath been said it may be easily gathered what is the true and natural cause why immaterial things are not so easily known as material . For , the understanding not being able to comprehend any thing without the imagination , and the representations wherewith it constantly furnishes the understanding being but the images of material things , it follows that it is more easie to comprehend material things then immaterial : just as when one proposes a riddle , the explication is difficult , but the literal sense is easily understood . In the seventh Section he continues to discredit the testimony of our senses , and calls the assurance they give us of the existence of our bodies , a moral assurance . A moral assurance is that which is grounded upon moral reasons , or such as a man must content himself withal in moral matters , although those reasons are not receivable in Physick . Now I think I may say , without incurring the censure of an unreasonable man , That the testimony of our senses , when our reason doth not any ways contradict it , is more satisfactory then a hundred moral reasons , and is receivable in Physick ; nay , which is more , is the foundation thereof , as we have shewed before . As for example , I am obliged to believe what a many persons of credit ( who have no design to surprise or deceive me ) do unanimously affirm they have seen ; this is to me a moral assurance that such a thing is true ; but I should be more indubitably assured , if I had seen the same thing with my own eyes . In like manner , because I have not known nor heard of any dishonest actions in such a man whom I have long conversed with , I have a moral assurance that he is an honest man : but the assurance that I have that he is crooked-nos'd , or that he is of a red complexion , is without comparison greater , and cannot well be called moral . But , says the Author , the senses do not give us a metaphysical assurance of things . Now there is a threefold assurance . The moral assurance is the least considerable in things , and that is when we cannot contradict a thing without some injury done to good manners , although we know well enough that it is possible the thing may be otherwise . The greatest is that which the Author cals metaphysical , which also may be called mathematical . There is yet another which we may call physical , and that is , when we know that a thing must absolutely be so or so , because it is impossible it should be otherwise then we affirm it to be , that is to say , when we know that according to the course of nature , and without the intervention of a miracle , the thing cannot be otherwise . As I am assur'd , if I put my hand into the fire , and continue it there some while , it will be burned : And that the Sun never goes backward , nor ever stands still . But to proceed , after he had thus invalidated the testimony of our senses , and made the assurance which we have of what they dictate to us very weak and uncertain , he hath observed that a man may imagine being asleep , that he hath another manner of body , and that he sees other kinds of stars , though there be no such thing . And in consequence of this he asserts , That the greatest wits that ever have been in the world could not give any rational account whence men came to know , that the thoughts which we are entertain'd with being asleep , are more false then our others , seeing that oftentimes they are as lively and express'd as the others , unless it be in presupposing the existence of God . But we see what he means by this question , namely , that the solution of it should depend upon this rule , viz. That those things which we most clearly and distinctly know , are all true . Which Rule yet he confesses is not infallible out of any reason ; but because that those idaea's and notions , inasmuch as they are clear and distinct , proceed from God , who is all wisdom and all perfection ; and when there remains in them somewhat of obscurity or confusion , they proceed from us , because we are not arrived to such a degree of perfection : And so consequently , by how much they are more clear , by so much are they the more true ; and if there be any falshood , it must be onely said of those notions which have somwhat of obscurity or confusion . Having therefore thus proved the Rule , he answers the Question in this manner . Whether we sleep , or whether we wake , we ought not to suffer our selves to be perswaded to any thing but by the evidence of our own Reason , and not of our imagination or our senses . And because our ratiocinations are not alwayes so evident and perfect while we sleep as they are while we wake , ( although somtimes our imaginations may be equally , if not more lively and effective ) if there be any thing of Truth to be expected in our thoughts , it must be found in those which we have when we are waking , rather then in our dreams . In the first place , the Author must pardon me if I deny him this consequence , viz. That because the imaginations which we have when we sleep are false , therefore we may not be fully assured of what our senses dictate to us when we are awake . For I shall presently take occasion to shew that there is no proportion or similitude between these two things . Secondly , it is true , and well advised , that we should not suffer our selves to be perswaded by our imagination , if it be not it self conformable to Reason , or the testimony of our Senses . But seeing all that is in us proceeds from God , our imaginations as well as our thoughts ; if the thoughts of our understanding are true so far as they are clear and distinct , wherefore is it that our imaginations may not by the same reason be all true , when they are lively , affective and distinct ? Thirdly , where he sayes , That our ratiocinations are never so clear and perfect while we are sleeping , as when we are waking ; he speaks too generally , for it happens sometimes that in our sleep we make most excellent ratiocinations . Lastly , I conceive it is not enough to say , that in the time of our sleep our ratiocinations arrive not to that evidence and perfection which they may come to when we are awake ; but the reason thereof should have been assigned . For it may seem that in the time of sleep the rational soul hath a greater and freer enjoyment of her self , and , as being so much the less diverted by exterior objects , she ought the better to acquit herself of her noblest function . But to treat this matter a little more tenderly , and to penetrate to the bottom , here are three Questions so linked together , that he that answers one of them , answers all . 1. Why the imaginations which we have when we are asleep , are false rather then those we have awake ? 2. Why our imaginations , whether we sleep or wake , are more likely to be false then the judgment of our senses ? 3. Why our ratiocinations are neither so evident nor so perfect in the time of our sleep , as in the time of ou● waking ? I shall endeavour to answer these questions upon other ●y●otheses then those of the Author , that is , without medling with the existence of God , nor with his nature ; submitting my self to the Learned , who may judge whether I have hit the mark or no . I say then , that our imaginations are rather false when we sleep , then when we wake : because in the time of sleep , our imagination strays up and down without any thing to guide or conduct it . But when we are awake , our Senses and our Reason hinder it from being extravagant , and either keep it from wandring , or reduce it when it hath . For we have imaginations of two sorts : some are voluntary , others have no dependance at all on our will , but on some other natural causes , which are yet naturally in our power . Which causes may be reduced principally to three kinds , and they are 1. The objects which smite our senses 2. The passions of our souls , and 3. Certain dispositions of our bodies . The voluntary imaginations are very frequent to us when we are awake : as when an Architect imagines within himself the Idaea of an edifice for to imitate it , or when a Painter imagines some chimaera or other fiction to make a picture of pleasure , or when we apply our imaginative faculty to some wholsom idaea's , such as may assist us in the understanding of any thing , whereof we have proposed to our selves the contemplation But in our sleep , we have no voluntary imaginations ; for though some of our dreams please us , and others displease us and afflict us , we can neither invite the one , nor avoid the other . As concerning the imaginations which are not in our power , according to the natural order of things , in the time of our waking , they are but attendants and dependants on our senses . But sometimes the idaea's of certain things which are absent , that have rais'd strong passions in our minds , cast themselves in the way , and do in such a manner possess and divert the imaginative faculty , that we perceive not what is before our eyes , nor hear the sounds which smite our ears . And in that posture , our imaginations , though we are awake , are in a manner dreams . In the same manner , the indispositions of our bodies do work in us sometimes very strange imaginations , as it daily appears in Phrenetick persons , and such as are hypocondriacal . Now these disorders and irregularities happening while we wake , fall not out very often , nor to all persons . But while we sleep , all our imaginations are nothing else but illusions , as when false idaea's are represented to the imaginative faculty , that is to say , the idaea's of things that are not , or in another manner then they are , or some other circumstances : As if a man that is in love should in his sleep imagine that he saw his Mistress , such as she is indeed ; but with this false circumstance , that she lay close by him , there being no such thing . In like manner , when in sleeping we imagine and dream of somewhat that was past the day before , or somewhat that shall happen the day after , 't is but an illusion , because we do not imagine the thing as past , but as if it were present , and in effect before our senses . As to the second Question , I say that our imaginations are more likely to deceive us then our senses , because that those things which smite our senses must be truly real and exist ; but they are but things in picture , as it were , which smite our imaginative faculty , when it operates alone and without the senses ; for external things cannot move the imaginative faculty but by the interposition of the senses . From hence it may be inferr'd , That when the Senses are at rest , the imagination must necessarily be at rest too , or it must contemplate those images which had at other times been represented to it by the senses , those images having remain'd imprinted in the memory , though perhaps the things themselves which they represent have ceas'd to be , or at least are absent or far distant from the sense . There is further this difference between the imaginative faculty and the senses , that the senses cannot change any thing in their object , nor in their operation . But when we are awake , and that we would beset our selves to contemplation , the imagination disposes and disciplines the images as we will our selves ; but when we are asleep , they are alwayes represented in the same manner , and in the same order as they had pass'd by the senses ; but most commonly without order , inconsequently , and many times making monstrous and ridiculous figures , as when the image of a Goat is represented with the head of a Lion . It is evident therefore , that however our imaginations may be lively and affective , we never ought to suffer our selves to be perswaded by them , but in as much as they keep harmony with our senses and with our reason ; and if they do so , it is not a perswasion of our imaginations , but of our senses and our reason . Nor doth it avail any thing against us , to say , That the imaginative faculty is of greater excellence then the senses ; for its excellence doth not consist in the truth of what it represents , but in the perfection of the Representation ; as it is the excellence of a Painter , not to represent any thing in a picture but what is truly and really so , but to represent any thing to the life that he hath a mind to represent . In like manner hath Nature bestow'd the imaginative faculty on man , not for to discern what is , or what is not , nor to judge of what is possible or impossible , but to be serviceable and subject to the Understanding upon the default of the Senses , which is when it represents unto it the images of things past or absent , or abstracted from our senses . From what hath been said it is easie to answer the third Question . For it being once granted , that the Understanding cannot work without the aid and assistance of the Imagination ; and that all the imaginations which we have when we are asleep , are false either in their substance , or at least in some circumstance , they are not so fit to be the foundations of good ratiocinations , the subsequent imaginations having no alliance , nor holding correspondence with the precedent , hinder the understanding to finish its work , and before it hath ended one , cause it to begin another . All that now lies on my hands to examine , is what the Author treats us with in the eighth Section , where he would prove that we should never suffer our selves to be perswaded by the evidence of our senses , no more then of our lively and affective imaginations . Our senses , sayes he , deceive often enough , though we be not asleep ; as when to those that have the yellow jaundies all things seem yellow ; and though we see the Sun very clearly , we ought not thence to judge that he is no bigger then it seems to us . To ruine the reputation of the Senses , he should have shewn that they are sometimes deceiv'd in judging of their proper objects , the organs being sound and in their natural state and condition , the objects being well and duly represented unto them , and the space between well dispos'd , according to these three requisites I mentioned before : But that he doth not so much as offer or pretend to do . Those , says he , who have the Yellow jaundies see all things yellow ; and consequently the sight is deceiv'd in discerning colours , which are its proper objects . It is indeed a proverb of no small standing , that the Yellow jaundies causeth all things to appear yellow to them that have it ; but ordinarily the reason of it is , because Melancholy , which causes that the Jaundies diffusing it self through all the skin , nay even through the white of the eyes , doth fasten on the horny tunicle . But let it be granted that this common saying is always true , I presume the Author will grant me that the eye is not then in its natural condition . But there is a great deal more to be said . I deny that in the case proposed , the eye is deceiv'd in the discerning of colours , for in effect it sees nothing but what is yellow ; it is only deceiv'd in not discerning where the yellow is which it sees . For it is the horny tunicle , which naturally not being of any colour , but is absolutely diaphanous and dy'd with the Melancholy , that causes the objects to seem yellow ; as when we look through a yellow glass , everything seems yellow , and if the glass be red , all things will appear red . In like manner when a web begins to form it self in the eye , we seem to see little flies in the air , yet they are nothing but thin and obscure vapors , or clouds which are raised between the horny tunicle and the chrystalline humor . And if sometimes we conceive that we see somethings which are not at all , as it happens to frantick persons , it is not the sight which deceives us , but the imagination . As concerning what he says of the greatness of the Sun and other celestial bodies , what matters it if the sight be deceived therein , seeing the celestial bodies are not at the distance requisite to be seen distinctly . But above all , methinks it is a strange assertion which the Author advances , when he sayes that the Sun is most clearly seen : For , his light is so great , that it dazles and so overcomes our sight , that we can see it but very confusedly and imperfectly . Too much light is no less injurious to the sight then too little ; and generally the proper objects of every sense being excessive in the highest degree , is insupportable to the organ , and does violence to the temperament , whereby it is what it is . To conclude , I would gladly ask the Author whether he hath composd this Discourse awake or asleep ? If he have done it asleep , I would entreat him to review itbeing awake , because it is not reasonable that we should suffer our selves to be perswaded to credit his dreams . If he have done it awake , how knows he that he was then awake ? It is indeed true , that our Reason dictates to us that we are awake , when we do effectually see and hear , and have all our senses open and attentive to the exterior objects : But that he then saw and heard , and felt actually , and not only by imagination , he could not any wayes be assured but by the testimony of the common Sense , which judges whether the particular Senses do their duty or no , as being their centre and mark . If he unravel this skain , he will very much undeceive me , — Et erit mihi magnus Apollo . FINIS . Notes, typically marginal, from the original text Notes for div A92327e-1030 * Pag. 9. according to the English Translation , printed 1649.